Kiwi B777 burst 12 tyres in aborted takeoff at NRT

[Tipsy Barossa]

News flash :


Air New Zealand is investigating what went wrong with one of its Boeing-777s after 12 tyres burst after a packed flight at Japan's busy Narita airport on Sunday night was forced to abort, sparking a full-scale emergency response.
Flight NZ90 was forced to urgently abort its take-off when the pilots discovered a potential problem with the auto thrust control, the Dominion Post reported.
Twelve tyres on the aircraft burst and fire appliances were needed to cool its braking system, resulting in the runway being shut down for 30 minutes.
Civil Aviation spokesman Bill Sommer said Air NZ had informed the authority of the incident.
An airline spokeswoman confirmed an investigation was under way.
Potential problem with autothrust? Is this one you would reject at high speed?

[Spooky 2]

Autothrust / Throttle Hold?? I wasn't there so I don't know.

[clunckdriver]

12 tires burst? more likely the "melt plugs" did their job and deflated them, a tire burst at 220 PSI {cold }is not an event you want to be close to.

[PJ2]

Potential problem with autothrust? Is this one you would reject at high speed?
We have one known fact thus far and that is that the takeoff was rejected. The reports of "outcomes" antecedent to the reason for the reject such as "12 burst tires" are not important - they are designed to do that to prevent explosions from pressure build-up due to heat so that is not news. (Nor is a burst tire in and of itself normally a reason to reject a takeoff).

The statement above regarding autothrust is not an established fact. It reads like a media statement. Otherwise your question about rejecting the takeoff would be easy to answer - the answer would be "no, one would not reject a takeoff due to a 'problem with autothrust' ".

However, there have been seven incidents on the B777 aircraft where crews have inadvertently engaged the autopilot on takeoff, one occurring just recently. It is a known issue, which, hopefully, FOQA programs are asking questions about.

We must wait for further details.

PJ2

[captplaystation]

One assumes Air New Zealand have started using Air France S.O.P's ? ? :rolleyes:

[beamender99]

www.avherald.com (http://www.avherald.com) says

An Air New Zealand Boeing 777-200, flight NZ-90 from Tokyo Narita (Japan) to Auckland (New Zealand) with 296 passengers and 13 crew, rejected takeoff from runway 34L at high speed. When the airplane came to a stand still, smoke was seen from all main tyres prompting attending emergency services to spray the wheels and overheated brakes.

The airport reported, that all 12 main gear tyres deflated due to the brakes overheat. The runway had to be closed for about 30 minutes.

Air New Zealand reported, that the crew received a warning indicating a problem with the auto thrust system and decided to reject takeoff. The airplane was able to taxi clear of the runway before emergency services started to cool the overheated brakes.

[Checkboard]

The reports of "outcomes" antecedent to the reason for the reject such as "12 burst tires" are not important - they are designed to do that to prevent explosions from pressure build-up due to heat so that is not news.
A bit disingenuous there.

"12 tyre bursts are not important"! :eek: A properly executed abort shouldn't produce anything like 12 tyre bursts - it is prima facie evidence of an abort above V1 - which would put it in the realm of untested (and thus not necessarily safe) outcomes. :cool:

[White Knight]

djfingers- who gives a monkeys:hmm::hmm: After V1 NO ABORT unless the aeroplane is considered unairworthy....

Autothrust fail = High Speed Reject Mmmmm - let's see about this one:uhoh:

[ELAC]

A properly executed abort shouldn't produce anything like 12 tyre bursts - it is prima facie evidence of an abort above V1 - which would put it in the realm of untested (and thus not necessarily safe) outcomes.

Now that's utter nonsense. The variables of aircraft and environmental conditions, as well as piloting technique during the abort, are more than sufficient to result in the potential for fuse plugs melting after a high speed reject initiated from below V1. The only prima facie evidence to be adduced from the above observation might seem to suggest an untested realm of experience with the observer.

ELAC

[GuppyEng.com]

Bring back the real Autothrottle! The FE!

[777AV8R]

Unless it was an engine fire, fail or the aircraft was 'unsafe' to fly (as per the QRH), a reject is not recommended beyond 80K.
An auto thrust problem is not in itself, a reason to reject.

[NZ_Pilot]

Would be quite possible for all 12 fuse plugs to melt after a close to V1 reject is what they are designed to do.
Will be interesting to see what actual problem is I think the auto throttle statement may be for the media. Unless you know the ANZ operating procedures or exactly what the problem was would be hard to know if this type of problem called for a high speed reject or not.

[18-Wheeler]

I have to agree with the fuse plugs blowing being pretty much an expected thing.
On the 747 Classic if you brake a touch hard when landing at max weight on a hot day you can get up near the brake temp limit without any trouble. And that's hitting the brakes at a slightly slower speed than a V1 reject, usually at a much lighter weight, and taking far more distance to stop.

[Jorge46]

You're right ELAC (I like your last sentence!) 18Wheeler is too.
I'd say you guys know what you're talking about.

[bloom]

Not A 777 and it is a long video, but watch the action at 5:30 and 6:01


YouTube - Airbus A340-600 Rejected Take Off (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UocxPoUUnIQ&NR=1)

[framer]

- it is prima facie evidence of an abort above V1
I don't think so.

[yssy.ymel]

An RTO at V1 and MTOW results in the brakes heating to amazing temperatures. As 18-Wheeler and ELAC and PJ2 quite rightly pointed out the fuse plugs deflate the tyres to stop them exploding with the heat generated by the brakes.

I remember watching the RTO tests for the 777 certification on a DVD ages ago, and all tyres deflating is expected.

The reason for the RTO, well that's another issue, but tyres "bursting" is poor reporting.

[Wizofoz]

A bit disingenuous there.

"12 tyre bursts are not important"! A properly executed abort shouldn't produce anything like 12 tyre bursts - it is prima facie evidence of an abort above V1 - which would put it in the realm of untested (and thus not necessarily safe) outcomes.


777 TRI here- The above is utter cock.

A high speed RTO in a 777-300ER will melt fuse plugs in anything close to limiting conditions.

Indeed we had an ER land overweght using brake three (MUCH less deceleration than RTO) and IT melted all the main gear fuse plugs.

Checkboard, the above is, rather, prima facie evidence of a propensity to shoot ones mouth off without knowing the fact.

As to the reason for the reject. the basic philosophy is that the inhibit systems leaves only Aural Cautions and Warnings for items which should result in an RTO. I can't think of an Auto-thrust caution that is on that list, bu journalism being what it is, I'll reserve judgement till the facts are in.

[skmarz]

FWIW, rumor in Narita is that when the pilot flying went to rotate, there was absolutely no response from the control column, just a clunking sound, thereby, no ability to get it off the ground. If that is true, luckily they were taking off on the long runway at NRT...

Wasn't there, haven't talked to the crew, nothing in the press here, just the rumor I heard....FYI, perhaps it's not too much to ask to have a little faith in your fellow pilots.

[minimum_wage]

The gap between V1/VR on the 777 wouldn't allow the a/c to stop at rotate. It was a V1 abort and the plugs did their job. The facts will obviously come out but it is being kept quiet at the moment.

And Checkboard stop talking about things you know nothing about. Listen to the Wizofoz.

[Wizofoz]

The gap between V1/VR on the 777 wouldn't allow the a/c to stop at rotate. It was a V1 abort and the plugs did their job. The facts will obviously come out but it is being kept quiet at the moment.

And Checkboard stop talking about things you know nothing about. Listen to the Wizofoz.

Thanks Min- But that isn't exactley right either!!

V1 is usually the minimum GO speed, particularly on a long runway. It's entirely possible that, if a truley unflyable condition became evident at Vr, that an RTO COULD successfully be carried out in a fair proportion of takeoffs.

[fergineer]

If what has been said in that he pulled back and nothing happened what was he supposed to do keep the power on and crash at great speed probably killing all or knowing he had a long runway attempt and manage a stop.....tyers as has been said have fusible plugs for the reason to prevent tyres blowing out. There has been much tosh spoken on this thread from some people who know nothing about aviation....listen to those that do!!!! Lets wait for the official reason and real facts come out shall we. As an FE if the driver in front of me pulled back, big clunk and no attempt to get airbourne and we stopped in time I would be buying him more beer than he could drink for some considerable time.

[18-Wheeler]

It's entirely possible that, if a truley unflyable condition became evident at Vr, that an RTO COULD successfully be carried out in a fair proportion of takeoffs

Only if you're fairly light - I wouldn't want to try it with a heavy TOW.

[evyjet]

Minimum Wage : The difference between V1 and Vr on a 777 can be very minute. In fact they can and are (dependent on company performance criteria) be the same speed.

Sounds to me to be a normal reject at high speed in a heavy 777. I would expect my 777 after a high speed heavy reject would also melt the fuse plugs. I would be suprised if they didn't!

[Wizofoz]

Only if you're fairly light - I wouldn't want to try it with a heavy TOW.

Nor would you except as a last resort. If there is any truth, however, to the speculation that the aircraft wouldn't rotate, you'd have a fighting chance of staying on the paved surface in a fair number of circumstances. We don't actually go to field-limiting conditions that often, and assumed temperature method does involve extra saftey margins over and above the normal regulatory net limits.

Still, if he's got to Vr, not been able to make it fly, and reacted quickley enough to stop by the end, he's done an outstanding job.

All speculation at this time, however.

[KiloB]

Wasn't there a comment from the Crew on the AF RTO about control problems as well (heavy to rotate?)

[golfyankeesierra]

So far the only one that's implying a stop after V1 is SKMARZ and he heard a rumour; it could well be that his rumour just mixed up the AF at Lagos with this one. After all this is a rumour network but it is a waste of energy to spend the next 10 pages reading speculation on a rumour that never happened and probably is going to be a copy/paste of the AF-thread. Anyone else could confirm this theory?

[5LY]

The 777 OPT does not do a Balanced Field calculation. It does an optimized or improved climb calculation depending on where it is limited. I don't know if the Kiwis have an EFB or if they use RTOW charts. In any case, it very possibly was not a balanced field calcultion so for anyone to suggest that an abort above V1 is not viable is BS. If this is too confusing for you, good. Go to the spotters forum.

