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767Capt
10th May 2010, 00:59
Hello All,

I do not want to mention my company's name here publicly, but am curious about how things work at your individual airline.

Lately, my company has started to put some pressure on Captain's to:

1- Accepting aircraft with a Legally deferred (MEL) item,
2- Tracking/monitoring Captains that increase the Cleared Fuel after dispatcher finalizes his flt plan.

A bit of background for the above questions to help you understand where I am coming from:

1- They are claiming that we are the only US Major Airline where Captain's can still refuse an airplane with a legal deferral.
But a lot of Captain's see this as questioning their authority and/or pilot pushing.
A poor example is; would you take a 767-300 with APU inop, from US to say Buenos Aires on a 10+ hrs flt time, at night with some terrain/escape route concerns, limited airport availability, etc..

2- They are dispatching flights with about 45' (FAR Reserve), No Alternate (Domestic and some Intl) with about 15 minutes of extra fuel (Total of 1hr extra) for contingencies, sometimes 1+15..Of course there may be some exceptions at certain airports based on weather, airport capacity/demand,etc.
Most Captains add fuel to their comfort level after calling Dispatch, for now.

Recent JFK American airlines flight that declared an emergency due to crosswinds for low fuel status kind of makes me wonder if he was given the extra fuel needed that day.

I wonder if Captains typically accept the fuel given to them by their dispatchers or are they free to add fuel..

Thank you.

boink105
10th May 2010, 01:17
Typically I can put on an extra :15 of fuel above minimum required with out question. over that I need to confer with dispatch. nomally no big deal as for the most part captains add extra fuel for good reason and are not questioned unless it's obvious comfort gas well over the :15 extra

protectthehornet
10th May 2010, 01:27
the pressure is increasing on everyone, everywhere.

you don't mention if you have a union or not. if you do, it is time to do what is right and use the power of the union.

if you don't...time to get a union...and it doesn't have to be alpa.

I am reminded of an old story..."Bartleby, the Scrivner". He would always say, "I would prefer not to". This so shook up his bosses, they couldn't do anything as he wasn't rude.

So, I would prefer not to take a plane with a bad apu due to considerations that would take hours to fully explain.

I would prefer not to

I would prefer not to.

Teddy Robinson
10th May 2010, 01:33
In the case you cite that would be a matter to discuss with dispatch, and the reasons you cite for concern appear valid. If your grounds for declining the aircraft are rooted in concern for the safe conduct of the flight then your position should be sustainable, that is what you are paid for, risk analysis and management.

These matters usually come to a head (in my experience) when there are multiple MEL items which are manageable on a nice day, but could compromise safety in less than optimum conditions were another failure occur to ramp up the workload.

Fuel ? per previous, if there is a sound operational reason for carrying extra, carry it.

A-3TWENTY
10th May 2010, 01:42
Hi,

I`m going to my 8th job, so I have some experience in lots of companies.

Concerning your first question , the answer is Yes. I mean , everytime you have a legally dispatchable MEL item , you are expected to go.

In the example you gave , if you lose one engine or one GEN you can at your discretion land in one of your enroute alternates.It`s cheaper than cancel or delay one flight because of a dispatchable MEL item.


About your second question....It`s fashion nowadays to monitor the block fuel.
There are 4 types of companies:

1. Up to the Capt.
2.They just monitor what do you refuel
3.They ask you to justify in the FPLN if you add fuel over a certain amount.
4.They don`t allow at all. (Qatar airways)

I have a simple way to solve this. When the destination and alternates are marginal , I simply add he fuel I consider good and end of question.
If the destination is marginal and I the alternates are good , I refuel for what they want and I don`t even allow the comerciality to cross my mind in case I need to divert. Hapened of don`t even start the approach for my destination. Direct to alternate.

No big deal.

Just divert and go to the hotel. This is the way of dealing with modern pseudo smart big counters.

Cheers

johns7022
10th May 2010, 02:30
One more reason I think I will stay in corporate....at least I can put as much fuel as I want on the plane...well I guess that's why you guys make the big bucks...always a price I guess....

What's the saying....'I would rather reign in hell then be a servant in heaven'?

filejw
10th May 2010, 03:28
I never have just asked for more fuel just because. I have however told the dispatcher I wanted a different alt, always further away and of course requiring more fuel...different way to skin a cat. I would like to know what airline he is talking about. At DAL I have never heard of anybody being called for either fuel or MEL's.But i am DAL north..

411A
10th May 2010, 03:33
Small ad-hoc charter airline with L1011 equipment.
Few MEL items, most quite minor in nature.
We carry three ground engineers everywhere we go, and in addition, a fly away kit is in the rear lower compartment.
IF the aircraft needs service, it is accomplished, period.
Occasionaly, we dispatch with an unserviceable APU, however, this is a ten day item, so on RTB, it is fixed or replaced.
Fuel.
I take what I need, no questions asked.
If this means that payload is offloaded/not accepted (very unusual, however) it is done, also, no questions asked.
Occasionally, to accept payload, we might offload the fly away kit, however, this is also very unusual.
In the last year, we have had 99% dispatch reliability.

Northbeach
10th May 2010, 05:06
In the market economy there is almost always pressure to lower cost. In your airline many divisions and individuals look upon flight crews as an expense center needing to be cut down to size. Accusatory statements such as your company being “the only US Major Airline where a Captain can still refuse an airplane with a legal deferral” infer that such decisions (by flight crews) are unnecessarily wasteful and must be curtailed. Tracking/monitoring increase in cleared fuel is another subtle method to apply pressure.

My point is this: there are plenty of people who will attempt to force you, the line pilots, into compliance with their “idea” of how things ought to be done. These individuals include hard charging management types out to make a name and empire for themselves, CPAs and accountants who see numbers, Chief Pilots and Base Managers eager to please their superiors and even some maintenance people. This mind set extends to gate agents and flight attendants who will sometimes try and tell you how to operate. There seems to be no shortage of people trying to “force” you into conformity with their will using subtle and not so subtle pressures.

However, if and when something goes wrong (accident, incident or a potential violation) and you find yourself in a tight spot (worried for your safety and trying desperately to keep the airplane from harm or standing in front of a regulatory body fighting to keep your license and livelihood) not one of those people, who earlier were telling you how to do your job, are going to step up and claim any responsibility for the negative outcome. You will be alone. To the man/woman/department, every one of them is going to argue that the flight crew is tasked with the responsibility, and given the resources, to make whatever decisions necessary to ensure the safety of the flight. And that’s the bottom line.

If you bear the responsibility you must be also given the authority; the two are indissoluble. In the past this was recognized and granted.

Several years ago our company lost an airliner. That accident killed everyone on board. I still remember the dazed look of unbelief and complete bewilderment that was on the face of our company’s chief executive as he faced the television cameras, the grieving family members and the onslaught of the various investigators. He couldn’t believe this was happening. There were many warning sighs leading up to that loss, including a constant assault on the authority of the flight crews. In the final analysis you ride in the front end of the jet and it's your safety in the balance.

