AA crew fed up with JFK ATC - declares emergency.

[AdamFrisch]

Apparently the crosswind component on the cleared Rwy exceeded the allowable limit. I wonder who will get the **** for this.

Construction And Crosswind Leads To JFK "Emergency" (With Audio) (http://www.avweb.com/avwebflash/news/jkf_construction_crosswind_American_pilots_clearance_crosswi nd_emergency_202510-1.html)

[eastern wiseguy]

I hope the runway wasn't covered with diggers/trucks or associated staff. Heaven knows what could be on it if is officially closed. :ooh:

[sabenaboy]

Eastern Wiseguy,

He landed on 31R which wasn't closed. 31L was closed according to the article.
I guess he must have been quite low on fuel as well for declaring an emergency so promptly.

Best regards,
Sabenaboy

[eastern wiseguy]

D'OH........read the article too quickly.....:ok:

[alwaysmovin]

JESUS....I understand the pilot couldn't land as it was over his limits but he didn't even give the controller a chance:ugh:....and then telling atc what he was going to do........eh hello ....you are not the only plane in the sky......In a normal emergency ok you can do what you want....but really just how low on fuel was he???. ....If he was so low on fuel surely he should have said it earlier when he realised the winds were getting near limits and may go over.....

Also "I said 3 times I'm declaring an emergency'"...... I didn't hear anyone say he wasn't getting 31 after this.......didn't this moron even consider the heading was for traffic and then he'd prob get the runway he asked for....

...or am I missing something??

[AdamFrisch]

Apparently the NYC controllers have their own way of doing things according to this answer from different forum:

I think some people need to understand ZNY center does not operate like some other centers in the country. "Min Fuel" means nothing to NY, because they have 200 other a/c coming over the pond all declaring "Min Fuel."

You can ask for whatever you need, your not gonna get it. Even in this case the crew "declared" and still the controllers tried to play stupid, and act like they didn't hear the crew declare an emergency.

You can request 31R as soon as you get the local ATIS, which was maybe 150mi out. All your request is going to go in the garbage, they are not going to change the entire arrival configuration for one a/c, needless to say how this change will affect EWR or LGA. The crew did the right thing by declaring and deviating from FAR necessary to get that aircraft safely on the ground.

Spend some time here flying in and out of JFK and you'll understand how things work here.

[On the beach]

I've listened to the tape 3 times now and not once did I hear any reference to fuel emergency. Maybe the crew declared a fuel emergency before, in which case, no problem. But I hope the crew listen to the tape and take on board the assistance that was trying to be offered and appreciate the increased workload that was handled very professionally by the controller. No doubt the controller was also co-ordinating with colleagues around to facilitate the American pilots safe and expeditious landing, which, unfortunately the tape doesn't record. Whoever the controller was, a job well done, in difficult circumstances.

[protectthehornet]

the plane landed safely...the pilot did his job

atc took way too long and sometimes you have to remind atc who the boss is.

pic is ultimately responsible and has the final authority.

[Plectron]

Well said, Sir, Paladin of the USS Hornet. The Monday morning quarterback crew seem to forget that while all Captains have the right to make any decision in the interest of safety and have the authority to act upon that decision, any Captain so doing will be asked some whys and wherefores at a later date. Both AA and the FAA are not shy about giving crews a chance to explain their actions after the fact and this Captain no doubt understands that. He did what he thought best at the time. He made a decision. That is what he is paid to do. Being a Captain is not a popularity contest.

[Shore Guy]

As alluded to in a previous post, JFK, LGA and EWR will hang on to their runway alignments until someone calls a stop to it. All three airports have to change their alignment if one changes.

While it may have been more diplomatically handled, changing runways would make operational/safety sense.....but realigning all three airports has an impact on arrival/departure rates.

For example, JFK will hang onto the Canarsie approach until someone misses or says they won't do it.

The most recent example of an incident/accident I am aware of is hanging on to a 4R approach (with a tailwind). A Gemini MD-11 went off the end (fortunately into an EMAS area) landing in tailwind situation. For those not aware, MD-11's have a very high Vref to begin with. A tailwind adds to the landing energy significantly. If not for EMAS, the damage on the aircraft would have been substantial.

NYC03IA117 (http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20030612X00863&key=1)

[Pugilistic Animus]

I think more background is required I'm not sure what to make of it yet...lots of non-standard coms from the AA FD:hmm:

[Jetjock330]

According to Jepp online, landing beyond threshold is 2638m and beyond G/S is 2295m. Considering to that the wind 320/23 gusting 35 kts is 100 degrees from the right, thus a tail wind component to consider to.

Not sure what heavy type he landed, but from experience of putting the A340-600 down there on a VOR approach, a tailwind in definitely not wanted! Nor 35 kts of gusting crosswind for that matter, however, the hiccup in communication between the crew and ATC is clearly evident.

[Halfnut]

They held for a while (zoom to see):

FlightAware > American Airlines #2 > 04-May-2010 > KLAX-KJFK (http://flightaware.com/live/flight/AAL2/history/20100504/1615Z/KLAX/KJFK)

Their original plan was 11.1 yet 6.5 was the actual at the gate on a B767.

Someone should give them an Air Metal for not becoming another AV52.

[GixxerK5]

Gentlemen, if a pilot say he is going to declare an emergency, it doesnt mean "he is declaring an emergency". If he says "Mayday, Mayday, Mayday" that means he is declaring an emergancy and now you have everybodys attention. The missunderstanding is due to non-standard phraseology.

Regds

GixxerK5

[vanHorck]

Whilst the "Mayday, mayday, mayday" is the phrase of choice when butting into a communication with an emergency, I see not reason to use that phrase when already in active communication with a controller.

In fact I have done just the same in the past.

In my view the declaration of the emergency was pretty clear.

[GixxerK5]

There are two choices when declaing an emergency. Mayday x 3 or Pan Pan x 3. Thats all! However, the Pan call is not worldwide recognized.
If you want ATCs unambigous attention, these are the phrases to be used, particularly important in a very busy environment. The results speaks for it self.


Regds

[Jet_A_Knight]

Why would you arrive at the circuit - at an airfield with known runway configuration issues - without gas for an 'out'?

[ZQA297/30]

Reminds me of an incident in Barbados many years ago. A PanAm Tri-Star doing a 2 engine ferry had a problem with another engine very shortly after liftoff. He announced engine failure, declared an emergency, and his intention to return immediately as well as commencing fuel dump.
When ATC started complicated radar vector instructions, the aircraft announced curtly you don't understand, we are returning NOW, have the equipment standing by!
They did a very tight circuit, dumping fuel almost to touchdown.

[The Trappist]

So unprofessional by AA2 – on several levels
Emergency = Maydayx3
Where was the emergency here?
Wind out of x-wind limits = Divert (no emergency)

Bully-boy tactics by the pilots = lengthy re-training session in the sim…

[J.O.]

No it is not recognized as standard phraseology, but "declaring an emergency" is exactly the same as saying Mayday 3x to ATC in the USA. And just because a crew declares an emergency doesn't absolve ATC of their responsibility to provide traffic separation. The controller was not being difficult when he asked them to maintain runway heading. He did it to give him time to sort the situation out. The runway track is protected for go-arounds, whereas an immediate turn may put the aircraft into someone else's flight path.

[Basil]

He made a decision. That is what he is paid to do. Being a Captain is not a popularity contest.
Hear, hear!

On approach to an airport we were given 09.
We pointed out that there was a large Cb on approach and we'd prefer 27.
Nope! 09 is the runway!
Following go around on 09, 27 suddenly became available.

No names, no pack drill but you know who you are ;)

[FUSE PLUG]

While it is ICAO standard RT to use the Mayday x3.

In the US all that is required is to give the flight number and then state that you are "declaring an emergency"

Per FAA RT the pilot of AAL002 declared properly.

As many of you who cross the pond know, they don't always have the same radio standard in the US as they do in other parts of the world. Unless you go, don't assume you know.

-FP

[Permafrost_ATPL]

Their original plan was 11.1 yet 6.5 was the actual at the gate on a B767

What's the final reserve and holding fuel flow on a 76-200?

P

[GixxerK5]

30 min of holding @ 1500 ft will prob be a bit over 2 tons, depending on weight.

[Permafrost_ATPL]

So he's got enough fuel to get vectors to his preferred runway, go around, try again, go around and land with final reserve.

And he throws all his toys out of the prams, after being unclear about declaring an emergency, and screws up ATC's plans for colleagues who had possibly less fuel than him.

Being a Captain is not a popularity contest
No but it's about keeping your cool and working with others when faced with a challenging situation. Unless there is more to the story or the fuel figures given here are wrong, his attitude was very poor.

P

[Permafrost_ATPL]

:} In that case I'm off to the kitchen to bake humble pie lol

I still think he did not handle the comms situation very well, regardless. If you're not using mayday, declare the emergency clearly ("if you don't let us do what we want, we're declaring an emergency" does not constitute a mayday). And give the controller a chance to handle the emergency. To justify doing your own visual circuit at JFK requires something like being on fire or into final reservers - in my book anyway.

P

[square leg]

Try saying: "We are Declaring an Emergency" in the UK... you won't get much help.

Why not use either: PAN PAN x3 or MAYDAY x3 ?

[dss3000]

Declaring Mayday Mayday Mayday may be the proper phrasology in the UK, However this happened in the US ... The crew advised the controller appropriately and completed a safe landing, can you imagine the outcome had he landed and departed the runway on the cleared runway!!!! who would be held liable? probably a carreer ending event at best.

Job well done,

It seems we all accept too many tail wind, X wind , and departures into severe weather to accomodate controllers/and traffic latelly.

[AerocatS2A]

Poor communication. They started by threatening to declare an emergency but nit actually declaring one. They then declared one and then got upset and said they'd declared an emergency three times. No you hadn't, you done it once. I wouldn't have wanted to be on that flight deck, it sounded tense.

[Plectron]

Tense because they knew a pack of pompous (and wrong) blowholes would be on them in about 10 hours. No, I guess that wasn't why - maybe it was because they were busy flying a very unplanned visual approach. Something not done, even planned, in your part of the world I suppose. It is "Declare an Emergency" where aviation was invented by the way. Sorry.

[remoak]

Have to agree with Aerocat. The flight crew's comms were crap. First they threaten to declare an emergency if they don't get their way, then they say they have declared when they clearly hadn't. As others have said, the ATCO has a responsibility to ensure separation and I'm sure the runway heading was just to give him time to clear traffic out of the way for the AA flight. He wasn't being difficult, he was being professional in the situation he found himself in.

The pilots, on the other hand, appear to be having a petulant episode.

Why had he already not diverted if fuel was an issue? If he allowed himself to get suckered into holding while eating into his divert fuel, he DOES need a session or two in the sim.

If you manage your flight properly, there is no such thing as a "fuel emergency" (which I'm pretty sure is not recognised outside the US anyway).

As for the exact wording of the call... irrelevant. Once you have used the words "declare" and "emergency" in the US, you have done all that is required. Get over yourselves, British pedants! Right may be on your side (in Europe, anyway),, but this is New York we are talking about...

[parabellum]

I would have thought that a runway change was at the discretion of ATC, if they or you are unable then divert. In just about every ATC environment that I have flown in, if you say, "I am declaring an emergency" that is enough, but yes, 'Mayday" when it is your first transmission on that frequency or when previous transmissions have been routine and unrelated.

(I'm a Brit!).

[IXNAT]

This pilot was going to show the controller who was boss. Understand that he was put in a box, some of it his own doing by arriving with min fuel. But terrible terrible CRM with the controller. Yeah, the emergency was the only way he was going to get what he wanted.....But to threaten an emergency, then say, "I told you three times". That helps the situation. How do you plan to arrive at your destination, especially NY ATC, without extra contingency fuel, knowing what it's like in that enviornment? Two way communication, send out your msg., but ensure the receiver gets it with no ambiguity. This pilot got his aircraft on the ground safely at the destination, bottom line. Doesn't mean that his saga is over. The FAA will be all over this. Don't let get to destinationitis, override a decision to divert. Sure it's Monday morning quarterbacking, but it makes for good discussion....and we all continue to learn.

BTW did you notice that the winds subsided for the DAL to land, I believe 22 knots, no gust.

[B737NG]

Since a few years I fly to JFK and the time / fuel wasted there is immense. If you are cornered from the beginning then it ends up in a fuel shortage, you can argue as much as you like: declare / mayday / panpan..... the lower the fuel gauge the higher the tension.

I am glad that in our outfit the fuel is down to the Skipper and not the Desk Driver who tries to tell me that 3 tonns more are inducing a higher total burn. We all know that but a divertion costs more and a relaxed crew operates more safe then a tensioned one. What is cheaper / safer at the end of the day? It lookes good when you hear safety first but for how many that is lipp service only. It starts deeper then some people are able to look into it.

Saving costs by all means can be expensive, we are saving costs regardless of the price? Nevada is good for gambling, flight planning not. How much is enough "juice" aboard is a diffrent level for everybody. It is not a crime to have a extra zip, just in case and who knows when the day with the case is waiting. Statistically low but not not exclusively impossible.

Fly safe and land happy

NG

[ATCO1962]

Why didn't the JFK controller just radio, "State the nature of your emergency"? Then he would have (a) known exactly what the problem was and (b) been able to call the equipment out or respond in an appropriate way. Unless the mp3 is incomplete, it sounds very poor all round. If the pilot was just making a point about being unable to use the designated runway because of crosswind limits, then he needs a dressing down. There are myriad ways of addressing that single issue without needing to declare and emergency.

[Muren]

First of all, how on earth should ATC know what the emer is when the crew don't let any one in on it? Was the go around enough to put them over the edge for Min Fuel it was just poor planning, sad to say. Had they planned it right they would have had enough fuel for their alternate (even though some pilots thinks they are geniouses making the parallel runway, or anopther runway at the airport their alternate. What happens that day the delay is due weather/another emer happens etc and you planned your fuel like Uncle Scrooge). Everyone is flying around with less and less fuel these days after the financial crisis kicked in, and we see this more and more often.

The Controller was very slow to understand and acknowledge the emergency, 3xmayday is preferred, but come on everyone has to understand the way this was said. But when he did he wanted to clear the path and the pilot, who neglected to tell any one what the emer was, chose to do whatever he wanted. Yes he did not get the direct track instantly, but maybe he would have gotten the turn 10 secs later, but chose to act like a complete baby "You know what...." . Insinuating the ATC knew very well that he needed this and this.

Had he kept his cool he would when he realised the x-wind component have said as he said and added "We need 31R due to fuelshortage due to the x-wind component" then the controller could make a statement and maybe still say no as he did, because it jacks up the runway configuration and the flow of the entire airport and delays everyone else. The pilots correct response to this should then have been. "We are declaring an emergency due to min fuel, intention is to make a left hand visual to 31R we would like to start turn now" At least to give the controller a heads up and a chance to react to whatever the pilot was thinking.

Had the controller then neglected to acknowledge, then I might understand the pilot, but in my eyes the pilot didnt give the ATC a chance here.

And please quit the "Show who the boss is" crap, thats just stupid are you 22yo? I bet it makes up for great cooperation with ATC where you fly...

[blueloo]

It is "Declare an Emergency" where aviation was invented by the way. Sorry.


You mean New Zealand do you? :ok:

[blueloo]

As a matter of interest does the US recognise the term "REQUIRE" ie I REQUIRE runway XXX. As in "you will give it to me"/you have no choice. So you don't need to declare an emergency.


** (i believe it is an international/ICAO term- but happy to be corrected)


Usually ATC will then confirm you "REQUIRE" it - sometimes they will ask - in which case unless you feel like explaining the reason in detail "operational reasons" is usually sufficient.

[bfisk]

By listening to just the avaliable tape itself, the situation comes across as poorly handled by the crew. Now, we (I) don't know what communications have taken place beforehand, and I haven't heard anything about fuel. More light on that could change my opinion:

--It's definately good that the crew is taking control over their own situation when the clerances given by ATC is inappropriate or unsafe.

--If the crew did indeed see this situation coming up, sorting it out earlier would have been preferable.
--If the crew did indeed see the situation coming up, having an alternate plan (as opposed to visually maneuvering and screwing up the flow for ATC, a maneuver which in itself could be dangerous, also to others), would have been better for all involved.
--If the situation could not reasonably have been predicted beforehand, or an alternate plan of action would not be possible, then:
----To me it seems like standard RT speak such as "Negative Unable" and "Mayday" could have contributed to raising the controllers awareness faster (if indeed the situation became apparent to the crew at that time).

I have flown in both the US and Europe, and while I agree there's a different vocabulary, tone and style of the RT, a Mayday call is universally recognised and respected. "We might be/will be/are declaring" sounds to me like it's adding to the confusion in this situation, and I don't blame the controller one bit (again note that I've only heard the tape and know nothing of previous exchanges). It seems to me that the threshold for calling Mayday in the US is a lot higher than in Europe. It's seems like "you don't want to alarm anyone", while that is in fact exactly what you want to do. Let's not forget that nonstandard RT have been indentified as a casual factor in many incidents/accidents.

[AerocatS2A]

Tense because they knew a pack of pompous (and wrong) blowholes would be on them in abut 10 hours. No, I guess that was wrong - maybe because they were busy flying a very unplanned visual approach. Something not done, even planned, in your part of the world I suppose. It is "Declare an Emergency" where aviation was invented by the way. Sorry.

What I found surprising was that they seemed to go from relatively normal operations to a life threatening situation requiring an immediate landing in the space of a few seconds. I can think of three reasons why it panned out that way. 1, there was more said on the radio and they'd already informed ATC they were low on fuel; 2, they were low on fuel or had some other aircraft problem and had been reluctant to actually tell anyone about it until it became apparent they weren't going to be landing as soon as they hoped; or 3, they didn't really have an emergency and just used the words to get what they wanted.

I'm all for taking matters into your own hands and doing whatever's required to get down safely when it's appropriate, I just hope this was an appropriate time for these guys to do it.

Incidentally, the pilot on the radio sounds stressed right from the start when he tells ATC that the localizer isn't up.

[HM79]

Dangerous landing at JFK Airport | Video | 7online.com (http://abclocal.go.com/wabc/video?id=7425662)

The ac's first transmission after being told the crosswind was too high was "we cannot accept 22 if we do not get 31r we are GOING to declare an emergency" The plan was to bring the ac overhead the airport and vector him for an ils to ry 31r.

The time spent bringing the ac overhead was not thought to be an issue because at NO time prior the ac's declaration of need for 31r was there any mention of fuel issues. The above link is the local news story of the event. Please remember that atco's in NY DO NOT make rwy selection decisions!!

All runway selection decisions in NY are made by FAA management in very close coordination with the AIRLINES. (The users make every decision about runway selection!!) It is all about capacity.

Controllers vector where they are told to vector.

[goldeneaglepilot]

Seems we dont know all of the story... I agree the pilot sounds stressed but just what was going on in the cockpit? If he had screwd up on his fuel calcs then that is bad and he deserves disciplinary action, if he had an emergency which has not been made public then perhaps that mitigates him. However if it was just a case of he spat his dummy (pacifier) out of the pram because he could not have his choice of runway for a routine landing he deserves sacking and not employing again.

Seems like very poor communication from the pilot to ATC... why did he (the pilot) not tell them the nature of his emergency? Surely that helps an appropriate response or is the ATC supposed to be gazing at a crystal ball along with watching the aircrafts progress on the radar screen

[Two's in]

From FAR AIM Chap 6 - That's an American regulation by the way!

