7 little weeks of Sadness..... XV109 today [Archive]

November4

31st May 2010, 19:52

Could well have been so very different

I flew on 109 as part of a MAMS team in Sep / Oct 1988 from Brize to Hong Kong and then two shuttles to Kathmandu. I think it was on that trip that that the Sgt (poss FS) Load Mistress ended up in the swimming pool, late at night, in Kathmandu...assisted a little by the Stewards and MAMS.

My trip on 109 was the one that could have been a different ending for her.

8 Dec 1988 109 was tasked to recover RM pax from Gardermoen when a Hercules went u/s. Gardermoen - Leuchars - Brize no problem except over, Birmingham a bang was heard from the wheel well. Apparently one of the main wheels had exploded and the debris had taken out the fuel lines to 2 of the engines as well as the auto pilot and hydraulic system. The crew managed to recover to Brize and the 50 or so RM and crew evacuated the aicraft via the enmergency slides. We later heard that this was the closest to losing a VC10 that the RAF had come.

8 months later though, 109 brough me home from a 6 month tour in Belize. Not sure if that was a good move or not as I got engaged not long after. But I suppose after almost 20 years of marriage....yes it was a good thing.

pma 32dd

31st May 2010, 20:10

I think there are only 4 pilots (ie 2 crews)who landed a VC10 on 2 engines (real not sim assymetric). The story above is one. I might have had involvement in the other! Aug 02 and I think XV109 IIRC at BZN post 3 eng ferry. I'll have to check my logbook next week.

NutLoose

31st May 2010, 20:27

Didn't Maggie go out to Washington on a Vc10, land in a Trident, set off back in a Trident and land back at Brize in a 1-11? and all the same aircraft.. ;)

On_The_Top_Bunk

1st Jun 2010, 00:08

Not before time. Harsh but fair.

BANANASBANANAS

1st Jun 2010, 10:23

Old-Duffer

1st Jun 2010, 12:24

The photos of XV109 remind me of a Beverley which had been blown up in the middle east and was lying at the side of the strip, looking so forlorn with its crew standing around.

The bubble caption has one of the crew saying: "How long to fix it, Eng?"

matkat

1st Jun 2010, 12:25

November, I remember that incident clearly as I should because here is the whole story. The aircraft came into Leuchars and was seen in by myself (The VAS line supervisor at the time) and 2 others did a walk round and noticed a large "scalop" out of one of the tyres looked like if you had carved a slice out of it with a knife. I advised the FE of what we had seen and advised that as far as we were concerned it was U/S we proceeded to the mess for supper only to be told by radio that the aircraft was leaving we rushed back and sure enough the G/E was on the headset directing the start-up I spoke to him and also advised him that IMO the tyre was U/S and had to be changed he said no it is ok they subsequently left. I returned to the VAS office and wrote what I had seen/advised etc. in the diary and said to the other 2 to sign, we also had a movements team(4 people) from Leuchars who I had said to go and look at the tyre. We did not hear anything about what happened until sometime later approx 3 weeks IIRC this was conveyed to me from the board of enquiry that had been set up and who were to travel to Leuchars to interview me, at that the Captain said that he was unaware of my missgivings but this was refuted by myself and my team because when I advised the FE they were both together and the Captain then instructed the FE to check it out I also had my 2 lads as witnesses to the event. I was also advised that this was very close to loosing the aircraft and only caused by your crew, obviously I am very happy it turned out ok but I can tell you myself and 2 lads were extremely annoyed(put mildly) by the way your crew tried to implicate the 3 of us in this however there were just to many witnesses to coroborate what really went on, I have no idea what the outcome of the B of I was if you know please let me know.

NutLoose

1st Jun 2010, 13:10

Wouldn't suprise me, reminds me of the one in Hong Kong that they noticed fuel leaking out of a wing, close inspection revealed a couple of inch crack in the lower wing skin, now these skins are rolled so all the metal grain runs in one direction for strength I believe, which means the crack can rapidly open like a zip...... so what did they do, they flew it back to the UK!!

BTW MAMS are movers and would be PAX not crew.

November4

1st Jun 2010, 13:29

Nutloose...why the dig

BTW MAMS are movers and would be PAX not crew

as I can't see anywhere on here where anyone has claimed the MAMS were crew. MAMS teams were usually manifested as Support Crew just the same as the GE were but never Air Crew.

MatKat

Thanks for the extra details. As I remember it, the crew were also told in Gardermoen by the Norwiegians that the wheel was U/S.

NutLoose

1st Jun 2010, 14:25

Wasn't meant to be an intentional dig or inferred to be, simply the line

by the way your crew tried to implicate the 3 of us in this

reads as if they were part of the crew,

"by the way the crew" would have distanced him from being part of them, does that make sense??

Sorry for any confusion, thats why I put about the movers to show that they wouldn't be part of the flying crew.

November4

1st Jun 2010, 14:43

Thanks Nutloose

Just didn't want to descend into another mover bashing thread.

BEagle

1st Jun 2010, 15:17

matkat, thanks for your account. When we of the superior VC10 tanker squadron used to visit Leuchars, we had nothing but good things to say about Leuchars VASF. Many a time on operational air defence detachments Big George and the rest of his happy gang would provide us with truly excellent assistance.

The actions of that 'shiny' crew are perplexing, to say the least. If you were so worried as to have such clear concerns about the aircraft's safety, the captain should most certainly have taken your advice and had the tyre changed. Bloody daft not to have done so, in my opinion.

Next time (I hope that there won't be one, of course), Flash call the tower and tell them that the aircraft taxying out has been seen to have a badly damaged tyre - and get them to call OC Ops Wg (or whatever silly title he now has...). No-one will ever criticise caution.

Pressonitis, a tyre explosion and failure of 2 LP fuel cocks as a result. They were very, very lucky.....

A VC10K3 once landed with 2 engines stuck at idle in the early days of the VC10K - it seemed that the stub wing drainholes had been blocked since delivery and water had frozen at altitude, effectively jamming the throttle controls which couldn't be moved after a long descent. A good job that the same fault wasn't also present on the other side....:eek:

R for Robert

1st Jun 2010, 15:44

'The old girl could have been "Guillotined" by a JCB and dumped in Skips'

She will, possibly this week!:{

Jimmy Macintosh

1st Jun 2010, 15:55

Who parked it at John Lenon International? It's their own fault.

NutLoose

1st Jun 2010, 16:22

Remember the one that taxied out and the wheel rim fell off?? so as if by magic the inflated tyre was still gripping the remains of the wheel, there was a megga discussion as to what to do and at one point mention was made of shooting the tyre out, though concerns were mooted about richochets going up through the fuel tank!.......... I kid you not... I distanced myself from the proceedings at that point, in the end they dragged some SAC out of the wheelbay that had last serviced it, he ran in screwed a deflator in the valve and ran away, it went down and never shifted off the core of the wheel......

on a side note if you want to see a richochet in action meet the worlds luckiest man............. unless you know different

YouTube - Man shoots AR-50...bullet richocet back!! (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6_HD7x4WSig)

matkat

1st Jun 2010, 17:16

Beagle many thanks for your kind words I was one of Georges happy crew, you did omit to say he actually joined you not long after that. Sadly I will never have to do such a thing as I left many moons ago, I believe George went to live in the states after he left the RAF and have not heard of him since pity though He was a PITA he was a top bloke.
Notloose sorry I probably put the statement wrong the movers that saw the tyre were Leuchars based and were not on the aircraft they were at the aircraft to move the RMs baggage and equipment. The crew I refered to was the Captain the FE and the GE.

BEagle

1st Jun 2010, 17:49

matkat, yes, the 'wee man' did indeed make the long journey south! I'm sure that, as a team boss, he was a bit of a task master, but what a top chap - particularly when we needed QTRs during our Boris-watching sessions!

As for MAMS teams, I always found them to be hard-working and, if the trainee captain ever deigned to talk to them rather than sitting on the flight deck, sipping coffee and communicating only via the ALM, he would find them very task-orientated.

Having watched the team (on more than one occasion) sweating to sort out a VC10 freight off-load/on-load in sweltering heat at Freetown whilst the self-important ALM faffed and tutted, they have my every sympathy. But I'm sure that others have different recollections - people are only human, after all. Whatever, it was all the same air force and "Movers v. Loadies" is surely something which by now has hopefully been consigned to the trash can of history.

Truck2005

1st Jun 2010, 18:15

As an ex GE myself I feel that I have to put something right here. There are many times that 'pushonitous, is applied to turnarounds, from all directions. Although it is not an excuse, and thank god all turned out ok, the GE's only fault was not insisting on putting the snag in the 700. If he had done that I think there would have been a bit of rethinking on behalf of the crew, (GE,s are not FLIGHT CREW), very difficult to explain that snag when the SengO sees it in the greens.

I have been put in similar positions and if I know I am right about something as potentially dangerous as this I will stand my ground, (and if necessary get off). I was taught this by some extremely good GEs on 10 Sqn during my UT day and their advice stood me well.

As I said, this is no excuse, but the GE comes under a lot of pressure from crews at times and he needs to be able to think clearly. A FE on his back telling him it will do one more landing is the last thing he needs, After all, it is his bum on the seat, what better incentive is there?

matkat

1st Jun 2010, 18:59

Truck, your comment is noted however as they (as in the crew) were twice told from 2 different stations that the tyre was U/S surely that should set alarm bells ringing, as you may note I never blamed anyone that was not for me to do the BoI had that task and I am led to believe he did get blamed for it, also please bear in mind my previous comments where they actually tried to blame me!!
I was also a GE in civilian life on DC-8s L1011s and B747s so I am well aware of the pressure that the job entails.
BEagle, yes indeed He was a hard taskmaster but you reap what you sow and I can honestly say I would not have had it any other way.

