BA pax tried to halt 777 take-off after taxiing error

[punkalouver]

Two passengers attempted to stop a British Airways Boeing 777-200 from taking off from a Caribbean airport last September, after realising the crew had lined up at the wrong runway intersection, but were too late to prevent the departure.

The pilots of the twin-jet, bound for Antigua, had intended to depart from the southwestern end of runway 07 - the 'A' intersection - at St Kitts' Bradshaw International Airport.

Despite specifically requesting a departure from 'A', the aircraft mistakenly taxied instead for the 'B' intersection, near the runway's midpoint, leaving available take-off distance of just 1,220m (4,000ft). The take-off performance calculations had been based on a distance of 1,915m.

The oversight escaped detection despite several references and queries in the communications between the crew and air traffic control.

In details of the event released today, the UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch reveals that the carrier's station engineer and airport duty manager were on board the 777 and realised the error as the aircraft lined up on the runway.

The engineer quickly moved from his seat to speak to a member of the cabin crew, telling her that he needed to contact the pilots immediately to warn them the aircraft was wrongly positioned.

In the cockpit the captain had specifically commented that the runway looked short. Neither pilot had been to the airport before and the lack of a tractor meant the crew had taxied the jet from the stand themselves. But, in spite of the captain's concerns, neither cross-checked the jet's location on the runway.

Instead the captain told the co-pilot to "stand on the brakes", says the AAIB, and apply a high thrust setting - some 55% of N1 level - before releasing the brakes for the take-off roll.

In the cabin behind, the station engineer realised that the aircraft was powering up for take-off and abandoned his bid to reach the crew. The 777 accelerated but reached the touchdown-zone markers for the reverse-direction runway 25 by the time it passed the crucial V1 decision speed, and lifted off about 300m from the end of the paved surface.

Taking off from the 'B' intersection reduces the available distance by 1,110m and the AAIB says that British Airways does not authorise 777 departures from this point on runway 07.

While the AAIB attributes the 26 September incident to simple lack of familiarity with the airport, combined with disorientation from poor signage, it also underlines the psychological factors which contributed to the failure to identify the error.

Bradshaw is a simple airport, and the crew did not conduct a taxi briefing. The AAIB says that the crew would probably have briefed the route at a larger, more complex airport.

It adds that the crew appears to have suffered from "confirmation bias", noticing only the evidence that backed their mistaken assumption of being at the correct intersection.

Crew resource management training should address this tendency in two ways, says the AAIB: by emphasising the need to "seek evidence that disproves assumptions whenever they are called into doubt" and by providing communications skills needed for "confident and clear discussion" of the problem.

BA passengers tried to halt 777 take-off after taxiing error (http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2010/09/02/346898/ba-passengers-tried-to-halt-777-take-off-after-taxiing.html)

[RobertS975]

This could have easily been a far worse version of the Comair CRJ crash at Lexington. Just lucky. And probably a light load, assuming that full fueling was to happen in Antigua.

Does anyone know the time of day this occurred?

[The Ancient Geek]

Does anyone know the time of day this occurred?


http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/4-2010%20G-VIIR.pdf

[Herc708]

I feel another BA pilot saga unfolding here - P1 will be leaving 'voluntarily', P2 gone for re-training. P1 to write a book .......etc

I think there has to be a comparison here between BA038 and this incident. It looks like very close similarities in people incolved - same backrounds, age, experience etc

In this case I think that the actions at StKitts are bordering at the reckless end of the scale and that a criminal prosecution is warranted. You are paid to check / re-check - there was a complete and utter CRM failure with no attempt at anything. Swiss cheese etc again.

If there had been any failure before V1, then this particular 777 would be a pile of molten metal, down the 100ft ravine at the end of the 07 runway

When I consider what has unfolded for the BA038 crew, what is going to happen here?

[TwoOneFour]

That extraordinary dilemma. At what point does someone less qualified than the crew decide to intervene, based on perhaps little more than a feeling that something isn't right?

Even though these guys were local BA reps and might have known the restriction on the Bravo take-off, that's still a pretty big shout.

[ETOPS]

Herc708

I feel another BA pilot saga unfolding here - P1 will be leaving 'voluntarily', P2 gone for re-training. P1 to write a book .......etc


Wrong on most counts, I'm afraid. This took place nearly a year ago and was discussed/handled internally within our "positive safety culture" - we all learned some valuable lessons.

[BOAC]

Wow..........................:sad: Loads of contributory factors there. I was initially puzzled as to why the controller had detailed the 'parallel' nature of 'A' until I read 1.18.2.2.

As Herc says, thank the Lord they did not need to stop.

[FullWings]

A test for whether someone else's incident occurred through idiocy or being unfortunate is whether you can see yourself making similar mistakes. Flying out of SKB knowing about this event, it wasn't going to happen to me but I did feel some 'but for the grace of...' The AAIB report focusses mainly on the non-technical aspects and is worth a read. Confirmation bias, faulty mental models, lack of advocacy from several parties... Interesting stuff which we have to deal with all the time as professional pilots. As Clint says: "A man's got to know his limitations".
That extraordinary dilemma. At what point does someone less qualified than the crew decide to intervene, based on perhaps little more than a feeling that something isn't right?
As most of the BA Caribbean shuttle destinations have no engineering cover, the hub engineers go out/back with the aeroplane. In this particular case he'd have been witness to dozens of approaches, takeoffs and landings at SKB - more than any pilot on the fleet.

I think he makes sure he's on the jumpseat now!

[Sobelena]

I have to say that as a pro BA guy this incident comes as a shock. People often question the qualifications and experience of LCC crews (for no good reason may I add) and then such an elementary error such as this happens to an experienced BA crew. Many lessons to be learned (yet again).

[fdr]

Interesting comparison.

Better outcome so far than the KAL 30 ton over weight departure from Chicago in a B777.

KAL sacked the national captain, messed over the FO, and ultimately got rid of the foreign pilot who reported the problem confidentially on the undertaking that the captain, aircraft, and airport would not be identified, due to the pathologically punitive culture. Apparently the reporters confidentiality was breached in about a week following the undertaking by the head of safety. Coming on top of KAL's deliberately overweight takeoff in an A330 out of Zurich by a similar amount... what the heck. The reporter of that event went west as well, (literally), as did of course the one person that stopped a B744 falling onto New York with no fuel on board some time back.

At some point airlines need to address their corporate risk issues openly to mitigate risk, or apparently not. BA should at least be respected for their actions if they truly have looked after the corporate risk matters, rather than acting expediently.

The balance between punitive responses and proactive response will continue to be perplexing. Does taking retribution on the crew for being human improve the program? Maybe it does, KAL at least hasn't left a blue bill board stuck in a hillside for quite a while, although not through the lack of trying.

For the same ticket price, I know who I would fly with.

Takeoff performance is an area of serious risks which have been poorly responded to by the industry. If you shoot the crew or messengers, and the same thing happens again, what did you accomplish, beyond retribution?

Remember Connies' B747 out of BRU? the one that went off the end into the rail lines? after the engine failure around Vr? Read the report again, and then check the data against the runway, and you may observe that the aircraft was nowhere near achieving a normal takeoff, irrespective of the engine failure. Like A340-300 takeoffs, rather "sporty" as they have been described by at least one person charged with the continuance of public safety.

"Sporty"... right. A new term in FAR/CS 25.107 etc... Just what the public pay for.

Humans err, but to get a major mess you need computers...


Wonder if they were derated?, definitely in the sporty category, shades of the IL76 happy snaps from CBR one would imagine.



Warm Springs.

[411A]

I have to say that as a pro BA guy this incident comes as a shock.

It shouldn't, and I'll tell you why.
First off, I've flown with BA First Officers that were secconded to the airline where I was at the time, so...I know the mind set.
Reasonable pilots all, good handling skills, pleasant folks.
Rather good decision makers, as well.
However....this absolute nonsence of having 'roll reversals' that BA espouse, is cr*p.
Note that this flight was a First Officer leg.
So far, so good.
However, with the nonsensical 'roll reversal' cr*p that BA uses, the First Officer is to taxi the airplane, the Commander then does...co-pilot duties.
Bad form.

To keep operations reasonable, the duties on the FD need to be standardized, and 'roll reversal' simply does not cut the mustard, in this respect.

I suspect...you can expect a few more of these BA fiascos, due largely for the reasons I have indicated, above.

In short, BA needs to reevaluate their FD procedures.
Urgently.

This very serious incident is just a case in point.

[tocamak]

the First Officer is to taxi the airplane, the Commander then does...co-pilot duties

If the First Officer is taxiing the aircraft what should the Captain do? There is surely no roll (sic) reversal here as the Captain is always the Captain (unless incapacitated) regardless of who is pilot flying or non flying. By that I mean there might be a change in duties from one sector to the next, which I thought was pretty common in most airlines, but the Captain is the one who ultimately calls the shots.

[Ancient Observer]

Herc,
Your reference to BA038 puzzles me. On what basis is there any comparison? Am I being thick to-day?

[411A]

There is surely no roll (sic) reversal here as the Captain is always the Captain (unless incapacitated) regardless of who is pilot flying or non flying.

Well, you need to visit the BA procedures, it can be an eye-opener, for sure.
I had one secconded BA First Officer say to me...'well, I taxi and I handle the throttles on takeoff'.
What rubbish.

Sadly, he was totally misinformed...here.

A co-pilot is a co-pilot...period.

[BOAC]

'Roll reversal' happens at the stall and due to shockwave formation amongst other phenomena (added for the purists:)). I think 411 means role reversal.:ugh:

[arem]

Makes one wonder just how clever he is if he cannot differentiate between roll and role!

[blaireau]

The roll reversal can be avoided by avoiding aileron use at high AOA.

[411A]

I think 411 means role reversal.
Yes, and it is still BA cr*p.

And, it will continue to be a problem for BA, until...they change.
Don't hold your breath.

[TyroPicard]

Speaking of role reversal could a BA 777 pilot answer this question...
Is it SOP for the PF to call for taxy instructions?

[ETOPS]

Is it SOP for the PF to call for taxy instructions?

Yes, once underway the PNF handles the R/T

[TyroPicard]

411A
Surely if the co-pilot is taxying the a/c it should be easier for the Captain to make sure they are in the right place?

[TyroPicard]

Yes, once underway the PNF handles the R/T
That is an answer to a different question. I still await a reply to mine...

[haughtney1]

To keep operations reasonable, the duties on the FD need to be standardized, and 'roll reversal' simply does not cut the mustard, in this respect

In BA, as with many other 777 operators, everything is "standardized", Boeing merely use the terms PF or PNF once the aircraft is ready to Taxi. In BA, just like KLM, AF (I'm led to believe), plus EK...if the First Officer is PF, then they taxi the jet...and do all the other duties associates with being PF..

[Two's in]

However you cut this, not being even remotely curious about the acres of runway disappearing majestically into the setting sun out of the left side cockpit windows when lining up; while not answering the FO's query about the apparently really short runway out of the right side windows seems odd by any measure of experience or CRM.

[ZFT]

I am actually quite surprised that the AAIB let their comment that “they attributed the 26 September incident to simple lack of familiarity with the airport, combined with disorientation from poor signage”, there.

I may be out of date here (and I’m sure a current BA crew member will correct me if needed) but the BA training/simulation policy with regards visuals has always been (IMHO) slightly archaic in so much that their sims are certified with the necessary 3 Level D certified visual airfields but they then mostly use generic scenes within their training programs.

The latest visual systems are very capable of reproducing airport scenes highly detailed utilising hi resolution satellite mapping data and with 100% accurate runway, taxiways and airport environment areas with again 100% accurate signage and markings so that no crew should ever be put into the situation this crew were. The simulator is surely the ideal environment to gain that initial airfield familiarity and to experience (in this case) their poor signage.

A specific St Kitts visual scene may well have provided this crew with the necessary training and experience to avoid this incident.

[BOAC]

It would have been interesting to see the comments if this had been RyanAir...........

[SmilingKnifed]

'A co-pilot is a co-pilot period.'

I'd hardly describe comments like that as being condusive to good CRM. Not exactly empowering the F/O to question your errors of judgement is it? What with him being but a mere 'co-pilot' and all. :rolleyes:

[protectthehornet]

for just a moment, let's not blame BA or the crew (though certainly they screwed up).

Let's fix these problems with a bucket of paint and some imagination.

when you take a runway, you should be able to read on the pavement from all types: IF YOU CAN READ THIS You are LINED UP WITH runway 27 Right with 9000' for takeoff from this point.

at an intersection: You are at intersection X on runway 27 right and you have 4000' remaining for takeoff.

additional color lines painted on the taxiways would take you to ONE PLACE ONLY when instructed to FOLLOW THE PURPLE LINE WESTBOUND to runway 9...or similiar.


And of course, until such times as someone springs for the cost of a bucket of paint, ICAO approval, and labor, LOOK FOR THOSE NUMBERS, OR threshold marks before taking the runway.

Did this field have signs on the side saying runway remaining? Some airports do...many dont.

[ehwatezedoing]

As BOAC wrote in post #7

Chapter 1.18.2.2 in the report is an eye opener.
From the Supervising Controller at the time:
misidentification of Taxiway Bravo for Alpha was, on average, a weekly occurrence and it appeared to be happening mostly to overseas operators.

[BOAC]

...and what would a person, supervising a trainee, in possession of this knowledge - and watching Dastardly and Muttley meandering around the airport - do?:ugh:

One go each, now.

[OFDM]

ZFT,

making sim visuals as realistic as possible can only be a good thing, but you cant train in the sim for every view you'll ever see out of the cockpit window - your post almost implies that you shouldn’t go anywhere new without doing it in the sim first. A runway is a runway to some extent and if you look out and think 'hmmmmm', it warrants some consideration. that said, i haven’t read the report and make no judgement on the crew in question here. looking at the plate for the airport and the position of intersection B, it looks very short, even at light weight and i'm glad they were all ok.

[411A]

Not exactly empowering the F/O to question your errors of judgement is it? What with him being but a mere 'co-pilot' and all.

It should be remembered that it was the First Officer whom was taxiing the airplane, in this particular incident.
It is my firm belief that 'role reversal' is just fine whilst flying, however, taxiing around on the airfield, be it large (and complicated, with many possible taxi errors) or small (same problem...as is quite evident here) should be done by the Captain.
This is not the first time BA has had this problem, nor will it be the last.
Long time readers here might recall Rainboe's slight taxi problem at IAD when he was a First Officer in a BA 747...dinged wing tip and all.

[strikemaster82]

And, 411a, no Captain has ever 'dinged' an aeroplane?

Who has hold of the tiller is immaterial. Good teamwork will ensure the aircraft goes where it is meant to.

BA prefer it this way, when a First Officer makes his conversion to Captain, he doesn't have to start from zero experience of handling the aircraft on the ground!

Guess what, BA F/Os are even allowed to park the aircraft given suitable stand guidance! What about that, 411a? :eek:

[OFDM]

411A

perhaps it is best to always have the captains hand on the throttles during takeoff and for him to taxi. you certainly have a valid point of view.

however statements like...

A co-pilot is a co-pilot period.

... as well as the tone of your posts mean that you come over as, ahem, overbearing, (whether thats the case in the real world or not). and you sound a little bit angry.

[qsyenroute]

I don't see any mention of possible implication of the control tower here.

ATC are required to have knowledge of aircraft performance. (And a reasonable degree of common sense). Consequently something like the following R/T exchange might have occurred:

“Speedbird “777” do you think a mid-point departure is wise sir”

Answer “probably not”

[doubleu-anker]

Entering an active runway can be a risky business at anytime. If each crew member had checked and confirmed the approach and the other end of the runway was clear, how is it they missed the amount of concrete between the aircraft and the threshold/threshold lights, of the active runway?

Is there anything more useless than the runway behind, etc.,etc.?

bet they wont make that mistake again!

[exvicar]

It is my firm belief that 'role reversal' is just fine whilst flying, however, taxiing around on the airfield, be it large (and complicated, with many possible taxi errors) or small (same problem...as is quite evident here) should be done by the Captain.

What? If your FO's do not taxi that would mean entrusting them to read a taxi chart? Do FO's even read these days? Are you crazy? Surely it would be better to get rid of the FO's altogether, that way you can go heads in and read the taxi chart whilst navigating your big aeroplane around those complicated airfields. No possible room for error there, FO's only get in the way!

Most FO's are perfectly capable of taxying and even parking an aeroplane - even big ones like the 340-600......... gosh!

[Centaurus]

I'd hardly describe comments like that as being condusive to good CRM. Not exactly empowering the F/O to question your errors of judgement is it? What with him being but a mere 'co-pilot' and all.

Methinks you are too sensitive on perceived pilot status. The current terminology that reduces the crew to PF and PM would suggest that both pilots are clones of each other - robots taking turns to fly each leg. The position of captain of an airliner has long since been reduced to a chap who just happens to occupy the left seat. It is almost to the point now where the copilot/first officer runs the whole shebang as if he is THE captain for that sector while the real captain is relegated by company policy to a subordinate role playing.

Whether you scorn it or not, in the early days of airliners the captain was truly running the show and at his discretion may offer or direct the first officer to conduct the take off. There was no question of "My" sector. The captain made all the in-flight decisions, weather diversions en route etc. Depending on many factors he may offer/direct his first officer to conduct the approach and landing out of the goodness of his heart.

Over the years there has been a steady dumbing down of the true role of the aircraft captain to the extent where he no longer directs the operation but is forced into a compromised situation of having to share the responsibility. This diluting of the captains role to his "mate" in the right hand seat leads to a more or less consensus before any decision is made. Except the flight deck should not be a democracy.

Forgive the ramble on, but countless hours reading about the wonders of CRM and its ilk has sometimes led to this wonderful concept of "empowering" the first officer so much that some see this as full authority to challenge the captain's every decision regardless if the questioning is a valid flight safety matter or not. This is not conducive to the principles of flight safety.

[three eighty]

taxiing around on the airfield, be it large or small should be done by the Captain

411 the only time you sprout forth with utter tripe is when you put finger to keyboard you skygod.
No doubt you look forward to the day that O' Leary gets his way and we fly jetliners single crew.

[strikemaster82]

Centaurus, you are pulling our collective string, right? :ooh:

[LGW Vulture]

Let´s give a thought to the poor Station Engineer who probably sat down in Row 4 and considered that maybe just maybe, things would end in absolute disaster and he could do nothing but sit there.

I shudder to think!

[yambat]

Like that post Centaurus
I am all for the modern CRM as I fly early generation jets under trying conditions at times and we need to work together, but never forget who signs all the paperwork, and who receives the phone calls from the boss!

Regarding this incident
I am always surprised that these sort of things happen as frequently as they do in large major airlines with so much available to them in the way of training resources etc.