They had an incident, no one was hurt, and the a/c can be used again. Good result!!! That's all we know. Pronouncements by wannabes don't further our understanding.

[jetjockey737]

might be of interest

YouTube - Boeing 777 rejected take off (RTO) (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wXpjBxD0Rhg)

[Landroger]

might be of interest

YouTube - Boeing 777 rejected take off (RTO) (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wXpjBxD0Rhg)


JetJockey beat me to it. The RTO test from the series 'Making of the 777' was one of the most impressive and spectactular events in a film full of impressive engineering. I believe they called it 'The Big One', because they knew they would damage the aeroplane, it was dangerous and Cashman was in half a mind not to do it. The test was made even more harsh because they had to rate the P&Ws at something like 104% or even 106% to allow for the Trent engine variants.

From an engineering point of view, in spite of knowing all about carbon fibre brakes, it is still an awesome sight to see how materials can stay together at the molecular level, when subject to stresses like that.

Roger.

[VONKLUFFEN]

more of the same?
Air France rejected T/O in Lagos.
Boeing has reported around 15 cases of problem with A/T engagement due to operational misstep by the crew...
Hope not.

[Checkboard]

I'm fully aware that limiting RTOs may produce deflations and indeed fires, thankyou to you all.

While considerable design effort is made to preclude fires whenever possible the regulations recognize the rarity of such high energy situations and allow brake fires after a maximum energy condition provided that any fires that may occur are confined to the wheels, tires and brakes ...

... the probability of a crew experiencing a brake fire at the conclusion of an RTO is very low, considering brake design factors, the dispatch parameters and the service history.

Information quoted from Boeing's Take Off Saftey Training Aid (TOSTA) (http://www.bluecoat.org/reports/TOSTA-Sec-1-3.pdf). :rolleyes:

Prima Facie - on the face of it. Sufficient to require further investigation. :hmm:

That means that it's a bit rich to say "12 tyre bursts are not important" :hmm:

[Wizofoz]

Prima Facie - on the face of it. Sufficient to require further investigation.

That means that it's a bit rich to say "12 tyre bursts are not important"

On the face of it,no evidence that 12 tires DID "Burst" other than usual media hyperbole. Very small amount of investigation seems to confirm this.

Every reason to believe a standard, well handled RTO resulting in predictable, by-design tire deflation after fuse-plug melt.

[yssy.ymel]

Umm, Checkboard - jetjockey737 and Wizofoz beat me to it. Watch the video. As I said before, this is the expected result. The tyres didn't "burst", they deflated because the fuse plugs did the job they are designed to do.

Thanks jetjockey737 - that's the DVD I watched - and I agree landroger, it's a great piece of work.

The unanswered question here is the reason for the RTO.

[Checkboard]

I want you to handle any investigation I am involved in, Wiz. :ok:

If it was high enough energy to either burst or deflate 12 tyres it would normally be classified as "high" or even "severe" risk in a safety analysis.

The tyres didn't "burst", they deflated because the fuse plugs did the job they are designed to do.

Yes in the video they did. You have video of this event?

Not saying it didn't happen, just saying you don't know it did happen.

The fusible plugs are placed on the rims, near the brake assembly in order to react to heat generated from the brake pack. If the heat in the tyre is not generated from the brake pack (i.e. it is generated in the tyre itself during long taxi operation for instance) then the fusible plugs more often than not won't operate (as rubber is a poor conductor of heat, sufficient heat doesn't reach the plug) and the tyre will burst.

[yssy.ymel]

Checkboard - I'd rather believe a 777 driver who has explicitly stated his experiences in an a situation that under heavy braking both sets of trolleys deflated because the fuse plugs blew. Whilst this may be unverified, I'll go with it.

I guess what I am saying here is that the tyre deflation (NOT "burst") is secondary to the reason for the RTO. If it was an RTO at MTOW, it's just going to happen. It's part of the rationale for the certification for the airframe.

[divinehover]

I landed a A340-600 last week (10 tons below MLW of 259 tons) after a Green Sys Hyd failure leading to Alternate braking. Even trying to brake gently (a little more difficult with Alternate Braking) and using all 15500ft of runway led to several brakes above 650 deg. A MTOW RTO will easily melt the fuse fuseplugs on any airliner certified under current regs.

[4greens!]

Not making any grand pronouncements here - just a question. Air New zealand reported that the a/c taxied clear. Was that a good idea from an engineering point of view, running on rims must cause extra damage musn't it ? To say nothing of shaking up the pax even more than they already would be.

[eckhard]

A few years ago I had a main-gear tyre that disintegrated shortly before V1.

All my training told me to continue the take-off.

If I rejected at this speed, we would only have a fraction of the full length of the runway in which to stop and the braking effort would be reduced due to the damaged tyre.

If we continued and got airborne, we could leave the gear down, complete any required checklists, reduce our landing weight to a minimum and then land on the full length with the fire crews in attendance.

All these thoughts went through my mind in a short time-frame.

While I was pondering this ‘received wisdom’, the aircraft was shaking and vibrating so much that the instruments were unreadable.

We were drifting to the right of the runway, towards scrub and rough ground.

There was still quite a lot of runway remaining ahead.

What did I do?

Did I make the right decision?

What did I learn?

Answers will be posted in a few minutes, so stay tuned!

In the meantime, all the ‘Monday morning quarterbacks’ can tell me what I should have done!

[yssy.ymel]

Eckhard - are you sure you weren't landing at YYZ?


I'll get my coat.... :}

[captplaystation]

Well, whatever you chose, it was right :ok: as you are here to tell the tale.

We are encouraged to be "go minded", and on a limiting runway this can be sound advice. . . But , if you look at the Concorde crash where V1 was about 150kt ? and Vr about 200kt, it would be difficult to argue the logic of his decision had he somehow known what was behind him.
As far back as the Manchester B Airtours accident there seemed to be a possibility we could end up with external cameras.
If you look at the technology and miniaturisation available today, it is shameful it has never come to fruition.
Had the Concorde crew seen what could be seen externally, there is no way they wouldn't have aborted (even at Vr of 200kt) and it would have been a good decision, as we can now see with the benefit of hindsight.
RTO's may not be funny, but they are preferable to taking something into the sky you have no certainty of controlling.
The AF 777 @ Lagos was a foul up it seems, but the decision to abandon based on the crews perception of lack of controllability (not correct, as it transpired, and probably just a problem of their own creation ) was a good call nonetheless.

[md80fanatic]

If I were in your position then, Eckhard, I'd have been aiming for the sky. If that is the wrong decision, then thank goodness I am not a pilot.

Kudos for making the obvious correct decision. :)

[eckhard]

Thanks for the replies. No, it wasn’t at YYZ.

And the correct answer (What did I do?) is............. (drum roll)............

I stopped.

Why?

Because I was scared that we were going off the side of the runway at high speed and I figured that if that happened, I would rather be slowing down already instead of blasting along at full power.

I wasn’t sure that we could get airborne before we left the paved surface, partly because the ASI was unreadable with all the vibration. Also, although I felt that the swing and vibration was caused by a tyre problem, I was not certain that some other damage to the flight controls, engines or structure had occurred.

The 'bottom line' was that the aircraft was in effect 'out of control' and I wanted to get it back under control. The simplest way seemed to be to close the thrust levers and hit the brakes. The decision was influenced by the fact that my last memory of the ASI was that it was below V1 and that there seemed to be quite a lot of runway remaining.

We closed the thrust levers, applied brakes (deployed the speedbrakes as well) and were worried to find that the RH brake pedal was 'floppy' and had no effect. The LH pedal seemed to be working but that gave us a yaw, which, although in a beneficial sense to start with, was going to give us problems eventually......so we took our feet off the brakes and used the manual emergency brake handle.

As this was happening, the vibration stopped and the aircraft adopted a right-wing-low attitude. The rudder was effective in helping us regain and maintain the centreline until the speed reduced.

We slid to a stop on the centreline with about 2,000ft of runway remaining. Everything from that point on (shutdown, ATC comms, Fire Services, etc) was as ‘routine’ as you would expect.

On inspecting the damage, the RH tyre had completely disappeared, the RH wheel rim was worn into a ‘D’ shape, the RH flap, gear door, lower wing and tailplane had impact damage from the rubber fragments and the RH brakes were leaking fluid.

There was a bright metal skid mark leading back from the RH wheel down the runway, which then changed into a black rubber skid mark.

The ‘balanced field length’ for this take-off was about 4,000ft. We had a 10,000ft runway and we elected to use the full length. OAT was about 32C and the elevation was about 1,000ft.

We used 8,000ft of runway, about double the ‘book figure’ for the conditions. I think this is explained by the following factors:


We were very close to V1 when the problem occurred;
We took a few seconds to recognise, control, analyse, and decide; and
The braking effort was not 100%.


Did I make the right decision?

Thanks to those who point out that it can’t have been so bad, as I’m here to tell the tale. Based on the successful outcome and the actual damage inflicted on the aircraft (over $100,000 repair bill) I think on balance it probably was the right decision. Had I managed to get the thing airborne, I think in retrospect it would have been flyable. I would have kept the gear down and eventually would have landed back on the full length of the 10,000ft runway. Against that, the extensive damage that I saw after the event helped to convince me that keeping it on the ground was the right thing to do. I did have some doubts during the initial few minutes after we stopped: ‘Were we above V1?’ ‘In the simulator, we were trained to continue the take-off.’ ‘Could I have got airborne before going off the side?’ etc, etc.

On the other hand, if we had got airborne, we could have had jammed elevators, jammed flaps, fuel leaks, etc. The damage was serious enough that all of these ‘nasties’ were a real possibility.

To be perfectly honest, I just had a ‘bad feeling’ as we were sliding towards the side of the runway, and ‘self-preservation’ over-ruled the theoretical training which was going round my head at the time. It was almost instinctive to close the thrust levers.

What did I learn?

