"Fog of War" being replaced by accountability for command decisions

[Two's in]

Interesting article here that details how following failures on the battlefield, some US commanders have been reprimanded or received letters of censure. The incident where Combat Outpost Keating was overrun was investigated, and those responsible for allowing the gradual degradation of security and defence measures were identified and disciplined.

The obvious reaction is that now people who are many times removed from the tactical picture are now second guessing the commanders on the ground, but there is of course a view that when your actions are responsible for the death or injuries of those under your command, you should be wholly accountable for those actions.

If you extend this logic to the MoD, it raises interesting parallels with the whole Airworthiness debate and provision of the correct equipment to those serving on operations. The thought of mid-level Officers being held accountable for sanctioning or condoning policy or actions that unduly places lives at risk can only be a positive thing.

U.S. commanders in Afghanistan face tougher discipline for battlefield failures (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/04/AR2010020404752_pf.html)

The U.S. military has reprimanded an unusually large number of commanders for battlefield failures in Afghanistan in recent weeks, reflecting a new push by the top brass to hold commanders responsible for major incidents in which troops are killed or wounded, said senior military officials.

The military does not release figures on disciplinary actions taken against field commanders. But officials familiar with recent investigations said letters of reprimand or other disciplinary action have been recommended for officers involved in three ambushes in which U.S. troops battled Taliban forces in remote villages in 2008 and 2009. Such administrative actions can scuttle chances for promotion and end a career if they are made part of an officer's permanent personnel file.

The investigations are a departure for the U.S. military, which until recently has been reluctant to second-guess commanders whose decisions might have played a role in the deaths of soldiers in enemy action. Disciplinary action has been more common in cases in which U.S. troops have injured or killed civilians.

[Jabba_TG12]

Damn right too :ok:

[tucumseh]

If you extend this logic to the MoD, it raises interesting parallels with the whole Airworthiness debate and provision of the correct equipment to those serving on operations. The thought of mid-level Officers being held accountable for sanctioning or condoning policy or actions that unduly places lives at risk can only be a positive thing.

Indeed. The list of officers and officials who sanctioned/condoned the airworthiness regulations being ignored is impressive. I won't mention any who haven't placed their views in writing, but let's see........... MoD(PE)'s Director General Air Systems 2 (DGAS), Director of Personnel, Resources and Development (DPRD), Chief of Defence Procurement (CDP) and, of course, the last five Ministers for the Armed Forces. More? Director Helicopter Support. The current Secretary of State for Defence.

Yes, I'd like to see that lot brought to account.

[sidewayspeak]

It's so easy to be a 'Monday Morning Quarterback'...

[SASless]

Read "Not A Good Day To Die" by Sean Naylor, "The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda", and let's see how the new policy would be applied to those who cocked it up in spades!

The Troops in contact with the Enemy are doing excellent work despite all the handicaps being placed upon them....it is the Senior Commanders that set these folks up for "failure" that are the culprits.

Somehow, I just don't see the "Stars" indicting themselves or their Command and Control system.....only the guys toting the spear are going to get done by this concept. If they apply it top down....with reviews of the very Senior Commanders first, will things change for the good.

What was it Disraeli said....."The British Navy never changed much until we shot a few Admirals." (....or words to that effect)

[Chugalug2]

I too would separate commanders at the sharp end making their tactical dispositions which subsequently turn out to be not for the best and even leading to a "CO Keating" outcome and those higher up the foodchain who issue and enforce illegal orders (eg to disregard UK Military Airworthiness Regulations). The first is at worst an error of judgement probably enhanced by lack of sufficient resources. The latter is an offence under military law and should be prosecuted as such by Court Martial. That it is more likely to be the former who is disciplined rather than the higher ranking latter is a comment on their service, in this case the Royal Air Force.

[davejb]

You have to be very, very careful doing this sort of thing - if a tactical commander knows his nuts are going to be on the block following casualties, then the safest option is not to place troops in danger - even when they need to be to prevent the mission failing. Prosecution of commanders shown to be incompetent, or inclined to unduly hazard their men for no good cause is laudable, but it's all too easy to purge good leaders simply because they've lost men when all the ducks lined up....

This could be a good move, but, on previous form, I bet it actually acts as a force towards mediocrity. I'll give you a historical precendent from the US, the initial USAF/USN kill rate vs the NVAF was poor, as the US airmen didn't have realistic air to air combat training, which had been curtailed due to (perception of) high loss rates.

[GreenKnight121]

Well, the problem was that, after placing 80 soldiers in an exposed (very) forward firebase, they then systematically began reducing support for them after they weren't immediately attacked in numbers (they were subject to harassing fire nearly constantly).

Recon drones that had been making several fly-bys a day to check for insurgents were reduced to once a day, they to once every few days, and similar reductions in active support were carried out.

When the inevitable occurred, and several hundred Taliban/Al-Queda attacked, they went for hours without air support of any kind.

As a former USMC Sgt, I call that negligence by the commanders, and they were rightly disciplined.

However, I am not sure the axe reached high enough... it is hard to believe no one higher up saw the reduction in support and asked if it was a good idea or not.