Section 3. Distress and Urgency Procedures



6-3-1. Distress and Urgency Communications

a. A pilot who encounters a distress or urgency condition can obtain assistance simply by contacting the air traffic facility or other agency in whose area of responsibility the aircraft is operating, stating the nature of the difficulty, pilot's intentions and assistance desired. Distress and urgency communications procedures are prescribed by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), however, and have decided advantages over the informal procedure described above.

b. Distress and urgency communications procedures discussed in the following paragraphs relate to the use of air ground voice communications.

c. The initial communication, and if considered necessary, any subsequent transmissions by an aircraft in distress should begin with the signal MAYDAY, preferably repeated three times. The signal PAN-PAN should be used in the same manner for an urgency condition.

d. Distress communications have absolute priority over all other communications, and the word MAYDAY commands radio silence on the frequency in use. Urgency communications have priority over all other communications except distress, and the word PAN-PAN warns other stations not to interfere with urgency transmissions.

[Farrell]

You can bandy about ICAO regs and RT standards and poor shows all round, however, what is the point of even posting this?

All I've read is drivel about "how great I am when I fly into JFK...", "this is not how it should be done...." and the gut-wrenching comment from protectthehornet about pilots showing ATCOs who is boss..... (sir, you may have a well respected career as a pilot but get over yourself) [I will wait with baited breath for your sidekick P51guy to show up]

Apart from a very short mp3 and some website that shows "live" traffic, no one has a notion about what really happened here.

Give it a rest!

[Checkboard]

Too many times I have seen pilots bought up in airlines unwilling to state their case with sufficient force to ATC to achieve a safe solution. This Captain did the right thing - when it gets to the point where you have to direct the course of action, then you do so - and simply tell ATC what you are doing (not following or waiting for vectors.).

This flight DIDN'T end up the same way as Avianca Flight 52 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Avianca_Flight_52) - and that, at least, is something to be applauded.

On January 25, 1990, Avianca Flight 52 had been in a holding pattern over New York for over one hour due to fog limiting arrivals and departures into John F. Kennedy International Airport. During this hold, the aircraft was exhausting its reserve fuel supply, which would have allowed it to divert to its alternate, Boston, in case of an emergency or situation such as this one.

Seventy-seven minutes after entering the hold, New York Air Traffic Control asked the crew how long they could continue to hold, to which the first officer replied “...about five minutes.” The First Officer then stated that their alternate was Boston, but since they had been holding for so long they would not be able to make it anymore; the controller then cleared the aircraft for an approach to runway 22L.

As Flight 52 flew the ILS approach, they encountered wind shear at an altitude of less than 500 feet (150 m) and the plane descended below the glideslope, almost crashing into the ground short of the runway. As a result, a missed approach was initiated. Air traffic controllers had informed the flight of wind shear at 1,500 feet (460 m). At this point, the plane did not have enough fuel for another approach.

The crew alerted the controller that they were low on fuel and in a subsequent transmission stated “We’re running out of fuel, sir.” The controller asked the crew to climb to which the first officer replied “No, sir, we’re running out of fuel.”

Moments later, the number four engine flamed out, shortly followed by the other three. With the aircraft's main source of electrical power, its generators, now gone and with only battery power remaining, automatic load shedding would have caused many non-essential electrical systems to lose power and the cabin would have been plunged into darkness. Within seconds, the aircraft had lost thrust from its 4 engines, causing it to plunge into the small village of Cove Neck on northern Long Island, in Oyster Bay; 15 miles (24 km) from the airport.

[TowerDog]

This flight DIDN'T end up the same way as Avianca Flight 52 - and that, at least, is something to be applauded.



Aye, Avianca 52: I was in the aircraft right behind them.
Long nigth, ****ty weather and they kept requesting "Priority" due to low fuel.
Then after holding for a very long time they got cleared for the approach on the fumes, got off the localizer/glide slope as they had no flight director or autopilot, then had to execute a go-around and flamed out and crashed on downwind.

We were the last aircraft to land that evening, the airport closed when we touched down.

[Sir Osis of the river]

Jfk atc need to get over them selves.

Inbound JFK after 14hrs. "enter the hold". "For how long I ask". Twenty minutes is the reply. " No problem" I say. I have ten minutes holding fuel then I am off to La Guardia.. "HOLD" . Ok, I got it the first time, just letting you know where I stand. Eight minutes and inbound....... Just checking, any improvement??? Loudly: HOLD. " Ok, Diverting to La Guardia." Errrrr... Ummmmm... #@$#@ You are cleared for the app, fly heading 250, etc.

And the Speed bird behind me had the same thing.

Either they can accept you, or they cant, why play games??

I did not declare low fuel or anything else. All of a sudden, they can accept me?? Please, they need to plan better.

And dont get me started on Ramp Control.

See you all tomorrow,

Sir O

[jackieofalltrades]

atc took way too long and sometimes you have to remind atc who the boss is.


What a moronic attitude to take. By definition ATC are in charge. It's Air Traffic CONTROL, not Air Traffic Do-what-you-like-and-we'll-just-watch-you.

It's hard to judge without seeing and hearing the entire communication between the controller and AA crew, but as other posts have alluded to the AA crew's actions were less than professional. Stating that they're turning contrary to the controller's instructions is very dangerous. In my opinion they should have given the controller chance to vector them for 31R.

[Final 3 Greens]

By definition ATC are in charge.

Only until the commander decides to use his authority to override them.

The buck stops with P1.

[jackieofalltrades]

Only until the commander decides to use his authority to override them.
The buck stops with P1.

I agree that responsibility for the safety of the aircraft rests with the Captain, but if s/he disregards ATC, then they have to answer and justify their actions to the authorities. It can't be a free-for-all up there.

[Final 3 Greens]

I agree that responsibility for the safety of the aircraft rests with the Captain, but if s/he disregards ATC, then they have to answer and justify their actions to the authorities.

As I said, the buck stops with P1 - both in terms of authority and accountability.

[Bobbsy]

Could you put up with a question from an SLF member:

Is the 767 in any way unusual in terms of the maximum crosswind component that is considered safe...or was there a whole queue of planes with a similar problem and this was just the first crew to make a fuss?

Bob

[TowerDog]

By definition ATC are in charge. It's Air Traffic CONTROL

Yup, they are in charge of seperating IFR traffic, not of flying airplanes and telling pilots which runway to use, or how much gas to land with.

ATC is certainly doing an important job, but they are not managing the jet, only keeping hard objects out of the way..

[TowerDog]

Is the 767 in any way unusual in terms of the maximum crosswind component that is considered safe...

Nah, the 767 is easy in strong crosswinds, inboard and outboard aileron, lots of rudder..Piece of pie, but the x-wind exceeded the book values, hence they had to go to a different rwy.

[Airbubba]

Nice analysis with a shoutout to PPRuNe today on Paul Bertorelli's AVweb blog:

After the emergency was declared, the controller evidently thought it was a “gentleman’s” emergency in which he would be allowed to vector the airplane back around for 31R in a more less orderly fashion. The Captain, on the other hand, clearly understood that under emergency authority, he could do what he needed to and seemed to inform the surprised sounding controller of his maneuvering plan. He told ATC—he didn’t ask, he told ATC—to clear the runway. American Flight 2 was landing on it. This is about as compelling an example of execution of command authority as you are likely to hear.

Taking Command (http://www.avweb.com/blogs/insider/AVwebInsider_EmergencyAtJFK_202513-1.html)

Any of the AA Skygods:) know what crosswind limits are in your manuals for a B-762?

[Sygyzy]

Heard once after a request for a deviation (in either direction) for thunderstorm avoidance had been denied.

"Say XXXXXX Centre, tell me, Am I up here 'cos you're down there-or are you down there because I'm........"

The response was a deviation approval.

S

[Intruder]

From FAR AIM Chap 6 - That's an American regulation by the way!
Nope. The AIM is NOT a regulation!

This publication, while not regulatory, provides information which reflects examples of operating techniques and procedures which may be requirements in other federal publications or regulations. It is made available solely to assist pilots in executing their responsibilities required by other publications.

[Jetjock330]

Is the 767 in any way unusual in terms of the maximum crosswind component that is considered safe...or was there a whole queue of planes with a similar problem and this was just the first crew to make a fuss?

In addition to the crosswind, the wind value was given at 100 degrees from the right which has a tailwind component for consideration 320/23 gusting 35, and Runway 22L/04R is the shortest runway at JFK!

In addition, eye balling a visual without G/S on 22L (from the tape) or possibly without PAPI lights, an extra couple of feet high over threshold adds a lot of extra meters at the very end which might not be there if they screw up the visual with strong crosswind and tail wind component.

The landing was safe in the end, good for the commander if he deemed this was required. But now he is on the ground, he is paid well for providing the answers to his actions as the captain/commander.

[AerocatS2A]

The focus on the unsuitability of runway 22L is on the crosswind for obvious reasons, but could the tail wind component have been a factor in the decision? Perhaps an aircraft problem that made that runway with that wind limiting (u/s antiskid, spoilers, something else?)

[alwaysmovin]

Think the pilot needs to learn to count too....

''I've told you 3 times I'm declaring an emergency''.........from what I heard he told the controller ONCE that he would have to declare an emergency IF he didn't get 31 and then he did declare when told to fly a heading......So he only declared once even though he was NEVER told he wouldn't get 31.

Unprofessional, dangerous and with complete disregard for the safety of others in the vicinity...should have the book thrown at him...... I understand the pilots responsibily for his craft and all on board but I can't believe any professional pilot could condone the manner in which he reacted without even giving atc the chance to give himwhat he wanted....

[con-pilot]

It's not just the controllers at JFK. Overall US Air Traffic Controllers are some of the best in the world* in my humble opinion, but, there is the occasional exceptions.

In the US, has others have pointed out here, pilots tend not to use the word 'Mayday', why I've not a clue. Instead we say "I/We are declaring an emergency." Ninety nine percent of the time that will suffice, however, there is on occasion a controller that when hearing the words "Declaring an Emergency." just does not register the seriousness of the situation.

Once I had a rapid decompression in a 727 while at cruise at FL350. I was in the left seat, PF, when the duct blew out. The first indication was the immediate pressure change that you feel in the your ears. The co-pilot and FE handled the checklist while I flew the aircraft and handled the radio.

When it almost immediately became evident that we could not control the cabin I 'declared an emergency' and informed ATC that we had lost pressurization and that we were descending to 10,000 feet.

The controller came right back and said, "Standby and maintain FL350." I didn't respond but just kept descending, I figured he would see the altitude readout start changing and realize that I was not going to "Maintain FL350."

I don't know if he ever did figure this out, but the supervisor did and took over.

That was the last time I used the term 'Declaring an emergency.', from then on I used 'Mayday', that always worked much better.


* London has some really fine controllers as well, I really enjoy working with London Controllers after a few months flying in Asia and the Middle East.

[Final 3 Greens]

Alwaysmovin

I'm not taking sides here, but the tape is edited and we don't know what we didn't hear.

He may or may not have declared three times.

[Johnny767]

What a moronic attitude to take. By definition ATC are in charge. It's Air Traffic CONTROL, not Air Traffic Do-what-you-like-and-we'll-just-watch-you.


ATC is a service. There is only one person "In Charge," and that is the Captain.

"Mayday (x3,) I'm doing a visual and landing on the Taxiway"

If that is what it takes to get the Aircraft safely on the ground.

[TowerDog]

Any of the AA Skygods know what crosswind limits are in your manuals for a B-762?

29 knots if memory serves right..

(The Skygod sub-title on my moniker is not AA induced, but rather from some moron I argued with 10 years ago over the Gulf Air A-320 crash.
I said if they had not learned to fly basic instruments after 2000 hours, they should find something else to do for a living.

The moron came back and asked if I thought I was SkyGod or what...?

Name stuck, he was right..:cool: )

[ferris]

One thing is clear; the huge gap between what the respective roles are!
Yes, the captain is responsible for getting his a/c on the ground safely. ATC are responsible for getting all the a/c on the ground safely.
If the captain was having real fuel issues, and really did need to get on the ground immediately, how did he communicate that so that ATC could assist him in that endeavor (instead of taking over separation/sequencing responsibilities from the controller)?
It just sounds like a dummy spit, pure and simple.
As I said, the buck stops with P1 - both in terms of authority and accountability. Very true- and I'm sure the 'accounting' part of this is happening (including by the lynch mob/monday's experts here). Maybe the controller might have averted a lot of the angst by appending the vectors instruction with "vectors for short final R31" or similar?

ps. how would you feel if you were one of the commanders of the other a/c buggered around (and there would've been more than the 3 mentioned) to facilitate this "emergency"? You would really hope the guy was on vapour and just hadn't told anyone, right?

[Dream Land]

Seems like there might have been a bit of frustration level by the AA crew, would "RWY 31 is required for operational necessity" be a better way to go? The captain got the job accomplished, but may be in for tea and biscuits.

Cheers, DL

[wingview]

Cpt is always the one who decides, but in this case most probably ATC will have filed a report and both have to come with a good explanation. In about a year we'll know more (if not forgotten).

[bfisk]

"Mayday (x3,) I'm doing a visual and landing on the Taxiway"

If that is what it takes to get the Aircraft safely on the ground.

If that is indeed what it takes to get the aircraft safely on the ground, well done. However:

The FARs state that "In an in-flight emergency requiring immediate action, the pilot in command may deviate from any rule of this part to the extent required to meet that emergency." Note: to the extent required to meet that emergency. That forces the conclusion that the executed option was indeed required, and that forces the question: how the hell did the crew get themselves into that corner (where that's your only out) in the first place?

The above regulation is not a free-for-all-do-as-you-please simply by using the word "emergency". The way I see it, it is needed to protect the crew from litigation when doing "the right thing".

[protectthehornet]

In order to understand what happened in the jfk incident, I offer this:

In 1978, the airline industry was deregulated...people said , "HOORAY" the price will come down.

And they did.

But additional runways were not built.

And then in 1982(I think), ATC went on strike. Yes, strike. And President Reagan fired the controllers.

(you in the 727 decompression, I wonder what year that was).

And ATC hasn't been the same since...it has never caught up with this decision. I remember being cleared for a route through a restricted area...all legal...and halfway into the restricted area I was told that I shouldn't be there. I reminded them that they were the controlling authority and THEY HAD CLEARED me for what I was doing.

Silence.

Now, what does deregulation, and the controller's strike have to do with the JFK incident?

With deregulation, scheduling of flights at airports went NUTS...over do it to the max.

Cost controls became imperitive...and what can we do about that...carry less fuel...it saves money. Divert if you have to. So, why didn't American Divert?

LGA, EWR, all nearby...but it takes half an hour of low altitude vectoring to go from JFK to EWR...though the straight line distance is about 30 miles or less.

So, there is our American pilot. He has fuel, but he knows how screwed up things really are.

He declared the emergency ( and please you brits, don't get me started about MAYDAY) and told THEM what he was going to do. Fine. He now has to explain...fine...he knew he would have to do that.

ATC factors include this: It use to be ( or is it USED to be) that controllers had pilot licenses too...but they don't anymore (not that it was a requirement, but it just showed that you knew something about airplanes).

So, the controllers, which still aren't as good as the ones prior to the strike didn't know what THEIR job was...it was to get everyone else out of the way while American did what they wanted to.

And that's the name of that tune.

[protectthehornet]

FARRELL

Keep pushing buttons and watch the machine do your job for you.

[ferris]

Ahh, protectthehornet, you are assuming the pilot was out of fuel and out of options.

At what point, exactly, was this made apparent to the controller? The pilot tells the controller that he needs 31 due to the crosswind. It sounds like he knows how things work, and that someone has to force a runway change (did you read earlier in the thread where the controllers have nothing whatsoever to do with runway configurations- that's between the management and the airlines :rolleyes: ). Forcing the runway change is one thing, but forcing his way onto being number 1 in the sequence is entirely different.
Like I said, you really hope he is that low on fuel, but just didn't tell anyone. And if he got to that point- why?

[alwaysmovin]

@final 3 greens...
Fair point and actually I did want to say it was based on what we heard...

I hope there is more and it is indeed cut..... otherwise it scares me that someone like that is allowed to have that sort of responsibility

[mary meagher]

A while back, I got worried about the fuel state while over water, flying at 11,000 as was my custom. Centre noticed, gently reminded me I was off track, did I have a problem? Well yes, I replied, I'm wondering if I have enough fuel.....
In an eager tone, the controller came right back - "Would you like to declare an emergency, Ma'am?" (This was in the USA Deep South, they had time for the niceities).

"Not at this time," I replied. "Well, Ma'am, would you like to divert to the nearest airport?" I agreed that might be a good idea. "Roger that, Cessna 24539, suggest I vector you to Tallahassee. Descend to 3,500 feet."

"Negative, Sir" I came back. "If I'm going to become a glider, I'd like to stay as high as possible as long as possible!"

"Yes Ma'am. We have cleared your track from eleven thousand feet down to the ground. Please advise when you have the airfield in sight!"

And they held my hand all the way down to the ground, and emergency vehicles met me and escorted the Cessna to the fuel pumps, and after filling the tanks I realised that the gauges had been lying all along.

In 20 years of filing and flying the plan in the US, ATC has always been there for me....thanks, guys.

[Pugilistic Animus]

yeah the "extent required" part of 91.3 can bite you

that's why it's there :}

[protectthehornet]

ferris

I thought I read in this forum that he had six thousand five hundred pounds on landing.

I can imagine that he was watching the wind and runway business prior to contacting approach control and had advised people all the way along that he needed a certain runway...but someone had dropped the ball (as is want to happen) along the way.

[Admiral346]

All runway selection decisions in NY are made by FAA management in very close coordination with the AIRLINES. (The users make every decision about runway selection!!) It is all about capacity.

Controllers vector where they are told to vector.

Great! So the people who want to make money and the people who want to keep things moving are making the choice that the one who is actually in charge should be making! And the other one is just following orders - sorry, but this sounds to much like the "You will do as you are told" mentality not allowing any backtalk or actual intelligent questioning. If this is really how the decision on RWY configuration is made, then it should be definatly changed!

I have seen this happen so many times flying to the US, especially ORD. You get told to use one RWY, you object, ask for something different. Then ATC threatens you with 30 min holding. You agree to hold in the interest of safety, and after flying a vector for 5 min you get what you wanted!
Just voice it aloud on the airwaves, so it is on the tape. There will be no excuses.

And someone further up the thread mentioned ground control. Be it JFK or ORD, but how can one create so much unnecessary stress for everyone around?

Nic

[protectthehornet]

Admiral 346

You are quite right regarding the way to get what you want.

IF all pilots would do what you suggest, we would all be better off.

ORD is especially bad as it impacts Midway airport, and Midway is a marginal airport as is.

I applaud your post and what you did.

[ferris]

Perhaps this needs to be made perfectly clear for you, protectthehronet, and would explain why you will never progress beyond the flight deck). How much the captain had in the tanks when he landed is irrelevant. Is that perfectly clear? IRRELEVANT. If the pilot had made perfectly clear what he wanted, in the case of the landing aircraft who was told to maintain 2000 and break off the approach, what that pilot wanted was to continue the approach and land. In the case of the departing a/c, it was to line up and depart (instead of follow a complex set of taxi instructions and drive around the airport for a later departure clearance). Instead, all these a/c had to be mucked around because the guy in the air wanted to be number 1.
Is this, at all, becoming clear to you? You can, at any time, declare an emergency and moved up the priority list, but all that means is you are moving EVERYONE else down. Is that at all sinking in?
All this "the commander is responsible for the safety blah blah" is all just BS in this case. This guy, in this situation, just moved himself up the landing order because he was frustrated. You can keep peddling the "commander is in charge" bull**** all you want. But it is clear, this was nothing of the sort of a fuel emergency. Due process will occur. And so be it.