Truck2005

1st Jun 2010, 19:37

I know what you mean Matkat. The GE in question was my SAGE when I started and I do not think there was a better one. I learnt from it, (and tyres became my pet hate, ask the line)! The real problem was his crew let him down by not being the total professionals I know those crews normally are. As I said - Pushonitous is a very dangerous thing:=

matkat

1st Jun 2010, 20:56

Truck, you are indeed correct his crew did let him down and that was apparent during the BoI their attitude to him towards the end of my interview was awful, as it became obvious that they could not blame anyone else all 3 of them turned on him asking various questions about why he did not do this or that, as a 30 year corporal techie at the time their behaviour towards both my team and me and to their supposed collegue was cowardly, not only that for me as a fairly young guy in charge of other even younger having to answer questions from them of why these officers and Master FE were lieing was embarrasing, these young guys are meant to aspire and look up to these people not listen to them blatantly lieing and trying to wriggle out of their responsibilities.
Thats all from me on the subject as even now as you can probably tell still grips me.

Not a Crew Chief

1st Jun 2010, 21:15

November4

Thought that rang a bell so just dug my log book out of the loft.

The trip was originally a westabout taking Fincastle crews from Kinloss to Adelaide. FE was ex Kipper fleet. We then, as you say, headed to HKG for trips to Seoul and Kathmandu for the Ghurka roulement. We used Seoul as Osan was having the runway done and thereby hangs a tale.
Myself and the other GE's (we'd picked up slip crews) stayed for the off/on load and during the evening our passports and papers were taken and examined several times by various officials. Next morning on departure I was deficient one of the many pieces of paper we were given on arrival. I was taken away by a very large - no arguements - Korean official. After an eternity locked in a very small room, a British Army WO with the UN came and asked for my story. He said we had to make our apologies and led me to another office with aforementione heavyweight official. We apologised profusely but were getting nowhere until he asked how much the fine was. The WO then opened his attache case, which I swear had more dollars than any 10 Sqn kitty, and paid a considerable sum. I was then allowed back through the terminal and onto the aircraft still wondering if that had just happened.
I didn't get back to Brize on 109 though, the icing on the cake was being offloaded at Bahrain to assist another GE with what turned out to be a flap assymetry problem. While we waited for a box to come out from UK I didn't think it prudent to mention that if his crew hadn't been so keen to take 109 back, and we'd had a proper handover, we could have taken the box out of my tech pack instead of watching it disappear into the sunset. Happy days.
I've got a couple of photos of 109 at KTM on that trip and will try and upload them.

Not a Crew Chief

1st Jun 2010, 21:27

Hopefully I've mastered the technology and you should see 2 pictures of 109 at KTM October 1988

http://i906.photobucket.com/albums/ac266/bennea1/109KTM.jpg

http://i906.photobucket.com/albums/ac266/bennea1/KTM109.jpg

BEagle

2nd Jun 2010, 08:00

matkat, you have my every sympathy.

Not a Crew Chief, they really were shiny in those days, weren't they!

bingofuel

2nd Jun 2010, 08:11

I always thought that colour scheme on the shiny fleet was the best ever. Fairly simple but just looked right. In my opinion never beaten by any military or civil paint job since.

LAS1997

2nd Jun 2010, 08:14

Who has got the nose section? I guess GJD Services? For sale perhaps? It would be nice to save a little VC-tenderness! A nose section would look great as a club-house, or museum exhibit. That said, a complete VC10 would be even better.

forget

2nd Jun 2010, 10:05

You're right about the colour scheme. A thing of great beauty. I remember going West through the Pacific, following Vulcans to Singapore/Butterworth. We picked up a couple of US Air Force guys in Guam (or maybe Wake) on an R&R scrounge flight. They just wouldn't believe that the beautiful 10 was a 'troop ship', real seats and all, and not a 4 Star's VIP ship. In-flight catering even! Very sad to see their end.

Squirrel 41

2nd Jun 2010, 11:54

If the rumour on here that 808 is to be saved for posterity is correct (and let us fervently hope so), what chance that we could get her repainted into the classic shiny white scheme? I, for one, will put hand in pocket to support this.

S41

BEagle

2nd Jun 2010, 12:03

The trip was originally a westabout taking Fincastle crews from Kinloss to Adelaide.

When once we had an air force......:{

NutLoose

2nd Jun 2010, 15:53

I didn't get back to Brize on 109 though, the icing on the cake was being offloaded at Bahrain to assist another GE with what turned out to be a flap assymetry problem. While we waited for a box to come out from UK I didn't think it prudent to mention that if his crew hadn't been so keen to take 109 back, and we'd had a proper handover, we could have taken the box out of my tech pack instead of watching it disappear into the sunset. Happy days.

I remember the line going out to do an engine change in Dulles that was taking for ever, excuse after excuse was coming from them and then the LSS got a phone call paid by the bod out in Dulles so as not to go through official channels asking if possible could we put the engine lifting beam they had forgotten on the Thursday? Washington run :}

Love the pics of 109, though 10 Sqn did not like the refuelling probe fitted to them as it "spoiled the lines."

BANANASBANANAS

3rd Jun 2010, 02:54

1986 I think and First Officer Bananas is flying a shiny 10, Brize to Bermuda (night stopping to continue somewhere not very popular) with the Sqn boss (he who will forever be associated with Phnom Penh) as his Captain. Just past top of climb Bananas sees the standby horizon (no go item) topple inverted. Quick scan out of the window to make sure that the blue is where it should be and Bananas is about to announce to the crew what a smart chap he is (being the first to notice this failure) when he feels a slap on the back of his head from very senior Flight Engineer. Bananas takes the 'hint' and shuts up.

Some hours later, Nav announces 'PNR Brize Captain' and four voices announce 'Oh, look the standby horizon has just toppled.'

Resulted in a 4 day layover if memory serves - and that is a story all on it's own!

Happy days.:ok:

moggiee

4th Jun 2010, 11:17

8 Dec 1988 109 was tasked to recover RM pax from Gardermoen when a Hercules went u/s. Gardermoen - Leuchars - Brize no problem except over, Birmingham a bang was heard from the wheel well. Apparently one of the main wheels had exploded and the debris had taken out the fuel lines to 2 of the engines as well as the auto pilot and hydraulic system. The crew managed to recover to Brize and the 50 or so RM and crew evacuated the aicraft via the enmergency slides. We later heard that this was the closest to losing a VC10 that the RAF had come.
I was the co-pilot up front on that. It was an interesting half hour or so!

We didn't lose the autopilot, if memory serves me right, but we did lose the LH hydraulics (requiring manual gear lowering) and perhaps more seriously we lost all 15,000lbs of fuel from the port wing, leaving us a bit tight for fuel on approach at BZN.

matkat and others:

For those who are speculating upon the decision making process that led to the aeroplane getting airborne with a faulty tyre, allow me to explain:

The tyre problem was spotted during the turnaround and the GE wanted to change it as we had a spare in the boot.

The Flt Lt Captain and MEng FE weren't keen on the delay that this would incur. Myself and the nav both thought that we should change it and said so.

Capt and FE went down to have a look at it and came back up to the flight deck to say that the GE now agreed that it was fit for one flight home and that he had signed the tech log (F700) to this extent. The nav and I accepted this as the truth on the basis that if all three of them were in agreement then we were happy to go with their decision.

At the subsequent BoI it transpired that the captain and FE had bullied the GE into signing it off and had then lied to myself and the nav about it, saying that the GE was happy when he in fact was not.

I gave the BoI a 100% correct statement of my understanding of the events and I believe that the nav and GE did the same. I made it clear that the GE had had his doubts but that we'd been told by the captain and FE that he was in agreement that it was OK to go. I'm not sure what the captain and FE told the board as I was not there when they gave evidence and they did not want to talk to me afterwards because they felt that I had failed to "back them up" - and that suggests to me that they were feeling uncomfortable with their actions and possibly with what they'd told the BoI. For my part, I felt that it was important to be honest with the board as the fact needed to come out, and if that upset the captain and FE then so be it.

The board came to the conclusion that the captain and FE had put unfair pressure upon the GE, had lied to myself and the nav and had been unprofessional. They were both punished for their actions. The nav, the GE and I were all reminded that it was our responsibility to be more assertive in the face of such pressure and to stand our ground - other than that there was no sanction against mhyself and the nav but I can't recall what happened with the GE.

I was annoyed with myself for not being more assertive but as a relatively junior co-pilot I was less confident than I should have been with regard to my knowledge of what was and was not right. The nav was also relatively new to type and we both made the "mistake" of trusting more experienced crew members who were, in fact, telling us lies. When not in possession of the full facts it's hard to make the right decision. I do not now, and never have, place any blame upon the GE - only the captain and FE for telling lies to us and myself and the nav for not being assertive enough.

I have never taken anyone's word at face value since then - I always check!

If anyone wants to discuss it further, I'm available by PM.

NutLoose

4th Jun 2010, 13:53

I felt that it was important to be honest with the board as the fact needed to come out, and if that upset the captain and FE then so be it.

Good on ya..:D

It's people not speaking out that ended up with the famous B52 incident where all those onboard died....

I was also subject of a BOI many moons ago involving a ruptured bowser, a major spillage and a driver pointing a finger in my direction....... they are neither nice nor wanted, but speaking out and telling the truth is the only way it ensures lessons are learnt as the next time the outcome may be different. I was exonerated for what it is worth.

moggiee

4th Jun 2010, 16:54

I've just realised that I had a typo in there, it should read "captain and FE" - I've amended the original post.

The captain never spoke to me again after I gave my evidence. I wasn't too bothered, to be honest, because my conscience was clear. His behaviour and that of the FE could have killed us all (and bloody nearly did).

Still, all those hours practicing emergencies in the sim paid off that night!

Squirrel 41

4th Jun 2010, 21:52

Good for you Moggie. Especially correcting the FE /GE differential.