1. Self-preservation is a very powerful impulse; it can be difficult to resist even if your training tells you that another course of action may be appropriate.
2. Balanced field lengths assume timely and correct action in the event of an RTO. They also assume that the brakes will be working correctly.
3. The old adage, ‘one of the most useless things is runway behind you’ is true! Intersection take-offs are of course fine, but the full length is better!
4. Burst tyres can cause loss of control, severe difficulty in reading the instruments and lots of structural damage.
5. A real ‘event’ is probably going to be quite different to what you have seen in the simulator.

Hope this is of interest.

Eck

[PJ2]

Checkboard;
That means that it's a bit rich to say "12 tyre bursts are not important"
My original post, if read by a non-aviator who doesn't know about these things, would leave the impression that "tires burst" but I'm writing in a forum where professionals dwell and my meaning, not made as clearly as I am accustomed to making, was nevertheless clear to everyone else - that the fuseable plugs did their job.

Let's not get stuck on minutae, but try to turn our focus on why the reject occurred. I did mention in my post that there have been at least seven other incidents not counting the Air France Lagos B777 reject where the autopilot was inadvertently engaged on takeoff and the comment was "the aircraft could not be rotated". That is an interesting bit of information.

Nobody rejects because the autothrust wouldn't engage, especially under those circumstances - at least I sure hope not.

Rather, there is a large issue lying dormant here which I thought that others reading PPRuNe would have picked up on the Lagos thread immediately and at least began thinking about even though we don't have any data yet. There was a comment early in the thread that the control column could not be moved back for rotation. I think that is a huge flag even unconfirmed at this early stage. (As an aside, I see someone has mentioned it yet again which tells me that that person and others do not read the entire thread before posting).

The other question Checkboard is, why would anyone take what the media has to say about such incidents seriously and then actually comment? We are professional airline pilots; we wait for data and, where inclined, speculate intelligently from knowledge and experience.

regards,
PJ2

[eckhard]

See my learning points #1 and #4 above.

If the aircraft cannot be rotated, self-preservation will probably dictate that you abort.

Unless a take-off with the AP engaged is practised in the sim (if indeed this is what happened) you will not have seen this before and so there is no training that applies, except for 'reject if the aircraft is unflyable'.

Eck

[Scimitar]

Yet another excellent post from PJ2.

If non-aviators wish to contribute I would strongly suggest they read all PJ2's posts on the subject first. They are much more likely to understand the nature of the problem before rushing in mouth first!

[Checkboard]

I admit my initial post was a little abrupt. Also not as clear as I usually intend, and rather than "above V1" should have read "high energy" ("above V1" being the most interesting subset of "high energy"). Having said that, however, my personal dislikes in accident & incident threads are posts which say:
wait until all of the facts are in
wait for the report
the pilots did a great job
the pilots did a terrible job
this incident is nothing
(in the case of fatal accidents) God bless all those who have perished, my thoughts are with you ... etc
those posts I disagree with are obviously wannabes with no experience in aviation

this is simply because this is a rumour forum - those who want to wait for facts and reports may do their waiting on the official accident investigation board websites and shouldn't bother reading anything here.

The incident was reported, it was obviously high energy, speculation about where V1 existed in the event is relevant - and none of this is any comment about the role played by the pilots. I am of course aware of the limitations of first information (usually from the media.).
where inclined, speculate intelligently from knowledge and experience.Exactly.

[TDK mk2]

Not strictly relevant I know, but I rejected a take off in a P68 at MTOW years ago after I found I couldn't rotate it. I'll never know for sure but it was probably the autopilot being engaged or severely mistrimmed. Still gives me a cold sweat when I remember how I felt when I went for the brakes and almost nothing happened. As the end of the runway approached I pulled the mixtures and dodged the runway end lights. We stopped about 10 feet short of the perimeter fence and I managed to start it up, turn it around and taxi back to the runway and then to the apron without anyone noticing as it was a small uncontrolled GA airport.

It does concentrate my mind on every takeoff I do in the RJs I fly now though...

[Capt Kremin]

The aircraft in question performed a high speed rejected T/O below V1.

Whatever problem they had, they considered it fixable as they requested a parking bay simply to get more fuel. They taxied clear of the runway, requested Fire services to check their undercarriage. Shortly after the fuse plugs melted and it became apparent they weren't going anywhere.

They then requested buses to get their passengers off.

They had stopped on taxiway alpha and ATC closed the runway for about 30 minutes for a check for debris. After the runway opened arriving aircraft were advised they needed to clear the runway by A3.

This from a source that listened to the whole thing.

[Speed of Sound]

Air New zealand reported that the a/c taxied clear. Was that a good idea from an engineering point of view, running on rims must cause extra damage musn't it ?

Having seen videos of both heavy Boeings and Airbus 'practicing' RTOs for certification purposes:

a) The fuse plugs don't 'pop' immediately as they need time for the heat from the brake assembly to reach them giving 4-5 minutes of taxiing time.

b) They don't all pop at the same time so with 12 wheels most of the time you are taxiing 'on rubber' rather than 'on steel'.

SoS

[PJ2]

they requested a parking bay simply to get more fuel.
Then drawing a tentative conclusion that it wasn't a mechanical/technical/computer fault is reasonable.

Above 80 knots the takeoff is rejected for fire or fire warning, engine failure, predictive windshear warning, (for others, this means aircraft system warning, not other airplanes or tower warnings), or the airplane is deemed unsafe or unable to fly. There are no other AOM-required conditions to reject the takeoff; in other words, after 80 knots the book is "go-minded" except for the above.

As per reported radio communications, a willingness to go again after a refueling indicates that none of the above occurred except (we must assume) the last reason. Whatever it was, was evidently assessed, understood and then cleared right away, without maintenance intervention, (ie, cb or system resets, changing PFM boxes, flight control problem, which usually grounds an airplane, etc). That information narrows the category of such faults (which render the airplane "unsafe" or "unflyable") even further.

One assumes that the FMA annunciations were read, announced and monitored as per SOP. An announcement of autothrust status is required when thrust is set and then at 80 knots. The call at 80 knots is a challenge - response requirement.

I think that both the recorders and the QAR (FOQA recorder) would be pulled and examined; this is Japan so the investigation will be very robust and detailed.

Checkboard, no worries - everyone's keen to find out and thank goodness for that. PJ2

[vapilot2004]

The fusible plugs are placed on the rims, near the brake assembly in order to react to heat generated from the brake pack. If the heat in the tyre is not generated from the brake pack (i.e. it is generated in the tyre itself during long taxi operation for instance) then the fusible plugs more often than not won't operate (as rubber is a poor conductor of heat, sufficient heat doesn't reach the plug) and the tyre will burst.

I've never heard of a fuse plug meting due to taxiing or anything tire related.

[JW411]

I have it my mind that I saw a report about the FAA loading a 747 up and taxiing it around on a desert airfield. After 9 miles, the first fusible plug went.

I also have heard of tyres deflating at Jeddah where, I believe, it is a very long taxi from the Haj terminal to the runway.

[mr Q]

eckhard what is the name of yur movie again???

[Checkboard]

I've never heard of a fuse plug meting due to taxiing or anything tire related.
The point is that the fusible plug won't melt! The tyre itself fails - it bursts, usually during the subsequent take-off roll, although it may sustain damage which isn't noticed and then fail down the line. Have a read of the Take-off training aid, in the link I put up in a previous post.

[Wizofoz]

Yes, indeed.

I once had BOTH tires burst on one bogie of a 737 whilst taxiing in after a normal landing.. Seems the first sent shrapnel into the second.

[Graybeard]

Are we sure that tires everywhere are being filled with nitrogen, and not air? The difference can be explosive, as you know.

With third party maintenance, especially, there are opportunities to cut costs, and this would be one.

GB

[DERG]

"Whatever problem they had, they considered it fixable as they requested a parking bay simply to get more fuel. They taxied clear of the runway, requested Fire services to check their undercarriage. Shortly after the fuse plugs melted and it became apparent they weren't going anywhere."

Gave a lift to a bloke once..he was an NZer..a farmer. Told me his son worked in civil aviation after the military. Now most farmers learn young often by trial and error and the occasional kick up the A from elders. This was NOT his son....tractor drivers know all about brakes and heat and damage and costs...this team had zero idea of what they had just asked the machine to do.

[FE Hoppy]

The 777 OPT does not do a Balanced Field calculation. It does an optimized or improved climb calculation depending on where it is limited. I don't know if the Kiwis have an EFB or if they use RTOW charts. In any case, it very possibly was not a balanced field calcultion so for anyone to suggest that an abort above V1 is not viable is BS. If this is too confusing for you, good. Go to the spotters forum.

They had an incident, no one was hurt, and the a/c can be used again. Good result!!! That's all we know. Pronouncements by wannabes don't further our understanding.


Tosh!

If they were accel stop field limited then they would be off the end.

[ASRAAM]

Gentlemen,

Setting aside this particular incident there is a fair amount of rubbish being talked on this thread about 777 take off performance.

When V1 is determined for a particular take off it will always be safe to go above this speed following an engine failure and it will always be safe to stop below this speed. (Assuming no multiple failures!)

Usually in a 777 V1 and Vr will be coincident, sometimes there will be a small gap. If an increased climb performance is required it may be a large gap.

From a pilots view the difficulty is that you have no idea what the go speed and the stop speed actually are, only that V1 is between them. On some days it would be safe to continue 20 kts (or more) below V1 and on some days it would be safe to stop 20 kts (or more) above V1. YOU JUST DONT KNOW!

[lomapaseo]

ASRAAM

Gentlemen,

Setting aside this particular incident there is a fair amount of rubbish being talked on this thread about 777 take off performance.

When V1 is determined for a particular take off it will always be safe to go above this speed following an engine failure and it will always be safe to stop below this speed. (Assuming no multiple failures!)

Usually in a 777 V1 and Vr will be coincident, sometimes there will be a small gap. If an increased climb performance is required it may be a large gap.

From a pilots view the difficulty is that you have no idea what the go speed and the stop speed actually are, only that V1 is between them. On some days it would be safe to continue 20 kts (or more) below V1 and on some days it would be safe to stop 20 kts (or more) above V1. YOU JUST DONT KNOW!