[Huck]

Perhaps this needs to be made perfectly clear for you, protectthehronet, and would explain why you will never progress beyond the flight deck

And this is an insult in your book?

Shades of Basil Fawlty. "You're through! You'll never waitress in Torquay again!"

[protectthehornet]

such phrasing...commander in charge? I've never heard of that one.

Earlier, I mentioned that he (the captain of the american flight) would have to explain his actions. And that is the way it should be.

But I truly doubt that he declared his emergency because he wanted to make someone taxi around the airport a bit more.

There is a philosophy, described in our regulations about right of way. An airplane landing has the right of way over a plane taking off (assuming an uncontrolled airport). It is always advisible to get someone down safely and wait for someone to takeoff.

And in this case, declaring an emergency assures right of way over everyone else...even a glider...even a hot air balloon.

And why would I want to go beyond the flight deck? Would I want to be an airline manager? maybe for the money, but not the fun.

Let me also add that this whole thing isn't about the emergency, it is about the problems JFK controllers have with the construction. It would have been better to build a new runway!

[FoxHunter]

Ferris, please tell us you have never progressed to the flight deck. Please!:ugh:

[ExSp33db1rd]

........I realised that the gauges had been lying all along.

They usually do - doesn't matter what aircraft- dip(drip) sticks and fuel totalisators and a handy calculator ( or Flt. Engnr. ! ) works best.

The only time to believe the fuel gauges is when they show Empty !

[ehwatezedoing]

Give us a break ferris.

To quote someone else (post #70)
how the hell did the crew get themselves into that corner
How the hell did the crew were put into that corner :=

[Farrell]

FARRELL

Keep pushing buttons and watch the machine do your job for you.

And that just goes to show how little you know about me, sir. :)

[Bearcat]

Just from listening to the script, the event sounds awful. I hate to say it but the voice of panic emminated form the cockpit with clear the circuit stuff we are breaking left for a visual onto 31R, in a big international airport but a detailed traffic pattern. We may not have the full access to the rt conversation but normally with a cross wind touching out of limits, a normal conversation with ATC re requirements for another rwy not just throwing all the toys out of the cot in an instant. As another poster pointed out the next wind read out was 22kts cross wind but AA may have not wanted to go the whole hog in shooting a 22L approach down to the deck re fuel and a full go around scenario. Just from the ATC transcript, the whole event sounds uncomfortable.

[Dutch_Ajax]

With my over 20 years of experience, as an area/approach/tower controller both in the militairy and civil side, I still consider ATC to be a part of ATS. So in my opinion still a service, but with extensive responsibilities. It is not without a reason that the required standards for controllers, as for pilots, are very high (at least in The Netherlands).

There are two things that I notice when following the discussion. First, and I am not the first one to recognize this, not all the facts of this incident are known. So this makes it very difficult to built an opinion, and especially to judge := the people involved.

Secondly, and many incidents and arguments in all kinds of variety start by this, a lack of communication. The pilot omits to state the nature of his emergency and the controller omits to ask. Now again, not all the facts are known, so it could be that the crew is too busy or stressed to state the nature of the emergency and the controller is too busy (according to the RT and probably additional coordination) organizing all the the other flights that are affected by the emergency of the AA flight.

Nevertheless it is a fact that the controller does not know the nature of the emergency and is thereby unable to provide optimal assistance. The lesson I learned (again) from this incident, keep communicating :ok:.

[Caudillo]

I hope someone can help me out, I've listened to this a couple of times and this is what I've come up with. Is this basically a correct sequence of events?

1. American is not on an emergency/mayday at the start of the tape when he makes contact with tower.

2. He's cleared to land 22L.

3. He's told the wind.

4. He can't accept the wind and declares an emergency.

5. He lands on another runway.

He cannot accept the wind limits on 22L. It's only a short tape and we can't know too much but it doesn't sound like he's operating with a stack of failures on board - it's simply out of a/c limits. Correct?

So then I presume he now will go below bingo fuel if he doesn't break off immediately for the other runway - hence an emergency, because of his fuel state. It will become an emergency if he can't route there directly, but it isn't at this point right now.

My question is therefore, if he's just gotten to that stage of fuel - disregarding any warnings he's given along the route - surely it's a bit drastic to start carving up the skies when you're at a major airfield and got (I presume) half an hour or so of fuel left?

Am I missing something important here?

[suninmyeyes]

Caudillo

If he is airborne and only has 30 minutes of fuel left, then that is an emergency.

[ferris]

It is always advisible (sic) to get someone down safely and wait for someone to takeoff. Of course it is. How very convenient of you to neglect to mention the other a/c inconvenienced. As I said- how would you feel if YOU were the captain of the a/c on final that had to break off the approach? Do you really believe that "getting everyone out of the way" at JFK involves only one or two a/c? The delays that would ensue? All the other captains now looking at their fuel and wondering how long it will take to clean up and get an approach?
Some of the attitudes on display here really do perpetuate certain stereotypes. Disregard totally any inconvenience to ATC. It is irrelevant, and part of the job to deal with emergencies (part of providing service). Based on the info available (the tape, which is all that can be discussed here), how did it go from "we can't take the crosswind" to "get everyone out of the way, we are landing now"? Read the title of the thread. Maybe 'the guy with balls' is one who carries enough fuel, or diverts when he doesn't have enough (for whatever reason). Lets face it- that's the real issue here. Commercial pressure.

[JWP1938]

OK, speaking as elderly SLF (with just a couple of flying lessons which gives me just a glimmer of understanding about aviation issues), plus a lifelong interest in aviation and a LOT of reading in forums like this:
A lot of discussion has gone on about mayday/emergency/pan and the way that things are stated differently in NYK as opposed to anywhere else. Just watching the Air Crash Investigation programs on the Discovery Channel shows that often accidents happen due to lack/misunderstanding of communications. This event concluded happily apart from a few ruffled feathers but, if it ended badly and, in the subsequent investigation, someone said “He didn’t call MAYDAY but just said he would declare an emergency,” then all hell would break loose about communications yet again. I just find it difficult to believe (given all I read here about correct procedures etc.) that a discrepancy like this is allowed to happen in this modern age. I have spent lots of time on flight decks (when we were allowed) and listened to many exchanges between air crew and ATC and have always been filled with confidence of my safety when listening to these professionals going about what is (to them) their daily job. I am not just nit-picking here. The amount of words on this issue shows that it is something worth discussing and it is JUST POSSIBLE that it could lead to a misunderstanding with tragic consequences. Lesser things have....

[Bullethead]

I flew a SAR helo at a fighter base for several years and whenever the fighter guys had a 'problem' they were very reluctant to declare an emergency using the standard phrases of MAYDAY or PAN but generally just said they were declaring an elergency.

They few times over the years I've had a problem myself and needed assistance I've declared the appropriate phase and the required help was forthcoming very quickly.

I think there is a reluctance to use the standard emergency phrases as they are used very infrequently and are unfamiliar to most pilots, a similar thing happens when a standard phraseology is changed for whatever reason until the players on both sides of the microphone get used to it and it becomes commonplace.

Regards,
BH.

[tonker]

The people responsible for this debacle are sat flying their accountants desk miles from the action, coining in on their min fuel bonus whilst congratulating themselves on their corporate management.

When the inevitable happens and i am amazed it has not already, i only hope the audit trail shoots them up their guilty arse as they flee blubbing out Part A "but the Captain has the final say"

Examples need to be made of these people to get some change, but just like the recent financial mess nothing ultimately will happen to the folks responsible.

[Ford Transit]

I don't suppose the previous communication is available ?
Seems that passage comes in a bit late.
Pete

[Tarq57]

@JWP1938
Just because you are posting in "this day and age" does not necessarily mean that all things are much better than they used to be.
A heck of a lot is better, as attested by the safety record; there is a heck of a lot that isn't. And it seems, in some ways, we are destined to not learn from the mistakes made in the past.
In the corporate environment that this undertaking seems to have become, there is always some trendy manager with a degree in something-or-other that feels the pressing and urgent need to reinvent the wheel, and a lot of past learning can be forgotten in that reinvention. Folk that resist some of these apparently arbitrary changes are labeled as dinosaurs, or similar.:rolleyes:

[JWP1938]

Sounds a bit like our local council. On a particular dual carriageway junction here there have been many accidents (with injuries) and many, many more near accidents. On being asked for a roundabout the council said that the criteria for a roundabout have not been met. On being pressed further it transpired that there had to be a fatal accident before the possibility was even discussed. Injuries only (or the strong possibility of a fatality eventually) didn’t count.

[AMF]

ferris quote;... Perhaps this needs to be made perfectly clear for you, protectthehronet, and would explain why you will never progress beyond the flight deck). How much the captain had in the tanks when he landed is irrelevant. Is that perfectly clear? IRRELEVANT. If the pilot had made perfectly clear what he wanted, in the case of the landing aircraft who was told to maintain 2000 and break off the approach, what that pilot wanted was to continue the approach and land. In the case of the departing a/c, it was to line up and depart (instead of follow a complex set of taxi instructions and drive around the airport for a later departure clearance). Instead, all these a/c had to be mucked around because the guy in the air wanted to be number 1.
Is this, at all, becoming clear to you? You can, at any time, declare an emergency and moved up the priority list, but all that means is you are moving EVERYONE else down. Is that at all sinking in?
All this "the commander is responsible for the safety blah blah" is all just BS in this case. This guy, in this situation, just moved himself up the landing order because he was frustrated. You can keep peddling the "commander is in charge" bull**** all you want. But it is clear, this was nothing of the sort of a fuel emergency. Due process will occur. And so be it.

This one had me in stitches!

Lecturing someone on "complicated" JFK aircraft movement logistics...and admonishing them they'll never "progress past the flight deck" because they supposedly don't understand the ramifications......

That's a bit like lecturing an Afghani who grew up in the middle of minefields and unexploded ordinance on the "danger" of playing with a firecracker...

"Listen kid, it could go off in your hand and perhaps blow your fingernail off. Is that becoming clear to you? It could even put your eye out. Is it sinking in?"

Attention all Naval Aviators! You may never have guessed this operating on and off your boat, but what you do and how you operate can have an effect on others. Yes indeed. You may get away with selfishly thinking only of yourself on the USS ....... with it's uncomplicated aircraft logistics and prevelance of fuel-fat, recovering aircraft and forgiving environment where screw-ups only result in death or dismemberment for yourself and others....but in the civilian world such selfishness might cause another aircraft to....taxi to another runway. Or even be vectored to a new heading. Im not kidding!

[fleigle]

Let us not forget the unfortunate crew and pax of a south american DC-8? into JFK a few years ago who were held and held due to wx who did NOT communicate sufficiently their fuel state emergency and crashed !!!!.

Maybe the AA Capt. was just having a bad day, or the nth. in a row bad day.

If you look at the Flightaware track (ref. in an earlier post) he had already done 2 circuits in a hold.

Until the full picture is revealed everything else posted here is speculation.

[aterpster]

Let us not forget the unfortunate crew and pax of a south american DC-8? into JFK a few years ago who were held and held due to wx who did NOT communicate sufficiently their fuel state emergency and crashed !!!!.


January 25, 1990, Avianca 707:

DCA90MA019 (http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20001212X22401&key=1)

They were not critizied for not stating "Mayday" three times, they were critized for not clearly declaring an emergency.

General comment: "Mayday" three times serves a useful purpose in a non-radar ATC enviornment, especially when relay of communications is taking place through ARINC or such. But, in a busy radar environment it serves no purpose other than to tie up the frequency. AAL 52 could not have made their declaration any clearer.

[captjns]

Too much speculation without all the facts... especially from the DCVR. That should probably shead a great deal of light on what drove the crew to declare an emergency so late in the game. Hopefully the transcripts from the voice recorder will be made available even if the NTSB does not hold hearings on this incident.

The good news here is that no injuries or fatalities occured.

After how many have puckered up at the approached TOD after a long journey with unexpected ground delays at the departure airport, stronger than forecast head winds, longer than usual sequence vectoring??? oh and better yet, the winds on the active runway are beyond the limits stated in the FCOM?

Let's wait and see before judgement is passed on either the crew or the controllers.

[ferris]

Thanks for your contribution, AMF. Perhaps if you keep up with the discussion, it wasn't about how complicated (or not) the logistics are at JFK. It was about the appropriate (or not) decision to begin disregarding ATC instructions and declare an emergency. And yes, it certainly appears from posts like protectthehornets, that some cannot see any problem with that.

Lets call a spade a spade. This is how it looks to me: The guy was close to landing, getting low on fuel after already accepting some delay, and thought that by sticking his neck out and demanding the other runway he was going to get "penalty box" type vectors and a delay he wouldn't be able to take. How am I doing so far?
The problem with this arises when he didn't give ATC the chance to accommodate him or not, or even see what was going to happen. Playing the emergency card too early, so to speak. All supposition of course, but all the purile stuff about "who's the boss" does make you wonder.

[Caudillo]

suninmyeyes, sure, I'm aware of that - my point was that if you're at the stage of 30 mins fuel remaining, it's an emergency but you've still got time to play with. Given that he presumably had half an hour left I don't see why he did what he did.

[Pugilistic Animus]

The only time to believe the fuel gauges is when they show Empty !

Yep that's the only time they must be correct!

Avianca is a bit different as the never declared an emergency



91.3 is absolute and was one of the first provisions in the Avigation Act of 1926 before then the post office told you when to fly ...and you flew or you were out, but with 91.3 came 91.13:\...I, for the sake of learning, hope we'll get some more details

:)

[de facto]

From what i heard on the tape, the captain lost it and engaged in a one man show trying to prove to atc and probably to his fo that he is the boss.
I wouldnt be surprised if the pilot on the radio was also flying the aircraft.
Poor Rt if not totally inexistent, showed his childish behavior by saying to atc he wanted no one in front of him just because...rather than making sure he had priority..
Atc well done eventhough he failed to confirm the type of emergency, ibelieve it became a cock fight rather than a well managed cooperation in a difficult situation.
Declaring an emergency should be clear and started by 3xmayday, followed by nature of emergency,actions and specific requests.

[PJ2]

In reading the many comments regarding the respective authority and responsibilities of ATC and a captain and recognizing the concurrency of requirements of traffic flow and managing an emergency due either to fuel or weather limitations, it may be worth re-reading the NTSB Report on Eastern Airlines 66, available here (http://libraryonline.erau.edu/online-full-text/ntsb/aircraft-accident-reports/AAR76-08.pdf).

In the report, there is support, if that's what one wishes to call it, for both arguments - captain's final authority when the ship is threatened and ATC's responsibility to maintain traffic flow, knowing that a runway change may solve one crew's problem but will create dozens more who may be close to the same situation.

The key of course is, how severe was the emergency and as someone has already pointed out, that will become apparent in the days to come. Both weather limitations, (crosswind) and fuel were the reasons given and it is reasonable to expect that either or both will be examined as the basis for the request, along with the airline's fuel policy and the captain's weather briefing at departure, etc, etc, etc.

It is abundantly clear to all professionals here that declaring an emergency to jump the queue is unacceptable so the burden of proof, after the request is granted and the airplane is on the ground, remains with the captain - this has already been stated many times: the captain has the authority to do what he-she wants but must be able to answer for such decisions. So too, must ATC, when denying or delaying the necessary assistance to a flight declaring an emergency. It is not ATC's right or requirement to outguess a flight crew.

There are parts of the NTSB Report on Eastern 66 which are relevant to this issue, again for both views.

We were four back behind Eastern 66 when he went in and along with others went around and held at Southgate before getting a clearance to divert. As we turned south at Hancock for the Empire intersection, (now the Ellis intersection if I recall), we began to see how huge the thunderstorm was; it was the largest I had ever seen up to that point, with huge contouring. The ride in the descent was through heavy rain and turbulence, the noise on the windshield over which we had to shout to be heard by one another. Our approach to 22L had the same conditions yet even after several aircraft went around and some said a change of runways was required, the approaches did not change.

I fully realize the many differences between that accident/circumstances and this incident and am not comparing the two with a view to justifying either of the arguments being presented here. But there are sufficient similarities to be instructive, for both sides.

PJ2

[Pugilistic Animus]

" you know this is asinine"

That was the EAL flight's first indication trouble ...it is a little different PJ2 but that report does show that clearly the difference between clearance issuance and clearance acceptance and who is ultimately responsible

When the AA captain declared an emergence, why did he not keep the controller abreast of the situation or request assistance? why was he so hostile over the vectoring?

[Guy D'ageradar]

already posted in the atc forum but duplicated here for those that don't visit it:

ATC provides a service from the air-conditioned, dohnut and tea room bunker

I don't know if it's an ego thing for the controllers, but that's just the way it is.

Notwithstanding the fact that a (supposedly) highly qualified pilot is unable to spell the word "doughnut" the above goes a long way in explaining the mindset of the posters (none of whom, I am sure, have ever bothered their ar$es visiting a busy ATC unit to see the chaos they cause).

As long as "sky gods" such as these take to the air in the misplaced belief that they have carte blanche to do as they wish and to hell with everyone else, such incidents will continue unabated. :ugh::ugh::ugh:

I have news for you guys - YOU ARE NOT THE ONLY AIRCRAFT IN THE SKY!!!!

When will that ever sink in?

Yes, we all know that you are ultimately responsible for YOUR aircraft - what you fail to understand is that WE are responsible for ALL OF THEM - AND WILL BE HELD TO ACCOUNT FOR IT!! If you have any doubt of that, get off of your sheepskin lined pedestal and have a look around these forums for examples....try starting with a few recent Italian cases.

Every controller that I have ever met will, without exception, do all in their power to aid and assist each and every aircraft under their control - whether it be in normal circumstances or in an emergency. Clearly, any aircraft having declared an emergency WILL have priority.

We are not, however, either mind readers or magicians. If you have not previously indicated a problem and/or actually declared an emergency (hopefully, using the unambiguous phraseology developed for the purpose), it is highly unlikely that the fact will be known outside of your immediate vicinity. (for the septics amongst you, think fart range). As an aviator friend would say -" I may have a pair of balls but neither of them is crystal"!

By all means aviate, navigate, communicate - that's what we would expect - do not, however, assume that all surrounding aircraft can be magically made to disappear with a sweep of the radar to accommodate your whims. Same goes for unilaterally deciding to help yourself to an out-of-use runway. It may or may not be in useable condition, full of vehicles, etc.

For the reasonable amongst you, please do not take this as an out-and-out attack on the piloting community - my wish is to highlight the idiocy of the few, not to alienate those professionals who still understand the meaning of the term "airmanship".

Rant mode off, enjoy the rest of the weekend.

Guy.

[protectthehornet]

ferris asks how I would feel if I had been the plane following and had to go around.

I would be proud to get out of the way of someone who had declared an emergency. and I am ready to do so at any time, unless of course I am in an emergency myself.

now, if the American Airlines pilot declared an emergency so he could meet a hot date and get a blow job, he will hear from me.

But if he was near his fuel limits, exceeding the crosswind limits and had notified center and approach prior to the business with tower, I am with him a hundred percent.

I make my living flying out of the New York area...granted mainly LGA and EWR but enough JFK to know the score there.

''a scout troops short a child...Kruschev's due at Idylwild"

[TOGA TEN]

2 questions for me guys,

Was this guy the only 767-2 arrival at JFK?
Did they change the runway config after the incident?

As far as I see, in an environment like JFK, taking the decision to turn to come back visually just by telling ATC and not giving him the time to move people around with proper separation is criminal!!:D

happy landings

[Guy D'ageradar]

again duplicated from the atc forum for the benefit of all...

West Coast,

I'm gonna be scared to Sh1te likely from an emergency that dire, also scared that I might prang someone, but sometimes it has to be done.

