Experience of Emergencies

[turbocharged]

I am preparing a presentation for a conference to be held in the UK at the end of April. My task is to examine the interface between airline SEP training and Emergency Response Planning. In short, I want to explore that gap between the aircraft coming to rest and the First Responders turning up.

I would be very interested to hear from anyone who has had personal experience of an adverse event that required fire and rescue services to attend the aircraft. It may have required an evacuation, but not necessarily.

Please PM me if you have some experiences you feel will benefit my study.

Many thanks in advance, and thanks to the Moderators for permission to post.

[turbocharged]

Many thanks to those that have PM'd me.

The management of a large crowd of confused, dazed and probably injured people around an aircraft while the AFRS is en route is clearly an issue. I am wondering if anyone has had to use their company SOPs 'in anger', so to speak, and found that the real world isn't like the annual training?

Here is a question. Given that the turn over of cabin crew can be quite (very) high in some companies - aggravated by the use of seasonal hires - does our current approach to SEP training deliver the necessary level of expertise?

Cheers

TC

[HamishMcBush]

I've never been involved in an aircraft emergency and I hope that I never am, but........

All the training in the world is useless if the trained personnel just "go to pieces" in the event of being caught up in a real emergency. How can you assess CC etc to determine if they will keep their heads in an emergency and not only follow the training and procedural matters to the book, but also be able to assess what is going on and adjust what is done to suit the specific conditions of a real-life emergency?

[joeflyguy]

I have been in a couple.

One was a "crash" but as no one died and there was not a hull loss it was determined to be an "incident". Have also ahd a couple of confirmed bomb threats on board and made expeditious landings and deplaning of pax, followed by a search of the aircraft. None of these are very much fun and certainly get you thinking about your own mortality and what you hold dear in life.

The truth is it is very hard to determine how any individual will be in any given circumstance if they have not been "tested" before. The fight or flight is a basic human response and is primal. It is what has kept us alive as a species. Many do not do well and I would be the last to judge anyone.

As for the ground response, at times they are good and others are found woefully wanting.

I am not comfortable going into great detail here but please feel free to contact me should you wish to discus thurther.

Joe

[turbocharged]

HMcB,

Effective drills and realistic training help ensure that crews will do the right thing but, at the end of the day, we need to remember that the crew on the aircraft are 'survivors' just like the passengers and are going to be just as shocked etc.

My question is really about exploring the effectiveness of the integration between airline plans and airport/first responder plans in the event of an emergency.

TC

[Hartington]

I used to be a fire warden at my place of employment. Only ever had one genuine incident (someone burned some toast and set the smoke detector off!). Two things used to amaze me when we had practice runs:

1) Most people would evacuate pretty quickly. They might collect a coat and/or mobile but the delay was minimal (yes, they shouldn't but I took the view that given the funnel effect of emergency exits and stairs an odd second here and there was not an issue in a practice). However, there was always someone who had to extracted, usually because they were incapable of terminating a phone call. On one occasion I took the phone from the hand, said "we have a fire alarm, he'll call you back" hung up and chased the offender out.

2) More relevant to your question was what happened outside. The idea was that you went to an assembly point, found your warden and "reported". Then, when the warden had accounted for everyone, he would report to the head warden. The idea was that we would then have an idea if anyone was stuck inside for the emergency services to rescue. This was where it really went wrong. People would continue meetings, get on the phone, sneak off for a smoke, go to their car and take an early lunch and the warden was left to search them out. Now, bear in mind these are people who've had a briefing about what to do (admitedly some time previously, not usually in the preceeding couple of hours as on a plane) and most of them had been through a practice at least once.

On a plane, the "what to do after you're out" instruction is usually a simple "and move away from the plane". No idea of how far (personally I'd get as far away as possible!), no idea of what to do once you are "away". (Would it do any good to say something in the briefing, probably not).

Ideally I reckon you send a couple of CC out first to organise people but, of course, in these days where there are often fewer CC than doors and the responsibility is to evecuate the plane that's not possible. One is therefore left with having to wait until the CC evacuate by which time the AFRS is likely to be pretty close and I can't help feeling that at that point responsibility should immediately pass to the AFRS. But then I'm not CC just lowly SLF.

[turbocharged]

Hartington,

thanks for the observations. I'll look at building evacuations as a parallel.