[Pontius Navigator]

Well, the problem was . . . systematically began reducing support for them after they weren't immediately attacked in numbers

This is clearly a case where 'cost-benefit-analysis' over came simple deterrence.

The principles of war -concentration of force and economy of effort were obviously subordinated to lack of resources (force) and hence squandering the effort.

[onetrack]

The greatest problem is, that since the Americans learnt modern battle tactics under Australian command, at the battle of Hamel, in July 1918 - they have lost sight of what constitutes the necessary ingredients to properly and effectively carry out war actions.

They let politicians interfere with what should be purely military decisions. They let PC interfere in the proper running of military forces. They let "cost-considerations" interfere in critical decisions. They let the media run their wars, and allow the media to sway public opinion, and that then interferes with proper military decision making. If General Sir John Monash was still alive, he would be appalled.

Monash is the greatest General of the 20th Century, bar none - and despite his Prussian Jew ancestry, which engendered bias against him - no man did more to care for the troops under his command, and reduce troop losses - whilst at the same time, he executed brilliant tactics, and war management, that put any other military leader in the world to shame.

A man who was never educated as a regular military officer became a leader of over 200,000 men (and of them, 166,000 Australians) which was the force that effectively ended WW1. He took on 39 German Divisions and defeated every single one of them, including the crack Prussian Guard.
The man was skilled beyond belief - and we need more men like him today, to contibute to an effective end of Muslim hardline terrorism - unlike the pussyfooting, badly run, severely hobbled, and castrated activities of the U.S. Forces, that has contributed to the serious demise of American war skills.

The Americans need to go back to square one, and study Monashs speeches on carrying out effective war strategies. These strategies still hold effective in modern warfare, and Monash was one of those gifted men who understood the need for the combining of all facets of war operations into one completely-welded effort, that is superbly managed. The Americans no longer have anyone who can do what Monash did.

In the trenches with Monash | Herald Sun (http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/in-the-trenches-with-monash/story-e6frf8lf-1111113001272)

Australian War Memorial - 1918: Australians in France - General Sir John Monash (http://www.awm.gov.au/exhibitions/1918/people/genmonash.asp)

[4Greens]

It is arguable that one of the reasons Monash was so good was because he wasnt a lifetime professional soldier, a civil engineer in another life. He wasnt hidebound by current military doctrine and thought for himself.

[Like This - Do That]

Monash is the greatest General of the 20th Century, bar none

EASY TIGER!!!!! I know we lionise the bloke, he WAS capable, but I suspect that may be gilding the lily just a tad .....

[onetrack]

LTDT - I am not gilding the lily - Monash, IMO, was the greatest General of the 20th century. In terms of understanding the requirements on how to collate and manage war actions, in terms of strategies, and in terms of recognising how best to use the latest technologies, in unison - the man is unparalleled.
In addition, the man keenly felt losses in action, and took every step to minimise deaths and casualties. In that area, he stands alone as a beacon to other leaders.
Bravery in war is excellent - but performing outstanding acts of bravery when your leadership is pathetic, and the strategies deeply flawed - as under early WW1 British military leadership, is bravery wasted. The amount of bravery wasted under commands other than, and prior to, Monash, is immeasureable.

Haigs comment, after losing vast numbers of men at the Somme, that "the nation must be taught to bear losses", shows a man who was incapable of understanding the meaning of a great number of deaths on the battlefront. Not for nothing was he called "the butcher of the Somme". All successful and logical war strategies are based on minimising your sides deaths, and maximising the other sides deaths.

Note that the Germans ended up fearing the Australian soldiers greatly - and it was all due, almost entirely, to Monashs effectiveness as a leader, welding together good capable men, utilising good strategies, and combining the latest technology, into a fearsome force. When you find that one quarter of the Melbourne population turned out for the man's funeral, you get some understanding of how much he was admired.
There have been no military men like him since. Patton came close, but he wasn't the careful manager of every single military activity, that Monash was. Pattons personality flaws extended to relishing the "blood and guts" part of war, very much unlike Monash, who sought to minimise it.

[Andu]

One of Monash's notable 'firsts' was his groundbreaking use of aerial resupply for attacking troops.

Until this innovation, whenever a breakthrough was achieved, the troops who made the breakthrough were almost always outflanked and / or overrun when they ran short of ammunition and water. (The muddy, badly broken ground torn up by shellfire, as well as the usually very accurate German counterbattey fire on the lines of supply almost always stopped effective resupply overland.)

Monash instituted the dropping of ammunition and water to the troops right on the front line from low flying aircraft. We accept this today as an everyday part of war, but he seems to have been the first senior leader to recognise its value, use it - and use it very effectively.

At Hamel, thanks to exhaustive, integrated training between the armour and the Australian (and American) infantry before committing both to the battle, he was also the first general to use armour effectively (note that last word), resulting in a major success. This was even more remarkable when you take into account that the Australian infantry had been let down so badly by the armour at Bullencourt, resulting in huge casualties among the Australian infantry. Thanks to the prolonged exercises with the armour before Hamel, the infantry went into the battle trusting the armour, and perhaps just as importantly, understanding its capabilities and its limitations.

