Royal Navy to Buy F18F

[Squirrel 41]

oldnotbold -

I have long held that Dave-B is a bl**dy silly compromise as a design, mostly because the ConOps are a nonsense: when will the US national interest demand that the USMC go ashore facing an opponent with double-digit SAM & IADS cued evolved Super FLANKERs when the USN can't be arsed to turn up with a CVNBG?

For any of these MEU/MAGTAF only ops, I find it hard to understand what the USMC needs other than a Harrier II+ with SNIPER and Rover IV.

As a result, if UK plc remains in the CVF game, the sooner we move to CATOBAR configuration and Dave-C, the better. If the USN cancels Dave-C, we can always go back to F-18E/F/G, but the timescales for a purchase (2019/20) are such that we have the luxury of a little bit of time. As ever in these things, the UK's lack of finance to meet its ambitions means that we must maximise bang-for-procurement-buck - and that means avoiding buying Mk 1 anything if at all possible.

S41

[servodyne]

Latest information, all be it in an aircraft publication (Air forces monthly) F-35B test program schedule likely to slip to the right due to various problems.

[ORAC]

Also in Ares by Bill Sweetman: How's All That Validate-y Stuff Working Out For Ya? (http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/defense/index.jsp?plckController=Blog&plckBlogPage=BlogViewPost&newspaperUserId=27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7&plckPostId=Blog%3a27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post%3ac843ba0d-1405-4732-941c-fcd895fff670&plckScript=blogScript&plckElementId=blogDest)

Lockheed Martin CEO Robert Stevens expects a "rephasing" of flight testing for the F-35B short take-off, vertical landing variant of the Joint Strike Fighter to emerge from a comprehensive review of the program, due to report in November.

(In this context, "rephasing" carries the same kind of meaning as when your cable company "adjusts" its prices - you know which way the change is going.)

Weeks after explaining that the F-35B tests were being delayed by problems with components "that you would not consider major systems" and that work was in-hand to fix the problems and get flight-testing back on track, Stevens said yesterday in a Morgan Stanley investor call (around the 55 minute mark) that although "the early corrective actions ... are showing some beneficial outcomes, my sense is that it is not going to be enough."

One root cause may be that suppliers, squeezed on schedule and cost, have failed to design and deliver components that can withstand the heat, noise and vibration generated by the F-35B powered lift system.

Stevens said that "the quality of parts in the supply chain" has been an issue. Lockheed Martin, he said, is putting pressure on suppliers in terms of "quality, performance and cost, and some of that pressure is manifesting itself in the F-35B program."

"I'm quite sure we'll see a rephasing" of F-35B testing, Stevens said, explaining that it will be part of a comprehensive technical baseline review that has followed the program's Nunn-McCurdy recertification earlier this year.

Today, the F-35B program is only six months away from the scheduled start of at-sea STOVL tests on the USS Wasp (set for March 2011). However, so far the reported progress with STOVL envelope expansion has been slow.

Of course, this may not be the time to remind the JSF program office of some of its earlier statements:

According to Brig. Gen. C.R. Davis, F-35 program executive officer "early flight test results show we are on a path to largely validate the design and aircraft systems -- we are not entering a period of discovery.

Or even:

The test program, [Maj Gen David Heinz] said, is about “validation, not discovery.” (Air Force Magazine Daily Report, June 4 2009)

Somehow I don't think we're going to hear that line again for a while.

[oldnotbold]

This article is very well worth reading



Challenging the STOVL Myth

defence.professionals | defpro.com (http://www.defpro.com/daily/details/397/)

[oldnotbold]

F-35B delays lead to rephased flight-test schedule

F-35B delays lead to rephased flight-test schedule (http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2010/09/01/346888/f-35b-delays-lead-to-rephased-flight-test-schedule.html)

[oldnotbold]

The Times from tomorrows edition:

"The Ministry of Defence may abandon plans to build new aircraft carriers as part of sweeping budget cuts and a long-awaited defence review, the chief executive of BAE Systems revealed yesterday.
Ian King told an influential committee of MPs that his company remained focused on producing two ships.
However, he added: “We have been asked to look at a number of options, recently asked over the last week or so... I think they range from having one carrier to no carriers but with an equivalent other programme.” He did not elaborate on what such a programme would entail.
The £5.2 billion contract to build two carriers is providing work for 10,000 employees at six construction sites around the country. Clauses within the contract mean that it would be almost as expensive to scrap as to maintain but, in the long term, cancellation would save on maintenance or the cost of fitting them with a new fleet of jets.
Raymond Duguid, a union member at the dockyard in Rosyth, near Edinburgh, where the two carriers are due to be assembled, said that any reduction in the project would be a blow for the workforce. “The carriers are just one job but they do give stability to the yard,” he told The Times.
Critics argue that the carriers are a waste of money at a time when the MoD’s over-spent budget should focus more on soldiers and smaller ships.
The Times revealed last week that Britain and France are preparing to announce a deal to share aircraft carrier capabilities as part of a wider plan to co-operate on defence. Such a move would enable both countries, the largest military powers in Europe, to maximise their strength at a lower cost. Requiring three times more steel than Wembley Stadium, the Queen Elizabeth-class carriers will each have a crew of 679, (1,600 if air staff are included) and should last 50 years.
MPs on the Defence Select Committe also heard from the head of ADS Group, a trade organisation representing Britain’s aerospace, defence and security industries.
Rear Admiral Rees Ward said he feared that the Strategic Defence and Security Review, to determine Britain’s military and diplomatic role, could be at odds with the Government’s spending review, putting 300,000 jobs at risk."


They have to come up with a , short term less expensive, way of putting an air group on the QE, or risk having the Carrier cancelled. If that happens RAF will certainly not get STOVL F35B either...

[Squirrel 41]

ONB,

What the BAE bloke was probably referring to was the Terms Of Business Agreement (TOBA) that covers the CVF ships: a certain amount of work for the design teams and the yards. AFAIK, it declines over time, and it leaves BAE with a big hole to fill if the Govt only meets the letter - which is presumably what this bloke is concerned about.