Yet us flicking around in an early generation jet are perceived by many in the recognised major airlines to be unsafe operators.
We have to check and double check all the time due to the "sophistication" of our old bus!
yambat

[three eighty]

This diluting of the captains role to his "mate" in the right hand seat leads to a more or less consensus before any decision is made. Except the flight deck should not be a democracy.


Well the airline accountants will be overjoyed to hear that. Think of all the money they will save on those pesky little CRM courses.

Have you checked the accident statistics since CRM was introduced.

[PJ2]

Centaurus;

You have a badly twisted view of CRM.

CRM doesn't "empower" anyone.

CRM does not challenge the authority and command responsibility of the captain. CRM is not a "manners" course for captains nor a licence to take over for F/O's. CRM does not disrespect the law which assigns responsibility for the flight solely to the captain. CRM is the requirement to speak up if one sees something unfolding that raises the risk to the flight, period.

CRM does not require that the F/O take over in immanent danger.

Such an action belongs elsewhere in training and responsibility, differing, obviously, with cultural differences. (One wonders, for example, what would have happened to the F/O on the Airblue A321 if he had taken over from the captain and successfuly cleared the hills...fired?, reprimanded? Anyone?)

The requirement to speak up and not remain silent while risk heightens is formalized so that a risk is identified, assessed, a response formulated and then actioned.

Such a process (a mini-intervention) can take hours or seconds..."Captain, should we be at this altitude?"..."Captain, the flight plan shows us burning into our alternate fuel"... , etc.

Those statements don't challenge authority, they bring information to the surface so the crew is aware of risk and can deal with it, even if it is only to dismiss the threat as it is being handled correctly.

The final decision is always the captain's. The FD is not a democracy.

In CRM, no F/O "takes over" the airplane and runs it unless the captain allows it, but that's not CRM; - like viewing statements about risk to the flight as "challenges to one's authority", permitting anyone to take over the FD is a far more serious operational and personal problem and well beyond CRM issues.

Because the "discourse" is about one's "authority" and not the "operational safety" of the flight, those that resist the notion of CRM and dismiss it as so much new-age psychobabble, are generally those who need it the most.

PJ2

[Dan Winterland]

Role/Roll reversal.

The F4 used to (still does - any still flying?) have a rudder shaker to remind you to roll the aircraft with rudder to prevent roll reversal at low speed. Perhaps airliners should have a rudder shaker to warn you are not taking off at the right intersection!



But seriously, a wrong intersection / runway incursion warning system should be a priority for the next life saving aviation gadget. It's not rocket science - the infrastructure is alreadt there. It's just software.

[fireflybob]

PJ2 - brilliant post! That's exactly how it is meant to be!

[eastern wiseguy]

ATC “SPEEDBIRD TWO ONE FIVE SIX ERR DO YOU NOT REQUEST ERR BACKTRACK RUNWAY ZERO SEVEN”
G-VIIR “ERR NEGATIVE SPEEDBIRD TWO ONE FIVE SIX WE ARE HAPPY TO GO FROM POSITION ALPHA”

So the tower controller REALISED but failed to pass it on that the aircraft was at the incorrect point.....:confused:

[411A]

Forgive the ramble on, but countless hours reading about the wonders of CRM and its ilk has sometimes led to this wonderful concept of "empowering" the first officer so much that some see this as full authority to challenge the captain's every decision regardless if the questioning is a valid flight safety matter or not. This is not conducive to the principles of flight safety.

Well said, Sir.

It would be well for First Officers to actually realise just whom is in charge of the airplane...and for those slightly challanged, a hint....it ain't them.

[Chesty Morgan]

Sorry for perpetuating the thread creep but I believe the real problem is perceived authority by the first officers.

[Big Pistons Forever]

It is kind of sad that yet another thread has degenerated into a weenie waving contest into the percieved dimunition of an airline captains authority.

There is a lesson here. The FO had over 6000 hrs and the Captain over 12,000 hrs, in other words senior guys with lots of experience flying long haul on the airlines biggest equipment. The FO was probably senior enough to hold a narrow body short haul Command if he wanted it. Frankly I think it is rather silly to imply htat this individual was not up to the task of taxing the aircraft, lining up and then doing the takeoff, it is not rocket science. The reason why many airlines do not allow this is because they are too cheap to pay for a tiller on the right side. This was not a case of a 250 hr new hire screwing up.

IN any case it IMO has no bearing on the central question, they had only two taxways to choose from yet chose the wrong one........why.

Yes there was a bunch of related factors (poor markings/signage, a missed opportunity by ATC to alert the crew) but ultimately the crew (that means both Captain and FO !) had completely lost airport situational awareness.

Personally I think the take away is the ease one can fall into complacency on the "easy" tasks. I look back at the screwups in my career and and many are similar to this incident...falling into the trap that "this is straight forward so I got it and I can start thinking about the next step".

BTW my company SOP is that the "ready" call includes the taxiway where the aircraft is holding short, something that we did not use to do untill the new Director of Flight ops insisted this procedure be adopted.

[411A]

..something that we did not use to do untill the new Director of Flight ops insisted this procedure be adopted.

He was very wise...we have the same in our company.
Also, we have another....intersection takeoff are not allowed, except in the case of part of the runway being closed.
Perhaps BA should adopt a similar policy?

[412SP]

411,

Loved the "copilot is a copilot period" comment. You must be a treat to fly with.

Some day, a lowly copilot may save your bacon, heaven forbid you make a mistake.

[Sobelena]

From what I've read 411A is far too good to make mistakes :)

[411A]

You must be a treat to fly with.



You might be surprised, 412SP...several F/O's request just that.
;)

[Neptunus Rex]

411A, you old dinosaur, I always find your posts, shall we say, interesting, reminiscent of Captain O P Jones of Imperial Airways:
"Pass me the silver tongs, Mr Hoskins, I wish to retract the flap."
Margaret Thatcher was correct in stating:
"Consensus is a lack of leadership."
However, when I attained my first command, my boss told me that a large part of my job was to help train my co-pilot to become a captain, and that was 40 years ago, long before anyone could spell CRM!

411A, my dear sir, whilst I realise that a lot of your comments are tongue in cheek, why not come clean and tell us how you educate your F/Os to become competent future captains?

[TopBunk]

Also, we have another....intersection takeoff are not allowed, except in the case of part of the runway being closed.
Perhaps BA should adopt a similar policy?

I would suggest that is fine in an ideal world, but it is not a really practical proposition. The important thing is to have in place the procedures and checks to try to ensure that the holes in the cheese don't line up. Clearly in this case all the holes bar one (the aircraft was light) lined up. That is clearly regretable and the procedures will have been modified as a result.

You can bet your shirt that those pilots will never make that mistake again!

To suggest that you should use full length of 31L at JFK, as an example, rather than KK intersection, is frankly ludicrous, but undoubtedly that is what 411A would do.

[grouchynojob]

Taxing an aircraft is easy. Knowing where to go is the difficult part. What must be understood is that taxing an aircraft is a two man job, it makes no difference who is taxing the aircraft at all. Your primary role as PNF/PM on the ground is to monitor the track of the aircraft, as it is in the air. As PM you should be telling the PF when to turn and what holding points should we expecting to see. With PF looking at his chart as well this is a good error check. Having your head down doing control checks or before take off checks while letting the PF blindly taxi on his own, before establishing that both of you are happy with the intended route, would seem to me to be poor airmanship.

[His dudeness]

Hmmm, I do fly a Cessna Citation with RAAS. Apart from other things, if I`d try to takeoff from a runway less (rather TODA) than 4000 ft it yells at me ("short runway"). 777 hasn´t got that thingy?
Next, we have the Jepp plate on the MFD with a little airplane on it showing our position. 777 hasn´t got that?

[TopBunk]

As PM you should be telling the PF when to turn and what holding points should we expecting to see. With PF looking at his chart as well this is a good error check.

I disagree with your wording above, although the principles are correct in part!

As PM and/or PF, you should be 'asking' open questions as to what you expect to see/where you think you are, rather than 'telling' someone what to do. It is the 'telling' that results in confirmation bias which is what you want to avoid. What you want is independent confirmation of a shared mental model, imho.

[Sonic Bam]

How about a TomTom with an airfield database?
"At the next junction, keep right" ....... "Recalculating" ...... "At the next junction, turn around"
Add in the John Cleese voice with witticisms and you're in for a fun time.:ok:

[Neptunus Rex]

"Well, Nigel, this is going to be an interesting take-off, don't you think?"
Nothing threatening there!

[TyroPicard]

Airclues - thank you, a misread on my part.
Yes, once underway the PNF handles the R/T
A simple "yes" I would have understood - but I read this reply as only describing the "underway" state in which I had absolutely no interest. The addition of "then" or "but" would have made it crystal.

[wheelie my boeing]

His dudeness,

In response to your two questions, the answer is no to both of them.

[SmilingKnifed]

Quote below from the Wikipedia page on the Tenerife disaster.

Captain van Zanten interrupted the co-pilot's readback with the comment "We're going". As noted in the NOVA documentary, Meurs chose not to embarrass his superior a second time by stating that they still did not have the proper clearance to take off.

411A, are you honestly saying that you'd prefer this situation to manifest itself again? I make no apology for banging on about CRM as quite simply, it saves lives. It's not about 'co-pilots' getting above themselves, it's about doing what is right and putting our egos in check when we make mistakes (and don't bull**** me for a second that you've never dropped a clanger!). Fortunately I fly with a bunch of great people who do just that and correct my daily mistakes in a cheerful manner. Demonstrating to me exactly the type of captain I want to be when I grow up :rolleyes:

'It would be well for First Officers to actually realise just whom is in charge of the airplane...and for those slightly challanged, a hint....it ain't them.'

It certainly isn't and I've every respect for the position. But nor does your signing of the tech log confer on you any right to ignore inquiries and assistance from the competent professionals with whom you work. You have no right to potentially cause an accident just to sate your seemingly fragile ego.

[411A]

411A, my dear sir, whilst I realise that a lot of your comments are tongue in cheek, why not come clean and tell us how you educate your F/Os to become competent future captains?
It's all very simple.
When they have achieved their Command rating but not eligable for Command just yet, and it's their turn to fly (PF) I put 'em in the LHS, and have them make all the decisions.
And yes, I'm a TRI/TRE....and am allowed to complete the above.
In this way they get the picture, early on, make no mistake.
OK with you, sir?:E

[Northbeach]

The most challenging aspect of my job is getting to the airport and then running the gantlet necessary to position myself in left front seat. The next most difficult part is getting the jet off the gate and to the assigned & appropriate runway. Then there is the task of getting the jet off the runway and to the gate. If I am going to get into trouble it is probably going to happen when conducting those ground operations. Does that parallel anybody else’s experience? For me, under most circumstances, ground operations are the most hazard packed and threatening phase of my job.


I was surprised when I read some of the preceding comments that seem to relegate taxiing the jet as a non-event.


At our airline the Captain’s job is the same whether or not they are the pilot flying or not; FOs don’t taxi or park the jet.

[Pitch Up Authority]

Since JAR OPS was introduced an ATPL became a Micy Mouse kind of exercise.
Pilots no longer have a feeling with the aircrafts performance.

Basically one needs to nominate a take off alternate for every departure. This includes to have a look at the runway lenght of the departure airway in case of a return.

In this case it would have forced the crew to have a close look at the performance and the runway lenght.

But we are living in a world were numbers spitted out by a computer are no longer cross-checked with common sence and basic knowledge of performance.

If I am right BA had to teach their crews how to interpreted a weather radar display after a B 777 flew into a TS at high level, BA had to teach their crews how to use the fuel system on a B 747 after the LAX-LHR incident ..... what's next?

By the way .... can any BA genius explain to me how you recognise a slower than normal acceleration on take off ???

[411A]

Does that parallel anybody else’s experience?
Yup, so very true.

what's next?
Back to basics...and individual responsibility.

Sorry, if accidens/incidents are to be minimised, nothing else will do.

[wheelie my boeing]

411A,

being an FO, I must admit that whilst I accept that the Captain is ultimately responsible I still feel it is my duty to speak up whenever I feel something is not right. It has nothing to do with me thinking the Captain is a bad pilot, I make mistakes as does everyone. What is important is how you deal with the mistakes.
Your arrogance is incredible. For you, a person on a rumour network, to try and advise BA on changing it's policy is not only arrogant but in my opinion stupid. It's safety record is outstanding as are it's crews.

As an irrelivant FO I am eternally gratefull I will never have to fly with you and one day when I hopefully gain my command I will never treat my FO's with such disrespect.

So, with your given system of the FO never taxiing the aircraft, what then happens when they gain their command? They have to taxi an aircraft in often unfamiliar airports and what's more - the person next to them is LESS experienced. Well done!

[411A]

...what then happens when they gain their command?
Then, at that time, these First Officers receive Command Training.
Simples.:rolleyes:

...to try and advise BA on changing it's policy is not only arrogant but in my opinion stupid. It's safety record is outstanding as are it's crews.


Well, if one actually reads the AAIB report (suggest you do so:rolleyes:) it would appear that the concerned BA crew was not exactly paying attention to details.:eek:

OMG, what an absolute surprise.:}

[racedo]

An interesting thread with a bit of thread drift but nevertheless looking at the issues from percieved different corners.

I wonder had this been Ryanair would we be already on page 25 with claims of poor skills, charging for toilets, crew paying to fly etc ad nauseum, thankfully we have not degenerated into that.

Humans make mistakes, some big, some small and in 99.99% of cases thankfully involving air crew nobody notices and hopefully somebody learns a little bit. Computers are great until you unplug them.

On a crew with this level of experience its a "oh ****" moment that puts all future career prospects on hold while everybody digs the life out of it.

Ultimately there is a responsibility by the airport operator to get it right as the tiny slip up almost has a catastrophic ending.

As a poster has said its the easy ones that you get caught with.

It will sadly not be the last incident like this on an airport, next time I hope for same outcome as the BA one.

Whatever else they did they still got it in the air and underpants can be changed.

[Checkboard]

however statements like...
A co-pilot is a co-pilot period.
... as well as the tone of your posts mean that you come over as, ahem, overbearing,

If 411 had said:
"A Captain is a Captain period."
Would that seem "overbearing" or "correct"? :hmm:

I have to agree with 411 here (and that isn't usual). A company pays for a pilot to fly an aircraft. They expect that pilot to get the aircraft from "A" to "B". If it is a complex aircraft, they hire a junior pilot as "load relief" - but the pilot hired to get the aircraft from "A" to "B" is the same guy.

I must admit that whilst I accept that the Captain is ultimately responsible I still feel it is my duty to speak up whenever I feel something is not right. It has nothing to do with me thinking the Captain is a bad pilot, I make mistakes as does everyone. What is important is how you deal with the mistakes.

Speak up - fine.

Understand that is the limit of your role, unless you are convinced your (and the passenger's) lives are in danger. In the vast majority of cases, the Captain knows the situation, has seen it many times before, and hasn't the time (at THAT time) to explain it - after all, they are the only pilot the company is paying to be responsible for the flight.

Yes - there are occasional guys who have slipped through the system, have made Captain and are still prepared to risk the aircraft to push a bad approach. The FO's job is to report them, before they become a risk - not to struggle for control on a single approach.

The problem with "complete role reversal", ie taxi, take-off etc etc is that the FO thinks that they know the entire job. You don't know the job until you look to the left, and see nothing but your reflection looking back at you.

[fireflybob]

I must admit to not reading the whole report but looking at the chart the airport seems quite simple from the point of view of layout, taxi routes etc.

Therein lies the trap methinks. If you're taxiing around a "complex" airport then you're much more likely to carry out a thorough briefing and also be monitoring carefully where you are. Of course this should apply wherever you are.

[AN2 Driver]

@fdr: when the hell did that happen?

Coming on top of KAL's deliberately overweight takeoff in an A330 out of Zurich by a similar amount... what the heck.

you mean by 30 as in three zero tons???? has anyone investigated this?

Best regards
AN2 Driver

[Basil]

As an ex BA pilot I agree with the 'What if this had been RyanAir?' comments.

I think it is great bedtime reading for everyone. It is such a simple example of the Swiss cheese analogy and I have to say, I thought 'There but for the grace etc.'

I have certainly been in a position where I should have spoken up but didn't. I have also spoken up and been wrong.
We are not paid to protect our fragile little egos. We are paid not to crash. So speak up; be wrong; it's only your ego; not a fireball.

Just in from pub - hope the foregoing makes sense and isn't too hectoring.

[GroundProxGuy]

Hmmm, I do fly a Cessna Citation with RAAS. Apart from other things, if I`d try to takeoff from a runway less (rather TODA) than 4000 ft it yells at me ("short runway"). 777 hasn´t got that thingy?
Next, we have the Jepp plate on the MFD with a little airplane on it showing our position. 777 hasn´t got that?

Actually yes 777 has RAAS. Both Boeing and Honeywell have had the ability to deliver RAAS in the 777 since late 2009 (after this incident) and I believe United is operating with it now. The Boeing version will callout "On Runway, x,xxx Remaining" if the aircraft aligns with less than an operator specified distance remaining, and as the aircraft exceeds 40 knots will then yell "Caution Short Runway, Short Runway".

[Slickster]

It is my firm belief that 'role reversal' is just fine whilst flying, however, taxiing around on the airfield, be it large (and complicated, with many possible taxi errors) or small (same problem...as is quite evident here) should be done by the Captain.
This is not the first time BA has had this problem, nor will it be the last.

You seem to be confusing "role reversal" with how we conduct operations in BA, specifically, the monitored approach. It works fine (I appreciate a lot of other airlines don't use it) and at least gives you both something of interest to do in the flight.

Your attitude is appalling, which is, no doubt why you reside in a desert, and work in one, flying a heap of junk, that most people retired years ago. I pity any FO that has to fly with you.

[Waterskier]

Back to the original thread... and how do we help prevent this from happening in the future.

I think we are long overdue for a display of taxi charts and current aircraft position on an MFD while taxying the airplane. Maybe even program the taxi route so it highlights the route to follow.

It is my understanding that many corporate jets have this great tool. Airliners are overdue....

[411A]

...."role reversal" with how we conduct operations in BA, specifically, the monitored approach. It works fine (I appreciate a lot of other airlines don't use it) and at least gives you both something of interest to do in the flight.



Hmmm.....and at least gives you both something of interest to do in the flight.