Thanks for that:ok:

I wonder if with so few posts you could be urged to repost your quote everytime we get into these kinds of discussions

[5LY]

"Tosh!

If they were accel stop field limited then they would be off the end."


Exactly my point! Depending on what the limiting factor was, they may or may not be off the end, where in a true balanced field calc. they would have been. Tosh yerself!

BTW, how do you get the nice blue background when doing a quote of someone else's offering?

[Wizofoz]

Even if you ARE ASDA linited, there are significant saftey margins built into the calculations, so it is still presumtuous to say you would definatley be off the end.

ASRAAMs point is well taken, but to me the thing is it really makes no difference. You should continue the takeoff after V1 if it is at all possible. If you have a truley unflyable malfunction, it is better to go off the end at low speed than dig a crater beyond the boundary....

[5LY]

Wizofox. Well said. These things are seldom perfectly cut and dried. It looks in this case (if the speculation is true) that an above V1 abort was successfull on what had to have been a heavy a/c. :ok:

[woodja51]

so was the A/P engaged or not - seems Boeing think it happens enough to be issuing a mod the the engagement logic... was it the case here...? if this has been answered ignore me - I just could not find it on the posts...

WJA

[FE Hoppy]

BTW, how do you get the nice blue background when doing a quote of someone else's offering?

copy paste the quote into [...QUOTE][/QUOTE...]

without the ... s

But,
Exactly my point! Depending on what the limiting factor was, they may or may not be off the end, where in a true balanced field calc. they would have been. Tosh yerself!
isn't true.

If they did a balanced field and Stopway was available then they may well be able to stop after V1 using the stopway that wasn't included in the calculation.

I would say if they used V1max or took off at MTOW Field limited using an unbalanced calculation then they would definitely be off the end if they tried to stop above V1 but for any other calc the jury is out.

However, you have to be pretty sure you can't fly to risk trying to stop. Lots of cases of rejecting above V1 ending in death. Not many cases of going ending the same way.

[HotelT]

Well .. even if their calculations (EFB?) indicated maximum thrust reduction with maximum use of the ASDA, there is a bit of margin built into the procedures (though not advertised!), a.o.:

Reverse Thrust: (FAR/CS 25.109) from a dry RWY no reverse thrust is taken into account (idle forward thrust), so any reverse thrust would have decreased the ASDR;
Reaction times: (FAR/CS 25.109) depending on certification limits used (amdt 25-42/92), the certified reaction times [1-2 secs recognition/accel time, brake (1 sec), spoilers (1 sec) - dry] provide a bit of margin;
Conservatism when using a reduced thrust takeoff: actual thrust will be higher than the rated thrust at the assumed temperature, because the actual air density is higher; actual true airspeed will be lower, because the actual ambient temperature is lower; lower true airspeed combined with the higher thrust will result in a shorter ground distance

So, if you want to perform a post-V1 abort (once again::=), you still stand (a bit of) a chance when departing from a dry runway:ooh: ... much more than from a wet:uhoh: or contaminated:{ runway!

[safetypee]

Re #64 “ there are significant safety margins built into the calculations … ”.
This depends on how you define significant; in comparison with the safety factors used for landing, the RTO factors could be considered ‘marginal’ – and note how often we mess up landings with margin. Also if you wish to rely on the timing margins in certification, then you have to be very well drilled (and resistant to surprise).
The apparent safety margin in some non engine related RTOs near V1 might be attributed to the availability of all engine reverse, whereas an engine failure RTO would not have the same stopping capability.

Re: ” If you have a truly unflyable malfunction … ”.
The phrase ‘unsafe or unable to fly’ is in many SOPs and is often quoted in forum discussions, but has the industry really thought through what this means?
The phrase appears to have originated with the Take Safety Training Aid (TSTA), Boeing / FAA circa 1993. Here it specifically refers to after V1 “… unless the pilot has reasons to conclude that the aircraft is unsafe or unable to fly. ” para 2.3.1.2.
What reasons have been considered and how would these be identified with sufficient certainty to entertain a late RTO with a high risk of overrun; perhaps the observation in #46 ”If the aircraft cannot be rotated, self-preservation will probably dictate that you abort”, defines the only realistic circumstance - and you don't need an SOP for that.

The TSTA modifies the problem by including the phrase (in later sections and simulator briefings) amongst the reasons to reject in the low speed region. In addition it complicates the issue further at high speed before V1, with the qualification “the perception that the aircraft is unsafe or unable to fly”. Does the industry accept that a high speed RTO can be based on the perception of safety without indication, as opposed to an engine failure / fire which can be confirmed from instrument displays and warnings?

In thinking about unsafe or unable to fly, also consider other items as reasons for rejecting in many SOPs – nosewheel vibration, or tire failure where debris may have damaged the aircraft. Again how can the crew know that a vibration is from the nosewheel – experience, simulator training? Or that the bang was a tyre failure and that debris have cause damaged? To have some certainty, perhaps confirmatory evidence is required from engine or systems displays – essentially the same indications to crosscheck an engine RTO event; thus SOPs could perhaps be simpler.

Some (most) SOPs attempt to cover a range of situations, but fail to consider how the crew can meet the requirements in the SOP.
At best, many of the decisions which should be based on assessment rely on perception, which is notably weak particularly in stressful and time limited situations. Whereas a warning and confirmatory display provides a good basis for understanding the situation.
Also, consider the choice of action, which should be a simple Go / No Go choice; this may now involve an assessment of the risks within that choice because the wording of the SOP places the responsibility on the crew for evaluating the risk in the choice.
RTOs are one of the few areas in operation where the choice of action should be self-evident from the situation assessment – is there a ‘reasonable’ failure, what is the speed in relation to V1; decision Go / No Go, the risks are bounded by certificated performance and correct crew actions. Unfortunately life is not clear-cut, - as related by ‘eckhard’ (#40); we require experience, naturalistic decision making, airmanship, etc, but not more complexity in SOPs.

Perhaps removing the ‘what if’ scenarios from the reasons to reject would reduce the occurrence of weak assessment or poor choice of action; particularly if these scenarios are already covered by the assumptions in the basis safety for aircraft certification (FAR/CS), i.e. systems and control redundancy. What is the probability that such an event (what if) will be encountered in operations? The TSTA did not identify any event where an inappropriate RTO would have resulted in the aircraft being unable to fly.

“It ain’t what you don’t know that gets you into trouble. It’s what you know for sure that ain’t just so.” Mark Twain.

[lomapaseo]

safetypee

Perhaps removing the ‘what if’ scenarios from the reasons to reject would reduce the occurrence of weak assessment or poor choice of action; particularly if these scenarios are already covered by the assumptions in the basis safety for aircraft certification (FAR/CS), i.e. systems and control redundancy. What is the probability that such an event (what if) will be encountered in operations? The TSTA did not identify any event where an inappropriate RTO would have resulted in the aircraft being unable to fly.


I heartedly concur with you on this.:ok: Unfortunately decison making is what pilots are for. Even on boards like this the majority of posts have to do with second guessing without all the cues or facts. I fear that broad what-if discussions only reinforce a pilots desire to take the time to make thought out decisons even when the time factor means it should be done by rote.

[safetypee]

lomapaseo. "decision making is what pilots are for ”, what a novel and refreshing view. :)

The time factor in decision making for RTOs is a central issue.
In the low speed zone, there is relatively more time and thus there may be a wider range of situations which can be considered. In this zone, the pilot may be able to use knowledge based thinking – evaluate the situation, options, and risk; where the additional time or any extension of it into the high speed zone should not be hazardous. Thus, operators should maximise human attributes – allow the pilot to think and make decisions. There may be no need for a SOP here, only guidance and information as to hazard, risk, etc.

In the high speed zone, a well constructed SOP should enable a quick and clear assessment leading to ‘rule based thinking’ for the choice of action, perhaps only considering an engine failure or fire, for which performance is optimised for.
Training has to provide practice in assessment (things not to consider, just as much as those which are important). Currently there is over focus on the actions. Both actions and thinking (the assessment) are important, they need to be developed as a skill, or at lest a semi automatic processes. The critical aspect is to prevent the thinking process extending beyond V1 where the risks from ‘late’ actions increase rapidly.
In addition, pilots have to develop the ability to manage surprise and the stress from unexpected symptoms.

Much of modern training is based on the human as a hazard, whereas if we saw humans as the generators of safety (James Reason) and use them in this way, then SOPs might be simpler. The industry depends very much on the human to rescue the rare and surprising event – perhaps as in this thread, the incident involved unique assessment decisions, most probably based on experience, to enable a safe outcome.

”The greatest mistake that a man can ever make is to be afraid of making one”. Elbert Hubbard.

[minimum_wage]

My sources tell me the A/P was engaged and the S/O called the abort.

[PJ2]

minimum_wage;
My sources tell me the A/P was engaged and the S/O called the abort.
This is a matter of terminology I guess, but the third pilot, where carried, is commonly known a Relief Pilot or Cruise pilot. The Captain, nobody else, calls the reject, unless it's a training situation with the training captain in the right seat. That situation calls for very clear understanding as to who will reject the takeoff and crisp cockpit discipline.

safetypee;

I'm sure you will have pondered this already, but in circumstances such as an inadvertent autopilot engagement on the runway during takeoff where it may not be known until the control column is moved rearwards for the purposes of the rotation manoeuvre that the control column cannot be moved due to such engagement, I think you will agree that there is no time to consider if the autopilot would disengage such that rotation can be executed. I don't know what the right answer is nor do any of us, for sure. By definition, Vr is past V1, and keeping the above comments from ASRAAM in mind, and your comments, thus: Perhaps removing the ‘what if’ scenarios from the reasons to reject would reduce the occurrence of weak assessment or poor choice of action; particularly if these scenarios are already covered by the assumptions in the basis safety for aircraft certification (FAR/CS), i.e. systems and control redundancy. What is the probability that such an event (what if) will be encountered in operations? The TSTA did not identify any event where an inappropriate RTO would have resulted in the aircraft being unable to fly., and the TSTA statements, “… unless the pilot has reasons to conclude that the aircraft is unsafe or unable to fly. ” (para 2.3.1.2), as well as the FAR/CS for the aircraft, I would concur with reducing the reasons/requirements for a reject above 100kts, I would acknowledge the SOPs as providing the legal freedom, (not authority - the captain already has that), to conduct a reject for "unsafe/unable-to-fly" reasons but would suggest that not all such circumstances have been examined which would provide guidance for crews rejecting for this last category.