One credible plan seemed to be to bin carrier, and use the TOBA to build the MARS Fleet Tankers in UK (vice South Korea or Italy) and then follow it with T26 frigates (nee Future Surface Combatant-C / FSC-C), which would result in more ships the RN needs and two fewer that it cannot protect or put an airwing on.

As hard as it is for Fishead types, the RN could be better served over the medium term by getting more FF/DD than CVF. Not ideal, but then this is a Defence Review....

S41

[oldnotbold]

Do not agree at all with that.
If they bin the Carriers it will destroy morale in the RN totally.
And remember if they bin the Carriers there is no way RAF will get F35, no chance at all.

[Squirrel 41]

ONB

If they bin the Carriers it will destroy morale in the RN totally.

I'm not in the RN, so don't have a view on this. But an enhanced FF/DD force is presumably more useful for SLOCs, presence and information ops?

And remember if they bin the Carriers there is no way RAF will get F35, no chance at all.

Why? F35 / Dave-C would replace GR4 from 2020 quite nicely.

S41

[GeeRam]

Why? F35 / Dave-C would replace GR4 from 2020 quite nicely.

F-35A surely....?

If the carriers are binned why would the RAF want the carrier spec USN version of the F-35...??

[Squirrel 41]

F-35A surely....?

If the carriers are binned why would the RAF want the carrier spec USN version of the F-35...??

Bigger wing, longer range, tougher structure?

S41

[ORAC]

On the other hand, it has the same max AUW as the A, but the structure is5000lb heavier.

So, yes, it has a longer theoretical range, but with a fuel/weapon payload deficit - and and more if a gun is required, as it's not internal and takes up the centreline station with the associated drag/stealth handicap.

[LowObservable]

Right Orac - If you want a long-range F-35, spec an A with no internal gun, a probe and the Israeli 600 gal external option.

[Squirrel 41]

ORAC / LO

Thanks, I'd not appreciated that. With the Israeli tanks, what sort of range does Dave-A produce?

S41

[Wrathmonk]

S41

With the Israeli tanks, what sort of range does Dave-A produce

I'd hazard a guess at Israel - Iran - Israel, following whichever route they care to! :E

[proudfishead]

As hard as it is for Fishead types, the RN could be better served over the medium term by getting more FF/DD than CVF

I could not disagree more. Not only is rapidly deployable maritime air power key to the UK's desired expeditionary capability, the CVF has been the core of the RN's development of a Versatile Maritime Force. From the procurement of the T45, design of the Astute SSN, future tanker and logistics requirements, painful cuts in other areas of the RN and changes in infrastructure; the procurement of two CVF has been key.

However, despite being a Naval Aviator, I feel that we have been somewhat tribal in our vehement protection of the FAA's fixed wing capability. With the standard caveat that our fixed wing chaps do a fantastic job in an organisation fraught with politics. Had the RN gone to the RAF at the original design stage of the CVF and agreed that the RN would do what they are best at, driving and operating warships, and allowed the RAF to provide the tailored air group (FW) for deployments, along with rotational positions in key posts such as Wings, SATCO, DSATCO, Eng Officers etc, then their may have been more support for the project.

Instead, we return to being forced to adopt the "I need this, so he can't have that" form of inter-service procurement debate. UK PLC requires both CVF if it is to achieve it's current Foreign Policy aims. This does not mean that the RAF do not need new aircraft nor that the Army need updated armoured vehicles. However, the disproprtional force multiplication that is provided by a fully independent CVF which is able to deploy worldwide at short notice, self-sustaining and self-protecting, able to deliver air, land and maritime power without host nation support is invaluable.

I really think that cancelling or reducing the CVF project will be a decision that we regret for decades. The RN has given up too much over the last 15 years in order to procure these assets. The phrase for years has been "short term loss for long term gain". It would be dreadful to think that it has been "short term loss for long term decimation".

Jumping rapidly back to the thread subject. If the procurement of a COTS updated F18 saves £Billions compared to F35(any variant), then perhaps it's all the effect we can afford to purchase.

[Lonewolf_50]

For proudfishead: I thought fisheads were ship drivers, not avaitors. :confused::confused:

Oh well, I tip my cap, one naval aviator (retired) to another. :ok:

In re the CV, it takes two to have one, and your industrial base (maritime) gets a few economies of scale benefit from having two versus one ... if one can afford it. <--- As you are well aware, that's the real beast of the issue.

I am out of touch with our continental friends, the French, who not only have a CV, but also chose to rejoin the NATO integrated command structure. Would your position be sound if your strat assumed a long term association with the French wherein you traded readiness phases (rotating "on call" so to speak within the European security realm), or is the global interest of the UK deep enough (still) to require the two in case an out of area requirement rears its ugly head ... I have an eye toward the South Atlantic, but hope to hell that doesn't come up again.

[proudfishead]

Lonewolf, there are a few who are lucky enough to do both, unfortunately at some point we must return to ship driving. Cap duly dothed in return.

[Squirrel 41]

ProudFH

The RN has given up too much over the last 15 years in order to procure these assets. The phrase for years has been "short term loss for long term gain". It would be dreadful to think that it has been "short term loss for long term decimation".

Nail, head, bang - this is exactly my point. The budgetary choices - I don't aver from calling them "realities" as doubtless many in Main Building are terming them now, as we could have a £100bn defence budget if we chose to - are such that the RN could indeed find itself in a position in 2020 where the "fleet" looks like this:

- 2 x CVF
- 2 x LPD
- 4 x LSD(A)
- Some tankers (well, at least 2 x Wave Class)
- 6 x T45 / D-Class
- 10ish x T23
- 2 x T26
- 5 x Astute
- 2ish x T-Class
- 4 x SSBN
- Some MCMs
- Some OPVs
- Shedloads of P-2000s
- VICTORY + BELFAST

Which may be extreme, but an FF/DD force of 16 or 18 means maybe a round 12 actually deployable, and if the choice was that vs. an escort fleet of 20 - 25 and no CVF, then I'd have to think very carefully about what the RN's future role is. I simply think that for the budgets being discussed, especially if Trident is to be funded from the core defence budget, that the days of UK independent force projection are essentially over, and that as such CVF is an expensive exercise in gutting the rest of the RN.

