Air North Brasilia Crash in Darwin (Merged)

[Wod]

Breaking news


TWO people are believed to have been killed when a plane crashed at Darwin's airport this morning.
A witness told the NT News he saw the plane crash at the Darwin RAAF base about 10.15am.

"We just heard this loud bang and then looked and saw the plane explode," one witness said.

Police, St John Ambulance and firefighters have been called to the scene but it is understood the two people on board the light plane were dead when they arrived.

It is not yet known where the plane was coming from.

Defence have confirmed it was a civilian plane, not a RAAF aircraft

[apacau]

Apparently an Air North Brasilia. In one sense, it's "lucky" (obviously not for the crew involved), it's 2 POB and not 18.

[Red Jet]

Two dead in plane crash

By Eleni Roussos
Updated 13 minutes ago
http://www.abc.net.au/reslib/201003/r535511_3074922.jpg (http://www.abc.net.au/reslib/201003/r535511_3074927.jpg) An E120 plane similar to this one has crashed in Darwin, killing two people.


Map: Darwin 0800 (http://www.abc.net.au/news/maps/map.htm?lat=-12.4668&long=130.8433&caption=Darwin%200800)

Two pilots have died after their plane crashed at the RAAF base in Darwin just after 10am (CST) today.
Police say the 30-seater Airnorth Embraer 120 had just taken off when it banked sharply to the left and crashed onto the RAAF runway.
It immediately burst into flames.
An Airnorth spokesperson says both pilots had significant flying experience and were undertaking a refresher training course.
The spokesperson says nobody else was on board.
The cause of the crash is still unknown.
Assistant Commissioner, Mark Payne, says police will begin investigating the crash as soon as they can get near the site.
Fire crews have been working to put out the flames but witnesses say the wreckage keeps re-igniting.
The crash scene is some distance from the Darwin International Airport terminal and all flights are running normally.

[OpsNormal]

Does anyone have any more info. Two of my very good friends work for AN and no-one has their phone on at the moment...:(

My thoughts go to the AN family at this time.:sad:

[victor two]

Two pilots killed in Darwin plane crash | Northern Territory News | Darwin, Northern Territory, Australia | ntnews.com.au (http://www.ntnews.com.au/article/2010/03/22/133611_ntnews.html)

[Jabawocky]

Very sad indeed, one of my "almost family" :{

Check PM's OpsNormal

[Jabawocky]

I am not sure its right just yet to publish names, but I can confirm the PIC (I assume he would have been) was a family friend, you know the adopted family thing....almost a brother. :{

So rather than broadcast things, if you wish to PM me with the names of folk you are concerned about I will either confirm or deny based on that one person. I do not know the other pilot concerned

MODS
If this post is out of line please remove it. I know how I felt for an hour or so, and others may want clarity.

Just not too sure how to handle this from here, but I now know how others feel at a time like this.

J

[The Green Goblin]

I can't believe someone has already updated wikipedia under the Airnorth information.

Farking despicable.

I knew both of 'em :{

When you fly long enough, I suppose this sort of thing happens. let's just hope that something positive comes from this mess.

[Leatherdog]

My sincere condolence's to the families and the greater pilot/aviation community of the NT for the unnecessary loss of life.:{

I hope that this brings the need for full flight simulator's to mandatory status for RPT operator's. Tam-air proved that.:ugh:

Leatherdog.

[remoak]

Like conducting refresher training in simulators and not aircraft... because this is an oft-trodden path. I wonder if they were practising an engine failure on takeoff...

Very sad for the families and friends of the crew, made worse by the fact that this sort of accident is unnecessary in this day and age.

[Much Ado]

Two threads merged - please keep all posts on this subject here.

[ROH111]

This is really sad news.

I am sure the pilots did their best in the circumstance but unfortunately it wasn't enough.

A sad day for aviation.

[pilot2684]

In another thread it was said they were doing Asymmetric training. Possibly a simulated EFATO, that went actual.

My sincerest condolences to the family and friends of the two pilots lost. This is a very sad day for both Air North and Australian Aviation as a whole.

To the family, My thoughts and prayers are with you.

[Much Ado]

Please don't turn this into a condolences thread especially if you have no personal connection with the crew concerned.

[LeadSled]

remoak,

Spot on.

And going further, cutting out in-air exercises, where the training value is no way proportionate to the risk. Our accident rate in training in small multi-engine aircraft ( where there is no sim. available) is there for all to see --- and it is not a pretty picture.

Our inflexible regulations ---- one size fits all ---- doesn't help either, with very little flexibility for training pilots to exercise operational judgment re. particular types of aircraft/AFMs/ Type Certificate Holder's recommendations, in complying with the "rules".

Tootle pip!!

[downunderscouser]

I was trained by the PIC, such a great guy and an absolute professional.

[remoak]

I'm just waiting for all the usual suspects to start bleating on about waiting for the report...

No airline-level aircraft should ever have it's crew training done in the aircraft. These two guys died for no reason at all. V1 cuts in small (and even large) turboprops are extremely risky if not handled correctly... that is why simulators exist.

[Stilted Converstions]

Please No Names, No Condolences from strangers and definately NO SPECULATION!

These were great guys.

[Jabawocky]

Downunder......

Yes, its true that he was one of lifes great people, comes from a family of them, and with recent events and other family sadness in the last 10-15 years I really am not looking forward to seeing his mum tonight. I have heard heaps from others along a similar line and will do my best to convey it appropriately.....however you do that. :sad:

[Servo]

I certainly agree with the above posts. I know for a fact that there is an Emb120 sim in Melbourne available.

I would hate to think that a company would use an actual aircraft to simulate and practice high risk manuevers than spend a proportionate amount and have the crew use a simulator and overnight them at a hotel etc.

I dont know what happened in this case nor do I wish to speculate what caused the accident, but a simulator lets you practice in relative safety, if the incorrect action/procedure was to be completed................

Now another two pilots have their eternal wings :{

[smoka21]

Does anyone have information whether any of the ex-Air Vanuatu boys are involved, please respond via pm.

thanks

g

[av8trflying]

Media Release

2010/06

Media briefing: Aircraft accident at Darwin Airport

22 March 2010


The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) is investigating the accident involving an Embraer Basilia aircraft (registration number VH-ANB) at Darwin Airport, Northern Territory, which occurred at 1010 CST on 22 March 2010.
The ATSB investigator in charge, Mr Alex Hood will conduct a briefing on known factual aspects of the aviation accident.

Where: Outside RAAF Base Darwin, NT (Cnr of Stuart Hwy and Billeroy Road)
Date: Tuesday 23 March 2010, 1400 CST (local time)

No further media briefings will be conducted by the investigation team. After this briefing, all media enquiries must be directed to the media contact listed below.


Media Contact: 1800 020 616

[VH-UFO]

I used to live on the RAAF Base in Darwin, Binnari Place.

Now if i remember the corner of Stuart Hwy and Billeroy Rd is the main intersection out of the RAAF Base where the shops are.(re the previous posts media release.)

I thought it came down near the golf course, which would be more likely since its on the direct path away from 29.

Where exactly did it come down?

[Horatio Leafblower]

Goose - that's where the media scrum is being held!!! :}

[flying-spike]

Let me push start the wait-for-the-investigation bandwagon.
At this stage we (the aviation community) just don't know what happened. Already there is criticism of the company and the regulations.

It won't be long before the engineers and CASA get a blast and eventually somebody will take a swipe at the crew. As I said we just don't know and until a proper, professional investigation has been done and the results released all the chest beating in the world means nothing.
One thing we do know. Two of our fellow professionals are dead, famililies are hurting in way we would never want to experience and their wider family, the airline, are grieving. Speculating only serves to add ignorant insult to injury.

Please express your genuine grief if you know the guys involved and support their families if you can but lay off the blame game. That is the least these guys deserve.

[Captain Kellogs]

To say I am in shock is an understatement.

I hadn't seen shane for years and caught up with him only a few days ago during a short visit to darwin,

He was one of the nicest people I have ever come across in the industry, I meet him as a new pilot in my very first flying job in Groote,He did my check ride and gave me a pat on my back and told me Id be right.

He was one of the most giving pilots I have ever come across in the industry, always trying to help others out and pass on his knowledge, He enjoyed watching young pilots learn and grow, and was always there to give useful pointers, I am very happy to have had him as a friend and I am very sad at hearing the news, it has upset me more than I thought it would, as all my memories of him are positive ones

My sincere condolences go out to his family who were always the most important thing in his life, when ever I spoke to him he would always talk about how they were going and how proud he was of them all.

You will be very sorely missed mate,

RIP

[Leatherdog]

Watch out guys, the media wolves are 'hunting' on this forum for someone to speculate on the accident.

I suggest any contact attempt from anyone from the media be left well ALONE.

Stay Safe

Leatherdog

[Howabout]

Guys,

Please read flying-spike's post again.

Enough said.

[RENURPP]

I see no problem with the media reporting "facts". Why hide facts, all be it I suspect not many are known at this stage.

I have been watching the news down south (Brisbane) and the accident hasn't rated a mention . I. E. Not on word, obamas health deal, Patels court case and some new orange fizzy drink are the headlines on 7,9,10 and the ABC

what are the facts known to date?

[BrisbaneR33]

The ABC have a story and video too:
Two pilots killed in plane crash - ABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation) (http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2010/03/22/2852536.htm)

[Utradar]

I'm really sad to hear this. I knew SW from the days of AA in Darwin and I had the utmost respect for his instruction and his genteel approach to everyone he came in contact with. He was a good guy and well liked and will be sorely missed! He supported a few of us at groote in very troubling times back in 02.
As always, PLEASE GIVE HIM AND HIS COLLEAGUE THE DIGNITY AND RESPECT THEY DESERVE as airmen. To you di@kheads, please refrain from wild speculating and finger pointing here and leave the findings to the investigators. They will do their job and the facts will be released in due course.

Can't believe it. really wish I wasn't posting this. :{

[Checkboard]

PPRuNe is a rumour network, specifically for pilots to report and comment on events in the industry. An accident is always a major story for pilots, some of us because we knew those involved, some simply for the safety lessons each accident brings.

please refrain from speculating here and leave the findings to the investigators. They will do their job and the facts will be released in due course.

With the utmost respect, the official report has its place, and speculation and commentary here has its place. To ask for no one to speculate is simply to ask for this site not to exist. You know speculation will occur - if you will find that distressing, don't read the thread.

My sincere condolences go out to his family who were always the most important thing in his life, when ever I spoke to him he would always talk about how they were going and how proud he was of them all.

We all feel for the sorrow the families experience in this difficult time, however those who really know the families involved would do better to contact them at an appropriate time. Those who don't - your general feelings are a given, there is really no need to express them on an anonymous website, to be read by other anonymous people.

[Jabawocky]

Capt Kellogs, not sure names have been officially released yet but you and Spoilher are correct on the checkie. Dont know who the other pilot was.

Just spen the evening with his mum here and its a pretty sad time with that and other family illness issues.

Were you up there for his 50th? Part was a few days early, his birthday being Thursday.

And you are right, one of the really top blokes, a family full of them.

J:(

Renurp..... Pretty sad really from the ABC, check pilots mum had not seen anything and wanted to see something, we sat there for the whole program, nothing but Tiger Woods and Patel. Maybe its better that way anyway.

[Checkboard]

Checkboard your an idiot....
Not such an "idiot" that I make a simple grammatical error in a post accusing another of being an idiot. :hmm:

[Utradar]

This site is also a site where us 'laaaaazy pilots' (SW) sometimes go to find news about things like this, where we might know the guys involved in the incident or accident and many of us might be a little emotional and sensitive about an ex-colleague or mate's passing. Tell me of another internet site where pilots know to go to find out about the guys involved.

I have watched PPRUNE over the years where people have baggged the hell out of the unfortunate pilots and they've turned out completely wrong. There is nothing wrong with healthy debate but don't start the blame game until the investigation is done.

I do believe due respect should be given to such a thread because often as has been said and seen many times before, the families and friends will usually get on here first and will continue to follow the thread. SENSITIVITY HAS IT'S PLACE! Be respectful.

[Capt Claret]

Does anyone know if Air North have grounded thier fleet over the accident?

No they didn't, heard several Top Ends on BNE Centre tonight.

[Checkboard]

I'm listening. I have been in aviation a long time and to date have had eight friends die in GA & the RAAF. I certainly don't (and didn't) condone a blame game - but that, for instance, doesn't preclude speculation on the cause or causes of an accident. Such speculation can help non-aviation readers (like the families) understand a bit more about how the tragedy occurred IMHO.

[Capt Claret]

Asking for no speculation is inane, banal, and contrary to human nature; and on a Rumour Network, no less. :ugh:

[remoak]

Checkerboard you really are a fool,

No, he's one of the very few making any sense here.

We all get that this is an emotional time for some here, but this is a PROFESSIONAL pilots forum... so how about a professional approach to this accident?

It doesn't take a rocket scientist to work out what probably happened. Whatever the report concludes in a couple of years time, there are already valuable lessons to be learned.

When there is an accident, there are generally two causes - either the aircraft broke, or the pilot(s) made an error. Sometimes, a crash happens because the aircraft broke and the crew subsequently made error... swiss cheese and all that.

Most of you that knew one of the pilots are clearly in denial that your mate could possibly have made an error. Fine, but recognise that for what it is, a purely emotional response, not an analytical (or professional) one.

There will be speculation, anyone with half a brain knows that. Try and see through the emotion and look at the bigger picture.

While you are doing that, you may want to ask WTF they were doing training in the aircraft... there is only one sort of training that you do with no pax on board... think about it.

Those capable of objective thought may find similarities in the crash of a BAe Jetstream on 6 October 1992 at Prestwick...

[Tidbinbilla]

Come on, guys!

The gentlemen involved have been named in a previous link. Please do not re-post old links.

Secondly, we requested earlier that this NOT be turned into a condolence thread. Let's just keep to the facts.

Finally, we WILL NOT tolerate personal attacks on Moderators or members, just because they may hold a different opinion to yours.

Crashes which involve injury or worse can bring out the best and worst in people. Unfortunately we have witnessed more of the ugly side of some people here tonight.

Please just step back for a minute and THINK before clicking the submit button.

TID.

[frigatebird]

I'm with Checkboard. Have lost twice that number of colleagues that I have worked with - the last one in Bonaire last year. Without Prune I wouldn't have known of it. So far away I couldn't even begin to speculate on it, but that doesn't make the feeling of sadness at the cutting short a promising career any less. May never get to read the Official report into that one either. After watching the petty feeding frenzy of speculation over the Norfolk accident, thankfully without fatality, all I need to add is for people to be responsible and balanced in their views if they are to contribute.

[Utradar]

TID,

Thanks for that,

There doesn't seem to be personal attacks here, just opinionated, passionate personal responses.

The 'facts' are good, but when people speculate, these aren't facts, it becomes more of a personal opinion.

[Captain Kellogs]

All these people talking about how they shouldnt have been doing training in the aircraft should read the regs again.

It is perfectly legal and unfortunately sometimes things go wrong, I for one am not commenting on the cause, any one that does is an idiot because at this point there is no way of having any idea to even make an educated guess on what happened.

All I, and a lot of other posts are saying are that these guys were good at there job and were great guys. anything more than that is guess work.

if people want to have a shot at operators for doing training in aircraft they should be aiming there attention at the regulators rather than the operators who are just following the rules.

yes I am upset, as everyone that lost a mate today is, at the end of the day speculate all you like but wait till we have some idea of what happened before judging people that were merely following the regulations and procedures that have been used for years.

[Flying Binghi]

It doesn't take a rocket scientist to work out what probably happened. Whatever the report concludes in a couple of years time, there are already valuable lessons to be learned.

When there is an accident, there are generally two causes - either the aircraft broke, or the pilot(s) made an error. Sometimes, a crash happens because the aircraft broke and the crew subsequently made error... swiss cheese and all that.

Most of you that knew one of the pilots are clearly in denial that your mate could possibly have made an error. Fine, but recognise that for what it is, a purely emotional response, not an analytical (or professional) one.


What a daft contradition - is the suggestion that in this prang that the aircraft could of broke but that the pilot is to blame... just what a grieving mother needs to hear...:*

The "valuable lessons" will be found by the crash investigators not by some muppet posters on pprune.

flying-spike put it well me-thinks.




.

[Utradar]

Why don't we give the guys the benefit of the doubt.

Speculation is not fact's. We all like specuation because it gives us something to talk about. But who does it hurt?

To Tidbinbilla, what i'm arguing here is the people who don't give the facts, they're happy to speculate online here and 'learn something' which there is no factual evidence for (go above and beyond an aircraft crashing). It's not a condolence thread, just a thread where people want to post something nice about someone unfortunate. What's the problem with that?

[remoak]

What a daft contradition - is the suggestion that in this prang that the aircraft could of broke but that the pilot is to blame... just what a grieving mother needs to hear..No... it is general statement that applies all accidents. It happens to be true as well - sorry if that bursts your bubble.

Tell me this - if an aircraft, certified for RPT as you call it over there, has an EFATO and the crew mis-handle it and crash - who is to blame? As the aircraft clearly has the performance to handle the engine-out, the responsibility rests with the crew, does it not?

I am not addressing a grieving mother, I am addressing a Professional Pilots forum. Try and keep your emotions under control.

The "valuable lessons" will be found by the crash investigators not by some muppet posters on PPRuNe.

Sure. Check back with me in a couple of years... until then, those of us with half a brain will draw our own conclusions...

[Jabawocky]

Spoilher

Unfortunately there has been a massive amount of bad stuff ....its just not here on this thread and any that was has been deleted it seems. I reckon a close eye is being kept for that stuff.

Dont blame Tids or MA for the clean ups and suggestions, some of what I saw on another thread was not very good at all. And it had nothing to do with Shane and Gregs demise.

Cheers

J

[Utradar]

Remoak,

"Sure. Check back with me in a couple of years... until then, those of us with half a brain will draw our own conclusions... "

Are you speculating that this happened to this crew? You may have half a brain and look very stupid if it turns out otherwise. People that draw their own conclusions based on the very limited facts they have turn out to be very ignorant. How do you it wasn't caused by some other reason out of the crew control? Is this how a professional pilot should think, therefore act on his/her own flight management? I don't think so. We learn from facts that have been thorougly investigated and experienced by our peers, and then apply what we've leared. It doesn't come from speculation over a few beers.

[positivegee]

I hope the findings of this terrible accident are released in a timely manner so that we can all learn from this!

+G

[beaver_rotate]

Ok I'm sorry but I'm having a nibble. We all know what was probably happening up the front of said Braz (following the letter of the our esteemed regulators law...)
Fact: ANB was on a training flight
Fact: 2 POB (only pilots onboard)
Fact: the Emb120 sim in Tullamarine is available (I'm happy to be stand corrected... is it U/S?) for ballpark (I'm aware of the pricing) $750 per hour; JQ DRW-MEL return $400? And a night at the 'Not so Quality Inn' $90 (....all facts)...
Why why why why why why... whyyyy do operators continue assy training in the aircraft when a SAFE alternative is available? No judgement to AN at all, it's legal still, right? Wasn't anything learnt from the Brasilia incident at Skippers (god bless 170% Tq hey?) I know the ATSB forwarded said final report to all Oz Emb120 operators.

And why x 1000 does this industry insist on savings today, giant sink holes tomorrow. I've just left an operator (RPT) who insisted on savings over safety time and time again.... You may have saved a few thousand $ today, but at what price?
An airfame
An insurance premium
Your reputation
And innocent lives.... Simply complying to the regs.
To CASA.... Shame on you and your beaurocratic bullshi*
Will this be another Tamworth? I hope so, I just wish at not this cost....

[remoak]

People that draw their own conclusions based on the very limited facts they have turn out to be very ignorant.

Leaving aside the incomprehensible grammar, let's look at this objectively.

I can only think of four likely causes. We'll leave weather out of it as it doesn't appear to have been a factor.

1. It was a post-maintenance test flight and something went catastrophically wrong.

2. It was a training flight, and the trainee mishandled a simulated emergency and the check pilot couldn't recover in time.

3. It was a training flight, and there was a real emergency that neither pilot could recover from.

4. It was a training flight, and there was a catastrophic failure that neither pilot could recover from.

The only scenario that puts the crew beyond blame is the sudden, catastrophic failure. Anything else should be able to be handled in this class of aircraft, particularly as it would have been very light. If it does turn out to be a mishandled simulated emergency (which I think it will, but don't know for sure), the question becomes why were they doing it at a dangerous height? Have we really not learned from the many other accidents of this nature?

Should we turn our brains off and wait for the report? Well, you can if you like. It is hardly a professional thing to do, but whatever floats your boat.

