Accountability?

[Farm-for-sale]

Folks,
Just watched the 'Air Crash' episode on a 1996 USAF accident near Dubrovnik, Croatia. Tragic event with some VVIPs lost in a poor vis / inadequately equipped jet scenario (wiki attached):
1996 Croatia USAF CT-43 crash - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1996_Croatia_USAF_CT-43_crash)

What REALLY struck me was the fact that a very critical report (Haddon-Cave, anyone?) led to two General Officers getting fired and one getting demoted. Am I trying to compare apples to viscously-sharp pieces of mango?

Just a thought (about time I had one)...

FFS

[CirrusF]

You do indeed raise an interesting point. The spams really do hold to account quite drastically any officers who screw up through negligence - dismissal with loss of pension is not unusual. Another example was the USMC F/A18D crash at Miramar in 2008 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008_San_Diego_F/A-18_crash) - IIRC the engineering officer who signed off the plane was dismissed with loss of pension, and the officer who ordered the pilot to return to Miramar (rather than eject) was also "relieved" of his duties.

The RAF seem less inclined to hold their officers to account - for example the Wing Commander who wrote off a Hawk at Cranwell after he forgot to lower the undercarriage was even allowed to return to flying duties. And after the Typhoon crashed at China Lake, an RAF insider even glibly told a national newspaper that "these things happen from time to time" (http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/campaigns/our_boys/article1110935.ece) .

[Tourist]

"an RAF insider even glibly told a national newspaper that "these things happen from time to time" . "

And it is quite true that they do, but I cannot think of anyone who has done it more than once.
To dump someone who cost x million to train because they are human would be the height of petulant idiocy.
Everyone makes mistakes when flying. The lucky ones of us get away with them.

[WorkingHard]

Was the rumour true about the Red's Hawk at Scampton where the pilot selected gear up during take off roll and relied on the pressure switch to keep u/c down? Saved one bit of cockpit workload just after take off!

[CirrusF]

Everyone makes mistakes when flying. The lucky ones of us get away with them.


Forgetting to put the gear down is not a "mistake" - it is a negligent disregard of the most basic of checklists.

[MightyGem]

Not done a Human Factors course then, Cirrus?

[CirrusF]

Not done a Human Factors course then, Cirrus?


Yes, several. What has that got to do with not performing pre-landing checks?

"Human factors" is not an excuse for being negligent in the wider world - though it seems to be acceptable in the RAF given recent incidences of mong flying.

[Pontius Navigator]

"an RAF insider even glibly told a national newspaper that "these things happen from time to time" . "

And it is quite true that they do, but I cannot think of anyone who has done it more than once.
To dump someone who cost x million to train because they are human would be the height of petulant idiocy.
Everyone makes mistakes when flying. The lucky ones of us get away with them.

It's called a wheel. It goes round and round. In the late 60s early 70s the RAF did indeed follow current US practice. It was quite the norm for the wg cdr or stn cdr to be penalised for the errors or mishaps for a subordinate. It might be habe been an instant career brake, or a posting, perhaps even gardening leave.

The atmosphere was paranoid with the SOs living on a knife edge and that from the actions of subordinates and the presumed omission by the chain of command as opposed to the issue of possibly illegal orders.

[Ali Barber]

I remember my ex-Bucc OC ULAS calling finals 3 greens on the Bulldog. Luckily for him, they were down!

[CirrusF]

In the late 60s early 70s the RAF did indeed follow current US practice. It was quite the norm for the wg cdr or stn cdr to be penalised for the errors or mishaps for a subordinate.


I very much doubt that the RAF was at that time following "current US practice".

It is quite simple - if the senior officer has properly briefed the subordinate, with clear orders, sops, and limitations, but the subordinate fails to follow those orders, sops and limitations - then the senior officer has carried out his duties correctly and is not implicated. The subordinate shoud then be held to account. The senior officer is only held to account if he has failed to brief properly the subordinate. You can fault the US military for a few things, but not their command procedures. To suggest that current US procedures equate to UK procedures fifty years ago is not credible.

I am still frankly staggered by some of the well-documented mong flying that has occured in the RAF recently. There should be a culture of zero-tolerance for incidences such as the Typhoon China Lake crash, the Hawk at Cranwell, or the Caterick Puma.

I remember my ex-Bucc OC ULAS calling finals 3 greens on the Bulldog. Luckily for him, they were down!


He was quite right to have that reflex.