One wonders what other nonsense BA has come up with...?:rolleyes:
From the report on this very serious incident, it certainly seems that BA pilots are so busy congratulating each other on a job well done:eek::eek:while at the same time a few of 'em are unable to determine just where on the airport they truly are...:{:{

[RobertS975]

Some comments and some questions: First, the trainee controller does not seem like the brightest bulb on the Xmas tree. A simple reply like "You are at Bravo, not Alpha" would have been good. Second, as someone has already pointed out, the mistaken identity of the intersections was almost a weekly event, yet the supervisor left the trainee controller without supervision, and the airport authorities had not done anything in terms of signage to stop these repeated errors.

Now for my questions: What percentage of professional air carrier pilots would have backtracked Rwy 07 for a full length departure? An extra 400m is, well, an extra 400m! Also, was the crew's decision to use flaps 20 made early in the process, or was that selection made after the captain commented that the runway looked short? How much benefit was derived by powering up while braked? If this had not been done, how much extra runway might have been needed before the mains left the ground?

[protectthehornet]

time to put a ''you are about to screw up and kill us" button on the panel next to the flight attendant call button.

press it and a voice booms in the cockpit...you are going to screw up.

and if the pax is right he gets a prize...wrong and he pays.

[kotakota]

Facts :- Taxiing is a Critical stage of the flight .

The most useless thing in aviation ,apart from the air in yr fuel tanks , is the runway behind you.

[PantLoad]

Sorry, gentlemen, but I have to agree with 411A. And, I am a major fan of the CRM concept and principles.

The link between the two (this issue and CRM): Standardization is the foundation of good CRM. With good CRM, accidents and incidents are reduced dramatically....almost to nothing.

And, with standardization, there must be explicit/well-defined roles and responsibilities. In practice, this is difficult to achieve with the role-reversal.

The exception is for a TRI/TRE to be giving command training. And, ostensibly, the TRI/TRE has received proper/adequate training for this environment...adequate experience....etc.

Please don not misunderstand what I am saying. I am not in any way looking down my nose at first officers. Many of them I've flown with over the years were extremely competent. And, frankly, on more than one occasion, a good F/O has keep my XXX out of trouble.

But, standardization is critical....and this means well-defined roles. A quarterback and a receiver....we just don't switch places, switch roles.....and one cannot function without the other.

My opinion.....probably worth nothing from this old, retired guy.


Fly safe,

PantLoad

(Sorry about the spelling, etc. It's late, here. What the hell am I doing up this late!)

[Dan Winterland]

My company's SOPs require both pilots to positively identify the runway and intersection and to confirm it's correct for the performance calculation. It seems like a bit of a 'noddy' procedure, but it would hae preventd this incident.

I know that the intersection wasn't marked, but there would have been enough clues to warn them. The fact that they were lining up next to the terminal being one - something which the riding engineer noticed.

[OKFINE]

Can't say it would have made any difference in their start of T/O position but I remember back in the day typing taxi instructions in the MCDU; especially at an airport foreign to me. Could glance at it whilst underway. Even more so when his or her nibs was at the tiller. I'm sure some of them did something similar as they knew full well my pencil too had an eraser.

[stilton]

Well, you can't blame the Tower Controller, how much is he / she supposed to know about B777 performance !



In any case the responsibility is and was the Captains in this case.



411a, the ultimate troll and s**t stirrer likes to postulate this would not happen if BA did not allow their FO's to taxi the Aircraft. This is nonsense, regardless of who is taxiing the Captain is always in charge and should maintain situational awareness at all times.



It seems like good practice and preparation for when a First Officer upgrades to Captain. We don't do it where I work but there is no tiller on my FO's side so that would make it a little difficult :confused:

[SMOC]

OKFINE,

You want to be careful there, as there have been incidences of taxi details ending up inappropriately placed in the legs or other pages once airborne due to failing to delete the taxi instructions from the MCDU/CDU data entry line.

Could end up being one of the holes in the Swiss cheese!

[OKFINE]

SMOC

Your caution is noted. I took care to alleviate same prior to throttle-up. I would hope that had failure to do so resulted in questions being asked, I could respond that at least the aluminum and its contents were intact. Cheers.

[eastern wiseguy]

Stilton...The tower controller was aware that something was not right. He asked if the aircraft wanted to backtrack(aware that he was at diiferent intersection).When the crew stated they were happy to depart from Alpha....he KNEW that they were in the wrong position. Why he didn't re-iterate that fact is a mystery (especially since there were TWO of them there and the INSTRUCTOR should be looking out for errors EXACTLY like this)

[Fly747]

The other thing no-one has mentioned here is complacency. This pair were out on a little evening jaunt from Antigua and back, after the shuttle it would be back to the bar. The weather was lovely, only a few pax, light fuel load, a bit of VFR big jet flying in the Caribbean, it makes up for the crap days. Their guard was down and it should be a lesson to us all.

PS kotakota, you forgot he other useless thing, blue sky above you.

[52049er]

No procedure in aviation (411A's personal SOP's excepted of course) are perfect. However, to think that any of BA's are implemented on some personal whim or preference misses the point completely.

Everything they do as a company is based on statistical risk assesment - allowing the FO to taxy/park/'run the sector' may lead to certain errors (every SOP can lead2 to errors), but it reduces the risk of (potentially much more serious?) errors committed by that FO when he becomes a Captain, as a result of his exposure to decision making at an earlier stage. Thats not my personal view - in BA it simply would not be SOP if it caused more problems than it avoided. Believe me, the lawyers would see to that.

[Dream Land]

It's been a while since I've operated there, but from what I can recall, it's not that long of a runway in the first place, why limit your options by choosing an intersection? :confused:

[SteveJWR]

How many of you on the flight deck, at a holding point or lineing up, would interrupt proceedures and interact with pax via cabin crew?

[HPbleed]

If the attendant call dings whilst lining up I would certainly abort the take off. In my mind I would imagine the cabin becoming unsecured. During the actual T/O roll however I would continue.

To be told that a passenger was sure we had lined up in the wrong place, I don't know, if I had suspected the runway looked short, ATC had questioned the line up point, and now a third point that a pax had gone to the trouble to give a relatively specific point about the wrong intersection, I would HOPE I would seriously question what I was doing. But in reality? Who knows.

[AFOS]

I would be extremely concerned at venturing anywhere near any type of flying machine with 411a on board.
The people in the front office are a team. As others have alluded to on here, similar to a football team. So what 411a is saying ostensibly is, only the striker can score a goal. The midfield, defenders even the goal keeper are unable or not allowed to score a goal for the TEAM?

He claims to be a Captain and gives the air of never having made a mistake, because after all he has four gold/silver bars on his wrist.
He also claims to be TRI/TRE, so it must follow it is impossible for him to make a mistake.

The person sitting in the LHS on KLM4805 I seem to recall was a Captain, oh and a TRI/TRE and what a total xxxx up he made. From the ATC transcripts it is more than obvious the F/O and F/E were to intimidated to exercise any form of CRM and dare question not only the Captain, who was not only in charge, but was a TRI/TRE and the "glamour" face of the airline, who in 411a analogy being both a Captain and TRI/TRE NEVER make mistakes.
I view that accident as the Captain was adequately trained/ responsible to handle the tiller enough to backtrack/taxi down the runway, but incompetent to command the aircraft thereafter.

Am I to believe this guy is telling the wider forum and the public that a F/O is adequately qualified to operate the aircraft in all manner of flight, navigation, approach, go-around, land etc but should the God like genius in the LHS become incopacitated die and the F/O gets the aircraft safely on the ground, he is totally incapable of taxiing the same aircraft off the runway?
How does he treat the other members of the team behind the cockpit door?

AFOS

[kernowclown]

Reading the report it was interesting to notice not only the good call by the positioning engineer to raise his concerns, but also the sound presence of mind, along with the CC, to sit on hands once underway. With the ASDA from B and the V1 in use any prompt to the flightdeck could have lead to an abort and overrun. That said, with the good VMC I'm sure the crew would have made a decision based on the situation ahead of them.
Long live ginger beers.

[BarbiesBoyfriend]

I'm a Captain who has just converted from a type with a tiller each side to a type with just one tiller.

So now, I'm always PF on the ground.

Therefore it's me who does the walk round, starts the engines, calls for checklists and taxis every single time.

I really prefer it and as the two of us are always doing exactly the same thing while we're on the ground, there is a much firmer regime in force.

I've really no problem with the BA monitored approach, which we use but I was taught that it's the Captain who watches out for the big stuff and the FO who avoids the wee stuff and I think that this SOP keeps the Captain more in the loop than the old one- although, of course a perfect Captain would be unaffected.:)

I'm 100% sure that having non varying duties on the ground is good.

[strikemaster82]

it's the Captain who watches out for the big stuff and the FO who avoids the wee stuff

As an F/O, I watch out for all stuff. If the Captain has missed something big, I'll tell him and I expect him to do the same for me.

BA's ground duties do not 'vary', you are either PF or PNF. Everyone knows what PF or PNF are meant to do and most of us are aware enough to know which one we are being during a particular sector!

[wiggy]

It's been a while since I've operated there, but from what I can recall, it's not that long of a runway in the first place, why limit your options by choosing an intersection?

One consideration may be that the 180 "turn on the runway procedure" for the 777, which they would have needed if they had backtracked, is not the most popular manoeuvre and can introduce it's own problems if not handled properly :\. Frankly if the performance figures aren't marginal I would have opted for the intersection.

[spin_doctor]

In BA, the Captain is always the Captain. It's completely untrue to suggest that the FO having 'the sector' then means he/she makes all the decisions. Obviously the intention is to let them run it as much as practical. If I gave the FO the sector and they suggested an unsuitable fuel figure, for example, I would discuss it with them and tell them why I thought it should be something else. Ultimately we take the fuel I am happy with.

When taxying, regardless of who is physically steering, I am aware that if we get lost, enter an active runway without clearance, hit anything or otherwise mess up that it is me, as the Captain, that is ultimately responsible. The excuse of 'it was the FO's sector' is not one that is going to get you very far in the subsequent debrief.

Extra procedures and checks will always be introduced to try and trap this type of error, but in fact it is not possible to design a 'perfect' system which people can't manage to screw up somehow. We all make mistakes and will continue to do so. Adopting a new procedure will not stop this happening again, it will just make the mistake required for it to happen slightly different.

[HPbleed]

To play devils advocate, with the FO taxiing, the Captain is free to navigate using the airport charts, whilst keeping an eye outside and talking to ATC to negotiate slots etc. Surely maintaining the bigger picture is more important?

[BarbiesBoyfriend]

Strikemaster 82.

Of course, we all watch out for everything. I think we all know that.

My point is simply that as role reversal is not possible on the ground in my new type (which has paint on it's tail that you would be familier with.;)) the Capt must always be PF when on the ground.

I greatly prefer it this way to the old way when 50% of the time the FO was PF.

Role reversal has a real value but, having tried both ways this year, I really think it works better with each guy doing the same job each time.

[everynowandthen]

Would anybody who has been an FO in an airline where you weren't allowed to drive whilst pootling around on the taxiways care to comment as to how they found the transition when gaining their Captaincy? Would life have been any different had you been allowed to taxi under a Captain's tuition previously?

[MD83FO]

How many of you on the flight deck, at a holding point or lineing up, would interrupt proceedures and interact with pax via cabin crew?




i would take the measures necessary to listen to any eyes behind the cockpit before take off, and I would like the crew to be responsive to passengers and relay the info that can save my life, if it happens before cycling the seatbelt for take off

[protectthehornet]

two points:

I've been the captain and just as we took the runway, we got an interphone call that something was wrong...we taxied clear and dealt with it...FA heard what turned out to be a faulty door seal. Happy to take care of it on the ground.

I've been a deadheading pilot when the flying crew took the runway with the flaps/slats retracted. I made up my mind that (as I was close to the cockpit) if I heard the configuration warning horn as they throttled up, and then heard them throttle back, that would be ok...but if they rolled I would be out of my seat beating the door down (actually using my key to get in...in the days when just a mechanical key would do). throttles up...HONK...throttle back flaps down...off we go. And when we got to the destination, I read them the riot act.

I also knew that taxiing would be the toughest part of upgrading...especially as I upgraded to a plane I'd never flown as copilot and was on a different route structure than I had been flying. So you take it slow, have your taxi chart out, make sure your f/o has his chart out and you make doubly sure.

[wiggy]

I would like the crew to be responsive to passengers and relay the info that can save my life, if it happens before cycling the seatbelt for take off

In general I strongly agree but unfortunately in this specific case the Station Engineer's rush to contact the Cabin Manager at Door 1 Left was triggered after the aircraft entered the runway and as it was lining up, so it's probable the "Takeoff chimes" (the equivalent of cycling the belts) would have already sounded.

[BOAC]

This really all depends on your cabin crew. If properly trained and instilled with the 'silent aircraft' rules at crucial times, yes, I would probably stop up to a reasonable speed, say 80kts, on receipt of a call on the basis that they would not have called unless it was important. Better safe than sorry? Even more so if your company has a system for indicating an 'emergency' such as 3 or 4 chimes.

[411A]

My point is simply that as role reversal is not possible on the ground in my new type (which has paint on it's tail that you would be familier with.) the Capt must always be PF when on the ground.
I greatly prefer it this way to the old way when 50% of the time the FO was PF.


Hardly surprising that you prefer it...the policy makes far more sense.
Sadly, BA appears, in many ways, to apply sideways thinking with many of their policies.
Having said this, as I have personally flown with several BA secconded crew at other airlines, found them to be quite good operators.
Just as good, in fact, as secconded QF crew, some years ago.

BA.
FD crew, OK.
Management policies...suspect.:suspect:

[Dream Land]

One consideration may be that the 180 "turn on the runway procedure" for the 777" by wiggyThanks for the information.

Cheers, D.L.

[Sobelena]

I think this scenario has been discussed before. There are two major problems: the time factor and ignorance.

TIME FACTOR:

1. Summon CC and hope they respond quickly.

2. Convince CC that you're qualified to make an observation regarding the safety of the a/c.

3. Hope that CC has enough time left to convey message to FD.

IGNORANCE:

I recall sitting just behind the wing on an FK-100 not so long after the Republic DC-9 crash in DTW and noting 0 flap as we lined up - ignorant of the fact that this was standard for the type. There was no time to say or do anything so I clenched my buttocks and figured that since we were light we'd get away with it! I remained ignorant for many years as on my subsequent flights on the type I was always ahead of the wing. When I learned of my ignorance I thought back to that day and was grateful that I hadn't rushed up front with my I/D to warn the crew (pre 911 days - so it was possible)!

[ZimmerFly]

Am I to believe this guy is telling the wider forum and the public that a F/O is adequately qualified to operate the aircraft in all manner of flight, navigation, approach, go-around, land etc but should the God like genius in the LHS become incopacitated die and the F/O gets the aircraft safely on the ground, he is totally incapable of taxiing the same aircraft off the runway?

I believe this has happened to one Far Eastern airline when P1 was incapacitated.

After a successful autoland by the F/O, he had to stop on the runway as he had NEVER been taught/allowed to taxi the beast.

Company policy allowed the F/O to control the aircraft from after lineup until about 40 knots on the landing roll. [B747 with a tiller on each side]

An ideal place for 411A perhaps?

[anything]

The flaws in 411 argument seem to be many but there are 2 points I would like to make.
Firstly having flown types with tillers on only one side and also with tillers on both sides I would far prefer to have tillers on both sides. Handing over control while trying to exit the runway expediciously at busy international airports is not the most sensible thing to do, although I do not know of any incidents caused by this it can only increase the risk, and was something I was very wary of.
Secondly I am sure if 411 had an incident in the air he would expect his FO to fly the aircraft while he managed the situation (unless he is such an aviation god that he can do everything). What is the difference with this scenario and having the FO taxi the aircraft while the Captain manages the pre departure procedures? Absolutely nothing as far as I can see.

Whilst I know we are meant to play the ball not the man, 411 does seem to display a particular dislike to BA procedures and I cannot understand why. Maybe he could enlighten us with some background information.

[411A]

An ideal place for 411A perhaps?
Yup, if I flew the B747.
Clearly the referenced airline had their policies straight.

Now, what should become of the BA 777 crew in question.
I would suggest...two months off without pay, followed by a PC (in the sim) and two line checks, then return to normal duties.

CRM?
Yup, have these two personally address the next few CRM classes that BA has, and 'explain themselves'.
IE: a learning experience, for all...without having any metal bent with the original incident.

Also, look carefully at the idea of...
1. Having the First Officer taxi the airplane (a bad idea, in my opinion),
and...
2. Make damn sure this does not happen again.
3. For all pilots...to be sure of the airfield layout, and, have the company (BA) survey the airports that they serve, to be sure that signage is up to snuff. IF signage is found defective, find out why.

And, for the UKCAA, have a very close look (review) of BA flight deck policies, to be sure that they are reasonable.
Reasonable defined as...the Captain always has control of the tiller for taxi...without question.
First Officers, when they advance to Command, will have an ample opportunity to taxi the airplane, during Command training.

[BusyB]

HP Bleed,
Agreed.


I cannot see how a Captain can fail to monitor an FO taxiing although it obviously happened here. Before TO checklists are not long on a 777. If unable to monitor at a simple airfield I would be unhappy as a pax at a more complicated one. I do however remember flying with Captains where I was far happier monitoring them than letting them monitor me due to their variable performance.

411A,
"You might be surprised, 412SP...several F/O's request just that."
Maybe they prefer to not learn to make decisions and feel safer monitoring you!!:p

[barit1]

Excuse my ignorance (cockpit technology is passing me by) -

For less than $150 I can buy a talking GPS that will direct my automobile - within a few metres - to a desired destination.

Are you telling me the FD/FMS can't direct me to the correct intersection for TO?

[RobertS975]

This was posted on airliners.net by someone who is a BA 777 flight crew member and I re-post it here for several reasons. First, it explains to me why the crew would opt for an intersection takeoff rather than backtrack for a full length departure. Second, this post raises the issue about the issue of BA crews being able to freely report safety issues without fear of punishment. And that clearly did not happen here as the Captain was demoted.

Here is the post from airliners.net:

."OK, before we get too carried away here:

The aircraft actually had sufficient runway without the use of full power as long as both engines kept running. The real problem would have been a loss of thrust before V1 which may have led to runway excursion whilst trying to

Neither pilot had been to St.Kitts before. The runway and taxiway signage was vitually non-existent at the time.

At many of the Caribbean Airports that we operate to, a full length departure means a backtrack (or Back-taxi if your American). Whils't that is not a big deal for a shorthaul/narrowbody aircraft, it is a big deal for a 777 which cannot turn 180deg in a standard rwy width (45m). There are turning circles at the end of most rwys, but a 180deg turn in a 777 is a convoluted affair (BA/Boeing SOPs) with a 15deg offset required, a full stop, hard tiller over and then turn into turning circle using outboard thrust. Apart from being slow and inconvenient, it tends to wear the rear tyres quite badly, especially if the rear wheel steering is U/S.