For once, Mr. Torpy notwithstanding, it's not an RAF plot, sadly.

S41

[oldnotbold]

These are worth having a gander at

Super Stealth Plane Breaks Through Cost Barrier | Danger Room | Wired.com (http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/03/super-stealth-plane-breaks-through-cost-barrier/)

Market analysis Joint Strike Fighter- How many JSF?s will be produced?|CEOWORLD Magazine (http://ceoworld.biz/ceo/2009/10/20/market-analysis-joint-strike-fighter-how-many-jsf%E2%80%99s-will-be-produced)

Ides of March | AVIATION WEEK (http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=dti&id=news/dti/2010/02/01/DT_02_01_2010_p32-199424.xml&headline=F-35%20Faces%20A%20Troubled%202010)

[Widger]

Had the RN gone to the RAF at the original design stage of the CVF and agreed that the RN would do what they are best at, driving and operating warships, and allowed the RAF to provide the tailored air group (FW) for deployments, along with rotational positions in key posts such as Wings, SATCO, DSATCO, Eng Officers etc, then their may have been more support for the project.

Sorry, proud fish'ead, but I have bit..... I could not let this one go unanswered. Whilst I agree with some of your sentiments, you view is, if I may be a little impolite..naive. Your comments forget about the history between the two services since the late 1970s and seem to state that the RAF are the best at flying. The Fleet Air Arm, does what it does best....generating air power from the sea and the long history the UK has, in generating air power from the sea, demonstrates that you CANNOT do it PART TIME. If there were a maritime branch of the RAF, that conducted its operations predominantly from the sea, then your argument could hold water (scuse the pun). I hasten to add that I am NOT an advocate of disbanding the RAF and add that there are areas of RAF capability in which they excel above the other two services.

But as we are talking about air power from the sea, I will confine myself to that. You also mention about the other support areas. This is again difficult and a previous 1SL was keen to point out to good old Glenn, that the RN also has a wide support infrastructure to support maritime operations that the RAF does not. CVF will need "sea-minded" personnel from all areas not just pilots and back seaters of whatever colour. The RAF does not have an Aircraft Handling branch, who are the teams that look after the aircraft on the deck and who the FAA specialist fire-fighters, the RAF does not have a dedicated MET branch, whereas the RN has the HMs who have wide and deep experience of providing Met and Oceanographic support at sea. The RN ATC branch have broad experience of controlling from the sea, in the wide ocean and the Littoral, often without the aid of diversions and with basic equipment. Senior Air Department officers are drawn from squadrons with wide experience of operating at sea who are aware of all the extra challenges that operating from the sea imposes, including storm force winds, deck operating limits, runways that move and bounce about, logistics (ammunition, fuel, food, liquid oxygen etc) There are other supporting branches of the FAA, including engineers, bomb bosuns, photographers, aircraft controllers to name just a few. Whilst I remember, don't forget the fighter controllers, who served with distinction in 1982 and 1991 and in many areas since. They are all part of the wider FAA that support operations from the sea and for the RAF to replicate them would be hugely expensive and take years to build up the level of operational capability the FAA has accumulated over many many decades. Additionally, they are all ship's staff when embarked, with responsibilities beyond their primary duties....that only a career training in the RN will provide.

So, it is very easy to say that it does not matter who pilots the aircraft, but there are a whole host of other factors that underpin generating air power from the sea. IMHO operating air power from the sea is best left to the FAA. Operating from a fixed land base, is best left to the RAF and the Army. Everyone has something to bring to the table. It is unfortunate that when one area appears to be getting a new toy, everyone else gets jealous and want to play with it.

:ok::ok:

[Canadian Break]

OK, I was right with you until you arrived at your conclusions about Fighter Controllers. RAF FCs have been going to sea with the Andrew for years, doing their primary job and also becoming watch-keepers. RN controllers who come to the RAF on exchange have, in my experience, struggled to come to terms with the job. :ugh:

[Widger]

Canadian Break,

I am sorry old chap but you are stretching the bounds of credulity there. Since about 1995 the rules for bridge watchkeeping qualifications have changed and whilst some RAF FCs may well have stood a watch occaisionally as OOW 2 or 3, there is no way any of them would have met the stringent IMO rules that are applied now to take charge of a watch at sea or would be allowed to stand a watch on a 65000 ton CVF. Please!!!!

You have successfully turned what was quite an adult conversation into an inter service p**sing match again!

[Modern Elmo]

The RN ATC branch have broad experience of controlling from the sea, in the wide ocean and the Littoral, often without the aid of diversions and with basic equipment.


You do understand that, in contrast to Harrier operations at Port Stanley in 1982, F-18's and F-35's can fly well beyond line of sight of the surface task force?


This is again difficult and a previous 1SL was keen to point out to good old Glenn, that the RN also has a wide support infrastructure to support maritime operations that the RAF does not. CVF will need "sea-minded" personnel from all areas not just pilots and back seaters of whatever colour. The RAF does not have an Aircraft Handling branch, who are the teams that look after the aircraft on the deck and who the FAA specialist fire-fighters, the RAF does not have a dedicated MET branch, whereas the RN has the HMs who have wide and deep experience of providing Met and Oceanographic support at sea.

OK, RN aviation --> specialized for operations over water.

You won't complain when others claim that deep penetration over land = RAF business, will you?

[alfred_the_great]

Elmo, not "over water", "from water". Where the pilot goes after that, it doesn't really matter, it's all about where (s)he lands afterwards.

Anyway, having seen the RAF pull a political blinder by agreeing to have a RN 2* in charge of maritime ops (including SHAR), and then, suddenly, conducting a re-organisation that chopped his job, including the reduction of the senior Harrier pilot (in role) from 1* to 4 ring (at best), I don't really trust the RAF to commit in a grown-up fashion about a CAG.