As a Captain usually I take the fuel given to me. However, if I don’t like that fuel load, for whatever reason, I get on the phone and come to an agreement. I do not go out of my way to be belligerent, after all most of my colleagues are only trying to do the best job they are capable of-no different from me. Sometimes they are correct and I am wrong, when that happens I learn something new.

As a flight crew you have to know what you are talking about, what you are doing and must be willing to hold your ground when somebody else is trying to get you to do something that isn’t a good idea.

“I would rather not”, I like that.

Capn Bloggs
10th May 2010, 06:23
I take what I need, no questions asked.

That's easy when you're the boss. :cool:

ironbutt57
10th May 2010, 06:31
Concerning your first question , the answer is Yes. I mean , everytime you have a legally dispatchable MEL item , you are expected to go.

Glad I don't work for you, you'd be in for a few suprises...:confused:

FullWings
10th May 2010, 07:28
1- Accepting aircraft with a Legally deferred (MEL) item
Assuming it didn't affect something like passenger comfort, e.g. APU U/S: 40C+ in the cabin on the ground, the fact that it's an approved deferred item means that someone else has done the risk assessment, calculated the repair interval and incorporated it into a legal document. In the case of multiple concurrent defects, this process is unlikely to have been carried out.

Personally, I'd have a problem with justifying a decision not to take an aircraft with an allowable defect unless there were obvious additional factors in play. Yes, you normally lose some redundancy when you despatch under the MEL but you can still go flying "safely" according to the JAA/FAA, etc. It does mean if you get a further unserviceability, you sometimes have to consider early termination of the flight - but that could happen at any time on a "normal" flight, anyway.

When it comes to loss of redundancy, how far do you want to take it? Would you go with a pack locked out - MEL say yes? Would you go with a brake locked out - MEL says yes? Would you refuse to fly a 767 because "it hasn't got enough engines"? ;)

In my company I've never come into conflict with the MEL, except under circumstances outlined above. I regard it as a "go" document rather than a "stop" one, to keep the operation running. Bigger brains than mine have spent long hours working out what's acceptable or not and in the simple, single defect case, who am I to argue with them?

2- Tracking/monitoring Captains that increase the Cleared Fuel after dispatcher finalizes his flt plan.
We have this - you can even go online and check your own figures and see how they compare with those of others. There isn't much pressure to take minimum fuel apart from "please take flight plan fuel unless you can think of a good reason to take more, in which case please do...". It doesn't affect the captain's authority on the day to load what he feels fit.

Huck
10th May 2010, 08:31
I did once refuse to fly an MD-11 from Anchorage to Seoul, long time ago, at Gemini.

It had a deferred engine generator and a deferred APU. Yes, it is possible to divert along the way in the pacific tracks, but it was at night in the dead of winter and I just didn't feel good about it. No questions were asked, and the mechanics were actually grateful - they wanted time to fix the plane....

26er
10th May 2010, 10:12
Many years ago there was the BEA captain who arrived at the aircraft to be met by the redcap (despatcher) who said he'd put xxxxkgs on. Captain said nothing, returned to check-in and told them he was going home. When asked why replied that there was somebody in a red cap out there who obviously knows more about flying aircraft than him so he can fly it.

Centaurus
10th May 2010, 12:01
When asked why replied that there was somebody in a red cap out there who obviously knows more about flying aircraft than him so he can fly it.

Obviously just one of those arrogant four bar fools for whom CRM was designed. He should have been sacked on the spot for dereliction of duty. Of course his union would have screamed blue murder but up them too. :mad:

LeadSled
10th May 2010, 12:10
Folks,
Re. BEA, a similar thing happened in Qantas in the B707 days, late '60's. A flight planner had the temerity to order the fuel, and finalize the commercial load before the Captain even signed on. Some time after sign-on the Captain could not be found, he was eventually located back home.

His statement, "as somebody else had finalized the flight plan, he "reasonably" assumed he had been replaced as the Captain".

After the resulting furor, no flight planner tried that again, or ever attempted to usurp the legal authority of the pilot in command.

Of course, in recent years, there has been huge pressure on fuel usage, we just have to live with that.

The BEA story (true) goes back to about 1962, and a Guardsvan. An old mate of mine was one of the two F/Os, he dined out on the story for months.

Captain??? Bloggs,

What is it that you don't understand about CARs 224/233/234 etc. Or do you abrogate your legal responsibilities (assuming you are, in fact, a Captain) in the face of management pressure that is part and parcel of the job of any pilot in command.

For non-AU readers, CAR 224 is the legal basis for the authority of the pilot in command for a VH- aircraft. In a few more words, CAR 224 says the same thing as ICAO, or FAR 91.3. The others regs. quoted are about pre-flight preparation and fuel requirements.

A general comment --- if there is any basis in fact about the statement nominating QATAR (the new owners of Harrods) that will make the next IOSA audit for their national carrier interesting.

Tootle pip!!

FlexibleResponse
10th May 2010, 12:18
The Captain is responsible for the safety and security of the passengers and aircraft.

Regulations are provided to help and assist the Captain in making decisions in the execution of the mission...but no regulation will absolve the Captain, in any way, of his duty of responsibility as outlined above.

A Captain may and must make any decision that he perceives to be correct in maintaining the safety and security of his passengers and aircraft.

Checkboard
10th May 2010, 12:28
Assuming it didn't affect something like passenger comfort, e.g. APU U/S: 40C+ in the cabin on the ground,

If I were a passenger I would rather put up with 40ºC for a little while than have the flight cancelled.

Having said that, while I reserve the right, I have never seen an MEL that I disagreed with. I think the MEL is more conservative than I am.

26er
10th May 2010, 13:14
And another thing, in BA back in the late 70s/early 80s after certain frustrating occasions with some cabin crew the flight management had to inform the cabin crew in very strong terms that the captain was in charge of the aircraft in accordance with the ANO, not the CSD, and his word is law. CSDs were getting above themselves. I imagine it must be very tricky now with locked cockpits and no opportunities for the crews to intermingle. I must say that in shorthaul we had a very good rapport with our cabin crew.

Max Angle
10th May 2010, 14:38
Our MEL contains the following statement:

"The decision of the Commander of the flight to have allowable inoperative items corrected prior to flight will take precedence over the provisions contained in the MEL. The Commander may exceptionally request requirements above the minimum listed, if in his judgement such added equipment is essential to the safety of a particular flight under the special conditions prevailing at the time"

I am quite sure, in my company, that if I raised a sensible objection to dispatching with an allowable defect that in my judgement could not safely be carried due to prevailing circumstances that the pilot management would back me up. We have a pilot manager (they take it in turns) who can be contacted 24/7 for any reason including just this sort of eventuality and I have always received good advice. The normal attitude is "do what you think is sensible and we will back you up".