Cheers,

TC

[Lancman]

My wife’s experience may be atypical but it bears on the OP’s question and is worth retelling. She and my daughter were on board a B 707 from Beirut to London when their attention was caught by the sound of gunshots from the flight deck and the fact that the Captain was backing the aircraft away from the steps by using reverse thrust.
My wife glanced back through the curtains into the economy section as they started to taxi normally, if a little quickly, to see that everybody including the cabin crew had disappeared. She opened an overwing hatch and she and my daughter climbed with the rest of the first class passengers out onto the wing and dropped to the ground. Ground support was immediate in the form of militiamen opening fire on the aircraft as it taxied away. One passenger who was among the first out was killed when jetblast threw him against a wall. The aircraft took off with the doors and hatches open and the slides down but returned a couple of hours later, when the hi-jacker (a security guard) was escorted away by friends from his militia.

Lessons:

1.You can’t trust even a security guard.

2.When people find themselves in an unfamiliar or frightening situation they will willingly pass responsibility for their safety to anybody who appears to be in control, but they can look after themselves remarkably well if forced to.

My daughter wrote a splendid essay on “What I did on my holidays” when she went back to school and later went on to become an Air Stewardess.

[turbocharged]

One thing that seems to be emerging from responses is that emergency-related SOPs do not always seem sensible when rehearsed during recurrent SEP but there is no way to challenge them.

here also seems to be a view that the flight deck will initiate and the cabin blindly execute even though the cabin crew are having to work in conditions of huge uncertainty. There doesn't seem to be much exploration of the proper role of cabin crew in dealing with emergency situations and the skills they might need.

Finally, cuts in training might be degrading the capability to deal with emergencies.

Any thoughts?

[Shazz-zaam]

Turbocharged,
Their has to be a chain of command, PIC orders evacuation. Believe me tech crew also have everyones best interest in mind.
Imagine what would happen if cabin crew initiated an evacuation before tech crew had shut down engines.
Good chance of a number of people being ingested into the fan blades. Human flesh and RB 211 blades spinning at several thousand RPM can only end up being nasty. RB 211 winning every time.
Tech crew have communications with the tower and a good overall idea of the situation and exactly how critical the situation is.
Evacuation may not be necessary.
Cabin crew that panic at a critical moment could possibly cost lives. Hence all the training and simulations. Human nature being what it is, some will panic. It's only when we are put to the test that we find out exactly what we are made of. With good training we can attempt to eliminate or at least neutralise the fear of the unknown.
Cabin crew can initiate an evacuation, but that is only after all attempts to contact the flight deck has failed (scenario is that they are dead) and it is imperative that everyone needs to get out fast.
Remember,the aircraft does not have to be in a situation as dramatic as you see in the movies.(all smashed up on the runway.) Evacuations can occur even once you have reached the terminal.

[turbocharged]

Thanks for your comments Shazz-zam.

We know that cabin crew have, in fact, initiated evacuations without reference to the tech crew and so it is important that this process works. And your point about evacuations on stand is well made. A 747 had exactly that at Sydney, believe, and it was very badly handled. Ironically, the crew had just rehearsed the exact scenario in recurrent SEP

I'm not just looking at the evacuation but also the interim period while the AFRS etc are deploying.

So, given that training doesn't always work (if we think about the Sydney event), I suppose my question is really 'what does constitute effective training to cope with an evacuation and its immediate aftermath'.

[Piltdown Man]

Once you have kicked the punters off, they are not your responsibility. You have no (legal) power and no (legal) authority so my suggestion is do nothing other than hand over the PIL to the the relevant authorities. Getting involved without knowledge of local RFF procedures and/or the ability to communicate with them has the potential of making things considerably worse. So I'd stick the liquid contents of the bar carts in your trolley bags and zip off to the hotel.

PM

[Checkboard]

This was where it really went wrong. People would continue meetings, get on the phone, sneak off for a smoke, go to their car and take an early lunch and the warden was left to search them out. ...
On a plane, the "what to do after you're out" instruction is usually a simple "and move away from the plane". No idea of how far (personally I'd get as far away as possible!), no idea of what to do once you are "away". (Would it do any good to say something in the briefing, probably not).

This is typical of evacuations. The cabin crew follow their procedures on board the aircraft pretty well. It's once the passengers are off that things become "muddled".

Now, it would be great, if all of the passengers marched in step to a safe location, formed up in ranks, and sat down so that they can be counted - in reality that's never going to happen. :hmm: The comment above was about a practice - but in a "real" event, some will want to walk about to "sticky beak" the fire, several will now want to film the event on phones and cameras (perhaps to sell to the news/post on their f@cebook page etc :rolleyes:) Many will want to call friends and family, or run about looking for same.