[Rigga]

""Human factors" is not an excuse for being negligent in the wider world - though it seems to be acceptable in the RAF given recent incidences of mong flying. "

A close friend who works at a RAF base told me of a certain Eng Wing's promotional slogan he had seen recently...

"Comfortable with Complexity"

I would doubt very much if any Human Factor courses attended actually meant anything to anyone there?

Maybe they should read H-C again?

[alf5071h]

Re: He was quite right to have that reflex. #10
Surely not – quite the wrong reflex; acting (calling) automatically in that situation.
The better ‘reflex’ is to check for the presence of three greens, and when not seen enquire if the gear is down. Both instructor and student might learn from that.

“...no matter how hard they try, humans can never be expected to out perform the system which bounds and constrains them. Organisational flaws will, sooner or later, defeat individual human performance.”

“Responsibility lies with those who could act but do not, it lies with those who could learn but do not and for those who evaluate it can add to their capacity to make interventions which might make all our lives the safer.”
Phillip Capper – ‘Systems safety in the wake of the cave creek disaster.’

[L J R]

Hands up all those who have turned Base (Finals for you RAF types) with the Gear Up......One day you will....

[Adour]

Another example was the USMC F/A18D crash at Miramar in 2008 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008_San_Diego_F/A-18_crash) - IIRC the engineering officer who signed off the plane was dismissed with loss of pension, and the officer who ordered the pilot to return to Miramar (rather than eject) was also "relieved" of his duties.



Cirrus,

This is not accurate; 4 Officers not including the pilot were relieved of their duties after the incident, to the best of my knowledge none of them recieved any loss of pension although if that was true of any of them it would have been the AMO who left the service immediately after the crash.

Additionally there was never any suggestion that the correct course of action was to order the pilot to eject, the 'accident chain' in this instance was very long and complex.

The CO was relieved of command and subsequently retired, the other 2 officers were given negative fitreps and moved to other posts / Sqn.

To remain on topic, they were not fired because of the mistakes of the Pilot in Command (and as such held accountable for their subordinate's error) but were held directly accountable for their own mistakes as cited by the board.

It is my firm belief that had the same incident occured under the same circumstances in the RAF the results would have been similar.

Interestingly, the Pilot in Command kept his wings and is currently completing his F/A-18 training on another Sqn.

Adour

[Tourist]

"Forgetting to put the gear down is not a "mistake" - it is a negligent disregard of the most basic of checklists."

Gosh Cirrus, you must be fantastic to have never made an ommission of checks accidentally.
Or, more likely, you are 14yrs old and never graced the cockpit.

[A2QFI]

Re did the RAF relieve officers of their duties for perceived negligence, I certainly know one Sqn Cdr who was moved off his squadron in the early 70s

[henry crun]

The Hunter fiasco at West Raynham in 1956 cost one senior officer his job.

[andyy]

If an RN war canoe runs aground the CO, the Navigator and the Officer of the Watch get Court Martialled and yet it is very possible that both of the first two could legitimately have been in their bunks at the time.

[Pontius Navigator]

Cirrus, slip of the brain, maybe deliberate.

Following from your senior officer covering his 6:

About 1982, the staish, later Sir Sandy Curtains, had all aircrew assembled in the large dining room at ISL - Buccaneer (the stars), Jaguar, Sea King and Shackleton - and proceeded to bollock us all.

A Bucc formation, RTB from Norway, had flown through an HPZ around one of the rig fields - bad, yes, but compounded by the Nav saying "What HPZ?"

He read the riot act and said it would not happen again; if it did then that man would never be a 4-ship lead and would forever be a wing-man.

As Shack SLF we were able to sit with smug grins as we would never be a 4-ship lead as long as we had ***** in our *****.

That said, one Shack controller, chasing a chinagraph dot, that managed to drive an F4 into Montrose Harbour when the target had already landed at Leuchars was not blamed.:}

[CirrusF]

Gosh Cirrus, you must be fantastic to have never made an ommission of checks accidentally.
Or, more likely, you are 14yrs old and never graced the cockpit.


I find that comment quite revealing, as I am neither a fantastic pilot, nor 14yrs old, but I can assure you I have never accidentally forgotten to do my checks. I'm surprised that you seem to think that it is something that pilots can be excused for occasionally forgetting.