In my experience, these things usually turn out to be pretty much what they look like. It's a bit like investigating an accident where an aircraft has run out of fuel (and there have been plenty). The report will take a year to come out, but it will simply conclude that the aircraft ran out of fuel, a conclusion that should be blindingly obvious to anyone who can form coherent sentences. Do you really need the report to come to that conclusion? Well, you might, but I don't.

One of the persistent problems in aviation is the refusal of pilots to objectively evaluate the role of their colleagues in accidents. It is a form of denial that is more prevalent in GA than the airlines, because the airlines get it and try and train it out of their crews via Human Factors training.

It is not a pleasant thing to consider that a friend and colleague may have messed up, but a professional pilot will make an informed judgement and move on. It's how we prevent ourselves from repeating the mistakes of others. The report just confirms what we (should) already know.

[Utradar]

I'm sure the grammer is comprehensible. You know what i'm saying.

Look, remoak, you may be right but then you maybe wrong. A professional pilot will not make An ASs out of UMand ME (ASSUME) but will get the facts and make a decision based on those facts. ATSB will also do this. If they can't come to a definitive conclusion, they won't say they suspect improper training caused it in the investigation.

Remoak says "It is not a pleasant thing to consider that a friend and colleague may have messed up, but a professional pilot will make an informed judgement and move on. It's how we prevent ourselves from repeating the mistakes of others. The report just confirms what we (should) already know."

Do you have all the facts? No, becasue you are not an ATSB representative studying the case. You have come to a preconceived idea based upon what you have heard. Just give the family and the guys reputations the dignity and respect and wait for the factual report.

We learn stuff in human factors that has been evaluated and proven by the ATSB and relevant authorites using research and FACT. It is fair to talk about why training is done in an aircraft of this capacity just don't blame the guys until investigation is done.

[eocvictim]

News limited is a rumour network, specifically for idiots to report and comment on events on nothing.

Fixed for accuracy.

What is "allowed" in this thread, no condolences, no speculation, no mentioning pilots involved, no mentioning facts due to prying eyes. Short of what's been posted why is this thread open. You've said no to all possible replies. Close the thread and mods to post all "factual" updates. In fact while you're at it ban all replies to all threads.

I'm not encouraging idiots without a clue to post but please realise, this is a public forum where everyone has the right to give their piece.

Main Entry: fo·rum
Pronunciation: \ˈfȯr-əm\
Function: noun
1. ... b : a public meeting place for open discussion...

If thats not your thing, write a blog.

[remoak]

How can you make an informed judgement based upon speculation? Do you have all the facts? No, becasue you are not an ATSB representative studying the case. You may merely make a decision based upon what you have heard. Speculation?

The facts, as I understand it, and as reported by the police, are:

- The aircraft departed on a training flight.
- Shortly after rotation, the aircraft banked steeply to the left and impacted the runway.

Now please tell me what you think caused it.

You may not be able to add two and two, but most of the rest of us can.

Now I am perfectly happy to be proved wrong, and in some ways I hope I am, but for now the most likely cause of this accident is pretty obvious. There is clearly a loss of control - but what caused it? It doesn't appear to be the weather, so what else? You only have two options - catastrophic mechanical failure, or crew error. Take your pick. Of course, if you can think of a third (or fourth) possibility, by all means correct me.

You don't have to be an ATSB representative, who by the way will also indulge in speculation where all the facts aren't known, to figure that out.

You have also missed the bigger picture, the human picture on how to be compassionate and noble in the face of grief.That is not the bigger picture. Whilst some of you will no doubt want to wallow in overblown sentiments of dignity in the face of grief, I am pretty sure that the two pilots involved would be amongst the first to say get over it, figure it out, make sure it doesn't happen again. THAT is the bigger picture.

[PLovett]

Gentlemen, to blame CASA for the legislation which permits crew training to be done in aircraft when a simulator is available, as several posters to this thread have done, is to miss the point.

The legislation is the minimum acceptable standard to which any organisation is required to meet. It does not prevent an organisation from setting higher standards.

QANTAS, Virgin Blue, JetStar at al could all train and endorse in the aircraft should they so desire but for a variety of reasons, including safety, they choose to use a simulator. Perhaps it is time for operators to review their training standards in the light of this most unfortunate crash.

[RENURPP]

How about starting a second thread discussing possible cause, training on aircraft v sims, other issues relative to this type of accident.

If you aren't interested or are offended by this type of discussion don't read it.

Quite frankly, we should all be interested.

There have been plenty of examples that we don't seem to learn from during my career; off the top of my head, all training related

Pelair Westwing off Sydney
Tamair Metro at Tamworth
RAAF 707

[GNR]

theres to many people on here that say what we can and can't do,

stop argueing like 5 year olds. and talk like adults. if your offeneded , then don't come on here.

end of storey, we are all friends, can't we get along

back to topic

I don't see anything wrong with training in the aircraft, surely it must be safer doing it in an emb than a chieftain?

[relax737]

remoak, I see nothing wrong with your posts.

This site is named PPRuNe, Professional Pilots' Rumour Network

If it was named PPFN, Professional Pilots' Fact network, I could then understand the positions a few take, but until that name change, I don't.

I do understand the emotions involved, but as you, or possiby someone else,said above, is there any point in an anonymous poster pouring out his emotions on a forum where more anonymous people read them?? Probably not.

I probably didn't know either pilot, but I did work for the organization some years ago, and follow the company's progress with interest.

Incidentally, I also see only two scenarios, or combination thereof.

[Horatio Leafblower]

When was the last time you guys read an accident report and thought "Well, THAT's a new way to crash an aeroplane!"

When was the last time you read an accident report and, within the first few paras, didn't know what comes next?

...and have any of you read Tom Wolfe's "The Right Stuff"? If not, I suggest you do so. It was SOP for Chuck Yeager and his contempories to kick around the circumstances of every crash and every fatality.

[relax737]

Horatio, well said. A NEW way to crash an aeroplane, indeed!

There aren't any new ways until somebody figures how to make them fly backwards, fixed wind that is, and somebody reverses one into a building.

[RENURPP]

I don't see anything wrong with training in the aircraft, surely it must be safer doing it in an emb than a chieftain?

I suspect this comment came from some one who has not had the opportunity to train in a sim?

There is absolutely no comparison. It is simply impossible to practice most scenarios in an aircraft.

The difference between a cheiftan and a larger aircraft is that there are no cheiftan sims, and we aren't talking about those flight sims.

[43Inches]

I don't see anything wrong with training in the aircraft, surely it must be safer doing it in an emb than a chieftain?


Not at all, whilst the chieftain may have less climb performance on one engine it is a much less complicated aircraft. An engine failure in a turbo-prop at low speed can require more effort to retain control than the lower powered pistons like PA31 and C400 series. An autofeather failure at low speed and altitude and you might be in trouble. There are many scenarios which could occur during and shortly after take-off which could lead to loss of control. Unfortunately all of them are a result of someone making an error at some stage whether its pilots, engineers, a part manufacturer etc...

The simulator if used correctly will prove how critical some of these failures can be and is invaluable in training crews.

[Anthill]

Fact: the Emb120 sim in Tullamarine is available (I'm happy to be stand corrected... is it U/S?) for ballpark (I'm aware of the pricing) $750 per hour; JQ DRW-MEL return $400? And a night at the 'Not so Quality Inn' $90 (....all facts)...
Why why why why why why... whyyyy do operators continue assy training in the aircraft when a SAFE alternative is available? No judgement to AN at all, it's legal still, right? Wasn't anything learnt from the Brasilia incident at Skippers (god bless 170% Tq hey?) I know the ATSB forwarded said final report to all Oz Emb120 operators.

And why x 1000 does this industry insist on savings today....



Spending more is usually the cheapest option. :(

[Checkboard]

A dozen posts in a row of decent, reasoned discussion! :D
There IS hope! :bored:

[mates rates]

The ATSB investigation will give us the real cause of this accident.I think I am right to say from the CAO's,for training flights the FDR/CVR's have to be serviceable.So they should tell the full story when the investigation is complete.Hopefully they were serviceable to make the flight legal.

[compressor stall]

Yup, irrespective of the final outcome to the causes of this accident, there are a number of people that still have to understand that just because the regs permit something does not make it safe or sensible - especially when there are other options.

[FGD135]

There is nothing inappropriate about remoak's posts. We should feel grateful that a person of his wisdom and experience is contributing to this discussion.

The "big picture"? That is all about the causes of the crash and what the lessons are for safety. Spoilher, you are confusing the big picture with the small picture.

As far as costs are concerned, it is actually cheaper to do this sort of training in the simulator. So, no, the operator is not doing it in the aircraft to save money!

I have had discussions with a couple of fellow turboprop pilots about this crash. When speculating about whether the engine-out performance of the aircraft was a factor, they both made statements similar to:


The Braz has got so much power it could fly away with gear down and propeller windmilling.


This view is alarming. I have also heard a King Air pilot say the same about his aircraft.

Where do these guys get these views? Do these ideas start as bar talk that then spread via the younger and more impressionable pilots? Just how entrenched is this view?

Something for the ATSB to think about ...

[ratso]

Tribute from todays NT Newspaper to two great AUSTRALIANS tragically taken from us.
I am sure they are in a better place than us.

Crash pair a part of NT community | Northern Territory News | Darwin, Northern Territory, Australia | ntnews.com.au (http://www.ntnews.com.au/article/2010/03/23/133751_ntnews.html)

[beaver_rotate]

Peter you missed my point; My argument is if there's a sim it should be law that it's used and not done in the aircraft (for example there's no F50 sim in oz so well they have no other choice)

[Josh Cox]

FGD,

I think you are missing the point with those two statements:

The Braz has got so much power it could fly away with gear down and propeller windmilling.

I have also heard a King Air pilot say the same about his aircraft.

In the case of the EMB120, it is an aircraft that has to be able to do exactly that to meet the requirements of CAO 20.7.1B.

In the case of the B200, whilst it is not required to meet 20.7.1B, it more than likely can, surely someone has ran the numbers on this statement.

They were making a statement on the single engine performance of the aircraft.

IMHO the same can not be said for say, a PA39 or C402B, (from personal experience). i.e. A PA39 on one engine can not climb away with gear down and the failed windmilling.

I do not believe they were displaying an over confidence or arrogance in those cases, statement of opinion/fact.

[rj27]

Had a chat to one of the deceased only a month ago at the Ansett sim centre, ironically he was there trying to organise the Brasillia sim training program for A/N. He was also heading to greener pastures in the near future. A terrible tragedy at any time.RIP.

[43Inches]

The Braz has got so much power it could fly away with gear down and propeller windmilling.

In the case of the EMB120, it is an aircraft that has to be able to do exactly that to meet the requirements of CAO 20.7.1B.



Not entirely familiar with the Braz but would assume it must have an autofeather system which enables the prop to quickly feather and then the aircraft can meet the CAO requirements. The prop discs on 30 seaters like the braz is huge and a windmilling prop would be the equivelent of about 2-3 tons extra weight. FGD is quite correct in being concerned with these statements and a quick visit to the sim may correct some of these veiws.

[Josh Cox]

Do you know what "Segment One" is ?.

Reference CAO 20.7.1B section 7.1


7.1 In the take-off configuration assuming failure of the critical engine so that it is

recognised at V
1, an aeroplane must be able to climb without ground effect at

the speed established as the speed at which the aeroplane becomes airborne and

in this configuration, without landing gear retraction, achieve a gross gradient
of climb which is positive for two-engined aeroplanes.





Note: I am not buying into discussion of this horrible event, thought FGD was mistakenly suprised by what he/she was told/overheard, wanted to share an objective explaination.

[FGD135]

Josh,

Your statements are causing me some alarm - and affirming my view that this dangerous perception is widespread.

No twin engined aircraft can climb with one propeller windmilling. You should know that instinctively!

[Josh Cox]

Really ?, are all twin engine aircraft equipped with operational auto feather ?, are you expected to rely on that auto feather, you know, with your life ?.

In two crew, when do you run your "Phase One Drill" ?, before or after the acceleration altitude ?, how then do you get to acceleration altitude ?.

[t303]

I have had discussions with a couple of fellow turboprop pilots about this crash. When speculating about whether the engine-out performance of the aircraft was a factor, they both made statements similar to:

Quote:
The Braz has got so much power it could fly away with gear down and propeller windmilling.
This view is alarming. I have also heard a King Air pilot say the same about his aircraft.

Where do these guys get these views?

"These guys" have likely experienced it themselves! I have seen it "demonstrated" by students many times - zero thrust (sometimes closer to flight idle), at fwdish c of g, training weights!!. Aircraft entirely controllable, and surprising performance, if everything else is normal. Not a method to be encouraged, of course.

[UnderneathTheRadar]

Peter you missed my point; My argument is if there's a sim it should be law that it's used and not done in the aircraft (for example there's no F50 sim in oz so well they have no other choice)

Bit of a strange concept. Is there something that invalidates a sim if you have to cross water to reach it?

Either it's not legal to train in a real a/c in which case it doesn't matter where the sim is - you have to use it; or it is legal to train in the sim. Putting distances from the sim in legislation?

Sensible to use an aircraft - not going there.....

UTR.

[Capt Claret]

No twin engined aircraft can climb with one propeller windmilling. You should know that instinctively!

Having more than a few hours C&T on the DH8, including the Simulator, I have witnessed, on several occasions, a twin engined aeroplane do just that.

A colleague with my current employer was also a colleague in a former life. He was flying a Nord out of Sydney for Tamworth when a blade separated from the 5 bladed prop, and in doing so damaged the hub preventing feathering of the prop. With a load of pax, they continued flight back to Sydney with the remnants of the prop windmilling happily.

--------------------------------------

One must agree that Stallie's comment above is right on the money. Legal isn't necessarily best.

[Hugh Jarse]

No twin engined aircraft can climb with one propeller windmilling. You should know that instinctively!Absolutely INCORRECT!

To use just one example - both Clarrie and I have a few hours on the Dash from previous lives. The 1/2/300 series ALL have MEL's for dispatch with autofeather inop. Yes, there is a weight penalty, which will guarantee compliance with 20.7.1b.

Most operators (as did the one I worked for) covered training for such situations in the simulator during the cyclic program on a very regular basis. All fairly routine, as I'm sure Clarrie will attest to. These exercises were conducted with the aircraft configured in the assumption that autofeather was operating (ie no weight penalty). The aircraft still climbed prior to the condition lever being moved to Start/Feather during the recall actions.

I'm sure there are other aircraft which can dispatch with inop autofeather/NTS.

To make a broad sweeping statement that an aircraft will not climb with a windmilling prop shows a lack of understanding (or experience) on propeller driven aeroplanes. Particularly turboprops.

I'm sure the guys involved in this crash were doing what was a fairly routine training exercise, only conducted in the aircraft. I'm not going to express an opinion on the merit or otherwise of what happened yesterday. I'll leave that to the experts.

[43Inches]

Forgot to add that at reduced weight aircraft which require a functional autofeather (or equivelent) may depart in compliance with the CAO;

(Very simply) To climb Thrust and Lift must balance or exceed Weight and Drag. Assuming power is limited then if drag dramatically increases (windmilling prop) then by reducing weight you can get the required performance. But the weight penalty is usually quite large.


Engine failure with the failure of an autofeather system at high weight soon after V1 and some large turbo-props may even struggle to get airborne at all let alone climb after lift off. Quick action by the crew to manually feather the prop is required.

Most twin engined aircraft could reduce weight to a level where able to climb in various high drag situations. But are these statements still true at normal operating weights? Most likely no, and configuration becomes critical.

[frigatebird]

Well this is my story, and I can claim it as either Fact or Rumour, at any time - but a valuable lesson was learnt at the time that has stayed with me ever since. It has no connection with anyone other than myself and the Instructor - I was embarrassed at the time, and now that I'm sharing it, will be embarrassed again, but it was an important learning incident at a critical point in my career.
With 5000 hours total, and twin time, I was sent to San Antonio for a month to Flight Safety to do my Initial Turbine Endorsement, Single Pilot, Systems Groundschool and Simulator training on Metro. There were about five of us on the Systems course, one fellow came from Angola and others from the U.S. When it came to the Simulator sessions, to operate single pilot, it was just myself and the Instructor.
The Simulator sessions progressed, and as I got used to the placement of everything, the handling, and the memory items on the checklists, the sessions moved on to Emergencies.
On a take off, the Instructor gave me an engine failure at about 100-150 feet.
Now I knew what I had to do, and there wasn't much time, so I did it. Part of the cleanup was to reach down and pull the big red Stop and Feather button. Handling the still strange aeroplane, watching out the front to keep straight, trying to remember the order of things, suddenly it all went very quiet in that Sim. I had pulled the Wrong Big Red Button.
With no time to even try a restart, all I could do was to try and glide it down onto, and overrun the simulated runway.
Back on the 'ground', the Instructor, in his Texan drawl, said "You won't do that again", to which I replied "No Sir !!!". "We prefer all our students to make their mistakes in the Sim", he said.

So ever since, when given an engine failure during a Renewal, or a Base Check, I take just a split second longer on the identification and confirmation, and get it correct. All the amount of reading of others mishaps, while valuable, doesn't compare to something you have survived, even if it was in a Sim.

I later did the real flying on the aircraft, to finish the endorsement, when it was delivered to the company.

[LeadSled]

----- and somebody reverses one into a building.
Folks,
Actually, if you substitute forest covered mountain for "building", that ain't a new way.

Many moons ago, BEA backed an Argosy freighter in to a mountain near Milan, the crew survived. Seriously strong winds and a bit of disorientation in a holding patter.

Tootle pip!!

[Hoofharted]

Two blokes dead, maybe/maybe not pilot error. Families grieving, friends lost forever and all most of you want to do is get into a dick waiving contest. :ok:

[relax737]

Hoofharted, this is a forum; what is being said/speculated upon here is not illegal, nor is it against the forum rules.

It is more than unfortunate that there are two pilots, as you say, good blokes, dead, two families + many others grieving, but this is life. People talk about events, dissect the circumstances, postulate on possible causes, and to do so shows no disrespect nor lack of consideration for those hurting.

To suggest so is just plain incorrect.

It seems there are some learning from this discussion and that can't be a bad thing. It's an ill wind that blows no good.

[ampk]

Fact: the Emb120 sim in Tullamarine is available (I'm happy to be stand corrected... is it U/S?) for ballpark (I'm aware of the pricing) $750 per hour; JQ DRW-MEL return $400? And a night at the 'Not so Quality Inn' $90 (....all facts)...


Pilot Wages several days $ ????
Flights XXXLD or more Pilots employed $ ????
Flight Duty Times $ ????
Allowances $ ????

There are more costs than some people care to think about - But no person ever wants to hear of a fatal crash..

[jetstar21]

We know the incident occurred and instead of attempting to ascertain what led to the result we should all just keep it to ourselves, sit on our hands/opinions and let the investigation proceed without outside influences.

Also, without the assumption that somebody must have done something wrong, might it just be possible that a malfunction like a run away propeller could have occurred which would cause the aircraft to do exactly as it did.
I won't elaborate further here now but having had that happen during training some time ago I can assure all that it is a definite possibility (among others) which seems to have escaped all the theories here. i.e. Don't be too fast in assuming a stuff up. "There but for the grace of god go I"

[KRviator]

"These guys" have likely experienced it themselves! I have seen it "demonstrated" by students many times - zero thrust (sometimes closer to flight idle), at fwdish c of g, training weights!!. Aircraft entirely controllable, and surprising performance, if everything else is normal. Not a method to be encouraged, of course.Correct me if I'm wrong, but Zero Thrust simulates a failed and feathered engine, not a failed one with a windmilling prop, so of course the aeroplane will climb away, that's what it was designed to do...

Did people not learn from the incident in Williamtown a decade ago where they set flight idle and the aircraft became uncontrollable because the action of setting flight idle (instead of zero thrust) simulated a failed engine, and a failed auto-feather system?

[Capt Claret]

Pilot Wages several days $ ????
Flights XXXLD or more Pilots employed $ ????
Flight Duty Times $ ????
Allowances $ ????

versus

every one alive and well, and an airframe in tact?

ps, I'm not attributing blame. Regardless of the cause, to be determined by the ATSB, had the training been in the sim, there'd be no wreck off the end of the runway and both pilots'd be talking about it in the pub.

What's the old adage?

If you thing training's expensive, try having an accident!

[relax737]

jetstar21, I don't believe anyone posting here has conclusively said it was pilot error, but it has been advanced as a possible cause.

Somebody said earlier that possibilities were

failure and pilot error
catastrophic failure

A failure alone wouldn't, and indeed shouldn't, cause a crash if properly handled; a catastrophic failure, e.g., a wing failing, would, regardless of what the pilots did.

Capt Claret, you're right on the button with that old adage.

Having spent a few years, and almost 5000 hours in GA before moving on, I can say that there are more cost cutting corners there than anybody is willing to talk about; not suggesting that was a factor in this incident, or that it was Air North policy when I was flying there.