If the event occurs on an airport, they will also be unprepared. A recent evac. at my company, no transport was found, passengers spread out - some walked to the terminal. The terminal staff refused to let them in the doors (most of their documents were, of course, left on the aircraft) as without documents they were trained to keep the terminal sterile.

When some passengers finally got into the terminal, some of those local to the area were so fed up they went home! The airport had no plans to provide a room to gather the people together.

Fire staff wouldn't allow anyone back to the aircraft after it was safe in order to collect their baggage. Eventually the crew organised a bus back to the aircraft which they filled with the carry on baggage, to return to the terminal etc etc.

Does any of this matter? No. :p It is all a hassle, but it is all "safe" once the people are off the aircraft! It would be nice if it were done better, but it is such a rare event, and involves so many different agencies that I doubt it will ever get any better! :cool:

[Howard Hughes]

Speaking of emergencies, these pictures always amazed me. Some passengers standing on the wing without life jackets but with their hand luggage, does anybody else see anything wrong with that?

In the second picture the people furthest out on the wing have their hand luggage, those closer in (who perhaps took more time to assess the situation) are nearly all wearing life jackets, or was this at the behest of the crew?

http://newsimg.bbc.co.uk/media/images/45381000/jpg/_45381159_006729121-1.jpg

http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/learmount/assets_c/2009/01/us-airways-a320-crash-lands-in-the-hudson-river-thumb-460x304.jpg

Perhaps the passengers are the major variable when responding to an emergency situation.

[1barnaby]

Am I the only one thinking that we're being used here? Great to benefit from experience, but to build a career on information kindly donated free by others is close to plagarism...

[apaddyinuk]

I personally would assume without doubt that the passengers are the major variable!

But we must remember the majority of passengers would have absolutely no situational awareness even at the best of times!

[firstchoice7e7]

I can recommend a good book called 'on a wing and a prayer' by malcolm macpherson, its got witness statements made to the NTSB from survivors (both cabin crew, flight crew and passengers) involved in emergencies. Its quite shocking but a very interesting read.

[turbocharged]

Dear 1barnaby,

I've done extensive research using the public domain accident and incident reports but rarely is the evacuation and post-evacuation phase covered in any detail, if at all. So how else am I to fill in the gaps?

I was invited to give the presentation which prompted my request to pprune. I sought the permission of the moderators before posting. I'm not getting paid and will probably be covering my own expenses to attend. I have no plans to set up in business as an 'evacuation consultant' on the basis of this project.

TC

[Checkboard]

Don't worry about it, turbocharged. Everyone is "paid" for their contributions on PPRuNe by being allowed to read others' contributions. That's why there is no "charge" for PPRuNe access - the "charge" is the contributions everyone gives, in turn. :ok:

Some people haven't quite understood that, yet. ;)

[Hansard]

As flight crew rather than cabin crew, I've experienced aircraft evacuation on stand (fire on start up) and away from the terminal. The evacuation on stand was far more difficult to manage. It seemed that the dispatchers/ground handlers hadn't been trained to consider/deal with that scenario (should they be?) and because we were on stand, there was more opportunity/temptation for the pax to wander off around a dangerous area. Away from the terminal, the pax remained in a group, treated the situation more seriously and the emergency services/airport authorities dealt with them on arrival.

[turbocharged]

Hansard,

many thanks for your contribution. Part of what i want to explore is that maybe we haven't really established a full set of contingencies and, therefore an adequate set of training requirements.

From and ERP perspective, we train AFRS personnel but, as in your example, we haven't thought about other agencies that will be in the vicinity.

Rgds,

TC

[Hansard]

TC

In the on stand evacuation example I quoted, a further complicating factor was that we had no cabin crew, the pilots fulfilled that function. In my opinion, the incident also served to highlight deficiencies in flight crew training in these circumstances. We were lucky that we could evacuate via the pax door but if the opposite engine had been involved, we would have been using the emergency exits (windows).

It's interesting to observe how the military do it. They seem to regard departure from/arrival on stand as a critical phase of flight and it's obvious that the ground crew have a safety role in addition to marshalling, receiving/escorting non-military personnel, etc.

[SLF3b]

I work in the oil and gas industry, and was in an emergency evacuation down the aircraft slides. Knowing what 200 te of kerosene could do, I ran until I dropped, as did several others. When we got our breath back, and started to chat, it turned out we were ALL from the oil and gas industry: some drillers from Shell, a few engineers from BP, and a mate and I. Incidentally, I realised afterwards (as we have been taught) we had run upwind.