Please indicate exactly where on the aforementioned tape you noticed any reference to "an emergency that dire". I may only have heard an abridged version - can't be sure - the only problem indicated was a breach of crosswind limits - not, as far as I am aware, a "dire emergency".

I sure as hell am not going to let ATC paint me into a corner when I lose a motor on takeoff and need an immediate turn, or when I lose one while at a low CI cruise number at cruise altitude meaning I have to start down NOW because I don't have any excess speed to trade to hold altitude.

I repeat, each and every controller that I have worked with for the last 20 years would do all they possibly could to help in those situations. I see no indication of such a situation in the tapes provided.

S.H.G.

ATC have no idea what's going on in a cockpit in an emergency situation and it's always our priority to deal with that emergency (by "AVIATING") before we tell them what has happened.

I agree wholeheartedly - however, we cannot provide assistance until a) we know there is a problem and b) we have some indication of what is required. It is in YOUR best interests to let us know ASAP. A lot can be done, but only if/when we know it is necessary.

For the record, most ATC manuals also have a clause stating that controllers can/should do whatever may be deemed necessary in unforeseen circumstances. We can and will do everything possible to help however, I repeat, I have two balls but neither of them are crystal!!!!!

[sharpclassic]

Now, I don't know all the background information (assuming the runway they eventually landed on was closed) but the way I have always been taught to operate is thus...

During pre-fight...
Read Weather
Read NOTAMs

If the forecasted weather indicates that landing on the only available runways (as dictated by the NOTAMs) may not be possible, plan an alternate that will allow landing.

If on arrival said conditions exist, divert to this prepared alternate.

Dont bully the controllers because you can't get into your scheduled destination.

Gethomeitis?

[kilomikedelta]

Does it really matter who had the most responsibility or the most dire need or the most urgent social date or the biggest genitalia and ego or the least fuel? The ultimate resolution (which by definition will become a standard) will depend on who has the most money to spend on lawyers for the next twenty years. Whoever finally stops paying the lawyers will lose. Lawyers will spend years (and charge accordingly) on determining the best course of action that should have been taken in the few minutes of an anomalous situation. The lawyers always win and will make a lot more money than you ever will. They will take years to make a case and charge you for it and then can claim that their failure to convince a judge or jury wasn't their fault. Try using that disclaimer of responsibility in any other profession such as being an air traffic controller or a pilot flying.

[Time Traveller]

Surely once an emergency has been declared, one needn't feel excluded from landing maybe slightly outside the crosswind limits if it is the safest course of action?

Therefore, if he was indeed in a very low fuel state, going for a jolly round a visual circuit is the last thing that I'd be doing. On fumes - I'd be landing straight in on 22, and deal with the crosswind.

This sounds like a very misplaced hissy fit to me.

[WhatsaLizad?]

"As long as "sky gods" such as these take to the air in the misplaced belief that they have carte blanche to do as they wish and to hell with everyone else, such incidents will continue unabated. :ugh::ugh::ugh:


You're right. Give an inch now and the scalawags like the skipper of AA2 will do what they want all over the globe.

Who knows what this brigand may do next. His ilk would probably scream right in for an emergency landing due to a fire, typical Sky God act, while the more reasonable airman would delay such a hasty action in order to ask permission for something like, for instance, to dump fuel.

There are rules for dumping fuel, of course, thank God there exist airman (or used to exist) that don't think they have carte blanche to ignore them.

Not sure you can have it both ways mates. Our actions today are the result of those who paid the price in the past.

[chris weston]

sharpclassic, sir

Was "pre-fight" literal or ironic? :ok:

Either way, I like the imagery.

CW

[infrequentflyer789]

Now, I don't know all the background information (assuming the runway they eventually landed on was closed) but the way I have always been taught to operate is thus...

During pre-fight...

Nice to know the conflict with ATC is fully prepared ! :D

[sharpclassic]

haha! Well, fail to prepare, prepare to fail!

[p51guy]

I have a feeling the crosswind and gust components got changed after the emergency rwy change. Notice the gusts over max xwind were not announced after the emergency? Did the winds really die down or were they reported diferently or not reported at all? I have played this game in the past so know they can be different.
The captain will have to explain what he did so let us wait for the final report. I still am waiting for the investigation to be completed before stating any opinion. At this point I don't have one.

[MarkD]

I just re-listened to the US1549 tape. Some posters above will note with disapproval, no doubt, that Capt. Sullenberger said neither "declare an emergency", "PAN PAN" or "MAYDAY".

[p51guy]

In the US declaring an emergency does the same thing. I did it and you get what ever you want. Why ask for more? Filling in the squares for international operations is the only reason. Service will be the same.

[p51guy]

1549 after saying both engines were out really didn't have to declare an emergency. Maybe when they said we are going to be in the Hudson would have also precluded declaring an emergency. Sometimes it is so obvious you don't have to do it. Just my opinion.

[ARFOR]

Very hard to discern from the JFK recording. Assuming the initial RT was from the FO [Crosswind i.e. likely the Capt PF], it sounds to me like a different voice [similar accent] assumes the RT as things start to escalate. Relevant? Who knows at this point. With regard comm’s, there is at least one over-transmission apparent [the tail end of a call from AA2 can be heard as ATC finishes a TX].

Time Traveller makes a good point re X-wind limits and emergency conditions, which has me wondering:-

- Were they on the GP? [height, miles to run] even though they are reported ‘visual’ once with the tower.

- Speed? [cross-downwind component aloft] inertia + GS to carry to touchdown?

Even if an ‘emergency’ was declared at that point [due X-wind limits and other factors unknown], where they were and what they had obviously made continuing with 22 a bad decision .

From the inflections in the early transmissions [regarding LLZ failure] it is probable that the PNF was [generally speaking] not sounding very comfortable, obviously the same applied to the PF given the decision/s then taken.

The crew had [I]time available to discuss/communicate with ATC [in this case the tower] repeatedly both before and during the deviation. It will be most interesting to learn why [at or before the beginning of the deviation from normal operations] they did not [even briefly] alert ATC as to 'why’ they needed immediate visual circling for 31. No services were requested so the approach and landing on 31 is presumed to have been 'normal'.

Timely [as is possible] Emergency [type and intentions] information in a busy environment is critical not only to ATC decision making in support of the emergency aircraft and other affected traffic, but to other surrounding aircrew for their decision making SA also.

Justifying the ‘aviate’, ‘navigate’ and, in this case ‘dictate’ to the exclusion of all else will be an interesting one to learn from.

[protectthehornet]

P51 guy makes a fine point. Sometimes controllers will tell you what you need to hear to land and not always the truth!

And if you listen to 1549/hudson...you will hear scully calling his flight 1539~

so, things do happen and things aren't just like in those great movies.

mayday comes from the French meaning: help me. AA2 didn't need help...he needed the runway he needed and he needed it now.

so he declared an emergency...and that is good enough to DICTATE.

I've gotten a huge kick out of this thread. There are some wimps out there that are pointing fingers ...but you might be the type of guy to get vectored into a mountain rather than question ATC and don't think it hasn't happened.

[340dog]

Just as good tonight in newark....wind 340/20 gusting 30...ils 22L with circle to 29.....50 degrees off runway at night to a non approach aid 65oo foot runway...

finally atis wind 320.20 gusting 30 for ils 22L but tower wind says 310/10 gusting 17 with turbulence below 4000 ft, finally wind at touchdown 310 at 8kts.....why not 4r...quartering tail wind all the way down to touch down.

i guess until you crash or declare an emergency, new york atc will use an out of wind runway....what a joke

[Guy D'ageradar]

arfor

The crew had time available to discuss/communicate with ATC [in this case the tower] repeatedly both before and during the deviation. It will be most interesting to learn why [at or before the beginning of the deviation from normal operations] they did not [even briefly] alert ATC as to 'why’ they needed immediate visual circling for 31. No services were requested so the approach and landing on 31 is presumed to have been 'normal'.

Precisely what I have been getting at.

This particular captain had no problem sniping at the controller that he had declared an emergency 3 times (albeit with the usual US dirsegard for established phraseology) but at no point appears to have given any indication of any problem other than an above limits crosswind.

Can anyone give a reasonable explanation why at least one of those opportunities was not used to give a clear and concise indication of what was wrong? It is much quicker on the RT to say "emergency fuel" than anything on that tape - IF that was the problem.

As for the method of runway selection, I agree completely - a farce.

[ARFOR]

pth
AA2 didn't need help...he needed the runway he needed and he needed it now.
That you can suggest that AA2 "didn't need help" is quite unbelievable.

To follow your argument through, you are implying:-

1. The crew had NO OPTION but to use 31, then and there. period
2. The crew knew where any airborne conflicting traffic was, and what actions those crew were going to take to avoid them
3. That ATC had the space to 'immediately' 'move' everyone else out of the way without causing other serious threats to safety of other airspace and airport users
4. The crew knew that 31 was [at short notice, 2-4mins from crossing the 31 threshold] useable [no vehicles, works etc in progress]
5. The crew knew that 31 was [at short notice, 2-4mins from crossing the 31 threshold] available to the tower controller to provide for its safe use by AA2
so he declared an emergency...and that is good enough to DICTATE.
An experienced AA 76 crew would not take the action they did without compelling reasons [we hope]. Let's see how "to the extent required" pans out ;)

As for runway selection. Didn't someone mention that it is not the ATC's on the frequencies that decide, it is companies and FAA flow management that do!?!?

Presumably if all three airport traffic flows are co-dependent, then wind variations [maybe as WX patterns are moving through] at short notice are probably unavoidable in the short term whilst the complex trio of airport flows [Taxiing, Ready waiting, SID's, Vectoring, Sequencing] is turned around into wind.

[Pablo26]

MarkD, according to the AWE 1549 transcript Sully did transmit a "mayday mayday mayday" call to ATC:

http://imgsrv.wcbs880.com/image/wcbs/UserFiles/File/420471.pdf

Apparently the first part of the transmission was blocked by the controller so you don't hear the mayday call on the ATC tape.

So for the "mayday" partisans -- Sully is on your side! :ok:

For what it's worth, I was taught during PPL training in southern California that "mayday mayday mayday" and "declaring an emergency" were both acceptable.

[Torquetalk]

@ protectthehornet

...and that is good enough to DICTATE.

I've gotten a huge kick out of this thread. There are some wimps out there that are pointing fingers ...but you might be the type of guy to get vectored into a mountain rather than question ATC and don't think it hasn't happened... blah blah blah

Much-too-much tub-thumping IMO. The full information is NOT available, but what is clear is that good commucation and an established system of procedures broke down. Discussing this in such a ****-waving fashion sets an irresponsible tone for new pilots.

And the man's name is Sully (bless his cool, calm, collected shoes). Scully was a character from the x-files :rolleyes:

[slip and turn]

I suggest the heavily edited recording on AVWeb has been most unhelpfully compiled. The first report in the edited clip is American 2 reporting visual for 22L at about 16 secs into the clip.


Clearly (but not from the AvWeb clip) four minutes earlier the pilot was expecting 31R as it was being approached by another heavy when wind was reported at 33026. Subsequently wind was given as 33025 and a minute before the AVWeb clip begins, wind is given at 32022 and American 2 then finds himself first to be cleared to land upon switching approaches to the other runway 22L, which is acknowledged and all is quiet for about 50 secs.

He then, as we know from AVWeb, reports visual for 22L but then two additional external items increased his workload unacceptably:

First, it appears that he had found the localizer on 22L was not working and there was actually a 12 second delay while ATC checked that out (not instantaneous as might be inferred from the clip) and reset. Was it now working? ... Do we care? ... Pure distraction ...

Then quiet for another approx 50 seconds while the information is assimilated and checked....................

............................................................ ...................................

............................................................ ...................................

Then wham! ATC kindly broadcasts wind 32023G35 - just what the doc ordered!

I suggest that was the point at which the pilot quite rightly firmly communicates his dismay at being somewhat led down the garden path with the winds (no mention of any gusts up to that point) and thus made his emergency intentions known.


What then follows descends into an unholy mess but ATC were not without sin - wasting time and bandwidth after the emergency was already both declared and understood - somewhat uselessly attempting to justify why the emergency might not have been initially understood ...


Then some 90 seconds after the emergency is initially declared, on hearing Cactus 12 still cleared on approach, American 2 has to remind ATC that it most definitely is HIS sky as of yesterday.

Overall, of course, and very easy to say, being still up there with some other pressing reason for being down ten minutes ago was the first hole in the cheese.

[AerocatS2A]

Just to continue the mayday discussion briefly. Some of you are saying that "declaring an emergency" is perfectly acceptable because it works, well I say it didn't work this time. The controller did not seem to get his head around the fact that AA2 had declared an emergency. He was bamboozled by the rapid escalation from "give us 31R or we will declare an emergency" to "we are declaring an emergency." The ATC was still trying to give AA2 vectors when AA2 was flying a visual circuit and he was still confirming that AA2 had declared an emergency. I think that if AA2 had said "MAYDAY MAYDAY MAYDAY..." the ATC would have been much quicker to respond appropriately.

[alwaysmovin]

Going from what we hear on the tapes its no wonder the controller didn't realise AA was declaring an emergency......the pilot said he would declare an emergency IF he didn't get 31...........perhapas the controller was coordinating....(something some pilots don't realise takes a little time) for him to get 31, hence the heading.... so was surprised!! However we won't know until the transcripts come out......

[Checkboard]

If you declare a "fuel emergency", or "we have an emergency" in the UK, without explaining the details you will be asked to confirm as ATC in the UK would much prefer the formal declaration via the standard phraseology.

Yes, I am aware we are talking about the US here, and that "declaring an emergency" is acceptable phraseology in the US, however many US pilot fly in both arenas and being in the habit of using "USA only" radio procedures could result in confusion in other parts of the world.

Having said that, I am firmly on this Captain's side. The situation deteriorated to the point where it was necessary for him to take control of the situation to provide a safe outcome for his passengers - and a safe outcome was achieved.
Job Done.

As an aside, I have never seen a preferred runway system which stays in place at more than 15 knots crosswind, when a more into wind runway is available (and the usual standard is 10 knots). I am rather shocked that such a situation has been allowed to occur.

[LeadSled]

As a matter of interest does the US recognise the term "REQUIRE" ie I REQUIRE runway XXX.

As does Australia.

Tootle pip!!

[jackieofalltrades]

ARFOR post # 127, that is very well put, as is Guy D'ageradar in post # 108.

ATC is here to aid the pilots, no controller I know wilfully gives an aircraft anything but the best service s/he can. Now that might mean that the pilot won't always get what they immediately want, but once an emergency has been declared properly, the controller with the assistance of colleagues will do everything they can to aid the pilot get the aircraft safely on the ground.

My concern with this AA into JFK was the pilot's refusal to listen to the controller. For me the major concern is did the AA pilot know where all the other planes into/out of JFK were at this moment and that he would not have a collision with any.

I hope that certain pilots like PTH are commenting with such huge egos just in an attempt to wind up controllers on the forum, and aren't really that arrogantly naive to think that their flying would be so much easier with ATC telling them what to do.

I would strongly urge you to visit a local ATC centre and see what your green dot on the screen is like in relation to all the other green dots. Having been involved with numerous pilots visiting the centres in the UK, I can say that every single one of them has gone away with a much better understanding of what ATC is doing, especially what it takes to coordinate something with an adjacent sector/airfield. So many pilots commented that they had no idea how many and how close aircraft were, nor how they interacted with so many various routes and flights into other airfields.

[LeadSled]

By definition ATC are in charge.

Folks,
Just to put things in perspective, think of ATC as "the talking traffic lights"

What is the difference between a controller and a pilot??

If the pilot screws up, the pilot dies;
If ATC screws up, the pilot dies.

Last time I looked, B767-200/300 X-wind limit for the aircraft I operated: 30kt, plus 5kt gust ---- maximum demonstrated crosswind.

The control limited maximum X-wind ( full rudder and a big handful of aileron on the rollout) is about 44 kt., about the same as a B744.
Unlike the 747/744, you can sideslip across the wind in a B767, pod clearance is never a problem.

Tootle pip!!

[Guy D'ageradar]

leadsled

What is the difference between a controller and a pilot??

If the pilot screws up, the pilot dies;
If ATC screws up, the pilot dies.

The part you forget to mention is that, if the contoller is not given the heads up as to what it going on, enabling him to do something about it, a lot of other people may well die.

I fully understand your concern for yourelf. As has already been stated, you are responsible for your aircraft. I, however, am responsible for all of them.

[DowneastGuy]

"As an aside, I have never seen a preferred runway system which stays in place at more than 15 knots crosswind, when a more into wind runway is available (and the usual standard is 10 knots). I am rather shocked that such a situation has been allowed to occur".

In Toronto it's my understanding that operations will stay on the east/west runways unless the steady state crosswind exceeds 25 knots or someone complains. Makes for some interesting arrivals.

[Jetjock330]

Having read all these posts and as a 15000 hour experienced pilot. I seem to think they worked out that they are landing within there normal legality and will have 30 minutes on landing in the tanks. They monitor the winds on approach from what is being broadcast ahead of them and decided to continue and no need to warn ATC of their limits. Each aircraft ahead has its limits, and then when cleared to land, the limits go over their legality when cleared to land.
The captain has prepared an answer in the event this happens and there is now not enough fuel to complete the full go around and re-alignment with 31R. (same as a diversion with minimum fuel to any alternate) He now gives the BINGO code (emergency in his mind) because he is fuel tight and makes an alternative plan. A basic circle to land, break off approach!

Imagine if every pilot now gives their endurance remaining to ATC when they start the approach, in case of "in the event of". ATC wouldn't want this either.


We did a go-around with 20kts tail wind after 15 hours flying to get to JFK and went around due to high tail wind. We called go-around in the A340-500 and changed frequency 5 times by 2500ft and were asked the remaining endurance. With 5% on 150 000kgs to start with, we had sufficient gas and we were told we were going to be number 17 to land with a runway change. The go-around cost 3500kg. Our flight time crossed the 16 hours to wheels touch down. Had we gone to EWR, we would be in an even worse case scenario, looking for a straight in approach bypassing everyone else, and this is the norm on any diversion, TO LAND WITH 30 MINUTES WITH STRAIGHT IN APP! Every one else in that pattern would have to give way, anyway! A diversion is not an emergency, but you are required to land with no less than 30 minutes in the tanks, who ever you are, otherwise the boss will say you could have spent more time at original destination, even by a minute if you did it any sooner.

But landing/flying anywhere with less than 30 minutes remaining is an EMERGENCY and calling for an emergency to get on the ground by minutes remaining is a good call, no matter how late, due unexpected last minute parameters.

Maybe the captain landed with 6500lbs, his 30 minutes (in B767, can't confirm this), but he walked away legally, he will fly again with a letter to explain. But land with 29 minutes and no emergency, you are going fishing for a long time somewhere and forget about checking a roster again, ever!

Hats off to the captain, in conciliation to the ATC who understood and did his job too, the system worked and the passengers, all went home safely!:ok: That is, both our jobs!

[Avman]

I may be stating the obvious for most of you, but I would presume the 22s would have been prefered as this enabled parallel ops (1 departure and 1 arrival runway). With the closure of 31L, the use of 31R for landing and 22R for departures would have caused additional and significant delays.

[IRISHinUS]

Just my 2 cents as a New York based pilot:

1. As repeated previously, in the US, under FAA regs, the declaration of an emergency does NOT require use of "Mayday", i.e. it is a non-ICAO standard, in fact it's discouraged (obviously doesn't apply to non-US pilots who must comply with their own ICAO-compliant standards). We are required to state "declaring an emergency" and that's it. (Of course for international destinations we must comply with the ICAO standard etc etc, we're talking here about a US airline in the US). So no retraining required on that front.