That said there is of course commercial pressure to get the job done but as said above it is part and parcel of the job. Being a commercial pilot doesn't just mean you get paid to fly, you have to operate and make decisions in a commercial manner, if you can't you are in the wrong job.

As for fuel I think most guys load a sensible amount and are trusted to do so, its 100% down to the Captain and no questions are asked although I think if you routinely loaded tonnes extra then someone would have a word.

IRISHinUS
10th May 2010, 16:56
A certain airline had this plan to clamp down on the frequency of pilots adding fuel (which the pilots did due to their extensive experience in the probability of expected holding, weather en route, etc.that the dispatchers couldn't be bothered including) . When the number of diverts for low fuel went off the charts, the policy changed pretty quick. Of course, it helped that the memos to pilots were leaked to the nightly news.

Continental’s 757s Running Low on Fuel on Some Transatlantic Flights | Autopia | Wired.com (http://www.wired.com/autopia/2008/04/continentals-75/)

" ... reporting a five-fold increase in the number of low fuel warnings made by pilots of Continental Airlines (http://www.continental.com/)‘ flights arriving from Europe into Newark (http://www.panynj.gov/CommutingTravel/airports/html/newarkliberty.html). According to the paper, the Department of Transportation (http://www.dot.gov/) (DOT) has released a report (http://www.oig.dot.gov/item.jsp?id=2288) saying that Continental pilots made 96 "minimum fuel declarations" last year. A statement by New Jersey Senator Robert Menendez (http://menendez.senate.gov/), one of senators who received the report, says that in some cases flights approached Newark so close to empty that they received priority landing clearance, effectively allowing them to jump the line to avoid running out of fuel."

Airline fuel cuts concern pilots - USATODAY.com (http://www.usatoday.com/travel/flights/delays/2008-05-15-fuel-diversions-flights_N.htm)

Pilots: To Cut Costs, Airlines Forcing Us To Fly Low On Fuel (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/08/08/pilots-to-cut-costs-airli_n_117872.html)

On the other hand, if the regs let you defer a certain item then I'm leaving without it unless there is some unusual consideration, such as it being your last operating coffee maker etc.

Johnny767
10th May 2010, 17:07
This nonsense has been going on for the three decades I've been in this business.

Until something goes wrong.

Then try to find the:

1, Dispatcher

2. Air Traffic Controller

3. Management du-jour

4. Insert name here - ________ who thinks they have business in the Flight Deck.

When ALL FINGERS point to the Pilot in Command, as everyone else runs for cover.

NVpilot
10th May 2010, 17:42
Yes, I too must operate with legally deferred defects. (scary) Fuel decisions where I am at are not scrutinized.

Admiral346
10th May 2010, 18:10
At my airline the MEL (original Bombardier) for the CRJ actually states that all the exceptions are thought for having ONE MEL item only, if multiple ones are planned to be dispatched the consequences should be considered thorouly (spelling?).
As Captain you certainly have the final say on go or nogo.

I can take as much fuel as I like, even leave payload behind for it, no questions asked. That right is not excercised often, though.
If it is a stormy day, I will fuel up to the max allowable, just to get the ship to be heavier, get faster approach speeds, and fly a bit "stiffer". I'll do that 4 times a day - still no questions asked. If running behind schedule, I sometimes fuel for 2 sectors, just to avoid another 5 minutes for fueling during a tight turnaround. That might make me take almost double of what the flightplan indicates - still, no questions, ever.

And our FOs can call for a goaround below 1000' and that makes it mandatory to fly one.

Nic

Prober
10th May 2010, 18:41
I have now retired, so no longer have to bother with counter-arguments over fuel. Our company had a line for “Reason for extra fuel” On the advice of an old hand referred to above (JW and the red cap), I always put POM as the reason. It was never queried.
Lack of fuel can bite – and how. I was positioning crew on one flight and was called in to help the newly qualified F/O manage the rapidly vanishing gas. We finally landed and the APU stopped after less than 10 mins! From Standby I once accepted an a/c on a calm clear winter day when the captain failed to report. It was all ready to go but had company fuel in tanks. I would have preferred more, but everyone was on board and we were already 15 mins late. On finals, the tower reported wind was suddenly 50 kts across. Diverted to alt. A few minutes before arrival, the airfield went out in a blinding snow storm – unexpected and certainly not forecast. Fortunately there was another airfield within 50 miles. Straight in but ran into snow with virtually zero vis half way down the runway and almost dry tanks. I should have listened to that other old guy who told me that “It is better to be 20 minutes late in this world than 20 years early in the next”.
Wind your shoulders out and do your own thing!

overun
10th May 2010, 19:00
This may have been one of the things exported from the UK.

Towards the end of the nineties a four engine jet "low cost" operator had a policy of if taking more than 200kg over minimums then tea and biccies would follow.

Now, it is possible that it was designed to focus minds but leaving Munich for Helsinki, a little late arriving and the full load champing on the bit to go, in poor weather with a u/s apu kind of set the scene.

Good luck.

Piltdown Man
10th May 2010, 19:01
I fly for a very blue European airline. In my little world (short-haul - up to 2.5 hours) we are under no pressure to accept any aircraft we don't want to, even though it may put a spanner in the works. Our big brothers, the sky gods who fly big aircraft all over our planet follow suit. To my knowledge, none of my colleagues have been invited for "tea & biscuits" as a result, even for the some of the more crass decisions that have been taken. Major defects are detailed in our briefing packages before fuel order.

Our fuel is our decision as well. We take what we want. But generally we are planned with either economical tanking or minimum fuel (and for our division, an additional 10 minutes of company fuel). However, it is normal for us fly four sectors, back to back, on "minimum" fuel. In some divisions, block fuel and fuel burns are monitored. But after (reasonable) union pressure, they have been de-identified. Typically, I will fly on minimum fuel but will put more on if I think I need it. In the 18 years I've been flying, I've never been in the air wishing I had more fuel - but I'm sure my time will come.

In addition, the way we operate the aircraft is recorded in detail as well. For "interesting flights", especially where the crew appeared not to notice what they did or how close to impending doom they were, we have a program whereby we show them a replay of the relevant section of the flight. This is part of our flight safety programme. Again, this is outside any disciplinary procedures.

In return for this, we operate the aircraft as safely, efficiently and economically as we know how. In general, our fleet managers are also open to suggestions and will normally back up their crews. So, yes as crews, our decisions are respected and they are not subject to disciplinary meetings or review (even though some of them probably should be). How? A respectable company, a "European attitude" to business and union pressure.

What should you do? A diversion or two would help. Instead of using a very sharp pencil to help your company, try using a child's crayon biased in your favour. Make sure ALPA are behind you make sure that you are not the only one outside the tent pissing in.