As a result, the crew elected to take the longest intersection departure (I would have made the same decision). Unfortunately, they misidentified the correct position and started the T/O roll from the shorter intersection.

We carry a station engineer from Antigua on this trip. As all of our 777s are ETOPS a/c, we are obliged to do an ETOPS transit check on all departures. A ground engineer is carried on all Caribbean shuttle flights to do this, leaving the flight crew to concentrate on their duties. In this case, as he had been there several times before, the engineer realised the error and tried to gain access to the flight deck (I think I would have done the same). Unfortunately, the Cabin Manager failed to understand the nature of the problem and concentrated on keeping the flight deck area sterile to avoid distractions!

Because the flight crew were expecting an intersection departure, they were expecting runway behind them, but failed to realise the lack of runway in front of them! ATC also failed to notify them, even though they were aware of the intersection point!

It was only after they were airborne that the crew realised their mistake. They were, of course, mortified! They fully confessed their transgression to BA management. A full investigation (with AAIB) was instigated. Despite the BA safety philosophy being a 'no blame' culture, the Captain was demoted and faces a long time before he can look at command again and both he and the F/O faced re-training in the simulator. This is highly controversial amongst the pilot force of BA, for many reasons.

I know both pilots and they are both competent and nice guys. I went to St.Kitts myself subsequently and personally found it difficult to comprehend how this had happened, but it did. All of us are very aware that this was an embarrassing and potentially fatal incident. We were lucky that we didn't have an accident, but we have to put it behind us, learn from the mistakes and put procedures in place to help prevent a repitition.

As part of the review following this incident, BA has decided to fit a runway alerting system to it's aircraft and our latest 777, a 300ER has just gone into service with this RAAS (Runway Alerting & Awareness System) fitted.

So, I hope that this answers many questions about the incident and that you might see it more from our perspective. For those who wonder about BA's operating standards, I can say personally that I think this was embarrassing and that we were lucky, but I think that all airlines have occasions where things go wrong, many of them we don't hear about! In our case, I think that BA and it's pilots have responded by learning from it and I beleive that our safety standards have improved even further as a result.

Incidentally, BA do not put undue pressure on us to achieve quick turnarounds. We obviously take pride in an on schedule operation, but I don't believe it was a factor in this incident."

[dfstrottersfan]

Isn't the answer to this as simple as having signs on all runways every ? 100 m ? showing the distance to the end of the runway. I am sure that I saw this at IAD.

The crew would then compare the distance from their position to the end of the runway with what they expected.

Is this a naive "too simple" solution?

Just SLF please don't flame me.........

[BOAC]

From 1.10.2 of the report:
There were distance-to-go marker boards every 1,000 ft on the edge of the
runway. Although a useful indication of relative position on the runway, this
is not an Annex 14, Volume I, Aerodrome Design and Operations, requirement
and is more commonly used at military airports.

[west lakes]

Though most are not directly involved I actually know one of the C/C who was on this flight. I am also aware that the engineer involved is fairly well known to most of the C/C that make these flights.

[Flightwatch]

I operated the BEA/BA “monitored approach” system with more-or-less total handover of PF/PNF duties for 30+ years and well remembered the howls of protest from the BOAC contingent when the system – in slightly modified form – was adopted for the introduction of the 747-400. Happily they were professional enough, despite many saying they hated it, to adopt it and it is, I assume still in use today, 22 years later.

For the past (nearly) 10 years I have flown with a company on the same equipment who use the basic Boeing “one man and his dog” system, whereby, in theory there is no change over of duties apart from whose hand is on the control column and where the F/O theoretically has little say in the operational decisions on the day.

Somebody asked a few posts ago what it is like for F/Os from the latter background what it is like when it comes to command upgrade. Difficult, appears to be the answer from those I have asked. In BA command upgrade failures were rare as compared with my present operator where although not common they are a significantly higher percentage than at BA particularly as in BA they often comprised of a seat/type change as opposed to the current outfit who only have one type. Also the duration of the course is about three times as long.

I well remember debriefing a converting F/O on the 744 after we zig-zagged off down the taxiway on his first sector on the aircraft why it had happened. “Well”, he said, “I have been on the 737-200 since I joined BA without a rhs tiller and the last aircraft I taxied was a PA-28 through the rudder pedals”.

This shows clearly the folly of an inflexible system which does not allow at least some hand over of responsibilities during line operation. I am not referring to the monitored approach which is a whole different argument and which has been done to death before and caused much disagreement between the two camps, mostly from those who have not had the benefit of actually trying both systems and who spout forth with the benefit of their inexperience. I am referring to allowing the co-pilot to make the fuel decision, calculate the take-off performance (rather than just checking it), do the walkaround and the myriad other tasks that the Boeing sop says is done by the Captain. On my side I try to use a certain amount of discretion in normal operation and I like to load the FMS merely to stay current with the whole operation (at my age I don’t want to be transferred to the 70+ thread and become an incompetent “gummer”!)

I understand that Boeing have just one sop for all types and realize that they do this as they sell aircraft to many airlines where it fits perfectly, I believe in the USA you don’t even have to hold a P1 rating to sit in the rhs in many cases. However in a well trained first world company it does not sit well to have a person in the lhs who makes all the decisions to the detriment of his colleague. In fact it goes against many of the principles of CRM to do so and there are few in my present company who do not include the F/O in their deliberations.

That font of all knowledge 411A condescendingly states that he has flown with BA/QF crews who were “quite good operators”. Well, in my opinion a “quite good Captain” should be competent and confident enough to supervise the co-pilot taxying. In fact even the TriStar was flown by BEA/BA for many years using the hand-over technique.

Having said all this in each company it is their train set and we all have to play with it as the ops manual states.

[411A]

Having said all this in each company it is their train set and we all have to play with it as the ops manual states.

Yup, and few companies adhere to the 'BA way'.
For a very good reason...it is nonsense.:E

[Flightwatch]

Have you tried it over a reasonable period of time?

If as I suspect you have not then you too are guilty of giving us the benefit of your inexperience.

Pilots are great at resisting change but before it is too late you too could open your mind to new ideas rather than relying on the mantra than "it has always been done that way so it must be right".

[stilton]

Yes I suppose being a big fish in a very small pond, a la 411a might lead one to believe they have become the crucible of all things aviation.



:D

[ATPMBA]

HOW WOULD YOU IDENTIFY ALPHA?

I just looked at a taxi diagram, Bravo has the tower and fire station across the way.

[M.Mouse]

flightwatch

An excellent factual post and from many years experience too. Your comment about pilot's naturally resisting change is so true. I was once on a QF 747-400 and visited the flight deck being curious as I was on the same aircraft with BA at the time.

BA jumbos have a shared bunk with a door and two bunks one above the other. QF have (or had) a single first class seat at the back of the FD behind a curtain and a second first class seat behind a curtain at the back of the upper deck where BA have a large wardrobe for passenger coats, etc.

On noise issues alone I thought the setup was inferior to ours. I mentioned this interesting arrangement and the SFO on the FD replied in that wonderful Australian style that 'the company want to give us a double bunk area behind a door but we're fighting it'!

Similarly, so much of the criticism of BA SOPs is from those not having ever experienced them. I have experienced both. I prefer BA SOPs. With reference to command conversions I gained my command on the B757 after 10 years on the B747 so a type AND command conversion. I completed that conversion in 24 sectors including a two sector final check.

In my 12 years as an FO in BA there were two basic types of captain - those who made all the decisions and paid scant regard to the guy in the RHS (who may well have had a command elsewhere and would not necessarily be wet behind the ears) and those who had sufficient confidence in themselves to actually allow FOs to make decisions and allow them to learn and develop. It is never in question who has the final say nor that the captain will override anything he/she is not happy with.

In the incident which is the subject of this thread it is plain there were a number of contributing factors. Anybody in commercial aviation will know of many, many seemingly inexplicable events which could so easily have been tragedies were it not for an element of luck.

Having flown close to 900 hrs for several years on the B777 it may well be that fatigue played a part but that cannot be proven. Complacency may also feature and that is something which all of us fight very hard to avoid. Hands up anybody who has never frightened themselves having lapsed from one's usual high standards, breathed a sigh of relief and learnt from the experience.

Given that BA has an open and 'no blame' safety reporting culture with the exception of actions deemed negligent. It is indicative of how seriously the company view the incident given the captain lost his command, something which rarely happens. In most cases retraining and supervision is the norm.

Those posters claiming BA should insist on minimum signage, etc at airports they operate to have clearly never ventured far from the civilised world.

[Flightwatch]

Thank you M. Mouse.

Interesting, isn’t it, how our self appointed expert never replies when challenged?

I too prefer BA SOPs however for the next few months until anno domini catches up with me I can only use my discretion to allow the co-pilot to make as many decisions and carry out my duties to the permitted limit which sadly doesn’t extend to letting him taxy the aircraft. I fail to see in the incident above how whoever was taxying was relevant; the fact is that both pilots mis-identified the intersection.

I seem to remember that a seat change in BA was accomplished in around 12 sectors, with my present mob it is many more.

[frangatang]

Dont worry about 411a, he is suffering from the desert heat and probably still pulling cactus spines out of his ar.. , which has fuddled his brain!

[captainsmiffy]

I have to know....does 411A own a goldfish?

[BitMoreRightRudder]

However, with the nonsensical 'roll reversal' cr*p that BA uses, the First Officer is to taxi the airplane, the Commander then does...co-pilot duties.
Bad form.


So in this case the F/O was taxying the a/c leaving the captain to moniter the taxi route. In other words the captain had more capacity to spot the mistake. This incident has absolutely nothing to do with who was controlling the a/c. Be honest, you just don't like the idea of some young upstart touching "your" thrust levers!

BA and many others have been following these procedures for a long time. They are safe and they work. If it bruises your ego then on behalf of BA and many other airlines, I can only apologise :hmm:

[Oakape]

The pilot not taxiing often has more to do than simply monitor the taxi route & check the charts. In our outfit he/she does the take-off review & the before take-off checklist.

The take-off review involves a run around the cockpit calling a number of settings & and visually checking them. If you don't want to break the flow & miss something, you will have your head inside the cockpit for a while while you are doing this, followed by selecting the before take-off checklist. I'm not saying that it is right, it is just what my outfit expects us to do.

The taxi in this case was quite short & it is possible that the captain had his head inside at the critical moment that the aircraft was turned onto 'B'. Not the best time to be 'heads down', but you could be forgiven for thinking that it was a simple taxi route & not prone to error. Particularly if you hadn't been there before.

So it is not necessarily the case that the captain had more capacity to spot the error. He may in fact have had less!

[Right Engine]

I bet the engineer will take the jump seat for the rest of his career!

[411A]

So it is not necessarily the case that the captain had more capacity to spot the error. He may in fact have had less!

Indeed so, Oakape, however I doubt our self-appointed BA experts would want to admit this, as it would damage their 'we know best' image.:rolleyes:
And, then we come to intersection takeoffs....this one in particular.
Was it such a waste of time to taxi to the end of the runway?
And, one can't use the excuse of a narrow runway either, as there are turning pads available.
The safer alternative is clearly to begin the takeoff from the end of the runway, yet our happless BA pilots chose otherwise.
Only three words needed to describe these two...careless and reckless.

[Shell Management]

Is M.Mouse correct? Do BA still have a 'no blame culture'? Are they really that backward? Forward thinking organisations through that concept out at least a decade ago.

A Safety Case for each destination would have prevented what could have been a major disaster as it would have highlighted the airport's shortcomings. The lack of teeth of CAA's ASSI organisation is also rather concerning.

[Slickster]

The safer alternative is clearly to begin the takeoff from the end of the runway, yet our happless BA pilots chose otherwise.

Not really, in this day and age, and on modern jets. A take off from the full length would have used a higher derate, and consequently the aircraft would need more runway, than from an intersection where a higher power setting would be used, and consequently less runway needed. A point often overlooked by the "runway behind you" brigade.

Regardless of your views on whether the captain should taxy the aircraft or not, I am at a loss to see what difference it would have made in this incident. I mean, he was on the flight deck, right? So he didn't do the take off brief, but presumably he listened to it?

Apart from 411a, who clearly came forth from his mother's womb, wearing 4 stripes, and a set of pilot's wings, we all have to start somewhere. IMHO, but only having known BA SOPs, the more you can get the FO to act as captain the better. We are all qualified P1 on the aircraft, and it will make the transition to captaincy that bit more straightforward when the time comes. In addition, many folk are vastly experienced in the RHS, either from a military background, or having held commands in other airlines.

[M.Mouse]

Is M.Mouse correct? Do BA still have a 'no blame culture'? Are they really that backward? Forward thinking organisations through that concept out at least a decade ago.

Care to expand on that rather interesting statement?

411A thank you so much for the laugh of the week when you refer to BA pilots as 'self-appointed BA experts '.

Kettle to pot, are you receiving over.

[411A]

A take off from the full length would have used a higher derate, and consequently the aircraft would need more runway, than from an intersection where a higher power setting would be used, and consequently less runway needed. A point often overlooked by the "runway behind you" brigade.

Not necessarily used a 'higher' derate, Slickster...the pilots can select any derate they so desire, within limitations, or....none at all.
Unless of course, perhaps for BA, who would not necessarily have common sense.
So, I gather that with your statement, re intersection takeoffs, you were quite OK and in agreement with the concerned pilots actions?
The shorter the runway the better, perhaps?:rolleyes:

BA are already directly responsible for one 777 accident, one wonders if they are aiming for some kind of record, with their (collectively) strange ideas?

[Aileron Drag]

You can choose not to derate, but in the long-term you are setting yourself and your mates up for a higher incidence of engine failures. You really ought not to cane the poor engines just for the sake of an anachronistic view of your 'rights' as captain.

By the way, I get the impression 411A once failed the BA selection procedure (or am I being unkind?) :O

AD

[SweetChariotXV]

To BarbiesBoyfriend and 411A:

Regarding the whole issue of F/O's shouldn't be allowed to taxi, and there only having a tiller on Captains side, what is the procedure if the Captain became incapacitated during flight?

With only one tiller, I presume the F/O would fly the aircraft from right hand seat, land, stop it on runway, apply brakes and await tug? And with that (as I only fly small turbo prop aircraft, we have no tillers), is the tiller not required to control the steering as the aircraft slows down on the runway?

Looking forward to some clarification...

[blueloo]

A take off from the full length would have used a higher derate, and consequently the aircraft would need more runway, than from an intersection where a higher power setting would be used, and consequently less runway needed. A point often overlooked by the "runway behind you" brigade.

Utter rubbish.

You are forgetting many variables, such as aircraft weight etc.

Our company has worked out a standard derate (in this case it is the maximum 61 degrees) for use at domestic weights at domestic airports. So on one runway for the same derate we can use full length and a variety of intersections.

(ah the power of a 767!)


A point often overlooked by the "runway behind you" brigade

As for this quote....hmmm...sometimes its more the "runway ahead" of you when you do a high speed RTO.........

[L337]

411A has an obsession with the British, and all things BA. He hates both. At every opportunity he posts here, and I assume, anywhere else he can, and posts the same obsessive diatribe over and over again.

By virtue of the internet he attains a large audience, and that seems to sustain him and his ego.

His main mode of operation is to say the same thing over and over again in the vain hope that what he says will become the truth. His views belong in a bygone age. The world and aviation have long since moved on from his archaic views and beliefs. Thank God.

At the end of the day he is an old man, with old ideas, flying an old aeroplane, in a tiny operation in a tiny backwater.

[Shell Management]

M. Mouse: Extensive research in the oil industry has shown that a just culture trumps a no-blame culture as reckless and irressponsible behaviour deserves blame and retrubution (errors don't).
411: 'BA responsbile for one 777 accident' - applying a blame culture there?

[Slickster]

So, I gather that with your statement, re intersection takeoffs, you were quite OK and in agreement with the concerned pilots actions?
The shorter the runway the better, perhaps?


Not at all. But the intersection they planned to take off from, was perfectly OK - they had the performance for it. Unfortunately, they took off from the wrong intersection. I'm not saying the shorter the runway the better, but I operate in a commercial environment, and if it saves me 10 minutes, fuel, and means I make my slot I'll use an intersection, if I have the figures for it. Presumably, you've never used an intersection departure, and no doubt, by the same token, fill your crate to the brim with gas everywhere you go regardless of how much fuel is required?

Utter rubbish.

You are forgetting many variables, such as aircraft weight etc.

Our company has worked out a standard derate (in this case it is the maximum 61 degrees) for use at domestic weights at domestic airports. So on one runway for the same derate we can use full length and a variety of intersections.


Well, on the 2 Boeings I've flown, we use CARD, via the ACARS to get our performance. You input all the variables, and it spits out your take off performance. All things being equal, you will get a better derate when using the longer runway, therefore, lower power setting, longer take off roll. You obviously get a better derate, the lighter you are, but I fail to see the relevance of this, as the aircraft is the same weight wherever you take off from. Either it can be done, or not.

As for this quote....hmmm...sometimes its more the "runway ahead" of you when you do a high speed RTO.........

I take your point, but again, for an intersection departure, you may often have a different (lower) V1, thus meaning you have just as much runway to stop in as you would have full length, with a higher V1, and the slower take of roll.

So I beg to differ - I am not talking utter rubbish.

[Timothy Claypole]

Shell Management: M.Mouse wrote:

Given that BA has an open and 'no blame' safety reporting culture with the exception of actions deemed negligent

My bold. Isn't that the same as a just culture? I think you may be getting into semantics.

[411A]

With only one tiller, I presume the F/O would fly the aircraft from right hand seat, land, stop it on runway, apply brakes and await tug?
Yup, that is precisely correct, and what is expected, by many (most) airlines.

(or am I being unkind?)
Nope, not unkind, not British (thanks for small favors), therefore never applied.

Quote:
A take off from the full length would have used a higher derate, and consequently the aircraft would need more runway, than from an intersection where a higher power setting would be used, and consequently less runway needed. A point often overlooked by the "runway behind you" brigade.

Utter rubbish.

You are forgetting many variables, such as aircraft weight etc.

Our company has worked out a standard derate (in this case it is the maximum 61 degrees) for use at domestic weights at domestic airports. So on one runway for the same derate we can use full length and a variety of intersections.



Quote:
A point often overlooked by the "runway behind you" brigade

As for this quote....hmmm...sometimes its more the "runway ahead" of you when you do a high speed RTO.........

...is slightly more important.

What surprises me the most is those at BA here (both retired and 'current'), whom are trying (with very limited success) to justify the actions of these two bozos, under discussion.
It is quite clear from the AAIB report, that the UKCAA thinks otherwise.