The number of crashes in the RAF due to foolishness or negligence would be completely unacceptable to an airline. Can you imagine if in the last couple of years BA had written off two aircraft through forgetting to put the gear down, and had killed a few passengers because the pilot decided amongst other things, that he wanted to "scare the **** out of a taxi driver"? You have to question the culture of an organisation that allows such completely avoidable accidents to happen.

[VinRouge]

Cirrus. stob being a knobber. How many PFs working for the airlines are flying developmental aircraft or single man flight decks?

How many airline pilots have required prompting by the other seat because the PF has forgotten to lower the gear?

How many airlines fly without GPWS fitted to warn when the gear is not down?

Your facile arguments are going down a path that have killed many crews AND passengers; you prevent an open reporting culture where honest mistakes are treated properly and all you end up with is a system where no-one fesses up to their mistakes.

If thats the way you want to operate, go ahead, no one will stop you. I certainly wont be, firstly, its not a pleasant environment to work in, secondly, its downright unprofessional.

I just hope your amaturist views dont go ending up killing or seriously injuring anyone in the future.

Gross negligence is NOT the same as forgetting to put the gear down, if you cant see that as a professional aviator, I pity you.

[CirrusF]

There are many GA pilots flying around single-pilot, including in light jets, and that don't have GPWS. The Hawk was flying with two pilots, as was the Puma. The Typhoon was single-pilot and developmental - but it still has visual and aural gear indications, and even if those aids were defective I don't believe for an instance that there isn't a significant trim change and/or noise increase with gear down.

Whether SP, GPWS, or developmental it has nothing to do with failing to do checklists on finals or before take off (such as Hawk with disconnected ailerons, a couple of Harriers without flaps, a Jag without afterburners to name just a few off the top of my head), or just being imbued with a reckless and irresponsible attitude to flying which would appear to be the case with the Puma pilot (and quite a few other military aircraft accidents that I can think of - eg AAC Gazelle in GW1, RFA Argus Sea King, RN Gazelle lost due to QFI trying to hover with his arms crossed all spring to mind).

Your facile arguments are going down a path that have killed many crews AND passengers; you prevent an open reporting culture where honest mistakes are treated properly and all you end up with is a system where no-one fesses up to their mistakes.

Where am I advocating that?

[VinRouge]

So the civvie world is completely pure is it?

Drunk United Airlines pilot arrested at Heathrow airport - Telegraph (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/travelnews/6540396/Drunk-United-Airlines-pilot-arrested-at-Heathrow-airport.html)

Passengers stop flight after 'drunk' pilot sparks panic - Times Online (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article5651516.ece)

KSTP TV - Minneapolis and St. Paul - Distracted Pilots Overfly the Twin Cities (http://kstp.com/news/stories/S1205029.shtml?cat=1)

Northwest pilots who overshot landing have licenses revoked - washingtonpost.com (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/27/AR2009102703821.html)

I don't believe for an instance that there isn't a significant trim change and/or noise increase with gear down.I take it you have never flown a FBW jet then I take it? :hmm: (Stick to your cessna 152, difficult to forget to lower the gear when its welded on).

but I can assure you I have never accidentally forgotten to do my checks.Those that have, those that will. I would love you to define "foolishness" as well. So tell us Cirrus, o great one, what is it about military aviators that makes you think they get out of bed in the morning, think, "you know, s0d it, I dont think I will bother trying hard today at work, I really fancy stacking my jet, killing myself and end up with my reputation in tatters".

Or could you possibly comprehend mil aviators are under a different set of stresses (you know, like getting shot at, ensuring the mission goes ahead whatever the cost if neccessary) that are different to the civilian pilot? Can your tiny pea-like brain comprehend there are different levels of acceptable risk for military aviation when compared to their civilian counterparts?


Whether SP, GPWS, or developmental it has nothing to do with failing to do checklists on finals or before take off

Tell you what then, you civvie uber pilots must not need GPWS, TCAS and ergonomic design. Because you always do your checks. Not a chance of someone making a mistake and therefore the above systems are an expensive and unneccessary cost then?

And before you get on your high horse, there have been civilian CFIT events in recent times (fatal), having read the report, down to a whole host of human factor related issues. I suppose these guys went to work thinking they would be "foolish" or "reckless"? Rather than drag their memories through the dirt (as you have above in your purile post), I can sit back and understand why the mistakes happened, and hopefully learn, so I do not repeat them.