[ampk]

Just mean when costs exceed income lots of lives are saved (until another operator starts up ). That is all there is no place with an endless money pitt.

That is not to say it was a factor in this.

[Pinky the pilot]

there are no cheiftan sims,

Not entirely correct. When the Kinghams ran ASA they had a twin sim in the TKFS that was set up as a Chieftain sim. Its handling in assymetric situations could best be described as 'vicious.'

When TK/CK retired it was sold to an organisation at YPFL which has since closed. Where it is now I do not know.

[strim]

RECOMMENDATION : AO-2007-017-SR-084 (http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/recommendations/2009/ao-2007-017-sr-084.aspx)

[Anthill]

Pilot Wages several days $ ????
Flights XXXLD or more Pilots employed $ ????
Flight Duty Times $ ????
Allowances $ ????


"A report released this month by the Federal Government's Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Economics (BITRE), puts a $2.67 million price tag on the cost of a road death, taking into account factors such as workplace and household losses, insurance and medical bills, road delays and legal costs". --- Illawarra Mercury, 20/2/2010.

On this basis the cost of the lost of 2 valued emplyees is $5,340,000.
Brasilia Aircraft (value): ~$2,000,000.
Lost revenue (80 seats/day, $200/ticket, 120 days): $1,920,000.

Not counting any other tangible or intangible costs (heartache, legal, increased insurance, corporate experience, re-training, loss of company goodwill...)

Already looking at economic damages to AirNorth of $10,000,000 upwards. This could kill the company.

Now, how much would it have cost to send these guys to MEL for simulator?

PS: I had the 'pleasure' of doing Base Training in a pressurised turbo prop aircraft some years ago at a CTAF airfield. There were 3 other aircraft doing circuit and navaid training while we were doing V1 cuts, SE circuits and SE NDB approaches (+Go-around). The questionable level of safety was raised to the check pilot by my good self. He explained that we couldn't afford to use the simulator. My take is that this is if you cant afford to send people to the simulator, perhaps you should not be in business.

[beaver_rotate]

As always GG, well put... I'm sure our employer doesn't value our life to a night in melb with associated allowances...!

[remoak]

My take is that this is if you cant afford to send people to the simulator, perhaps you should not be in business.

Precisely.

More to the point, CASA should mandate that a simulator be used for all asymmetric and emergency training where one is available, even if it is elsewhere in the world.

I'm afraid that in NZ and OZ, the regulatory authorities are in the dark ages when it comes to training in third level airlines and GA.

[Harry Cooper]

KR you are correct, zero thrust is there to simulate the aircraft with an engine failed and the prop feathered. The Braz requires (or at least used to) that the autofeather on each engine was tested before each sector, if it did not work it was a no-go item and the aircraft was grounded. The B200 is the same, however I think the requirement for testing on each sector has been removed (for the 4 blader that is). The one thing that has not been bought up yet, from my brief scan, is the massive increase in Vmca of a prop that is windmilling. If you conduct a V1 cut, continue the takeoff and attempt to climb at V2 with the prop windmilling you may not have control especially at the very low weights hence low V speeds that a Braz might have during training. On the B200 (with 4 blade props) it can be as much as 17knot increase (91KIAS to 108KIAS). If the aircraft does not meet climb gradient requiements during testing then systems like auto feather are often included as mandatory items. Thats why they are not allowed to operate without them.

[relax737]

Anthil, I was saying a similar thing from my first day in GA; if the boss can't afford to pay the award, not overload, not shortcut on maintenance, etc., then he shouldn't be in business, but plenty were, and still are.

Thanks for crunching the numbers; it's just such a shame that operators don't look at them and take note instead of adopting the 'it can't happen to us/here' mentality.

TAA stopped training for three engined take offs after a Viscount crash at Mangalore in 1954 killing three CC's. The risk of people being killed and aircraft lost in training far exceeded the risks involved for the odd occasion it maybe required. It was safer, and more cost effective, to fly bits to the grounded aircraft than train pilots for that eventuality.

I would venture to say that there have been more aircraft lost and crew killed in training accidents than in real incidents, so the common sense is that the training be done in the safest possible way, and if that involves more $$, then so be it, but the regulator must have the will, because operators aren't going to volunteer.

[privateer01]

Props have been known to do worse then windmill.....

Reverse would render it pretty unflyable.

[relax737]

Yep, and that would come under the category of 'catastrophic failure' if it occurred at low level, which this incident did. Even at altitude, if it couldn't be controlled, i.e. back to zero or flt idle, it would be likewise.

Different issue I know, but the Lauda Air 767 that had a reverser deploy on climb out of Bangkok in 1991 was deemed by Boeing and the NTSB to be recoverable if the crew had acted quickly enough. I think that occurred at about 15,000' and the aircraft disintegrated at about 4,000'.

[ampk]

Very well point anthill,

The questionable level of safety was raised to the check pilot by my good self. He explained that we couldn't afford to use the simulator. My take is that this is if you cant afford to send people to the simulator, perhaps you should not be in business.

Seems to come down to a choice - If the business can not afford to use the simulator - A Pilot does not have to work for them. We all have that choice.

If it came down to a split pin or a heart attack then there is no choice for the 2 concerned. Simply a tradgic accident.

[Hugh Jarse]

I don't know what engines the Braz has. With the PW12x on the DHC8 there is nothing (apart from the triggers, which are not locked out in flight) to prevent you from retarding the power levers below the flight idle detent.

I would suggest that if a power lever were to inadvertently be moved aft of the flight idle detent in flight, the result would be a propeller overspeed, and most likely blade separation long before reverse would be possible.

Neither is desirable, however.

[relax737]

ampk said

Fact: the Emb120 sim in Tullamarine is available (I'm happy to be stand corrected... is it U/S?) for ballpark (I'm aware of the pricing) $750 per hour; JQ DRW-MEL return $400? And a night at the 'Not so Quality Inn' $90 (....all facts)...


Pilot Wages several days $ ????
Flights XXXLD or more Pilots employed $ ????
Flight Duty Times $ ????
Allowances $ ????

There are more costs than some people care to think about - But no person ever wants to hear of a fatal crash..

OK, so factor in the DOC's of the aircraft versus the total costs of a simulator session, bearing in mind that two crew licences are renewed simultaneously.

Multiply the cost of sim hours by 2 (I'm guessing 2 hours are enough for two renewals, and I don't recall my GA renewals ever taking anything like an hour!) and do the sums. Probably close to $3,000 for two renewals over two hours including associated costs, but FAR more would be achieved in a sim than the aircraft. If the aircraft cost is within $500 per licence renewal (under) then it would have to still be worth it. I think the aircraft cost would probably be higher

[redline666]

No speculation here to a cause, but merely replies to a couple of queries in prior posts. Condolences to the pilot's families and greater Air North family.

Props have been known to do worse then windmill.....

Reverse would render it pretty unflyable

It wouldn't be the first Bras to pull Beta inflight.

ASN Aircraft accident Embraer 120RT Brasilia N270AS Brunswick, GABrunswick-Glynco Jetport, GA (BQK) (http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19910405-0)

An Airworthiness Directive was issued very quickly after the Atlantic Southeast accident and I have never heard of anything else similar since as far as the Brasillia and PW100 series is concerned.

I don't know what engines the Braz has. With the PW12x on the DHC8 there is nothing (apart from the triggers, which are not locked out in flight) to prevent you from retarding the power levers below the flight idle detent.

The Bras as a mechanical gate on the pedestal, as well as a lock out solenoid to prevent PLA below flight idle once weight off wheels. The solenoids can be locked out be tripping a CB.

[ampk]

relax 737, I hear you.

But these guys were in Darwin not Tull Airport, so you need to concider associated costs and time. There is a fair chance these guys may have been rostered for a revenue flight this same day.

The ideal a free sim with every Braz included in purchase from factory with free spares and updates or CASA supply a sim for all Braz endorsed pilots. The list goes on. This is not a perfect world infact far from it..

[Horatio Leafblower]

Someone earlier referred to the Bae Jetstream at Prestwick in 1992.

Without making any statement about the cause of the Bras accident, I offer this for those of us less familiar with turboprop assymetric handling and training issues. It is interesting reading.

Prestwick J32 Report (http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/British%20Aerospace%20Jetstream%203202,%20G-SUPR%2011-93.pdf)

[training wheels]

I know that Indonesia's Wings Air (Lion Air's subsidiary regional airline) send their pilots to the Ansett Sim Centre every 6 months for their currency checks on the Dash 8. Now if they can afford to do so .....

[AerocatS2A]

Hugh, some Dash 8s have a beta lockout to prevent the props going into ground beta in flight, regardless of where the power levers are. If you get singing canaries when you lift the triggers on the power levers then you will not be able to select beta in flight.

[Flying Bear]

From discussion recently with some in the know at AN, I understand that they are working towards a sim training programme for their Brasilia fleet / crews. Shame it did not come about quick enough, and I commend AN and other operators that prioritise such training resources, sometimes to the detriment of the "bottom line".

Sound training practice is the cornerstone of aviation safety.

I have long been an advocate for FFS training - the notion that in-aircraft training is as realistic, or as safe as a simulator is archaic, to say the least, and smacks of ignorance from those with a gung-ho attitude to their work...

If an operator cannot afford to use a sim for their training in sequences that are risky to the aircraft (ie asymmetrics), then they should not be in business. To justify risking crews and aircraft on fiscal grounds these days with the technology that is about is weak.

If you have to travel overseas, so be it. Factor it into your operating costs and ticket sales.

If the sim you want is in Melbourne or Sydney, fantastic.

CASA put out their discussion paper regarding this subject and comments / feedback for it recently closed. Hopefully they will accelerate their decision and law making process to mandate this safety in training, based on this tragic event.

I believe that this should apply to all aircraft above 5700 kg - from Dash 8s to Beech 1900s and the sooner the better.

Some of the comments regarding asymmetric performance earlier are laughable - and highlight the ignorance and poor standards that all-too-often escape from today's flying schools - but that is another subject... How can one teach a skill that they have yet to master? (my old mate HM coined that one to all new instructor rating trainees).

Not to necessarily say that a training mishap caused this accident - the ATSB lads will find that out in due course - but my two cents worth since the topic has gone down this path.

I hope this causes each C&T pilot out there to redouble their efforts to stay safe - I know it has for me.

[Hugh Jarse]

Gidday Horatio,

Yes, I remember from the Tamair crash (which I witnessed) and subsequent investigation that "zero thrust" (simulating a functional NTS on the Garretts) was around 15% torque on a functional engine (and probably a factor, considering it was normal practice to select flight idle during asymmetric training in that particular organisation). But that was with Garretts, so probably not so relevant to this investigation. Nonetheless, the Prestwick investigation mentions flight idle vs zero thrust.... Good reading.

Aerocat, the QL Dash fleet was retrofitted with Beta warning horn switches quite a few years ago. The mod does not prevent power lever movement below flight idle in flight. It purely involves a microswitch mod into the power lever triggers to alert the crew when the triggers are depressed in flight.

[news]

Was it the first flight after maintenance. If so what was the maintenance?
Have the cockpit voice and flight data recorders been recovered.





just the facts

[Goat Whisperer]

There is concern when an aircraft in the Dash/Braz/Saab class has a sim gathering dust in our country (literally weeks/months between log entries).

[Mach E Avelli]

It is such a shame that CASA is not as advanced as either the PNG or NZ CAA with regard to mandating simulator (see NZ CAR 121.579 and its PNG equivalent) for exercises which are hazardous or impractical in the real aircraft. These countries have had this legislation in place for several years already and our time-warped CASA are still beating their gums about whether industry will accept it or not. We have a long and sad history of training fatalities in this country and we are still debating it ??? In such matters firm dictatorship is sometimes appropriate, especially when backed by precedent from more advanced aviation nations (and for all that we may bag the Kiwis, they do seem to be way ahead of us with their aviation legislation). If all operators were equally required to conduct simulator, no one operator would be disadvantaged commercially. Well, not unless they operated some exotic type that is only supported by a simulator in Vladivostok, but that should be their problem, not CASA's.
Quoting from CASA sources dating back to last August:

CASA will address this issue and will commence a review of the legislation. In the course of that review, CASA will consider whether there is a need to mandate the use of simulators in connection with certain flight crew training requirements in the air transport sector, and other sectors where this may be appropriate.
This work will commence immediately. It will involve consultation with industry and may come to involve a risk assessment, a cost-benefit analysis, and the preparation of a regulatory impact statement. As this is likely to be a protracted process, CASA is not in a position to specify a specific completion date at this time.

[3 Holer]

High risk (http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2010/03/23/2854126.htm) manouvre being performed???

Says who?

[Checkboard]

AO-2007-017 (http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2007/aair/ao-2007-017.aspx)

The crew's endorsement and other training did not include simulator training and did not adequately prepare them for the event. There was no EMB-120 flight simulator facility in Australia and no Australian regulatory requirement for simulator training. In March 2009, an EMB-120 flight simulator came into operation in Melbourne, Vic. A workshop and discussion forum was conducted on 27 to 28 April 2009 for Australian Embraer 120 aircraft operators. All those operators were expected to commence utilising the simulator for flight crew endorsement training following that workshop.

Although, it looks like this was recurrent training, not endorsement training, the point has to be made that if it is considered safer to use the sim for one, then the same risk analysis would apply to the other, surely?


RECOMMENDATION : AO-2007-017-SR-084 (http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/recommendations/2009/ao-2007-017-sr-084.aspx)
The following inter-related activities are in the process of implementation:

* A combined workshop activity with Ansett Aviation Training, Capiteq Limited trading as AirNorth, Network Aviation Pty Ltd, Skippers Aviation Pty Ltd, PelAir Aviation Pty Ltd and CASA was held on 27, 28 April 2009.

(emphasis mine)

[remoak]

High risk (http://redirectingat.com/?id=42X487496&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.abc.net.au%2Fnews%2Fstories%2F2010%2F03 %2F23%2F2854126.htm) manouvre being performed???

Says who?

Pretty much everyone in the world who has any knowledge of this type of training... which is why it is not permitted in civilised parts of the world...

[Pimp Daddy]

It is such a shame that CASA is not as advanced as either the PNG or NZ CAA with regard to mandating simulator (see NZ CAR 121.579 and its PNG equivalent) for exercises which are hazardous or impractical in the real aircraft. These countries have had this legislation in place for several years already

Hang around at POM on the weekend and you'll still see Dash 8s doing V1 cuts. Unless they aren't classed as hazardous.

With ref to the Zero Thrust v Idle - there was an article on this very subject in Flight Safety magazine in the last year or 2.

[Mach E Avelli]

Pimp Daddy, it sounds like PNG has regressed. It's in their legislation (copied from NZ) that Part 121 operators should be using simulator but if the CAA fools won't enforce it, that's another matter. ICAO need to pay them another visit.

[AerocatS2A]

Hugh Jarse,

Could be the QL fleet didn't get the full beta lockout system. This is from the 300 manual,

Beta Lockout System (CR 873CH00011)

This system incorporates electrical circuits to prevent the propellers from entering the ground Beta range of operation during flight.

...

The BLS is disabled on the ground to allow for discing, by either 50 ft. RAD ALT or WOW signal ... Setting the PLA [Power Lever Angle] less than Flight Idle while in the flight mode enables the system. Beta backup protection remains enabled regardless of PLA setting while in the air mode.

The warning horn provides an aural warning [canaries] as the Flight Idle gate is removed by lifting the power lever triggers, and before ground beta is actually selected. The revised beta backup enable logic provides low blade angle protection independent of PLA while airborne, instead of the existing standard PLA greater than Flight Idle logic. The NP trigger is tripped upon detection of NP values in excess of 1000 PROP RPM when the power levers are set below the FLT IDLE gate in flight. This provides a discrete signal to increase the prop blade angle to reduce PROP RPM to values below the trigger point.

(My comments in square brackets [].) So it physically stops the props from going into beta as well as having the warning chirps when you lift the triggers. Incidentally it is not mentioned in the FCOM manual, but is in the Flight Manual. My reading of it is that if you have the canaries then you have the rest of it. It's not something you'll be testing in flight though and it's disabled below 50' RADALT so you wouldn't notice anything different in the flare.

If you had Beta Lockout Test switches on the Captain's side panel then you had the revised system that prevents beta in flight, if you had Beta Backup Test switches then you had the original system.

[learner001]

Zero thrust (±12% Garret D228, ±10% PW F50) (Can usually be accurately set by the trainer...)

or

Flight idle (depending on the (correct) 'rigging')... (On first flight of the day or airframe, you sometimes have 'no clue'...)


Two totally different worlds...

With (if not prepared, unexpected...) totally different (flight) characteristics...


Kind regards, learner...

[Kiwiconehead]

If you had Beta Lockout Test switches on the Captain's side panel then you had the revised system that prevents beta in flight, if you had Beta Backup Test switches then you had the original system.

Haven't got the manuals at home but when I was at QFL we only had the Beta Warning system. Tested each line check, put aircraft airborne, hold #1 RADALT test and flick the triggers for the warbler.

[alser]

Can anyone explain why the aircraft could not be set up in T/O configuration and then perform the exercise at a safe (safer) altitude.
Outside of using a simulator this would appear to be the safest alternative.

[remoak]

That is exactly what the UK CAA mandated after the Prestwick J32 accident - all "V1" cuts had to be done above 500' AGL.

Unfortunately, the point of the training is somewhat lost as you really need to be accelerating from below V1 to really get the point of how tricky the manouevre is, and how small the margin of error can be.

Which is why we have simulators...

I can remember when converting onto the F27 many years ago, that the simulator was regularly crashed while getting to grips with V1 cuts. It was perfectly possible to get off the ground with virtually no yaw and climb away at V2, but all of us, at some point, messed it up and crashed. Thank god for sims, eh...

The other "gotcha" in the F27 was an engine failure on finals... the autofeather didn't operate at approach power settings, so the prop stayed in fine and unless you remembered to feather it, you ended up with a giant disc and the end result was always a descent below the glide, max power on the operating engine and a gradual loss of control as you ran out of rudder and aileron... followed by a crash, usually inverted, short of the threshold. Nasty.

[Jabawocky]

In my opinion, there is no valid or justified reason. If the report comes out with a finding along the lines of what many expect, there will be yet another reason why your post is extremely valid.

I never allow any unbriefed (read as surprise attack) EFATO below 1000, if anyone does it, they may have grounds to visit a hospital shortly afterwards, with or without an accident.

Maybe there is some CASA requirement or company SOP's that require it, and if so someone qualified to comment might like to.

J

[Checkboard]

The other big difference between simulator training and flight training is that simulator training is (usually) conducted as a two crew procedure. The trainer operates the simulator from an instructor station behind the operating crew - leaving both able to concentrate fully on the training.

In a two crew engine failure exercise (or real event), both crew members work together to achieve the best result. Should the PF mishandle slightly, the other pilot calls, and if necessary corrects, before the situation gets out of hand, They help each other to to best extent possible.

In a flight training exercise, one pilot is under training - and the other is conducting the training. When the failure exercise takes place, the pilot conducting the training is constrained not to help, but to assess. The pilot conducting the training is at the same time distracted from the events by the requirement to adjust the power levers, retard them and then set zero thrust and monitor engine parameters. Should a handling error occur, the pilot trainer has a performance pressure to allow the error to develop somewhat before attempting to take control and thus "failing" the student.

This makes the flight training exercise more difficult to perform than the simulator exercise, as well as having a terribly higher consequence.

The training value compared to the simulator is also lower, due to the somewhat artificial crew roles required by the flight exercise.

[A37575]

but the Lauda Air 767 that had a reverser deploy on climb out of Bangkok in 1991 was deemed by Boeing and the NTSB to be recoverable if the crew had acted quickly enough.

Thread drift I know, but I remember reading that Lauda 767 accident report and the published tests that done after the event. The test report stated that the crew had four seconds to recover from the situation once the reverser deployed before control was irrevocably lost due aerodynamic forces. Keeping in mind it was at night and at the climb speed at the time which was around 280 knots IAS, the effect of reverse on one engine at that speed was catastrophic.

The rate of roll with one engine in full reverse would have inverted the aircraft extremely quickly. In any case there is a safety factor with inadvertent reverse in flight in that the throttle automatically closes to idle which in theory would make the rolling action less severe.

Assuming that safety factor did cut in with the Lauda 767, four seconds to get the aircraft straightened up after an extremely rapid roll and extreme nose down attitude was probably impossible allowing for the surprise factor. Also in those days very few airlines practiced unusual attitude recovery on instruments in their simulators so the Lauda pilots were possibly ill-equipped to get out of that event.

[AerocatS2A]

Haven't got the manuals at home but when I was at QFL we only had the Beta Warning system. Tested each line check, put aircraft airborne, hold #1 RADALT test and flick the triggers for the warbler.
Oh well it doesn't matter, my original point was just that some Dash 8s won't let you select beta in flight.