S41

Dan Winterland

5th Jun 2010, 01:36

''I always thought that colour scheme on the shiny fleet was the best ever. Fairly simple but just looked right. In my opinion never beaten by any military or civil paint job since.''

It looks very similar to the CNAC 707 parked next to it. And Air China (what CNAC became) still have a very similar paint scheme.

bingofuel

5th Jun 2010, 13:26

And all women are biologically similar but........................some are beautiful and some are not.

JamesA

5th Jun 2010, 14:50

bingofuel,
I and many more agree with you. The simplicity of the blue cheat line between the white and grey always looked the business on whichever TC aircraft it was applied. Sad when the 'Transport Command' was removed.

I also remember when 809 had four engines.

Truck2005

5th Jun 2010, 15:35

As I remember it. The GE involved ran the desk for sometime and then finished with us. I think I am correct in saying he was honestly thinking of binning the RAF for that treatment but he did stay in and the last I heard, which was many moons ago, he got his commission and was a Flt Lt :ok:

moggiee

5th Jun 2010, 20:29

he did stay in and the last I heard, which was many moons ago, he got his commission and was a Flt Lt :ok:
That's good to hear - he was a good chap who was badly treated by a couple of people who should have known better.

There is a bit more to the story of the captain and FE but I'm afraid that's not for public viewing.

old10ge

6th Aug 2013, 23:45

Yes a good guy and as the award of his commission showed he was blameless. The previous poster has alluded to the other two members of the crew having more history and as I worked with both can second that

ShyTorque

7th Aug 2013, 22:59

I was a passenger in a rushed then aborted takeoff in a VC-10 one dark night out of (nearly) Dulles, bound for Belize. A bit of a c**k-up all round, from what I learned later from a Phanton pilot Sqn Ldr who had been given the "benefit" of the jump seat. Crew turned up late (they had put us on the aircraft once then taken us off again in those awful mobile lounge things) then failed to properly configure the aircraft for takeoff. We had apparently very nearly gone off the end of the runway, to the extent that they couldn't get a tow truck in front of the nose gear. It became an even longer dark night. :(

NutLoose

7th Aug 2013, 23:29

That's why they had reverse thrust, to back up a bit :)

ShyTorque

8th Aug 2013, 11:01

Still overheated the brakes though. Took hours to sort out.

Davita

8th Aug 2013, 14:24

re post 49.

My recollection is that an inconfigured A/C will give a warning when the power levers are about one third open, generally before brake release.
If a rolling T.O. was intended full thrust was used much earlier in the Take-Off run and a warning would thus be early.....that used to be the procedure.
Either way it should not occasion the full-blown abort the poster indicates.

Is my memory wrong?

ShyTorque

8th Aug 2013, 15:43

Don't know about your memory, but mine's OK.

Chugalug2

8th Aug 2013, 15:46

An interesting thread that seems to indicate:-

That the VC-10 was/is an excellent aircraft, but like all aircraft vulnerable to bad airmanship. Even then it could save itself and those within it from the consequences of their own actions/inactions.

Also that the unsung heroes of the RAF were as ever its groundcrews, often working in intolerable conditions yet maintaining the highest professional standards.

Finally, that any aircraft that finishes its service in one piece, only to be then taken to pieces as is the case for the subject aircraft, is a tribute to those who built it, maintained it, and operated it. This is how all aircraft should end up (unless being preserved for posterity), and not as a hole in the ground of its own making.

NutLoose

8th Aug 2013, 17:41

That must be a record in itself, I cannot think of another type the RAF operated that hasn't had at least one end up as a smoking hole in the ground, true there have been a few ground based incidents, but not one RAF Ten went in...

WE992

8th Aug 2013, 22:18

Many moons ago I was at what is now a former Buccaneer base in Suffolk when a 10 turned left at the end of the landing roll at the 27 threshold instead of right and ended up at the HAS site gates. VAS had no tow bar and there was not one on the aircraft. The aircraft had to reverse about a hundred yards before being able to turn round in what I think was probably a former V bomber dispersal narrowly missing a lighting trolley in the process. This is the one and only time I have ever seen a 10 reverse under its own power. After getting the steps in when the aircraft finaly got to the main ASP we were greeted with a tray of Tea & stickies!

Air Canada regularly use to reverse thrust their 727's off the stands at Calgary but that was also a long time ago.

Davita

9th Aug 2013, 05:14

The reason I asked for verification of my post #52 is because I’ve flown as an F/E on many other A/C (B707; L1011; B747) since my tour on 10Sqn’s early VC10s, then later as a VC10 F/E Simulator Instructor.
My recollection of the VC10 is if the crew ‘inadvertently’ position the controls wrongly the take-off configuration warning horn (TOCW) will sound as soon as the thrust levers are advanced, thus obviating a full abort.
That's why the quote in post #49 “crew failed to configure the aircraft for take-off” then aborted and overran the runway; jumped out at me and tested my memory.
Anything can occur before V1, where the TOCW will activate, thus the crew may abort at high speed. For example….vibration may cause the speed brake lever to rise from detent, the variable tail angle switches malfunction, or similarly, the flap/slat switches trigger incorrectly……but, imo, those faults can hardly be blamed on the crew.

thanks to Beagle....Edit.....I got CTOW and TOCW arse about face!
Also that Conways used N3 %RPM for thrust settings...I'd used RB211 EPR for so long I'd forgotten. Standards keep changing .....I was on Bristol engined Hastings when they switched from Lbs Boost to Ins Mg. Should have bought shares in the instrument manufacturer.

BEagle

9th Aug 2013, 06:55

If the correct take-off configuration is not set, the TOCW will indeed sound as soon as the thrust levers are moved above a value corresponding to about 80% HP RPM, if I recall correctly. But above a throttle angle corresponding to about 96% HP, TOCW is inhibited.

There must have been another reason for what sound to have been a high speed rejected take-off - but it will not have been that 'the crew failed to configure the aircraft for take-off' unless part of that 'configuration' was to obtain take-off clearance.

Later in the RAF VC10's life, some bright FE decided that 93% would be sufficient to use for take-off, provided of course that the calculated P7 value was obtained (until then we had a min. HP RPM limit of 96% for take-off). But this requires a throttle angle less than that corresponding to TOCW inhibit, something he obviously forgot when this new SOP was introduced. One day I was doing such a take-off at Brize when at around 90 KIAS the TOCW suddenly sounded - causing me to abort the take-off. Subsequent investigation revealed a fault in the horn interrupter unit - there had been nothing wrong with the aircraft. But what really annoyed me was the fact that a few other crews had experienced the same thing, but hadn't bothered to report it....:mad:

moggiee

20th Sep 2013, 17:02

If I remember correctly, there were about 7 things that had to be set correctly to avoid setting off the TOCW:

Aileron upset armed
Tail trim in the takeoff range
Spoilers retracted
Flaps at Takeoff

and then some other stuff that I've forgotten.........

Capt Niff Naff

20th Sep 2013, 17:20

Don't think we lost any Dominies due to Ac/ Ground interface. Only when they were 'consolidated' by mixing the best wings and fuselages did the fleet shrink and then as they were taken out of service and finally sold off or scrapped.
Maybe it was because it also had a T- tail ?
I'm sure we never lost a Belfast or 146 either.
CNN:ok:

Fareastdriver

20th Sep 2013, 18:33

I'm sure we never lost a Belfast or 146 either.

A Belfast was too slow to crash into anything.

Bill4a

22nd Sep 2013, 09:33

Reading the above from Moggiee I was reminded of the very useful item in the old Air Clues titled 'I Learned about Flying from That'!
I think most of us will have been there, pressured by more experienced people, and I'm sure it still goes on. Until it goes wrong that is!

moggiee

22nd Sep 2013, 20:26

I certainly learned a lot. My new found assertiveness had a detrimental effect on my career though - my boss didn't take kindly to my more "frank" approach to dealing with senior officers

vc10617

4th Oct 2013, 22:15

I was at Brize then and 109 was being ferried from Fields,Casle D. after a rewire. I know you said where you were but 109 hadn't been anyway near Brize for months. Did this happen twice?

NutLoose

4th Oct 2013, 22:21

Who?

They all went through and Fields offered to put in the tanker wiring for free, it was turned down as on a different contract. Last one out lost the panels out of the U/C bay.. Didn't note which was which as I see so many air raft it's like looking at car number plates, you don't unless the bugger is mowing you down.

Tankertrashnav

4th Oct 2013, 23:28

vc10617

5th Oct 2013, 10:08

A Belfast over ran the runway at Brize 73 ish and crossed the Bampton road.

vc10617

5th Oct 2013, 10:10

This was the C.MK.1 rewire contract 1992.

NutLoose

5th Oct 2013, 12:34

Question about the tanker version. I had a couple of trips on these with ATC cadets in the 1980s and was interested in the escape hatch which was originally intended to be used for crew abandonment (just aft of the flight deck on the port side). I think the idea was binned fairly early on when it was realised that getting a crew of four out was one thing, but a crew of four and a dozen odd pax was something else again.

Anyone know what sort of trials were done on this escape hatch and how it worked? I think there was some sort of extending slide to take escapees clear of the aircraft, but as it was all welded up by that time, I'm not sure about that. I take it even at the development stage nobody ever actually jumped out of a VC10

From my Ten course if I remember correctly it was a set of telescopic tubes inside each other that extended out and curved around the fuselage so you would exit underneath, the test dummies dropped hit the wing, hence it wasn't pursued and was disarmed. I think the reasoning was the Ten could provide all its fuel if needed in wartime then the crew would do a rapid depressurisation and abandon it. I don't think in the scenario envisaged the pax seats would be occupied. The complete design cost some £1,000,000 per aircraft and was installed as it was part of the design and had been manufactured. They found soon on that the closed slide was an correct diameter to take a bin bag so as it was opposite the Galley it became the most expensive bin bag holder in history. ( unless you know otherwise )

.