Best of luck,

PM

overun
10th May 2010, 19:48
l can only assume that when the crew next have an "interesting flight" they will have learned from the previous film.

767Capt, there you have it.

Never mind good luck, divine help is needed.

Checkboard
10th May 2010, 20:12
I have seen TWO instances where the cabin crew refused to fly on aircraft with valid and legal MELs, despite the Captain's insistence that the aircraft was fine. Both flights eventually had to be cancelled.:cool:

SeniorDispatcher
11th May 2010, 00:58
>>>I do not want to mention my company's name here publicly, but am curious about how things work at your individual airline.

Completely understandable. Here's my view (from the perspective of my username) at a US Part 121 airline operating 737s.


>>>Lately, my company has started to put some pressure on Captain's to:

1- Accepting aircraft with a Legally deferred (MEL) item,
2- Tracking/monitoring Captains that increase the Cleared Fuel after dispatcher finalizes his flt plan.

Our MEL gives both the PIC and the dispatcher the ability to decline an aircraft, irrespective of the MEL permissiveness of any deferred MEL item(s). In my own experience and the knowledge of others, it's not often that either a PIC or dispatcher has had to avail themselves of this particular action, but it has happened, with cases having been both pilot-initiated and dispatcher-initiated. Our procedure is basically set-up as a check-and-balance type system, which follows the philosophy of joint PIC-dispatcher responsibility for the safety of the flight that's inherent in the US Part 121 FARs. One of the more “classic” cases in which I had to say “NYET!” was when a MX person was lobbying to get a sick bird one last leg into a MX base, with the PIC being agreeable (so he could presumably avoid an aircraft swap and get home on time). I said it didn’t matter to me whether the aircraft involved maintenance ferried or taxied all the way home on the interstate. MX’s reply (seriously) was that the aircraft was in no condition to maintenance ferry, yet they were advocating operating with passengers? NYET!

As far as your second item is concerned, a company has the right to monitor its personnel however they want, as it is, of course, their company. From my individual perspective, if I transmit a release and the PIC doesn't like the fuel load it specifies, what I expect isn't an independent automatic uplift without communication, but I do expect a phone call to discuss things. If s/he brings forth an item that I've missed in my planning considerations, great--I'm only human (just as the PIC is), and we'll jointly adapt as needed. (Joint responsibility, again). The only issues I have are (1) PICs that consistently and automatically add N.nn fuel over minimum on every flight, seemingly "just because", and (2) PICs that don't call to discuss anything.

This second point is a sore one, as although a PIC who adds fuel without calling their dispatcher almost certainly feels as though s/he's solving the problem on their specific ABC-XYZ flight, they're creating one (perhaps multiple ones) for the dispatcher. If the ABC-XYZ PIC's concern is a valid one, and the dispatcher isn't in the loop here, how many other flights does the dispatcher have (that the PIC isn’t aware of) that are also destined to XYZ, and could also benefit from the info that the PIC of the ABC-XYZ flight brought forth? The dispatcher can't apply it to other flights if the PIC is playing "I have a secret" or is avoiding contact for other reasons. Sure, "some" dispatchers can seem nitnoid about PICs adding fuel, and perhaps these are the folks that some PICs are seeking to avoid perceived confrontations with, but really, man-up and call--other flights could be affected.

Many PICs flying in Part 121 operations are under the impression that their PIC authority emanates from FAR 91.3, but that is actually incorrect. Sure, 91.3 applies to them if they're flying their own personal aircraft, but once they strap-on an employer's jet, they're operating under the more stringent Part 121 regs, specifically 121.533/121.557 (domestic), or 121.535/121.557 (flag) that cover the same items 91.3 does, but in greater detail. Pertinent FARS below, with my [emphasis]:

FAR 121.533(b): [The pilot in command and the aircraft dispatcher are jointly responsible for the preflight planning], delay, and dispatch release of a flight in compliance with this chapter and operations specifications.

FAR 121.533(d): (d) Each pilot in command of an aircraft is, [during flight time], in command of the aircraft and crew and is responsible for the safety of the passengers, crewmembers, cargo, and airplane.

I have no doubt that many here will take spirited exception with the above FAR interpretation, but the FARs say what they say. The higher legal standard of care involved with US Part 121 ops more than strongly suggests the PICs and dispatchers should be encouraging two-way communications versus looking for ways to avoid doing so.

And, to any folks not operating within the US under Part 121 rules, please note that my comments have been purely in the context of those Part 121 rules, and not the rules of whatever country you happen to be operating in. Ditto for the definition, job description, duties, and responsibilities of a “dispatcher” under FAR Part 121, versus anywhere outside the USA. The OP asked their questions in the context of a Part 121 operation, thus my answers are as well--no need to debate the point that things are done differently elsewhere--everyone gets it.


>>>Until something goes wrong.

Then try to find the:

1, Dispatcher

Oh, we'll be very easy to find--we'll be the one NOT in the smoking hole... One of my past airlines had a fatal accident, and it wasn't a pretty experience, for anyone.

nugpot
11th May 2010, 12:50
In a perfect world, companies would accept the PIC's word on not accepting a/c under MEL relief and give him however much fuel he wants. In this same world, the PIC would be making decisions based on the commercial success of his company combined with his safety responsibility to his passengers and crew.

Unfortunately pilots have become much more mercenary (only looking after #1) and companies are run by accountants who only see figures and completely ignore the safe operation of any individual flight. This necessitates a little fine tuning of procedures to at least get captains to think before only accepting perfect a/c with full tanks. On the same hand, it forces us as captains to carefully detail our concerns, but also to stand firm against any assault on safety.

To answer the original question: I am expected to take legally deferred a/c and can take 20 mins fuel over (admittedly generous) sector fuel without any questions. On the other hand, the Co is happy to listen to any changes to the above and although we sometimes have a little disagreement with dispatch, the captains will be backed up by management pilots if their concerns are legit.

As with most things, a mature (as in adult) approach to differences in opinion usually has a satisfactory result. Only start throwing toys when all other avenues have been exhausted... :E

svelte yelk
11th May 2010, 13:20
I couldn't care less if the most junior cabin crew member has the right to decline accepting an aircraft, provided that the Captain is the only one with the right to accept an aircraft.

Mansfield
11th May 2010, 14:42
The original questions are excellent issues to raise and discuss, as many times as need be to maintain an informed position when called to act on them during operations. There are a number of underlying themes. One truly useful method of understanding some of this stuff is to read through the portion of FAA Order 8900.1, Flight Standard Information Management System (FSIMS) that addresses operational control. Naturally, they have an embedded linking system in their web based access, so I can’t post a specific URL; however, the relevant section is: Volume 3, General Technical Administration, Chapter 25, Operational Control for Carriers.