I was quite willing to present this as a learning experience, thereby saving these guys their positions.
However, having read a few 'odd' comments from former and retired BA pilots, I have changed my mind.

Rather than change this into a 'learning experience' for BA, these bozos deserve to be sacked (or severely demoted), forthwith.

Wonder if they were?

BA, perhaps trying to tie AirFrance in the hull loss ratings?
It can't be long before this happens, with BA 'obtuse' flight ops procedures:rolleyes:

This very serious incident has exposed BA for what they truly are...an airline whose aircraft are crewed by pilots whom have few (perhaps outdated) ideas of what they are correctly doing.
Oh, how the mighty have fallen.:eek:
How very sad.

[Justin Cyder-Belvoir]

to justify the actions of these two bozos

Question:

Did anyone die? No

Did we all learn from the mistake? Yes

Are they "bozos"? There but for the grace of your non existent God........

[SpaceNeedle]

By 411A Having said this, as I have personally flown with several BA secconded crew at other airlines, found them to be quite good operators.
Just as good, in fact, as secconded QF crew, some years ago.



Did sim training for several ex BA pilots, most are OK but rather long winded self absorbed individuals. Yada, yada,yada .......

[haejangkuk]

fdr....Better outcome so far than the KAL 30 ton over weight departure from Chicago in a B777.

KAL sacked the national captain, messed over the FO, and ultimately got rid of the foreign pilot who reported the problem confidentially on the undertaking that the captain, aircraft, and airport would not be identified, due to the pathologically punitive culture. Apparently the reporters confidentiality was breached in about a week following the undertaking by the head of safety

Bollocks! KAL did sack the national captain but the foreign squealer was done in by his own arrogance. When it was time for his contract renewal, flight administration did contact him asking about his interest in continuing. However his arrogance knew no bounds; to quote, " there're much better opportunities out there; we'll see about it ". Well flight administration thought it was better to be done with him!

His identity was divulged by a fellow expat, the hamburger!

Coming back to the incident, he made no attempt to reach the crew ( when he was augment captain sitting in the forward cabin within reach of the cockpit or interphone ). He let the incident happened so that he can be " one up ". My fellow pilots know him as a self aggrandizing individual with a lot of heroic schemes and anecdotes which we have to bear with on long flights with him.

[411A]

Did sim training for several ex BA pilots, most are OK but rather long winded self absorbed individuals........

Oh yes, par for the course.:rolleyes:
It never changes, I suspect.
Endemic for the breed.:yuk:

[hec7or]

Coincidence or maybe not, but I've twice been lined up by assertive FO's at the wrong intersection and I've not picked it up due to the confident nature in which they have assured me that the performance calculations have permitted it. The first time it happened I was distracted during taxi by a cabin issue, and as we lined up (FO's tiller) I queried as to whether my colleague had rechecked the perf data for the intersection we were using, as it wasn't the one we'd briefed for and he assured me he had. Once airborne, owing to the fact that the piano keys had come up a lot sooner than I'd expected, I got the book out and found that we didn't have any figures for that intersection, even though other companies were using it...(confirmation bias??)., and the second time, the FO was polite enough to admit to me and to the TWR, he'd got the wrong intersection and we backtracked to the one we'd briefed for. (BA franchise operation/geriatric early jets)

Now, both these lads were ex Air Force, and both went on to BA (back in the 90s) and I'm wondering if the psychometric profiles that each of these employers used then had sufficient bias on airmanship to truly support a leg and leg about P1 / P1(S) operation, as even though whilst I was the Captain in each case, I attributed too much credibility to their advocacy and their decision making due to the confident nature of the pre take off brief and the "captaincy" being demonstrated. In effect I was a left hand seat co pilot. They didn't seem to understand the role of the captain as the final arbiter of the decision making process and to my shame I didn't challenge them in the interests of good CRM as I didn't want to come across as "old school".

Having therefore been there, done that, got the T shirt, I commiserate with the crew and blame the management.

[411A]

...I commiserate with the crew and blame the management.

Yup, I would agree.

ANY airline management that would allow a co-pilot to presume that they are in charge of anything, is daft in the extreme.
BA is a perfect example of the odd man out, IE: daft ideas in progress.

British Airways...complete and utter malfeasance, of the highest order, with the crew under discussion.

[M.Mouse]

M. Mouse: Extensive research in the oil industry has shown that a just culture trumps a no-blame culture as reckless and irressponsible behaviour deserves blame and retrubution (errors don't).

I am sorry. I would reply but being of limited intellect I haven't a clue what you are on about.

[johannschmith]

As usual, the best contribution to this thread has come from PJ2, thank you sir for your eminently sensible and logical contributions on this and many other threads over the years.

Risk assessment is mandatory in most organisations that operate a Safety Management System nowadays whenever a new or changed procedure is introduced. Runway incursions are a fact of life, especially at busy airports so any procedure that helps to mitigate the risk should be identified. This can range from what my mob does - a simple reiteration of the taxy routing and a turn by turn commentary from the PF (who always taxies the a/c 411) on where he is going before he makes the turn, to relatively cheap RAAS from Honeywell et al which is available at very little cost.

This loss of SA by the BA crew could be due to any number of reasons - all of them human and all of them traps lying in wait for the rest of us - no matter that 411 appears to be immune to these! Identifying threats and preventing them turning into mistakes is at the very heart of Threat and Error Management. We are all humans and WILL make mistakes, nothing is surer. Being aware of the potential threats and enunciating them as a team - such as the FSF ALAR Risk Assessment Checklist for approach and landing is just one way of doing this. There are many others, all of them useful. What should not be acceptable in the modern world is the concept of nobody being prepared to speak up whenever he's not happy with something. Unfortunately is continues to happen due to experience and cultural reasons, especially in those parts of the world where authority is almost sacrosanct. Perhaps a factor in the A321 accident at Islamabad?

Our Ops Manual allows us to accept intersection departures but I will never intentionally leave runway behind me and I teach my student F/Os and Captains my reasons for this. While the RTOW figures may state that we have the performance for an intersection takeoff, how would you feel if, having performed one of these, something went wrong in the RTO case and you ended up with just the nosewheel in the grass? You're now facing a serious incident enquiry instead of a simple RTO had you used the full length! It may be a cliche but runway behind you is still of those three most useless things in aviation and that hasn't changed since the Wright Brothers.

The division of responsibilities on the flight deck will always be a source of argument among pilots. BA operates a particular type of monitored system that works perfectly well for them. In another existence, I used these procedures and they work very well and are particularly useful during an approach to minimums. There are many other SOPs that work equally well for their operators and I wouldn't have the arrogance to presume that my particular set is better than anyone else's. What is important is that the crew sticks exactly to whatever procedures they have in their company as they give a certain level of certainty to each pilot that he knows what to expect from the other. In this sense, there are probably no bad SOPs - just that some may be better thought out than others.

For 411: you are perfectly entitled to your view on the role of the F/O. However, I firmly believe that giving the F/O as musch authority as possible from the very beginning is the best way to go in the long run. Our 250hr F/Os start the engines, handle all comms with the ground engineer and taxy, takeoff and fly the aircraft from A to B perfectly safely. They do not have the arrogance to believe that they are in charge of the a/c but we give them the licence to make as many of the decisions as possible and if I'm not happy with a course of action I will (gently) query why he/she thinks he/she would do it his/her way and try to educate them on what I believe they may have missed. For 411's benefit, in the past 15 years my F/O has picked up my mistakes more often that I have picked up his! It is a two-man operation with the Captain as leader of the team but with input required and expected from the F/O - even if it happens to be wrong. It is how the Capt handles this kind of situation that will ultimately determine the lesson that the F/O learns from it. mY sincere thanks to all those Captains who over the years gently educated me to get to where I am today.

[411A]

Now, both these lads were ex Air Force, and both went on to BA (back in the 90s) and I'm wondering if the psychometric profiles that each of these employers used then had sufficient bias on airmanship to truly support a leg and leg about P1 / P1(S) operation, as even though whilst I was the Captain in each case, I attributed too much credibility to their advocacy and their decision making due to the confident nature of the pre take off brief and the "captaincy" being demonstrated. In effect I was a left hand seat co pilot. They didn't seem to understand the role of the captain as the final arbiter of the decision making process and to my shame I didn't challenge them in the interests of good CRM as I didn't want to come across as "old school".


I would agree with your comments, and would also agree that the 'captaincy' being demonstrated by these referenced First Officers was poor, in the extreme....IE: they sound very confident, yet often demonstrate poor attitude and proper decision atributes (beak well above ground effect, syndrome).

....I didn't challenge them in the interests of good CRM as I didn't want to come across as "old school".


Nothing wrong with 'old school' in my considered opinion, with appropriate modifications to satisfy the PC set, today.

I commiserate with the crew and blame the management.
I would agree.

[Chief Brody]

411a, your immaturity is truly quite scary.

If I didn't think you were a 17 year old wind-up merchant sitting there in your undies flicking endlessly between pprune and PPorn hoping to god your mum don't walk in I might actually take offence at your drivel.

One things for sure with the regularity of your posts you seem to have very little else to do with your day.

[Juan Tugoh]

I'm surprised that 411a allows mere co-pilots to actually fly the aircraft at all, if taxying is beyond them and dangerous. It beggars belief that such attitudes still exist in management and trainers. We can argue all day as to the role reversal and BA, but to suggest that a commercial pilot is incapable of safely taxying an aircraft is just plain stupid.

[ExSp33db1rd]

In the Olde Days of Yore, when BEA were introducing their monitored approach technique, to the amazement of all the rest of the Worlds' Airline Pilots, a Pan Am ( Ahhhh ! ) Captain approached us in the Idlewild Customs Hall under the impression that BOAC and BEA were one and the same ( 15 years later they were ) and told us that Pan Am had always used a monitored approach !

Oh! Really ? Yes, he said - I fly, he monitors.

I had left BA before the procedure had spread to the 747 fleet, so cannot comment, but I had no problem with the concept that one pilot handled the hardware start to finish, and the other carried out the co-pilot duties, didn't matter which seat was handling the hardware, but as Captain I made the decisions for actions that weren't obvious, or routine. Seemed to work, but then we had a Flight Engineer to do all the real work !

[AFOS]

I agree with you Juan, as per my last post on the matter.
411a says in one breath a F/O is capable, inteligent, qualified to fly the aircraft, even if said genius as 411a become incapcitated or God forbid, die and get the aircraft not only from A to B but actually get the aircraft on the ground, where in his second breath the F/O suddenly becomes so incompetent, unqualified, uninteligent and incapable of moving same aircraft from one slab of concrete to another.
The F/O is clearly capable to handle throttles to make the aircraft go forward/faster, but is incapable to handle the tiller to control the aircraft on the ground
The bloke is a joke beyond anything resembling credible.
AFOS

[infrequentflyer789]

I'm surprised that 411a allows mere co-pilots to actually fly the aircraft at all, if taxying is beyond them and dangerous. It beggars belief that such attitudes still exist in management and trainers.

Given this weeks "management" quotes, starting to wonder if 411A is acutally MOL...

Ryanair boss says air stewardesses should be allowed to land planes in an emergency - Telegraph (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/travelnews/7981643/Ryanair-boss-says-air-stewardesses-should-be-allowed-to-land-planes-in-an-emergency.html)

[oxenos]

"... long winded self absorbed individuals..." (Post # 146 ).
Sums up 411A very well

[411A]

...and told us that Pan Am had always used a monitored approach !
Oh! Really ? Yes, he said - I fly, he monitors.


A quite reasonable alternative, on many occasions.:E

[Basil]

Just to clarify a point about the Monitored Approach.
The technique, as developed by BEA, is extremely useful in aircraft which do not have autoland. IMHO it is less advantageous on those which have a good auto-coupled and/or autoland capability.
One spin-off is that, until the sector pilot takes control, (s)he is doing the RT and does not have to refer to the other pilot for a decision. As a company SOP it works well.
Once had a captain who joined us from a subsiduary and, like some posters here, was determined to demonstrate how wrong BEA was by flying his own approach on a dark and dirty night. He totally screwed it up and burst all the maingear tyres. Before anyone asks what the FO was doing, I warned him and he still continued. I've given that one some thought and really, the only other thing I could have done with this nitwit was to physically fight him for control and that seemed to be the greater of the two weevils.

I've flown six different SOPs and can't get worked up about the detail. As a chief pilot dear to some on another forum said: "Just do it!" . . and thereafter was known as JDI.
Others get paid to argue over the Flying Manual detail so why bother?


ExSp33db1rd,
OK, sorry you had to get the monitored approach which wasn't your SOP but, in exchange, we had to stop using intercom and shout at each other which is probably why my hearing's nearly as bad as that of an ex Shack crewman I was shouting to last week :)

[Slickster]

Let's not get too bogged down in who's SOPs are better than others, with regards to monitored approaches etc. I think the important thing is that everyone is singing from the same hymn sheet, and secondly the right hymn sheet.

BA (BEA really) brought in the monitored approach after a nasty accident, involving a CAT 1 break out, with the pilot doing it all himself. It's a very hard thing to do, to go off instruments, and transition visually at 200 odd feet, in lousy weather, unless you're 411a of course.....

The monitored approach is less relevant now, as most aircraft and airports are more sophisticated, when bad weather hits, but I believe BA still thinks it has relevance, as regardless of the conditions, both pilots are more involved in the outcome of the approach - one briefs the other on how it should be flown, and then a discussion about potential threats might well develop, even from the lowliest low timer. Of course, 411a no doubt just informs his lackey what is required of him, and the outcome is always a complete success, due to his pure brilliance. The rest of us are happy to listen to any points made by other people, and act on them if necessary.

None of this detracts from the captain's overall responsibility for the flight - something 411a appears to cling to with terrified determination, afraid to let his FO drive the aeroplane, even when on the ground. As mentioned earlier in this thread, the captains who intervene on the most trivial of issues, are usually the under confident ones, or incompetent ones. I wonder which category Tristar Warrior falls into?!

Incidentally, I did an intersection departure from an Italian airport today. The alternative was a 400m backtrack, thus, further delaying my passengers, whilst waiting for someone else to land. What a foolhardy bozo am I.......:hmm: I fly to Jersey regularly, which is shorter than any intersection available to me at LGW. Should I never take an intersection at LGW, or demand Jersey build a bigger runway, else I'm not taking off.:ugh: Be practical people.

This is all a bit of thread creep. I'm pretty sure the incident above did not happen due to BA "giving sectors" to FOs - the captain is still supervising, and I'm sure it didn't because the FO was taxiing. In most modern airlines, you are team, and whilst someone is still in charge, everyone else from the dispatcher to engineers to cabin crew have safety critical responsibilities.

The "why" is more important, so that everyone else learns (apart from 411a, who knows everything anyway). So, is it how/why did it happen, let's look into it and learn from it, or the 411a answer - 3200 BA pilots are all "bozos", poorly trained, with ingrained personality defects? That is almost half of all British commercial pilots BTW......

ANY airline management that would allow a co-pilot to presume that they are in charge of anything, is daft in the extreme.
BA is a perfect example of the odd man out, IE: daft ideas in progress.


I particularly like the emphasis on co-pilot. I would agree with with you, if the first officer was a monkey, simply there to do as he was told (tellingly obvious, in the position of the gear lever, flap lever, and speedbrake lever in Boeings), but the World has moved on from "Atlantic Barons", and monkeys in the RHS, as Boeing intended. We have First Officers and Captains in BA, and either will act as co-pilot on a day to day basis. This does not detract from the Captain being in charge one iota - at least, not my flights.

And this is priceless:

I was quite willing to present this as a learning experience, thereby saving these guys their positions.
However, having read a few 'odd' comments from former and retired BA pilots, I have changed my mind.


Gee, thanks for your magnanimity, 411a, but I somehow doubt you'll be at the centre of any BA investigation, or involved in any subsequent disciplinary or training matters. I'm sure we'll manage fine without you. We'll all learn from it, but clearly you won't - there's nothing for you to learn, after all, is there?

[BBK]

Slickster

Good post. You said all I would have wanted to say.

regards

BBK

[411A]

We'll all learn from it, but clearly you won't - there's nothing for you to learn, after all, is there?

Not very much, no....especially from still wet behind the ears co-pilots.:E

[SmilingKnifed]

Might I urge retirement in that case?

At least that way your arrogance won't be a factor in an accident.

[wiggy]

For some reason, I know not why, I'm reminded of the Jasper Carrott one-liner about the elderly motorist who "had never had an accident but seen thousands".

[411A]

Might I urge retirement in that case?


Negative, still have work to do, training new Captains.:)

[Sick Squid]

Speaking with my moderators hat off....

I've worked for several years to BA's SOP's. Prior to that, I worked in the PF/PNF environment. Both work admirably well. If anything, BA is one of the few airlines that empowers copilots, unlike others that neuter them. That leads, in my experience, to a more rounded level of command; we can all make mistakes, we can all learn. Couple that with a learning, no-blame, open culture, and you see this incident, which was not picked up by any monitoring system, but revealed and owned up to by the operating crew. After all, if they'd STFU'd, then nothing would probably ever have come out.

I would rather work within THAT culture, than any other. That is perhaps the hidden message behind this; they screwed up, they got away with it, they owned up. In a culture where the Captain is God, would this have been revealed? Given such a culture, how do you then continue in the same manner when found so wanting?

I am having trouble recognising the stereotype image of BA and BA Captains perpetrated here by 411A. I certainly flew with commanders with the attitude he describes, however, unfortunately, it was in my previous company. BA is far more relaxed and open in all manners whilst still maintaining a very professional operation, than people realise from the outside.

The word on the street is that all BA fleets are to be fitted with the system that tells you how much runway you have available, and warns if it less than acceptable. Is that not a fair and reasonable outcome from an incident where there was a mistake made, owned up-to within the positive safety culture, and lessons learned by all? To limit this discussion to the merits or demerits of empowering FO's or having a monitored approach system in place is missing the main point. I'd rather have the culture I work within, though some who prefer to rule-the-roost OPENLY may differ with that preference.

Squid

[411A]

The word on the street is that all BA fleets are to be fitted with the system that tells you how much runway you have available,

Oddly enough, BA was one of the first to have this equipment, long ago...and yes, on L1011 aircraft.
Having used it at other airlines (leased BA aircraft) it worked just fine, thank you....IF operated and set properly, for each takeoff.
Many times..a very big IF.

[Sick Squid]

4!!A, I think you'll find it now works from an independent GPS feed, therefore not reliant on any prior input, but that is a good point.

[Juan Tugoh]

Out of curiosity 411a are you talking about the GRM?

[411A]

Out of curiosity 411a are you talking about the GRM?
I believe so, yes...the correct term.
As I recall, it worked very well, indeed.