2. Also under US regs you may declare "Min fuel" as a heads up to ATC that any "undue delay" will result in a fuel emergency, frequently used in New York airspace. It is a non-emergency call and one still typically follows the flow of aircraft to the airport. It would be a surprise for a US controller to suddenly receive a fuel emergency from a US airline without first receiving the "min fuel" call. (that's in defence of the controller)

3. However, the controller was told that they would declare an emerg. if they didn't get the required runway. To me that sounds like a sort of "min fuel" call. The controller's mistake, in my view, was to say that he would "pass on the request" or something to that effect, that showed an undue concern that would have transmitted to the pilots that they were about to get sent out 50 miles to join the end of the line. Under those circumstances the pilots subsequent emergency call seems not only reasonable but required.

4. After receiving the emergency call, rather than ask what they intended, the controller's reaction was to issue an instruction (runway heading for the moment), this would have transmitted to the crew that "this guy just doesn't get it". If they have an emergency that absolutely allowed them to tell the controller what they were doing and it was the controllers job to get traffic out of their way.

5. I have had to go-around in New York recently and immediately declare min fuel, the controllers reaction was to FIRST say, "Ok, I'll get you right back in after the three on final, turn to XXX heading ...". That reassured me that this controller "gets it" and wont force me to declare an emergency. If the controller had said "I'll pass that on blah blah .." I would have done precisely what this crew did. All pilots think of Avianca Flight 52 when put in this situation, the pilots were not clear or decisive and let themselves get intimidated by the NY controllers, it got them killed along with scores of passengers.

6. I would say that the post-emergency investigatory interview with the pilots would have two questions, 1) were you low on fuel? 2) Why didn't you declare min fuel earlier? If those questions can be answered reasonably their interview would probably be no more than 5 minutes. I'd think the controller will have many more questions to answer.

[MarkD]

I am obliged to Pablo26 for the link provided - I stand corrected. :ouch:

[Guy D'ageradar]

jj330

He now gives the BINGO code (emergency in his mind) because he is fuel tight and makes an alternative plan

I have only listened to one part of this tape (the "declaration" of emergency) and at no point was any "bingo" code or other indication of the type of emergency given.

Please provide a link to any other tape that does contain such a statement.

As for the controller's "fly runway heading" - I am unaware of policy in the US, however, in many busy airports elsewhere, the tower controllers (or, at least, a large percentage of them) are NOT radar rated and therefore absolutely forbidden from given anything other than "straight ahead" in the event of a g/a unlesss otherwise approved by local instructions/procedures.

Again, I know not the procedures in force at JFK but this could easily account for the instruction, while coordination was effected with the appropriate radar guy/gal.

Perhaps someone more enlightened can confirm or otherwise.

[Pugilistic Animus]

As painful as it maybe... perhaps nothing came of his emergency actions 91.3 states...written report ...if requested:)
if I were captain I would want to assure traffic clearance hence I would perhaps keep ATC more in the loop---I might suspect the vectors were for traffic separation...this did not seem like a falling out of the sky emergency..hence 91.3 has the extent required provision...and folks have been violated... in one case a suspension for an airspace incursion despite having declared an emergency...suspended on 91.3 and 91.13 and 91...the one about adherence to clearance...:bored:

PS he did not initially declare an emergency only the he would if he did not get 31R so the declaration came late...very late

enough Monday morning quarterbacking from me ...I can't fly another guy's ship:cool:

[Bearcat]

I made a post and was moderated and deleted forthwith as it was obviously deemed too searching. From what I see the crew could have advised ATC on appr to 22 that w/v was out of limits and requested rwy 31R.....no, the ATC tx's certainly do not advance confidence from the AA crew.....panic imo. They then after declaring an emergency, were requested to go straight ahead off 22.....nope, they did a split ars@ visual LH turn to line up with rwy 31. If they were on final reserve fuel executing the orignial approach, they had a onus to report same to ATC. From my findings they did not land with less than 30mins fuel on board.....likewise La Guardia,etc etc airports were at their disposal.........:eek::eek:

[Jetjock330]

From my findings they did not land with less than 30mins fuel on board.....likewise La Guardia,etc etc airports were at their disposalPicture this:
He diverts to La Guardia, to land with 30 minutes and all is well until the controller gives him a new crosswind component that exceeds his limitation on final approach. If he goes around, he will land with less than 30 minutes and be in an emergency. There fore he informs the controller the exact phrase, as in the current tape, "we can't accept that crosswind limitation, we are landing on XX runway and if you don't give to us, we are declaring an emergency". As you can see, even by diverting, it can put us back to square one as per this case. Is is possible to divert to LA Guardia and not exactly going to solve this scenario!

[WhatsaLizad?]

Just a couple of experiences from a US pilot dealing with busy US controllers (one of the top 3 busy airports, another not so):

We had weather and holding and ended up telling approach "one more turn, then it's direct to the airport or divert"

Right at keying the mic for divert we are cleared out of the hold, and promised " to get us right in, you're number one, direct to the airport"

Fuel was planned and "ok" for the approach...............

What happened? 20 mile downwind, 180 degree turn to airport, 20 mile final, 40 mile round trip that was considered "direct". Those who are crew here can do the fuel burn plan at 180Kts with flaps and slats out. 14 extra minutes with 1 available extra minute of flight sometimes doesn't add up.

We fly the airplanes, not ATC, they have enough work to do and we help them as much as we can, but sometimes (very rarely) they need to be told who's the Skipper.

Example #2: We are cruising by another airport and hear a B757 declare an emergency, smoke in the cockpit, emergency descent into major US airport. Following along the frequencies, we can tell the crew was serious, yet professional and calm, yet obviously were on oxygen masks.

What happened? on switchover to tower while proceeding to the airport, (also cleared 300Kts+ below 10K), tower tells them, "Roger emergency aircraft airline XYZ,.........slow to 180Kts,.....you're number 3 for the runway 10".

Both of us monitoring pilots were stunned what we heard.

Consider also that in the JFK case, it may have been both a New "Yawk" controller and a New "Yawk pilot. Given the right conditions, they probably would be buying each other beers and laughing about it 2 hours later while we here on PPrune go on for days. Those guys up there are in a whole different country compared to the rest of us in the USA.

[p51guy]

Advising JFK you would continue approach but unless you were at 29 knot xwind restriction before landing you would be required to go around would have been an easier way of handling it. I think then you would have got that 22 knot report. Adding we have min fuel would have guaranteed it. It has been done this way since I got out of props. My last airport I frequented in Honduras we played this game all the time. We told them what the max tailwind could be and within minutes we had it. We were both happy.

For the doomsday people we took off over a cliff so it didn't matter much how high we were or rate of climb in our powerful 757. I know this post will make some people crazy but sometimes common sense prevails. Just make sure the report of wind keeps you legal. It is not your job to go up in the tower and verify it.

[NVpilot]

IRISHinUSThe controller's mistake, in my view, was to say that he would "pass on the request" or something to that effect, that showed an undue concern I think maybe a trip to the tower would be in order, the approach controller is responsible to sequence / feed aircraft from the IFR system to the Local controller (VFR) who is in charge of the active runways, he does his sequencing with his eyes, from what I remember from the tape, the crew advised the Local controller that the runway was not acceptable and if you don't give us RW31 we will...yada yada. The controller acknowledges this, but the AA crew up to this point made no indication that the aircraft needed to be on the ground NOW, so without proper communication by the AA crew, the controller plans to advise the TRACON so re-sequencing can occur.


this would have transmitted to the crew that "this guy just doesn't get it"Get what, again, the AA crew made no indication to ATC that I remember, that there is some urgency to land ASAP, so ATC did a fine job, and when the crew finally indicated that they had to turn left now and to move traffic out of the way, the controller immediately went into action.

Again, my advise is to go to the facility and get a little bit of an education on how the two facilities; TRACON and Tower work together.

[mustangsally]

Have not seen it here, maybe it is but, Boeing usually puts crosswind limits as demonstrate. There is a difference between demonstrated and limit. Some companys may turn this demonstrated into a limit.

The flight came from the west coast, as I understand. So the forcast wind was better than six hours old on arrival.

Fuel burn may have been over planned.

The flight might have been a redispatch. In some cases the alternate can be dropped along with the fuel to reach the alternate.

So the flight arrives near JFK with just holding fuel. Enters the hold, then gets vectored as only major airports can do. I don't know where he was holding or how many miles his vector intotal.

(EWR and LGA are close, say within 15 miles, but me thinks if you say we are going to EWR....you will end up almost over PHL if EWR is using the 4's. LGA would be the same. Today and for several years I've always brief Bradley, it is almost a straight shot to a not real busy airport.)

Aircraft had been landing with the winds, gusts very. When AA checked it was out of his limits, maybe when the next guy came in the winds were within that companies limits.

The crews performance or communication may seem to be lacking to some, but it got the job done and no metal was damaged. More importantly every one walked safely of the airplane.

Me thinks this tread is getting over extended.

[SeniorDispatcher]

I'm not privy to what went on behind the scenes as to the planning and conduct of the AAL flight, so I'll not comment on the validity of some of the comments here.

That said, compare and contrast the recording of the AAL2/JFK emergency with that of this one (just a day or two later) between COA9 and various EWR/N90 controllers as the 777 air interrupted back to EWR after a hydraulic issue.

COA9 edit.mp3 - File Shared from Box.net - Free Online File Storage (http://www.box.net/shared/3ccex1l5ki)

Granted, the context of what was driving the emergency declaration was different, but from a human factors perspective, I think the difference in tone and tenor is interesting.

[sabenaboy]

Granted, the context of what was driving the emergency declaration was different,...

Indeed it was.

COA9 probably suffered a failure of a single hydraulic system. (I'll admit that I even didn't listen to more then the first few minutes of the conversation)

I'm not familiar with the 777, but I suppose that basically it means that the crew had no controllability problems and just needed some time to run through the check-list and to make an operational decision (return? divert? which rwy? etc.)

In this case there's no urgency whatsoever and the crew had plenty of fuel (perhaps still overweight for landing?) to sort thing out without having to hurry.

AAL2 was (probably) low on fuel and did (probably) not have much time to lose. VERY different scenarios, I would think.

I will refrain from commenting on the AAL2 case. The audio file does not give enough information about what exactly the situation was or about what happened earlier during the flight.

Best regards,
Sabenaboy

[747JJ]

I am a bit at loss with some of the comments here regarding the use of word MAYDAY in declaring an emergency. As it is many of the North American contributors seem to think that it is merely enough to state that you are declaring an emergency to the very strange view that the use of the word MAYDAY is discouraged. I hold and FAA ATP with several type ratings on large jets on my licence and while doing my PPL and CPL in US many moons ago had similar text in the AIM. Alas nothing has really changed.

You will find that AIM is quite clear with the matter.


6-3-1. Distress and Urgency Communications

c. The initial communication, and if considered necessary, any subsequent transmissions by an aircraft in distress should begin with the signal MAYDAY, preferably repeated three times. The signal PAN-PAN should be used in the same manner for an urgency condition

[de facto]

Proper RT,(maydayx3 ,Actions,Intentions)proper CRM(ATC/Crew). English text book work.:ok::D

YouTube - ThomsonFly 757 bird strike & flames captured on video (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9KhZwsYtNDE)

[ONE GREEN AND HOPING]

A while back, following the Avianca incident, I seem to recall a bulletin....or possibly a local Notam, reminding us foreigners that the words "MINIMUM FUEL ADVISORY" will be recognised and provide a terse and immediately understood opening gambit for those whose first language is not American English. On a busy intermediate approach frequency, we can appreciate that this will give a highly pressured controller a couple of seconds to concentrate on your particular place in the scheme of things ahead of responding. For all you know, could be someone else with a problem having checked in ahead of you on frequency, or, again, also inbound on a different sector frequency.

I confess to being now around five years into retirement and therefor way out of date on the knock-on effect of current runway maintenance schedules, but on a normal day, I remember feeling a bit itchy when many of us were being fed into a Canarsi towards deteriorating conditions onto 13L, and although everyone ahead of us was going around, nothing mentioned on ATIS or approach freq prior to late change to Tower......bit of a waste of fuel, but I suppose time was needed by ATC to come up with a new plan, and turn everyone around and vector for a runway change. Rush hours at JFK are never going to be dull.....in the air, or on the ground.

Now, back in the early 1970s, when things were really..... ZZZzzzzzz....

[stator vane]

i sit in the moving office and have several friends who sit in the tower office-

my take on the event--both were under stress, both were being human, both eventually got the job done--both will stay awake at night rethinking things they could have said and done better, but in my opinion-NO ONE should receive any blame! and we all are better for having listened to the tape.
but i don't understand this tendency to take sides on an event like this!

personally, all the tower/enroute personnel i have met, deserve all my respect-they are playing 3 dimensional chess with high speed chess pieces-

and yes, i do think that the airplanes started flying before ATC started, but they came in after a few aircraft flew into each other.

we need each other-

[Ditchdigger]

I think no more arguments about what wording is required to declare an emergency in US of A.

FAA AIM Section 3. Distress and Urgency Procedures

6-3-1. Distress and Urgency Communications

c. The initial communication, and if considered necessary, any subsequent transmissions by an aircraft in distress should begin with the signal MAYDAY, preferably repeated three times. The signal PAN-PAN should be used in the same manner for an urgency condition



But, at the same time, the ATC Order 7110.65 says:


10-1-1. EMERGENCY DETERMINATIONS

a. An emergency can be either a Distress or an Urgency condition as defined in the “Pilot/Controller Glossary.”

b. A pilot who encounters a Distress condition should declare an emergency by beginning the initial communication with the word “Mayday,” preferably repeated three times. For an Urgency condition, the word “Pan‐Pan”should be used in the same manner.

c. If the words “Mayday” or “Pan‐Pan”are not used and you are in doubt that a situation constitutes an emergency or potential emergency, handle it as though it were an emergency.

d. Because of the infinite variety of possible emergency situations, specific procedures cannot be prescribed. However, when you believe an emergency exists or is imminent, select and pursue a course of action which appears to be most appropriate under the circumstances and which most nearly conforms to the instructions in this manual.



(Bold added for emphasis.)


That puts the onus on the controller to treat the situation as an emergency even if the pilot never says the magic words.

I think the problem here is that the pilot essentially presented ATC with a potential "emergency" as a threat, in order to get his preferred runway. (on edit: Or at least that's how it comes across from the limited information that's publically available at this time--the LiveATC recording.) From the perspective of the controller, that really muddies the waters with respect to the "course of action which appears to be most appropriate under the circumstances." A more cooperative tone from the pilot earlier on might've led to this appearing to be the non-event that it ended up being.

(And as always, since I don't post here frequently, I add the disclaimer, I'm neither a pilot nor a controller, but my wife is an ATC, and this is the stuff of our dinner table conversations, and pillow talk...)

[Guy D'ageradar]

stator vane

Nicely put. ATC can greatly help pilots and vice versa. It should not be a wi!!y waving contest.

Notwithstanding the validity of the emergeny call, I believe the development of this situation would have been significantly different if the aircrew had simply indicated the nature of the problem. No need for snide remarks / repetition and everyone is immediately reading from the same script.

[de facto]

I agree we all make mistakes.However we are trained to break the chain as soon as possible,which i believe he didn't do,just making things worse by his actions and poor RT/poor CRM.
You are right in the fact that the Thomson event is often trained during the sim,and apparently the training paid off as they handled the engine stall quite well,therefore a relaxed PM and a proper RT.
Unfortunately pilots think the RT is some of a second grade (especially in the US, i flew there)but i believe it is essential to keep all in the loop and use all available help possible.
The AA had the A/P engaged,both engines running,in an airport quite used by AA.
If they had their last reserve of fuel they could have easily maintained the initial runway vector and taken an extra minute to allow the ATC to digest what is happening and come with a quick plan safe for ALL.
I just believe the captain over reacted in a somewhat non normal situation but what i am most worried about is the personality of such pilot and the risk he took just to make a point, that declaring an emergency gives you the right to engage other traffic into a potential lethal ending.

[controllerzhu]

Lack of clear communication is what I got from the transmissions (on both sides of the exchange). If the pilot was that concerned about his fuel situation in the U.S., Minimum or Emergency Fuel is declared with the word Emergency placing him at the front of the line. The Minimum fuel transmission would only alert us that he should not receive any undue delay. And what is a undue delay? That is subject to as many interpetations as there are pilots and controllers.

I have only heard one mayday call in my career with not a good outcome. But a clear, straight forward I AM DECLARING AN EMERGENCY will get any controllers immediate attention and they will move heaven and earth to get the flight safely on the ground. They really is no place in the pilot/controller on air relationship for bad attitudes. CZHU

[aterpster]

de facto:
I just believe the captain over reacted in a somewhat non normal situation but what i am most worried about is the personality of such pilot and the risk he took just to make a point, that declaring an emergency gives you the right to engage other traffic into a potential lethal ending.


That is a tad speculative and contrary to the layout of the airport. Check an airport diagram for the relative position of Runway 22L/R and Runway 31R. AAL 2 was visual, had Runway 31R in sight, and was aware that it was not being used (even though a very strong wind was right down the runway). It sounds to me that he had made an assessment that his safest and quickest course of action would be a left turn to a short downwind, base and final to 31R. Of course, this could have conflicted with traffic landing 22L or R, or it may not have. That conflict would have likely been the same had the controller mucked around with AAL 2. But, there was likely no traffic conflict south/southwest of the airport that the controller's heading assignment would have resolved.

I suspect the captain of AAL 2 sensed a "Long Island Tour" because of the heading assignment when a short circuit downwind, base, and final, in visual weather conditions, would have complied with the declared pilot's (read priority aircraft at this point) plan.

We still don't have the facts as to AAL 2's actual fuel state. Could be he has flown into JFK enough to recall Avianca in 1990 and how that was handled by the tower and the TRACON. Heaven forbid he may have acutally read that accident report.

[Auberon]

Make of this what you will, but AAL 2 is scheduled to take 5 hours, 35 minutes, arriving at KJFK at 17:35 local. According to FlightAware, on May 4 AAL 2 was in the air for 4:48, arriving at 16:56.

[aterpster]

Auberon:
Make of this what you will, but AAL 2 is scheduled to take 5 hours, 35 minutes, arriving at KJFK at 17:35 local. According to FlightAware, on May 4 AAL 2 was in the air for 4:48, arriving at 16:56.
That doesn't give us all the facts. Perhaps we will never know.

What I do know is someone circulated the recording, and then pilots (and controllers) on boards everywhere like this one parsed every word and nuance and relished in speculation. Such is the way of today's world.

[SeenItAll]

A key point of importance in this debate has been the fuel status of AAL 2. While these data are not dispositive because they do not display the expected in-air time planned for each day, they do suggest that the in-air time for AAL 2 on May 4 (4:48) was well within the normal range of times that this flight had experienced over the preceeding months.

See: FlightAware > History > American Airlines #2 (http://flightaware.com/live/flight/AAL2/history)

[Ditchdigger]

That doesn't give us all the facts. Perhaps we will never know.

What I do know is someone circulated the recording, and then pilots (and controllers) on boards everywhere like this one parsed every word and nuance and relished in speculation. Such is the way of today's world.


if I were captain I would want to assure traffic clearance hence I would perhaps keep ATC more in the loop---I might suspect the vectors were for traffic separation...this did not seem like a falling out of the sky emergency..hence 91.3 has the extent required provision...and folks have been violated... in one case a suspension for an airspace incursion despite having declared an emergency...suspended on 91.3 and 91.13 and 91...the one about adherence to clearance...