( quick ref for the 2* cuts: No. 3 Group RAF - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/No._3_Group_RAF) )

[Pure Pursuit]

Canadian B,

Your comments about Freddies coming ashore and struggling to handle the job may well have been valid several years ago however, having worked closely with the D School, I am confident that the standard of FC coming out of the RN has improved hugely. They are a professional bunch who have a superb approach to training. I would go as far to say that in some areas, they could show us a thing or two.

In days prior to the MDA system, RAF FCs were maxed out on every sortie dealing with civil traffic. This was the area that caught out the RN chaps who had previously been controlling a pair of SHAR off the west coast! The MDAs have taken the workload away in many areas to the point where the live phase of RAF FC training has reduced from 60-70 hours to 20-30.

[ORAC]

In days prior to the MDA system, RAF FCs were maxed out on every sortie dealing with civil traffic. Speak for yourself. :cool:

[Pure Pursuit]

ORAC,

I assumed that the reading audience would fully understand that I was in no way referring to you!

[Widger]

Whilst not wishing to extend this futile p@@@@@@g contest or to further cast assertions on the professional ability of Officer's from any service, can I just say that there are idiots and stars in every branch and every career and trade both within the armed forces and without. Be they bus drivers, trade unionists, doctors or dentists.

The main difference between the RAF ABMs and the RN FCs is that in the RN it is a sub-specialisation. This very fact means that there are few FCs that have more than 2 or 3 tours under their belt and accordingly, very few"career controllers"They are drawn from some of the brightest of the Seaman Officer Cadre and then after FC go on to become Warfare Officer's Executive Officers and Commanding Officers. Many of the 1, 2 3 and 4 stars that have walked the halls of the MOD are ex RN Fighter Controllers. They are, on a par with Submariner's, the RN equivalent of the 2 winged master race. So whilst they may not be specialists in controlling within the UK, they have, on the whole, with some exceptions, broad and relevant experience.

It is worth mentioning some examples, such as the FC that stayed at his post in 1982, whilst HMS Sheffield burned around him and the man next to him was missing parts of his body. This event is quoted is some books and I have heard the story first hand. A bit more stressful than crossing the Manchester TMA I think. Additionally, it is worth mentioning the controllers of Gloucester and Exeter in 1991, that sat in the Northern Gulf supporting Air Operations from destroyers designed in the 1950s. This was before 8 Sqn turned up on the scene.

The new T45s will finally, give the RN FCs the kit they should have had 30 years ago and CVF with F18 or F35, will bring them into a new age of controlling.

So I have no criticism of the RAF ABMs or the crews that fly the E3s........there is plenty of mud I could sling!!!!!!!!! but I won't. Whilst both sides of the fence have similar roles, in practice, their career paths are different and they are there, for different reasons as well.

DIRIGEAMUS

[glad rag]

I remember the fun and games during JMC's:E

[oldnotbold]

But General Sir Richard Dannatt, the former head of the Army, raised fears over the funding of the 80 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft due to be ordered to fly from the carriers.

He told BBC News: "The big but is what's going to fly off them - because the Joint Strike Fighter programme is about £10bn, and that's what really frightens us."

BBC News - Figures reveal cost of new aircraft carriers decision (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11274060)

USN say F35 B and C will be 40% more expensive to operate than F18 or Harrier.

CHART: F-35B/C operating costs versus Hornets, Harriers - The DEW Line (http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/the-dewline/2010/01/chart-f-35bc-operating-costs-v.html)

[BEagle]

I remember the fun and games during JMCs

Is that infamous FC Roger Waitout still serving on one of HM's little grey war canoes?

He seemed to feature in every JMC I remember....:rolleyes:

[Pure Pursuit]

Widger,

I fear you may have misread my post as a p@@@@@g contest it is not. As a ex RAF FC, I was merely standing up for the Freddies!

Back in the old days, RN guys would come over and few would go back. I suspect that Mrs Freddie drove the issue on most accounts having become accustomed to Mr Freddie coming home every night for a few years!

Some top ex fish heads wearing blues these days.

[Hedgeporker]

F35 was meant to be bespoke, and for F16 prices.

Now it is anything but.

1. Sealed off sub-systems.

2. The main production line bestowed upon Italy. Why? What the **** have they contributed?

3. Whatever was agreed behind closed doors in 2006, there is still no official black-and-white ITAR for the source code / operational sovereignty.

4. RAM coating - purrlease. USAF mechs have to wear padded cotton shoes and gloves when crawling over the B2s. With no ITAR, it's back to factory every time that precious RAM paint gets chipped by FOD. What was that about operational sovereignty?

In other words, **** em. ****em up the arse and then in their faces.

Granted, F/A-18 won't come with the source-code either, and it will also have sealed off sub-systems - but then it never was still isn't touted as bespoke and as such I can accept it's shortcomings. It's very transience gives hope for an indigenous JSF (pace Taranis).

We just do this sort of thing far, far better alone.

Boeing will gleefully kick Lockheed Martin in the teeth. Fag packet figures for 50 X SHornet - £2bn.

[oldnotbold]

Catapult system among plans to cut cost of aircraft carriers
Cheaper planes also being considered as part of defence review, but MPs argue against ripping up building contracts

"Cost-cutting measures being considered for the carriers include slashing the number of strike aircraft to go on them and buying cheaper planes, which would be launched by catapult. This would have the added advantage of what officials call "interoperability" with France, whose navy aircraft all use catapults."

Catapult system among plans to cut cost of aircraft carriers | UK news | The Guardian (http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/sep/12/catapult-cut-cost-aircraft-carriers)

[oldnotbold]

Defence review: 'Carriers give politicians options – not dead ends'
At the heart of rows over the defence review is the cost of equipment – but a balanced Navy, led by new aircraft carriers, could help preserve Britain's standing in the world

"Critics of the new carriers are quick to point at the cost. However, to get out of the contract will cost £2.3 billion which, as these ships will only cost £44 million a year to operate, is more than will be spent on them in their entire working lives. It has been suggested that money could be saved by reducing the number of aircraft or making them less capable. Having fewer aircraft actually wastes the investment in the carriers – it's like buying a tank but never buying shells for the gun. As to having less capable aircraft, that is already happening. The version of the Joint Strike Fighter we are buying, the F35B vertical/short take-off and landing model which is slated for the carriers, has less range and a smaller payload than the conventional naval "C" variant the Americans are buying; the "C" variant is also about £25 million cheaper per aircraft.