[ExSp33db1rd]

One of my 'co-pilot' colleagues was once flying with one of BOAC's North Atlantic Barons, a breed apart, and after three calls - inserting the word Sir, but without first being spoken to ! - that the speed on short finals was low and dropping, finally advanced the throttles.

After landing said N.Atl B. said " MR xxxx, if you ever touch MY throttles again they will be the last throttles you touch in BOAC. "

Them were the days ! ( are you listening, 411A ? )

names witheld to protect the innocent.

If you think it's difficult to line up at the wrong intersection, how about the closed but parallel RUNWAY, as happened to a well known S.E.airline with a previously good safety record and flight deck culture ( I worked for them ! ) at Taipei one dark and dirty night. ( and Lexington, of course )

We can all make mistakes and to deny that possibility is sheer folly.

[777fly]

411a: The GRM ( ground roll monitor) was only ever used in 'British Airways' by one of its predecessor airlines, BEA ( British European Airways). BEA took delivery of the L1011 2 years ahead of the merger with BOAC, (this merger creating British Airways.)
BEA had pioneered autoland operations with the DH121 Trident many years before, using a triplex autopilot system. Many of the features of that system were incorporated directly onto the L1011, although moving to a 'dual-dual' autopilot system, rather than triplex. BEA were keen to maintain their lead in low vis operations with the L1011 and were intending to work towards CAT3C regularity, i.e operating in virtually zero visibility. The GRM was designed to get the aircraft from the gate to the runway by a strictly defined route at a limited number of airfields, via distance run and heading information. We used to practise the technique in good visibilty and occasionally as a back up in CAT 2/3 conditions. It was never fully operationally approved and the ideal of CAT3C was dropped as being completely impractical at a time when there was no airfield ground movement radar and because fire services would never find you in an emergency. Also, the general environmental clean up in the UK post 60's meant that the UK rarely went below 100m vis, at worst, from mid 70's on. It used to go below 50m in the smoggy old days.
The GRM was an interesting toy, but would never have had a use at basic airfields in the Caribbean in preventing an erroneous line up. The GRM preload data would not have been available.
The GRM never provided information on the takeoff run available, it was just a tool to get you to the correct runway threshold.
The best technology available to pilots to prevent these erroneous line-ups is now the active airfield map in the electronic flight bag.. Its the newest kit on the latest B777s.

[411A]

( are you listening, 411A ? )

All very interesting, however...I never worked for BOAC/BEA/BA, so, does not apply.;)

[stilton]

'Oddly enough, BA was one of the first to have this equipment, long ago...and yes, on L1011 aircraft.
Having used it at other airlines (leased BA aircraft) it worked just fine, thank you....IF operated and set properly, for each takeoff.
Many times..a very big IF'




' Quote:
Out of curiosity 411a are you talking about the GRM?



I believe so, yes...the correct term.
As I recall, it worked very well, indeed'



'The GRM never provided information on the takeoff run available, it was just a tool to get you to the correct runway threshold.
The best technology available to pilots to prevent these erroneous line-ups is now the active airfield map in the electronic flight bag.. Its the newest kit on the latest B777s'





( are you listening, 411A ? )

All very interesting, however...I never worked for BOAC/BEA/BA, so, does not apply'





Oh dear another case in which 411a seems not to know what he is talking about. The BS flag has been well and truly raised on you here old chap.



His schizophrenic views on his First Officers are well known here as are increasingly, his ignorance of anything other than the L1011 and whatever third world country he is buzzing around in these days :p

[411A]

Oh dear another case in which 411a seems not to know what he is talking about. The BS flag has been well and truly raised on you here old chap.


Poor 'ole stilton, his reading comprehension has gone south, once again.:rolleyes:
Having used it at other airlines (leased BA aircraft) it worked just fine, thank you

777fly.
We used it for distance remaining during the takeoff roll, seemed to work OK for us.

[L337]

Prior to BA I worked for a UK Charter outfit that had the man and dog approach to the Flight Deck. The usual stuff, FO never taxis, never makes a fuel decision, never handles the thrust levers on take off, right down to having to ask for the captain to deploy the spoilers on his behalf. As I say, man and dog... not unsurprisingly they had a huge chop rate on command courses.

On my initial conversion into BA, on the 747-100/200 on about detail four the instructor stops the sim, turns up the lights, leans forward and says to me.. "do you not like your sim partner?" A little confused, I replied that we got on just fine, and had survived the carrel together, so no conflict at all. He then asked, "then why do you not help him? you can see what he needs... give it to him." My reply was that he had not asked for it, so I would not dream of doing anything unless asked first." The trainer replied... "That is not how we do things here in BA. We work as a team, and if you can see he needs help, or a frequency, or whatever, you help him." With that out the way, I realised I had arrived into a very different world.

BA expects a FO to make decisions, run the sector, own the sector if you will. BA assumes that an FO is an adult, and a Captain in waiting. The buck always stops in the left hand seat, as ever. However because of this Captains need to step up to the plate. It requires line captains to have the ability and capacity to supervise, and teach, and pass on attained knowledge.

It makes for a happier, more adult, and ultimately it makes for a much safer operation.

[Basil]

My vision of the First Officer was first created in the Mercantile Marine where the First Mate runs the ship on behalf of the captain. His is an important and respected appointment.
It was a vision which, upon arrival in the world of aviation, required rapid and drastic revision.

[411A]

Perhaps we can now move on to the topic at hand.....

Why certainly.

Let's see...
1. Continual role reversal on the FD, IE, non-standardized duties at a critical time, whilst entering the runway.

2. The 'oh, let's all be friends' attitude that seems to permeate the BA flight deck culture, such as it is.

3. Quite possibly the presence of a non-authorized crew member on the FD at the time of this incident (which could well have been a very serious accident, as most would agree) leading to distraction of the FD crew at rather critical time IE: entering the runway prior to takeoff.

4. Poor signage at the affected airport, a definite airport management liability.

From the above list, we can clearly see several major deficiencies in the way BA manages their FD operations, and last but not least, improper/incomplete survey of intended destination airports, to ascertain the quite obvious runway/taxiway signage deficiency problem.

In conclusion, clearly to an outside observer, BA urgently needs to reorganise their FD operations policies, and further, to remedy the other deficiencies noted.

And yet, we have some contributors here who proudly proclaim that 'the BA way is the only way' and 'our policies are the best in the business' etc.

As British Airways has been, to date, the only airline to have crashed a B777, one wonders if they are trying to enter the record books as the only airline to do so...multiple times.

[Machinbird]

411a
As British Airways has been, to date, the only airline to have crashed a B777, one wonders if they are trying to enter the record books as the only airline to do so ..........
411a, Not really a fair comment. There was a technical cause to this accident that had to do with the airframe/engine design interface. BA's only mistake was their choice of engines, and that wasn't the fault of the aircrew in any case. If you have to have an accident, that one turned out very well.

[L337]

1. Continual role reversal on the FD, IE, non-standardized duties at a critical time, whilst entering the runway.

Wrong: It was the FO's sector. It is standard for the FO to taxi the aircraft.

2. The 'oh, let's all be friends' attitude that seems to permeate the BA flight deck culture, such as it is.

Wrong: CRM is not about "oh, lets all be friends." It might be in your book, but not in BA.

3. Quite possibly the presence of a non-authorized crew member on the FD at the time of this incident (which could well have been a very serious accident, as most would agree) leading to distraction of the FD crew at rather critical time IE: entering the runway prior to takeoff.

Wrong: Where is the evidence for that? If no evidence then this is simply libellous.

As British Airways has been, to date, the only airline to have crashed a B777, one wonders if they are trying to enter the record books as the only airline to do so...multiple times.

To suggest that the 777 accident at LHR is BA's fault is ridiculous. How exactly is it BAs fault that the fuel froze in an completely "new" way, u8nknown to the airframe or the engine manufacturer.

Once again your bigoted, and increasingly racist view of BA gets in the way of any logical thought processes you may have.

[Slickster]

1. Continual role reversal on the FD, IE, non-standardized duties at a critical time, whilst entering the runway.


Not really a problem, as it's the way we operate, so not "non-standardised" at all, unless you read the "Bible According to 411a". Luckily, most of us don't, but read FCOMs.

2. The 'oh, let's all be friends' attitude that seems to permeate the BA flight deck culture, such as it is.


Yeah, let's all be nasty to each other, and point-score - that'll make for a safer operation. Some of the guys I fly with are friends, others not, and others I don't know from Adam. As you have self-confessed to never applying to BA, how on earth do you know what the atmosphere on a BA flight deck is like?

3. Quite possibly the presence of a non-authorized crew member on the FD at the time of this incident (which could well have been a very serious accident, as most would agree) leading to distraction of the FD crew at rather critical time IE: entering the runway prior to takeoff.


Quite possibly completely irrelevant. I regularly have authorised people on the flight deck, and no sane BA pilot would ever have anyone unauthorised there - it would be in the papers before you'd taken off. I love the opportunity to offer a jumpseat to CC; it gives them a different view of our world, from what they are used to, and in the long term, can only foster flight safety.

4. Poor signage at the affected airport, a definite airport management liability.

And last, but not least, our intrepid aviator finally hits the mark. That's not to excuse the error, but mustn't have helped.

This incident has nothing to do with BA SOPs, and everything to with Human Factors. You can change your SOPs a million times, and God knows, I've seen a few, but whenever there are humans, there is the potential for a screw up. It happened, we all learn from it, and hopefully move on.

I wonder how much stuff goes on that we never hear about. Often I see an airline, and comment "I'd love to be fly on the wall in that flightdeck". I can't wait to see a Tristar - I'll even know who's taxying it. We don't hear about what goes on, because they are not as open as BA is. You are only giving us the benefit of your questionable wisdom due to BA's open culture.

[411A]

This incident has nothing to do with BA SOPs, and everything to with Human Factors.

Rubbish.
Human factors aside, it has everything to do with SOP's, or rather, lack thereof, applied in a proper way.

One primary example.
IF the referenced airplane had been taxied to the end of the runway, there would quite likely not have been an incident.
Ergo, BA allows intersection departures (even when the full length is available) and the pilots simply could not find the proper interesction. Even the tower thought this was odd, and the Captain mentioned that the runway looked rather short, and told the co-pilot (who was pilot handling) to perform a static engine runup...and yet, they still departed, without due regard to the safety of the operation.

As for BA's supposed 'open culture', the pilots simply could not have gotten away with this fiasco unnoticed, as it was observed by too many people, not the least of which was the BA ground engineer (who knew the position on the airfield was incorrect)...therefore it was bound to come out in the end.

I am shocked that current and former pilots at British Airways would condone this irresponsible bahavior on the part of the referenced crew, and continue to make any number of excuses...none of which hold much water.

One wonders when the next pile of aircraft rubble will have British Airways painted all over it?

This BA incident was gross FD crew negligence, without a doubt.

[GobonaStick]

Any journalist worth his name would only ever look to an anonymous forum for a pointer, at the very best. Never a direct quote and most certainly never for reliable information that doesn't need bang-to-rights verification.

Just look at the garbage and nonsense on the UPS crash which was being written by PPRuNe posters - while at the same time they had the gall to criticise journos for not checking their facts.

There are already websites claiming to offer professional aviation news but which are prepared to paste unsourced and unverified information - from places like PPRuNe - in a bid to be first, and those same websites then get quoted here. What a shambles.

[Right Engine]

This story disproves your contribution in full 411a (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/419519-ba-747-crew-commended.html)

[Slickster]

IF the referenced airplane had been taxied to the end of the runway, there would quite likely not have been an incident.

Sort of correct. In fact, if the aeroplane had been taxied to the correct intersection, there would not have been an incident either. They got the wrong intersection. Don't tell me you've always used the full length. Most airlines I know use intersections, if it suits their's and ATC's purposes. What next? Build an infinitely long runway, always fill her up to the brim with fuel, because that's safer?

I am shocked that current and former pilots at British Airways would condone this irresponsible bahavior on the part of the referenced crew, and continue to make any number of excuses...none of which hold much water.


Nobody is "condoning" anything about this, but even yourself has presented mitigating circumstances, re. signage. I'm not defending the crew for screwing up, and I haven't seen a single person doing likewise.

Most of us are scratching our heads, and wondering how it happened, so that we can all learn from it.

[L337]

As for BA's supposed 'open culture', the pilots simply could not have gotten away with this fiasco unnoticed, as it was observed by too many people, not the least of which was the BA ground engineer (who knew the position on the airfield was incorrect)...therefore it was bound to come out in the end.

It is poor logic to say BA has a "supposed open culture" by linking it to the fact that the incident was noticed. The airline has an open reporting culture. Fact. You can decry that fact till you are blue in the face, but the fact remains is that it does.

I am shocked that current and former pilots at British Airways would condone this irresponsible bahavior on the part of the referenced crew, and continue to make any number of excuses...none of which hold much water.

I am most certainly not condoning his irresponsible behaviour. Not is anyone else. Indeed neither is BA, as the gentlemen concerned has lost his command. What I, and my fellow pilots are wanting to do, is learn from the incident, to see what can be done better.

There but for the grace of God go I.

You on the other hand are obsessed with blame, obsessed with BA, and continue to rant in your usual bigoted way.

[c130jbloke]

This BA incident was gross FD crew negligence, without a doubt.
Rubbish :=

For those wondering with the "how did they" part of the thread, I commend: Amazon.com: The Field Guide to Human Error Investigations (9780754619246): Sidney Dekker: Books (http://www.amazon.com/Field-Guide-Human-Error-Investigations/dp/0754619249) for a read.

It gives several explanations as to why they did what did and has some good case studies too ( I suspect this one would also make a good example).

As for the BA bashers and that fool who called for a criminal investigation (:bored:), get real. There are those who have screwed up and those who will...

[lederhosen]

I think it perfectly probable that the crew did not want to backtrack and turn on the runway. But it is stretching a point to say that it is impossible. The airfield chart clearly shows turning areas at each end. I am pretty sure 777 pilots would rarely be required to backtrack at the airports they normally fly into.

[wiggy]

411A

The dual engine flameouts (or rather, severely reduced thrust) experienced by BA with their B777 aircraft, enroute LHR...was entirely predictable.
Fly in very cool ambient temperatures aloft, whilst others diverted to warmer (aloft) temperatures strikes me as a...'we know best, we will not descend, nor change route, nor divert' attitude.,
In other words...press on regardless

Seems it wasn't just the Brits who had problems with their 777's. Care to give us your opinions of the performance of Delta's flightcrews?


NTSB investigates Heathrow-like Trent 800 engine issue (http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2008/12/10/319956/ntsb-investigates-heathrow-like-trent-800-engine-issue.html)

[WhatsaLizad?]

Some observations from operating into St Kitts, something I've done every couple of months in a twin jet airliner for a few years.

The ramp sits south of the runway. It is lower than the runway and both taxiway entrances are uphill. The grass is relatively long and blocks the runway from view into on the taxiway entrances.

As one departs the terminal ramp taxiing westbound, the first runway entrance is a half right turn. This is where BA entered the runway. To get to the proper entrance point, one must make a jog to the left to continue taxing. At this incorrect entry point, one is looking at what looks like the proper entry point (it isn't), and when looking at the proper dogleg left turn, it looks incorrect since it appears to be a long rectangular parking ramp and not a legitimate taxiway. The proper entry point at the far west of the ramp is not visible from this point. The correct way is to take the dogleg left and find the entry point hidden behind the sloping grass at the far end.

How do I know it's a little confusing? My last trip there, out of 10 or so in the last couple of years, we were cleared from the ramp to backtrack on the runway for takeoff. I taxied west on the terminal ramp, started making the right trun at the wrong exit point and suddenly realized something wasn't right and stopped. After reviewing the airport diagram, I had enough room to make the left dogleg for the proper route. I still felt I was going the wrong way until finally seeing the hidden entry point at the end. It was a beautiful sunny afternoon, I was reasonably familiar with the field, yet I still almost entered where BA did.

In my case, it was a loaded 737 and would not have attempted an intersection takeoff, nor would I at St Kitt's. As a former 777 crew member, the 737 is a ground loving pig compared to it. I see no problem with a light weight 777 performing the proper intersection takeoff at St Kitt's. My case could have been a problem if an unseen landing aircraft exited into me at high speed.

From my experience flying into SKB and on the B777, I can say that those pontificating here on the intersection takeoff are basically ignorant. that wasn't the issue.

The fact that the FO may have been taxiing the aircraft per procedures is another non-issue despite of what some greasy out of work, arrogant geriatric may have to say on the issue. If it's company procedure, it should not have been a problem. the Captain is in charge and can monitor ground operations like any other inflight phase. If it was two new guys and a new procedure, maybe it could be a problem.

As for general takeoff performance of the B777, we once had a 3000' ground roll with the aircraft loaded full of pax and 11 hours of fuel. The BA aircraft probably had the thrust to weight ratio or better of that of a light 20-series Learjet. Fortunately for them of course.

Any large airline with thousands of weekly operations will eventually test the safety chain at some point. The challenge is keeping the safety chain intact to prevent tragedies.

[wiggy]

:ugh::ugh:

To be fair to 411A ( though given the Brit bashing it requires a British thick skin to do so) you should be able to turn a 777-200 at the runway ends, using the turning pads. Whether you would choose do so during routine operations of a lightweight 777 is another matter.

Now about Delta and it's rollback.....

WhatsaLizad:

Thanks for that post - Your comments confirm what I heard about the taxiways, visibility and charting from other St Kitts regular's in the months following this incident.

[ExSp33db1rd]

and now for some light relief .......

Many years ago ( of course ) I was at an Asian airport when the incoming crew brought us a 747 with the body-gear steering inop.

According to The Boeing How-to-fly-a-747-Book, this would seriously increase the turning circle prescribed by the aircraft in making a 180 deg. turn at the end of the runway, and maybe scrub some tyres. Not a good idea as the width of the runway without a turning circle was deemed to be inadequate.

First Solution ........ taxi across the runway, enter the Country's Air Force property, turn left, turn left, turn left on to the runway from the other side. Brilliant - except ..........

Entry from the other side meant that we would be making an intersection take-off, albeit with only a small reduction in overall length, but this was not catered for on the airfield charts at our disposal, or in our Ops. Manual of RTOW field length calculations for take-off.

How much length are we losing by starting from taxyway A, we asked the tower, no idea, was the reply, but we have some charts here that you can examine.

Off to the Tower, where we were given UK War Office Survey charts dated circa. 1940, used to construct the then RAF Base during W.W.II, and from them measured the reduction in present length from the threshold to the Air Force taxiway that we would use.