I'm given to wonder whether, in the long run, this incident, and the resultant public discussion, couldn't prove counter-productive. If the pilot is found to have exceeded the "extent required" part of the above mentioned 91.3, and gets even a symbolic rap across the knuckles, might that not make the next guy hesitate to be as assertive? (When a moment's hesitation might make all the difference.)

[muduckace]

These days of MGT watching every ounce of fuel you take off with are having an impact, this should be taken into account when vertually every flight as I have come to understand into JFK ends up landing with close to minimums onboard.

[aterpster]

These days of MGT watching every ounce of fuel you take off with are having an impact, this should be taken into account when vertually every flight as I have come to understand into JFK ends up landing with close to minimums onboard.

This incident aside, the overall trend to carry less and less fuel is going to bite bad sooner or later.

And, dispatching with rock-bottom reserves when JFK has one runway closed and presumably winds were forecasted to be near limits for landing to the southwest is just asking for trouble.

I have always felt that places like the 3 New York airports and ORD need "bad traffic" reserves when the weather is good. But, that is not the way today's breed of "greens" think.

[Pugilistic Animus]

I'm given to wonder whether, in the long run, this incident, and the resultant public discussion, couldn't prove counter-productive. If the pilot is found to have exceeded the "extent required" part of the above mentioned 91.3, and gets even a symbolic rap across the knuckles, might that not make the next guy hesitate to be as assertive? (When a moment's hesitation might make all the difference.)
it is important to know the details of the FARS the FAA long ago set up a blame culture, a punitive culture and started a war between pilots and ATC ...it is not for safety....however every letter of the law must be read...

I wrote those things not to criticize or anything but to inform, as to to reality, you are right, it may make someone too hesitant to act correctly in the future..:(

[Nubboy]

Just so as people realise that flight, and therefore, fuel planning has moved on let me state what is blindingly obvious to anyone who has operated a commercial flight since the price of avaition fuel went up to historic highs.

Regardless of how long your flight is scheduled for, you will be given a navigation log, on the day, that calculates how much fuel you will burn for that individual flight. This will take into account forecast winds for your airborne period and how heavy the aircraft is based on latest estimates for passengers and freight. It will have a fuel factor for that particular airframe and specific engine combination. If you get more passengers or freight at the last minute, you will have to recalculate the predicted fuel burn. This will effect your contingency fuel, which is either a fixed amount, for short flight, or a percentage of planned fuel burn for longer flights.
The company will have standard figures for fuel burn taxying out, and an amount for diverting if you don't make your planned destination. Is it a standard day or do you expect "surprises"? Finally there's a final reserve requirement figure of 30 minutes, below which you shall not go without declaring an emergency.

To boldly state that as the flight was only airborne for 4:48, with a scheduled block time of 5:35, and to make of that by insinuation that there were therefore 47 minutes fuel left untouched, so why the urgency, is a statement of such arrogance, I am completely stunned.

[Airbubba]

Finally there's a final reserve requirement figure of 30 minutes, below which you shall not go without declaring an emergency.


Perhaps you're not too familiar with required fuel reserves on a U.S. domestic flight either.:)

See: Federal Aviation Regulation Sec. 121.639 - Fuel supply: All domestic operations. (http://www.risingup.com/fars/info/part121-639-FAR.shtml)

Here's a discussion of fuel terms and reserves from an FAA bulletin:

http://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/airline_safety/info/all_infos/media/2008/info08004.pdf

Anyway, I've listened to the tapes for approach, tower and ground for AAL 2 and there is no mention of fuel state in the final ten minutes or so of the flight. The final controller was obliging as they asked for minor vectors to avoid buildups. And ground held traffic once the emergency was declared. The controller asked if they required further assistance when the AAL '76 turned off the runway, they said they did not and that was it from what I could hear.

Tower Dog, I forgot you were both a Sky God and an American pilot when I made my earlier query. Have you heard anything more on this incident?

[SeniorDispatcher]

>>>To boldly state that as the flight was only airborne for 4:48, with a scheduled block time of 5:35, and to make of that by insinuation that there were therefore 47 minutes fuel left untouched, so why the urgency, is a statement of such arrogance, I am completely stunned.

I wouldn't be too hard on the fellow, as he's a probationary member, and it's apparently his first post on PPRUNE. Perhaps the concept sof "scheduled" (what rez is showing) and the "actual" (influences by the varying jetstream winds) are foreign to him...

[Nubboy]

SD, words of wisdom. It's been a long day at the office.

Ab, of course, you're spot on. I don't operate into the US and therefore I'm not conversant with FAA rules, just CAA, JAR, or EASA or whoever's making the rules in western europe this week. I just go with the rules of my own operator, and appropiate regulatory authorites (with a good dash of common sense as well!)

I just got VERY annoyed at a newbie's posting, making 2 plus 2 into whatever he wanted to, with all sorts of underlying implications. I merely wanted to make the point that the fuel on board ANY commercial operation will have lots of different components.

The very bottom line is that the pilot in charge wasn't happy with what he was given by ATC, challenged it, took what he believed, at the time, to be appropiate action, and landed safely with all on board safe, and the airframe undamaged.

[Pheasant Plucker]

Nubboy

...... and an amount for diverting if you don't make your planned destination ....... Finally there's a final reserve requirement figure of 30 minutes, below which you shall not go without declaring an emergency

....are you therefore suggesting that he had exhausted the diversion fuel and the final reserve of 30 mins (or, having just read Airbubba's post, the appropriate amount of fuel for the above) necessitating the declaration of an emergency (after one missed approach)??

[p51guy]

Obviously the captain knew he was disrupting traffic flow when he declared the emergency and thought it was necessary to complete his flight safely. He has already explained why he did it through reports to the FAA and company. We have not seen those reports yet but we will. He used his judgement to handle the ATC problem of not landing with winds beyond the x-wind component. Being vectored to another landing was not acceptable to him so he did what he felt he had to.

[Shore Guy]

As mentioned in an earlier post, said flight blocked in with 6.5. Not really enough to manuver, get back in line, wait for runway change, etc. in a 767.

Sounds like it could have been handled better by all parties, but "bottom line", everyone arrived safely. If mishandled any more by either flight crew or ATC, would have been front page news.

[de facto]

Quote: 'I suspect the captain of AAL 2 sensed a "Long Island Tour" because of the heading assignment when a short circuit downwind, base, and final, in visual weather conditions, would have complied with the declared pilot's (read priority aircraft at this point) plan.'

Aterpster,

You are most certainly correct that he sensed a Long Island Tour BUT this is exactly one of the reasons why i posted earlier the gross lack of CRM from the Captain.(Poor RT is part of it).
He ASSUMED and did not COMMUNICATE his worries which lead to a dangerous decision.(and lets not start talking about the possibility of a dangerously low fuel level as if that were the case ,i hope he would have elected to land on 22L even if the winds were a tad stronger than his sops).

ATC did react to his distress cancelling the initial approach clearance(Poor RT by ATC there,should have said some like,clearance cancelled,maintain runway heading,vectors 31L) by instructing the crew to maintain runway heading,(rather than telling to continue approach)this is a radar vector which should have alerted the crew that a contingency plan was in progress...

The captain did a one man show obviously.:hmm:

[Auberon]

I re-read my post, and I don't see where I did anything other than point out some facts that hadn't been discussed so far. Yes, I am aware that scheduled block time is not equal to flight planned flight time. And yes, unfortunately I didn't spring forth fully formed with 182 PPRuNe posts to my name. But thanks for the warm welcome. :ok:

[YoDawg]

it is not recognized as standard phraseology, but "declaring an emergency" is exactly the same as saying Mayday 3x to ATC in the USA

Maybe not. It didn't get the IMMEDIATE response AA2 wanted in this case.

Slack RT is almost cultural for Americans, as is spelling and slack English in general. This is where it leads.

Imagine being a non-English speaker and reading the transcript translation of this event - it'd read like many of the African and Mid-East accidents and incidents we westerners laugh at, rife with non-standard RT and short-cuts, non-usage of callsign and general mis-communication.

"We're going to the left and then we're coming around"??????? :rolleyes:


There are two choices when declaing an emergency. Mayday x 3 or Pan Pan x 3

1) That is ONE choice, but two options. You should be precise when arguing semantics! :p

2) The PAN call is for an URGENCY phase, not an emergency.


It is "Declare an Emergency" where aviation was invented by the way. Sorry.

And it's "Lite" too in the US but that doesn't make it "Rite." Some terminology becomes "standard" because of frequent use, like "charlie, charlie" or "FULLY ready" (A Brit favourite).


because they were busy flying a very unplanned visual approach. Something not done, even planned, in your part of the world I suppose.


If they find flying a visual approach to be challenging, maybe they should consider a career change.

[FoxHunter]

de facto
He ASSUMED and did not COMMUNICATE his worries which lead to a dangerous decision.(and lets not start talking about the possibility of a dangerously low fuel level as if that were the case ,i hope he would have elected to land on 22L even if the winds were a tad stronger than his sops).

ATC did react to his distress cancelling the initial approach clearance(Poor RT by ATC there,should have said some like,clearance cancelled,maintain runway heading,vectors 31L) by instructing the crew to maintain runway heading,(rather than telling to continue approach)this is a radar vector which should have alerted the crew that a contingency plan was in progress...

Dangerous decision? It appears to me both safe and smart if his fuel situation was as reported 6,500 lbs. The tower told him to fly runway heading, which would have put him right in the middle of traffic departing. The departure runway in use was 31R, 31L was closed for construction. All SIDs are LT direct CRI or OGY. AA was not given any traffic after he made his left turn off the approach to 22L for his visual to 31R for the simple reason there probably was none. The tower gave fly runway heading because it was probably the only thing he was permitted to give.

[cwatters]

Has time been cut out of the audio recording? It's not clear the tower was given time to agree 31 could be used. Sure they said maintain runway heading but would they do that anyway while checking 31 was ok?

[galaxy flyer]

There is a lot of history of NYC ATC driving pilots to act like this Captain, mostly because of the traffic load and bureaucratic procedures. In the early days of the 747, a Pan Am flight landed at EWR and, after clearing the runway, had one engine running and the APU wouldn't start. IIRC, for either delays in the hold or a missed approach, they asked for clearance to EWR and got a 120nm routing for an airport 20 nm away. I've been on the shuttle several times, as a B727 S/O where the pilots had to be nearly as forceful in getting a landing clearance. I vividly remember one instruction, the Captain didn't like the tone of, he, in a sweet Southern accent, told LGA tower, "please, you will not speak to my crew like that and you make requests to us, not demands."

One thing I find interesting on this thread is how many think ATC is "in control" as one put it several pages ago. I find this attitude very common among airline pilots and the "younger" generation. This is most emphatically WRONG! They coordinate traffic, provide advice on how best to manage traffic, but they don't run your plane. Yes, 99 times out of 100 times, I agree to their requests and comply, but reserve judgement on the advisability of their plan. No doubt, this crew tried to go along with JFK ATC, but when it was no longer possible, in the race to see who was in command of AA 2, the Captain rightly won.

There have been many threads hereabouts on "why some pilots question ATC when given a descent clearance 200 nm from destination" or "would you land in VMC conditions, if no contact with tower". In all of them, I sense of pilots unsure of who is in command of their planes, a very dangerous attitude in my most humble opinion.

Who would have been "in the klink" if AA 2 followed the ATC instruction and landed with considerably less than the 45 minute final reserve? Not the controller.

Also, JFK ATC is now populated with a large group of brandy new, fresh out of OKC controllers.

Then again, I was taught by old, crusty airline and military guys who demanded "unquestioned" authority.

GF

[Airbubba]

Has time been cut out of the audio recording? It's not clear the tower was given time to agree 31 could be used. Sure they said maintain runway heading but would they do that anyway while checking 31 was ok?

You can listen to the unedited audio here, AAL 2 checks in at about 7:30 into the 21Z tower archive:

http://archive-server.liveatc.net/kjfk/KJFK-Twr-May-04-2010-2100Z.mp3

Then again, I was taught by old, crusty airline and military guys who demanded "unquestioned" authority.

As you know, the PAA Sky-Gods had a horrible safety record before CRM and Hart Langer's remake of the training department. Of course, in those pre-CNN days, you could crash on Pago Pago and there would be an article on page 17 of the New York Times a week later.

Still, I can see your point, the pilot in command job has kinda morphed into being the whipping boy in the modern swiss cheese model cockpit.

I'm sure we will hear these AAL 2 tapes in training in years to come with a 'facilitator' asking 'what were the threats and how did they manage them?'

[JW411]

Galaxy Flyer:

I was based at JFK (on DC-10s) when PanAm had their famous diversion to EWR.

Next day, I was conducting a PIC upgrade with the local FAA guy observing. He told me later (in the bar) that the PanAm computer plan had only allowed the straight-line distance from JFK to EWR (23 nms). As you say, getting you out of the JFK traffic pattern and into the EWR pattern soaks up at least 120 nms.

The FAA guy asked me how we dealt with the problem. I was delighted to tell him that we had simply told the producer of our computer plans NEVER EVER to accept an alternate of less than 150 nms.

He was well impressed and told me that this suggestion was already winging its way towards PanAm!

[Airbubba]

I was based at JFK (on DC-10s) when PanAm had their famous diversion to EWR.

For the record, I believe the Pan Am 747 EWR divert on fumes was on Saturday, October 20, 1979. Does that sound right?

And, in all of this as you point out, what is on the paperwork is one thing, you may still be out of gas in the real world.

[JW411]

Airbubba:

Actually, I would have gone for 1984 or 1985 but my memory is not what it was.

Or else, they did it twice!

What I do remember was that the Fed was Jim McN.

[readytocopy]

This pilot made a good decision ...lets stop analizing it...Thank god we did not have another AVIANCA crash where the crew, may be because of language were unable to state the seriousness of their situation causing many people to loose their lives. Good Job guys :D

[er340790]

maybe because of language

What? FUEL EMERGENCY!

:ugh:

[Airbubba]

Actually, I would have gone for 1984 or 1985 but my memory is not what it was.

Or else, they did it twice!


Here's the incident I'm familiar with:

http://www.asias.faa.gov/portal/pls/portal/STAGE.AIDS_BRIEF_REPORT_PUB?EV_ID=19791020053099C

Here is a contemporary news item in the right top column of the Ocala, Florida paper:

Ocala Star-Banner - Google News Archive Search (http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1356&dat=19791025&id=mygxAAAAIBAJ&sjid=tAUEAAAAIBAJ&pg=6957,7306096)

[protectthehornet]

I learned to fly in an era of regulated airlines and non fired controllers.

I learned that ATC could vector you into the side of a mountain unless YOU knew where you were and what was going on.

We are in an age in which an airline doesn't want to send a 767 from the west coast to New York with a 2 hour fuel reserve...that's money talking for you.

We are in an age in which ATC thinks you can fly forever and just take their word that you have to do what they say...and it will all work out.

If you get a vector, ATC is to provide the reason for the vector. In this case,, fly runway heading VECTORS for immediate landing on 31right. But nope...just fly runway heading.

The American captain didn't want to fly to New York with min fuel. But his company made him (of course the FAA could mandate 2 hour reserves upon landing at kennedy, but they don't)

All the airlines won't reduce scheduling with a 25% ( possible 50% if you figure it one way) loss of runway capacity at Kennedy.

So, knowing all this, watching things go down the tubes for the last 30 minutes, the captain makes his choice with an emergency. He could have told everyone how to make things right before he left the hotel for the airport...but no one will listen.

someone mentioned my ego...I don't use my ego unless everyone else has screwed up so badly that I have to finally say, in a nice way of course...none of you know what you are doing...and I will make it work my way.

[aterpster]

aiming point:
Bet they wish now they had used their "Command Authority" at the beginning of the flight to carry an extra 20 minutes contingency fuel.....how much less stressful it would have been.

Only an active AAL pilot could tell us what their management's view and reaction would be currently to any fuel add by the captain.

[rmiller774]

What are the chances of this turning out to be Orlando revisited. That captain showed the purser who was boss. This captain showed the ATC controller who is boss. I hope he was below minimum fuel for his sake.

[KeepItStraight]

One thing I find interesting on this thread is how many think ATC is "in control" as one put it several pages ago. I find this attitude very common among airline pilots and the "younger" generation. This is most emphatically WRONG! They coordinate traffic, provide advice on how best to manage traffic, but they don't run your plane. Yes, 99 times out of 100 times, I agree to their requests and comply, but reserve judgement on the advisability of their plan

Very true.

I have thought for a quite a while now that "Controller" is the wrong name they should be called "Facilitators" or "Coordinators", because that is their job - to facilitate or coordinate safe and efficient flow of air traffic. Too many ATCer's these days seem to be control freaks.

[Shore Guy]

I've operated flights into NY Tracon for over thirty years. Two different flight plan providers, and tens of different dispatchers. When the closest legal alternate is listed (e.g. for JFK, EWR, PHL), the routing is almost always great circle direct, or perhaps a near direct airway. About 18 hours of the day, this will never, ever happen. But you are "legal".

Remember, Legal is not safe all the time. That is when Captain authority comes in. Perhaps (not second guessing here) this "situation" could have been remedied by a few extra thousand pounds before takeoff (One main runway closed at JFK is a prescription for delays). Or not accepting dispatched direct routing to alternate you know you will not get without adding some fuel to the extra column.

In today's climate, you may get a phone call in a day or two (that you would never have gotten twenty years ago) asking why you needed additional fuel. The answer should be simple.....Captain authority, safety, airmanship, and experience. Period.

End of conversation.

[VH-Cheer Up]

Whatever happened to x pounds for the journey, plus the mandated reserves, plus extra for the headwind, a bit more for the hold, a bit for the missed approach, some more for diversion, a bit more for the missed approach at diversion, some for the insurance company, and a bit extra for the (pardon my political incorrectness) wife and kids?

As a student pilot 40 years ago, my favourite instructor Herr Stogmuller told me to make sure we had air in the tyres and none in the tanks. Air was removed most effectively from the tanks by displacing it with AvGas. When it reached the brim, stop filling.

[BDiONU]

I have thought for a quite a while now that "Controller" is the wrong name they should be called "Facilitators" or "Coordinators", because that is their job - to facilitate or coordinate safe and efficient flow of air traffic. Too many ATCer's these days seem to be control freaks.
ATC exists for your comfort but primarily your safety ;) You're not the only aircraft in the sky and any unilateral action you take will affect other aircraft. Hence someone needs to be 'in charge' or 'controlling' all of those aircraft in the sky at the same time or we're going to see lots of aluminium tubes welded together and falling back to earth. Simples!

BD

[Wino]

VH-cheer up

Whatever happened to x pounds for the journey, plus the mandated reserves, plus extra for the headwind, a bit more for the hold, a bit for the missed approach, some more for diversion, a bit more for the missed approach at diversion, some for the insurance company, and a bit extra for the (pardon my political incorrectness) wife and kids

Commercial pressures killed that a long time ago. Do you realize that if the weather at your destination is VFR, you don't need an alternate on an airlines type instrument flight plan? So interestingly, high winds tend to make for clear skies, which should allow more aircraft in and out of the NY area, but in practice actually leads to MORE holding, all without alternate fuel, as the NY airports are forced to use less than "optimal" runway configurations. But of course, when you prepared a flight plan on the west coast 7 hours ago, the holds hadn't started yet, so dispatcher can't give you "hold" fuel....

For every extra pound of fuel carried (tankered) a percentage of which will be burned enroute. The pressure from all the companies is now to take the barest min fuel. You can add from there, but if you ask for an extra 3k lbs of fuel, it seams like a lot. (MANAGEMENT will certainly say its a lot) but in a 767 you haven't gained but a few minutes, because you are starting with such rediculously low numbers to start with.