[Seldomfitforpurpose]

Vin,

I suspect rejection may well be at the heart of his ire with all things military :(

[Farm-for-sale]

Although 'civi-baiting' is rumoured to be entered at the Olympics for 2012, and I like the dedicated practice that many of us get on this Forum, I was hoping to see if anyone knew of any 'repercussions' within the MoD, BAe or Qinetiq from the in flight explosion of one of HM's aircraft, the tragic death of 14 personnel, the grounding of an asset during 2 wars and the subsequent damning report from an independent tribunal? Anyone?

[Brian Abraham]

Love your confidence in your ability Cirrus.

How to land a 747 gear up - nearly.

Pelican's Perch #80: Gear-Up Landing In A 747? (http://www.avweb.com/news/pelican/188536-1.html)

[cornish-stormrider]

Much as I hate to stick my hand up on this one - Cirrus has raised a point. I do think, however, there is a great difference between flying like a knob to " scare the **** out of a taxi drvier" as Cirrus puts it & a genuine ommision of an item that has become routine e.g. a u/c check on finals.

What is needed is common sense, something lacking in the world of late. I have fessed up to my sins on this very forum, so have others. Hopefully someone might learn from them and not do the same screw up. However, they do differ from a wilfully dangerous, slack and unprofessional attitude.

I have known pilots who were still under the influence when they flew - they would not drive 6 hours later. I have known engineers turn up for work drunk......

I would not work with either and have reported the engineer....

If you are soooo perfect to have never made a mistake then I hope your run of "perfection" continues. Good luck with that.

If you are like the rest of us humans, flawed but doing their best then you would want an open and honest reporting system that does not pin gross negligence on two pilots who had a large and messy crash but that does not belive anything is wrong when an aircraft explodes after a fuel leak ..........

Oh, sorry, wrong topic. Anyway we are human, we make mistakes, we need to learn from them and improve, the carrot approach gets better results than the stick etc.

Most of all we need to be as professional as we can be - there is a time and a place for "chuck it around a bit for the troops". Just keep it to a sensible level and listen to the crew.

Communication, an open and honest system and being able to take advice from your juniors all help in this matter.

Finally Cirrus - if you think the septics are sooo damn good now. remember the Bud Holland saga.......??
Maybe that is why they are so hot on chain of command?

Fly safe, land even safer.

[CirrusF]

I find it interesting and revealing to read that there are certain (presumably) RAF and service pilots here that seek to excuse such appalling flying standards, and have such blasé attitudes to basic procedures such as checklists.

If the RAF were an airline, and had had two wheels up landings in around two years, plus a few pax killed through crassly irresponsible flying (all recorded on the CVR), then any civil aviation authority in the western world would have by now abscinded their AOC, and the pilots concerned would have lost their jobs, almost certainly have had their licences annulled, and even if not, would be completely unemployable elsewhere in the industry. As an example - read the report into the Kegworth accident - despite their being numerous mitigating circumstances, the pilots were deemed at fault and had their licences annulled. I believe one may have won his back on appeal, but found it impossible to get rehired.

The same fate awaits most civilian pilots who make a substantial mistake - you will be immediately fired by your employer, you will be lucky to keep your licence (or even get an insurance payout if you have broken a regulation, eg on alcohol, or otherwise deliberately breached the company ops manual), and you will almost certainly not get rehired elsewhere. That knowledge really focuses your attention. Vin Rouge himself pointed out several examples in his rather aggressive post - eg the North West pilots who had their licences revoked just for overshooting a runway.

I don't understand how the Puma pilot in question was ever awarded his wings - surely his basic training should have picked up his evident lack of temperament? I have to question the culture in the services that allows such temperamentally unsuited people to captain aircraft.

I am not a QSP (though did UAS), but have served in the military in UKSF. We had enormous pride in our "badge", and if anybody let down those standards, even in a minor or accidental way, then they were immediately and ruthlessly RTU'd. That was how standards were maintained. Nobody objected - on the contrary it engendered spirit and cohesion in the regiment. I am baffled really why you seem to want to excuse pilots for landing wheels up - I'd have though you wouldn't want your badge tarnished by such ineptitude?

I may now "only" be a civvie pilot (not a C152 - I fly a CJ3, both single-pilot and multi-crew). I am well aware (having jumped out of and spent many hours in the back of service aircraft) that the standards of flying training in the services are exceptionally high - which is why it is all the more baffling to me why the services have such a bad safety record due to (for want of a better word) mong flying.