If Britain wants to save money in the carrier programme, fit them with catapults, arrester gear and buy the F35C, not vertical/short take-off version. These carriers represent excellent value for money – probably more so than many other British or European defence projects in the past 20 years. The commitment Britain shows to its maritime position through the carriers and the concept of having a balanced Navy is valuable. In an age where Britain will need the support of allies to further its foreign and security policy, it makes sense to contribute to such alliances as Nato or the EU in the most effective manner to ensure our voice is heard."

Defence review: 'Carriers give politicians options &ndash; not dead ends' - Telegraph (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/defence/8004066/Defence-review-Carriers-give-politicians-options-not-dead-ends.html)

[Ian Corrigible]

UK offers CVF to India (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/ajai-shukla-making-warships-happen/408614/)

I was taken aback last week to receive an invitation from BAE Systems, the world’s third-richest arms corporation, for a four-day media tour to the UK. What was remarkable in the BAE invitation was the company’s proposal to fly us to Glasgow for the launch of a new Royal Navy destroyer and a tour of other warships. Why, I wondered, was British shipbuilding being showcased to India in the absence of a plan to buy a warship from the UK?

A few phone calls later I had my answer! A cash-strapped UK defence ministry, unable to pay for the two aircraft carriers on order with BAE Systems, had offered one of them to New Delhi. In the circumstances, a few news reports in India on “high-quality British shipbuilding” could only be useful.

Given that the Indian Navy already has four aircraft carriers in the pipeline — the lame but functional INS Viraat; the infamous Gorshkov (renamed INS Vikramaditya), being constructed in Russia; a third (so far unnamed) carrier being built in Cochin Shipyard; and another to follow that — Britain’s offer of yet another carrier might be considered wildly optimistic. But desperate times demand desperate measures and the UK is conducting its greatest strategic downsizing since the 1968 retreat from the Suez. David Cameron’s new government has initiated a strategic defence and security review (SDSR), which involves defence spending cuts of 20-30 per cent to bring down military expenditure to below 2 per cent of GDP.

Amongst the several multi-billion pound programmes that seem certain to be pared is the Carrier Vessels Future (CVF) programme: the £5 billion ($8 billion) construction, mainly in British shipyards, of two 65,000-tonne aircraft carriers called the HMS Queen Elizabeth and the HMS Prince of Wales. These were ordered before the global economic downturn; the Labour government thought they were essential for the Royal Navy to retain its centuries-old capability to project power across the globe. Even amidst today’s cost-cutting, current defence secretary Liam Fox had hoped to build both carriers, operating only one with the other kept in reserve. But just days ago, BAE boss Ian King revealed that the government had asked BAE Systems to evaluate the cost of cancelling the CVF programme entirely.

With £1.2 billion ($1.8 billion) already spent on the CVF, and 4,000 skilled workers busy fabricating the Queen Elizabeth, London knows that an outright cancellation would ruin Britain’s shipbuilding industry. And so, one of the aircraft carriers hopes to wash up on India’s shores.
..........
I/C

[Failed_Scopie]

Well, it was perfectly obvious that the much-vaunted Prime Ministerial visit was all about flogging off a CVF or two, as well as anything else that Cameron, Osbourne, Hague and Fox could get away with. I strongly suspect that the Indians uttered a polite 'no thank you', although I stand to be corrected. In any case, it seems that HMS Ocean will almost certainly be sold to the Brazillians in short order, along with some escorts (Type 22/23 anyone?).:rolleyes:

[oldnotbold]

"It’s impossible to imagine a better fit to the Secretary of State’s vision than the Royal Navy’s Carrier Strike and Amphibious Task Groups. But cancellation of the new Queen Elizabeth-class future aircraft carriers (CVF) has for a decade been offered as the 'silver bullet' solution to the MoD’s funding crisis, and it is yet again being promoted with amazing success (at least in terms of column inches) by a segment of the media and defence establishment who seem to have a pathological hatred of any large grey warships that are able to carry aircraft. In practice – with over £1.2 billion in contracts already placed and the UK shipbuilding industry now totally dependent on the project - construction of the new carriers has almost certainly passed the point at which cancellation is viable under any rational criteria, however significant changes to the CVF programme are still quite possible.

The most obvious problem is finding aircraft and helicopters to form air groups for the new carriers. The UK has theoretically committed to buying up 138 of the Lockheed Martin Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) to meet its Joint Combat Aircraft (JCA) requirement; indeed it has already ordered three of the Short Take Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) JSF variant (designated F-35B). However there seems to be little chance that more than 50 JCA's (costing nearly £100 million each) will be affordable. One of the surprises of SDSR might be a decision to abandon the F-35B version for the F-35C which can carry a higher payload over a longer range. The F-35C is also slightly cheaper, but this will be negated by the cost of fitting at least one of the new carriers with two catapults and arresting gear. Adoption of the F-35C will avoid the dangerous looking 'rolling landing' technique that the UK has been studying for the F-35B in order to overcome its payload 'bring back' weight restrictions. Another potential advantage with the F-35C is that the Royal Navy would be able to cross deck aircraft with United States and French Navy aircraft carriers for the first time since 1978.

If SDSR did decide to go for the F-35C over the F-35B, it’s the second CVF - HMS Prince of Wales - that would be adopted to the operate the aircraft. HMS Queen Elizabeth will be completed largely as planned, including a bow ski-jump. She would initially operate Harrier's (assuming that they stay in service as currently planned until 2019). Thereafter she would operate as a super-sized helicopter carrier (LPH), effectively replacing HMS Ocean, with the possibility that funding priorities might eventually permit her to be upgraded to the same standard as Prince of Wales."

Navy Matters | Home Page (http://navy-matters.beedall.com/)

[LowObservable]

The F-35 backers might actually like to see the RN go F-35C as it would help cement the USN program in place.