Communication between the dispatcher and captain is an essential part of genuine CRM. In my experience, a talented dispatcher can be a remarkable asset in times of stress. Familiarization is most certainly a two way street and must be not just encouraged, but facilitated. At my previous airline, I taught quite a lot of CRM, and we made a point of including the dispatchers in applicable portions of the classwork, particularly the scenario portions.

However, I noted the suggestion from SeniorDispatcher that the PIC authority does not emanate from FAR 91.3, but rather FAR 121.533. My read of several opinions from the FAA Chief Counsel leads me to affirm that Part 91 very much applies to Part 121 operations, and has been the deciding factor in quite a few decisions by NTSB administrative law judges and other courts. Part 91 is superceded by Part 121 operations only in cases where Part 121 is more restrictive or specific. FAR 121.533(b) provides more specific information regarding responsibility for planning and regulatory compliance; 121.533(d) specifies that the PIC is in command of the crew. Neither of these rules supercedes the requirement under FAR 91.3 that the designated PIC is the final authority as to the operation of the aircraft.

Under the concept of operational control, the PIC and the dispatcher each have the authority to stop the flight, but neither has the authority to prevent the other from stopping the flight. This is the dual veto idea. If the dispatcher’s decision regarding fuel or MEL items is the more conservative, then it is final because he/she has that regulatory authority under US Code. However, if my decision is the more conservative, it is also final, because I also have that authority under the US Code…and because I am the guy who releases the brakes. In other words, if I want more fuel, the dispatcher cannot refuse it within the framework of operational control. Nor can the Director of Operations, etc.

Outside of the framework of operational control, the company owns the airplanes (at least for the purposes of this discussion) and they do have the right to tell me how they want the airplane flown. My job is to decide whether that is compliant with the applicable regulations and, more to the point, whether it entails risks that I am unwilling to take. If I do refuse the operation, it is my professional obligation to have some pretty solid reasoning…matters of public safety are poor places in which to engage in a power play. In point of fact, I have not felt a need to add fuel very often at all during the years that I spent in the left seat, but I have stopped a couple of flights due to MEL issues.

The Boeing preamble to each of their Master MELs states the following:

Operators are responsible for exercising the necessary operational control to ensure that an acceptable
level of safety is maintained.

The ICAO Master Minimum Equipment List/ Minimum Equipment List Policy and Procedures Manual, Appendix D, actually substitutes the word “required” for Boeing’s “acceptable”…imagine that.

The PIC’s decision is very much a part of the operational control requirement. The PIC has a regulatory obligation to make a decision under both the FARs and JAR-Ops. Professional standards require that decision to be an informed one.

A couple of war stories to buttress the ideas: many years ago, I gained some short-lived corporate notoriety for refusing a Metroliner that had the oxygen system deferred under the MEL. The requirement was simply to operate below 10,000 feet. However, the emergency procedures for smoke required that the oxygen mask be donned…kind of pointless when there is no oxygen cylinder attached to the other end. The following day, the Director of Training issued a memo stating that the emergency procedure mask requirement was only applicable if the system was operable. (Where do we find such people?) A few months later, the union asked me to argue this point in front of the FOEB, which I did successfully…the MMEL was revised to remove allowance of the oxygen system deferral.

More recently, I refused to fly a 757 across the Atlantic with the APU inoperative. You might consider this to be extreme…the DO certainly did…but let me outline the circumstances. The airline did not yet have ETOPS approval. It was in the demonstration phase, meaning that all maintenance, etc., was done to ETOPS standards. However, the company was still required to dispatch with a 60 minute alternate; they had craftily solved this problem by listing Narsasuaq as the alternate between Gander and Keflavik. This met the requirements as interpreted by the local FAA but, as you might imagine, there was no one who actually considered going to Narsasuaq for any reason. The flight was essentially a de facto ETOPS flight, completely approved but really a paper exercise. At the time, the MEL required that the APU be operative for dispatch on an ETOPS flight. My position was that although we could depart without the APU because it was legally not an ETOPS flight, it had been planned in a manner as to make it identical to an ETOPS flight. I felt the ETOPS requirements for the APU were there for a reason and, in this case, should be adhered to. This resulted in quite a telephone shouting match, but we all survived and used another airplane. Oddly enough, the same situation came up a week later. This time, the dispatcher and I conspired to avoid the issue by replanning the flight so as to use Sondrestrom as the intermediate alternate, which is what I should have done the first time. Not ideal, of course, but at least one could actually imagine safely landing there without the special training that the Air Greenland fellows use for 757 qualification into Narsasuaq. The Master MEL for the 757, by the way, has since been changed. The APU is no longer required for dispatch under the 120 minute ETOPS rule. Your company MEL may be more restrictive.

In a simpler case, I recall watching the captain of a 727, on which I was the FO, engage in yet another heated telephone discussion over a yaw damper being deferred under the MEL. The flight was to go to Miami, and from there up to New York. The captain did not want to be restricted to FL 290 (or was it 260…can’t recall) under the MEL because there was a good chance of thunderstorms over the Gulfstream on the way up to New York. He also prevailed…we took another airplane.

These are complicated decisions. There are often ways to re-plan the situation to alleviate the problem. This is where the dispatcher can really be an asset. That said, the earlier one can see these situations coming, the better one can intervene and effect a change before tempers flare. Knowledge is key. But the bottom line is that the captain is not the only authority, but he/she is the final authority.

411A
11th May 2010, 15:01
However, the company was still required to dispatch with a 60 minute alternate; they had craftily solved this problem by listing Narsasuaq as the alternate between Gander and Keflavik. This met the requirements as interpreted by the local FAA but, as you might imagine, there was no one who actually considered going to Narsasuaq for any reason.

Narsasuaq receives B757 aircraft on a regular basis (weather permitting)...and yes I've been there, many times over the years.
Therefore, your company, nor the FAA was not being unreasonable...:rolleyes:

Commander Taco
11th May 2010, 15:18
This nonsense has been going on for the three decades I've been in this business.

Until something goes wrong.

Then try to find the:

1, Dispatcher

2. Air Traffic Controller

3. Management du-jour

4. Insert name here - ________ who thinks they have business in the Flight Deck.

When ALL FINGERS point to the Pilot in Command, as everyone else runs for cover.


Johny767 - I just completed a cycle with a VR based F/O who is soon to be promoted - that's exactly the one bit of warning/heads up I had for him!