Finally Cirrus - if you think the septics are sooo damn good now. remember the Bud Holland saga.......??
Maybe that is why they are so hot on chain of command?

Indeed, you raise an interesting point which I toyed with mentioning in an earlier post. There was a period until about 10-15 years ago when the US had a poor record - remember also the USMC Treviso incident? There were a few other incidences of totally inept flying too around that time. They appear to have really cleaned up their act over the last decade or so, and as the USMC Miramar incident shows, they really hold to account the chain of command now.

I wonder whether the proposed Military Airworthiness Authority shouldn't also have a remit to maintain flying standards, and thus have the power to rescind the "wings" of military flyers, or sanction establishments, who grossly let down standards, just like the CAA can do in the civilian world?

[CirrusF]

Cirrus,

The Hawk did not have two pilots on board. One was an engineer.

Thus even more difficult to understand the RAF letting off the pilot so lightly. I have the following in writing from the RAF:

"Hawk XX320 (RAF Cranwell) - Although the pilot selected the switch to lower the undercarriage, during flight test procedures undercarriage control had inadvertently transferred to the rear cockpit. The wheels were not lowered and this situation was not noticed until too late."

Paraphrasing -

"Hawk XX320 (RAF Cranwell) - The pilot transferred undercarriage command authority to a non-pilot for a test procedure, then forgot to resume command authority once the test was completed (What test? Was it an authorised test?). On a visual approach, in daylight, to a non-hostile low-traffic airfield, with a non-limitative runway, the pilot lowered the undercarriage switch, but forgot to check that the indicator lights illuminated red (to show that the undercarriage was lowering but not locked) and then green (to show that the undercarriage was down and locked). The pilot also failed to notice the usual increase in noise level, vibration, drag and pitch trim associated with lowering the undercarriage switch. The pilot then failed to carry out pre-landing checks which would have included a check for a complete set of green indicator lights to show that the undercarriage was down and locked. The pilot thus destroyed a £3m aircraft, paid for by the taxpayer, representing an amount which could have paid for an entire year of BBMF operations. Nevertheless, the pilot was allowed to return to flying duties shortly afterwards, thereby setting an inspiring example to all serving and future RAF pilots, and the rest of the world, that flying like a c0ck, at the UK taxpayer's expense, is an acceptable standard for the RAF"

[PumpCockMixMags]

CirrusF
Mistakes happen because we are human as are you my friend. I know many QSPs some of which have well in excess of 11000hrs and all would happily fess up to making mistakes because of the healthy policy of open reporting. Working under the premise that a little information can be dangerous, I think you are making some incredibly ill advised comments based on reported facts. You are also aware that some of the family and friends of those lost in the incidents to which you so bluntly refer, read many of the threads on prune so regardless of your rediculous views, due regard should be given to their feelings.

Tone it down please

[Two's in]

Forgetting to put the gear down is not a "mistake" - it is a negligent disregard of the most basic of checklists.

Great quote, and I suspect it fits well with any other "all crabs are knobs" type generalizations, but sadly, it's utter bollocks. The US DoD have done plenty of research into this phenomenon and here's the gist of it - try to keep up;

1. The accident or incident will be preceded by other key inputs. These fall into 4 categories ordered by their proximity to the event;

a. Unsafe Acts.
b. Pre-conditions.
c. Supervision.
d. Organizational Influences.

2. Taking the wheels up landing scenario, the most likely inputs are;

a. Unsafe Acts (What happened?)

Basically 2 categories - Errors or Violations. Guess what? Checklist errors (gear up landings) have their own special place under Skill based errors.

b. Pre-conditions.(Why did they do it?)

Pre-conditions include Environmental, Personal factors, and the condition of the individuals. Under the condition of the individuals lies Cognitive Factors. Within Cognitive Factors are Channelized Attention ("fixation" on a trivial or non-pertinent task), Cognitive Task Oversaturation (too much information to process effectively) Distractions and Interference/Interruptions.

The Everglades Tristar crash was due to Channelized Attention (3 crew watching the failed green U/C lamp while the plane flew into the ground)

c. Supervision.

These can be Inadequate Supervision, Failure to correct known problems, Planned Inappropriate Operations and Violations. Whether they apply to operations, discipline or Leadership, they all have an effect on overall supervision.

d. Organizational Influences.

These include Resources, the Organizational Climate and the Organizational Process. This is about how the individuals involved in the accident perceive they are treated, equipped and managed.