A Canadian Airlines DC10 rejected a takeoff right near V1 in Vancouver due to a loud, explosive noise which turned out to be a compressor stall. The aircraft overran the runway and while substantially damaged, all evacuated successfully. In the context of this thread, it is worth quoting the Canadian TSB Report (http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/1995/a95h0015/a95h0015.asp) briefly:
The captain's decision to reject the take-off was based on his perception of the circumstances. The influences that could have shaped his understanding of the situation were his training and experience, his perceptions as to flexibility provided by the use of C2B power, and the available visual and aural cues. In addition, the wording contained in the CAI DC-10 FCOM, that a "further 3 seconds is allowed until full braking with spoiler actuation is attained," may be ambiguous in that it implies that some time beyond V1 is available for the pilot reaction. The limited published information regarding the inevitability of an overrun when a take-off is rejected beyond the V1 speed could also lead to this adverse consequence not being considered in the decision to reject.

The captain's understanding was that an engine failure would not be an adequate reason to initiate a rejected take-off after V1. In this case, however, prior to making his reject decision, he did not see or perceive indications, or hear advice from his crew, that an engine failure had occurred. Also, the loud bang was neither similar to any compressor stall symptom that he knew about, nor similar to sounds that he had heard in training or experienced during actual flying.

All the members of the flight crew reported that the sound was unlike anything they had heard before. Not only was the bang very loud, but it was difficult to specify its point of origin. None of the crew saw the engine fail light illuminate<23>, nor did they notice the drop in N1. The only cue the captain received to indicate that the take-off was no longer normal was the loud bang, followed by a series of thuds and vibrations. Because the situation did not match any of the captain's previous training or actual flying experience, he was required to respond instantly to the situation by drawing on whatever knowledge or other experience he had.

When the captain heard the loud bang, he immediately thought of a bomb. The only procedural guidance available for this circumstance was that a rejected take-off after V1 could be initiated when "the captain believes that the aircraft has suffered catastrophic failure and will not fly." According to the captain, his action was probably also influenced by the fatal DC8 occurrence that he had witnessed and which resulted in his mental rule of thumb that if structural failure were suspected, he would not take the aircraft into the air.

When the captain decided to reject the take-off, it was his correct belief that, because they were using C2B power figures, the aircraft would have reached the 164-knot V1 earlier, and that there would be additional runway available for the reject. Based on this fact and his visual impression of the runway available, he was confident that the aircraft would be able to stop on the runway.

To my knowledge and all previous experience in rejected takeoffs executed in the simulator, no training nor discussion was provided for other than engine failure or fire at some point in the takeoff. Sometimes a loud noise accompanied an engine failure. There was never the "unsafe to fly" factor introduced which was intended to cause a reject. I suspect this is the case with most simulator recurrent sessions because that is what is examined in IFR and PPC (for others, Pilot Proficiency Checks - aircraft-specific procedures) rides.

Just to complete the discusssion along this line, I can recall one session where, in the A320, the Captain's sidestick went u/s, (there is now a Master Caution but if I recall, there was none at the time, (18 years ago) and when I went to rotate nothing happened. Control was instantly given (commanded) to the F/O, with the word, "Rotate" and that was that. Had we rejected, we would have overrun - had the F/O's sidestick also been inoperative we would have been in trouble.

So....I should think that, under the circumstances of this reject (Tokyo ANZ B777), a control column that would not permit movement aft would be accompanied by exceptional surprise and an instantaneous decision, which, in this case, was the correct one because it worked and which would take the engineers and aerodynamicists months to tell us why, which would almost certainly not be sufficiently applicable to another case of autopilot engagement, should it occur.

Which returns us to the original point above concerning what necessarily renders an aircraft unsafe to fly and what should not be cause for a reject even when surprise is the primary motivating factor?

There is already good guidance on tire failure, (continue, due reduced braking and a full runway for landing), but not on shrapnel damage so it is always a guess and experience cannot lend too much of a hand. Do we "triage" the event by computer-projecting various tire delaminations? Any such work must include degradation of warning systems as well as structural parts. In Toronto, a DC9 overran a runway in 1978 when one of the red gear unsafe lights came on as a result of a tire delamination which damaged the gear proximity warning switches and also caused initial failure of one of the engines, (which recovered after the reject decision was made). The decision to reject was made very near V1 on a max-gross takeoff and the aircraft overran into the same gulley that AF overran into a couple of years ago.

Do we examine flap structures for flyability after substantial damage? Again, there are cases which may apply.

Your original point however is key; are the goalposts moving within airline operations departments without substantive research, and are certification standards fully comprehended by both airline flight operations departments and crews? While certified performance is always pristine in terms of substantiation, we all know that actual rejects are far messier and unpredictable. The narrowing of factors which should cause a reject becomes a single point at V1 - what that point is in terms of engine performance is well understood, relatively clear and trained for; what the point is for aircraft performance and "flyability" is not researched so there are no rote procedures for guidance and therefore relies almost solely on those factors observed in posts above: experience.

PJ2

[Wizofoz]

Just for accuracy's sake, there is no "S/O" on any airliner these days,

Qantas, Air New Zealand, Cathay and several other airlines employ Second Officers (S/Os) who occupy control seats during cruise only, are in Jump seats for T/o and landing, and are entitled to call deficiencies as part of CRM practices.

So you'd be wrong there.....

Just recieved a communication stating that a software fix is on its way due to "A number" of cases of inadvertent A/P engagement on the ground, with consequent unexpected control forces, which had led to RTOs above V1, so I give some credence to that idea here.

[blah blah blah]

[QUOTE]Just for accuracy's sake, there is no "S/O" on any airliner these days, and the Captain, nobody else, calls the reject, unless it's a training situation with the training captain in the right seat.[QUOTE]

What sort of screwed up airline only lets the Skipper call an abort? Never come across that one before.

[Mushroom_2]

What sort of screwed up airline only lets the Skipper call an abort?

Ours, for one.

[minimum_wage]

PJ2,


Just for accuracy's sake, there is no "S/O" on any airliner these days, and the Captain, nobody else, calls the reject, unless it's a training situation with the training captain in the right seat. That situation calls for very clear understanding as to who will reject the takeoff and crisp cockpit discipline.




For your own accuracy, I fly for Air NZ so I should know. I'm not a Captain and I have called a reject before. :ok:

[slamer.]

What we call an FE the Americans call a SO
What we call an SO the Americans call a cruise pilot

Maybe thats where the confusion lays

[JW411]

Well, when I flew in the USA, we had FEs AND SOs. The FEs were professional flight engineers and the SOs were second officer pilots peforming at the FE's panel while waiting to get into the right hand seat.

I have also heard of ROPES (Retired Old Pilots Engineer's Station). This was a wheeze which kept old captains employed beyond retirement age.

Confusing isn't it?

[blueloo]

What sort of screwed up airline only lets the Skipper call an abort? Never come across that one before.


Not getting confused with - anyone can CALL the abort....but ONLY the Captain makes the decision on whether to abort or not.

[lomapaseo]

I always thought that it was important for only the two guys at the controls to know who who calls the abort and unimportant/ambigous to anybody else

[PJ2]

What we call an FE the Americans call a SO
What we call an SO the Americans call a cruise pilot

Maybe thats where the confusion lays
Well, when I flew in the USA, we had FEs AND SOs. The FEs were professional flight engineers and the SOs were second officer pilots peforming at the FE's panel while waiting to get into the right hand seat.
Yes, that's what I meant. We had "S/O's" as well, who managed the panel at the back until we sold our DC8's, B727's, L1011's a very long time ago now and everybody got a window seat and we flew long-haul overseas with just two pilots on the B767 for the long time until the notions of "augment pilot", and "cruise relief pilot" were introduced in Canada and which were fought tooth-and-nail against by one carrier - another thread for another day. The CRP's are top-of-climb to top-of-descent certified and the Augment pilot is a qualified First Officer permitted to takeoff and land the aircraft; we use just one captain on all long-haul; some carriers use dual crews.
What sort of screwed up airline only lets the Skipper call an abort? Never come across that one before.
Not getting confused with - anyone can CALL the abort....but ONLY the Captain makes the decision on whether to abort or not.
For your own accuracy, I fly for Air NZ so I should know. I'm not a Captain and I have called a reject before. http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/thumbs.gif
I always thought that it was important for only the two guys at the controls to know who who calls the abort and unimportant/ambigous to anybody else
Interesting comments on what we probably thought was a pretty settled maneuver.

For clarification....
For me, the terminology of "calling" a reject means that the decision has been made to reject the takeoff and as such is a command not merely an alert by a crew member. In other words, it doesn't just mean that a crew member is calling out a fault which may require a reject - "calling" means "commanding" a reject, so perhaps that is one area of confusion and hopefully this will sort it out.

Obviously it is paramount that all crew members call out any fault but at the airline I retired from the actual decision to reject and carry out the actions of a rejected takeoff is the skipper's alone.

So minimum_wage and blah blah blah, does disagreement with the view that only the captain can reject a takeoff mean that in some carriers (ANZ?), the First Officer is permitted by SOPs to make the decision to reject the takeoff and then carry out the reject actions while the skipper performs the PM role? Does this obtain even if the F/O happens to be the PM on the takeoff? In other words, can the F/O reject a takeoff under all circumstances or just when he-she is the PF? In such a case, at which point does the captain take command of the situation?

Other questions arise but perhaps this is all a confusion of terms and not a confusion of actual duties and responsibilities.