NutLoose

5th Oct 2013, 12:36

Vc10617

After the rewire at C Don they then went down to Bournemouth to get the wiring and tanker refuelling points installed, though cannot remember if it went straight away.

vc10617

5th Oct 2013, 14:04

Nutloose
Could have done, the 1st C.1K conversion,XV101, flew mid 1992.The re wire was running at the same time. I remember I needed engine stills for four Conways but there was a shortage. Fields had at least four as did FRA and maybe some at Filton on the K.4 conversion.
It took a while for someone to eventually get them to us.

moggiee

5th Oct 2013, 19:21

I was at Brize then and 109 was being ferried from Fields,Casle D. after a rewire. I know you said where you were but 109 hadn't been anyway near Brize for months. Did this happen twice?
Trust me - I have the logbook to prove it (I could scan and email the requisite page if you want :) ). I flew XV109 in June, August, September and November so it hadn't been away from Brize.

I'm sure that the re-wire at EMA was later - I think that I delivered at least one myself. My logbook says that we did a 1 way trip to EMA in XV108 on 3rd July 1989.

Tankertrashnav

5th Oct 2013, 20:20

Thanks Nutloose, that clears that up.

We rear crew had an escape hatch on the Victor, of course. It was called the door. Success rates in abandoning the Victor were very poor - not sure if there ever was a 100% successful abandonment. Sounds like it was a good plan to forget the whole thing - after all you got a £1m bin bag holder out of it! And in the event, because of the ten's 100% record, thankfully it would never have been needed.

NutLoose

5th Oct 2013, 20:54

The Ten one used the forward pax door, it's a long time ago, says on VC10. Net

The left front entrance door was converted to enable crew members to exit the aircraft by parachute in case of emergency. Because of this the right front service door would from now on be the main entrance door. The escape chute was extensively tested, but later on in the service life of the tankers a decision was made to block off the system as there was no need for it.

But we were told they hit the wing, so anyone's guess as to the truth.

The Tanker Conversions (http://www.vc10.net/History/tanker_conversions.html)

Though the prototype escape chute on the very first one dropped out underneath and that said

Testing and early days (http://www.vc10.net/Memories/testing_earlydays.html#How) to Escape from a VC10

The first three aircraft had escape hatches for the flight test crew and one of my jobs was to help the photographer with his high speed cine-film photographs of simulated escapes from a model in the 13' x 9' tunnel. I pulled the string which released a model man who was then photographed, something that we did for various speeds and attitudes. All was well except for one particular combination and one hatch (the one forward on the side), when the man flew into the engine. We did that test again and he hit the tailplane. At the third attempt he just caught the wing downwash and went safely below the engines.

Some time later I asked the photographer what the flight test crew said when they saw the film. He told me that he had cut that bit out and only showed the safe exit as he didn't want to worry them! I never did find out whether he was pulling my leg or whether he really did edit the film."

Well, things could have been worse! On the subject of escape hatches I couldn't resist adding the following lines from Brian Trubshaw's 1998 autobiography 'Test Pilot'. In these lines Brian Trubshaw recalls one of the stall tests that he carried out with the prototype G-ARTA when things didn't go as planned. There is also some information about this flight on the Incidents and Accidents page, including some comments from an ex-Vickers ground crew member.

"The last day of 1963 nearly brought the stalling programme to an abrupt end. I was just recovering from a clean stall when at about 250 Kts all hell broke loose as G-ARTA started shaking violently. There was a shout from the Senior Observer, Chris Mullen, who was looking at the tail through his periscope, 'Right inner elevator'. I was quite certain that G-ARTA was going to come apart and it nearly did, so I fired the escape hatch door and ordered the crew to bale out. The flight engineer, Roy Mole, could not get out of his seat and the same applied to the co-pilot Captain Peter Cane of BOAC, while the crew in the back could not hear me above the general racket. I managed to reduce speed to about 160 Kts which put me very close to a pre-stall buffet, whereupon the violent vibrations and oscillations calmed down to a smaller amount. The escape hatch chute which went through the front forward hold had collapsed and gone out when the door was jettisoned, so it was as well nobody tried to use it and only a jangled bunch of metal remained. I made a very gentle return towards Wisley under Mayday conditions and soon realized that I had lost half the aircraft services. However, the split system principle worked very well but I had to free-fall the right landing gear. After flight inspection revealed that the two right-hand engines had rotated 2 inch and in doing so pulled off hydraulic pipes and air-conditioning pipes. The right inner elevator had broken its attachment bracket which had set up flutter of that surface. Two fin attachment bolts were severed. In fact poor G-ARTA with whom I had developed a great bond of affection was in a sorry state. I think that we had done about 2,300 stalls together."

The type of escape hatch discussed above was fitted to both the VC10 and also to the BAC 1-11 (and perhaps other types of aircraft but I'm not sure about that). They consisted of a metal tunnel (the escape chute) that slid down through the forward freight hold to extend down below the aircraft through the freight hold door aperture after the door was removed using explosive bolts. Whether this would have provided a safe exit for the flight crew is a debatable issue, especially when the stories above are taken into account. The BAC 1-11 prototype G-ASHG was lost in October 1963 - just months before the incident with G-ARTA - when it got itself into a stable stalled condition and the flight crew did not have enough elevator authority left to regain control. The escape system was fired but the aircraft hit the ground shortly after the freight hold door was explosively removed. The flight test crew of seven did not survive the accident.
:*

moggiee

6th Oct 2013, 14:20

One extra bonus of the design of the VC10 - the primary flight controls were not powered by the main hydraulic system but by individual electro-hydraulic PFCUs. This means that even if both hydraulic systems are lost then the full range of primary flight controls are still available - and conversely, the physical separation of a primary control surface (elevator, aileron, rudder) from the airframe would not cause a loss of hydraulic services.

BEagle

6th Oct 2013, 16:32

The 'million pound dustbin' was a complete and utter waste of time and money.

It replaced the front door and was supposed to be extended into the airflow to enable a controlled abandonment. We were told that only one flight was ever made with the device extended, but that the noise and buffeting were so extreme that the aircraft landed early.

We were taught how to use it on #3 VC10K course, but refused to waste any time on it. It worked as follows:

1. The decision was made to off-load all available fuel to receivers and the low-level override system was selected on.
2. The aircraft was then depressurised. Or rather, the pressurisation was turned off and the cabin allowed to climb until the min. diff. pressure for chute deployment was reached. This could take several minutes.
3. Individual crew members were then supposed to use walk-round Mk4 oxygen bottles, before going into the cabin to don parachutes and oxygen systems as the flight deck seats weren't modified to allow for parachute packs. Pilots would take it in turns, but it was physically impossible to sit in any crew seat wearing the emergency AEA.
4. When the diff. pressure gauge suggested it was 'safe' to do so, the escape chute was deployed by pulling a large lever. The first item in the sequence was for the external door seal to be severed; however BWoS suggested that this would be ingested by the left engines, causing an uncontained failure of at least one engine..... 3 of the 4 crew might get out, but the last pilot was supposed to fly the thing by leaning over the seat to hold the control column in order to maintain at least wings-level flight, then let go, turn round, make his way back to the chute and jump out - probably to join his colleagues in the remains of the left engines.

Eventually common sense prevailed and the stupid system was removed. But the K2 and K3 were left with just the starboard service door.

There was never any proposal to enable the system to be used by passengers.

One legacy of the system was that the squadron had a large room allocated for immersion suit storage. In later days this became the 'new' Duffy's bar!

I recall being asked by some visiting multi-starred personage what I thought of the system. So I did so....:uhoh: I pretended that I didn't know that he was the idiot who had approved it!

Tankertrashnav

6th Oct 2013, 17:05

There was never any proposal to enable the system to be used by passengers.

Last thing the hypoxic passengers see as they slip into unconsciousness is one of the crew donning a parachute and carefully avoiding eye-contact :uhoh:

Not surprised the system was abandoned. How many stars did said personage acquire, I wonder. Doubt if he loses any sleep as he collects his not inconsiderable pension :*

NutLoose

6th Oct 2013, 17:48

I must admit when I first saw the thing I thought someone had a nut loose to design it and it wasn't me. I struck me as a system that was based on a lot of If's having to all fall in place for it ever to have worked. Still one supposes anything was better than nothing.

ICM

6th Oct 2013, 18:21

I have to admit to having read these last posts in some amazement. What was the perceived need to have an escape system on the new Ks after the multiple hours they had flown without, and some 15 years of C Mk1 ops ditto? Is there a history of tankers having to be abandoned after in-flight incidents? Did/do the KC-135s have some such system? I ask in the spirit of genuine enquiry for the absurdity that Beagle mentions seems so obvious to me, yet clearly did not to a number of folk who must have been involved in the specification.

NutLoose

6th Oct 2013, 18:34

It was purely a wartime tanker contingency as Beagle hits upon, if it's an all out strike the Ten would deliver ALL of its fuel to the attacking force, after which it was an expendable asset as there probably wouldn't have been anything to come home to, we would all by that time have the Ready Brek glow.

.

Saintsman

6th Oct 2013, 18:37

I think that the clue is 'off-loading all available fuel'.

It was a chance for the crew to get out before it became a glider.

Despite it not working, it didn't stop the Cmk1s being fitted with a suicide switch though.

Jhieminga

6th Oct 2013, 18:42

The way I read it is that it was meant for a war situation where a tanker would be sacrificed to provide fuel for other aircraft, and then abandoned. Not as an emergency escape system.

Edit: I guess I took too long to type that. ðŸ˜‰

BEagle

6th Oct 2013, 18:59

The way I read it is that it was meant for a war situation where a tanker would be sacrificed to provide fuel for other aircraft, and then abandoned.