[remoak]

Checkboard makes some great points above.

I can remember doing conversion training in the Shorts SD360 (conducted in the aircraft) and seeing an instructor get maxed out during a V1 cut and lose situational awareness. Luckily, the student sorted it out but it could have been very, very nasty. In case you are wondering how I knew about it, it was SOP in those days to take four guys up plus the instructor... one guy flying, one observing (by standing behind the trainee in the doorway), and the other two raiding the galleys and waiting their turn to fly. Wouldn't happen these days... I hope...

[The Green Goblin]

Typical BS again.

The facts - it is not a Dash 8.

It is a:

Brasilia
Multi Engine Turboprop
>5700 kg
Multi Crew (both highly experienced)
20.7.1b Performance (Positive rate with gear/flap down)
Autofeather
CAT A maintenance.

Along with being LIGHT, The conditions where only around ISA+15 at the time with light winds, minimal cloud and no buildups or sig wx.

Before you speculate about training, V1 cuts, asymmetric handling and whatever other nonsense think about the above.

Signing off.......

[FGD135]

learner001 said the following about zero-thrust and flight-idle:


Two totally different worlds...

With (if not prepared, unexpected...) totally different (flight) characteristics...


There is a third regime, and that is: windmilling-prop. In terms of flight characteristics, this one is like a more extreme version of flight-idle.

I made the statement, many posts ago, that no twin can climb with one prop windmilling. (Windmilling means that NTS systems are not operating).

The drag is so prohibitive that descent is the only possible mode of steady state flight. This means that, if you try to maintain level flight, you will soon lose control.

Of course, several posters disputed this statement. t303 was one, but he thinks zero-thrust is the same as windmilling.

Hugh Jarse said "Absolutely INCORRECT!" and made some references to training exercises in the DHC8 simulator (with autofeather configured). Not sure what exactly you were saying about those exercises, wrt to autofeather and whether the prop feathered - but a feathered prop (or a prop getting NTS treatment) is not a windmilling prop.

I remember reading about a loss of control and near accident in a DHC8 that had an engine failure during the departure phase from an airport in Europe. The prop was never feathered. One of the recommendations from the safety authorities was to remind pilots of the importance of feathering. I will try to find a link to that incident.

The only things I know about the TAMAIR accident is from what I have read here. I speed-read the Prestwick J32 accident report.

The implication in both of these cases is that flight-idle was set - and not zero-thrust.

If that was true - then think about how much more extreme windmilling is than flight-idle! Then you may see why I say that no twin can climb with one prop windmilling.

[TBM-Legend]

Atlantic Southeast Airlines Flight 2311, crashed in Brunswick, Georgia on April 5, 1991. The crash claimed the lives of all twenty-three people on board, including former U.S. Senator John Tower of Texas and astronaut Sonny Carter. This was due to propeller control failure.

[learner001]

FGD135 said:

"There is a third regime, and that is: windmilling-prop. In terms of flight characteristics, this one is like a more extreme version of flight-idle."

Very clear... And agree...

Additionally, this much more grave situation would not necessarily be limited to a failure of any sort...
It could even happen if the flight idle rigging for an engine-propellor combination, for whatever reason, would be incorrect (too low)...

Kind regards, learner...

[VH-VIN]

Dont know about a braz but a B1900, F 406 and B200 if you bring one power lever back to flight idle at V1 you will lose control and crash, and it will happen very fast!! At v2 you might be able to pull it off but its struggle. That prop needs to be feathered or zero thrust set.

[Socket]

High risk manouvre being performed???

Says who?

Airnorth chief executive Michael Bridge says pilots perform the move twice a year in training.

"It's obviously one of the highest-risk manoeuvres," he said.


I think he just might be in a position to know.

Mr Bridge said the company was moving to introduce training simulators and it was possible the two pilots were performing the move for the last time in the company's history.

I should hope it is more than just a possibility.

[AerocatS2A]

Hugh Jarse said "Absolutely INCORRECT!" and made some references to training exercises in the DHC8 simulator (with autofeather configured). Not sure what exactly you were saying about those exercises, wrt to autofeather and whether the prop feathered - but a feathered prop (or a prop getting NTS treatment) is not a windmilling prop.
I'll help you out there.

You said earlier that no twin will climb with a windmilling prop. The point a few of the Dash 8 drivers were trying to make is that any one who's been in the Dash 8 sim has probably seen it climbing with the prop windmilling.

Take a Dash 8, fail an engine, fail the autofeather system so that it doesn't feather, handle it ok and it climbs. It's not pretty and the performance is very marginal, but it can be done. That's not to say it should be done, and any one who's done it is under no illusions that it is in any way safe, but you are simply wrong when you make a blanket statement that no twin will climb with a windmilling prop.

[frigatebird]

re. post 132
In the intervening 19 years we have all learnt from that accident, and had the extra maintenance surveillance to prevent a re-occurence. Those on other types with similar engine and prop combinations at the time, have paid particular attention to their equipment indications in case they could be developing problems, ever since.
Anything is possible as the cause of this departure from controlled flight.
With time and hard work a finding/ probable finding will be arrived at.

[FGD135]

Take a Dash 8, fail an engine, fail the autofeather system so that it doesn't feather, handle it ok and it climbs. It's not pretty and the performance is very marginal, but it can be done.

AerocatS2A, thanks for your post.

Are you saying you can get steady-state climb? That is, climb with a constant airspeed?

Or, is the climb of only a short duration (a few seconds - as the airspeed drops off)?

And, there is definitely no NTS action on the prop?

[Dave Incognito]

Before you speculate about training, V1 cuts, asymmetric handling and whatever other nonsense think about the above.

Have a look at the ABC story (http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2010/03/23/2854126.htm) linked on the previous page, which includes the following excerpts:

The airline has confirmed [the crew] …were performing an "engine cut out on take-off" manoeuvre when their plane crashed...

The bureau's investigator in charge, Alex Hood...says the sharp left roll of the plane that caused it to crash is characteristic of an engine-out manoeuvre.

However he says a mechanical or systems failure could also be the cause.

Interesting how several posters were given a hard time earlier in this thread for suggesting similar thoughts to what the ATSB investigator in charge has stated above.

[3 Holer]

I think he just might be in a position to know.
So Socket ,he was on the flight that crashed was he?

You and remoak both missed my point. NOBODY knows at this stage what caused this aircraft to crash. It is ALL speculation at his stage.

As was said, but totally ignored, earlier in the thread. Let's not speculate what occurred here but wait until the experts have time to investigate.:ugh:

The ABC story is speculative too:
However he says a mechanical or systems failure could also be the cause.

[no one]

Crash pilots were flying 'dangerous' manoeuvre | Northern Territory News | Darwin, Northern Territory, Australia | ntnews.com.au (http://www.ntnews.com.au/article/2010/03/24/134111_ntnews.html)

I see the media is now quoting pprune

[relax737]

Dave, it's difficult for people to admit their mates could have screwed up under these circumstances; I understand that and I'm no different. We all do it, and fortunately for most of us it hasn't been a situation that hasn't been recoverable.

It is not, however, insensitive nor disrespectful for those who post here to speculate on possible causes and that's what I see. To suggest that it is, is just emotion talking, and I also understand the depth of that.

There is nothing illegal, immoral, indecent, nor against forum rules to speculate on possible causes, even though nobody knows with any degree of certainty. 3 holer, you are abolutely correct about that.

However, there are two possible causes

Failure and loss of control
Catastrophic failure

As I see it, the only other possible is crew incapacitation, but I'd put that at about .001% or less, but not an impossible chance.

Jabawocky, you were in a difficult and unenviable position, but if you've gone some way to consoling an elderly mother, then well handled.

[Socket]

Quote:
I think he just might be in a position to know.

So Socket ,he was on the flight that crashed was he?

3 holer you moron, I was commenting on the fact that he may be in a position to know whether it was a High risk manouvre being performed. A question you asked. He is after all the Airnorth chief executive.

His knowledge of the reasons for the flight and what was to be performed during it should be far superior to yours I am guessing, so get off your high horse and pull your head in.

[empire4]

I wanted to read from other pilots what speculation they had on what happened the 2 chaps that have perished. instead you get a majority of ego tripping pilots that think pilots are the only humans on earth that make no errors.

I know most people here are from aviation, then you all know that PILOT ERROR is the primary cause of a fatal crash although the trend is moving closer to maintenance.

Causes, 1.Pilot error 2.maintenance error 3. mechanical failure 4. weather 5. combination of 1,2,3 or 4. simple.

No one wants to say that they don't make mistakes, especially one that costs a life or 2. we are all human, we all do.

This forum is a blessing for aviation. although a lot of crap is on here, it makes people think about the consequences of actions in your job. Speculation is just that. Don't have a go at the speculator if the media wishes to print. we all know 95% of media is made up anyhow.

My thoughts are with the family of the many people involved, RIP to the boys on board. aviation and australia will miss you.

[remoak]

3 Holer

Let's not speculate what occurred here but wait until the experts have time to investigate

I agree with Socket, you are showing all the signs of being a moron... as characterised by:

1. A complete refusal to objectively examine the evidence available.
2. A complete refusal to add 2 and 2 together to arrive at a logical answer.

Why is that you think that accident investigators are mighty gods, and the only people who can come to a sensible conclusion? Most of them have only done a six week course anyway. The only time when their talents are particularly relevant, is when the cause of the accident is an obscure mechanical failure or some other reason that is not immediately apparent, but requires detailed analysis. And even then, they don't actually DO the analysis, they just collate the data from experts and arrange it in a technically pleasing fashion.

You (and others) who constantly repeat the mantra "wait for the investigators to publish the report" are simply in denial - much like the ostrich with it's head firmly in the sand (not that ostriches actually do that, but it's a well-known myth, so...)

if it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, quacks like a duck - it's a duck. I don't need a 50 page report to prove it. If you do, you don't have the deductive and analytical skills required by to be a pilot.

[AerocatS2A]

AerocatS2A, thanks for your post.

Are you saying you can get steady-state climb? That is, climb with a constant airspeed?

Or, is the climb of only a short duration (a few seconds - as the airspeed drops off)?

And, there is definitely no NTS action on the prop?

This is what I've seen in the sim (it's happened to me.)

Aircraft set to max take-off weight and auto-feather is supposed to be serviceable, that is, all indications prior to take-off are that it is working.

Engine failure experienced shortly after V1 (while rotating.) Gear is selected up and PNF announces the failure. PF confirms the failure. PNF identifies that the prop has not feathered, i.e., the autofeather system has failed. The prop is windmilling at about 400 RPM.

Normally the engine failure recalls would be done after acceleration but in this case, with the prop windmilling, they are done immediately to achieve certification performance.

PNF selects the power lever to Flight Idle, the condition lever to Fuel Off and completes the rest of the recall items and calls "recalls complete."

PF continues climbing out at V2. At some point early in the engine out departure a turn is commenced, during the turn the EGPWS starts saying "DON'T SINK, DON'T SINK." It's at this time that the PF realises he is finding it more difficult than usual to maintain altitude in the turn and notices that the prop has still not feathered. He brings this to the attention of the PNF and the PNF uses the alternate feather system to feather the prop.

Obviously this is a big cock up, the PNF should have checked that the prop feathered when he moved the condition lever to Fuel Off, but he didn't. The PF could also have kept a better eye on what was going on, it'll be a debrief point. But they didn't crash, and until they commenced a turn they had some climb performance, not much, but enough to fool them into thinking everything was ok.

So, in the sim at least, it is possible to maintain a steady climb on one engine with the other prop windmilling.

Having said that, I've also seen the same situation lead to a crash. I don't mind saying I was the PF in both cases, when I was having a good day I got away with it, when I was having an off day, things didn't turn out so well.

[Marauder]

Remoak

"Why is that you think that accident investigators are mighty gods, and the only people who can come to a sensible conclusion? Most of them have only done a six week course anyway"

The lead investigator has been with ATSB for probably 10 years, is/was a pilot, was a Chief Pilot who was well known and respected for his "take no prisoners approach" to internal company incidents,he would seek the cause, recommend a solution and not look for scapegoats, and certainly wasn't afraid to tread on management toes if this is what his well researched conclusions pointed to.

[3 Holer]

Socket & remoak = Dumb & Dumber maybe?

Oh and remoak, good luck in aviation with your if it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, quacks like a duck - it's a duck. reasoning.

I'm sure when you come up for Command Training you'll really impress your training Captain with that logic. :D

NFTA.

[DC6Alaska]

Double Auto Fearther while doing a V1 cut HAS occured before in the E-120.

Just a thought............

[carro]

I would think the running costs alone for running the bras (fuel, maint. etc) would be in the ballpark of at around $1500/hr. ie 2hrs = $3000

Ergo, the sim wouldn't be a lot more expensive, and could in fact be cheaper. Plus you cover more in the 1-2 hours having the abililty to reset the sim, and practice V1 cuts over and over, and other inflight emergencies which you wouldn't consider doing or have the ability to do while actually flying (eg. windshear).... and there's no ATC so no delays.

You will be missed fellas. Rest in peace.

[AussieNick]

is anyone else here appaled with the NT News using quotes and innuendo from this website ti justify their front page spread title "Crash Pilots Were Flying Dangerous Training Manouver" within only a few days they are using speculation to justify their article. I mean, ok, EFATO excercises are gonna have a level of danger, what in our profession doesn't but that doesn't mean you can go and label standard training procedures as dangerous and insinuate that they have attributed to the accident before even the accident investigators have had a chance to 'investigate', something clearly the NT News no nothing about....

[MACH082]

To send 3 crew to the sim center is about a 10,000 exercise

Travel 2 crew plus a sim operator (Line captain, line FO and C&T) = $2000.
2 x 2-4 hour sim sessions = $4000
Crew travel/meal/Overnight allowance = $1500ish
Wages during loss of revenue flying (4 days) $4000
Crew to cover those 4 days that you're loosing the Pilots for non revenue $4000

As you can see the costs add up pretty quickly compared to revenue flight for an IR renewal and a EFATO with an instrument approach in the Aeroplane.

With the fleet size and amount of Pilots I'd be allowing at least $500,000 a year for such a program.

[Hugh Jarse]

FGD135,
Aerocat has explained (what I meant to say) in his/her post. I've done similar routines during SIMEXes, and can confirm that the aircraft will climb with a windmilling prop without autofx.

There is also dispatch relief Via the MEL for autofx inop.

The point I was trying to make, is that it's a broad statement to claim that no propeller driven aircraft can climb with a windmilling prop. Many can, under favourable conditions and weights, etc.

Kiwi, gidday! I seem to remember we only got the abridged version you wrote about (Beta Backup switches and singing canaries), which still allowed selection of below flight idle in flight. Not desirable.

Green Goblin, they are similar engines. I'm not going to speculate on the crew, just interested in the technical aspects (as I'm sure most here are).

[PLovett]

MACH082,

Without wanting to appear picky or abusive, your figures may well be accurate but pale into insignificance with the hull loss of one aircraft and the deaths of two pilots.

It may have been cheaper to do the work in an aircraft while nothing goes wrong but it can never be so when things go pear-shaped. The sim wins out in every situation then.

[Stationair8]

The NT News one of the great news publication of our time, personally I wouldn't wipe my arse on it let alone put in the pet cockatoo's cage!

[Hugh Jarse]

personally I wouldn't wipe my arse on it let alone put in the pet cockatoo's cage!

Some might call it the "John Wayne" of news/toilet papers:

Rough, tough, and doesn't take **** from anyone ;)

[Kiwiconehead]

Rough, tough, and doesn't take **** from anyone

And a croc story in the first 3 pages or your money back

[remoak]

Marauder

The lead investigator has been with ATSB for probably 10 years, is/was a pilot, was a Chief Pilot... etcSo what?

I doubt he has done more than the standard six week course at Cranfield. I'm pleased that he's apparently a good guy, but quite frankly he is only slightly more qualified than I, or a lot of people here, are.

3 Holer

I'm sure when you come up for Command Training you'll really impress your training Captain with that logic.Well as I've been commanding jets for the last 20 years, and been a training captain for ten of them, I'm not too worried about that...:rolleyes:

Everyone else

I think a lot of you are missing the point here. The issue isn't whether or not the aircraft can climb away in various configurations... the issue is the LOSS OF CONTROL. The only real question in this accident investigation is, why did they lose control? It was either mechanical (ie a prop in reverse or something equally unlikely), or it was pilot error.

The point is that even if the aircraft had been unable to climb, there was nothing to stop either pilot retarding both power levers and landing it straight ahead, under control. Had they done that, they almost certainly would have survived.

It is the LOSS OF CONTROL that is the issue here.

[neville_nobody]

With the fleet size and amount of Pilots I'd be allowing at least $500,000 a year for such a program

And what would your cost analysis for a double fatality hull loss be??

If you think training is expensive, try having an accident.

[relax737]

That's been speculated on above nev, as high as $10 million!!

[Dog One]

From reading the above, I can see that the concenus is to use a simulator for all assymetric training, which I think is great, as long as you have the simulators for the types available. Now if we follow the suggestions above, all operators will need a simulator for endorsements and IRT training. How will the operators of King Airs, Chieftains, Barons etc comply with such a rule?

The availability of a simulator can be a major problem for some operators, will they be grounded?

[Checkboard]

King Airs, Chieftains and Barons aren't certified to climb with an engine failure at rotation, thus the exercise shouldn't be conducted in those aircraft at all. Engine failure exercises with sufficient height for attitude recovery would be appropriate.

[t303]

FGD135
Are you saying you can get steady-state climb? That is, climb with a constant airspeed?
Or, is the climb of only a short duration (a few seconds - as the airspeed drops off)?
And, there is definitely no NTS action on the prop?
Of course, several posters disputed this statement. t303 was one, but he thinks zero-thrust is the same as windmilling.
Be fair, I did say flight idle to zero thrust!
But thanks for telling me what I think. Apparently, I also think I know how a Bras performs, so humour me for a moment..

Without any inference or opinion whatsoever reference this unfortunate event, but to simply (hopefully) ease FGD's anxiety about turboprop twin performance:

EMB120: THE AIRCRAFT (NOT the movie)

Takeoff config: flaps 15, 100% TQ, around 9.5T training weight,
simulated engine failure at V2+10 and after pos. rate callout.
TQ on dead (critical) engine flight idle, circa 5%. (13-15% was the accepted simulated zero thrust range)

A/c climbs at (eventually) 3-400fpm to 1000ft altitude WITH THE GEAR DOWN. Congratulate him/her on skillful handling of speed, attitude and balance, then point to the gear lever/indicator and make observation that even without CHECKING THE FX OR RETRACTING THE GEAR the old girl has dragged your sorry arze up through the briefed acceleration altitude, 3rd and 4th segment to 1000ft, without any configuration change!
Remind him/her (if s/he doesn't know already) that if s/he tries it with 30pax onboard........ well, use your imagination.
(You don't have to explain it twice, embarassment usually prevents repeats)
And before anyone starts....
Would I prefer to have done it in the SIM? HELL YEAH!!!!!!!!
But we didn't have the luxury.
Did I feel s/he was about to lose it? Not at all, otherwise Mr Pratt's wonderful piece of kit could not have come up any faster if it was running on Viagra! (I don't need to practice bleeding.)

So you can choose to believe me or call me a liar if you wish,
BUT AT LEAST ONE TURBOPROP TWIN WILL DO IT, at least under ideal conditions.
SEEN IT, DONE IT, LIVED TO TELL YOU ABOUT IT

Of course the usual caveat applies:
DON'T TRY THIS AT HOME KIDDIES!

[Checkboard]

The NT News article (yeah, I know) quoted:

"There is no full flight simulation training aid available anywhere in the world for this type of aircraft and, as such, there will always need to be a component of in-aircraft training."

The EMB 120 has been around for 25 years, and there are several sims available world wide. Non in Australia until last year, though.

[teresa green]

Assymetric or no assymetric, two colleagues have died, four little kids left without their fathers, two devastated families, it does not matter how long you have been in the business, if never fails to shock you, and I have seen too many. Some of you post out of shock and grief, some post to try to understand, none of us know, lets wait to see the results, and appreciate the fact that there but for the grace of God go I.

[4PW's]

Condolences not allowed, but speculation is.

For the common good we're told, so's we're all the wiser.

If you keep saying that, remoak, you'll convince someone.

Sad day for the kids, mum's, family, friends: just don't mention it here.

RIP.

[ace from space]

One of the benefits of a discussion forum such as this, is that it gets people sharing thoughts and ideas that may help prevent a similar type of accident occurring in the future.
We don’t know the facts prior to the accident, what we do know is the end result.
For my money it looks like a loss of control situation (for whatever reason) soon after rotation, where the a/c deviated dramatically to the left and never cleared the airport boundary. The subsequent crash appears to be a high speed impact.
Something that occurs to me in all this, is not so much whether the a/c will still climb after takeoff , if the configuration, power levers or condition levers are mishandled or there is some sort of catastrophic failure or failure of the auto- feathering system, it’s why they(the crew) appear to have lost control?