Despite high-level sounds of approval, F-35C is at risk because:

- The Marines want 420 of the planned Navy Dept JSFs to be STOVL, leaving the Navy with a minimal (for the US) 260 Cs
- The C is at the tail-end of a flight test program that may not be doable on the current schedule, so might be the one that they decide to slip, which would leave the Navy needing more F-18s
- With the upgraded Hornet promoted by Boeing, the Navy has a potential JSF alternative
- The Super Hornet as it stands today will do anything better than the F-35C until 2020+ except a deep strike mission against double-digit SAMs.

[Squirrel 41]

LO

All very pertinent points, but the ConOps for the F-35B still seem ridiculous.

Given your proximity to the programme, a genuine question.

When will the USMC need the capability to go after double digit SAMs from LPDs or rough strips without a CVN turning up? It seems so improbable that I just can't see how (politics aside) the USMC can justify F-35B instead of bashing out some new Harrier II+ or flying F-35Cs off the CVNs.

S41

[Widger]

Oldnot bold.

A very insightful post!

[Modern Elmo]

When will the USMC need the capability to go after double digit SAMs from LPDs or rough strips without a CVN turning up? It seems so improbable that I just can't see how (politics aside) the USMC can justify F-35B instead of bashing out some new Harrier II+ or flying F-35Cs off the CVNs.

The ultimate reason for the US Navy's F-35B's is to operate a smaller class of aircraft carrier -- new generation escort carriers, one might say.

The USS America currently being built is the first ship in this class.

The USMC remains a subset of the USN.

[Squirrel 41]

ME,

All understood, but what is the mission set that sees US interests sufficiently engaged against a double-digit SAM threat (else why F-35?) but insufficiently interested to drive one of 11 CVNs near it?

I just don't see the combination of MEU/MAGTAF vs double-digit minus CVN.

S41

[LowObservable]

S41 -

Exactly. I'm not saying that 420 makes sense as the number of Bs, but that's the default because of the Marines' political influence and because they want to replace all their aircraft with STOVL F-35Bs - even though, at any given time, most will be on land bases or complicating life for a CVN.

No President or Joint Chiefs will ever send an MEU against a serious threat without a CVN in the area. In the Cold War, given an ASTOVL-like fighter, you might have done it in a diversionary operation, but not in the foreseeable future.

Modern Elmo

Smaller escort carriers? I would remind you that a CVN is 1000 feet long and keel-hauling would be unpleasant. And as the entire Brit process has shown, the idea is impractical. If the goal is to provide FJ support to a littoral operation, against a low-grade threat (for instance, a couple-squadron, not-well-equipped AF) then you need to support CAP and offensive ops at the same time, which drives sortie rate X, which drives number of jets Y. The UK went through this and CVF grew from under 40000 tons to 65000 tons.

The America is not an escort carrier. How many F-35Bs do you get on a 50000 ton ship that also carries troops, equipment, vehicles and the helicopters they need to get ashore? Even if you eliminate the well deck?

The answer is double digits if you're lucky - particularly because your medium "helicopter" is now a 13000 shp 30-ton monster - so if you have two America-class amphibs in the task force you maybe have added 15-20 per cent more fast jets, with less range and weapon load than the CV-based aircraft.

Sure, you can get 20-some JSFs on America if you eliminate the transport helicopters, but then you've got no way at all to get your troops ashore. I will be surprised if LHA-8 does not have a well deck.

So the CONOPS no longer makes sense, but the Marines won't look at the mess they are in and nobody dares to take them on.

[oldnotbold]

Why Catapults are Cheaper

Why UK should buy less expensive, yet more capable, F35C

http://grandlogistics.********.com/2010/09/why-catapults-are-cheaper.html

[John Farley]

Why UK should buy less expensive, yet more capable, F35C


Some might consider that operating site flexibilty matters more to the UK than pure range and as such is worth buying.

[ORAC]

That might be true John, if the RAF were driving the procurement. However, I don't believe it is or was a RN key requirement for the JSF, rather being driven by the RAF due to the currency needs for cross-training of RAF pilots (and the Harrier mafia).

With the limited numbers now be mentioned for purchase - around 50 to 60 - I can't see there being any pool of non-current pilots around, and the opinion of the RN will undoubtedly prevail.

[John Farley]

I was not considering the RAF or RN interests. Just those of the UK.

[ORAC]

I believe both the RN and RAF have the same interest at heart as you do John.

They may, however, differ as to how they are best achieved.

[LowObservable]

The next question is the feasibility or otherwise of austere-base ops (1) with the F-35B as opposed to the much smaller Harrier and (2) with a changing threat.

Marines and industry say F-35B's ground impact will not cause problems, but the Corps has been seriously wrong in this respect with V-22. USN construction guidance still calls for a 100 x 100 foot VL pad made of heat-resistant, continuously reinforced concrete.

Also, the senior Dept of Navy leadership is worried about the threat to forward arming and refueling points posed by guided rockets and mortars, which they expect to be widely used by the late 2010s.

[cokecan]

i'd echo LO's concerns about forward basing and Dave B being the heir to Harrier - nothing whatsoever about any part of the F-35 programme says you'll be able to run this aircraft from a field with a portakabin and a bag of spanners.

my fear is that we'll buy an aircraft that doesn't need the things you can find anywhere or can build easily (great big strips of concrete or pierced steel matting), but does need the things that are like rocking horse **** in these 'austere' locations, namely a surgically clean, sealed environment with enough IT to cater for the porn usage of the entire British Army.

seems a bit 'arse about face' to me...

[GeeRam]

Marines and industry say F-35B's ground impact will not cause problems, but the Corps has been seriously wrong in this respect with V-22. USN construction guidance still calls for a 100 x 100 foot VL pad made of heat-resistant, continuously reinforced concrete.

Pardon......:eek:

Well, if that's true....this is no Harrier replacement, and will be about as much use as a chocolate teapot.