Cheers,

'Taco

heavy.airbourne
11th May 2010, 17:45
Most of this discussion is fruitless, as we all work for different companies, in different countries, flying different aircraft types over different routes. The point should not be to argue about do's and dont's or yes or no, but to listen to the stories and learn.
Now, here is my part:
1. There was only one pack operable, perfectly acceptable acc. MEL. The flight was from Europe to DEL, routed over the Caucasus mountains and over the Hindu Kush. That was too much risk for me, as there are no procedures for flying unpressurized over high terrain, and the packs are somewhat unreliable on this a/c, anyway (s.abv.). After conferring with maintenance and them stating that any action would result in a major delay, I then called dispatch to have them plan a reroute, which resulted in a 50 min. longer flight time, as Iraq had a no-fly-zone than, and we did not have traffic rights for Iran. Announcing this fact to my co-pilot, with the maintenance guys overhearing this, they then come up with a quick solution of changing the PRV. Delay only 15 minutes.
2. Flight was planned to PHL, with a chance of low clouds around ETA. We took 50 minutes additional fuel and barely made it. Low clouds hinder visual approaches usually used by commuters for the small runways; with low clouds there will always be delays in PHL. We had fuel for 3 more minutes in the SPUDS holding when we were picked up for vectors to land.

767Capt
12th May 2010, 02:17
There is a lot of very good and informative postings and exchanges so far.
That was exactly the goal of starting this thread.

Companies names are not important. I just wanted to know if other airlines were having similar issues, and if so, how you all handle them.

I think it is very important to maintain the "Captains Authority" in these challenging economic times by using all the resources available, while remembering commercial interests of our companies.

But SAFETY should never be compromised under any circumstances.

I know the ash clouds are back in Europe, and will take the attention away from this thread somewhat, but please keep them coming.

Thanks for all the well thought out replies.

SeniorDispatcher
12th May 2010, 05:08
>>>However, I noted the suggestion from SeniorDispatcher that the PIC authority does not emanate from FAR 91.3, but rather FAR 121.533. My read of several opinions from the FAA Chief Counsel leads me to affirm that Part 91 very much applies to Part 121 operations, and has been the deciding factor in quite a few decisions by NTSB administrative law judges and other courts. Part 91 is superceded by Part 121 operations only in cases where Part 121 is more restrictive or specific. FAR 121.533(b) provides more specific information regarding responsibility for planning and regulatory compliance; 121.533(d) specifies that the PIC is in command of the crew. Neither of these rules supercedes the requirement under FAR 91.3 that the designated PIC is the final authority as to the operation of the aircraft.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Thanks for your comments, but a few clarifications are in order.

As far as your statement “…Part 91 very much applies to Part 121 operations…”, please note that I never made any general statement (or inference) to the contrary. Certain, in fact, many Part 91 regs do indeed apply to Part 121 ops. However, as you go on to note, “Part 91 is superceded by Part 121 operations only in cases where Part 121 is more restrictive or specific” and I’d submit that a close read of applicable FARs below indicates that to be precisely the case that supports my position.

§ 91.3 Responsibility and authority of the pilot in command.

(a) The pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsible for, and is the final authority as to, the operation of that aircraft.

(b) In an in-flight emergency requiring immediate action, the pilot in command may deviate from any rule of this part to the extent required to meet that emergency.

(c) Each pilot in command who deviates from a rule under paragraph (b) of this section shall, upon the request of the Administrator, send a written report of that deviation to the Administrator.

§ 121.533 Responsibility for operational control: Domestic operations.

(a) Each certificate holder conducting domestic operations is responsible for operational control.

(b) The pilot in command and the aircraft dispatcher are jointly responsible for the preflight planning, delay, and dispatch release of a flight in compliance with this chapter and operations specifications.

(c) The aircraft dispatcher is responsible for—

(1) Monitoring the progress of each flight;

(2) Issuing necessary information for the safety of the flight; and

(3) Cancelling or redispatching a flight if, in his opinion or the opinion of the pilot in command, the flight cannot operate or continue to operate safely as planned or released.

(d) Each pilot in command of an aircraft is, during flight time, in command of the aircraft and crew and is responsible for the safety of the passengers, crewmembers, cargo, and airplane.

(e) Each pilot in command has full control and authority in the operation of the aircraft, without limitation, over other crewmembers and their duties during flight time, whether or not he holds valid certificates authorizing him to perform the duties of those crewmembers.

§ 121.557 Emergencies: Domestic and flag operations.

(a) In an emergency situation that requires immediate decision and action the pilot in command may take any action that he considers necessary under the circumstances. In such a case he may deviate from prescribed operations procedures and methods, weather minimums, and this chapter, to the extent required in the interests of safety.[/SIZE]

In a Part 121 operation (domestic/flag) , the FAR 91.3(a) verbiage is covered in greater detail by FAR 121.533(a)(b), with 121.533(b) adding the aircraft dispatcher as being jointly responsible with the PIC for the preflight planning, delay, and dispatch release of a flight in compliance with this chapter and operations specifications. FAR 121.533 continues to expand on the basic FAR 91.3(a) requirements by adding dispatcher-specific requirements in 121.533(c)(1)(2)(3), and PIC-specific requirements in 121.533(d)(e). Please also note that 121.533(d) limits PIC total authority to during flight time alone.

In a Part 121 operation (domestic/flag), the FAR 91.3(b) verbiage is covered in greater detail by FAR 121.557(a), with 121.557(b) adding dispatcher emergency authority. The reporting requirements of 91.3(c) are covered (with changes) in 121.557(c).

All I’m trying to point out here is that such differences in applicable regulatory structure are subtle nuisances that are commonly lost in the apparent airline management and flight crew zeal to apply the “KISS” philosophy in situations when it shouldn’t be. There’s another party involved in the airline safety process, and while the dispatcher doesn’t have the ultimate authority the PIC does (under 121.533(d)), that fact doesn’t render all the other FAR responsibilities the dispatcher does have as being moot points.

As I mentioned before, a proper awareness and understanding of these subtle nuisances is needed. PICs and dispatchers need to be looking for ways to enhance operational communications, and not to avoid them (or have them negated) based upon management and flight crew misunderstandings, misconceptions, or misinterpretations of the regulatory intent of the aforementioned FARs.

>>>Under the concept of operational control, the PIC and the dispatcher each have the authority to stop the flight, but neither has the authority to prevent the other from stopping the flight. This is the dual veto idea. If the dispatcher’s decision regarding fuel or MEL items is the more conservative, then it is final because he/she has that regulatory authority under US Code. However, if my decision is the more conservative, it is also final, because I also have that authority under the US Code…and because I am the guy who releases the brakes. In other words, if I want more fuel, the dispatcher cannot refuse it within the framework of operational control. Nor can the Director of Operations, etc.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

That said, there still needs to be communication between PIC and dispatcher with such fuel discussions/uplifts so that any valid concerns the PIC may have can be applied to other flights. The PIC is watching the “bubble” around their flight (and rightly so), but the dispatcher is also looking the big-picture systemic view of multiple bubbles to multiple destinations.

Please call us…. ;)

Checkboard
12th May 2010, 16:36
I couldn't care less if the most junior cabin crew member has the right to decline accepting an aircraft, provided that the Captain is the only one with the right to accept an aircraft.

So you are away from base, on a multi-sector day, and a hydraulic guage fails (as an example). As Captain, you examine the MEL and agree with the provisions of relief, and the MEL is then written up & approved correctly according to the regs.