Which would never have happened. Quite how anyone would have thought that any VC10K tanker crew would ever have considered obeying such an absurd order is beyond me.

NutLoose

6th Oct 2013, 19:23

Yup... But that's what you got the big bucks for... Oh hang on though, they weren't that big.

vc10617

6th Oct 2013, 21:37

quote
Moggiee
Trust me - I have the logbook to prove it (I could scan and email the requisite page if you want http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/smile.gif ). I flew XV109 in June, August, September and November so it hadn't been away from Brize.

I'm sure that the re-wire at EMA was later - I think that I delivered at least one myself. My logbook says that we did a 1 way trip to EMA in XV108 on 3rd July 1989.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I believe you, My mistake. Memory playing more tricks. PM inbound

Does anyone know why Fields had a full set of Conway engine stills in 91?
And when was the last rewire at Fields? Thanks in advance.

ICM

6th Oct 2013, 22:23

vascodegama

7th Oct 2013, 05:40

BEagle

7th Oct 2013, 07:07

I am fairly certain that the only reason that the VC10K was going to have an escape system was that the Victor had one. Don't forget that, when the idea of the VC10K was being mooted , the Victor/Buccaneer accident was still fresh in the minds of some.

That would have required rather more than the 'million pound dustbin', vasco. The Victor / Buccaneer accident caused structural failure of the Victor which bunted and disintegrated; only one pilot, the late 'Neddy' Hanscombe, survived (just..) but there would have been no survivors of such an accident involving a VC10 unless the crew had ejector seats, which would have required a complete redesign of the VC10K flight deck at huge expense.

Most tanker aircraft have a fuel system which provides both receiver fuel and fuel for the tanker itself. Notable exceptions are the A310MRTT, whose outer tanks feed only the aircraft, the KC-135Q which supported the SR-71 and was configured with independent systems as the Habu needed special fuel - and AiMA's A310 boom demonstrator which, as purely a proof-of-concept aircraft, has only a single 7200 litre tank for receiver offload purposes.

With a 'common' fuel system, it is sensible to include a device which inhibits offload at a particular fuel value, so that the tanker is not put at risk of running itself out of fuel. When that level is reached, the crew may elect under certain circumstances to offload further fuel, having overridden the low level system. In the VC10 / VC10K this was a fixed fuel state; I suppose it could be considered a 'suicide switch' as incautious operation could indeed lead to a really, really dull crew transferring all their fuel to receivers, leaving themselves in control of a glider with only the ELRAT to provide electrical power - and no hydraulics.

More modern tankers (with mission planning systems which actually work, Mick :p ) allow the crew to set a 'Min Off-Task Fuel' value on the flight deck, so that the tanker will stop transfer at the minimum fuel required for the tanker to leave the AARA, transit back to base, make an approach, go-around, and divert to an alternate, reaching the alternate with 30 min final reserve. The transit from the area to destination also includes contingency fuel; the 'MOTF' can be calculated for either still-air, statistical met. or 'met. of the day' conditions. But it's important that, although the MOTF is accurately calculated by mission software, the actual MOTF is agreed and set directly by the crew, not some brainless computer which thinks it knows best. An example of which was some tanker aircraft which flew a hi-lo-hi profile to a distant AARA and started offloading to a receiver with a stiff tailwind. When they turned back into wind, 'HAL' decided that, at the low TAS and consequent low GS they were now flying, the tanker had reached MOTF and promptly closed the pod valves on the receivers! HAL didn't know that the plan was to climb to high level for recovery and assumed they would lumber all the way home at low level....:rolleyes:

Saintsman

7th Oct 2013, 18:14

This thread continues to fascinate. The C Mk 1s with a "suicide switch?" Did I miss something, for I've no recollection of volunteering for self-immolation nor of hearing of anyone else being asked to do so. To what might that term refer, pray?

It allowed the Eng to pump out all available fuel to the receivers. If the crew did that, they weren't going home. As BEagle has mentioned, it would have been extremely doubtful that it would have been considered by the crew, but it was still installed during the tanker conversions.

NutLoose

7th Oct 2013, 20:48

Yup the C Mk1 had the switch but not the slide, hence the suicide switch.

BOAC

8th Oct 2013, 15:19

No mention here of the K2 that went into Dunsfold last month. A source of 'dubious accuracy' tells me that no-one is allowed near it as it is being kept semi-airworthy 'in case':eek:

BEagle

8th Oct 2013, 15:34

VC10K3 ZA150 flew to Dunsfold on Tue 24 Sep and has been acquired, I understand, by the Brooklands Museum.

All the K2s have long since been scrapped.

But it's good to hear that people are being kept away from the aircraft at Dunsfold - so less chance of pilfering or vandalism.

NutLoose

8th Oct 2013, 15:35

It was once rumoured to be getting dismantled and moved to Brooklands, though the website says it will be open to the Public at Dunsfold

Brooklands Museum (http://www.brooklandsmuseum.com/index.php?/news/story/queen-of-the-skies-retires-to-dunsfold-park/)

'Queen of the Skies' lands with a roar at Dunsfold Park (http://www.dunsfoldpark.com/dunsfold-park/news/queen-of-the-skies-lands-with-a-roar-at-dunsfold-park.html)

BOAC

8th Oct 2013, 16:09

But it's good to hear that people MAY BE BEING kept away from the aircraft at Dunsfold - see caveat.

RetiredBA/BY

8th Oct 2013, 18:11

The 'million pound dustbin' was a complete and utter waste of time and money.

It replaced the front door and was supposed to be extended into the airflow to enable a controlled abandonment. We were told that only one flight was ever made with the device extended, but that the noise and buffeting were so extreme that the aircraft landed early.

We were taught how to use it on #3 VC10K course, but refused to waste any time on it. It worked as follows:

1. The decision was made to off-load all available fuel to receivers and the low-level override system was selected on.
2. The aircraft was then depressurised. Or rather, the pressurisation was turned off and the cabin allowed to climb until the min. diff. pressure for chute deployment was reached. This could take several minutes.
3. Individual crew members were then supposed to use walk-round Mk4 oxygen bottles, before going into the cabin to don parachutes and oxygen systems as the flight deck seats weren't modified to allow for parachute packs. Pilots would take it in turns, but it was physically impossible to sit in any crew seat wearing the emergency AEA.
4. When the diff. pressure gauge suggested it was 'safe' to do so, the escape chute was deployed by pulling a large lever. The first item in the sequence was for the external door seal to be severed; however BWoS suggested that this would be ingested by the left engines, causing an uncontained failure of at least one engine..... 3 of the 4 crew might get out, but the last pilot was supposed to fly the thing by leaning over the seat to hold the control column in order to maintain at least wings-level flight, then let go, turn round, make his way back to the chute and jump out - probably to join his colleagues in the remains of the left engines.

Eventually common sense prevailed and the stupid system was removed. But the K2 and K3 were left with just the starboard service door.

There was never any proposal to enable the system to be used by passengers.

One legacy of the system was that the squadron had a large room allocated for immersion suit storage. In later days this became the 'new' Duffy's bar!

I recall being asked by some visiting multi-starred personage what I thought of the system. So I did so.... I pretended that I didn't know that he was the idiot who had approved it!

This sounds as daft an idea as the decision to introduce a new tanker/transport into the RAF without a refuelling probe/ slip way or a cargo door !

Or have i missed something (and the RAAF on whose A330 tankers they have installed both.)

I mean, a tanker which cannot receive fuel, imagine that on Black Buck !!

BEagle

8th Oct 2013, 19:02

RetiredBA/BY, if you're going to quote others, it is normal PPRuNe courtesy to use the 'quote' option....

Regarding probe/receptacle on Voyager, that probably falls into the same court as the original probe on the TriStar. Which, much to the relief of their crews, was soon de-modded.

A cargo door on Voyager? The existing underfloor compartments are entirely adequate; if not, then there's always the C-17A fleet! Shortly to be joined by the Atlas.

ICM

9th Oct 2013, 10:22

BEagle, Saintsman, Nutloose: Thanks for clarification on that "Suicide switch" - my time on 10 Sqn was well before any thought of receivers. (And I'd forgotten about the Victor/Buccaneer incident.)

haltonapp

9th Oct 2013, 10:33

Also if a tank outlet valve would not open because of a malfunction of the low level system, operating the switch might allow the valve to open, so not necessarily a suicide switch!

RetiredBA/BY

9th Oct 2013, 19:57

Beagle,
So where's the reply with quote button ?

Perhaps the probe on the TriStar was removed, surely no big deal as the main body of the tanker fleet, the VC10, DID have a probe and could therefore receive fuel retaining operational flexibility. My argument is that if the Voyager cannot receive fuel it may, in the 20 year future projected for it with AirTanker, (my guess is it will turn out to be a lot longer) severely limit its capability, a conclusion the RAAF, who are most certainly no fools, came to and incorporated a slipway onto their 330s. I would put it into the same category of mistake as that which removed the guns from the Lightning, later reversed when the penny dropped.

Nobody, but nobody, can predict the operational requirement of tanking for the next 20 years (Falklands !) so limiting its capability may prove "unfortunate".

Forgive me for being so outspoken but I MAY have a little idea of flight refuelling ops. having flown Victor (1) tankers and refuelled the first RAF VC10 on its FR trials from Boscombe. (Oct 7th 1966 from XH 651 ) which is why I firmly believe a tanker, the only type of tanker in the fleet, which cannot receive is a limited resource.

As for the cargo door, perhaps there is a case for deleting it as the overall performance affect of the heavier door and the freight floor might outweigh the predicted total benefit. But didn't the RAF VC10 have a cargo door installed for military application, even though we had Belfasts in those days, never saw it on my BOAC/BA VC10 ! The performance loss couldn't have been that great as East African Supers had a cargo door installed making it a combi. Again the RAAF who have the C17 (and own them, they are not leased !!), and Hercs., did decide a cargo door was required and Qantas military installed them, I believe). Wonder why Airbus offer freight door facility for the 330 tanker ? They, the RAAF, now have a true multi-role tanker/transport.