Pouring concrete to that spec and to the thickness that would be reqd for 100' x 100' cont is a serious undertaking in a benign home base enviroment.... let alone in a FOB 'field' enviroment :ugh:

[Easy Street]

I believe the whole F35B STOVL concept for austere ops is flawed. F35B could not have gone to Kandahar in 2005 as the Harriers did, as its STOVL ops would have destroyed what little surface was actually usable - not to mention wrecking the airframes' stealth characteristics through FOD impacts. If bespoke reinforced concrete mixes are required for pads, what chance would MEXE or a third-world rough strip have? Even using rolling vertical landings would submit the surfaces to extreme treatment.

IMHO the UK's stance on F35B comes down to the following factors:
1) Choosing the same variant as the USMC, as they're the only US service fanatical about actually getting the F35. This increases our chances of eventually receiving some ourselves. The USAF would probably bin F35A for more F22 if they were pushed, and the USN would be happy with a load more F/A18 instead of being sole customers for the F35C (which has a different airframe to the A and B models).
2) Lots of lovely workshare and technology showcasing in the lift fan
3) Lots of Harrier pilots involved in the project who already know that STOVL is the answer, and offers a perfect chance to get bums-on-seats for their mates (having noticed with envy how the Jag force managed to 'own' the Typhoon stand-up).

[John Farley]

Chaps

I did not mean to stir up the whole austere site B/Harrier thing.

I suggested – and I stand by it – that the B has more operating site flexibility than the C. At sea it can be flown from smaller and simpler ships and ashore it needs less space to operate. Given the way the future never works out as the planners would wish I think those are useful characteristics for the UK.

My term ‘operating site flexibility’ should not be taken as code for something else or as jargon implying the flexibility of past Harrier ops.

[LowObservable]

Thanks, JF - I would not want to be on the other side of a STOVL debate with you.

I believe that it would have been better to focus on a real "Harrier replacement" oriented towards CAS, battlefield interdiction and air defense. (A STOVL equivalent of Gripen.) But back in the early 1990s, Lockheed sold the Marines and the Pentagon on the idea that they could get that, plus stealth, in an F-18C-sized package for less money, by combining it with the AF and Navy programs. Everyone bought into the deal and here we are...

[Thelma Viaduct]

If going down the JSF purchase route, why not split the purchase 50/50 B & C, you then get the best of both worlds and added flexibility for when either V/stol or long leg missions are required.

[ORAC]

For all the original talk, commonality of parts between the B and C models is down to 10-20%. With a total buy of around 69 aircraft it's just not logistically or fiscally feasible.

[Thelma Viaduct]

So the compromise is flexibility vs capability.

What's more important?

I doubt that future strike ucavs are going to be v/stol capable, will this influence carrier design and therefore jsf type?

[mick2088]

I doubt that future strike ucavs are going to be v/stol capable, will this influence carrier design and therefore jsf type?

To quote Barry Norman, "And Why Not?" Maybe not a Taranis or X-47B Pegasus-sized UCAV, and I guess it depends on US DoD funding or whether LockMart plans to fund it itself, but this beast might be ideal for the CVFs if they remain as they are.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_profilepage&v=vUpMG-KN7Pg#! (http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_profilepage&v=vUpMG-KN7Pg#%21)

[cokecan]

PP - 'Flexibility vs Capability'.

how much more - in real world terms - flexible do we think Dave B is really going to be than Dave C, or Dave A, or F/A-18, Tornado or F-16?

if, as is suggested further up the thread, Dave B could not have operated from Kandahar when GR9 first did, why are we buying this version?

does 'austere' in LM parlance actually mean RAF Lossiemouth?

[Frostchamber]

There's a long list of pros and cons in making the choice between STOVL and cat and trap. It's not just a question of austere basing, but (as I understand it) a shedload of other factors like sortie rates and the sea states you can operate in. I suspect it was also felt that continuing with STOVL operations would be more straightforward and lower risk than getting back into the cat and trap game from scratch.

Then again there's a downside in terms of cost and other aspects of performance such as range.

Both have their advantages and disadvantages and how you view it depends on which factors you see as most important.

[glad rag]

F-35 alternate engine damaged after high-speed anomaly (http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2010/09/28/347904/f-35-alternate-engine-damaged-after-high-speed-anomaly.html)

single seat, single engine bla bla bla.:rolleyes:

[Double Zero]

So a new engine on a test bed has had a hiccup; what's the big deal ?!

[oldnotbold]

SDSR – ‘Carriers give politicians options – not dead ends’
September 25, 2010
by Alexander Clarke

Contributing Author: Dr Duncan Redford
Introduction

‘Many of our allies still consider Britain to be a maritime power – even if we don’t’

The Strategic Defence and Security Review will ensure that Britain’s Armed Forces end up looking very different from today. Getting the balance right between short, medium and long-term threats, commitments, orders of battle, procurement plans and the desires of each of the three Services will be difficult. One issue that encapsulates the hard decisions that will be taken is debate over whether Britain should keep the two aircraft carriers being built for the Royal Navy.

The carriers are a key component of a vital aspect of maritime strategy – the balanced fleet. A balanced fleet combines different capabilities rather than concentrate on one. The whole is greater than the sum of its parts, able to deal with a very wide range of threats and tasks, from high-intensity war-fighting to disaster relief or anti-piracy operations – and everything in between.
A Balanced Fleet

As a result a balanced fleet is not irrelevant today, nor will it be in the future; it has a structural agility that allows it to meet a wide range of strategic scenarios. The flexibility of a balanced fleet – and the new aircraft carriers – allows Britain to insure against strategic shocks.

The Royal Navy has been accused of living in the past, or pursuing an “exorbitant quest” for these two new ships. So why are these two ships so important to the Navy? What can aircraft carriers do that makes them so important to Britain? In one sentence: almost everything a government could desire from its armed forces.
Military Role of the Carrier

The carriers will be able to play a major part in defending Britain’s global maritime and national interests, be they oil rigs, energy supplies, merchant ships, or the massive amount of British trade moved by sea. These carriers will support British diplomacy and deter aggressors, as well as protecting the other ships of the Navy from attack by submarines, surface ships and aircraft.