A Flight attendant looks over your shoulder as you sign the book, and says "If this aircraft is broken, I'm not flying on it - and neither is any of the crew I am working with."

... and you are OK with this? :confused:

If the Captain takes the decision to fly the aircraft - as a question of authority according to this thread - who should be able to gainsay that decision?
An engineer?
A dispatcher?
A Flight Attendant?
A Passenger?

BOAC
12th May 2010, 16:43
Certainly am - crew member off-loaded, operate with minimum crew OR ring company and leave it to them.- simples.

icarus sun
12th May 2010, 16:57
Contact company let the management deal with the cabin crew.

Re-Heat
12th May 2010, 18:28
1- They are claiming that we are the only US Major Airline where Captain's can still refuse an airplane with a legal deferral.
But a lot of Captain's see this as questioning their authority and/or pilot pushing.
A poor example is; would you take a 767-300 with APU inop, from US to say Buenos Aires on a 10+ hrs flt time, at night with some terrain/escape route concerns, limited airport availability, etc..
If you can still justify it like that, then is there a problem? Are some colleagues refusing to fly with APU inop from JFK-MIA perhaps?

I don't think we can comment here without knowing the culture of your colleagues, and whether some are substituting excess conservatism for valid experience of what is sensible v what is legal.

Spadhampton
12th May 2010, 18:50
Weight should be the ONLY reason to limit fuel load. If companies are worried about dumping fuel then let them demand that airplanes are built strong enough to land with fuel! Otherwise it's the captain’s decision and it should be criminal for any business interest to question a Captain or even suggest anything different. I really get sick of these money grubbing jerks pushing economics until people die, for their “bottom line”. I swear they should be dragged into the street and SHOT!

WhatsaLizad?
12th May 2010, 19:57
Many of these issues arise out of organizations with large pilot groups. Typically in normal operations there is pressure apllied to other departments and when their is a leadership vacuum in the left seat, the vacuum will be filled by some department whether it's maintenance, the FA's or management getting their way.

The problem for many other departments in the typical airline is the pilot's can be inconsistent. The maintenance folks may have gotten Captain's "A", "B" and "C" to fly an aircraft with an issue, then Captain "D" comes along and correctly identifies the safety shortcomings on the flight with the MEL. Instead of Captain "D" getting recognized for superior judgement and safety awareness, he is thought of as the "problem child" or not a team player. Same goes for interactions with the FA's, they may "act up" and slide by several Captains. When the next one expects proper behavior and respect, he becomes the bad guy.

411A
13th May 2010, 01:52
....goes for interactions with the FA's, they may "act up" and slide by several Captains.

Tail wagging dog.
A sure-fire cure....
It's called....on the spot termination...as in, 'buy your own ticket home, bubba.'

Works every time...:ok:

PS.
Yes, I know, trolly dollies get no respect.
Tough.:E

heavy.airbourne
13th May 2010, 03:46
After all the postings an old rule comes to my mind: 3 persons (or entities) can ground an airplane/stop a flight -the dispatcher, the mechanic, the captain - anytime one of them says no, it's no! But be prepared to look for another job... :ouch:

no more nite flights
13th May 2010, 10:43
Hi All

Been flying for 34years and retired from main line flying 3 years ago. However to support my passion for fast cars and faster women went back flying in the lo-co sector. How sad to see how the Captain's authority has been eroded to no more than a bus driver. Young trolls and F/O's with attitude all comprise the new "team" culture where all crew members are "equal" status with no differential between the poor Captain and the most junior trolley dolly . Whilst the Captain has the ultimate responsibility for the aircraft he is not empowered with the authority that should go with it. If you dare criticise a crew member (privately) you risk the wrath of a cabin crew trainer reminding you of the company "culture"....I wish she was on the flight deck on a dark and dirty night on a Cat 3B approach and handing control over to her...I think she would very quickly get the message..We are 100% professional pilots at the top of the intelligent 5% of the population and not the percived "bus driver" as promoted by the company culture to c/crew...Lo-Co has ruined the profession of the pilot community forever as we are exploited as temporary hired hands by bean counters,management and c/crews from the MCD schools of excellence. I would be interested to hear comments from others on this topic.

From an old F...t, with 21,00hrs jet time!

Mansfield
13th May 2010, 22:09
SeniorDispatcher: I believe that we are in near complete agreement on this point. The FARs tend to define an information flow from dispatcher to PIC; while the reverse is not nearly as well defined, it seems clear that any information that will influence the opinion that the dispatcher is required to have under 121.533(c)(3) and 121.627(a) must be communicated. In any other case, the dispatcher’s opinion may not be fully informed, which prevents him/her from executing their regulatory responsibilities. Cell phones have made this incredibly easy.

My only critique is that I still believe that the PIC’s authority does indeed emanate from 91.3. I have pasted in a couple of opinions from the FAA Chief Counsel that I believe support this. Obviously, this is nitpicking, but I wouldn’t be the captain if I didn’t insist on having the last word! Anyway, for what it’s worth:

The term "pilot in command" is defined in Sec. 1.1(14 CFR 1.1) of the Federal Aviation Regulations as the "pilot responsible for the operation and safety of an aircraft during flight time". Consistently, Sec. 91.3(14 CFR 91.3) provides that "the pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsible for, and is the final authority as to, the operation of that aircraft.” A second section, Sec. 91.9 (14 CFR 91.9) prohibits operation of an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of another. In general, Part 91 of the Federal Aviation Regulations sets forth the general operating and flight rules that govern the operation of any aircraft. Furthermore, if the operation is of such a nature that it requires either a Part 121 or Part 135 certificate, Sec. Sec. 121.385(c) and 135.35 require designation of the pilot in command for the flight...

...Nothing in FAR 121.629, as amended, purports to change the responsibility for the operational control of the aircraft by the pilot in command or aircraft dispatcher as provided for under FAR 121.533 and 121.535 or other sections within the FAR. As the FAA stated in the preamble to the interim final rule, in response to your comments regarding the ultimate responsibility for takeoff, "nothing in this rule changes FAR 91.3(a) that the pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsible for, and is the final authority as to, the operation of that aircraft." The responsibility of an airline dispatcher, as provided under FAR 121.533 and 121.535, includes "the joint responsibility for the preflight planning, delay and dispatch release of a flight, monitoring the progress of each flight, issuing necessary information for safety of flight, and canceling or redispatching a flight if a flight cannot operate or continue to operate safely as planned or released." As amended, FAR 121.629 does not alter the aircraft dispatcher's responsibilities for operational control of aircraft under FAR 121.533 and 121.535.

411A: I may have mispoken; the company was not expecting me to actually land at BGBW. They were simply using it as a paper alternate to facilitate a non-ETOPS requirement. In the case I described, they then wanted to take advantage of being non-ETOPS to operate outside of the ETOPS MEL provisions. All quite legal, but that is the point of the discussion.