The FAA can fix this by refusing to allow the NYC airports to be filed "no alternate" until the runway repairs are complete, but or course, no one has died recently of fuel starvation at JFK, so why act? Plus, the ATA (The paid shills for the airlines) would howl about how its just another cost being heaped on an over taxed and broke industry.


Cheers
Wino

[Guy D'ageradar]

BD,

May as well give up - something tells me these plonkers won't be listening to any answers as they obviously know it all already!

Gents, it is called air traffic control because that is exactly what it is.

With a bunch of egos like yours mixing it up out there, how long do you think you would last without our instructions?

YES. Instructions. Not requests, not suggestions. Sure, you are within your rights to ignore them IF THE CIRCUMSTANCES DEMAND IT but you had better have a damned good reason for doing so if you want to keep that precious ATPL.

One day you will realise that by far the best way to make this system work is to do it together, rather than the oft seen "I'm alright, f*$k everyone else" attitude posted here.:ugh:

Nothing to do with being control freaks or otherwise - we simply are REQUIRED to ensure the safe, orderly and efficient flow of ALL aircraft. Not just yours. Someone has to be at the back of the queue. Often, it will be the primadonna who always asks for the wrong end of the runway, even after being informed that he's no. 12 in the sequence (for example).

Please help us to help you. Fly the speeds INSTRUCTED - not what you think you'll get away with. Take the vectors - it's for your safety, not mine. And for god's sake, if you have an emergency, A) tell me in a clear and concise manner and B) tell me what it is. That way I can know what's required and do it. Leave me guessing, as this guy did, and watch the chaos that ensues. :rolleyes:

[Keepthembodiesmoving]

The American captain didn't want to fly to New York with min fuel. But his company made him

Hornet, would it not be closer to the truth to say that he chose to transfer part of his own responsibility to the dispatcher?

[wiggy]

that he chose to transfer part of his own responsibility to the dispatcher

Just a question re: despatchers from a European, as an aside to the specifics of the JFK incident.

Sat in line for departure at a certain Eastern Seaboard airport last night whilst reroutes were being given to multiple aircraft due Severe Weather. At least one pilot replied that in addition to loading the route he'd have to contact his despatcher before being ready for departure..which was a right royal PITA because of the delays it generated at the holding point. So the question is when does the despatcher's authority/responsibility for the flight end - can the Cdr not accept a reroute without running it past someone in the office?

[Wino]

Wiggy,

NO a dispatcher must be notified and agree with any routing change or altitude change of 4000 feet or so...

Cheers
Wino

[wiggy]

Ah ha, thanks very much :ok:

(edited to add: so presumably the despatcher can veto a reroute?)

[SeniorDispatcher]

Wiggy said>>>
Sat in line for departure at a certain Eastern Seaboard airport last night whilst reroutes were being given to multiple aircraft due Severe Weather. At least one pilot replied that in addition to loading the route he'd have to contact his despatcher before being ready for departure..which was a right royal PITA because of the delays it generated at the holding point. So the question is when does the despatcher's authority/responsibility for the flight end - can the Cdr not accept a reroute without running it past someone in the office?



Not to quibble, but I'm going to refer to "dispatcher" here versus your "despatcher" term to clearly distinguish between the US FAR Part 121 incarnation of the former versus the latter term more commonly used outside the US and its FARs...

The US Part 121 dispatcher's authority and responsibility ends when the flight blocks-in at the destination. A common misconception is that the dispatcher is strictly a clerical paperwork generator (the flight plan and dispatch release) and once we send that, we're done. That paperwork is clearly the "initiating" aspect of the FAR 1.1-defined "operational control", but there are two other aspects--"conducting" and "terminating".

As far as a PIC having to coordinate a weather re-route with their dispatcher, that was the subject of a FAA legal interpretation back in the 1990s from FAA AGC-200 to Glenn Morse (then with the ATA). The reason for it was that normally, the most wind-advantageous route or ATC Pref route route will be utilized in a dispatch release, and thus what the fuel load is based on. If the PIC and dispatcher are in agreement that the flight can operate safely as planned per the conditions as set forth in the dispatch release, each of the two signs it.

When weather runs amuck and re-routes start being issued, it's necessary (as per the legal interp) that the PIC contact their dispatcher to ensure sufficient fuel is aboard to accomodate the re-route. If it's not, and they're off the gate, they may have to tinker with the alternate and contingency fuel already onboard to make it work. If not, it's back to the gate to get more gas.

Many reroutes are codified and referenceable (See PLAYBOOK (http://www.fly.faa.gov/PLAYBOOK/pbindex.html) ), and as such fuel can be considered for their potential use. For example, the normal Chicago-Houston route takes one over STL and LIT, and into Houston from the NE side. If the dispatcher suspects a reroute might occur later due to possible weather in the STL, LIT or enroute environs, it's a common practice to also plan the flight via MZV, STJ, TUL, FUZ and into Houston from the NW side. The difference in fuel burns between "normal" and "reroute" will be added as additional contingency fuel, and the flight will be released and filed via the normal route (so if the reroute doesn't occur, the flight won't be over MLW on arrival at the destination.) A remark will be added to the reelase that advises the PIC that his min fuel load also has considered the MZV reroute, so if that ATC later pulls the trigger to use that reroute at the very last-minute, all the necessary coordination has already taken place.

Conversely, some reroutes are not predictable, given the obvious dynamic nature of the weather. More often than not in such situations, the dispatcher is already carrying additional contingency fuel, but verification still needs to take place that it's sufficient to accomodate the reroute.

[Wino]

Ive operated both ways, "Dispatched" and "flight followed"

If you were flight followed (supplemental/charter ops) you just tell em what you did.

If you are dispatched, you have a lot more resources at your disposal, if you know how to use em, but the flip side is you and the dispatcher both have to agree with what you are doing. If you declare an emergency, then you do what you want and tell dispatch what you did (time allowing)...

Dispatch can declare an emergency for an airplane as well... (usually happens in cases of fuel burn issues on long overwater legs (think bermuda or hawaii) But can happen as a result of passenger action, threats against the aircraft, something datalinked in about the systems on the aircraft etc...

Cheers
Andrew

[protectthehornet]

keepthembodies movin

no



....

This whole things is about everyone (except the pilots) trying to get more for their money by being lucky. That flight took off and everyone from the ATA to ATC, to the airline management was keeping their fingers crossed.

The pilot, 32 years ago would have taken extra fuel for screwing around...but things are different.

IF he took off and had a problem, he had been told somewhere along the line...well, declare an emergency!

The emergency could have been avoided by adding two hours of holding fuel (at 1500'msl) and he could have waited out the winds for the runway.

But we all know that would cost management money.

The system is broken. It is very broken when an emergency has to be declared to make an otherwise normal flight work.

And to you controllers out there making your case on this forum...you aren't making it well at all. Don't tell me blindly to follow your ''instructions.''. I made a point awhile back about vectors. IF you give me a vector, you have to say the reason for the vector. EG: Runway heading vectors for immediate return to runway 31 right...that would have precluded the emergency declaration.

American 723, fly heading 250, vectors for ILS 27Right approach.

but you guys are short changing things with...fly runway heading.

That's BS and we both know it.

[wiggy]

Thanks guys, interesting stuff.

When weather runs amuck and re-routes start being issued, it's necessary (as per the legal interp) that the PIC contact their dispatcher to ensure sufficient fuel is aboard to accomodate the re-route. If it's not, and they're off the gate

Yep, there were a least two of those.

[zedoscarro]

When an airplane declares an emergency (Mayday x3), how does it cancel the emergency? By saying "Cancelling the Emergency"? "Cancelling the Mayday"?

[p51guy]

PTH has a good point. If they were down to 6500 # fuel and were beyond xwind component to land they may have accepted an expedited approach to 31R but they didn't know what ATC had in mind for them after the fly runway heading clearance. They probably thought they would have to do the same thing to land on 31R they did on the approach. Land without ATC approval because they needed to get on the ground.

The pilots have filed their reports so we will know soon enough why this flight ended up doing what they did. Maybe AA will start putting on more fuel for New York area flights so this doesn't happen again. Legal fuel works for paperwork, but the pilot needs to add fuel as necessary to avoid repeats of this. I had to do this a few times, not many, but the pilot is more in tune with the airports and weather tendancies than the dispatcher a lot of times. Never have I been denied more fuel so asking for extra is no problem if performance allows it.

[SeniorDispatcher]

readytocopy said>>>
This pilot made a good decision ...lets stop analizing it...Thank god we did not have another AVIANCA crash where the crew, may be because of language were unable to state the seriousness of their situation causing many people to loose their lives.

There have been several mentions of AV52 in this thread, especially as it relates to ATC and language issues. That said, I've yet to see anyone demonstrate any awareness of the fact that in their final report the NTSB said: "Contributing to the accident was the flight crew's failure to use an airline operational control dispatch system to assist them during the international flight into a high-density airport in poor weather." That contributing factor ranked ahead of the ATC and language issues involved with this accident. Avianca's operational control system (under Part 129) was inferior to that of airlines operating under Part 121.

JW411 said>>>
Next day, I was conducting a PIC upgrade with the local FAA guy observing. He told me later (in the bar) that the PanAm computer plan had only allowed the straight-line distance from JFK to EWR (23 nms). As you say, getting you out of the JFK traffic pattern and into the EWR pattern soaks up at least 120 nms.

I don't know of a single flight planning system that doesn't add some sort of major distance bias (to account for vectoring) when computing a fuel burn to an alternate. The computer flight plan may still show EWR as being only 20-whatever miles from JFK, but a longer distance has undoubtedly been considered in the fuel calcs. This can be verified (or not) either via your dispatcher, and/or the computer geeks in the back room.

protectthehornet said>>>
The American captain didn't want to fly to New York with min fuel. But his company made him

With all due respect, unless someone had a Glock to the PIC's head forcing him to sign the flight's dispatch release, nobody "made" him do anything.

§ 121.663 Responsibility for dispatch release: Domestic and flag operations.

Each certificate holder conducting domestic or flag operations shall prepare a dispatch release for each flight between specified points, based on information furnished by an authorized aircraft dispatcher. The pilot in command and an authorized aircraft dispatcher shall sign the release only if they both believe that the flight can be made with safety. The aircraft dispatcher may delegate authority to sign a release for a particular flight, but he may not delegate his authority to dispatch.

Don't agree with a fuel load? Simply, DON'T SIGN THE RELEASE, call your dispatcher, and come (return) to fuel figure that you can both agree upon.

§ 121.533 Responsibility for operational control: Domestic operations.

(b) The pilot in command and the aircraft dispatcher are jointly responsible for the preflight planning, delay, and dispatch release of a flight in compliance with this chapter and operations specifications.

Managements don't plan fuel loads---dispatchers do. While it's obviously true that management has their policy desires, they're not supposed to conflict with the FARs that FAA expects the dispatcher and PIC to follow, none the least of which, in this case is:

§ 121.647 Factors for computing fuel required.

Each person computing fuel required for the purposes of this subpart shall consider the following:

(a) Wind and other weather conditions forecast.

(b) Anticipated traffic delays.

(c) One instrument approach and possible missed approach at destination.

(d) Any other conditions that may delay landing of the aircraft.


aiming point said>>>
Bet they wish now they had used their "Command Authority" at the beginning of the flight to carry an extra 20 minutes contingency fuel.....how much less stressful it would have been.

..not to mention compliant with 121.533(b) above. ((121.535(b) for the 121 flag folks)

aterpster said>>>
Only an active AAL pilot could tell us what their management's view and reaction would be currently to any fuel add by the captain.

Likewise, only AAL2's PIC and dispatcher know what was/wasn't planned or discussed relative to the flight's planned fuel load. There seems to be an obvious retroactive conclusion afoot here that because they reportedly arrived with 6.5, it could only be because the flight wasn't planned properly. Absent someone from AAL with detailed knowledge chiming in, the assumption that AAL2 wasn't properly planned is just that--an assumption.

Shore Guy said>>>
I've operated flights into NY Tracon for over thirty years. Two different flight plan providers, and tens of different dispatchers. When the closest legal alternate is listed (e.g. for JFK, EWR, PHL), the routing is almost always great circle direct, or perhaps a near direct airway. About 18 hours of the day, this will never, ever happen. But you are "legal".

Remember, Legal is not safe all the time. That is when Captain authority comes in. Perhaps (not second guessing here) this "situation" could have been remedied by a few extra thousand pounds before takeoff (One main runway closed at JFK is a prescription for delays). Or not accepting dispatched direct routing to alternate you know you will not get without adding some fuel to the extra column.

Your concerns are previously discussed above...

Wino said>>>
Commercial pressures killed that a long time ago. Do you realize that if the weather at your destination is VFR, you don't need an alternate on an airlines type instrument flight plan? So interestingly, high winds tend to make for clear skies, which should allow more aircraft in and out of the NY area, but in practice actually leads to MORE holding, all without alternate fuel, as the NY airports are forced to use less than "optimal" runway configurations. But of course, when you prepared a flight plan on the west coast 7 hours ago, the holds hadn't started yet, so dispatcher can't give you "hold" fuel....

The days of Jet-A @ .25 a gallon are long gone, and with prices now $2.50 a gallon, the amount off loss from carrying fuel weight goes up proportionately. It's not something airlines can ignore, no matter how much some folks long for the old days. That said, fuel loads should cover realistic operational threats, and not "What if a meteor his the intersection of the only two runways?"

I'm sure some out there might assume that we calculate fuel loads by lobbing darts at a dartboard, but we actually utilize a number of items (other than just the TAF). The CCFP. FSM data that indicates the projected AAR versus demand at ETA. SPTs that occur every two hours during the operational day that update users on actual conditions, and what's expected to occur in the next 2-4 and 4-6 hours. ATC "Hotlines" that go live when WX hits a major terminal area, where affected towers, TRACON, Center, and adjacent ATC facilities handle things minute-to-minute as WX opens/closes airspace.

If any of the above items seem foreign to crews, they are things that could be observed first-hand were pilots ever to spend some meaningful time in their airline's dispatch office/OCC. Dispatchers spend a minimum of 5 FAR-mandated hours (if not more) on cockpit jumpseat observation rides (part of annual recurrent), but there's no similar requirement for pilots to come visit their dispatchers. If they did visit, they'd get an eye full, and a more-informed opinion on how their dispatcher can be their ally, and not a perceived adversary.

Keepthembodiesmoving said>>>
Hornet, would it not be closer to the truth to say that he chose to transfer part of his own responsibility to the dispatcher?

No transfers--FAR 121,533(b) is a joint thing; please see above.

aiming point said>>>
This "Dispatchers" power and control over the Flight-Crew is fascinating.
Seems the pilots live in constant fear and stress of the dispatcher, what a real stranglehold for pilots to operate under.....could be very inhibiting to a crews "gut instincts" and freedom to make the safest decisions without any additional systemic encumbrances.

Possible sarcasm aside, pilots have little reason for any "fear" or "stress" regarding their dispatchers, were they truly to understand both the historical, and continuing need for the operational control function. Sure, technology has changed immensely from what was there in the 1930s, but what hasn't changed is that all the humans involved with the process are still of the Mk-I variety, and still easily capable of human error. PICs catch dispatcher mistakes, but the converse is also true--dispatchers catch PIC mistakes, and believe me, I've seen some lu-lus. No dispatcher I know expects to get a call from a PIC requesting permission to turn 10 left for weather, nor permission to pull and turn the illuminated red handles with the numbers on them. If it's anything else regarding weather, mechanical, or operational factors, give us a jingle via ACARS, phone, or radio.

Is this really such a good way for the system to operate? Advice can be very helpful but "joint control"....not sure that can be such a positive thing......at least from what I read here.

The "system" has been around since 1938, and its record speaks for itself.

This site is frequented by nearly all pilots, and a handful (maybe) of dispatchers---is it then so surprising that "what you read here" is pretty much the pilot perspective to the near exclusion of a dispatcher's?

Wino said>>>
If you are dispatched, you have a lot more resources at your disposal, if you know how to use em, but the flip side is you and the dispatcher both have to agree with what you are doing. If you declare an emergency, then you do what you want and tell dispatch what you did (time allowing)...

Dispatch can declare an emergency for an airplane as well... (usually happens in cases of fuel burn issues on long overwater legs (think bermuda or hawaii) But can happen as a result of passenger action, threats against the aircraft, something datalinked in about the systems on the aircraft etc...

Thanks for "getting" it... ;)

[protectthehornet]

senior dispatcher

it must be nice to live in the non real world

if your airline says...we won't carry extra fuel to JFK and we would rather you divert during the construction, or in this case, declare...

then you have to put up with it or jump through alot of hoops.

I know part 121 as well as anyone here...

the flying world has never been more cost conscious and by that pushing the envelope.

we both know the 767 could easily have carried another couple of hours of fuel...but they didn't...and it is cost...even pennies matter...and that's the name of that tune.

Ihope P51 guy will find out the truth for us...even if it boils down to the captain had to pee really bad!

[SeniorDispatcher]

protectthehornet said>>>

senior dispatcher

it must be nice to live in the non real world

Believe me, I'm well-rooted in reality, even if it doesn't seem to be yours at your outfit.

if your airline says...we won't carry extra fuel to JFK and we would rather you divert during the construction, or in this case, declare...

In addition to the FARs I previously cited, I think you'll find another one (and a legal interp) that says that one can't predicate a flight with declaring to be a planned option.

then you have to put up with it or jump through a lot of hoops.

Where's your outfit's pilot/dispatcher unions (and safety committees) on all this? How about your airline's POI?

I know part 121 as well as anyone here...

OK, but why do you appear to not be complying with it and instead kowtowing to real/perceived company and management pressures?

Just asking..

[p51guy]

Fuel to destination plus alternate plus 45 minutes and expected holding fuel is the the fuel needed in the USA. Pilots need to step in at this point and say what other delays might happen like depending on time of day, MIA always has holding about 6PM because of thunderstorms in the area in the summer on a regular basis. Unfortunately the above formula doesn't work well on those days. I have landed there many times thankful I added fuel. 13 yrs at MIA and only one diversion. Much holding with that extra fuel so no diversion. Put on the fuel you need.

[SeniorDispatcher]

p51guy said>>>
Fuel to destination plus alternate plus 45 minutes and expected holding fuel is the the fuel needed in the USA.

Ironically, that's just about what I carry as a minimum at most places. Arrival fuels at Podunk tend to be less...

[aterpster]

SeniorDispatcher:
How about your airline's POI?

That suggestion is most decidedly not real world.

Can you image a line captain going to the POI? He probably would be in trouble with both the company and the union's safety committee if he did that.

Plus, you surely must know more POIs than not are paper-pushing hacks. They take their marching orders from AFS-200 at FAA DC. The current "order of the day" at FAA DC for very strong political reasons is "green."

Yeah, tell me you've encountered some sharp, buck-FAA-headquarters, POIs. No doubt; perhaps 1 in 20.

[protectthehornet]

senior dispatcher

for a moment, we will assume that the american flight departed with ''legal'' fuel.

not more, not less.

anyone who goes to any airport has to at least consider a runway closure due to an emergency ahead of your flight.

so, you tell me...why didn't american take another two hours of fuel...or even thirty more minutes...or whatever you would think is right?

why?

now, my OUTFIT, still allows us to gas up as we can justify...not just for fun, but no problem.

other outfits might not be as lucky.

so, why didn't american take more fuel...as you MIGHT know, most of us are paid by the minute...if we have to hold, we actually earn MORE money.