The study found that in all cases the causes could be traced back to a series of:
a. Unsafe Acts.
b. Pre-conditions.
c. Supervision.
d. Organizational Influences.

These were in fact the “holes in the cheese”. You were more likely to end up with an unsafe act if your Organizational set-up was flawed in any way, and on down the chain. The bottom line is that to call this ‘negligent disregard” is indeed a rich irony, as it is in itself a negligent disregard of the causal factors in why Channelized Attention and Cognitive Task Oversaturation occur, and ultimately lead, and continue to lead, to these accidents.

Many forget that for the Military pilot the aircraft is simply the delivery means of the capability, be it C4ISR, Air Defence, CAS, Maritime Patrol etc. Operating the aircraft competently is simply a subset of one of many complex mission tasks required of the crew or pilot. It is hardly surprising that from time to time task prioritization and cognitive failures occur. The reason civilian airline pilots have a lower failure rate in these areas is almost certainly a function of the fact that flying the aircraft from A to B successfully is the single task they are required to do, without the distraction of having to complete a series of critical mission tasks while they are airborne, so any comparisons are largely meaningless.

[rmac]

On the gear up landings issue, many a time when flying in the US in a higher workload situation, night instrument landing in IMC, having made my final call, I have been happy to hear the controller reply "cleared to land check three greens.."

That led to the habit of giving myself an additional "short final check" of important items like gear (and in my aircraft yaw damper, engagement of which can make a crosswind landing near limits quite an interesting affair).

Always reminded me how easy it might be to screw up when things are a little busy...

I think there is a major difference between "mong flying" , i.e. Scaring the sh1t out of taxi drivers and simple but important mistakes like landing gear up.

For example, how many airline pilots have tried to take off without flaps in a rushed departure, in the old days it led to a written off aircraft and dead bodies, now the software refuses thrust and calls out "flaps you idiot !" or something similar but less destructive to the ego.

[cornish-stormrider]

interesting points from both sides. Cirrus, do you accept there is a bit of middle ground between perfect (that which we strive for) and, as you so eloquently put it, flying like a mong?

I think in the real world there is, the maitakes that occur here should be openly reported and acted upon like grown-ups. not sack the guilty B'stard.

I agree with hang them for flying like a mong. If you are showing off for the troops and having a bunt or whatever then at least make sure it is within the capabilites of yourself, crew and airframe. Otherwise it will get expensive.

On another thread (airshow cock-ups) there is a fine tale of a slow pass in an SR71 that came quite close to being expensive. Within capabilities, honest cock-up, a browntrousers close call or flying like a mong??

To sit back and read the report the call anyone flying like a mong, especially if they are not here to defend themselves is poor form.

For the record, the Puma crash. The evidence speaks for itself, a tragic end that many others have come close to but gotten away with it.

You all fly much dangerous and pointy things along with machines that only fly through bloodymindedness (rotary). I put my trust, money and occasionally in the past my life into your hands. I expect your best efforts. nothing more and nothing less.

I expect you to weed out poor atitudes to safety and those who wilfully break rules that should not be broken.

I also expect you to bend the odd rule, prang a jet (for various reasons) and sadly I know some of you will not come home. I know you will move heaven and earth for those in need and am proud to say that on occasion I have helped in my own small way.

One final thing - I don't think the civvy world is as pure as Cirrus makes out. There is a lot we don't get to see or hear from there as well. You'se all ain't cowboys, Arrogant ******s yes - but then it comes with the territory

(Mod's please note, the Arrogant ******s comment is a well used term of admiration for the stinking growbag wearing master race and as such should not be moderated too badly.)

[Torque Tonight]

The Catterick Puma is a complete red herring in Cirrus' argument. This crash was not so much a human factors issue as a deliberate f--- up which would be treated harshly under both civil and miltary regimes. Even if the pilots survuved with their medical categories intact (rather than one dead and one paraplegic) I do not believe for one moment that they would have returned to flying. They would have been chopped, court martialled, discharged or a combination of all three.

You may think that calling "three greens" on a Bulldog shows that a pilot is instinctively thinking every time about the landing gear. Not so. It shows that the pilot is paying lip service to checklists, doing things by rote without concious thought and saying things without checking them. In other words an easily done human factors issue or cognitive failure. In fact pretty much exactly the same process that could lead to not putting the gear down in an aircraft that does have a retractible gear.

Trying to make direct comparisons between military flying and airline flying is comparing apples and oranges.