Best of luck to the RAF when they have urgent palletised freight, no C17 availability and can't get it into the belly of the tanker/transport voyager ! I suppose they will have to wait for a Herc. or Atlas to get it there, eventually !

I rest my case, m'lord !

vc10617

9th Oct 2013, 20:57

The original RAF VC10, the C.MK 1 had the cabin freight door and load bearing floor panels from the start. You cant remove anymore than two floor panels without supporting the wings. I don't think you can tow a 'ten with any panels removed.
EX BA 'tens (K2&K4) weren't given cabin freight doors or load bearing floors

The refuel probes were removed and then scrapped early on, before 1972 anyway. I'm not sure if they were all delivered with them. During the Falklands war the eng. opps. controller got a signal from group instructing Brize to refit the probes. The controller (EOC) was on the team at Brize way back as a JT removing them RTS. They were then scrapped. He told the guy at group that they'd been scrapped years ago and hadn't any in stock. He proved it by finding the signal that removed the probes and scrapping order. That was that until some new ones were manufactured a few years later on the C1K conversion. I didn't work on a C1K anyway, I left there summer 92. The 1st C1K flew June 92, then Boscombe Down?

BEagle

9th Oct 2013, 21:16

So where's the reply with quote button ?

Either click on this icon:
http://i14.photobucket.com/albums/a341/nw969/TB_1_zps5ec09026.jpg (http://s14.photobucket.com/user/nw969/media/TB_1_zps5ec09026.jpg.html) or simply type [QUOTE] at the beginning of the piece from which you wish to quote and [/ (followed by QUOTE)] at the end.

Given that the Voyager has roughly 3 x the fuel capacity of a Victor, it is difficult to imagine any potential conflict which would require the aircraft to be operated in the receiver role, given the cost of installation, testing, maintaining proficiency etc.

Although jousting is indeed the sport of kings :ok: , I don't actually think that the lack of a receiver capability is particularly limiting for the Voyager.

Chris Scott

9th Oct 2013, 21:17

Re BA/BY's post, and as Jhieminga will confirm, the 3 standard VC10s originally purchased by BUA were 1103s, with Kucheman (droop-snoot)wingtips and an extended wing chord to enable FL430. They had the cargo door and strengthened main-deck floor. When BUA added the prototype to the fleet (G-ARTA), it was configured as an 1109 with the same wing as the 1103s, but no cargo door. I don't remember the difference in APS weight between the 1103 and the 1109, unfortunately, but doubt it was remarkable, as we were often stretching the payload-range to the limit and a big reduction in empty weight would have been noteworthy.

The Omani a/c at Brooklands is, of course, an ex-BUA/BCAL 1103 (G-ASIX) with cargo door.

NutLoose

9th Oct 2013, 21:22

The Cmk1 had refuel probes in the 80's as we used to fit them adhoc, 10 Sqn didn't like them as it ruined to look on the pax version, but when required we did fit them, I can remember at least 5 occasions we had them on various aircraft pre tanker days.

I would have thought a freight door on a voyager would have been ideal, after all when deploying a squadron, the ability to trail the aircraft, carry the Engineering staff and the tooling / spares etc that won't fit downstairs such as engines.

Might have Hercs etc, but using one aircraft surely must be better than two.

vascodegama

9th Oct 2013, 21:25

Sorry BEags you are wrong on this one. AAR consolidation is (for those that can do it) a regular feature of modern ops.

vc10617

9th Oct 2013, 22:33

The BUA aircraft SIW, SIX and TDJ had the down turned wing tips. The RAF, BOAC, East African, Ghana A/W, did not. MEA might have. The prototype bought by Laker and immediately leased to MEA did I'm sure.
They had non drooping kuchemann tips on the C.MK. 1, Super (K3,K4)

I never worked on or ever saw a C.MK 1 (72-92)with a probe fitted. The fuel plumbing to the deleted probe was diabolical. There was no servicing instructions, SPs etc. for their inspection.

NutLoose

9th Oct 2013, 23:28

Here you go 1989, Lyneham airshow

Vickers VC-10 C1, XV104, Royal Air Force (http://www.abpic.co.uk/photo/1368158/)

Calgary

Vickers VC-10 C1, XV104, Royal Air Force (http://www.abpic.co.uk/photo/1340560/)

Australia 89

Vickers VC-10 C1, XV108, Royal Air Force (http://www.abpic.co.uk/photo/1341262/)

All pre tanker conversion and 10 Sqn

vc10617

10th Oct 2013, 07:19

Nutloose
The reason I said what I did is...We had a C.MK1 in bay 1 Base Hangar 1991. We were (I was BAe then) fixing fuel leaks, The Sqn guys came to get the thing ready for runs. they got power on and started flicking switches etc. There was a panic in the cockpit and one of them, I'd known him in the RAF asked me why they have a fuel leak in the cockpit entrance area. I couldn't believe it. You expect 80 leaks on a VC10 and I could tell you where they'd be without looking. Not here though. I said its the probe plumbing. He looked and some of the others thought I'd gone mad. Its a C.1 It hasn't got a probe. They didn't know anything about C.MK.1 probes, either the original fit or the new build probes you've mentioned. There was a meeting about the lack of anything in any servicing procedures, Vol 1 etc. They weren't serviced or checked, the seals weren't sealing and nobody knew what state the pipe work, bonding etc. was like. I never saw one, I was in Base so its possible that I just didn't see one as I was inside.
The lack of tech support for the probe system and the fact these RAF guys had never heard of C.MK 1 probes lead me to what I'd said.

NutLoose

10th Oct 2013, 09:30

we used to pop em on on the line :)

BEagle

10th Oct 2013, 11:01

AAR consolidation is (for those that can do it) a regular feature of modern ops.

Well yes, vasco. - it was also used a lot during GW1. But the squadron allowed its receiver skills to wither rapidly thereafter, so that the effort required by the AARIs to restore full day/night receiver capability for Bliar's bring-a-bottle wars was considerable. Particularly if that included receiving from a TriStar.

Not many nations have the ability to consolidate nowadays.

Given the proposed number of Voyager crews and the small number of KC3s, the effort involved in maintaining the necessary probe-and-drogue receiving skills would be quite considerable. The cost of retrofitting the Voyager to KC-30A standard would be high, as would be the training costs for boom operators and receiver pilots.

Desirable for Voyager to be able to receive or transfer fuel to another tanker? Yes. Essential? I don't think so.

A pity the RAF didn't go for the 'Airbus Industrie' MRTT proposals of 15+ years ago though. That included a cargo door, combi flexibility, either a probe or UARRSI, a boom or FRU and 5 rather than 4 ACTs - if I recall correctly, we were anticipating around 2 dozen of such aircraft, each with a 77.5T fuel capacity.....

Jhieminga

10th Oct 2013, 15:37

The BUA aircraft SIW, SIX and TDJ had the down turned wing tips. The RAF, BOAC, East African, Ghana A/W, did not. MEA might have. The prototype bought by Laker and immediately leased to MEA didn't, I'm sure.
MEA used a leased Ghana type 1102 and the prototype leased from Laker, so no downturned wingtips on those aircraft. Although the question of whether G-ARTA had them after its conversion to type 1109 is still open as far as I'm concerned.
The photo below is of the wingtip of G-ARTA after conversion, is it downturned? It could be in my view.
http://www.vc10.net/div/OD-AFAwingtip.jpg

Chris Scott

10th Oct 2013, 17:45

Hi Jhiemingha,

(Sorry to be responsible for this thread-drift, chaps!) We've been here before:
http://www.pprune.org/aviation-history-nostalgia/363494-vc-10-a-15.html#post6715449

As you know well there are three factors here, all of which were definitely present on the 1103s, (e.g., the Brooklands a/c):
(1) chord extension inboard (so the L/E has a mid-span kink);
(2) Kuchemann tip (as you said, this seems to refer to the shape visible in the plan view, not the "droop-snoot";
(3) the "droop-snoot".

Having flown G-ARTA in 1109 config with BUA/BCAL, I'm absolutely sure it had (1) and (2), not least because she was FL430 capable and we used the same cruise-performance charts as the three 1103s, proving the buffet margins were the same. What I cannot confirm is that she had (3), because I simply can't remember (and the F/Es did the walkrounds). I wonder what effect(s) the droop-snoot had on performance. Pity that photo is in silhouette... I cannot disagree with anything vc10617 says.

Brain Potter

10th Oct 2013, 19:06

The RAAF KC-30A does not have an upper deck cargo door. To date, the cancelled KC-45 for the USAF is the only variant of the A330MRTT that has been ordered with this option.

RetiredBA/BY

10th Oct 2013, 19:07

Given that the Voyager has roughly 3 x the fuel capacity of a Victor, it is difficult to imagine any potential conflict which would require the aircraft to be operated in the receiver role, given the cost of installation, testing, maintaining proficiency etc.

It is difficult, BUT when I was sitting in a nuclear armed Valiant on QRA and someone had seriously suggested that a V bomber would be used to bomb a tiny British Island in the South Atlantic and need 12 tankers to get it there and back, I think we would have assumed the guy really had flipped under the pressure !

BEagle

10th Oct 2013, 19:56

The Black Buck raids needed so many tankers because:

1. The Vulcan burned about 3 x times the fuel per hour that a modern fighter-bomber requires.

2. The Victor K2 had a relatively small offload capability compared to its own fuel burn rate.

3. The Vulcan was using dumb bombs and unsophisticated bomb aiming equipment, so to stand any chance of hitting Stanley aerodrome, needed a large bomb stick.

4. Down-track RV procedures were difficult, relying on very accurate navigation and A/A TACAN. Hence an accompanied cruise was preferred.