I think we would all agree that regardless of how this most serious of all emergency actions is conducted, that everybody in the cockpit must understand for each takeoff, who will always do the reject, how it is to be done and what the actions for each, after stopping, will be, again, for each takeoff. For me, the SOP that keeps it the same for all takeoffs whereby only the skipper, after hearing verbal calls regarding aircraft/system faults from other crew members, can actually decide to reject the takeoff and actually perform the actions of rejecting the takeoff, is the safest SOP which ensures that everyone knows who is doing what and when and knows where to look for command direction.

[FE Hoppy]

From my old RAF days the briefing was something like:

"call all malfunctions with enough info for the captain to make a decision. Anyone may call abort for an engine fire, overheat or failure indicated by 2 parameters. The pilot flying may also abort for blocked runway or loss of control"

or something like that.

Philosophy was that if you were good enough to be operating crew you were good enough to call abort.

I've called abort a couple of times from the FE seat. Once at low speed and once quite high.
It was the FE's job to call the speeds on the Nimrod too.

The removal of this responsibility was the hardest thing to learn once I left the RAF after so many years of being able to call abort.

[PJ2]

Philosophy was that if you were good enough to be operating crew you were good enough to call abort.
Yep. I understand that in the Canadian Forces, crews on the Argus, and I assume the Orion and other heavy transport aircraft, (C-17), switch seats depending upon whose leg it was, the PF always sitting in the left seat as commander.

Unfortunately, I don't think the philosophy you describe would be the safest in today's commercial environment where even the left seat sometimes has minimum experience and training.

[FE Hoppy]

Yep. I understand that in the Canadian Forces, crews on the Argus, and I assume the Orion and other heavy transport aircraft, (C-17), switch seats depending upon whose leg it was, the PF always sitting in the left seat as commander.

Unfortunately, I don't think the philosophy you describe would be the safest in today's commercial environment where even the left seat sometimes has minimum experience and training.


Concur. Not sure even the skipper should be allowed sometimes!!

[SiriusTheDogStar]

The military machines were not handicaped like todays commercial fleet, nether were the flight crewe.

For starters military crewe are trained how to fly..not double guess what the computer is planning..in other words the pilot input gets a reaction.

Cannot compare military to civila aviation today.

[Smilin_Ed]

PJ2: Yep. I understand that in the Canadian Forces, crews on the Argus, and I assume the Orion and other heavy transport aircraft, (C-17), switch seats depending upon whose leg it was, the PF always sitting in the left seat as commander.
I can't speak for the USAF but many decades ago when I was flying the P-2 (Neptune) and P-3 (Orion) for the Navy, there was no such thing as "your leg" and "my leg". The Co Pilot might get a takeoff or landing occasionally but just occasionally. The only time you got a landing was when there was a flight specifically designated for training. Then, the pilot making the takeoff or landing moved to the left seat. I went on a full five-month deployment without making a single landing because the squadron commanding officer decreed it. Training be damned, "safety" came first and only designated plane commanders (PC) could make landings. Apparently there was no thought as to how to handle a situation where the PC became incapacitated.

Some years later, after transitioning to attack jets, I was project officer on a weapon system which was also going to be installed in P-2s. I flew as co pilot and observer on one flight and the PC, knowing that I had P-2 experience, offered to let me make the landing. I elected to stay in the right seat and the PC was astonished. Apparently no one in his experience had ever done so. Subsequently, we were able to use the aircraft again so it must have been a really good landing. :)

I don't think we can make any broad assumptions about military philosophy on who is allowed to actually fly the aircraft. It varies from unit to unit.

[PJ2]

I don't think we can make any broad assumptions about military philosophy on who is allowed to actually fly the aircraft. It varies from unit to unit.Interesting...thanks.
Cannot compare military to civila aviation today.
I would agree in terms of training, knowledge, standards and experience given the way the commercial aviation industry has unfolded since de-regulation and especially over the last twenty years, but in flight safety work human factors are human factors; neither the military nor civilian aviation are immune or without key examples which have resulted in accidents. The C-5 accident at Dover is perhaps a case in point which has some commonalities with recent accidents.

[slamer.]

In Air NZ.

The Captain has the sole responsibility for the decision to reject the takeoff...... end of story

[PJ2]

slamer, thanks much - I thought so but the post by minimum_wage is slightly confusing. Probably the meaning of the word, "call" the reject vice "decide" to reject (and action it).

[blah blah blah]

PJ2

On the military types I flew either pilot could call "Abort, Abort". This would be in response to red lights (master warning) or control malfunctions. These were the only items that were to be aborted for (excepting of course those weird situations that cant be planned for, the cow running onto the runway, the ied going off at the end of the runway etc etc). If either pilot called "Abort, Abort" the abort was carried out immediately. PF would carry out the actions to stop the aircraft with control handed to the skipper (if he was acting as PM) at a set point as per every landing.

On the civilian types I have flown it is exactly the same situation.

Quite simply if a pilot calls the abort it is actioned immediately and any discussion can happen afterwards. I haven't operated in a company that has a skipper making a decision based on input from the crew. The closest I got to this was in the military where other crew members (in the back of the aircraft) could announce a problem they have spotted. It was then up to the pilots to decide whether to abort or not. In reality back end crew would keep quiet, quite sensibly reasoning that anything they saw that wasn't already indicating to the pilots could probably wait until cleaned up and climbing away.

How does it work in your experience where you are at V1 and a problem arises that would demand an abort? The FO spots the problem, announces it, waits for the skipper to acknowledge and then make a decision? Surely this process takes the crew past V1 and so forces the take off to continue. What could have been a safe and prudent abort (admittedly at V1 we are getting towards limits, but that doesnt mean they aren't safe) becomes you getting airborne with a problem you really don't want to be dealing with in the air. The FO cant rotate due a jammed control column, the plane is never going to get airborne, but he waits for the skipper to say its ok to stop, all the while getting faster and closer to the fence.

Im amazed that airlines are operating like this. Obviously they are though, and Im sure justifications can be made for this, but for me, hearing of this for the first time, it still sounds crazy.

Blah

[blueloo]

These days most companies are operating purely from the manufacturers guidelines. (Presumably with the odd change here and there).

This is verbatim from the Boeing 767 QRH. (And would guess that due to boeing standardisation the 777, 737 and 747 are the same)

Rejected Takeoff
The Captain has the sole responsibility for the decision to reject the takeoff. The decision must be made in time to start the rejected takeoff manoeuvre by V1.

[framer]

Man it would be messy if the Captain was incapacitated then....bloody thing would plow a trail into the maize paddock.

[Sir Richard]

blueloo

You may find that the "Boeing" documentation is Airline Specific. Look at the front of most Boeing Manuals and you should find that they have been produced for your airline with Airline/State requirements incorporated.:8......but I could be wrong :}

[blueloo]

Sir Richard - yes no doubt. (Which was why I mentioned the odd change here or there).

....but my understanding was that boeing went through an alignment of procedures for all Boeing fleets (in so far as possible for standardisation), and additionally many airlines now use Boeing standardised documentation (subject to the Airline requirements) in an effort to (what I would guess) prevent/minimise litigation in the event of a prang.

As to whether the Boeing promulgated RTO procedure varies amongst airlines - (or Air NZ in this instance) - who knows - but I would suggest it is the same.

And realistically, lets not get confused (as has been mentioned a few times) between calling a reject, and the person who actually makes the decision to reject. Only 1 person on the flight deck is the person in charge.


[I would love to see an extract from a Boeing 737/767/747 mainstream Commercial Airline - not military or other odd ops - just to see if it is different and how it varies - just out of curiosity]

[jurassicjockey]

PJ2

I came from the connector side of the other airline in Canada, and on one of those aircraft, the FO could call the rejected takeoff with the verbal call "Reject" and the closing of the thrust levers. Captain's aircraft after that.

[lomapaseo]

Can we hear from those that have been in real rejected takeoffs (not training) as to how the situation was handled.

was the responsibility discussed in the cockpit beforehand?

Did the captain perform the reject without consultation (e.g. PNF response)?

Did the PNF call out abort?

Was the right seat flying the aircraft and if so performed the abort on his decision or only via the captains command?

To me it makes no difference (subject to reading further posts) as long as it is agreed beforehand.

[PJ2]

blah, blueloo;
Re your comments, enquiries:

Boeing 777 Flight Crew Training Manual
Rejected Takeoff Maneuver
The decision to reject the takeoff is the responsibility of the captain, and must be made before V1 speed. If the captain is the PM, he should initiate the RTO and announce the abnormality simultaneously. NOTE: If the decision is made to reject the takeoff, the flight crew should accomplish the rejected takeoff non-normal maneuver as described in the Maneuvers chapter of the QRH.


Rejected Takeoff, Maneuvers Chapter, QRH:

The captain has the sole responsibility for the decision to reject the takeoff.

The decision must be made in time to start the rejected takeoff maneuver by V1. If the decision is to reject the takeoff, the captain must clearly announce “STOP”, commence the stopping action, and assume control of the airplane.

If the first officer is making the takeoff, the first officer must maintain control of the airplane until the captain makes a positive input to the controls.

During the takeoff, the crew member observing the non-normal situation will immediately call it out as clearly as possible.


blah;
Im amazed that airlines are operating like this. Obviously they are though, and Im sure justifications can be made for this, but for me, hearing of this for the first time, it still sounds crazy.
Understand that comment very well now because I must admit to the same impressions hearing that in some operations rejects can be initiated by any crew member. As I mentioned above, I think in much of today's civilian operation where training and experience is not nearly what it used to be that would be a flight safety issue - whole 'nuther thread! However the procedures outlined above work well and do not present the problems described in your post in terms of transfer of control, time to decision, etc. I've never done a high-speed reject except in the sim but have used these procedures (as Captain & F/O) for the entire career without issue. "Normal" is many things. When something works in aviation we are reluctant to change and when we encounter procedures that are contrary to all our "instincts" (as historically learned and relied upon), we can't see how they can possibly be as good or even work as well. Hopefully lomapaseo's questions will provide some sense of the "success" rate for rejects using either way. Perhaps fortunately, the data-set is relatively small. I'm sure there is searchable literature.

lomapaseo;
Bearing in mind comments regarding today's standards of training, experience and SOPs, I think your comment is valid that it doesn't matter who does the maneuver so long as everyone has a clear understanding of who does the reject and why. The special case may be during captain upgrade training where again a clear understanding as to who will do the reject is required.

framer;
Incapacitation procedures apply during takeoff as well as during other ops. The one or two verbal challenge-response calls (regarding speed, timings and/or power) during the takeoff are not only intended for situational awareness but as a check for incapacitation. The chances of an incapacitation occurring right at V1, forcing the takeoff are possible but very small.

