Rouche
6th Sep 2010, 09:39
Bus_boy* posted 22-07-2001 14:32 HKG
You are all probably aware that, amongst other things, I have been
involved closely with the development of the legal case concerning
Roster Practices (HCMP 1679 of 99) and also had a minor role during
the 1999 negotiations. I also tried my hand at roster negotiations for
while.
This week a document entitled 'Roster Practices 2001' has been issued.
Our Association is strongly urging that we reject this document.
As we appear to be at a fairly critical time I thought it appropriate to write
to you all, my friends, with a few personal thoughts and beliefs.
The legal case we are running at the moment, HCMP 1679, is both
technical and complex. Our counsel, Mr Cran, whom I have developed
great respect for, was able to quickly come to grips with the issues and
thinks a favourable outcome is probable on some if not all points. Little
is guaranteed in law though, and this case cannot possibly be activated
in sufficient time to head off RP2001. No saviours there, sorry.
CoS 99 Clause 22 was very clearly written by John Warham and myself
to ensure that an event such as RP 2001 could not happen. You have
my personal assurance that Cathay Pacific management in the form of
the DFO and Nick Rhodes were completely aware and comfortable with
the fact that this clause would prevent any change to RPs until and
unless one of the two specified criteria were met. This clause was
discussed in excruciating detail and there can be no possibility of
misunderstanding. There may be an avenue for relief in this area and I
am sure it will be investigated, but as I said little is guaranteed in law. I
believe our President has understated the risk to you in not rejecting
RP2001 though. My opinion is that you would most certainly fatally
compromise HCMP 1679 and open up the very real likelihood of
subsequent changes to thresholds, multipliers, crewing levels, 5/4/3 etc.
if you do not reject RP2001.
I believe that if we do reject RP 2001 Cathay Pacific management's next
action will be to repudiate the contract. That is, they will issue a new
contract which entitles them to change Roster Practices and you will
have the option to accept or leave, according to them. According to me
it is accept or fight. This is not the prospect that any of us would want,
but I don't imagine too many people had a great time at Gallipoli. I am
convinced that ultimately, and probably soon, we are all going to have to
put our job on the line to defend the profession, our colleagues and our
contract.
If we don't do that, it is going to get very bad around here. Very bad
includes the real prospect of 90+ hours of mainly three man long haul,
or 80+ hours beating around the region. Of that I am certain.
If we do stand up shoulder to shoulder and say 'no', I think it will be OK.
I could be wrong, often am, but based on eight years in the middle of
this, that is what I think. I wont pretend to know exactly how things will
pan out, but I think it will be OK. I can also guarantee you that the
proposals put forward by your negotiators were quite in line with
'industry practice' and so, by inference, were quite affordable and
sensible for the Company. Clearly, RP 2001 is more affordable, but is
that the point. RP 2003 will no doubt be even more affordable.
Our current system is fatally flawed and if CX had accepted this fact
when I first told them in 95 we may not be in this mess. They had
another opportunity to do a very favourable deal in 99, but weren't
interested. IMHO it has become essential for them to have greater
flexibility with overtime than the current system provides. I don't expect
that the option to remain with the 700 hours cap will be long lived.
The DFO has told a big fib in his cover letter when he says 'the
multipliers have been set at such a level that it would be more
expensive for the Company to routinely work a crew member into
overtime than to employ an additional crew member.' In fact this quote is
a direct lift from a paper I wrote that in 1997 which concluded that the
minimum acceptable multiplier was 1.75. I know there does not appear
to be much difference between 1.5 and 1.75, but there is.
When you concede to the employer the right to work you into overtime,
the multipliers must be sufficiently punitive to ensure that the Cost of
Employment of an additional Officer is exceeded comfortably at the
number of hours you are prepared to work for extended periods in a
surge situation. Data passed to me by Nick Rhodes and KY in 99 shows
that for CX the C of E varies depending on base area etc, but is as high
as 1.92 x Salary in the numerically significant HKG based B Scale
Group. To make it simple, if you agree to RP 2001 and you fly long haul,
I expect you will be flying 95 hours per month. That is the point at which
they will start to look at more pilots as being a cheaper option (you need
to consider training and recruiting costs as well; it gets a bit complex).
You may make a bit of money, but is 95 hours sensible. You will have
no control over that if they subsequently write 5/4/3 out, but they
wouldn't do that would they? I should tell you that Col Pearce lectured
your Committee in 1995 for two hours about how restrictive 5/4/3 is.
He's right and they would love to get rid of it.
So, in summary, I am of the opinion that rejection of RP 2001 is the only
sensible course. I strongly support the Committees guidance on this
matter. Sorry about the long diatribe, but this is fairly important and I
thought you may appreciate some insights. I have no problem with you
forwarding this information to trusted friends who I may not be close
friends with.