Were it to be necessary ever to repeat such a mission, a single Tornado or Typhoon with an appropriate, very accurate weapon would need far, far less fuel. Modern tankers carry HUGE amounts of fuel; the Voyager carries around 40 tonnes more than a VC10, a difference which would keep a Tornado airborne for another 20-ish hours...

As for AAR consolidation, that's fine if 'hoses in the sky' is not an issue. Otherwise having a single tanker with lots of fuel and only 2/3 hoses is perhaps of less worth than 2 tankers with less fuel but 4/6 hoses in the sky - and which can be in 2 places at once!

vc10617

10th Oct 2013, 20:09

Ken Scott

The BUA originals, SIW, SIX and TDJ, all had the "droop snoot" tips and were modified with the inbd chord extensions. The prototype, GARTA/OD-AFA MEA was modified too, it was the the 1st to get both as part of the flight test programme. It ended up that only the BOAC/BA/RAF K.2 didn't have either Chord growth and (sure it didn't) K/tips. BTW The chord growth was in the L/E panels not the main wing box /tapered torque box the wing box didn't "step" just the panels and therefor the Slats. Wing tanks were the same internal volume throughout all models.
The inbd Wing fences on the other hand are a nightmare of detail. The BOAC standards were further inbd and were fitted across the forward 1 and 2 tank access panel.There is a removable piece of fence for access to the tank panel.It also had the full chord fence outbd of rib 22. The Ghana A/W "fence" continued around the leading edge ending underneath the L/E panel. Some were slightly bent inbd at front . Never mind the Beaver tail styles over the production run!
Link for pics of..
VC10 G-ARTA (http://www.british-caledonian.com/G-ARTA.html)

Go down till the BUA picture ,you can see the downward tip.

moggiee

10th Oct 2013, 20:17

I never worked on or ever saw a C.MK 1 (72-92)with a probe fitted. The fuel plumbing to the deleted probe was diabolical. There was no servicing instructions, SPs etc. for their inspection.
I was on 10 Sqn in the late 80s and every one of our aeroplanes had a probe and I had a great view of them from my seat up front. They would sometimes glow pink and purple with St Elmo's fire in the right weather conditions (out in the tropics).

We even used the probes on exercises to Oman and the Falklands to prove the AAR receiving capability (getting to Oman with a full load of pax and no refuel stop)

vc10617

10th Oct 2013, 20:40

I saw the three 1989 shots Nutloose linked. I've also seen some more from 88. I cant understand why that RAF team in my post didn't know anything about C.MK1 probes. On the engineering front, non of the APs Vol1, Maint manual and Vol 3, catalogue of parts (IPC)had any probe details, No Sect/Ref So you couldn't demand any spares. No servicing plan.

It wasn't the 1st time something was overlooked, If you remember "control cable gate" where ALL the flying control cables were changed because they'd been left out of the servicing procedures, one shredded down route and the more they looked the more they found. All had to be changed when the our fleet was grounded, late 1983 or early 84,where ever they were, Ascension etc. . It was a nightmare. Imagine LSS with every available wall, table and floor space bags of every control cable required for every line VC10. Base looked after the two they had in.

BEagle

10th Oct 2013, 21:17

All had to be changed when the our fleet was grounded, late 1983 or early 84,where ever they were, Ascension etc. . It was a nightmare.

It was indeed...literally. Once the jets had been fixed, they launched at all times of day and night to catch up on the backlog of route task requirements. I'd just arrived at Brize and my room was 3 floors up at the front of the OM, with a grandstand view of the RW. The 'Sound of Freedom' was quite considerable!!

NutLoose

10th Oct 2013, 22:01

Then I remember ( I think the Eng O off one of the shifts ) deciding he would go out to Dulles to do an engine change.. Great plan, rushed through so they could go instead of the on coming shift...until they got there that is and realised they'd left the engine lifting beam back at Brize.... Personal call put through by said Eng O to the line to avoid going through ops etc frantically asking if we could secrete the lift beam in the front hold on the next Dulles flight, whilst they stalled with excuse after excuse :E

VC10617, base would not have a lot to do with them, they were fitted by LSS as and when required by tasking, but as said " it ruined the lines" so we would remove them post task.

vc10617

10th Oct 2013, 22:32

I was dragged off my cushy number the night shift Role desk, because someone down the line remembered me. I ended up down the hangar with a guy straight out of training and a gripper (supplier) I had to change to bottom rudder PFCU. Off giraffes. What a pain trying to kick over the rudder to get one out then the replacement in. Anyway, Catering Sqn. came up trumps. Constant supply of hot drinks and food at meal times. served from tables they'd bought down and plonked them on the hangar floor, so we didn't have to leave the hangar for "beans". Wasn't that nice? I think that it only took about two weeks. I remember it didn't drag on too long,Those cables were bad. If you twisted them against the manufactured twist the centre cable was dust and loose strands, just a void. And towards the end of all this, someone higher up decided we should check the engine control cables! Yeah, some of those were as bad, but not as many as the flying control cables. The whole operation went well though. The amount of work and the relatively short time taken was amazing, bearing in mind these cables, most of them had to be manufactured. Some had leave cancelled and TACEVALS were postponed. As soon as the operation was finished the gits called an exercise!! Is that supposed to be the way to build morale?

vascodegama

11th Oct 2013, 06:58

A couple of points

The Voyager carries twice a Victor load not 3 times and burns at a higher rate. That said to my mind the RAF missed the golden opportunity to buy the KC10 when it was offered back in the late 70's (as well as choosing the wrong ac when we got the Tri*). For example 3 KC10 s could have supported 2 Vulcans attacking Stanley Airfield (it would have needed Tanker/Tanker transfers of course).

The reason for AAR consolidation in modern ops is to maximize the oft-limiting factor of tanker availability especially in a reactive situation. So instead of a number of ac with a small offload with little chance to contribute to the mission you end up a replenished ac which can support the task especially when the plot changes. It has nothing to do with how much fuel a particular ac has -we never seem to have enough fuel (or indeed the correct tanker config )when needed.

BEagle

11th Oct 2013, 07:26

Sorry, vasco. - the figure I had in mind was for the Victor K1 (replying to RetiredBA/BY) was 39T and the Voyager can theoretically carry 285% of this figure. I now note that the Victor K2 had a max. fuel figure of 58T, so don't doubt your figures. But is the Voyager fuel burn significantly higher than a Victor K2s? I do know that the Voyager's burn rate is considerably lower than the VC10/VC10K average burn rate, but I can't recall the exact figure I had for the Victor at present.

The rationale behind the VC10K rather than KC-10A purchase was no doubt down to cost. But when we asked why the VC10K wasn't configured as a tanker-transport, the answer was that the RAF would have had to lose some single role VC10 C Mk 1s if the VC10K had been given any official transport role.

Worthy papers were written when the VC10K Mk 4 was being converted, suggesting that it should be fitted with rather more passenger seats than planned, given that it didn't have any fuselage tanks. But They had made up Their minds and such logic was defeated.

I seem to recall that the RAF could have had 5 x 'white tail' DC-10s for the same price that was actually paid for the 3 x PanAm TriStars......??

hanoijane

11th Oct 2013, 08:16

So, assuming unlimited tanker support and a motivated driver, how long would you have expected a Lightning to stay airborne without flashing lights starting to appear all over your cockpit? What was the limiting factor? I presume someone tried it.

Just curious :-)

BEagle

11th Oct 2013, 09:50

Well, the last 22 Saudi Lightnings flew non-stop from Tabuk to Warton. We supported our flight with a VC10K, then handed them over to a Victor for the remainder of the trip.

There were also some significant deployments in the 1960s/70s.

Chris Scott

11th Oct 2013, 10:31

Thanks vc10617,

Looks like we're all in agreement on that aspect of VC10 wing evolution, and thanks for the extra gen on fences. Yes, the pic of G-ARTA being pushed back in latter-BUA livery (still marginally my favourite) - via your link to the BCAL website - does seem to confirm the droop-snoot, because the slats are usefully still retracted.

Presumably the RAF C1s had the same wing as the Super VC10, which did not employ the "droop-snoot", but was otherwise identical to the 1103/1109.
The only thing I'm still in doubt about is the precise terminology: i.e., does "Kuchemann tip" refer to both the plan-view shape AND the droop-snoot, or just the former? If just the former, did the 1101s also have Kuchemann tips?

Jhieminga

11th Oct 2013, 10:55

I cannot recall the source but it refers to the shape in plan-view. The 1101s also had Kuchemann tips but without the extra camber.

Perhaps we should take this wing discussion back to the VC10 thread, I'll see if I can copy these replies to that thread later today.

vc10617

11th Oct 2013, 11:24

Chris Scott
I always thought it was the plan view, a large sweeping curve meeting the line of the trailing edge. Might not be though. Kuchmann also introduced/developed/invented winglets, that are on just about anything now. Is this droop on the BUA kites a sort of variation on that theme? I've read a paper by Kuchmann (NASA engineer)on winglet development. There are designs with something like a wing tip tank with vortex (like) generators ay varying angles when viewed from the front, down, level and up. As far as I know not fitted to any production aircraft.
The TSR.2 took it to the extreme, with a down ward tip. Partially developed and built (Fwd section) at Weybridge, Home of the 'Ten.

BTW.You are right about C.Mk.1s and Super wing tips. Not being cambered.

Jelle.
Which VC10 thread are you referring to in your last post? Got a link?:)

RetiredBA/BY

11th Oct 2013, 11:43

Quote

The RAAF KC-30A does not have an upper deck cargo door. To date, the cancelled KC-45 for the USAF is the only variant of the A330MRTT that has been ordered with this option.

Quote.

Yes you are correct. and my apologies. However, I do remember reading in the Australian press, aviation and other, that the RAAF tanker would have a freight door and it would be installed at Qantas military in Brisbane after the aircraft had been delivered.