[Bullethead]

G’day lomapaseo,

I had a medium speed, around 80kts, RTO recently due to a takeoff config warning which turned out to be spurious and caused by a faulty leading edge slat proximity sensor.

It was the FO’s sector and in the normal course of events he would set the initial thrust level and let it stabilise before engaging the autothrottle which would then apply takeoff thrust. As soon as he removes his hand from the thrust levers to engage the auto throttle I follow through on them with my right hand as the thrust is set and until V1 is called when I remove my hand.

This action has me primed and ready for a reject if necessary and after V1 with my hand away from the thrust levers less likely to attempt a RTO on the high side of V1.

So this is what we were doing when the TO config warning occurred, I had my right hand on the thrust levers and the FO had both hands on the control column. The weather conditions at the time were day VMC.

I immediately closed the thrust levers, took over and called STOP. The FO after an initial startle moment made the appropriate radio call and continued to monitor the RTO actions. It all worked as per the books even though the circumstances of this particular RTO were unusual and one not practiced in the sim.

In my airline it is always the Captain’s decision to carry out an RTO regardless of who announces the problem or how the problem is announced and always his responsibility to actually carry it out.

Pre-flight I always give the RTO brief regardless of whose sector it is.

I think that answers your queries though if you have any others feel free to ask.

Regards,
BH.

[solitaire]

Interesting discussion this. Surely the most important thing is that everyone is clear who can say what during the t/o roll. In my airline (I believe on every fleet) the FO can call STOP (whoever is handling) for 5 reasons.

Any fire
Confirmed engine failure - 2 parameters
T/O config warning
WINDSHEAR AHEAD warning
MONITOR RADAR DISPLAY warning

Additionally, when handling pilot, the FO can call STOP for a blocked runway or significant handling difficulty. If they are handling, the FO carries out the reject and the Captain takes control as the aircraft comes to a stop.

If there is a P3 on the jumpseat, he can call what he sees but is not supposed to call STOP.

If unable to rotate the aircraft at Vr when handling, it's surely safer for the FO to reject than to advise the Captain and wait for him to make the inevitable decision. IMHO

[blah blah blah]

lomapaseo,

I have had two RTOs, one as an FO the other as a skipper.

The one as a skipper was simple as I was PF and I stopped well prior to V1 because "something" didnt feel right through the controls. Turns out there was a problem with a wheel bogey that probably would have meant control issues at higher take off speed and during landing.

The RTO as an FO was different as I was PM. Two things happened at once, a master warning and a rwy incursion. I called the abort, the skipper only saw the master warning and called continue (against SOPs, though I understood his reasoning, there was background to that particular warning). However, I still wanted him to stop as I didnt particularly want to hit what was now well onto my side of the rwy. I called abort again and took control of the throttles, closing them. Skipper continued the RTO procedure from there as PF. Either of these issues should have meant a stop. The problem here was the skipper going against SOPs. To those that would say I should have stated what the problem was, well that wasnt in our SOPs, but which problem do I announce? Or which one do I announce first?

Surely these things should be kept as simple as possible, and there is nothing more simple than a qualified pilot calling an abort in accordance with the SOP requirements, carrying out the appropriate actions, and then discussing it on the taxi.

Blah

[cjam]

Most here seem to fall in one camp or the other. There is the "it's always the Captains decision" camp and the "If I'm qualified to fly the plane I'm qualified to call a reject" camp.

It's not a black and white situation. It would be very nice if it was, if we could simply make a rule that applies in every single situation, but we can't, the situations are too varied and dynamic.
Blah Blah Blah's example where he had two events unfolding but the Captain was only aware of one is a good example. The Captain was forced to make a decision ("continue") based on half of the information. The fully qualified pilot sitting next to him was privvy to all of the information not because of experience, not because of how many stripes he has on his shoulders, but by virtue of the fact he was the PM at that moment.
If you reside in "Camp One" how do you think this situation should have been dealt with?
Incapacitation (especially subtle incapacitation) is another situation that highlights the fact that although it would be nice to put it in a box and say "it is always the Captains decision" , that is not always the best course of action.
So how do we stop 500hour F/O's from rejecting when the Captain has called 'continue' while at the same time recognising that in some rare situations this would indeed be the correct thing to do?
Ahhhhh aviation, gotta love it :)

[PJ2]

cjam;
So how do we stop 500hour F/O's from rejecting when the Captain has called 'continue' while at the same time recognising that in some rare situations this would indeed be the correct thing to do?
Ahhhhh aviation, gotta love it
Yep. Gotta love it.

We can build unlimited scenarios and bring individual experiences to bear on the case for doing something one way vice another. The key is in large data amounts and wide industry experience, not one's particular event. It's been said and we know that no situation is going to be fully covered and that takes us back to an important comment earlier in the thread - "decison making is what pilots are for".
Incapacitation (especially subtle incapacitation) is another situation that highlights the fact that although it would be nice to put it in a box and say "it is always the Captains decision" , that is not always the best course of action.
Not necessarily. In and of itself, I would not consider an incapacitation a reason for a reject above 100kts so what we're really talking about here is a double failure over a period of about 5 to 8 seconds (100kts to V1) which means an incapacitation in combination with a Master Warning, an engine fire/failure, an unflyable airplane, or a runway incursion. And as I pointed out in a previous post above, incapacitation is part of the reason why verbal challenge-response calls regarding speeds, etc are made during the takeoff roll.

Given the timings and probabilities involved, while possible, such a double-failure is no more an issue than other significant but extremely rare occurrences during takeoff. If these circumstances obtain, yes, it is one of those really bad days where the remaining PF uses every ounce of experience and airmanship he/she can muster.
So how do we stop 500hour F/O's from rejecting
I think that is a worrisome and very possible scenario if any pilot can reject a takeoff. Disagreements and/or confusion in the cockpit at critical times have caused numerous accidents and THAT is (in today's industry, as presently constituted), the main reason why only the captain should be responsible for the reject.

[cjam]

"I would not consider an incapacitation a reason for a reject above 100kts so what we're really talking about here is a double failure over a period of about 5 to 8 seconds (100kts to V1) which means an incapacitation in combination with a Master Warning, an engine fire/failure, an unflyable airplane, or a runway incursion."

I agree that an incapacitation in the high speed phase is not cause for rejecting. I think incapacitation here is fairly subjective though. Many people think of it as a heart attack or passing out or some other obvious ailment. In reality subtle incapacitation is much more likely and can be caused (as I'm sure you know) by many many things. Is it for example "subtle incapacitation", if the shock and surprise of an engine failure 15kts before V1 results in a stunned mullet reaction from a pilot as the event seeps slowly into his/ her fatigued brain? Another subject perhaps.

"I think that is a worrisome and very possible scenario if any pilot can reject a takeoff. Disagreements and/or confusion in the cockpit at critical times have caused numerous accidents and THAT is (in today's industry, as presently constituted), the main reason why only the captain should be responsible for the reject. "

I tend to agree with you on that, I think you have come close the the reality of the situation with that statement. But it still needs recognising that that is not the optimal situation. That may be how we can get the safest environment for operations in the near term, but I don't think it is the best we can do long term. Your paragraph above conceedes problems with the industry. It is a band-aid to cover a wound not a scratch. We may not be able to reverse the situation we find ourselves in now (inexperienced fo's flying large modern jets with the bare minimal recurrent training, maximum duty hours and low salaries), but if we don't we will have to continue to have "less than optimum" SOP's such as the one above.
"Continue...."

[skol]

minimum wage

My manual says:
'The captain has the sole responsibility for the decision to reject the takeoff.'

[rottenray]

lomapaseo writes:

I always thought that it was important for only the two guys at the controls to know who who calls the abort and unimportant/ambigous to anybody else

As it is happening, certainly.

Later on while sorting out facts and trying to apply those facts to improve safety, then it's everyone's business.

Or at least "everyone" as it applies to sorting out the facts.

Much better to learn from someone's bad adventure than to repeat it.


RR

[H Peacock]

I fly for an outfit where either pilot can call the abort. We also operate a policy where the NHP (PM) can call 'what he sees' leaving the PF to make the call, even if the PM is the captain and the PF the co. As PF we will always have a hand on the throttles until V1 is called.

Not sure I can ever see a scenario where an abort was called below V1 when the captain would know better and ignore it. If you abort below V1 then you will always be safe and at least can talk about it safely and comfortably in the crewroom.

[joeflyguy]

Interesting that with so much ill informed speculation about the RTO speed and what actually occurred that others with real information of what happened have not come forward to comment.

[WindSheer]

My manual says:
'The captain has the sole responsibility for the decision to reject the takeoff.'

That goes totally against modern CRM practices.

[Fantome]

Not much time for command by committee in the few seconds before V1 when ****s are trumps.

[Max Angle]

I think you will find that the vast majority of the worlds airlines operate that way on the advice of Boeing and Airbus who both consider it provides the best percentage chance of a good decision. Perhaps you would rather have a nice inclusive group hug and a chat about it as the end of the runway looms at 300ft per second.

Actually the Captain has sole responsibility for just about everything that happens anyway, CRM is about using your available resources effectively to make good decisions not about sharing or spreading the responsibility for those decisions.

If you abort below V1 then you will always be safe.

Think there are a lot people who rejected close to V1 who would disagree with that statement, you might have no choice but safe it ain't.

[PJ2]

That goes totally against modern CRM practices.
In what way?

As has been pointed out, the rejected takeoff decision isn't a group decision because there is no time. Where CRM enters into such a decision is in the takeoff briefing during the cockpit check where the captain ensures that everybody comprehends and agrees with how a reject will be done and what each members' duties are.

If your comment is of the thinking that the F/O, if he/she is doing the takeoff, should have the decision-making capability, then you are just changing the location of the single decision to reject.