Regards
Murray
You are all probably aware that, amongst other things, I have been
involved closely with the development of the legal case concerning
Roster Practices (HCMP 1679 of 99) and also had a minor role during
the 1999 negotiations. I also tried my hand at roster negotiations for
while.
This week a document entitled 'Roster Practices 2001' has been issued.
Our Association is strongly urging that we reject this document.
As we appear to be at a fairly critical time I thought it appropriate to write
to you all, my friends, with a few personal thoughts and beliefs.
The legal case we are running at the moment, HCMP 1679, is both
technical and complex. Our counsel, Mr Cran, whom I have developed
great respect for, was able to quickly come to grips with the issues and
thinks a favourable outcome is probable on some if not all points. Little
is guaranteed in law though, and this case cannot possibly be activated
in sufficient time to head off RP2001. No saviours there, sorry.
CoS 99 Clause 22 was very clearly written by John Warham and myself
to ensure that an event such as RP 2001 could not happen. You have
my personal assurance that Cathay Pacific management in the form of
the DFO and Nick Rhodes were completely aware and comfortable with
the fact that this clause would prevent any change to RPs until and
unless one of the two specified criteria were met. This clause was
discussed in excruciating detail and there can be no possibility of
misunderstanding. There may be an avenue for relief in this area and I
am sure it will be investigated, but as I said little is guaranteed in law. I
believe our President has understated the risk to you in not rejecting
RP2001 though. My opinion is that you would most certainly fatally
compromise HCMP 1679 and open up the very real likelihood of
subsequent changes to thresholds, multipliers, crewing levels, 5/4/3 etc.
if you do not reject RP2001.
I believe that if we do reject RP 2001 Cathay Pacific management's next
action will be to repudiate the contract. That is, they will issue a new
contract which entitles them to change Roster Practices and you will
have the option to accept or leave, according to them. According to me
it is accept or fight. This is not the prospect that any of us would want,
but I don't imagine too many people had a great time at Gallipoli. I am
convinced that ultimately, and probably soon, we are all going to have to
put our job on the line to defend the profession, our colleagues and our
contract.
If we don't do that, it is going to get very bad around here. Very bad
includes the real prospect of 90+ hours of mainly three man long haul,
or 80+ hours beating around the region. Of that I am certain.
If we do stand up shoulder to shoulder and say 'no', I think it will be OK.
I could be wrong, often am, but based on eight years in the middle of
this, that is what I think. I wont pretend to know exactly how things will
pan out, but I think it will be OK. I can also guarantee you that the
proposals put forward by your negotiators were quite in line with
'industry practice' and so, by inference, were quite affordable and
sensible for the Company. Clearly, RP 2001 is more affordable, but is
that the point. RP 2003 will no doubt be even more affordable.
Our current system is fatally flawed and if CX had accepted this fact
when I first told them in 95 we may not be in this mess. They had
another opportunity to do a very favourable deal in 99, but weren't
interested. IMHO it has become essential for them to have greater
flexibility with overtime than the current system provides. I don't expect
that the option to remain with the 700 hours cap will be long lived.
The DFO has told a big fib in his cover letter when he says 'the
multipliers have been set at such a level that it would be more
expensive for the Company to routinely work a crew member into
overtime than to employ an additional crew member.' In fact this quote is
a direct lift from a paper I wrote that in 1997 which concluded that the
minimum acceptable multiplier was 1.75. I know there does not appear
to be much difference between 1.5 and 1.75, but there is.
When you concede to the employer the right to work you into overtime,
the multipliers must be sufficiently punitive to ensure that the Cost of
Employment of an additional Officer is exceeded comfortably at the
number of hours you are prepared to work for extended periods in a
surge situation. Data passed to me by Nick Rhodes and KY in 99 shows
that for CX the C of E varies depending on base area etc, but is as high
as 1.92 x Salary in the numerically significant HKG based B Scale
Group. To make it simple, if you agree to RP 2001 and you fly long haul,
I expect you will be flying 95 hours per month. That is the point at which
they will start to look at more pilots as being a cheaper option (you need
to consider training and recruiting costs as well; it gets a bit complex).
You may make a bit of money, but is 95 hours sensible. You will have
no control over that if they subsequently write 5/4/3 out, but they
wouldn't do that would they? I should tell you that Col Pearce lectured
your Committee in 1995 for two hours about how restrictive 5/4/3 is.
He's right and they would love to get rid of it.
So, in summary, I am of the opinion that rejection of RP 2001 is the only
sensible course. I strongly support the Committees guidance on this
matter. Sorry about the long diatribe, but this is fairly important and I
thought you may appreciate some insights. I have no problem with you
forwarding this information to trusted friends who I may not be close
friends with.
Regards
Murray