It DOES seem to have receiving capability using a slipway though !

In this month's "Aeroplane" there is an extensive article on the F111 and description of the Libyan operation from the UK. Seems on that operation 3,000,000 pounds of fuel were transferred including topping up the KC10 from KC135s.

Jhieminga

11th Oct 2013, 12:13

vc10617/Chris Scott/other interested parties: I've copied the 'wing tip discussion' into the VC10 thread on Aviation History & Nostalgia, see here: http://www.pprune.org/aviation-history-nostalgia/363494-vc-10-a-19.html#post8093696

Xercules

11th Oct 2013, 16:17

I am not a tanker man, except for a time as one of those reviled Albert tankers both in the UK and FI, so I will not comment on the need or otherwise for AAR consolidation. However, many comparative statements are revealed here with, as far as I can see, few real facts to back the statements.

I have a copy of HQ 38 Gp "AT and AAR Planning Parameters" dated November 1992 (even at that time marked as UNCLAS before anyone squeals).
This shows Max Normal Fuel Loads as follows: Victor 49.5, VC10K2 75.5, K3 82, C1K 68.5, K4 67 and Tri* 132.5.
Fuel transfers are then shown for:
3 hr sorties at a range of 1230 nms of 22.5, 41, 47, 34, 32.5 and 97.5.
4 hr sorties at a range of 1660 nms of 17, 34, 40, 27, 25.5 and 90.5.
5 hr sorties at a range of 2090 nms of 11, 27, 33, 20, 17.5 and 83.5.
all figures are in Tonnes.

Now moving to Voyager, and admittedly using the OEM's figures, the Max Fuel Load is 111 Tonnes. This fuel fills the wings and centre fuselage tank (but still part of the wing) and brings the ac to MTOW. There is no need for ACTs as with Boeing's offering so you permanently have full availability of space both above and below decks. However with a payload of 45 tonnes it has a range of 3800 nms and empty a ferry range of 8000nm. On a towline at 1000nms range and 4 1/2 hrs on station its fuel offload is 50 tonnes and at 500 nms and 5hrs on station 60 tonnes. On a trail it could take 4 Eurofighters 3600 nms (otherwise empty) or 2800 nms (20 tonnes of payload).

I leave the true tanker aficionados to draw their own conclusions.

vascodegama

11th Oct 2013, 17:51

XH -the fuel figs for the Victor & VC10 are within acceptable tolerances-the Tri* figure is a bit off the mark. At 122T ZFW and an almost unachievable MTOW (eg can't do it from BZZ normally) of 245 that gives 123 T.

As for the Voyager the 111T is just about possible but I am not disputing its payload range capability -the argument about consolidation is as above it is a matter of utilization of assets by keeping a usable load airborne in one ac rather than a number having to go home with an unusable offload. As an American speaker at ARSAG said a few years ago-we learnt that lesson.

If you want to talk big payload /range/offload look at the KC10 and don't even get me started on inter-operability between boom/drogue etc I have lost count of the occasions I have heard problems on ops with offload/rx compatibility.As I said above we made our big mistake in the late 70s when a fleet of 10-12 KC10s would have eliminated the need for the VC10K programme, the C-C1K programme and would have given us the chance to scrap the Victor much sooner. Not only that but those ac would still have had plenty of life left and we could have saved the odd 13 Billion.

Xercules

11th Oct 2013, 19:18

VdG

As I said I did not want to get involved with the purely AAR considerations because that is not my field. However, I must challenge your saving of 13 billion. People tend to forget that this figure covers the whole of the programme from procurement to operation of the aircraft over 25 years. You would certainly have been able to buy your KC10s for considerably less than this figure but would still have had to service and support them. All of this aspect is also covered by AirTanker within the overall headline figure.

Having said that I long ago questioned the wisdom of PFI programmes especially where the capital cost is extremely high. The balance between capital and service delivery has to be right, as it is on the service delivery that the theoretical efficiency savings pay for the higher cost of finance for a commercial company (typically about 2% higher than the Government can borrow). I am not convinced that this balance would be achieved in the Voyager contract although AirTanker and its backers (shareholders and banks) obviously are.

vascodegama

11th Oct 2013, 19:44

XH

The savings would have been the costs of the maintenance of the Victors, the costs of the 2 different VC10 programmes, the cost of the TRI purchase etc. Had we bought the KC10 we would still have the ac since it is the last USAF tanker to be replaced (KCZ programme). Perhaps by then we might have looked at the true cost of the PFI?

vc10617

11th Oct 2013, 20:33

In Gulf war1 Swartzkopf (spelling might be a problem!) singled out the VC10 K2 and K3's ( words to the effect of)for their operational success and reliability that allowed the air war to be carried out better than planned. There are guys on here that know what was actually said/written (I cant remember exactly). The VC10/101 got a slap on the back. I'm not sure that the KC10 could have done exactly what our 'ten did. Some of the stories the guys coming back told me. The KC10 couldn't have operated in the same way.
It was either 140 or 141 had to be pulled from the Gulf (just before the air war kicked off) for a running c class fuel leak. I got a call from a Sqn Ldr attached to Swartzkopf's command, asking me if I could turn it 'round in 4 days. What? I told him I could ,but with out seeing it etc. He told me the leak area and I ended up doing the longest temporary fuel leak ,never done before and doubt its been repeated because its an unbelievable task to stick that much before the sealant starts to "go off",on the outside of the lower surface Rib 22 down to Rib 8. They got it back in the time they wanted. It was a bit of a clue they were about to start and the VC10 K's were to leaned on. KC10? Wash your mouth out!:)

vascodegama

11th Oct 2013, 20:55

I would have said that it was the approach of the crews in the air and ground crews who kept the jets going that was important. My point (and I do have a bit of time in the role) is that the KC10 is the best AAR platform around (note I have not said dual role)

Lisa Ally Singleton

11th Jun 2020, 15:48

with reference to the events that happened below, I was an air steward on this flight and have been searching for people who experienced this as there is very little information documented, I would be grateful if anyone on here could message me please.
many thanks Ally
Could well have been so very different

I flew on 109 as part of a MAMS team in Sep / Oct 1988 from Brize to Hong Kong and then two shuttles to Kathmandu. I think it was on that trip that that the Sgt (poss FS) Load Mistress ended up in the swimming pool, late at night, in Kathmandu...assisted a little by the Stewards and MAMS.

With reference to the events that happened below, I was an air steward on this flight and have been searching for people who experienced this as there is very little information documented, I would be grateful if anyone on here could message me please.
many thanks Ally

My trip on 109 was the one that could have been a different ending for her.

8 Dec 1988 109 was tasked to recover RM pax from Gardermoen when a Hercules went u/s. Gardermoen - Leuchars - Brize no problem except over, Birmingham a bang was heard from the wheel well. Apparently one of the main wheels had exploded and the debris had taken out the fuel lines to 2 of the engines as well as the auto pilot and hydraulic system. The crew managed to recover to Brize and the 50 or so RM and crew evacuated the aicraft via the enmergency slides. We later heard that this was the closest to losing a VC10 that the RAF had come.

8 months later though, 109 brough me home from a 6 month tour in Belize. Not sure if that was a good move or not as I got engaged not long after. But I suppose after almost 20 years of marriage....yes it was a good thing.

BEagle

11th Jun 2020, 22:04

Ally - from another thread:
I was the co-pilot up front on that. It was an interesting half hour or so!

We didn't lose the autopilot, if memory serves me right, but we did lose the LH hydraulics (requiring manual gear lowering) and perhaps more seriously we lost all 15,000lbs of fuel from the port wing, leaving us a bit tight for fuel on approach at BZN.

matkat and others:

For those who are speculating upon the decision making process that led to the aeroplane getting airborne with a faulty tyre, allow me to explain:

The tyre problem was spotted during the turnaround and the GE wanted to change it as we had a spare in the boot.

The Flt Lt Captain and MEng FE weren't keen on the delay that this would incur. Myself and the nav both thought that we should change it and said so.

Capt and FE went down to have a look at it and came back up to the flight deck to say that the GE now agreed that it was fit for one flight home and that he had signed the tech log (F700) to this extent. The nav and I accepted this as the truth on the basis that if all three of them were in agreement then we were happy to go with their decision.

At the subsequent BoI it transpired that the captain and FE had bullied the GE into signing it off and had then lied to myself and the nav about it, saying that the GE was happy when he in fact was not.

I gave the BoI a 100% correct statement of my understanding of the events and I believe that the nav and GE did the same. I made it clear that the GE had had his doubts but that we'd been told by the captain and FE that he was in agreement that it was OK to go. I'm not sure what the captain and FE told the board as I was not there when they gave evidence and they did not want to talk to me afterwards because they felt that I had failed to "back them up" - and that suggests to me that they were feeling uncomfortable with their actions and possibly with what they'd told the BoI. For my part, I felt that it was important to be honest with the board as the fact needed to come out, and if that upset the captain and FE then so be it.

The board came to the conclusion that the captain and FE had put unfair pressure upon the GE, had lied to myself and the nav and had been unprofessional. They were both punished for their actions. The nav, the GE and I were all reminded that it was our responsibility to be more assertive in the face of such pressure and to stand our ground - other than that there was no sanction against mhyself and the nav but I can't recall what happened with the GE.

I was annoyed with myself for not being more assertive but as a relatively junior co-pilot I was less confident than I should have been with regard to my knowledge of what was and was not right. The nav was also relatively new to type and we both made the "mistake" of trusting more experienced crew members who were, in fact, telling us lies. When not in possession of the full facts it's hard to make the right decision. I do not now, and never have, place any blame upon the GE - only the captain and FE for telling lies to us and myself and the nav for not being assertive enough.

I have never taken anyone's word at face value since then - I always check!

If anyone wants to discuss it further, I'm available by PM.