Beyond this, if you haven't already, please read the entire thread as this and other similar points have been discussed and your point, if this isn't it, may be addressed.

[cactusbusdrvr]

At the airline I fly for it is the Captain's responsibility to reject the takeoff. The PM will call out the malfunction and, as the Captain always has his hands on the thrust levers, he will initiate the rejected T/O.

CRM is for who pays for the first beer. Just kidding, CRM has it's place but a rejected T/O is not one of them. CRM is useful for situations where there is time to set up a plan of action.

[tarmac-]

Theres no reason for a F/O to not be able to make that call. If something doesn't feel right in terms of controls etc to either pilot then not calling an abort is utterly stupid.. Aborting a t/o is a serious thing , something that doesnt get done often however if theres reason for either pilot to call it then they should be able too. Safety first. F/O's arent stupid.

[Centaurus]

That goes totally against modern CRM practices.

Which of several hundred or more of published books, articles, research papers on the subject of CRM has been elevated to the title of best "modern" CRM practices? Every man and his dog has seen CRM and TEM or whatever the latest buzz word, done to death in Pprune. As much as some would prefer to have a committee decision when it comes to a high speed rejected take off, the old adage of "too many cooks spoil the broth" comes to mind.

[Max Angle]

F/O's arent stupid.

Very true, they are however frequently VERY inexperienced and if so they are not well placed to make what is probably the most crucial and potentially unforgiving decision there is to make in commercial aviation.

[Re-Heat]

A devil's advocate would say that most professional crew have not experienced a real technical failure leading to a high-speed RTO.

CRM is a red herring if everyone is briefed and knows what they are doing in the flightdeck - either approach can be feasible and right.

What is not acceptable are jumpy FOs calling RTO for minor occurrences, and Captains who don't listen to the best advice of their highly-trained colleagues albeit with less flying time.

Black and white is never right...

[maggotdriver]

It is the Captain's decision where I am but if I see an aeroplane stooging down a cross runway, call it and he does nothing - I'll be doing something!:eek:

[Nubboy]

Exactly:D

If your company SOP is that the nominated commander makes the decision, then the other guy should call what he sees. Give him the info to make that decision.

If you're really convinced that you're going to die as a result of that decision, then you're between a rock and a hard place. All bets are off, do what you believe to be best, but be prepared to defend your your actions if you survive.

[leewan]

A remedy is finally in sight.
FAA calls for fix to Boeing 777 (http://blog.seattlepi.com/aerospace/archives/198341.asp)

[Machaca]

AD 2010-06-09 (http://www.airweb.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library%5CrgAD.nsf/0/59D7B22F2CE0DD03862576E9005030AF?OpenDocument)

Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Model 777-200, - 200LR, -300, -300ER, and 777F Series Airplanes

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Model 777-200, -200LR, -300, -300ER, and 777F series airplanes. This AD requires installing new operational program software for the autopilot flight director computers. This AD results from reports of rejected takeoffs at speeds above takeoff decision speed following inadvertent autopilot engagement on the ground, and from the discovery during flight simulations that the climb gradient is less than optimal for obstacle clearance during a performance-limited takeoff situation. We are issuing this AD to prevent inadvertent engagement of the autopilot during takeoff roll, which could result in rejected takeoff at rotation speed, and consequent possible overrun of the runway. We are also issuing this AD to prevent a lower-than-optimal climb gradient during takeoff, and consequent failure to clear obstacles on the ground during a performance-limited takeoff.

DATES: This AD is effective April 1, 2010.

[Kalistan]

The incident should never have happened if the flight crew sticks to time honoured practice.........if the authrottle did not engage, set the thrust ( EPR/N1 ) manually by 60 kts. No messing around with the MCP. One wonders how the flight crews of 1st world airlines can make such deliberate violation of SOP! No, not schadenfrude but just wondering...........

[fdr]

The incident should never have happened if the flight crew sticks to time honoured practice.........if the authrottle did not engage, set the thrust ( EPR/N1 ) manually by 60 kts. No messing around with the MCP. One wonders how the flight crews of 1st world airlines can make such deliberate violation of SOP! No, not schadenfrude but just wondering...........

"All human actions have one or more of these seven causes; chance, nature, compulsion, habit, reason, passion, and desire".
Aristotle (384 BC - 322 BC)

As AD 2010-06-09 refers, there have been 9 cases reported since 1995 of this event occurring with similar responses from the crew.

On this occasion, there probably was at least 3 properly qualified and competent flight crew on the flight deck. Yet in spite of the training, SOP's and procedures, this event type has occurred at least 9 times with the same result, sufficient to get the FAA and Boeing's attention. What is not reported is the extent that such actions by crew do not result in a problem, yet would be an indication of spontaneous crew actions. The comment on failure to follow SOP's is as correct as it fundamentally disregards the human element. The reason the industry has accepted Human Factors training as a basic component of qualification. That the crew(s) have not followed the procedures and as are promulgated is self evident, as is the failure of monitoring of the pilot monitoring.

That's what human do.

Even well trained ones.

While most, if not all programs strive to maintain SOP's at all times, none achieve 100% compliance, nor does any one individual if they are honest about their own performance.

Hence the training.

The training doesn't ensure complete protection, but it does give some insight into the inherent problems, and occasionally modifies behavior patterns.

100% compliance with Policy, Practices & Procedures is a desirable goal but has not been achieved in any industry at any time in human history. (Non compliance probably started with Adam & Eve in the Garden of Eden.... hasn't improved since. Human error?, consider Bhophal, Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, "Weapons of Mass Destruction", The Maginot Line, "Peace in Our Time", "Titanic", The Somme (I & II), "Waterworld", Emperor Constantine XI's armament procurement program, the Inqusition, Enron, The Edsel, Lincoln's choice of theaters, Romeo's decision making, Napoleon's Eastern European Tour 1812, Paris' choice of girlfriend, Wallstreet 1987, 2008, 20??, IMF 1997 etc... let alone the aviation industry; AA191, JAL103, AA1420, TE901, IA605, AF296Q, GF072, TAM3054, D-AXLA, F-WWCJ, THY981, AC621, UAL173...Challenger, Columbia.... [direct and indirect causations]).

On a day to day basis, if you (metaphorically, not personally...) get to completing the Before Start Checklist without a non compliance, non adherence of standard crew actions or callouts, I would be happy. If you get to engine shutdown without a momentary lapse of same, I would be rather impressed. If a pilot believes they achieve full compliance on a daily basis, it may be that a more critical analysis of their performance is in order, rather than they are inhuman in their performance.

The vast majority of flight crews are professional and do an impressive job day in and day out. They remain human, and that is their strength and their weakness as well. Flight crew make mistakes, and the system copes generally well with these. Occasionally it doesn't. Being surprised the crew failed to follow SOP's appears to forget the human factor in the operation utterly.

"have no fear of perfection - you'll never reach it"
Salvador Dali (1904 - 1989)

Cheers,
Fly Safe,


FDR

[4PW's]

The word is the autothrottle was not engaged for the takeoff. The Word goes on to say that, on reaching for the MCP's A/T engage switch, the handling pilot pressed the autopilot engage switch by mistake at the commencement of the takeoff roll. Not rated on the B777, I'm informed said switch is similarly located and looks the same as the A/T switch. More informed sources may say otherwise.

Moving on: apparently the flight crew did not notice the FMA change to CMD on the PFD, but they did notice the A/T didn't engage. Whatever, I wasn't there. The decision to continue was made and the thrust levers advanced manually. V1 was called, a trusty hand came off the TL's and, when VR was called, pulled back, along with his other trusty hand..... yet nothing!!!

Gladly, **** did not turn to trumps. They rejected. Pretty well done too. The word from on-high went on to suggest the abort occured at V2 + 20 kts....so the situ was very serious from thereonin.

I've had five RTO's as operating crew: two were for HPSOV valves not locking out at low speed - Master Caution, had to stop; another was upon seeing an A340 barreling in from the left as we took off on 18 at EDDF. He was on 25.

One other was on Tower's command. Our's was a late tkof clearance after having lined up behind a landing who exited beyond the Tower-anticipated HST. We had one up our chuff on final, a 73, and, with us now rolling merrily along at around 60 or 70 knots, Tower called the abort. The B737 was ordered to go-round. There was one more, a low speed reject but the details are sketchy. It was a long time ago. I did not perform the reject. The Captain on the day did.

On each RTO, my heart was pumping harder than a whore's in church.

Air NZ did a great job. So they 'allegedly' had some finger trouble. **** happens. It's happened before; it'll happen again. I was once told that if all things are equal and gross negligence is not a contributing factor then it matters not how you got into the problem, but how you get out of it. So I say bravo to the Air NZ crew. Life has probably gotten a little tough for youse lately. Hang in there. I wish I could say more to help...

[HotelT]

Mind the last line of the AD:

"We are also issuing this AD to prevent a lower-than-optimal climb gradient during takeoff, and consequent failure to clear obstacles on the ground during a performance-limited takeoff."

The docket (http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2010/2010-5290.htm)states:

"The Boeing Company has also discovered during flight simulations that the climb gradient is less than optimal for obstacle clearance during a one-engine takeoff (performance-limited) situation. This is caused by an error in the pitch command law of the autopilot flight director computer (AFDC). This condition, if not corrected, could result in a lower-than-optimal climb gradient during takeoff, and consequent failure to clear obstacles on the ground during a performance-limited takeoff."
...
"Because an unsafe condition exists that requires the immediate adoption of this AD, we find that notice and opportunity for prior public comment hereon are impracticable and that good cause exists for making this amendment effective in less than 30 days."

Interesting ..

[paulomarko]

Me thinks kalistan was trying to make the point that pprune has a lot of apologists for pilots from the western world but when third world pilots made similar mistakes the racist innuendoes and comments of incompetence abound.

I have noticed this all through other threads too; guys too easy to offer all kinds of excuses for the yanks ( AA in Kingston, Delta landing on wrong runway/taxiways; NWA pilots overshooting destination, just to mention a few ). Time for introspection and honest questions about our " racist " tendencies...........flame on!