In a former life when I flew the Bras, the #1 engine (left) is the critical engine should it fail.
In over 6000 hours on type, twice I experienced a situation when the #1 engine was simulated to fail (by setting flight idle) after V1 and the speed is allowed to get a little slow, the a/c required not only full opposite rudder but also full opposite aileron to check the yaw and roll to the left. (and even then the a/c continued to deviate from centreline)
The situation was remedied by reducing the power on the live engine to reduce the asymmetric yaw.
The point I am trying to make is, at low speeds and high torque setting on the live engine, when the critical engine has failed, it is possible to run into controllability issues if you weren’t careful with speed control when conducting training at low weights (with fwd C of G) and relatively low speeds.
I am not postulating as to the reasons for this terrible accident, but simply sharing some experiences and thoughts which help keep us all safe!

[Utradar]

Geez, this is like talking to a ostrich or maybe even a goose.

Remoak (and other's with this mindset), with that sort of experience, you are expected to have healthy sceptical mindset as to what happended then rather than be the typical armchair expert with experience. There have been many accidents that have misidentified over the years, so you'd in a better position to keep an open mind.
You might be right about the control issue mate because it was a control issue otherwise they wouldn't have crashed at high speed during a turn.

You arn't the guy doing the investigation. How do you know that they find something that may prove otherwise that you dont know about? You said:

"The point is that even if the aircraft had been unable to climb, there was nothing to stop either pilot retarding both power levers and landing it straight ahead, under control. Had they done that, they almost certainly would have survived."

How do you know it wasn't something else that caused it. That's what these
'6 week inexperienced' investigators are looking for. What caused the loss of control is what everyone wants to know. A dose of humble pie may be what's in order.
:ugh:

[remoak]

Spoilher

I love the way you pick and choose your quotes to suit your argument.

What I actually said was "The only real question in this accident investigation is, why did they lose control? It was either mechanical (ie a prop in reverse or something equally unlikely), or it was pilot error".

Note that there are two possible causes in that sentence... :ugh:

People with "my sort of experience" are actually expected to have an analytical mindset, which is informed by the incident/accident stats of the airline we work for, and the same stats for the type itself. These stats (in a decent airline) are comprehensive and very revealing. What they show is that by far the majority of accidents and incidents have a significant element of engineer or pilot error to them.

Now if you were to compare all the accidents in turboprops and light twins that were characterised by a loss of control during a V1 cut (and there have been a lot), how many of them would be down to a mechanical failure? That's right - not very many.

That is why it is a relatively safe (but unpalatable) bet to draw a conclusion about what caused this accident - because it has been seen many times before.

Why do you think we have simulators?

Anyway... you wait for the report. Feel free to send me a PM and remind me how wrong I was when it eventually comes out...

[archangel7]

for such a sophisticated aircraft like that to suddenly lose control on take off with 2 highly experienced pilots for no apparent reason makes no sense. Even if they where conducting EFATO drills this shouldnt happen. The Brasilia has gauranteed performance with one engine on T/O... Obviously Something terribly went wrong.This could not be pilot error. Without a doubt, mechanical failure!!! To me it sounds like the malfunction of the engine propeller control unit and this would allowed the propeller blade angles to go below the flight idle position if they where conducting EFATO drills. I am sure there are many other factors contributing to the accident as all accident have a chain of events to lead up to it.

[Capt Claret]

This could not be pilot error. Without a doubt, mechanical failure!!!

Not very wise words there. It could be pilot error. It could be mechanical failure. It could be a combination of both.

Highly experienced pilots make mistakes. Equipment fails. Wise observers don't pronounce cause without being able to substantiate said cause, and at least not until they've completed their investigation.

But I'm not investigating I hear you say.

[ace from space]

for such a sophisticated aircraft like that to suddenly lose control on take off with 2 highly experienced pilots for no apparent reason makes no sense. Even if they where conducting EFATO drills this shouldnt happen. The Brasilia has gauranteed performance with one engine on T/O... Obviously Something terribly went wrong.This could not be pilot error. Without a doubt, mechanical failure!!


Archangel7, even with said guaranteed performance, it doesn’t guarantee you anything if the technique isn’t correct. I.e. control inputs are inappropriate or insufficient, or speed control is inadequate. There is a human element to a large percentage of air accidents which has been pointed out by many on this thread.
A routine event can go wrong very quickly and one can find themself in a position from which there are few avenues of escape if the situation is mismanaged or mishandled.
We’ve all had bad days in the sim, or seen bad situations in the sim where we walk away afterwards thinking to ourselves that we are still alive to fight another day because it was in the sim.
Experience gives us many things, but it doesn’t give us immunity from making a mistake!

[privateer01]

Well I brought up the sim vs Airplane today in recurrent training.....

Was a jet recurrent but I'm typed on 2 turboprops, 2 piston engine, and 2 jets....all in excess of 5700 (12,500 lb for you not metric folks)...

The chief pilot made the comment that even with sim training theres still no replacement for training in the aircraft.

Having been in 6 different sims for 5 different aircraft I'd have to agree.

Sim's are a wonderfull thing but they are not the actual aircraft.

Sim's are designed to replicate the airplane's....but there are issues.

1. The sim is designed to be in fact more difficult to fly then the actual aircraft. Theory being when you transition to the actual airplane all is good.

Sadly no sim ever does a great job of replicating the aircraft and I've had sim's that were different day to day. It depends where the tech sets them. No sim I've ever been in ever ground handled like an actual aircraft. Theres other areas where realism suffers but it depends on the aircraft and the individual sim. Example: Boeing 727 sim...designed to replicate the -100 and with quick changes the -200....it doesn't do both perfectly...but pretty close. Example Falcon 20 sim....quick change from TFE-731's to CF-700's...doesn't do either particularly well.

Lets face it sometimes no two airplanes fly the same...every fleet has a dog or a hanger queen....but you get the point.

2. It seems like no sim is ever configured like your actual fleet. Hell...most places you'll work don't have everything in every airplane standardized. Switches move, Instruments can be different...as someone pointed out...reverse systems can have different mods. Systems can have different mods. Example: Metro's.....I trained in San Antonio on a Metro 23 sim with EFIS (Military C26B) for goodness sake.....Has anyone ever seen 2 metro's set up the same? Know where theres some EFIS equipped metros?

3. Its hard to do a walk around preflight on a sim....yeah ok I just threw that one in for some humour.

Certainly theres things that are best left to the sim and there are things that you can only ever replicate in the sim.

Its just not the end all be all second coming of JC....that some voices seem to be making out.

Wanna have your first engine failure in an actual airplane with pax on board having never had the experience in something thats relevant to your operation?

Scratches head.....well....ummm...that switch or instrument was right over here in the sim.

Holy cow! This thing doesn't really fly like the sim was set up to ......

Let the disagreement commence...but its something to think about.

[relax737]

Good points ace.

Even with a jet, buckets of power and performance, if not flown accurately, and I mean very accurately at AUW, an engine out on a twin is a critical manoeuver.

I've seen as little as half a degree in pitch the difference between climbing and sinking.

And I agree with you Capt Claret, very unwise words from archangel.

There's an old saying

When you're up to your ar$e in alligators, it's difficult to remember you were there to drain the swamp.

The analogy applies equally in aviation, and when everything is going pear shaped, professional aviators aren't much different from the guy draining the swamp. What we do have going for us is instinctive action based on ingrained training, but if you put a foot wrong then it's curtains.

[601]

King Airs, Chieftains and Barons aren't certified to climb with an engine failure at rotation,

Depends on the King Air model - 200/B200 no but try a B300 (Beech 350)

[KRviator]

for such a sophisticated aircraft like that to suddenly lose control on take off with 2 highly experienced pilots for no apparent reason makes no sense. Even if they where conducting EFATO drills this shouldnt happen. The Brasilia has gauranteed performance with one engine on T/O... Obviously Something terribly went wrong.This could not be pilot error. Without a doubt, mechanical failure!!! You're kidding, right? You have to be. A true professional is never as arrogant, or closed-minded...

Afterall, with such a sophisticated aircraft as the 737, with 3 arguably more experienced pilots up the front, to fly into the ground at Schipol for no apparent reason makes no sense. It shouldn't happen. The 737 has guranteed performance with two engines on approach. Obviously something went wrong, yadda yadda yadda...

Get the point? No matter your experience level, you're not immune to screwing up, and if you think you are, more fool you...

As has been said, nothing in aviation is guranteed and if you try to extract such "guranteed" performance from an airplane that may or may not be capable of delivering such performance due to any number of issues (be it age, engine/prop wear & inefficiency and so on), instead of looking at the bigger picture, and putting the airplane down as softly as you can wherever you happen to be, then you are always entertaining the risk of becoming another statistic instead of simply the walking wounded.

[relax737]

Yes, KRviator, good points.

I know this is digressing somewhat, but that's the nature of a thread such as this.

Another old saying

The two most dangerous times in your aviation career are when you think you know it all, and when you do know it all.

We can, at times, be our own worst enemies!

archangel, it seems the ad isn't for Brazilia pilots, but for Metro, but even if it was, it isn't insensitive or disrespectful to do so; Air North is a business and businesses need people to generate revenue. The world doesn't revolve around people, but money, and without someone to fly their aircraft, a company can't survive.

[redline666]

VU-XUE - Fuel Starvation - Jundee (http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2007/AAIR/pdf/aair200703952_001.pdf)

Good example of the controllability issues faced by the crew in a very abnormal situation. For those that don't know, the LH engine rolled back, and eventually shut down due to fuel starvation on finals.


The crew recalled that, as the pilot in command advanced the engine power levers at the commencement of the go-around, the aircraft yawed and rolled left ‘aggressively’. The co-pilot applied right rudder and aileron but was unable to control the aircraft. He informed the pilot in command that he was unable to hold the control inputs, so the pilot in command placed his hands on the control yoke and his feet on the rudder pedals and assisted the co-pilot. Together, they were able to steady the aircraft’s flight path, which they estimated at that time to have been approximately 100 ft above ground level, with 30 degrees bank left, and 100 to 111 kts airspeed. The crew reported that the stick shaker activated twice, and that each time they slightly reduced the control yoke back pressure. During that period, the EGPWS warning ‘too low terrain’ sounded. The co-pilot called for the flaps to be retracted to the ‘flaps 25’ position. After the pilot in command confirmed that the co-pilot had control, flap 25 was selected. The crew reported that the airspeed slowly began to rise above 111 kts and the left bank started decreasing, although full right aileron and rudder inputs were still required. The crew retracted the flaps
to 15 degrees, and the co-pilot was able to return the aircraft to a wings level attitude. The aircraft achieved a positive rate of climb a short time later. The crew then retracted the landing gear.

31 people were very lucky to walk away from that one.

[ace from space]

Capt Claret spot on with your response to A7.

Relax737
yep I’m with you, you don’t have to get it wrong by much.
Even though the Bras, relatively speaking does have bucket loads of power, directional control for me is the issue (as compared to a jet) exacerbated on a turbo prop by the critical engine factor, windmilling prop and by the large moment arm from the longitudinal axis to the thrust line, combined with a fwd Cof G with only 2 POB.

Archangel7 another thought on your thinking “it can’t happen to such an experienced crew”
From my own experiences, things often happen when a very experienced crew is operating together due to mutual assumptions made about each other.
As a checkie we might be inclined not to intervene until a later time when conducting training/checking with a very experienced operator, than flying with a newbie, if something was going pear shaped.

[relax737]

ace, you mention that the experienced crew/s tend make mutual assumptions about each other, and that is absolutely correct.

I recall an incident when working for that very company many years back when a particular client required a two pilot operation, but the aircraft wasn't normally 2 crew, nor were the pilots qualified to fly 2 crew.

On downwind, the pilot flying ran through his checklist, changed tanks to the fullest for landing, and sometime after that, the "support" pilot changed tanks (selector on the floor between seats) without mentioning it to the pilot flying, and an engine ran out of steam on short final, in fact over the highway, landing on R36.

That's the reverse of what you mention, but indicates how unsafe an operation can be without the required discipline.

I mention it for no reason other than someone may learn something from the incident. If you're not 2 crew qualified, one must sit on his hands.

Then there's that question,

What are the three most dangerous things in aviation?

The first is two check captains flying together, and one of the reasons is as you state, the other being he's not a dedicated co-pilot.

The other two answers don't require mentioning here.

[ampk]

$500,000 a year - direct cost to a company.

$10,000,000.

I think over 1/2 that was put to the loss of 2 lives.
A figure from a road death (I concider mine to be valuable but would put a much lower figure on my ex-wifes) anyway insurance!!!

Hull $2,000,000. insurance!!!

The rest can maybe break a company.

If this was not pilot error these guys just saved a bunch of lives.
If it was pilot error they may well have saved a bunch of lives.

At the end of the day it is the pain that costs most.

[archangel7]

Archangel7, even with said guaranteed performance, it doesn’t guarantee you anything if the technique isn’t correct. I.e. control inputs are inappropriate or insufficient, or speed control is inadequate. Hang on!!! let me get the facts straight.. wasn't this a training flight? wasn't there a C&T pilot on board? Both very experienced pilots? I am sure there was some sort of pre flight brief to prepare for the training?? the technique isn't hard if you are prepared for it on a training flight under the guidance of a highly reputable Captain who is watching over you. The problem is when it catches you off-guard in a real Engine Failure! That's when your skills really will get tested...

Not very wise words there. It could be pilot error. It could be mechanical failure. It could be a combination of both. I can agree with you to an extent that it might not be a very wise comment compared to your comments but it is my opinion. You seem like a very experienced and knowledgeable pilot and your post are highly regarded and it is for that reason I chose to respect your opinion on many matters and stay out of your way on this one :ouch:

You're kidding, right? You have to be. A true professional is never as arrogant, or closed-minded...like i said, its only my opinion and its not a big issue! :P i guess it is easier to just point the finger at the dead pilots and say it was "human error" . That would make me less arrogant and close minded i guess.:\ I personally believe it is a mechanical error and you can call me as narrow minded and as arrogant as you want it will not change my opinion. But a high-speed crash on take-off points the finger more towards a mechanical error then human error. Do some research on Brasilia fatal crashes and you will discover that 90% of them are mechanical errors!. they vary from propeller going into reverse thrust on final approach, failure of the horizontal stabilizer and there was another interesting one which i read up on the other day where the propeller separated from the engine assembly and became imbedded in the leading edge of the wing and the pilot was committed to make a forced landing into a paddock killing 18 passengers. do some research and see for your self. I don’t think I am being closed minded at all.

[obie2]

Relax 737 has said...

"There's an old saying...

When you're up to your ar$e in alligators, it's difficult to remember you were there to drain the swamp.

The analogy applies so much in aviation, and when everything is going pear shaped, professional aviators aren't much different from the guy draining the swamp. What we do have going for us is instinctive action based on ingrained training, but if you put a foot wrong then it's curtains."


Been in the business for 40 years Mate! Wanna tell me what the hell you're talkin' about? :confused::confused::confused:

[SIUYA]

archangel7...

But a high-speed crash on take-off points the finger more towards a mechanical error then human error.

Why? :confused: And what evidence have you got to conclude that it was a '...high-speed crash'? :confused:

What obie2 said:

Been in the business for 40 years Mate! Wanna tell me what the hell you're talkin' about? :confused::confused::confused:

I don't pretend to know what happened here, and I'll bet at this point of time the ATSB folks don't know (exactly) either. But (and despite the fact that I haven't had the advantage of a 6-week accident investigation training course) like obie2, I think I've been around long enough to understand a few things that DIDN'T happen in this accident.

[Utradar]

I don't pretend to know what happened here, and I'll bet at this point of time the ATSB folks don't know (exactly) either.

They'll probably be working on that as we 'speak' in Canberra. If the boxes were working, it'll be pretty good evidence!

[Checkboard]

From wiki:

Embraer 120 Accident history

Atlantic Southeast Airlines Flight 2311, crashed in Brunswick, Georgia on April 5, 1991. The crash claimed the lives of all twenty-three people on board, including former U.S. Senator John Tower of Texas and astronaut Sonny Carter. This was due to propeller control failure.
Continental Express Flight 2574, broke up in flight on September 11, 1991, killing all of the passengers and crew members. The media stated that initially people speculated that a bomb had destroyed the aircraft; the NTSB discovered that missing screws on the horizontal stabilizer led to the crash.
Atlantic Southeast Airlines Flight 529, crashed in a field near Carrollton, Georgia on August 21, 1995. Of the twenty-nine people on board, ten were killed. This was due to failure of a propeller blade and subsequent severe engine vibration and failure.
Comair Flight 3272 crashed in Michigan on January 9, 1997. All of the passengers and crew died, the probable cause was in-flight icing.
Airnorth VH-ANB took off approximately 10.10am (ACST) on March 22, 2010, from Darwin International Airport on a routine training flight when it apparently banked sharply to the left and crashed into the nearby bushland at RAAF Base Darwin.

The aircraft does have some history of mechanical failure (although, not an unusual amount for 200+ airframes over 25 years of service), however the publicly released circumstances of this accident are still suggestive of a training related problem until the CVR/FDR can be read.

[FGD135]

ace from space, interesting post. You said:

In over 6000 hours on type, twice I experienced a situation when the #1 engine was simulated to fail (by setting flight idle) after V1 and the speed is allowed to get a little slow, the a/c required not only full opposite rudder but also full opposite aileron to check the yaw and roll to the left. (and even then the a/c continued to deviate from centreline)
The situation was remedied by reducing the power on the live engine to reduce the asymmetric yaw.

This is alarming. You were on the verge of being out of control. It could be said that you *were* out of control - given your continued problem with directional control.

Is this a frequent occurrence on these sorts of training flights? Is CASA aware of this?

Being on the verge of losing control, just a small hiccup (e.g. wind gust) would have put you out of control.

With the rapidly developing yaw and roll towards the dead engine, what then is the procedure? Is there an officially documented one?

You said that you "decreased power on the good engine". Is it possible that somebody could instead try to increase power on the "failed" engine - with a long spool-up time then making a crash inevitable?

[FGD135]

On windmilling again. Apologies to all if this subthread is getting tiresome.

AerocatS2A, thank you for the dramatic and interesting post. Hugh Jarse, thank you too for the further clarification. t303, thank you for the detailed account of an EMB-120 simulated EFATO.

I am still incredulous that any twin can climb with one prop windmilling.

AerocatS2A and Hugh, I concede that you have given credible accounts of this occurence in the DHC8 simulator.

But, 400 RPM (stated by AerocatS2A) for a windmilling prop sounds a little too low. This value leads me to suspect that there is some form of lock in the propeller - to prevent the fine pitch angles that give the high windmilling RPM and consequent enormous drag.

Is there such a lock? Does it operate at all times the aircraft is airborne? Is takeoff permitted with it unserviceable?

If there is such a lock, then we have different ideas of what "windmilling" means.

t303, your account refers to simulating the engine failure by setting flight-idle. Flight-idle is not the same as windmilling. This is twice now that I have called you on this.

ace from space also said flight-idle for the engine failure simulation on the EMB-120. His was an interesting account and revealed that the aircraft was virtually out of control. How would it have gone if the prop was windmilling?

[Fred Gassit]

One important factor with regard to a windmilling prop is the powertrain configuration, the PW100 series are free turbines so a windmilling prop will, in effect, only be driving the power turbine, hence the general lack of NTS systems on these powerplants.

Compared to a Garrett (for example) where the prop will have the job of driving the turbine and compressor assembly and the windmilling drag will be very significant.

I don't know how FI drag compares to actual failed engine/windmilling prop drag but the platform I fly also performs with one engine at FI, obviously not as well as when feathered or with zero thrust set but a very definite positive gradient nonetheless.

I think I agree with FGD though, I don't think FI would replicate a completely failed powerplant with a pitchlocked prop. One aircraft I have flown (in a sim) without autofeathering could only climb briefly before starting a gradual descent.

[Josh Cox]

But, 400 RPM (stated by AerocatS2A) for a windmilling prop sounds a little too low. This value leads me to suspect that there is some form of lock in the propeller - to prevent the fine pitch angles that give the high windmilling RPM and consequent enormous drag.


With both Garrett (-10 and -11U) and Pratt (-41, -42, -34, -67 and -114), when the engine stops working, oil pressure is lost/drops very considerably in normal operation, the props will feather over 20-30 seconds due to loss of oil presssure.

This is something you should know instinctively.

When a prop is feathered, it just about always still rotates a little inflight, every configuration is different.

No multi engine aircraft that I know of when the powerplant fails, the prop will move to the fine position ?.

ace from space also said flight-idle for the engine failure simulation on the EMB-120. His was an interesting account and revealed that the aircraft was virtually out of control. How would it have gone if the prop was windmilling?