Since you have referenced Air Greenland’s 757 ops into BGBW, I thought I would offer some additional information for those who are unfamiliar with it.

At the time, the only available approach into BGBW was the NDB DME-1 into runway 7. This required a descent gradient from the MAP to the runway of 5.66 degrees. A go-around from below the MDA could be problematic with one engine inoperative, due to the serious obstacle issues and resulting climb gradients. Advisory Circular 120-29A stipulates that

A multiengine aircraft conducting a Category I or Category II instrument approach should be capable of safely executing a “one-engine-inoperative” go-around from any point in an approach prior to touchdown with the aircraft in a normal configuration, or specified non-normal configurations (e.g., engine out, if applicable)… In the rare event that operation out of a runway may not be possible following a rejected landing, then provision of suitable information on a “commit point,” or equivalent condition (e.g., limit weight, minimum speed, or suitable configuration) may instead be provided.

We were aware of Air Greenland’s 757 operation, and I had a pleasant exchange via email with their chief pilot. He stated that they consider the operation “difficult” and highly recommended specific simulator training since, in his words, “pilots often seem to find it difficult to meet the stabilized concept parameters”.

So without the limit weights, commit point, appropriate company procedures and specific simulator training, I would “prefer not” to go there in the middle of the night on one engine. Particularly since the airplane is, in all respects except for the final FAA program approval, ETOPS capable and thus quite able to lumber on over the Kef or Goose.

DJ77
13th May 2010, 22:30
Not the subject of this thread but ...

Mansfield; just wondering out of curiosity why not BGSF instead of BGBW ?

BarbiesBoyfriend
14th May 2010, 18:05
Our company has such a small contingency fuel in the fuel plan (5 mins) that its not 'whether' you take extra fuel or not but, how much extra will we take? A little or a lot.

Senior Dispatcher. I've never discussed how much fuel to take with a dispatcher. It must be different where you work. As far as defects go though, I once had the dispatcher inform me that we were tech, due to some not-very-obvious issue. Issue closed as far as I was concerned. Off to the bar!

My take on the fuel issue is simple: Want to choose the fuel? Fly it yourself!

SeniorDispatcher
14th May 2010, 18:18
>>>Senior Dispatcher. I've never discussed how much fuel to take with a dispatcher. It must be different where you work.

As noted at the outset, a different ruleset, and different job description over there than over here. ;)

CJ1234
14th May 2010, 19:28
Spadhamton: don't talk crap.

Gone are the days when captains can just say "ah stick another tonne on" - and the industry is all the best for it. Airlines save money, less fuel loaded=less fuel brnt. Everything's good. I'm all for captains being in overall charge, but the question of fuel is a serious one and fuel calculations should be calculated and thorough. They should, therefore, be able to justify their fuel calculations - not just stick it down on paper and assume that their decision is justified, because they have 4 stripes on their epaulettes.

That would be a very unpleasant, and downright dangerous atmosphere to work in.
Just because they have to justify how much fuel they load doesn't mean there's a lack of respect for them - just means they are given incentive to be a bit more careful.
1234

Edit: no more night flights, bloody well said, chap. :ok: i'm an f/o at the moment, and as such understand the extra pressures and responsibilities placed on captains - they deserve, in my opinion, authority in terms of rank as well as responsibility.

Having said that, i haven't come across any cabin crew who have played up yet.

Spadhampton
14th May 2010, 20:39
I give my pilots full authority. I also scrutinize every Pre-Flight Action and keep detailed records of those actions. Systems don't run themselves. Systems must be constantly analyzed and trends noted. This is upper management's job. Not just selling space and playing golf.

dav99sod
14th May 2010, 23:38
Hi Guys

I pose this a question rather than a challenge. I am pic with a major with 25 years on the atlantic on 747/777. Narsasuaq has plates for cat a and b only I have never seen anything bigger, if there are please post them!!

One lonely day not so long ago I called their tower as we passed overhead.

My question to him was what was the largest he ever had in to land. He said it was a weekly 737 that left half empty due perf. problems.

My fo was a 20 year vet but in a former life a military boy who had been in as pic with a herc and said it was very limiting.He is one of the few I have flown with with a dual uk/usa test military test pilot rating

Now I am waiting for the knock down but his opinion is one which I do respect and that the chance of getting in ( in a heavy) daylight let alone at night in the **** ie smoke ect was almost zero. He went as far as saying virtually any other option would be better, yet on a regular basis I have colleagues next to me who consider it their best option as the weather is good ( just cat 1 )but have never looked at the reality of getting in. BGSF with all its fun seems benign although I know its miles away.What I am trying to get at as how bad do you think it should be to have a go with the risks that go with that .What other options could you generate if your answer was no.


More on thread I often carry planned fuel if I can but also have no probs putting on 10T EXTRA( less or more) IF I need it .Not once with a phone call to ask why(respect to my management ). Is that not what being a captain is all about. If you need it carry it.

Discuss

BarbiesBoyfriend
14th May 2010, 23:54
Another 2p worth re fuel.

I am a regional or 'short haul' pilot.

Our lot say you burn 4% per hour, of what you tank due to being heavier.

Therefore 1/2 a ton for an hour= 20kg. (about 10 mins APU fuel)

Talk about cheap insurance. :)

Heli-Ice
14th May 2010, 23:56
You can check AIP Greenland (http://www.slv.dk/Dokumenter/dsweb/View/Collection-30) for more information.

If 1830 meters are enough for the 747 and a few mountains close to the runway are fine, then you should be good. I don't fly them but I am guessing they need a little more space then Narsarsuaq airport.

dav99sod
15th May 2010, 00:11
No probs with the length 1700 at heavy weights with fire on my toes and your mine!!! BUT ONLY IF THE CB GRANITE ARE NOT THERE .

Thats a far quicker end!!!

Mansfield
15th May 2010, 01:36
DJ77: I believe the answer to your query is in my original post on page 2 - BGSF is indeed a better choice, although not without its own challenges.

Admiral346
15th May 2010, 09:27
What I am trying to get at as how bad do you think it should be to have a go with the risks that go with that .What other options could you generate if your answer was no.

Before starting on the A340 I had a briefing with our safety department, and the option Narsarsuak was discussed. If I remember correctly, it is a beacon approach with different inbound and outbound courses, and a very steep final. Not really doable in an A340 without flying a 360 in that fjord. You would have to be at min speed and get lucky not to hit anything. So the only reason to try such a manouver is if all other options are exhausted and not trying it means certain death. I didn't consider it an alternate any more as I would "Alert", where an overrun is certain, but better than falling out of the sky in a burning ball.

Nic

DJ77
15th May 2010, 16:51
Mansfield; Thanks for pointing me to your page 2 post. I should have read everything before asking. I appreciate and share your well balanced views.