Slide rules, and reference to long remembered (!) instruction on Performance A calculations needed to obtain an ATPL, resulted in a unanimous decision that we had enough length to complete the take-off on the slightly reduced length. ( in practice it was about 100m of a 10,000 m runway, so was a No-brainer issue from the start, but in the event of a Subsquent Court of Inquiry the crew " had satisfied themselves that they had sufficient length of runway and First Stage Climb Profile - over the sea - to safely conduct the operation " QED.

but ..........

Permission would be needed from the Air Force Commander to taxi through the Base, but yes, sufficient width, and bearing strength - they said - of taxyway was available.
Get it.
It's 03.00
That's why he is the Air Force Commander - ring him.
Permission granted. No problem, except.....
The Air Force Taxyways were blocked by H.M. The Queens' aircraft - H.M. being on a Royal Visit to an ex-Colony - and her support aircraft.

Why didn't you tell us, we asked ATC, before you awakened the Air Vice Marshall at 03.00
You didn't ask us, was the reply.

Second Solution........ ground engineers confirmed that they had a good tractor so we were pushed backwards to the threshold, started up, and blasted off. No problem.

If you question the intelligence of ATC in the above( or even mine ! ) it was akin to another ATC controller at an African Airport who told us the temperature was 28 C. We were cold, and it was about 10 C in our opinion. The Stn.Mgr. suggested we took his car to the tower, which we climbed, to find the ATC controller swathed in an old army greatcoat, balaclava, gloves with the ends of the fingers cut out, and huddled over a one bar electric fire that he had smuggled into the tower, and which was placed under a wooden, room thermometer hanging on the wall.

We asked him for the field temperature, and he pointed to the wall thermometer. What about this, we asked, pointing to the instrument on his control console ? " No Sah, dis is the temperature "

International Operations still fly through that African station.

My lips are sealed.

[tflier]

Now, I might have missed this as a previous comment...normally do.
But when lning up it is beholden of both pilots to check that their end of the runway and approach is clear of any 'unexpected' traffic. Would this not then highlight the point that there seems to be an awful lot of runway behind us?
Now would then be the time to troubleshoot. To try and rectify this scenario by standing on the brakes when you perceive the runway to be too short ahead should trigger at the very least some sort of doubt that what you have done is incorrect. Now think about it for a few seconds and put it right.
A training captain I used to fly with, told me that a mistake is never made if it is rectified in time, that is how we learn. Wise words from someone wiser than I'll be. Also, he was the first guy to tell me that 'if there is ever any doubt....then there is no doubt' as we are again beholden to put it right.
None of us are perfect that's why there are two of us, and in a perfect world..three. I make mistakes on a daily basis, be they major or minor, but I am always chuffed to bits when my f/o points them out, and I learn a little bit more........
Just my twopenneth worth, for what it's worth.

[Dont Hang Up]

Now, I might have missed this as a previous comment...normally do.
But when lning up it is beholden of both pilots to check that their end of the runway and approach is clear of any 'unexpected' traffic. Would this not then highlight the point that there seems to be an awful lot of runway behind us?



Intersection 'A' is still several hundred metres from the threshold and they would be looking straight into a low sun and mainly thinking about approaching aircraft.

Another implication of 'A' not being near the threshold is that the ATC query about further backtrack would not necessarily have raised any mental alarm bell.


To try and rectify this scenario by standing on the brakes when you perceive the runway to be too short ahead should trigger at the very least some sort of doubt that what you have done is incorrect.


One may suggest cognitive polyphasia at work. One's logical mind convinced all checks are done so all must be well, some baser instinct saying "take care".

[WhatsaLizad?]

"Wrong.
It was a low level engine failure in a Piper Navajo.
I speculated that it was pilot error, IE, fuel exhaustion...and this is precisely what it was...
The inability of the pilot in command to adhere to the operating parameters specified for takeoff, IE: fuel selectors selected to main tanks only.
Even the 'well respected':rolleyes: concerned airline pilots couldn't get it right...all they had to do was actually read the checklist and complete the task."


You didn't "speculate", you gleefully danced and pointed your finger before the bodies were cold.

The investigation did prove they killed themselves and didn't fly the aircraft according to procedure. The fact remained that immediately after the crash you picked out your favorite cause (agreeably a high percentage one) and jumped on it. Wow, a light twin crashes on T.O., what are the odds it was an engine failure handled wrong? :D

At that time it could have been many other possible factors, bad fuel, flight control failure, birdstrike ect. Jumping up and down and assigning blame without the facts was scummy, vindictive, immature, not respectful of the dead and their families who may have read your post seeking answers. It was also not very smart considering the other possible factors.They were AA and you were going to make them and every AA pilot pay no matter what. In the end, yes you were right, but even a broken clock is right twice a day.

Thanks for proving my point. I was too lazy to dig up the archives and open up another of your foul smelling posts of despicable thought.

I wondered if you were that lacking in judgement and brains to basically indict yourself, but you did a wonderful job.

My apoligies to the board for dredging this up from the archives.

Mods, please keep these posts, they are relevant to 411A's contribution to this board. I will not further comment on him on this thread. Thank you.

Now back to SKB.

[c130jbloke]

With these two, gross negligence, nothing more, nor less.

Who are you to make such an assumption !

Gross neglegence implies an almost willful neglect of the rules or a deliberate attmept at a reckless activity for unkown purposes.

This was nothing but an unfortunate case of incorrect mind set and a loss of situational awareness leading to the TO form an incorrect position ( ie not the point as briefed ).

I would like to know why BA felt it necessary to demote the Cmdr - I could see some retraining and informing the rest of the company about the pitfalls, but busting him seems harsh.

The act of him telling the FO to "stand on the brakes" during engine run up is interestering. Their mind set was telling him that they were good, but a latent cue ( not a lot of runway ) was telling him something else - hence that directive ? Or was it a standard proceedure for the B777 ( I have no experience on that type apart from as SLF ).

[edmundronald]

"The act of him telling the FO to "stand on the brakes" during engine run up is interestering. "

This is a really interesting post - if training could help pilots emerge their uneasiness, then some take-off incidents might be averted. After all these are NOT mechanical incidents or reactions to outside events.

These threads were a healthy aircraft mispositioned or misconfigured by the crew just barely scratches its way into the sky with the help of a higher being are a recurrent theme on PPrune. And a disturbing one.

Maybe a new action category the "takeoff go around" should be introduced - no penalty to the crew, can be called instantly, pilot in-command or pilot flying says "I feel uneasy, let's go-around", and the aircraft goes back to the loading point, all take off numbers are recomputed, cabin crew gets asked if they see anything out of the ordinary, walkaround gets done again, all preflight checks rerun, and the taxi is done again?

Edmund

[Timothy Claypole]

An obtuse conclusion to draw. Perhaps he's just familiar with the idea that punishing people for making mistakes doesn't stop mistakes being made, it just stops people telling you about them.

[Oilhead]

"Punishing people for making mistakes doesn't stop mistakes being made, it just stops people telling you about them."

Bingo. Score a big one for ASAP.

[c130jbloke]

The point raised in #250 is valid and well worth considering.
In the mid 1990's an RAF C-130 (heavy) was mid taxi towards the active when the Loadmaster comes up on the intercom and requests they return to the stand. When challenged why, he honestly could not give a definite reason, he had checked the W+B calcs and "on paper" all was well. However, to this aviator the palletised load just ”did not look right"........
Thankfully, his highly professional capt took him at his word and went back to sort out whatever was "the problem" Cue lots of ****e from ops and the movers in particular as he had dared to challenge a fairly large empire, but he stood his ground.
After an independent W+B recheck, the ac was 40 index units out of trim (fwd) with a corresponding MAC of about 9% (the limits are 15 - 30%). There then followed a particularly unpleasant round of buck passing form various factions with a view of putting it all on the LM as he had the final check. The who and why of the screw up are to a certain point irrelevant. The fact that this LM's intuition was disturbed enough to make a pretty ballsy call ( and respect to the BA mgr and engineer for doing the same thing ) was all that mattered and what would have been a pretty scary departure was avoided. The movers concerned got an interview without tea and biscuits (for the buck passing mainly) and the LM got a flight safety award.
Unfortunately it also said lots about the safety culture at Lyneham at the time that the movers felt the need to try and dump the cr@p onto somebody else who was just doing their job. But now it is much better, thankfully.
Take from that what you will, but my concern is that somebody was reduced from his position because of an event that could have caught most people out. Nobody made any attempt to hide anything, nobody was negligent (411A get real please) and was his call for the brakes a result of that professional instinct he had spent his whole flying career working towards. Yes this was an incident that required investigation but what has the final result done to promote an open culture at BA?

That you are even questioning why indicates that you are OK with the Commanders actions, perhaps?
No perhaps to it, I am more than happy. During my RAF career I flew with several people in various positions who in your (twisted) view had been grossly negligent. Everybody gets it wrong sometimes and if I were to walk into the Sqn with a list of guys I would not fly with because they had "screwed up" then (rightly) I would be viewed as the one with the problem.
After an incident during Gulf War 1, I was found negligent in my duties by a board of enquiry and I honestly did not know what I had done until the ac returned to base and the damage was found. What saved me, was my lack of experience on type and the fact that when presented with the evidence, I accepted full responsibility for my actions and I was heartbroken at having”screwed up". My willingness to accept blame even at the risk of my career said more about me than anything else and when I went on to become a leader in my own right, my mantra was " do your best, if you screw up, don't worry but come forward".

So 411A, go right ahead and lambast :ok:

[BOAC]

it would appear that you also missed some English lessons in your early days at school! - may I also enrol in your English class along with TC?

c130jbloke - here an aeroplane was placed at significant risk under the command of a Captain. You have to allow BA to judge from their enquiry (which may have other contributory inputs) what is the best course of action. On many occasions yes, 're-training' might be appropriate, in others not.

411A would obviously advocate the 'hang 'em high' principle (would he still be around?) but in a more reasoned world other actions might be called for.

[big white bird]

"but busting him seems harsh"

I can't believe I'm reading this. Another poster, two or three on, suggests we all hold hands, go back to stand, walk around, and perhaps even ask the flight attendants what they think...???

Where the hell is aviation going?

I am shamelessly with the hang-em-high mob. So was the company, it seems. And rightly bloody so. The rest of you fembots can pontificate all you like, but if a south east asian carrier or an african crew did this you'd be on their case like the plague.

Shame on you weaners who think punishment is passe.

Aviation is not a kindergarden. What went on with this incident is not hearsay. Nor is it minor stuff. The Captain has been demoted for endangering not just the safety of the airplane, passengers and crew but for bringing the company's name into disrepute; not to mention tarnishing the majority of professional, well trained and disciplined crews in 'Big Airline', and many others.

[Slickster]

Take from that what you will, but my concern is that somebody was reduced from his position because of an event that could have caught most people out. Nobody made any attempt to hide anything, nobody was negligent

But we'd all be talking about a different story if the aircraft had suffered an engine failure, or other malfunction. There but for the grace of God go I, and indeed, them, on that day.

So, the commander has been demoted. I don't know him, or his training record, but BA felt this was an appropriate sanction, taking into account all the factors, many of which none of us know anything about. He wasn't the first, and won't be the last, and it is not deemed "punishment", much as it might appear, but BA's way of managing operational performance.

I prefer this way to many others - I believe the Emirates pilots, who tail-scraped out of MEL were greeted with resignation acceptances as soon as they got back to Dubai - that'll stop it happening again!

The simple fact is that we wouldn't all be chewing the cud over this, if it had happened in many other airlines. I bet many have used the wrong intersection at SKB, and many other airports, with the pilots being blissfully unaware. And with your resignation already accepted before you'd landed, would you own up?

[Slickster]

I am shamelessly with the hang-em-high mob. So was the company, it seems. And rightly bloody so. The rest of you fembots can pontificate all you like, but if a south east asian carrier or an african crew did this you'd be on their case like the plague.

Shame on you weaners who think punishment is passe.

I take your point, but you have to balance the long term benefits of crews not being terrified to own up to mistakes, or turning up to their sim check, for fear of the sack. Very few people wilfully go out of their way to endanger an aircraft they're sitting at the front of.

Us "fembots" would probably never have heard about this incident, unless it had ended in a smoking hole, by one of your African or SE Asian carriers.

[edmundronald]

So the highly hierarchical military has a culture where the loadmaster can say he requests a return to stand.

As SLF I can understand that controlled flights into terrain are an unavoidable consequence of human pilots, but bad takeoffs, surely, should be avoidable by procedure?

Edmund

[Timothy Claypole]

Procedures don't trap all errors. There are plenty of procedures to prevent CFIT but it still happens, there are plenty of procedures to avoid take off errors but they still happen. As long as humans are in the loop there will be errors, of omission or commision.

[WhatsaLizad?]

As SLF I can understand that controlled flights into terrain are an unavoidable consequence of human pilots, but bad takeoffs, surely, should be avoidable by procedure?


Edmund,

Obviously yes if the procedure is designed correctly. Sometimes though, the very people designing and approving procedures for varied airports on the line like this are the last people that should be designing operational line procedures since they tend to reside in office buildings and when they fly, it's a somewhat "fun" event like a private pilot getting out to fly on the weekend.

I've also seen others get so bogged down with procedures that they literally miss "the elephant" walking right in front of them. Once when I was FO flying the aircraft on a reasonably complicated departure, I had the pilot-not-flying Captain hell bent on watching every transition speed and turn, and with great overkill, calling them out even though I was flying it correctly while watching for outside traffic. With all his attention drawn to the speeds and turns, mainly noise abatement, I was the one who glanced inside to catch the number one EGT breaking redline which I cured immediately with a slight power reduction. I had to interrupt another "procedure" comment to point this out.

Fill in one gopher hole and another one always seems to pop open somewhere else. ;)

[The Ancient Geek]

None of us will know what other evidence (if any) was available to the internal enquiry but there is an important principle involved here.

Since the first days of sailing ships the captain has been ultimately responsible for his vessel. Command is not just a promotion with better pay, it is a position of great authority and responsibility and the place where the buck stops. If a lowly seaman fails to let go one rope and the departure uproots a bollard on the quayside guess who gets to face the enquiry.

Aviation has rightly inherited the naval culture - the real question lies in an individual's suitability for command. So in this case was the airline confident to allow this captain to remain in command. It is their judgement call and they clearly had doubts.

Anyone offered the LH seat should ask himself honestly if he is prepared to accept total and unconditional responsibility for any eventuality regardless of cause or blame. Your career is on the line. Are you really
ready ?.

Similarly airlines should be asking some very searching questions about the suitability of command candidates.

The buck stops here. Harsh maybe but the buck still stops here.
End of story.

[Flightmech]

While I admit I agree with 411A's views on many things, I find his statement that BA are already directly responsible for one 777 accident quite astounding:ugh: Thank goodness the airline he flys for (L1011's in worldwide arenas????) is perfect in every way.

[James2696]

In 19 years of flying I have never posted on Pprune though looked at it many times.

As a LH Skipper with BA I am simply disgusted by 411A 's attitude, quite shocked infact that he knows very little about dynamics on a BA flight deck. I'm also quite happy that he doesn't fly with myself or my company.

I know many many more BA Captains than he will ever meet in his entire life and first officers, and apart from the odd one or two, they are all excellent operators, like most companies.

Is he privy to BA's safety data, I think he'd be surprised to hear how good the SESMA monitoring in the airline is. Blaming the airline for the 777 accident is just plain stupid, what a thoroughly grotesque statement, from an unlikable person.

I probably won't post again but thanks 411A for making me register, not much winds me up, sadly you do.

All the best,

James

[Sick Squid]

And now, with my moderators hat firmly back on, may I announce that the 411A show has now ended for this thread.

Let's get it back on topic, and keep it on topic. There is a lot of learning to be had from this incident, learning that has been somewhat diluted by the recent sideshow.

Squid

[JazzyKex]

411A May also be interested to know just how many LH FO's in BA had commands before joining BA! Did they lose their competence by moving airline and seat?

Whether in the military or in other companies very many direct entrant pilots to LH have considerable previous experience. We are very capable of controlling a large aircraft on the ground and have been doing so for many years!

Rather than ignore this experience BA utilises it in it's procedures by encouraging the Captain to manage and the FO to operate the aircraft should the situation warrant it and an abnormal situation arise.

In this unfortunate situation unlike 411's one 'armed paper hanger' command style better use of resources (REAL CRM) would dictate that the skipper give control of the aircraft to the FO to taxi and study the chart and aircraft position him/herself! A distinct advantage of having two tillers and BA SOP's.

This however would firstly require the crew to realise they MAY not be where they think they are. I can't imagine any aviator anywhere who has not a some point become a little unsure of their taxi position. The question is how you regain SA.

The failing in this case was that they did not realise their incorrect position and as a result did not think their was a need to regain any awareness. The holes in the famous 'swiss cheese' lined up. They were not helped by many outside factors as the report states. However having been to St Kitts and seeing what they saw they must as the final arbiters of safety carry the responsibility. The runway IS short, but clearly all this nonsense being talked about not using intersections for TO is coming from those with zero understanding of Perf A. Either the figures are good or they are not! Or do these same people advocate stopping post V1? Not being at the correct intersection does not mean the performance was wrong. I assume also then that the advocates of full length TO everywhere also use full power everywhere!

A mistake was made DESPITE well thought through SOP's (from someone who was anti many of them before joining the company and having the reasoning explained). The open safety culture allowed the information regarding the mistake to be disseminated amongst other crews operating there. As a result the taxi charts have been improved the airfield given the respect it deserves in briefing. That the company decided to demote the skipper (temporarily) is a decision they feel justified. It does not entirely fit with the completely open culture but is nonetheless the sanction they agreed upon given much greater information than we do.

It could have been much worse despite all the best intentions, and procedures. These I'm sure will be scrutinised and amended if it is considered they would have affected they incident.

Despite 411A being a dinosaur in his attitude to modern aviation it does not mean ALL his views are invalid. Their is no harm in questioning procedures when necessary. However to assume that returning to the man and boy cockpit which have been shown with more research than I could quote to reduce the likely positive outcome of aircraft incidents, is probably not the wisest direction!

Jazzy

[411A]

The question is how you regain SA.


An interresting question, and one for which I have a definite answer....IF it is during taxi, you stop right where you are, and positively ascertain your position, either by reference to the taxi chart, query ATC, or...ask for progressive taxi instructions from the air traffic controller.
(Another option, electronic taxi charts....EFB, if you have them).
What you definitely do not do is...guess, and press on regardless.

Recently, whilst taxiing for departure at EZE, the ground controller issued us three different taxi instructions, for three different departure runways, within the time frame of three minutes.
A trifecta of nonsense!
I stopped where I was (and so did Iberia, behind...and American behind him) and we all asked for progressive taxi instructions.
EZE ground control got the message, pronto, and taxi resumed.