As a pilot with a META, this is, and how power reduction stops yaw is a part of the VMCA demonstration, done at a safe altitude.

I have never experienced a prop ceased in fine pitch, but FI on either type presents a huge amount of drag, I believe the engine is not driving the propeller in either case, so what is ?.

All the turbine aircraft I have flown will still climb with one engine at FI and the other producing max power above V1 on T/O and inflight.

[43Inches]

400 RPM is not rotating slowly and it does sound a little slow for the coarse pitch stops (min governed position), which is where a windmilling prop will settle to.

However at least one type of turboprop has an autofeather system which actually lets the prop cycle and this allows less drag than the feathered prop.

Any pitch lock system would be worse as it would lock the prop most likely in a finer than ideal position.


I have never experienced a prop ceased in fine pitch, but FI on either type presents a huge amount of drag, I believe the engine is not driving the propeller in either case, so what is ?.




Unless you have shut down the gas generator then it will still be producing some thrust however small.

[relax737]

obie, I'm more than happy to explain, but not sure whether you want the analogy explained or the bit after, so I'll do both.

An analogy is a similarity or parallelism.

The guy being up to his butt in alligators tends to forget why he's there because he panics.

Pilots aren't dissimilar; believe it or not, we do panic from time to time, and let me assure you, when I had an explosive decompression at FL390, I did experience a moment of panic. That panic was probably associated, in a small way, with the sensation that my guts was going to end up on the floor, and it wasn't going to be through my mouth!

However, what pilots have going for them is bags of (hopefully good) training, so after that instant of panic, the training kicks in and they do what is necessary, but in a critical situation if not performed accurately, it can be over in an instant.

There you are, the old analogy about the alligators, which, incidentally, is as old as aviation itself (may have been coined by Wilbur or Orville) explained. I'm surprised you haven't come across it previously.

I first saw it whilst at Air North where a wag put one of those up on the whiteboard every morning.

Another was

Working here is like being a pubic hair on a toilet seat; sooner or later you'll get pissed off.

Now I'm not going to explain that one to you!

This has evolved into a good thread, way off topic at times, but I bet there are people learning a lot from this about turbo props and their operation.

[Josh Cox]

43 inch,

Sure, whilst ever the hot section is producing hot air, it could be argued that in some respect the engine has the ability to produce a small amount of power, what does the TQ gauge tell you ?.

If the aircraft was stationary on the ground with the engine operating at FI, what power is the engine producing, in terms of TQ ?, so does it make the amount produced relevant, I do not think so, great to have but probably not even indicating on the TQ gauge.

So, unless the propeller is ceased in fine pitch, how does one have this massive amount of "windmilling" drag if the engine has actually failed and the prop will start feathering on its own ?.

What I think many here are thinking about is the FI position, engine still producing high oil pressure, prop lever still selecting high rpm and the oil making the fine pitch happen, yet engine not actually scheduling enough fuel to produce positive TQ, this produces high drag (common training scenario, we've all seen it, but would it happen in real life ?).

A ceased prop in fine'ish pitch will produce high drag.

For example, jump into a CSU single engine piston, climb to 10,000ft, pull the mixture, set the glide, once estabilshed write down the FPM, pull the pitch lever into the coarse position ( pull pitch lever out ), check the FPM.

I did this in a lightly loaded C207, first reading was 1480FPM, the second was 690FPM. Whilst the single engine prop operates differently this indicates what a small pitch change will do to a glide/drag produced.

[Fred Gassit]

Most turboprops whilst on the ground with FI selected are off and running, certainly way too much thrust for a controllable taxi, also consider landing when idle is not trimmed as low as it should be, easy to float clear over the horizon.

They generate significant thrust at idle although the prop is generally on the fine stop i.e. ungoverned, I wouldn't think (but don't know) at Vmca type speeds that there would be as significant a windmillling effect although we are cautioned on most types I've operated to use zero thrust settings and not FI.

The prop in question is likely to be a double acting mechanism (again I don't know for sure) meaning it is feathered by an autofeather system (inoperative if a power lever is retarded) and in the case of loss of oil pressure the hub will lock the propeller blades at the existing angle until, either piston oil pressure is restored or the auxiliary feather pump is operated (manual fx or condition lever)

So a windmilling propeller is a real possibility in these scenarios, and it is on the drivers to recognise and feather where required (as soon as positive control and rate of climb are established).

[baron_beeza]

A lot of speculation on the operation of the Brasilia prop.

A few pages of the simplified operation can be found at Smart Cockpit. This is dumbed down for pilots so may not tell the whole story, - but I suspect there may be a little more to it than some here appreciate.

SmartCockpit - Airline training guides, Aviation, Operations, Safety (http://www.smartcockpit.com/pdf/plane/embraer/EMBRAER-120/systems/0004/)

[Stikybeke]

Well, after reading all these posts over the last hour, I just want to say a thanks to Frigatebird :ok:....well balanced, good simulator example we can all learn from and a sensible approach to this tragic incident "anything is possible..."

It just makes you stop and think...

Stay safe one and all....

Stiky

[Josh Cox]

Fred,

Just about all of this discussion is regarding FGD statement that any aircraft with a windmilling prop will not climb, something he/she claims we should know instinctively, or words to that effect.

Many have disputed this from their own hands on experience, yet some continue this "windmilling prop / no climb theory".

To be polite, it was a theory that was put to peer review on this thread and has since been denied as true by many.

Most turboprops whilst on the ground with FI selected are off and running

I would not agree with that statement.

So do you have to pull beta to get the aircraft on the ground ?.

Disclaimer: I have never flown a braz, am not referring to the ANB accident, this is a purely academic discussion, as I do not agree with FGD's earlier statement.

Baron Beeza, that is a good link,thanks.

[MACH082]

In my type we brief to climb to acceleration altitude (400 feet AGL) with a windmilling prop (NTSing), T/O flap and gear retracted.

The only time we will feather the engine straight away is if we have an NTS failure in which it will happen as soon as the gear has been selected up.

A turbine engined aeroplane above 5700kg is certified to achieve a positive rate until the gear has been selected up, then must achieve a certain climb gradient until the end of the second segment, which in my case is 2%. This is with a windmilling prop, gear selected up and take off flap extended.

We do this all the time in the sim, and on our base checks and it performs well. In the sim at max weight it also performs above the minimum required climb gradient provided you maintain V2 with correct technique.

[1a sound asleep]

Remember this was on a 21 year old airframe and a/c performance usually diminishes with age. Darwin is also a failry hot climate - certainly not standard field performance.

There are many school of thoughts that it's ok to fail an engine before V1 OR wait until 400 feet and give yourself some safety margin.

This was an accident, no matter how you look at it. I can potentially see CASA regs being ammended re this type of training - either to mandate sim training and/or limiting simulated EFATO to a min altitude.

There's no reason the a/c cant be configured to simulate an EFATO at 2000 feet

[Harry Cooper]

Most turboprops whilst on the ground with FI selected are off and runningI do agree with that statement. Every turboprop I've flown, except the Nomad, will happily move off the blocks at Flight Idle. The B200 is a good example even at max weight. If you are turning off a bay then sure power will be required but if its straight ahead then 9/10 times as soon as the brakes off, off it goes. And your soon into Beta to slow it down.

So do you have to pull beta to get the aircraft on the ground ?What do you think? There is a big difference between a B200 (or whatever) overcoming ground friction than the same aircraft trying to stay in the sky with a s**t load of drag from flaps, gear, wing etc.

[Harry Cooper]

I've found with aircraft with 4 blades or more you usually have to land with the power on and quite a bit of power. If you pulled the power back to FI you will fall out of the sky as those big blades start to disc. I've found when training with guys on one of these types you have to be careful they don't pull the power off too soon or it can quickly get away from you. With aircraft with 3 blades such as Cheyennes and older B200's you can get away with pulling the power back to idle at around 30' and flying them on.

[Josh Cox]

Thanks Harry,

On landing, I have never needed to use beta, i.e. a clear demonstration to me of how little power, if any is being produced at FI, with the power lever/s at the gate.

Which I believe ties in with my opinion that with one engine at FI and the other at max pwr, inflight, is pretty much the worst drag situation you can find yourself in, excluding a ceased prop, which I've not experienced or seen.

It would appear from Baron Beeza's link that, the braz for example will pitch lock at a lower pitch than it was at when a EFATO occurs, IMHO theoritically a better scenario than FI with power lever at the gate.

I have not flown a turbine twin that will not climb on one engine with the other at flight idle and power lever at the gate, so to me this further disproves FGD's earlier statement.

Plus the braz pilots I've met are of the opinion that the braz, for example, with correct technique will easily fly away with 2 pob on one engine, with the other engine at FI.

Whilst failing engines inflight can be a dangerous procedure, it can be done relatively safely, but it is certainly not wish out risk, smoking hole in the end of the runway type of risk, have never heard of someone losing their life in a sim.

[Harry Cooper]

Most aircraft won't allow you to come into beta unless there is Weight-on-Wheels. I have flown some types where with age squat switches fail and you can come into beta early - not a good position to be in if beta "deploys" assymetrically, you will be well and truly screwed.

I agree totally with you in the other respect. Practicing a V1 cut or EFATO by pulling the power lever to FI increases drag and increases Vmca by a substantial margin. Obviously Zero thrust is used to simulate either the engine secured or initially at least autofeather operation. At light weights there could be only a small margin then between say V2 and Vmca. Again I use the B200 as example. The new models are certified to Part 25, meaning they run to transport category numbers. At max weight V2 is 111 KIAS. If autofeather was to fail, then Vmca will rise from 91 KIAS to 108 KIAS. Thats a 3 knot margin between the them - f**k all. Everybody here is going on about gradients, windmilling etc but bottom line is that if these aircraft are certified in the US then they do not need to meet these requirements in their basic form. If they have a shortcoming modifications such as MANDATORY autofeather can be employed and performance credits are then given, but these have to be functional at all times they are required or else the aircraft is not airworthy. Obviously some aircraft such as the Dash are so overpowered that this is not an issue. For some such as the B200 it is. The autofeather must be tested each day and the aircraft is grounded if it does not work. I believe the Bras is the same. It would be interesting to find out what a "light" V2 would be for a Bras as well as Vmca in the event of autofeather failure. I'm sure it would be tight. Obviously the only way to recover from a Vmca departure is to reduce power and lower the nose to increase airspeed. Who the hell is going to do this at a few hundred feet AGL as their aircraft is rolling and descending - I doubt I would.

[john_tullamarine]

Some thoughts .. (caveats - no free turbine piloting experience, only F27/L188 and not speaking specifically to this particular aircraft loss)..

Many have disputed this from their own hands on experience, yet some continue this "windmilling prop / no climb theory".

The certification basis will give you the starting point for figuring what might or might not happen given this or that problem.

In general, if the weight is (appropriately) low enough, there ought to be no great difficulty climbing with a more adverse than certification thrust/drag situation .. not much different, really, to the similar problems with light twins in a takeoff engine failure situation ... hot and heavy = forget it ... light and cold = far less sweaty.

The principal flight management problem with this sort of training manoeuvre lies in handling qualities and consequences of uncommanded/unexpected failures at a fairly critical stage of flight. If a failure-related problem occurs, say, around or especially a little below V1 with a near Vmcg/Vmca limited speed schedule, and the takeoff is continued, then things might rapidly get out of the pilots' ability to keep on top of the situation. The propeller beast is far more critical, in this regard, than its turbofan brother.

So far as what the failed engine's propeller should do, generally we see the certified system's incorporating either autofeather or neg torque sensing to drive the failed engine's prop to a pitch condition resulting in a predictable (reasonably low) drag so that handling problems, initially, and climb capability, subsequently, are manageable and within the certification expectations.

In my type we brief to climb to acceleration altitude (400 feet AGL) with a windmilling prop (NTSing), T/O flap and gear retracted.

which is the typical certification scenario .. where the handling and performance is predicated on autofx/NTS correctly functioning

The only time we will feather the engine straight away is if we have an NTS failure in which it will happen as soon as the gear has been selected up.

.. (or autofx failure, as appropriate), either of which can be expected to result in a critical situation generally requiring fairly rapid pilot response to maintain control of the situation

There are many school of thoughts that it's ok to fail an engine before V1

.. provided you intend to stop .. especially if you are on a near min speed schedule

There's no reason the a/c cant be configured to simulate an EFATO at 2000 feet

.. perhaps not really a useful training consideration generally for heavies ... however, a good strategy for initial failure introduction to a multi engine new chum.

Who the hell is going to do this at a few hundred feet AGL as their aircraft is rolling and descending - I doubt I would.

.. been in a similar situation in the 727 sim engine failure with the FE being a bit slow on the old "check essential" thing (long time ago so I'm stretching the memory a bit) ... either way we ended up with no rudder for a bit and the thrust had to be reduced substantially to give us time to catch up with the FE's delay.

In the real world, it is a matter of discipline and training ... leave the power on you DO die .. inverted. Pull the operating levers back a bit and you MIGHT just live in the belly landing. You might well doubt that you would .. I doubt that I would not ... when you have departed controlled flight without a preprogrammed recovery, the normal rules go out the window and you are looking to maximise the probability for a survivable accident.

So far as training in the aircraft versus training in the sim, the sim is preferable if you have a reasonable fidelity device available .. you get to have the other guys smile and chuckle at your mistakes but you also get to have another go at getting in right next time around.

Having said that, some training ends up needing to be done in the aircraft due either to no sim being available or inadequate sim fidelity for particular requirements. I did all my F27/L188 training in the aircraft but with fairly rigorous adherence to published protocols. Even then, some silly things were done eg for my L188 endorsement - it was all done at night due to aircraft availability and with non-flying pilots standing in the cockpit observing. I shudder now at the likely headlines had something gone wrong .... however, we didn't do overly silly things like training at near min speed schedules.

[ace from space]

sound asleep There are many school of thoughts that it's ok to fail an engine before V1 OR wait until 400 feet and give yourself some safety margin.
This was an accident, no matter how you look at it. I can potentially see CASA regs being ammended re this type of training - either to mandate sim training and/or limiting simulated EFATO to a min altitude.


Sound asleep.
Not sure what you mean there.
V1 occurs whilst the a/c is still well and truly fixed to the runway, prior Vr, so if one were to suffer a failure prior to V1 then stopping on the runway is still an option, after V1 it is not. (Unless you are prepared for the potential risk of over running the R/W)
EFATO is a term more applicable to light twins or singles and such, that don’t fit into Transport Category performance criteria.
In a Transport Cat a/c the failure could actually occur before takeoff (before Vr) and with training one learns to deal with the failure and continue the takeoff. Hence the obvious benefits of being able to do this kind of training in a sim.
I do agree with your points about doing this exercise (in the real aeroplane) at a safe height.
I for one have never felt the need to do this exercise at or just after V1 but rather at a more comfortable 100-200 ft AGL so that if anything were to go pear shaped there was some margin for error. This doesn’t give the same experience as suffering a failure at V1 and controlling the a/c on the runway whilst waiting for Vr to occur before rotating and maintaining control and stabilising the a/c at V2 and positive rate.
Call me soft, but I never felt the likelihood of ever suffering such a failure is worth the risk of carrying out this exercise at 0 ft AGL; the Tamworth Metro crash brought that truth home to me.


FGD135
This is alarming. You were on the verge of being out of control. It could be said that you *were* out of control - given your continued problem with directional control.
Is this a frequent occurrence on these sorts of training flights? Is CASA aware of this?

Being on the verge of losing control, just a small hiccup (e.g. wind gust) would have put you out of control.

With the rapidly developing yaw and roll towards the dead engine, what then is the procedure? Is there an officially documented one?

You said that you "decreased power on the good engine". Is it possible that somebody could instead try to increase power on the "failed" engine - with a long spool-up time then making a crash inevitable?


In response to your questions FGD135, I only experienced this situation twice where I felt we were at the limit of controllability during a ‘critical’ engine failure and put it down to over pitching or over rotating and low speed.
I discussed it with my colleagues at the time and also with the Airframe ‘ginger beers’ and no one else had had a similar experience or reported such. I recall the ‘ginger beers doing a control rigging check and full control operation check but reported that everything was within limits, so I put it down to poor technique and the vagaries associated with different airframes. (Some just fly straighter than others)
The technique to recover from such a situation would be to increase speed if it was low by lowering pitch attitude and decreasing Tq on the live engine (which someone already pointed out is the below VMCA recovery procedure).
If control loss was imminent one could quickly advance the ‘failed’ power lever as with a PW118 series engine, from FI there is very little power lag.

[ace from space]

relax737

good story about both pilots switching the tanks...
A couple of blokes I know who were both senior pilots (Capts) went flying together on a test flight and left the gear pins in....oops!
Human factors...
Btw the Alligator analagy is an oldie but a goodie....:)

[Harry Cooper]

John, I agree with all your points. My last point however? Witnesses report that the aircraft had just got airborne and then there was a rapid roll to the left. I have never briefed during my takeoff safety brief for a loss of control on departure due to Autofx failure and possible subsequent Vmca departure. I think with the height they had available to them and everything else going on even if they had recognised the issue, which maybe they had, it may have been too late. A 10 tonne airplane already carrying inertia toward the ground is going to be hard to stop with inadequate airspeed let alone height and controllability. Of course this is just hypothetical scenario based on my comments and the accident at hand.

[ace from space]

JT good post, well said :ok:

[ace from space]

Redline

The crew recalled that, as the pilot in command advanced the engine power levers at the commencement of the go-around, the aircraft yawed and rolled left ‘aggressively’. The co-pilot applied right rudder and aileron but was unable to control the aircraft. He informed the pilot in command that he was unable to hold the control inputs, so the pilot in command placed his hands on the control yoke and his feet on the rudder pedals and assisted the co-pilot. Together, they were able to steady the aircraft’s flight path, which they estimated at that time to have been approximately 100 ft above ground level, with 30 degrees bank left, and 100 to 111 kts airspeed. The crew reported that the stick shaker activated twice, and that each time they slightly reduced the control yoke back pressure. During that period, the EGPWS warning ‘too low terrain’ sounded. The co-pilot called for the flaps to be retracted to the ‘flaps 25’ position. After the pilot in command confirmed that the co-pilot had control, flap 25 was selected. The crew reported that the airspeed slowly began to rise above 111 kts and the left bank started decreasing, although full right aileron and rudder inputs were still required. The crew retracted the flaps
to 15 degrees, and the co-pilot was able to return the aircraft to a wings level attitude. The aircraft achieved a positive rate of climb a short time later. The crew then retracted the landing gear.


interesting post, must have been a very uncomfortable few minutes for those involved. :eek:

[Harry Cooper]

This is the aspect of this place that I like. Regardless of the sh*t fights that always ensue in these forums after an accident or major incident, once the forum gets rolling and experienced guys such as J_T start posting a lot can be learnt. If only one person walks away with new useful knowledge then these posts have served a purpose. If subsequently that knowledge saves lives down the track then accidents such as these, although tragic, are not in vane and forums like this are worthwhile. When you look at Australian aviation regulations and the background of how they came about (such as the Coffee Royal Affair), you see that these regs are written in blood and it is unfortunate that new regulations will be written (most likely) on the basis of this accident too. I think that this certainly won't be the last either.

[ace from space]

Harry
I agree totally with you in the other respect. Practicing a V1 cut or EFATO by pulling the power lever to FI increases drag and increases Vmca by a substantial margin. Obviously Zero thrust is used to simulate either the engine secured or initially at least autofeather operation. At light weights there could be only a small margin then between say V2 and Vmca. Again I use the B200 as example. The new models are certified to Part 25, meaning they run to transport category numbers. At max weight V2 is 111 KIAS. If autofeather was to fail, then Vmca will rise from 91 KIAS to 108 KIAS. Thats a 3 knot margin between the them - f**k all. Everybody here is going on about gradients, windmilling etc but bottom line is that if these aircraft are certified in the US then they do not need to meet these requirements in their basic form. If they have a shortcoming modifications such as MANDATORY autofeather can be employed and performance credits are then given, but these have to be functional at all times they are required or else the aircraft is not airworthy. Obviously some aircraft such as the Dash are so overpowered that this is not an issue. For some such as the B200 it is. The autofeather must be tested each day and the aircraft is grounded if it does not work. I believe the Bras is the same. It would be interesting to find out what a "light" V2 would be for a Bras as well as Vmca in the event of autofeather failure. I'm sure it would be tight. Obviously the only way to recover from a Vmca departure is to reduce power and lower the nose to increase airspeed. Who the hell is going to do this at a few hundred feet AGL as their aircraft is rolling and descending - I doubt I would.

Interesting point you make about the margins above Vmca for V2.
You are so right, margins are tight so good technique with speed control
Is important for maintaining control as well as achieving the desired performance.
I don’t recall Vmca for the Bras or the margin between V2, someone else may be able to help with that?
From my recollection of performance for FAR part 121; V2 = 1.1 Vmca or 1.2 Vs and doesn’t change whether auto fx is operative or not, as the prop is assumed to be windmilling in the engine out case.