All the others (including the CC) were milling around the bottom of the slides, some taking pictures on their mobiles of granny coming down and others on the phone to mum.

The evacuation was flawless, but once it was complete the crew did nothing to encourage the passengers to move away from the plane. I suggest they should have done. Just because there isn't a fireball doesn't mean there won't be one.

[bunkrest]

I find Hanson's point in regard to critical phases of flight in the military very pertinent.

I was cabin crew for a national carrier and had a very 'near squeak' operating a 747 service around 5 years ago. We were around 10 minutes into boarding when a very curt call from the flight deck requested that boarding stop immediately. A second call for the F/O to report to the flight deck followed a few seconds later. The third and final 'alert call' ( the formal declaration of an emergency) came about a minute later.

I was at door 1R, opposite the boarding door and was well aware that this was either a bomb, fire, or serious fume event and that the likelihood would be a controlled evacuation using the airbridge, (although if the situation escalated a full evacuation was on the cards.)

While waiting for the next command I checked for outside hazzards and saw a number of baggage trucks and ground crew wandering around directly in line with where my slide would deploy.

The space needed for the slide was very difficult to judge and I knew that if I miscalculated I could risk injuring/killing people. If, as in the military, ground crews were aware that this was a critical phase then baggage trucks and personnel would have been kept clear of the slide paths.

As it transpired we didn't evacuate. A baggage truck had caught fire on the left side of the A/C but the fire services had dealt quickly with it.

As far as my training went I think it fully prepared me for the day. Apart from the initital 'oh bugger - hope my number not up' my mind snapped straight into procedure. I was quite alarmed with some of the comments here regarding crew ambling around the bottom of slides once an evacuation is completed. I can assure you that I and my adrenal gland was very well aware of what 700 hundred tons of jet A1 can do!

I think it might be more to do with the calibre of cabin crew than training alone. However with the move towards bargain basement wages I believe that those who do have the aptitude are far more likely to move towards the better paid, and more respected fields, of police/paramedic/military etc.

[dollydaydream]

Just curious as to why your slide would be armed during boarding?

[jetset lady]

dollydaydream,

It wouldn't. I assume Bunkrest would have armed the door if a full on emergency evacuation was called for.


Jsl

[dollydaydream]

Thank you for stating the obvious jsl, I have now removed my pedantic head!

[girtbar]

Have a quick read of the following articles;

TWA Flight 843 (http://www.twaflight843.com) (long standing experienced crew)



Ryanair cabin crew struggles to open doors on burning plane - Times Online (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article464556.ece) (new inadequately trained crew)

The first article have a read about, it contains detailed descriptions of how the passengers reacted and how the crew had to deal with some challenging situations both inside and outside the cabin.

Personally i don't think there is enough training on the actual evacuation process its self.

Yes we all know the processes of an evacuation, but there is very little time spent on using real life examples such as the above, which show in great detail the challenges that actually happen.

Manuals are literally black and white, crew are left fairly much to their own devices to colour the rest in should they need it.

[bunkrest]

As jet set lady said my door was still in manual because we'd only just had the alert call.


Looking at the botched ryanair evac it does seem that their training falls very far short. Not being aware that a door may be far heavier in an evac should be adressed in SEP day 1! Its interesting to note that ryanair pilot sops's don't ask them to add on further information (if they have it) when ordering an evac ie: fire/smoke on left hand side etc - which they would with us. This may have made some difference to this incident although with inexperienced, badly trained crew perhaps not.

I also think in some airlines there is a real rigidity to training and the crew are not encouraged to make decisions themselves. In my incident the sops stated that I should be at my alert station awaiting the NITS or Evac command, but I was also taking the time to clear the area and check outside which, although sensible, was not written down in black and white.

I've heard that some crew have to memorise the emergency announcement (I'd like to see ayone try to recite that from memory in a smoking cabin with 150 screaming pax) and CM's/CSD's etc not being encouraged to to make notes on nits briefings.
It was always underlined to us that an incident would never play out as it did in training and to make use of anything to help. But then all this was underpinned by lots of sim work, videos/discussions about past incidents etc.

I feel that with the way the market is going airlines will increasingly do the very minimum training to make an operation legal. This allied with a high turnover of crew, less able candidates etc etc will just make the situation worse.