It's not rocket science, folks, although some might think otherwise...:rolleyes:

By the way, two of our departures from EZE were to MVD...ferry, a very short flight.
When asked if we wanted an intersection takeoff, we declined.
We simply do not do takeoffs from runway intersections, unless...we have to because of runway closure/construction.
Company policy.

[c130jbloke]

BOAC: Point accepted - perhaps there was a trend with said pilot or other causes for concern. I am only going on what's on this thread and having read ( twice - I am interested in the SA / CRM / rear crew interface aspects ) the AAIB report so hence the bias in my posts.

Big White Bird: Mate, if you think that my example implies the mil types are touchy feely wimps, I can arrange a visit to Lyneham where C-130 CREWS have been slugging it out for 9 years in both AFG and Iraq. I would give your viewpoint about 45 seconds on a good day and they would even let you pick the window to leave by :ok:

Today ( the RAF at least ) works on a linear crew structure. Absolutely the guy/girl in the LHS makes the final call but the good ones take the crew input and work from there.

If you want an example of gross negligence, then I suggest you read : RAF pilot 'in deadly game of chicken' - News - The Independent (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/raf-pilot-in-deadly-game-of-chicken-1327162.html)

Appreciate it’s a military application and nowhere the commercial world, but if you want a good case study on CRM / SA failings….

[Timothy Claypole]

The failing in this case was that they did not realise their incorrect position and as a result did not think their was a need to regain any awareness

And therein lies the crux of the issue. You've got to know you've got it wrong to make it right. If, despite crosschecks and taking extra care, you've still got managed to get it wrong you're even less likely to notice your error, as you're now sure you've taken every precaution and therefore your mental model must be right! It has crossed my mind that the instruction to power up against the brakes may have been a result of them being sure they'd already taken the required precautions. Was it the extra piece of string they tied round their waist after they thought they'd done up the belt and braces? Unfortunately if you think you've put the belt and braces on but you've done it wrong you end up embarassed with your pants down.

[sunbird123]

I wonder if BA did a Safety/Risk analysis of operating from St Kitts. Also is it wise to allow intersection take offs at shorter airstrips?.

[411A]

Also is it wise to allow intersection take offs at shorter airstrips?.

No...but don't try to tell that to BA, as they (collectively) apparently don't want to know.:rolleyes:
All this 'safety', 'togetherness' and mutual admiration the BA guys (and gals) apparently have, and yet...the concerned crew could not bother to taxi the airplane to the end of the runway.
I say...baloney, BA is simply not what it's cracked up to be, safety-wise
And, for that matter, neither is AirFrance.
IF this flight had been operated by other than a large Euroland aircarrier, the pro-BA guys here would have been all over the crew, for safety deficiencies, poor airmanship, etc.
Without a doubt.

[WhatsaLizad?]

All,

I'm am sure BA analyzed the performance issues at SKB. It does have a turn around pad, but I am unfamilar if there is an engineering trade off with making tight turns to use the full length for takeoff. It doesn't look like that much to a 737, but similar to Port-au-Prince where 747's and C5's made 180's recently.

Full length is about 7700', from the intersection, 6600'. Typically there is 15-20 kt seabreeze straight down the runway. The field elevation is 160' with a clear departure path that is quickly over the ocean.

From my experience on the 777 and looking at the BA route, a rough guess is that they were somewhere around 380k-400K for takeoff. total possible engine thrust is 180K. That thrust/weight ratio is nearly .5 to 1 and is similar to a Lear 24 and probably better than a 1950's F86. V1 on the departure is around 120Kts and will happen very quickly after TO thrust is set. for landing, the VREF might be somewhere near 130kts with a stall speed near 100-110 (rough guesses). Landing is surely not an issue, I don't have the takeoff data from the intersection, but I suspect it's well within acceptable parameters.

I fly into SKB in a 737. For contrast, while the widebody 777 is approaching around 130 kts, my overextended "pig" is screaming in at 150Kts with just 4 braking wheels compared to their 12. On departure, my V2 typically is around 150Kts+, and only gets airborne after touring across half the island like a drunk Albatross before deciding flight is better than driving.

Let me put the criticism of using the intersection to bed for good. I would much rather fly a lightly loaded B777 into and out (intersection) of SKB any day of the year before before my standard fully loaded 737 using the full length.

There are far more better discussions on situational awareness and crew briefings and responsibilites than imagining in our heads what the real performance numbers our for the runway at SKB.

[411A]

Let me put the criticism of using the intersection to bed for good.
Negative, you simply cannot.

More reasonable...and respected safety dictates a full runway length departure.
Anything else is...baloney.

Period.

[sorvad]

presumably 411A "tops off" the tanks before each departure too, ..."fuel in the bowser"........"runway behind you"......"sky above you".....all very approprate axioms in modern airline operations....NOT!;)

[411A]

"........"runway behind you"......"
Absolutely, you need it all.
IF this crew under discussion had actually bothered to taxi to the runway end, prior to departure...this discussion would most likely not have been relevant...because...there would have been NO incident.
Ergo...the BA crew was out to lunch...safety-wise.:rolleyes:
Fuel in tanks, etc has no bearing on the outcome.
None.

[WhatsaLizad?]

411A,

Do you do reduced power takeoffs?

[The Ancient Geek]

safety dictates a full runway length departure


OK, so we have 7700 feet full length or 6600 feet from the best intersection.
By your logic we should backtrack a Twotter which typically operates out of ISC with only 1870 feet or even the Maule which gets off the ground in around 200 feet from my local 750 foot farmstrip.

Yea right.
:ugh:

[KBPsen]

With the use of optimised speeds and corresponding thrust reduction, it does not necessarily follow that a full length take-off results in more runway remaining at Vr compared to an intersection take-off.

[JW411]

Would you rather have an engine failure in your Maule after take-off on your 750 foot strip or on a 7,500 foot runway?

Don't be silly.

Your options on the 7,500 foot runway are much, much better and you bloody know it!

Spurious BS.

[JazzyKex]

The intersection is immaterial!!! The perf A calculation showed the calculated runway was more than sufficient for the operation. That is not the argument!

It is simply that the wrong one was used.

PPrune has many threads on the use or non use of intersections. If 411's company policy is not to use them then all well and good. Continue to follow your SOP. BA's do not state that intersections should be avoided as long as performance figures exist for the intersection and the calculations show a take off can safely be made.

IF the correct intersection is used there is no problem. This situation was brought about by both pilots losing their SA for a multitude of reasons. If the policy in SKB was for full length TO's and they did not comply then that would have been gross negligence. That was not the case. A lightly loaded 777 with probably 10t of fuel has considerably more performance than necessary to cope with an intersection take off in SKB. I know, I have done it. No split max derate.

As WhatsaLizad says, and I mentioned in a previous post the logic of never using intersections follows that you never reduce thrust! Is that a sensible way to operate an airliner?

[RobertS975]

Quoted from post #114 as to some reasons why a full length might not have been a good idea:

"At many of the Caribbean Airports that we operate to, a full length departure means a backtrack (or Back-taxi if your American). Whils't that is not a big deal for a shorthaul/narrowbody aircraft, it is a big deal for a 777 which cannot turn 180deg in a standard rwy width (45m). There are turning circles at the end of most rwys, but a 180deg turn in a 777 is a convoluted affair (BA/Boeing SOPs) with a 15deg offset required, a full stop, hard tiller over and then turn into turning circle using outboard thrust. Apart from being slow and inconvenient, it tends to wear the rear tyres quite badly, especially if the rear wheel steering is U/S."

[411A]

411A,
Do you do reduced power takeoffs?
Yes, using the assumed temperature method, as approved by the regulatory authority, and the specific aircraft/engine manufacturer.

And, oh by the way, bringing B737 aircraft into the discussion has absolutely NO relevance to the subject, because...a B737 was NOT involved in this incident.

By your logic we should backtrack a Twotter which typically operates out of ISC with only 1870 feet or even the Maule which gets off the ground in around 200 feet from my local 750 foot farmstrip.


No significance to the present discussion, IE: not the same category, as is the above mentioned B737.
NONE.

British Airways policy, by condoning the use of intersection departures with the B777, set themselves up, hook, line and sinker...for trouble.
And, they found it.

"At many of the Caribbean Airports that we operate to, a full length departure means a backtrack (or Back-taxi if your American). Whils't that is not a big deal for a shorthaul/narrowbody aircraft, it is a big deal for a 777 which cannot turn 180deg in a standard rwy width (45m). There are turning circles at the end of most rwys, but a 180deg turn in a 777 is a convoluted affair (BA/Boeing SOPs) with a 15deg offset required, a full stop, hard tiller over and then turn into turning circle using outboard thrust. Apart from being slow and inconvenient, it tends to wear the rear tyres quite badly, especially if the rear wheel steering is U/S."

Adequate width runway turning bays existed at the airfield under discussion, therefore, the above quoted 'explanation' is totally without merit.

[Basil]

a full stop, hard tiller over and then turn into turning circle
A full stop? Shurely shomething wrong there? :confused:
Missed that on 114. Just can't understand full tiller on a stopped aircraft then apply (a lot of) power.

[L337]

If 411's company policy is not to use them then all well and good.

Absolutely.

However, BA is not prescriptive about this issue. It allows its commanders, indeed empowers its commanders to make there own decision on the day, based on the prevailing conditions on the day.

You cannot operate out of LHR as your main base and insist on "no intersection departures." LHR has enough problems without the major player demanding the full length for every departure. Just crazy. And that is the key here. A small operator based in Riyadh (say) it is an OK SOP. But for BA based at the most slot constrained airport in the world, it is just a non starter.

For me as a BA 747-400 Captain, I will always use full length if at all possible. Always. However, sometimes I just have to compromise, and for a whole host of multiple reasons I will accept an intersection departure. I do it reluctantly, but accept that sometimes, on balance, it is the best decision. And BA trust me to make that decision. Not only that, they pay me a shed load of money to make that decision.

For a blanket.. never use intersections edict, it is forcing the operation into unnecessary crutches.

[L337]

Yes, using the assumed temperature method, as approved by the regulatory authority, and the specific aircraft/engine manufacturer.


And I will go from an intersection, using the exact same criteria.

And, I will go from the correct intersection.

...... but.

There but for the grace of God go I.

[Slasher]

KAL at least hasn't left a blue bill board stuck in a hillside for quite a while, although not through the lack of trying.

As I recall the last one was a 747C rollover into the dirt after
TO Stansted. Capt A/H failed and the FO just let his boss kill
him. This wasnt long after Guam I think.

Its a while since then and yep there well overdue for a fatal
prang.

[411A]

For me as a BA 747-400 Captain, I will always use full length if at all possible. Always.
I approve.
However, this discussion is not about the B747-400, nor about departing from LHR.
No B747 involved.
Not LHR.
Please do try to stick to the relevant facts.
Yes, I know it's difficult, but do try.:rolleyes:

[Timothy Claypole]

It's entirely relevant. We're running a scheduled airline, not an adhoc charter outfit in the third world. If you can accept an intersection - the correct intersection - and you have ample performance then it's perfectly sensible, both from an airmanship and a commercial perspective, to take it. Avoiding all intersections is no more sensible than avoiding derate take offs in case you screw up the derate.

[L337]

You are being perverse.

The 777 is heavy. The 747 is heavy. More than that, I was pointing out BA company policy regarding Captains area of responsibility with regard to intersection departures. One of the reasons that BA does not wish to be prescriptive is because our main base is LHR, and de facto that extends to outstations.

Please do try to stick to the relevant facts.
Yes, I know it's difficult, but do try.

Tells me, yet again, more about you than it does about me.

[ExSp33db1rd]

By your logic we should backtrack a Twotter which typically operates out of ISC with only 1870 feet or even the Maule which gets off the ground in around 200 feet from my local 750 foot farmstrip.

No significance to the present discussion........

Oh yes it has, it's the generalisation we're talking about not the specifics.

My present Microlight (LSA) needs less than 100 m. of the 1,100m runway I have available, I'll USUALLY take the whole length, but should I CHOOSE not to then I do it in the full knowledge of the possible consequences.

Successfully handling the hardware is a very small point of being The Captain, every action should be prefaced with .....At The Subsequent Court of Inquiry ....... can I defend the decision I took ? If so go ahead, if not think again.

[WhatsaLizad?]

411A,

While it might be true that BA is just saving a buck/pound/euro with the intersection departure, what we don't know is if BA Engineering has any problems with the turning circle at SKB relating to tire wear as stated by another poster or even tearing up the asphalt surface during the turn.
After seeing that runway a fair amount, I wouldn't doubt a hard scrubbing might have an effect on the low grade asphalt. to act as if we know all the issues is arrogant and stupid. Powering up a Trent vacumm cleaner over the gravel, grass and weeds of the typical Caribbean airport in order to barely make max rate turn wouldn't exactly rank in the pinnacle of airmanship. (although I agree what they did rank far lower). I'm sure you considered that.

If it's a just a financial issue with the intersection takeoff, they are doing the same thing as you are with engineered. approved procedures for reduced power takeoffs. Both methods take advantage of excess performance and runway/climb margins. One would be a fool to act as if there was a difference.

I brought the 737 into the discussion because it highlighted the performance differences and if I departed where BA did, I'd be a smoking heap on the beach. You claim intersection departures are foolish,yet with a straight face, you practice reduced power takeoffs which is basically the same thing, an aircraft farther down the runway than if it started max power at the start of the pavement.

I already posted my experience with confusing the runway entrance at SKB. How both the BA crew and myself found ourselves in that predicament is more an issue than approved preformance issues with intersection takeoffs. It wouldn't been a safety issue for me. My "pig" has to get a running start from the beginning of the runway, and besides that, I'm paid by the hour. :E

[brit bus driver]

I approve.
However, this discussion is not about the B747-400, nor about departing from LHR.
No B747 involved.
Not LHR.
Please do try to stick to the relevant facts.
Yes, I know it's difficult, but do try.

By God you're a pompous ar$e...you give us TriStar drivers a bad name. You're not a 777 skipper, you don't work for BA and I doubt you have as much information as some of those posting on here in terms of company SOPs or the incident itself.

Perhaps your comments are the irrelevant ones?

FWIW I have conducted numerous intersection departures on the TriStar, and I seem to be sitting here in the comfort of my armchair writing about them. Perhaps your understanding of Perf A (or whatever you colonials call it) isn't quite up to scratch? Let's not start on -22B thrust eh...

[sunny11410]

Dear 411A,

do you remember the "Cpt" who almost burnt down a B747 ( catchword APU ) in the UK and subsequently was laid off?
The "Cpt" who has flown with improper licence for an EASA operater, means illegaly in the UK / Europe?

Would you say that such a "Cpt" is entiteled to blame others in regards to safety standards?:=

Sorry but it's just ridiculous to read your postings about safety, BA crews and your general UK bashing, especially in the light of above mentioned "Cpt".

[411A]

I'm paid by the hour. :E

As I am, (especially overtime) and I set the policy to take the best advantage of same.:E
And, what's more, the company still makes a handsome profit, and...no complaints from the head shed, either.

do you remember the "Cpt" who almost burnt down a B747 ( catchword APU ) in the UK and subsequently was laid off?
The "Cpt" who has flown with improper licence for an EASA operater, means illegaly in the UK / Europe?

Would you say that such a "Cpt" is entiteled to blame others in regards to safety standards?

Sorry but it's just ridiculous to read your postings about safety, BA crews and your general UK bashing, especially in the light of above mentioned "Cpt".

No idea what you are on about, and in any case, hardly has relevance to the present discussion, re: intersection departures with a heavy jet transport airplane, and the BA incident referenced in this thread.

[Basil]

sunny11410,
I'd also heard your tale. We aren't as anonymous as we may think :)

[Airclues]

sunny11410

I believe that it was a Tristar rather than a B747. The accused did admit it on PPRuNe although, if I remember correctly, there were mitigating circumstances.

Dave

[CaptAirProx]

May I take a different angle.

I can't find any discussion here mentioning why the cabin crew did not alert the flight deck by a company SOP alert function?? I assume that as the pax concerned with the departure point, was a BA Engineer, on a staff positioning ticket, he would therefore be known by the crew as such.

Now, I am thinking here, in my company/aircraft (sorry 411A but I dare to use my experiences to form a basis for discussion which ironically, you have aswell) if a crew member needs to alert the flightdeck to impending doom, they press the emergency call button to flightdeck. I accept a random pax is hardly going to invoke a split second reaction to press the button regardless, however a known qualified engineer who works on on type for BA must have more 'clout'?? I have not read the report, but did the cabin crew consider alerting flightdeck with said similar function?

I have been informed rather embarrasingly by the senior once on backtrack whilst turning in the end circle (wow I used full length) to inform me a pax could see fluid draining from the wing. I was able to just see it from pushing my head to the DV window and realised it was from the NACA overflow duct for the fuel surge bay . . . ooops. Thanks to a pax and good CRM - yes CRM we, as a team, stopped the incident from being taken into the air . . .

So, in this modern world of new age aviating, I claim at least one 'cock up' of mine/ours, has been resolved by team work where ALL crew are encouraged to play a role as the TEAM. So my experience if only minor in comparison is a proof of the concept of 'speaking up' to your superior.

I am left thinking that if I had possesed the attitude of a minor few on here, my Senior cabin Staff would have probably said to the pax "oh its fine - the captain knows exactly what he is doing" . . . . . Sadly the truth is, often he does not . . . thats human surely?

So to me this 'concept' goes beyond those in the flightdeck???? Isn't that what the 'new age aviating' preaches these days??

[sorvad]

411.......we're taking the p#!ss !

[sorvad]

......out of you....in case your wondering....you sound like you must be a hoot at parties

[Slickster]

I accept a random pax is hardly going to invoke a split second reaction to press the button regardless, however a known qualified engineer who works on on type for BA must have more 'clout'?? I have not read the report, but did the cabin crew consider alerting flightdeck with said similar function?


No, quite strangely, they didn't, despite the engineer's protestations. On the other hand, they cannot be criticised, because they were only following SOPs. One would hope for a little imagination, and willingness to think outside the box, on occasion, but it won't always happen.

[sorvad]

standing by for serious response

[Aileron Drag]

a full stop, hard tiller over and then turn into turning circle
A full stop? Shurely shomething wrong there? http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/confused.gif
Missed that on 114. Just can't understand full tiller on a stopped aircraft then apply (a lot of) power.Sorry if I missed a reply to the above but, yes, you do stop the 777 pointing at the grass at 15 degrees to the r/w direction. Tiller hard over (one nosewheel rolls forward, the other back), then quite a bit of welly on the outboard engine.

Doing it is very time consuming, and a total pain in the ****.

Strange procedure, but true. I would go for the intersection any time.

AD