[CharlieLimaX-Ray]

Okay PPrune experts explain how you can take-off in a transport category four engine aircraft(jet or piston) with an engine shutdown or in the case of piston engine with a failed starter motor prior to commencing the take-off roll, and still maintain directional contral and still achieve the climb gradients?

[aussie027]

I agree with some of the above comments. Very valuable when people post high value data that others can think about and learn from, it may save their butts one day.

I was told during basic flight training--- "Learn from the mistakes of others, you won't live long enough to make them all yourself".

Very true, I also have found, as have many others to pre think your actions in certain super critical situations so hopefully if the situation ever arises your actions will be immediate and correct. A second or 2 could make the difference.

Illustrated by this true story--

A navy carrier pilot in a fighter felt the cat shot was "cold", ie very weak , so his aircraft was basically moving just fast enough as it left the deck to go down into the ocean right in front of 100 000 tons of carrier moving at 30kts.
He ejected just as his plane left the deck.
Later, when someone asked him when he made the decision to eject, he said, " about 10years ago".:ok::ok:

[ace from space]

Archangel7
for such a sophisticated aircraft like that to suddenly lose control on take off with 2 highly experienced pilots for no apparent reason makes no sense. Even if they where conducting EFATO drills this shouldnt happen. The Brasilia has gauranteed performance with one engine on T/O... Obviously Something terribly went wrong.This could not be pilot error. Without a doubt, mechanical failure!!! To me it sounds like the malfunction of the engine propeller control unit and this would allowed the propeller blade angles to go below the flight idle position if they where conducting EFATO drills. I am sure there are many other factors contributing to the accident as all accident have a chain of events to lead up to it.

like i said, its only my opinion and its not a big issue! :P i guess it is easier to just point the finger at the dead pilots and say it was "human error" . That would make me less arrogant and close minded i guess. I personally believe it is a mechanical error and you can call me as narrow minded and as arrogant as you want it will not change my opinion. But a high-speed crash on take-off points the finger more towards a mechanical error then human error. Do some research on Brasilia fatal crashes and you will discover that 90% of them are mechanical errors!. they vary from propeller going into reverse thrust on final approach, failure of the horizontal stabilizer and there was another interesting one which i read up on the other day where the propeller separated from the engine assembly and became imbedded in the leading edge of the wing and the pilot was committed to make a forced landing into a paddock killing 18 passengers. do some research and see for your self. I don’t think I am being closed minded at all.

Dude, you are persistent about this...
No one is saying that it is pilot error or a mistake by the crew, but you can’t definitively rule it out by making a big assumption like that.
Recommended reading ‘crash comics’ vol 1-3 (or otherwise known as Airline Disasters by Macarthur Job)
For me personally, I have a very healthy respect for the V1 cut, after experiencing an experienced colleague/sim partner losing control and crashing the sim during this exercise. A good learning experience that we got to walk away from as it was in a sim not the real a/c.

Background info for you.
Although you attribute some of the earlier Brasilia fatal accidents to mechanical failure, several of the earlier prop or prop governor related crashes were before the electrically activated ‘FI stop solenoid’ was fitted. Why was it fitted you may care to ask?
Because it was determined that relatively inexperienced crews on the type were pulling the power levers (particularly when hot and high) back over the mechanical stop, either advertently or inadvertently with disastrous consequences. To my knowledge no further related hull losses have occurred since this mod was carried out.

[Centaurus]

Later, when someone asked him when he made the decision to eject, he said, " about 10years ago

I'll go along with that. After years of reading accident reports from around the world where high speed aborts for whatever reason on limiting length runways often ended in grief off the end, I made up my mind that, unless absolutely sure the aircraft would not fly, then from 15 knots below V1 I was going to continue the take off and sort the problem in the air. Might have been procedurally illegal but that's the way I saw it. Still do, too. No further correspondence entered into:ok:

[t303]

OK FGD

t303, your account refers to simulating the engine failure by setting flight-idle. Flight-idle is not the same as windmilling. This is twice now that I have called you on this.

I mistakenly thought the argument was concerning drag, your concern being about a windmilling prop, lack of climb performance and all. I offered my experience in the aircraft with the gear out (lots of drag). My bad, so I'll fold.
Life's too short.

[LeadSled]

CL X-Xay,
Engine out ferry is a very specific operation, with it's own limitation and performance requirements.

The conditions for an engine out ferry are very type specific.

For example, on a DC-4, the prop. on the failed engine must be removed, a DC-6/7 can just have the prop. feathered.

Engine out ferry of a B707 was available, but few airlines ever used it, because it was virtually impossible to produce a V1/Vr/V2 that could cope with a further engine failure on T/O ----- the Vmca2 was so high, compared to any reasonable speed at which you could keep the aeroplane on the ground.

In the case of some B747, Vmca2 was low enough that a "survivable" set of figures could be produced. As I remember, it was normal to remove the fan and blank the core engine, much reducing the drag of the failed engine ---- ie: the failed engine configuration was the same as if the engine was a fifth pod.

Because of the very "iffy" nature of 3-Engine (or in the case of the DC-10/MD-11 2-engine) ferry, very few airlines ever exercised to option. Given that an engine change is a straight forward operation, and carrying a fifth pod is straightforward, or there are plenty of L-382 or AN-125's around, changing the failed engine is the much preferred solution, short of WW111.

Tootle pip!!

[Capt Claret]

CLX

As best I can recall the procedure in the BAe146, was thus:
Obtain specific RTOW for three engined ferry from Flight Ops
Confirm from RTOW for given atmospheric/aerodrome conditions that RTOW is ok.
Line up & with feet on brakes, set take-off thrust (N1) and mark thrust lever quadrant, reset ground idle.
Set takeoff thrust on symmetric engines and then release brakes.
At 60 kias introduce thrust on asymmetric engine to have take-off thrust set by 80 kias.
No V1 as such, Vr is considered V1,
Because only tech crew allowed, it usually climbs much better than with a load of pax & 4 engines.

To be current, we had to have been checked in the sim within the last 6 months. I did at least two that I can recall, ASP-ADL & TIM-DRW (Timika).

[CharlieLimaX-Ray]

Done at Airlines of Tasmania when a Heron had a starter fail motor fail at YKII or YFLI, three engine take-off approved(crew only) approved in the ops manual.

Likewise National Jet, Southern did three engine ferries on the BAE-146.

I have seen photos of the demo pilots taking a BN-2 Islander off with one engine feathered at the start off the take-off roll.

The original Aerocommander was flown across the USA on one engine with the non operating engine prop removed and tied down in the cabin.

[remoak]

Centaurus

from 15 knots below V1 I was going to continue the take off and sort the problem in the air. Might have been procedurally illegal but that's the way I saw it.

Hmmmm well I hope you briefed your F/O accordingly... or that could have resulted in some very ugly incidents...

Better to just artificially reduce the V1 if you are going to be doing stuff like that.

[obie2]

...or better still, go and ask the Chief Pilot to step down and give you the job so that you can amend the SOPs to incorporate your own stupid theories and go and kill everybody!! :bored:

[Shed Dog Tosser]

This has been one of the most interesting threads in quite some time, some great learning from respectful speculation.

Also glad the moderators cut the peanuts out of the thread, must be great to have a "ban" function on your tool bar.

Yes Smoka 21, I'm talking about you, loved your PM, thanks:


Subject: bout you

You Sir are obviously a neophyte and a grub!

Nothing more than a grub.

Let me know your name and phone number big man, and I personally guarantee I will end your career before it starts. Regardless of under which rock you hide.

You grub!

Good luck

All from a "man" that list the following as your profile:

Current a/c Type (eg B737. Pilots only):black smoke spewing noise machine
Biography:hot ******* dude
Location:bum**** alabama
Interests:oh wanking and stuff
Occupation:dole monkey

You are not my peer.

BBBbbbaaaaaaaahhhhhhhh hhhaaaaaahhhhh :ok:

[teresa green]

Just a little off the subject for a moment. Why is that a young mans tragic death in the surf here on the Gold Coast has been in the media for some days and yet two educated, highly trained tax paying family men who lost their lives in a rather large aircraft barely rate a mention. This does not deride the young man that died, but to question is a pilots life less than a young ironmans, what makes this young fella so newsworthy, yet a young pilot with a family, rates little. I would much prefer that there had to be no coverage on either accident, but sadly there is, but living here on the Gold Coast its is all we have heard about, absolutely nothing on this tragic affair in DRW.:confused:

[Led Zep]

Funny you say that, teresa green. I can't recall seeing any mention of it in the media here either.

[john_tullamarine]

Witnesses report that the aircraft had just got airborne and then there was a rapid roll to the left. I have never briefed during my takeoff safety brief for a loss of control on departure due to Autofx failure and possible subsequent Vmca departure

I don't suggest that one ought to brief on every unlikely oddball eventuality .. the aircraft would need then to return to the ramp for a top up.

However, and especially for the commander, one ought to have spent a lot of time in the armchair at home, over a coffee or fine wine, contemplating this and that eventuality and what one might be able to do to reduce the severity of the outcome consequences. The bird IS going to get bent and people ARE going to die. Better to have some survive rather than none ? What we don't need is for the commander to have his/her first thoughts on the subject at the time he/she is faced with the problem ... very likely those thoughts may be the last he/she does have.

A fine read in this regard is Al Haines' presentation on the Sioux City mishap. The text and video is readily available on the net and is well worth the neophyte's time over a coffee or ten.

More importantly, SOPs cover the routine, not the out of left field. On occasion, the commander is called upon to make a VERY rapid assessment/decision and implement it in the interests of minimising the losses during the accident.

Departure from controlled flight in a critical situation is just such a circumstance .. better, I suggest, to die trying .. and with a chance of surviving, than just sitting there and going along for the ride into guaranteed oblivion.

Another is the Vmcg departure from controlled flight (say, in a strongish adverse crosswind) .. the aircraft IS out of control and the takeoff HAS to be abandoned even though above V1 .. There is no time to have a reflective consideration about it, the situation requires immediate and decisive action.

I'm sure we can all dream up a list of similar scenarios ?

I see some raised eyebrows in respect of Centaurus' post. Now, I have known this (very experienced) pilot for most of my working life. He has a great knowledge of performance and so forth. Implicit in his comment is the need to be aware of how close the speed schedule is to min speed (ie either a Vmcg/Vmca limited takeoff).

[Brian Abraham]

Centaurus


from 15 knots below V1 I was going to continue the take off and sort the problem in the air. Might have been procedurally illegal but that's the way I saw it.
Hmmmm well I hope you briefed your F/O accordingly... or that could have resulted in some very ugly incidents...

Better to just artificially reduce the V1 if you are going to be doing stuff like that.

As a non plank multi driver I'm some what confused. My reading of the FAA definition of V1 agrees with the take Centaurus has.

To wit - V 1 means the maximum speed in the takeoff at which the pilot must take the first action (e.g., apply brakes, reduce thrust, deploy speed brakes) to stop the airplane within the accelerate-stop distance. V1 also means the minimum speed in the takeoff, following a failure of the critical engine at VEF, at which the pilot can continue the takeoff and achieve the required height above the takeoff surface within the takeoff distance.

FAR § 25.107 Takeoff speeds.

(a) V1must be established in relation to VEF as follows:

(1) VEF is the calibrated airspeed at which the critical engine is assumed to fail. VEF must be selected by the applicant, but may not be less than VMCG determined under §25.149(e).

(2) V1, in terms of calibrated airspeed, is selected by the applicant; however, V1may not be less than VEF plus the speed gained with critical engine inoperative during the time interval between the instant at which the critical engine is failed, and the instant at which the pilot recognizes and reacts to the engine failure, as indicated by the pilot's initiation of the first action (e.g., applying brakes, reducing thrust, deploying speed brakes) to stop the airplane during accelerate-stop tests.

The decision to abort is made prior to reaching V1, because the first physical action of applying retardation has to occur at V1. The hard part is at what speed below V1 do you pick as the decision point to allow you to react and commence retardation at V1. Rate of acceleration would play a major role I would imagine. And whether you are bright eyed and bushy tailed, against the commencement of the last sector in a very long and fatiguing day.

[1a sound asleep]

teresa green - I have heard almost nothing, even though Air North serves OOL. I agree we should all be paying respect to the 2 lives lost but then again I am sure are all wishing the best for the airline's future. A media beat up could easily destroy a reputation

[Utradar]

A media beat up could easily destroy a reputation

And where do you think the media is getting it's information from?

That's why I hold my opinion until the facts are presented! :ok:

[remoak]

Brian Abraham

You missed the second part of the FAA definition (not that it applies in Australia anyway):

"V1 also means the minimum speed in the takeoff, following a failure of the critical engine at VEF, at which the pilot can continue the takeoff and achieve the required height above the takeoff surface within the takeoff distance."

The point being that if you decide to go before V1, you can't be assured of obstacle clearance.

The decision to abort can be taken at any speed, however the decision to go (from a regulatory standpoint) is taken at V1. That is why most operators have an SOP that states the PF (or captain) has his hand on the power levers until V1, at which point they are moved off the power levers as an abort is no longer intended (although it could still be possible, but you risk shredding the tyres and/or overheating the brakes).

V1 can be reduced, in fact it often is when runway length, condition, or the net takeoff path demands it.

Some airlines operate to a Decision Speed instead of V1, typically around 8 kts below V1 for a 747.

Whatever the case, V1 must not be less than VMCG, VR must be not less than 1.05 VMCA. V1 must not be greater than VR.

john_tullamarine

The danger of what Centaurus is saying (and it IS dangerous) is that it could lead to confusion on the flight deck at a critical moment; It doesn't take either field length of obstacle clearance into account - for example, on a contaminated runway where there would be significant reduction to the acceleration to Vr and a consequently extended ground run; it contradicts the company SOPs; and would almost certainly have significant repercussions to the pilot and the company if there was an incident related to a "go" decision prior to V1.

Yes, the speeds are close, and the engine failure profile has to be flown accurately. However, there is sufficient "wiggle room" in the speeds to give a reasonable assurance of safety - the certification process makes sure of that.

In this phase of flight, everyone needs to know exactly what the other is doing, and not have any surprises thrown at them. Making up your own procedures is just asking for it, it doesn't matter how old or experienced you might be. Centaurus may know more than the aircraft manufacturers, certification test pilots, and the regulatory authorities - but I doubt it.

More importantly, SOPs cover the routine, not the out of left field. On occasion, the commander is called upon to make a VERY rapid assessment/decision and implement it in the interests of minimising the losses during the accident. Well most of what abnormal/non-normal SOPs cover isn't really routine, most pilots only see the more arcane abnormals/non-normals once every 3 years or so.

Having said that, when I was flying turboprops, a wise old training captain told me that I should always be prepared to just close the power levers and put it down straight ahead - better to have some control than none at all. He was right, particularly in the older turboprops, which can be pretty marginal. As far as I am concerned, losing control is the absolute enemy.

the Vmcg departure from controlled flight (say, in a strongish adverse crosswind) Vmcg doesn't apply if you are flying... it's one or the other (ie Vmca if in the air or Vmcg if the wheels are on the ground).

But yes, there are times when flat tyres and melted brakes are better than going flying!

There was an interesting incident several years ago, involving a HS748 that had a catastrophic engine failure on takeoff (just after rotation) that resulted in a major fire. The aircraft was airborne for 27 seconds before the captain re-landed the aircraft and went off the end of the runway at about 60kts. The nose gear collapsed, but everyone got out OK.

The report exonerated the captain, but the company basically crucified him for disobeying SOPs.

Air Accidents Investigation: 3/2001 G-OJEM (http://www.aaib.gov.uk/sites/aaib/publications/formal_reports/3_2001_g_ojem.cfm)

[john_tullamarine]

The point being that if you decide to go before V1, you can't be assured of obstacle clearance.

.. or TODR, TORR, loss of directional control, etc ...

V1 can be reduced, in fact it often is when runway length, condition, or the net takeoff path demands it.

.. such has, as an implicit requirement, compliance with all the rules. The normal procedures are not capricious but, rather, are quite deliberate in their bases.

The danger of what Centaurus is saying

I'm neither agreeing/disagreeing with Centaurus.

He was expressing his own philosophical take on the matter as a greybeard (actually he doesn't have a beard, but never mind) - his level of experience warrants a hearing regardless of whether you might agree or disagree with the sentiments so expressed.

As a general rule, adherence to SOP is the preference if for no other reason than that it is a sensible risk based approach to the routine problems of flying.

The point of the discussion is that, sometimes, when problems come out of left field and the situation is outside the certification fence-around-the-paddock ... SOPs don't have the answer and the commander is called upon to step up to the mark and earn his/her paypacket for the year in the next few seconds. If the outcome is successful, we pat him/her on the back, if not, and quite unfairly in many cases, we tend to hang the pilot's integrity/competence. Part and parcel of being "the commander".

However, there is sufficient "wiggle room" in the speeds to give a reasonable assurance of safety - the certification process makes sure of that.

I'm a little uncomfortable with that as a broad statement. For the accel-stop manoeuvre (and that is the principal concern with V1) there is very little fudge factor (wiggle room, if you prefer) for accel-stop. This is especially so for the earlier aircraft .. indeed FAR 25 A/L 42, which introduced the requirement for a 2-second delay, recognised just this concern.

Centaurus may know more than the aircraft manufacturers, certification test pilots, and the regulatory authorities - but I doubt it.

to give Centaurus his due, he is quite SOP-oriented so we can take your comment in the underlying spirit it was made.

Well most of what abnormal/non-normal SOPs cover isn't really routine, most pilots only see the more arcane abnormals/non-normals once every 3 years or so.

and, with increasing engine and general system reliability, some never are called upon to step up to the mark .. surely a good thing overall for the customers.

a wise old training captain told me that I should always be prepared to just close the power levers and put it down straight ahead

precisely my point but one perhaps overlooked by the blinkered SOP adherents ?

Vmcg doesn't apply if you are flying... it's one or the other (ie Vmca if in the air or Vmcg if the wheels are on the ground).

indeed .. if I gave the impression that I was suggesting otherwise then that was only a consequence of my poor literary skills - perhaps the reference to "departure from controlled flight" which has a specific meaning and covers situations on the ground as well as in flight.

However, it is very important to keep in mind that any takeoff at low weight, with min speed schedules, can bite the pilot hard ... either due to a Vmcg OR Vmca departure ... if he/she is a bit hamfisted. Indeed, if the pilot has not been trained for such takeoffs, then the gyrations can be very surprising ...

I can recall a training contract with a particular airline which generally operated to higher overspeed (improved performance for the Airbus folk) procedures. When I had some of the folk have a look at the other end of the spectrum the results opened a few eyes. Indeed, most involved needed several goes to get the beast under control. Not a problem, per se, but emphasised the need for specific training in low speed schedule engine failures ... quite a different sort of beast to the "normal" EFATO licence renewal sequence at forward/mid CG and higher weights/speed schedules. The reality is that the directional control thing ramps up very rapidly in the last few knots of V1 reduction and a comparatively tame aircraft can become a bit of a tiger.

But yes, there are times when flat tyres and melted brakes are better than going flying!

or, indeed, a bent aeroplane in the overrun .. but with plenty of survivors.

The nose gear collapsed, but everyone got out OK.

my philosophical point precisely.

[Dashunder]

Just a little off the subject for a moment. Why is that a young mans tragic death in the surf here on the Gold Coast has been in the media for some days and yet two educated, highly trained tax paying family men who lost their lives in a rather large aircraft barely rate a mention. This does not deride the young man that died, but to question is a pilots life less than a young ironmans, what makes this young fella so newsworthy, yet a young pilot with a family, rates little. I would much prefer that there had to be no coverage on either accident, but sadly there is, but living here on the Gold Coast its is all we have heard about, absolutely nothing on this tragic affair in DRW

It is interesting, living in Brissy, the young lifesaver has made the news everyday since the very sad incident, WRT the sad loss in Darwin, have had to hunt for any media, I can only recall it making the TV news on the day and the day after and that was on the ABC.

Sadly I can only put it down to a couple of things, Firstly: the Lifesaver was a volunteer, and it is now being revealed that he had thoughts about not competing in that event, and Secondly, our dear friends in Darwin didn't have 18 passengers behind them.

Regards,

[relax737]

It's most unfortunate Dashunder that the media whores will completely disregard what people like us see as newsworthy in favour of something that is likely to sell more product.

A contributing factor, I'm guessing, is that Darwin is a long way from anywhere, and then the point you make about no pax is also relevant.