They will be the main means of attacking enemy naval, land and air forces in support of our government’s security objectives – “power projection”. They can support land forces carrying out counter-insurgency operations – as aircraft from American carriers in the Indian Ocean are doing over Afghanistan – or high-intensity operations if required. These ships will act as the command and control centres not just for naval forces, but also for operations involving all three Services.

The carriers can, in conjunction with the Navy’s amphibious ships and the Royal Marines, act as a mobile base from which land forces can operate against an enemy – terrorist or state – without the political, financial, diplomatic and military cost of basing troops on land, where they are constantly exposed to every means of attack. More importantly, the threat of being able to do all these things – especially when backed up by a “balanced” fleet, gives a prime minister a great deal of political choice about how Britain’s interests are to be protected.
Further Roles

But the fighting aspects of the aircraft carriers are only one part of the naval power that they represent. There are also the “softer” functions, which are just as vital as the high-intensity war-fighting. From disaster relief, anti-piracy, counter-narcotics, helping to implement UN sanctions, or evacuating stranded British civilians from war zones and natural disasters, to naval diplomacy, these ships – and the wider Navy they are a part of – will be able to provide massive support to British interests around the globe – sometimes through just being there; showing that Britain is interested in events in that region, or that we support a particular country.
Political Power

Using aircraft carriers means that the UK doesn’t have to worry about basing rights, over-flight agreements, or other states allowing us access across their territory. Carriers and the Navy give Britain independence of action if needed, and also make her a valuable ally. This isn’t about old-fashioned “gunboat diplomacy” – it is far more subtle; about the unspoken messages that navies, especially aircraft carriers as the pinnacle of maritime power, can send.

A navy capable of operating at a global level with carriers at its core will be a powerful “naval diplomacy” tool. It can move at 500 miles a day between trouble spots and loiter out of sight until needed. It can deploy for months without the need for land-based support. It can operate overtly in sight of a coast line to reassure the friendly or deter an aggressor; the strategic flexibility and mobility inherent in maritime forces gives politicians options, not dead ends. It can visit ports and countries to show support for British interests, to build good will and understanding, or to aid the civil authorities. It can be used to promote alliances by working with friendly navies; it can build trust with former enemies by allowing ships to exercise together without the potential political problems of land-based operations.

The carriers are also a symbolic commitment by Britain that says it values maritime issues and the Royal Navy in particular. It is a commitment to a very public form of international prestige and national power – carriers divide nations into those that have them and those who will end up wishing they did. After all, when Tony Blair was prime minister it is said that his first question regarding the British response to an international incident or crisis was always “Where is our aircraft carrier?”
Cost-effectiveness

Critics of the new carriers are quick to point at the cost. However, to get out of the contract will cost £2.3 billion which, as these ships will only cost £44 million a year to operate, is more than will be spent on them in their entire working lives. It has been suggested that money could be saved by reducing the number of aircraft or making them less capable. Having fewer aircraft actually wastes the investment in the carriers – it’s like buying a tank but never buying shells for the gun. As to having less capable aircraft, that is already happening. The version of the Joint Strike Fighter we are buying, the F35B vertical/short take-off and landing model which is slated for the carriers, has less range and a smaller payload than the conventional naval “C” variant the Americans are buying; the “C” variant is also about £25 million cheaper per aircraft.

If Britain wants to save money in the carrier programme, fit them with catapults, arrester gear and buy the F35C, not vertical/short take-off version. These carriers represent excellent value for money – probably more so than many other British or European defence projects in the past 20 years. The commitment Britain shows to its maritime position through the carriers and the concept of having a balanced Navy is valuable. In an age where Britain will need the support of allies to further its foreign and security policy, it makes sense to contribute to such alliances as Nato or the EU in the most effective manner to ensure our voice is heard.
European and World Standing

Many of our allies still consider Britain to be a maritime power – even if we don’t – and given the contribution Britain makes to maritime forces available to the European members of Nato, it is easy to see why they think we are. Britain is ranked first in its contribution of nuclear powered hunter-killer attack submarines, aircraft carriers, amphibious assault ships, and at-sea replenishment vessels to keep the fleet supplied wherever it is in the world; it ranks second in terms of helicopter assault ships – “commando carriers” and air-defence destroyers; third in anti-submarine or general purpose frigates; and fourth in mine-sweeping and mine-hunting ships – which does not reflect the qualitative and quantitative superiority over many ships in other EU and Nato navies. Importantly, given the small numbers of ships involved, scrapping one or two ships could have a massive impact not only on Britain’s capabilities, our international credibility and the value of our support to our allies, but also that of Nato and the EU.
Way Ahead

If Britain wants to sit back and let the world come to us, inflexible and immobile, chained to our island, then cancel the carriers and continue decimating the Royal Navy. On the other hand, if Britain wants to be a part of the global community, it will need a capable Navy to promote and defend its interests around the world – and that means it will need aircraft carriers. For hundreds of years and until quite recently almost the entire country believed that “It is upon the Navy… that the safety, honour and welfare of this realm do chiefly depend”; there is still a great deal of truth in that statement today.

SDSR – ‘Carriers give politicians options ? not dead ends’ The Phoenix Think Tank (http://thephoenixthinktank.wordpress.com/2010/09/25/sdsr-carriers-give-politicians-options-%E2%80%93-not-dead-ends/)

[oldnotbold]

F-35 grounded to fix new software problem
"All flights in short take-off and vertical landing mode are also suspended after a post-flight inspection on the BF-1 flight test aircraft detected an "issue" with the auxiliary inlet door hinge located immediately aft of the lift fan.

Lockheed is still working to identify the root cause of the auxiliary inlet door hinge issue that has stopped all STOVL-mode tests.

The STOVL-capable F-35B has to complete at least 50 vertical landings to clear the flight envelope to launch a series of shipboard tests scheduled in March 2011. Completing shipboard testing is critical to meeting the US Marine Corp's plan to enter service with the F-35B in December 2012.

The software-based grounding and the STOVL restrictions mean the F-35B could fall further behind schedule with two years left to stand up the first operational unit for the USMC."

F-35 grounded to fix new software problem (http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2010/10/01/348074/f-35-grounded-to-fix-new-software-problem.html)