I'm sure the american captain made it as clear as he could...either give me runway 31 right or I declare an emergency and take it myself.

the controller could have said, I will give you 31 right...fly runway heading to 2000' turn and enter the downwind...clear to land 31right.

but he didn't...DID HE?

so, in a rare moment, an airline pilot made good on his word.

[SeniorDispatcher]

aterpster said>>>
That suggestion is most decidedly not real world.

Can you image a line captain going to the POI? He probably would be in trouble with both the company and the union's safety committee if he did that.

Plus, you surely must know more POIs than not are paper-pushing hacks. They take their marching orders from AFS-200 at FAA DC. The current "order of the day" at FAA DC for very strong political reasons is "green."

Yeah, tell me you've encountered some sharp, buck-FAA-headquarters, POIs. No doubt; perhaps 1 in 20

You read the suggestion in the context of a line pilot contacting them, when it was intended as your union or safety committee contacting. As far as the line guys, FAA still has their 800 number, no?

I actually know/have know several POIs, but I did better than your 1-in-20 ratio. They don't all have horns...

[SeniorDispatcher]

protectthehornet said>>>
so, you tell me...why didn't american take another two hours of fuel...or even thirty more minutes...or whatever you would think is right?

BTSOOM; I wasn't there...

ATCSCC runs special telcons on the JFK situation every day, and dispatchers know what AAR to expect. Dispatchers that have a firm grasp on their FAR responsibilities will offer any bean-counting management types the fickle-finger-of-fate and plan whatever fuel they think is appropriate as per 121.647. It happens every day, albeit not everywhere..

I said this before, but it bears repeating--if crews interfaced better (individually and collectively) with their dispatchers, they'd realize that we have more commonalities than differences, and can (with proper awareness and support) be allies moreso than adversaries. If the culture of an airline's pilot group is unable to understand that and/or get behind that, well, then nothing will improve. It's a shame, because it really doesn't have to be that way.

And, BTW, I have no issue with what the PIC of AAL2 did, other than to note that he could have offered "fuel" as the reason (to ATC), which would have helped the overall situation. It seems clear why he perhaps didn't, but it would have helped if he had.

[mary meagher]

In following this thread, I am truly impressed with the refreshing contributions from Senior Dispatcher. Always wondered how the chaps at the sharp end could, in the 30 minutes after arriving at the gate, work out the details of routing, taking best advantage of tailwinds, avoiding VA, providing for known eccentricities of destination ATC, and still allow for the 20 minute walk around in all weathers to double check on what the line engineers have just double checked on anyway.

My eyes have been opened. It all depends on teamwork, and one of the team players who is keeping an eye on the big picture is the Dispatcher.
Though pilots grumble, eg. Aiming Point in his post, that "Pilots live in fear of the dispatcher.....thereby inhibiting gut instinct and freedom to make the safest decisions...." I should think most would be very happy to have the dispassionate dispatcher to consult and advise on vital elements both before takeoff and enroute.

[rmiller774]

"It seems clear why he perhaps didn't, but it would have helped if he had."


I also have an idea why he didn't mention fuel - and that is because he is a truthful man.

[Ireland105]

Dreadfully irresponsible remarks from the pilots having listened to recordings. Horrendous really for wide bodied pilots flying for Americans number 1 airline. Even the tone from his voice was very demeaning and arrogant to the ATC officer. If you ultimately cant land, you divert. And what about the other traffic behind him and ahead of him, how did they land ?

The closed runway may have been undergoing significant repairs - the approaching pilots certainly did not know its state at the time of requesting it. Further, injuries to ground personel could have resulted as im sure they were quickly hussled off the runway.

This is a real case of bully boy tactics. This pair of pilots should be hauled into the conference room for a cup of coffee, hit play on the recorder, and than ask what the hell is going on. Frankly, they should be ****** out the door and fired for this. What they did was potentially very dangerous.

[protectthehornet]

don't you get it? they didn't land on a closed runway.

sheesh

[L337]

Ireland105:

Have you read the thread at all?

[Ireland105]

Im afraid there is no way out of it, its dreadful behaviour. How anyone could not think so is simply beyond me. Get rid of them I say and make an example of them. This kind of corporate bullying should not be tolerated. Real shame on them and their actions.

[jrmyl]

So I guess Ireland was there in the cockpit with them and knows exactly what was going on then. Since he is so adamant on firing the pilots who exercised their emergency authority he must have been there.

If not, then I suggest you move onto your next trolling duty. :rolleyes:

[nugpot]

The closed runway may have been undergoing significant repairs - the approaching pilots certainly did not know its state at the time of requesting it. Further, injuries to ground personel could have resulted as im sure they were quickly hussled off the runway.

Frankly, they should be ****** out the door and fired for this. What they did was potentially very dangerous.

Ireland105,

It is difficult to take your comments seriously when you get one of the two available facts wrong.

Not reading the full thread before posting is stupid and insulting to the rest of the readers/contributors.

Frankly, you should have your posting rights removed. What you did was potentially very irritating.

[Ireland105]

jrmyl - If you are referring to a fuel shortage issue than this further underscrores the crews incompetence. This forum is not about massaging the ego's of flight crews (please read nugpot). The sheer arogance in that mans voice was disturbing to say the least. Nothing on that tape indicates the nature of the "emergency".

If he did not feel comfortable about performing a cross wind landing than he should at least have the decency to raise this point for additional training in his next sim session, rather than removing his frustrations on already hard working and stretched ATC. AA002 was not the only aircraft on an approach to runway 22 that day - how could all the other airlines manage it ?

Again I stress, this forum is not a ego massaging forum for flight crew. If he is not up to the job than than lets just get that clear, rather than taking his anger out on ATC. :=

[wilyflier]

Moderator , please remove Ireland or close the thread

[Ireland105]

why Wilyflier - what is your problem exactly ? Maybe you can pm me on it ? I dont think its reasonable to remove someone who has a different opinion to you, do you think thats fair ? Dont you realise that the actions of the crew was potentially very dangerous ?

[stator vane]

again, i am dismayed at the assumptive attitudes of the posters on this thread against the pilot and the ATC involved in this event and after reading more replies today, i sense a return of the British/Irish/Europeans looking down at the Americans again.

yes, some of the American culture is a bit 'cowboy-ish'

but like all things, it is good at some times and bad at others.
on the other hand, an emphasis on procedures is good at times and bad at others.

being humans, we find it difficult at times to know what is best at times, especially pressing times of short duration.

yes the British RT is more proper most of the times-but it would be interesting to compare the volumes of traffic into the different areas-i have flown into LHR,LGW,STN,MAN and all the major airports in Europe since 1998 to present and i have never heard anything that comes close to what i heard in DFW, ATL, LAX, SFO, and the entire New York area even back in 1995-96. at times Approach control was simply a 'broadcast' of instructions--no time for any readbacks at all-and even when there is time for readbacks, it evolved into an abbreviated english-by necessity.

after listening to the tape again, what strikes me is the suddeness of the change! after checking in with approach, AA's heart beat must have dropped a bit from max, thinking they're on the last stretch-almost home-perhaps after some time of redline bpm on earlier segments of the approach-then suddenly they are told the wind had increased and yes, we can tell by the RT that they were back at redline and perhaps going above--the spare mental capacity had suddenly reduced and they sound as if they were having to think and speak at the same time--

i am convinced that both the pilot and the controller--upon reflection could see ways that both could have done better-but i would also wager that they would buy each other beers and shake hands at the local as well. and both will be better at what they both do from here on out. no terminations should be given!

i am american born and a british citizen and it cuts me very deep when i hear any one imply that americans are in any way lower than the british or visa versa--

on any subject--from friendly fire in the current fighting in the sand pits to the New York RT, the yanks and the brits/poms/irish/europeans have had their glorious moments and complete bollocks perhaps in the same percentage ratio-

and before making conclusions upon any of the incidents--only the people who were actually there (right there!!!) -and survive (key word) should have any real say in any 'sentencing'

the rest of us should simply listen and learn!

something that hasn't been mentioned yet--i suspect only in America would any one have such free access to the tapes!!!!

cheers;

[SLFguy]

Ronseal - it does what it says on the tin.

Pique - it closes threads.

[Ireland105]

Stator Vane - agree with the "cowboy-ish" piece, I dont see either though buying each other beers !

[stator vane]

even after the AA started his turn--i think i can hear in the ATC's voice "okay, he's doing what he thinks he needs to do--let's move on--i've got aircraft coming at me like there's no tomorrow."

any pilot that doesn't respect any ATC is simply ignorant and any ATC that doesn't respect pilots is simply ignorant as well. if they knew more about each other, they still might not agree on all points, but they would have respect.

[SeniorDispatcher]

stator vane said>>>
any pilot that doesn't respect any ATC is simply ignorant and any ATC that doesn't respect pilots is simply ignorant as well. if they knew more about each other, they still might not agree on all points, but they would have respect.

Common-sense wisdom that's applicable in so many other areas as well... :ok:

Now, can someone please turn off the volcanic ash machine?

[Avman]

The only arrogant person identified so far in this thread is you Ireland105. You're obvioulsy neither a pilot nor an ATCO. You don't seem to know JFK and you obviously didn't know that 31R was not closed. Personally, I didn't find the Captain's r/t arrogant or demeaning. He had a problem of some sort, made a decision and communicated his intentions clearly. No time for diplomacy or discussion at that point in his approach.

[protectthehornet]

Ireland 105

do you understand that YOU are saying the American pilot landed on a closed runway? He didn't! I say again he DID NOT.

so a great deal of your initial comment is WRONG. WRONG!

please understand that Three One Left was closed and American requested and was cleared to land (after declaring emergency) on Three One Right. Do you understand, OVER?

AS to Radio work in the United States...it has evolved beyond the standard . As wisely mentioned above, There isn't enough time to do everything the way the BOOK says. There are too many planes.

A huge amount of time has been used on this forum to make clear the following:

1. if You go around or divert or are otherwise interrrupted in your landing at JFK, you might end up flying at low altitude for over 100 miles...and fuel might get tight.

2. ATC must be aware of the crosswind and other limits used by airlines and be ready to change runway configuration or other clever methods to deal with such things.

3. That, on occasion, a pilot will make good on his word. The pilot clearly stated that if he didn't get the runway he wanted, he would declare an emergency. He didn't get what he wanted and DECLARED an emergency and then dealt with the emergency . EVEN ATC understood after awhile and CLEARED HIM to land on Three One right.

[Ireland105]

Protectthehornet - Clearly the runway was open at the time of landing, I never said it wasnt.

Avman - I think most people would find the general tone of the pilot highly unprofessional and arrogant. Clearly, he was talking "at" the ATC officer rather than to him. No we are not looking for "diplomacy" as you so elequantly put it, rather a bit of professionalism and a concept of working together. Throwing himself into a line of traffic on another runway without appropriate approval is of course dangerous and needs to be recognised as such during both pilots review next week. So, if it was an cross wind than you go around and take further instructions. If its to do with low fuel than what were they doing without sufficient reserves on board - answer me that. Hopefully all will become more clear next Wednesday.

[protectthehornet]

IRELAND

please re read your post, number 222...especially the second paragraph

[Ireland105]

Protectthehornet - I think you have misunderstood me, but rather than dwell on incidentals lets talk about the facts pertaining to the case at hand I suggest.

[ARFOR]

OFFS :ugh:

He either had a justifiable reason for his actions, or he did not.

Lets put the :mad: skirts down and wait and see :hmm:

[Ireland105]

Agreed. D day is only just over 1 week away anyway.

[SLFinAZ]

As others here have noted none of your comments have anything to do "with the case at hand".

There is absolutely no information available at this time that indicates the pilot in question overstepped his authority in any way. He was on final when the crosswind exceeded his allowables and immediately requested the required change. My understanding is that if he in fact continued along the vector "suggested" that an emergency declared beyond a certain point would greatly complicated things for all parties.

By immediately declaring an emergency he mitigated the complications for others as much as possible.

From all I can gather he exercised his authority in accordance with generally accepted "best practice" until proven otherwise...

[Roffa]

pth,

AS to Radio work in the United States...it has evolved beyond the standard . As wisely mentioned above, There isn't enough time to do everything the way the BOOK says. There are too many planes.


Given that poor r/t has killed on more than one occasion, I don't think that's anything to brag about or be proud of that the system has evolved in such a manner.

[aterpster]

Roffa:
Given that poor r/t has killed on more than one occasion, I don't think that's anything to brag about or be proud of that the system has evolved in such a manner.

That is thread creep for it doesn't seem to have been an issue in the instant case. Having said that, you are absolutely correct. VHF voice communications have not improved since World War II. The system has just "progressed" to saturation at many times.

I have called it "the fragile VHF comm link" for years and, indeed, it has killed on far too many occasions; particularly with radar vectors in mountainous areas.

EGPWS has made a lot of saves since its implementation. Even the low-end terrain warning options in light aircraft Garmin panel-mount navigators have made some saves in recent years. We don't hear about most of them.

[jackieofalltrades]

stator vane i am convinced that both the pilot and the controller--upon reflection could see ways that both could have done better-but i would also wager that they would buy each other beers and shake hands at the local as well. and both will be better at what they both do from here on out. no terminations should be given!


I think this paragraph sums up this thread perfectly. There are learning points to be made on both parties, most of which has already been discussed. But most importantly it is communication. The AA pilot could have communicated his reasonings and need for 31R to ATC, and the controller could have informed the AA crew better of his intentions and plan to get them onto 31R.

As with so many other incidences, lets learn from this, take away how things could be handled better so that if/when a similar situation arises, those involved will act in a manner which is safest for all in the sky.

[DRM1973]

Just to throw my two pence worth in, I have listened to the tape a couple of times and I hear a decisive AA flight crew, obviously completely aware of the type of airspace and situation that they were in, the skipper makes a difficult choice and executes its, albeit quite forcefully, the controller meanwhile is slightly thrown off balance as he now has to make adjustments to allow the emergency traffic make a left turn/visual, reroute other approaches, whilst reconciling in his own mind that the AA 2 is now actually 'declaring an emergency' when the initial transmission stated 'we will have to declare and emergency'. Yes there are some standard phraseology issues, which are cleared up pretty quickly but ultimately everyone does their job. Its easy to point the finger, I am sure the work in progress at JFK is less than ideal, it doesnt suit crews or the controllers, but as a previous post stated this crew were certainly not going to be another Avianca 52.

DRM.

[CenAir]

Ireland105

"I think most people would find the general tone of the pilot highly unprofessional and arrogant. Clearly, he was talking "at" the ATC officer rather than to him. No we are not looking for "diplomacy" as you so elequantly put it, rather a bit of professionalism and a concept of working together."

Seems you missed the PIC stated if he didn't get 31R he would declare an emergency, and did when ATC told him to fly the runway heading, skip the diplomacy and elequantly as you are in New York and transmissions are a little more short and to the point.

"Throwing himself into a line of traffic on another runway without appropriate approval is of course dangerous and needs to be recognised as such during both pilots review next week. So, if it was an cross wind than you go around and take further instructions. If its to do with low fuel than what were they doing without sufficient reserves on board - answer me that. Hopefully all will become more clear next Wednesday."

Just for your info 31R was a departure runway so there was no line of traffic landing, after you declare you can do anything to meet the emergency and the pic stated they were on the visual, going missed might add 75 nm and flying or more. In so far as low fuel for whatever reason they refused to fly the runway heading twice by atc and landed safe and nice they didn't follow the pushy NY Controller who ignored the emergency.

[Plectron]

Thank you again, Capt PTH, for so eloquently stating what seems obvious to me. I really don't see what a certain group has its knickers in a bundle over.

Maybe it's just me -20,000 hours and a bunch of 767 into Kennedy but what do I know?

I had a bit of time off from this site but I have been following it. If anyone is interested in what triggered my time off and the message accompanying please feel free to msg me.

Does anyone believe that, if the Captain in question did wrong, that the folks down at the Dallas schoolhouse are not capable of looking into it? Or the FAA for that matter?

He was fully aware of the consequences of his actions and did what he felt he had to do.

Just for the record - very few AA guys know about this site and the ones that do don't read it much. I suspect the tone here would be decidedly different if they did.

And, for the record - I think the Captain did what he had to do at the time and it was a non-event. It worked out fine. Thanks again PTH for standing up to the abuse of a brother aviator.

[Ireland105]

Todays preliminary hearing should clear things up. Im told the pilot in question is for a nice (fair) grilling.

[Wino]

Well Ireland,

Once again you appear to be wrong, as the pilot's reports have already been accepted, prior to today, and said pilots returned to flight.

Of course you also said...

Dreadfully irresponsible remarks from the pilots having listened to recordings. Horrendous really for wide bodied pilots flying for Americans number 1 airline. Even the tone from his voice was very demeaning and arrogant to the ATC officer. If you ultimately cant land, you divert. And what about the other traffic behind him and ahead of him, how did they land ?

The closed runway may have been undergoing significant repairs - the approaching pilots certainly did not know its state at the time of requesting it. Further, injuries to ground personel could have resulted as im sure they were quickly hussled off the runway.

This is a real case of bully boy tactics. This pair of pilots should be hauled into the conference room for a cup of coffee, hit play on the recorder, and than ask what the hell is going on. Frankly, they should be ****** out the door and fired for this. What they did was potentially very dangerous.

So we know where you stand, not a position shared by anyone with knowledge of JFK ops, including the air traffic controllers.

The number of factual errors you have made here is frankly astounding. Even your grandstanding is wrong. AA is America's 3rd largest airline at this point...

I would suggest that you go back and read the thread from the VERY beginning. Also do a little research on dispatch fuel and flight planning for VFR days and rethink your posts. Both the Pilots and the controllers on this thread will be waiting for your apology.

Cheers
Wino

PS, not spoken about here but needs to be mentioned. Runway alignment at NY often has more to do with avoiding flying over wealthy connected neighborhoods rather than wind direction or safety. Ireland, are you one of those people that buys a house near an airport because its cheap, then files a lawsuit to move the planes away? Is that your goal, keep planes from flying over your house?

[Jetney]

The pilot in this instance dished out what the ATC blokes dishes out daily to foreign pilots who are non native English speakers.
Having said that, I guess the PIC will probably be in for some kind of reprimand by the pen pushing management.

[Pugilistic Animus]

Whatever the outcome it's important to really understand the law...91.3 or your country's equivalent...:)

PS, not spoken about here but needs to be mentioned. Runway alignment at NY often has more to do with avoiding flying over wealthy connected neighborhoods rather than wind direction or safety. Ireland, are you one of those people that buys a house near an airport because its cheap, then files a lawsuit to move the planes away? Is that your goal, keep planes from flying over your house?

Yes, Lawrence, Cedarhurst, Woodmere and Hewlett :E

[FLCH]

So, why were they min fuel ?

Probably because of the typical goat rope that happens when you are flying into the NY airspace area, nothing like 120 degree vectors either side of the airway in order to accommodate congestion especially on a clear VFR day.

I don't fault the controllers, just the situation and equipment they are handed to deal with the influx of traffic.

Low fuel situations happen more than you think, and if you do fly into the NY area regularly, you would know how things sometimes unfold.

[p51guy]

Min fuel happens ocassionally if you fly long enough. Winds, altitude limitations because of atc or turbulence, deviations for wx, speed restrictions and holding may cut into reserve fuel. If you are all lined up on final in VMC most pilots wouldn't declare minimum fuel landing with 1 hr fuel remaining. Having to go around because of the increase in crosswind would have made them critical on fuel according to reports. Their actions had to be justified by them and I am sure they were.

I have been there a couple of times in a long career. Notice you almost never hear min fuel declared. I wonder how many of those flights could have comfortably gone around and been sequenced back for another approach? 100%?