[Back Seat Driver]

Centaurus it seems, has read the content of several articles sourced from Boeing and the FAA, regarding the GO / NO GO, decision making process. (Happy to have provided the link, all those years ago;))
Boeing Aero Magazine - Rejected Take-Off Studies (http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aeromagazine/aero_11/takeoff_story.html)
FAA - Take-Off Safety Training Aid (http://www.bluecoat.org/reports/TOSTA-Sec-1-3.pdf)

[Brian Abraham]

Thanks for those links BSD. The most pertinent part to this discussion I think is

http://i101.photobucket.com/albums/m56/babraham227/v-1.jpg
http://i101.photobucket.com/albums/m56/babraham227/v1.jpg

[ace from space]

remoak

But yes, there are times when flat tyres and melted brakes are better than going flying!


Sometimes indeed it is....
A good recent example of when it was a good decision to stop, even though it was after V1 and Vr, was the ANZ 777 RTO at Narita in Feb.
On rotation the PF found that the controls wouldn’t budge. Even though it was well after Vr the Capt then rejected the TO bursting about 12 tyres but managed to pull her up by the RW end.
It was found that the Auto pilot had inadvertently been selected on prior to TO.

[remoak]

The most important part of that text in Brian Abraham's post being the last paragraph in smaller letters... which is why committing to "go" before V1 is not a smart idea at all. I don't see anything in any of those documents that endorses a "go" decision before V1, other than from the point of view that you are always "going" unless you consciously decide to abort. All of the copied text above is making the point that you shouldn't try an RTO after V1, that you should have decided by then - in other words, it's talking about the danger of a LATE decision. The Evergreen procedure simply uses a reduced V1 and accepts the slightly degraded 1st and 2nd segment climb performance - but it still calls it V1.

The danger of what Centaurus was suggesting is that is seems to be a completely arbitrary speed that he decides on, apparently without reference to any performance data, or to his First Officer. The danger isn't so much the speed itself (although a 15kt reduction could put you in the trees), but the apparent lack of CRM and the very real likelihood of considerable confusion on the flight deck at a critical time.

I've met plenty of "graybeards" who made up their own SOPs, the whole point of modern CRM/Human Factors training is to eliminate that sort of thing. Now that I'm approaching "graybeard" status myself, I fully understand WHY Centaurus might want to do what he is suggesting, but, frankly, the days of "old school" command techniques are over.

john_tullamarine

his level of experience warrants a hearing regardless of whether you might agree or disagree with the sentiments so expressed.Yes, absolutely, and it would be interesting to hear further from him on why he does what he does, and how he reconciles it with the stuff I have suggested. Having a decent debate on the subject can only be good.

SOPs don't have the answer and the commander is called upon to step up to the mark and earn his/her paypacket for the year in the next few seconds. Absolutely, and I have had several occasions like that during my years in command. Sometimes you are just hanging on and praying... other times you get a flash of right-field inspiration.

I'm a little uncomfortable with that as a broad statement. For the accel-stop manoeuvre (and that is the principal concern with V1) there is very little fudge factor (wiggle room, if you prefer) for accel-stop. This is especially so for the earlier aircraft .. indeed FAR 25 A/L 42, which introduced the requirement for a 2-second delay, recognised just this concern.
Actually I was referring more to controllability issues, remember the original issue was the small gap between V1 and minimum controllability speeds.

The relationship between V1 and accel-stop is an utter fudge anyway. When I was operating the 146 above the arctic circle, we went into plenty of runways that technically should have complied with all the requirements, but which you absolutely knew were too slimy for the crew to have much chance if they had to abort, particularly as the 146 is completely dependent on wheel brakes. V1 on those runways should have been about 50 kts. Another good example is the last third of 15 at Birmingham in the UK, technically the same as the rest of the runway but known to be bumpy and slippery in wet conditions.

However, it is very important to keep in mind that any takeoff at low weight, with min speed schedules, can bite the pilot hard ... either due to a Vmcg OR Vmca departure ... if he/she is a bit hamfisted. Indeed, if the pilot has not been trained for such takeoffs, then the gyrations can be very surprising ...True, but in my experience, very few pilots ever manage to keep the speed down near a lower limiting speed anyway. There aren't many turboprops that don't have the power to either climb away well, or speed up when very light. We always taught our guys to hold the achieved speed as long as they were climbing, and this was rarely less than Vr + 20kts or so. If you try and hold it at V2 and initiate a steep-ish climb, you WILL have trouble unless you are ace of the base.

[Brian Abraham]

Posted purely to add to the discussion, recognising that the amendments in force at the time of certification may have an influence. Bolding mine.

AC 25-7A
(3) Accelerate-Stop Time Delays. Section 25.101(h) of the FAR requires allowance for time delays in the execution of procedures. Amendment 25-42 (effective March 1, 1978) amended the airworthiness standards to clarify and standardize the method of applying these time delays to the accelerate-stop transition period. Amendment 25-42 also added the critical engine failure speed, VEF, and clarified the meaning of V1 with relation to VEF. The preamble to Amendment 25-42 states that “V1 is determined by adding to VEF (the speed at which the critical engine is assumed to fail) the speed gained with the critical engine inoperative during the time interval between the instant at which the critical engine is failed and the instant at which the test pilot recognizes and reacts to the engine failure, as indicated by the pilot’s application of the first retarding means during accelerate-stop tests.” Thus it can be seen that V1 is not only intended to be at the end of the decision process, but it also includes the time it takes for the pilot to perform the first action to stop the airplane. The purpose of the time delays is to allow sufficient time (and distance) for a pilot, in actual operations, to accomplish the procedures for stopping the airplane. The time delays are not intended to allow extra time for making a decision to stop as the airplane passes through V1. Since the typical transport category airplane requires three pilot actions (i.e., brakes-throttles-spoilers) to achieve the final braking configuration, Amendment 25-42 defined a two-second time period, in § 25.109, to account for delays in activating the second and third deceleration devices. Amendment 25-92 (effective March 20, 1998) redefined, and reinterpreted the application of that two-second delay time as a distance increment equivalent to two seconds at V1. No credit may be taken for system transient effects (e.g., engine spin-down, brake pressure ramp-up, etc.) in determining this distance. The following paragraphs provide guidance related to the interpretation and application of delay times to show compliance with the accelerate-stop requirements of Amendment 25-92.

[gileraguy]

Pilot deaths spark risk debate - ABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation) (http://www.abc.net.au/news/video/2010/03/26/2857703.htm)

interesting topic on Darwin fatal crash.

[LeadSled]

To wit - V 1 means the maximum speed in the takeoff at which the pilot must take the first action

Folks,
Please read again, very carefully, what FAA actually says. Any of you flying Seattle tin, see the Boeing training material. The MD words might have been different --- but the intent is the same ----- because it all stems from the certification practices of FAR 25, as amended, and the related flight test guides.

An accurate definition of FAR 25 V1 is:

The speed at which the takeoff must be continued, if the abort has not already been commenced.

V1 is NOT the latest speed for a stop decision, V1 is a GO speed, the difference is significant and critical. The failure must be recognized, the decision made before V1.

We have come a long way in certification, from the days of SFAR 422B.

Tootle pip!!

[flyhelico]

always the same type of accident, go below VMC, kick wrong rudder, and bye bye!!! or keep pulling yoke , stall, encounter turbulence, and go spin,...or kick wrong rudder, keep nose up, flat stall. etc.

what international law says?: "no engine shut down below 5000ft , 5000ft is the minimum altitude you must recover"

who's next?:E

[john_tullamarine]

Couple of thoughts -

(a) There aren't many turboprops that don't have the power to either climb away well, or speed up when very light

Same applies to the jet brigade as well. However, the problem is not acceleration capability but risk of yaw departure. This is mainly a worry for min speed schedule takeoffs at low weights for aircraft which are Vmcg/Vmca limited. Hiccup once and you are in a world of hurt.

(b) The speed at which the takeoff must be continued, if the abort has not already been commenced.

This has been the mantra for the past 25-30 years. To paraphrase .. if you're not already stopping by V1, then you're going .. (caveat is those oddball loss of control situations when one might be forced to abort above V1)

As Brian notes above, it is important to keep in mind that V1 has varied in definition over the years and the relevant words in your particular AFM are the best guidance as to what is expected for the performance data to be reasonably predictable.

[remoak]

However, the problem is not acceleration capability but risk of yaw departure.The two are inextricably linked. Accelerate, and the yaw departure risk disappears.

This is mainly a worry for min speed schedule takeoffs at low weights for aircraft which are Vmcg/Vmca limited. Hiccup once and you are in a world of hurt.All multi-engine aircraft are Vmcg/Vmca limited. There are very few (if any) situations where an aircraft being used for training, with no payload and low-ish fuel (ie very light) NEEDS to be flown at, or anywhere near, limiting speeds. it's simple airmanship. I can't recall one transport category aircraft that I have flown, that REQUIRES you to fly at minimum speeds at light weights - they all allow you to maintain an achieved speed, as long as the required climb gradient is being maintained (and that is rarely more than 500'/min).

So I guess my point is, there is no need to ever go to the place you are describing. It's a theoretical exercise that only needs to be carried out in the sim.

V1 is NOT the latest speed for a stop decision, V1 is a GO speed, the difference is significant and critical.Please explain the difference. You have a binary state of affairs, stopping or going. You are either doing one or the other. The speed at which you can no longer safely do one of them (probably) is called V1.

So what is your point, other than semantics?

For what it is worth, I always expect to stop until I hear V1, at which point I am absolutely going unless I cannot control the aircraft, or we have an uncontained fire.

Interesting development in the media...

Pilot deaths spark risk debate - ABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation) (http://www.abc.net.au/news/video/2010/03/26/2857703.htm)

[Chimbu chuckles]

Remoak V1 was long thought of/described as decision speed but so many people went off the end of runways rejecting AT V1 that a rethink was in order. Its better to think of V1 as a decision MADE and ACTION TAKEN speed.

At a previous airline we would remove our hands from the thrust levers approx 5 kts before V1. Where I am now uses a wet V1 for ALL departures which amounts to the same thing.

Either way if you lose an engine a fraction of a second after you remove your hand from the thrust levers YOU ARE GOING and you'll be a fraction below the screen height on a performance limited runway - on a typical runway you pass the end of the clearway at hundreds of feet anyway.

If you decide to reject AT V1 by the time you react, slam the thrust levers closed, autobrakes kicks in (or you stand on them) and the reversers deploy and spool up you'll be significantly above V1 by the time you stop accelerating and start to slow down.

Hence V1 is a GO speed.

[john_tullamarine]

The two are inextricably linked. Accelerate, and the yaw departure risk disappears.

I fear that you have the cart before the horse. If a yaw departure has occurred then there is no option for acceleration to get out of the situation for Vmcg and only descent for Vmca ... the very thrust upon which you place your salvation's reliance is the same thrust which is taking you to your accident .... the thrust must be reduced to regain control. Like it or not ... we can't overcome the realities of the physics involved.

Be very aware that this sort of departure is quite rapid and ramps up very quickly over the spread of a few knots. Difficult to appreciate unless you either have been there or watched the aircraft gyrations under someone else's ministrations.

All multi-engine aircraft are Vmcg/Vmca limited.

Again, I fear you miss the point. A multi can be so limited IF the thrust/speed mix is appropriate. At higher speeds for a given thrust, the takeoff will be limited by some other criterion.

There are very few (if any) situations where an aircraft being used for training, with no payload and low-ish fuel (ie very light) NEEDS to be flown at, or anywhere near, limiting speeds.

I would agree. However, if you choose to use the standard min speed schedule .. and if that schedule is Vmcg or Vmca limited (which it often is) then you need to be aware of the potential for excitement in the event of a failure.

they all allow you to maintain an achieved speed ..

I'm afraid you have quite lost me here .. perhaps you might elaborate on your point ?

there is no need to ever go to the place you are describing. It's a theoretical exercise that only needs to be carried out in the sim.

This is not at all a theoretical exercise. Many aircraft schedule takeoff speeds at low weight which put you right in this sort of harm's way if you mishandle the failure during a continued takeoff. I think that it will be useful for the newchums if we continue with this discussion ?

So what is your point, other than semantics?

Philosophy and SOP. From a risk-based approach to things, the OEMs have, for quite some time, recommended such a black and white approach for normal failure situations.

For what it is worth, I always expect to stop until I hear V1, at which point I am absolutely going unless I cannot control the aircraft, or we have an uncontained fire.

The point is that, under the present paradigm, reaching V1 confirms that you are going to continue keeping on going ... ie if you aren't already stopping then it's up, up and away. (Caveat that this is predicated on "normal" failure situations).

[LeadSled]

Remoak,
My flying career has spanned the period from SFAR 422B to the present certification standards.

What Brian Abrahams and Chimbu Chuckles ( and I) say is correct. It might only be a subtle difference between your views and ours, but believe me, the difference is significant. It is nor just a semantic difference.

I commend to you a careful consideration of the difference.

Tootle pip!!

PS: A Captain being presented with the ANZ problem in Tokyo recently is an unenviable one. It happened in Sydney many years ago. A Pan Am B707-321B had a multiple engine failure, due bird strike, after V1, at max. gross.

[Oakape]

Some quotes from the B777 FCTM -

As the airspeed approaches V1 during a balanced field length takeoff, the effort required to stop can approach the airplane maximum stopping capability. Therefore, the decision to stop must be made before V1. (my emphasis)

And -

When the takeoff performance in the AFM is produced, it assumes an engine failure one second before V1.(again, my emphasis) In the runway limited situation, this means the airplane reaches a height of 35 feet at the end of the runway if the decision is to continue the takeoff.

Within reasonable limits, even if the engine failure occurs earlier than the assumed one second before V1, a decision to continue the takeoff will mean that the airplane is lower than the 35 feet at the end of the runway, but it is still flying. For example, if the engine fails 2 seconds before V1 and the decision is made to go, the airplane will reach a height of 15 to 20 feet at the end of the runway.

And, finally -

What's important to note here is that the majority of past RTO accidents were not engine failure events. Full takeoff power from all engines was available. With normal takeoff power, the airplane should easily reach a height of 150 feet over the end of the runway, and the pilot has the full lenght of the runway to stop the airplane if an air turnback is required.

The decision should be made when the event occurs & the RTO figures are based on that occuring one second before V1. In terms of speed, one second will differ on each departure depending on the aircraft type, weight, etc. For my operation I'm with Chimbu chuckles & my hand comes off the thrust levers approximately 5 kts before V1.

[ace from space]

I fear that you have the cart before the horse. If a yaw departure has occurred then there is no option for acceleration to get out of the situation for Vmcg and only descent for Vmca ... the very thrust upon which you place your salvation's reliance is the same thrust which is taking you to your accident .... the thrust must be reduced to regain control. Like it or not ... we can't overcome the realities of the physics involved.


JT, I agree with your statement and it reinforces some of my earlier comments about directional control issues that have been experienced.

Remoak, I also think I get your point, if the a/c has accelerated through Vmcg or Vmca (once in the air) and has been stabilised directionally then yes yaw departure risk disappears.
However, if the directional issue hasn’t been stabilised then the acceleration will serve to exacerbate the departure, and as JT said, it can be all over pretty quick unless that thrust is reduced.
Tough choice to make I know, if you’ve got trees rushing up at you....

[obie2]

Err!...could I just humbly suggest that you all read the Ops Manual of the airline that you currently work for?

If you do what I say, you will find that it doesn't differ from the airline that you previously worked for!

Do you get my point? :rolleyes:

[Defenestrator]

I'm not easily drawn into this particular discussion but feel compelled in the interests of safety.
Chimbu Chuckles and JT and many others have posted many very valid, and in my view, technically correct points. I have one to add though I couldn't hold a flame to these guys.
In the event of an aborted take-off, prior to or at V1, depending on the school of thought of the particular airline you work for, and in the absence of auto-brakes, the first action should always be max braking. Start the deceleration, close the throttles etc. etc.

Just my 2 cents from a substantial background in C & T. Not in jets but the theory is the same for mine.

My heartfelt sorrow to all affected.

D.

[ace from space]

Defenestrator,
In the event of an aborted take-off, prior to or at V1, depending on the school of thought of the particular airline you work for, and in the absence of auto-brakes, the first action should always be max braking. Start the deceleration, close the throttles etc. etc.


For my money (and at all airlines I've worked) the first action is to retard the power levers to max reverse whilst then simultaneously applying max braking...etc etc.
Obviously this action would be dependent on Airline SOP and a/c type operated, I know it’s splitting hairs but brakes against power doesn’t sound like the best way to start the deceleration ....
You could argue that it all happens about the same time, but for me the logic of it would be to initiate with the power levers and call “reject” so the other guy is in the loop, in the time it takes to get your feet up on the brakes and start braking...
I'm not saying you're wrong however, just adding my 5 cents worth :)

[Defenestrator]

AFP,

I agree wholeheartedly. It does all happen in a very quick fashion. I won't get into an argument though on the finer points of a rejected take-off.

D.

[remoak]

I think we are all basically talking about the same thing.

Nowhere have I said that V1 is a "decision" speed, it is (as others have said) a "must have decided by" speed. So, for example, my takeoff briefs have always, for the last twenty years, been "... at or after V1 we will continue the takeoff..." Note the "at or after".

Now, having said that...

Chimbu Chuckles

If you decide to reject AT V1 by the time you react, slam the thrust levers closed, autobrakes kicks in (or you stand on them) and the reversers deploy and spool up you'll be significantly above V1 by the time you stop accelerating and start to slow down.

Firstly, the certification requirements of the aircraft allow for that (2 second recognition time). Secondly, what is the difference between an abort at V1 minus say, 1/4 second, and V1? Figure it out - if your V1 is 120 kts, we are talking about an additional 15m. Thirdly, deceleration starts as soon as you close the thrust levers - it just isn't at it's maximum until spoilers are out, brakes are applied and reverse is at full noise. If you do exceed V1, it will be by very little. I've never seen anyone take two seconds to figure out it was time to stop with a failure, most folk have the thrust levers retarded within half a second. So figure another 30m or so if your failure happens ever so slightly under V1.

I'm not saying that your point about V1 is wrong, simply that the performance of the aircraft already allows for your scenario.

JT

I fear that you have the cart before the horse. If a yaw departure has occurred then there is no option for acceleration to get out of the situation for Vmcg

If Vmcg is controlling, you are on the ground, right? That is what Vmcg means. So in that situation, you control the yaw with asymmetric brake.

and only descent for Vmca ... the very thrust upon which you place your salvation's reliance is the same thrust which is taking you to your accident .... the thrust must be reduced to regain control. Like it or not ... we can't overcome the realities of the physics involved.

Whatever happened to lowering the nose to, at the worst, maintain level flight while you accelerate? It doesn't have to be a descent, not even in the F27 which is marginal at the best of times. The only time I can see that you would be correct is if you had an unfeathered prop or a similar failure. Of course, if you are talking about GA aircraft at high weights, then sure.

A multi can be so limited IF the thrust/speed mix is appropriate.

Not quite sure what you mean by that...

they all allow you to maintain an achieved speed ..

I'm afraid you have quite lost me here .. perhaps you might elaborate on your point ?


With the 146 (and the F27 too I think), under JAA-approved manuals, it was permissible to fly the engine-out departure profile at a speed higher than V2 if that speed had been achieved and the minimum climb gradient was being complied with. So, for example, if you were at training weights, it is actually pretty hard to stop the speed running away a bit while still maintaining a reasonable rate of climb (probably initially around 2000'/min at training weights in the 146). The point was that, rather than trying to chase a low V2, allow the aircraft to accelerate a little to aid controllability.

This is not at all a theoretical exercise. Many aircraft schedule takeoff speeds at low weight which put you right in this sort of harm's way if you mishandle the failure during a continued takeoff. I think that it will be useful for the newchums if we continue with this discussion ?

OK, but I can't think of any transport-category aircraft that wouldn't either accelerate quickly through the danger zone you are describing, or allow a power or pitch reduction to regain control while still climbing away quite happily. The reason I say that it is theoretical, is that you never need to get into that position in the first place. Again, using the 146 as an example, if you take off using flex thrust (as you normally would at training weights), there is no requirement to increase thrust to N1ref if you suffer an engine failure. You can if you want, but you don't have to as the flex thrust performance allows for the engine failure case. So for the 146, you have even less of an issue with controllability as the assymetric thrust is lower than it would be with full thrust.

I would be interested to know what aircraft you are thinking of when you mention these difficulties.

The point is that, under the present paradigm, reaching V1 confirms that you are going to continue keeping on going

Yep been saying that from the beginning...

Obie2

Err!...could I just humbly suggest that you all read the Ops Manual of the airline that you currently work for?

If you do what I say, you will find that it doesn't differ from the airline that you previously worked for!

Maybe not in Oz, but I have flown for three 146 operators in Europe with markedly different Ops Manuals and SOPs. One was radically different to the others.

I don't think any of us are fundamentally in disagreement, but we are seeing the problem from our own experience and the instruction that we have had. One's views may well be different if one has operated a type with marginal performance, etc...