One history book states that if the armistice had not been signed in November 1918, the British would have been forced to swallow their pride and appoint Monash into Haig's position. Anyone who knows anything of those times would understand what a huge step this would have been - a non-professional, colonial, Jewish officer in that post would have rocked the British Military Establishment (to say nothing of the British Establishment) to its very core.

It needs to be noted that Monash was able to achieve some of his major successes only thanks to extraordinary, sometimes career-risking support from (the very British) General Rawlinson.

And let's not forget the Canucks - Aurthur Currie, the commander of the Canadian Corps at the same time, was, in quite a few people's opinion, right up there with the very best military leaders to take the field.

[SASless]

Pretty easy for him to be the first to use aviation in a support function....aviation being so new to warfare....but indeed the first to use it in support of the ground troops!

As much as I hate MacArthur.....he took more territory with the fewest casualties of any commander in the Pacific. He was vain to a fault, an egomaniac, and a complete ass....but he did win battles with fewer casualties than did the Navy under Nimitz. He was almost as bad as Montgomery in those personal issues.

Read up on the invasion of Pelilu and why it was not needed....but went on because Nimitz decided to let it go on anyway after MacArthur landed in Leyte instead of Mindanao thus ending any tactical need for Pelilu....and 24,000 Allied Casualties.

[Jabba_TG12]

It's so easy to be a 'Monday Morning Quarterback'..

Very droll, SWS.

What exactly are you getting at?

I realise that compared to the other officers mentioned here by our Antipodean cousins, Stuart Tootall may not have faced the same levels of responsibilities in the same circumstances, but having read his book about 3Para's campaign earlier on in Herrick, I found it enlightening that someone in his position appeared to take the force protection issue a lot more seriously than I had previously given some of our commanders credit for. Whether this extends higher up the chain, I have no idea, but taking the current operation into account, I find the tactic of pre-announcing the venue, troop sizes and objectives to be... questionable to put it politely.

saying "its easy to be an armchair general" and then retiring, in my view, snootily to the sidelines without saying why is IMHO, a cop out.:=

[Pure Pursuit]

Jabba,

I don't think there has been any harm done in announcing the forthcoming operation for several reasons:

1. The insurgents already know where we are having watched the troops deploy into their starting positions. In other words, there is no element of surprise to be maintained here.

2. Civilians have been given the chance to get out. There is no point in forcing the insurgents out of Southern Afghanistan only to have to local population resent ISAF forces who have killed numerous civilians.

3. It gives the weaker tiers of insurgents food for thought & many of them will have almost certainly had second thoughts & headed out of the area.

God speed to the people involved.

[Jabba_TG12]

PurePursuit:

I see your points, and to a degree can understand it, but cant help but have a bad feeling about it..

Most certainly echo the sentiments of good luck and godspeed to those taking part.

[Fubaar]

Surely Terry - or those among his ranks with half a brain - will just melt away to somewhere safe (like Pakistan?) for the period of the op. and them move back in as soon as the op. is over?

[Wiley]

Until the awful Somme battles, British officers went over the top carrying sidearms and wearing easily identifiable uniforms, making it easy for the German snipers and machine gunners to spot them and kill them. The Germans had learned very early in the war that if they killed the British officers, the British enlisted men didn't press their attacks - not, I hasten to say, because of any lack of courage on the part of the British soldiers, but because in most cases, they hadn't been properly briefed.

Monash instituted the (for those times, totally novel) concept of the sand table, where every soldier (not just the officers) was 'walked' through a large scale sand model of the battlefield and it was explained to every soldier what his particular unit's objective in the coming battle would be. It was made clear, again to every soldier, that if his officer was killed, the sergeant took over; if the sergeant was killed, the corporal; and if the corporal was killed, the senior private would lead.

He also brought in the until then, unheard of concept of promotion from the ranks. By 1918, the vast majority of Australian junior and middle ranking officers were ex-enlisted men who had proven themselves in battle, and many went back to command the same units where they'd once been private soldiers. (This was not without some controversy, as anyone in today's military would fully understand.)

He also held the (for those days, utterly novel) belief that infantry should be used, not as a battering ram against strong defences, but primarily in a mopping-up role, going in only after every piece of technology had been put to maximum use against the defences first. This, along with his use of trench raids, where sections of the German trench line were taken by stealth, with no artillery preparation at all, was unlike anything other general officers of the day employed.

[SASless]

If the Taliban have any sort of Intel ability...they would be marking up their own "Enemy Order of Battle" map just as we do. To what end does one warn the bad guys "We're Coming!"

Did we not do exactly the opposite "in spades" for D-Day?

Is the real purpose to entice the Taliban to leave hoping to avoid a Fallujah like battle or to have them out in the openn where they can be picked off with much more ease and less risk of Collateral killing?

The Taliban know they cannot defeat us militarily....but if they start using the same tactis the NVA and VC did in Vietnam....hiding among the people and "holding the belt"...which negates our advantage in firepower and air support....they can cause us casualties which they know will bring the war to an end in their favor. They have to lose folks to do that.....but Western nations have no heart for a war of attrition anymore.