AA Crash Jamaica

[spinning]

From Fox News Website

An American Airlines plane skidded off the runway and broke in two after landing in Kingston, Jamaica, shortly after 10 p.m. local time Tuesday, according to local news reports. There were no immediate reports of casualties.

Details were not immediately available, but passengers at Norman Manley International Airport told local media that flight 331 had just arrived from Miami in heavy rain when the crash occurred.

The flight apparently originated in Washington, D.C.

An airport official said the plane overshot the runway and persons are being evacuated, with some sent to hospital.

"The plane crashed and broke almost in front of me," said passenger Naomi Palmer to the Jamaica Observer. Palmer said she was in pain.

Emergency vehicles sirens could be heard as she spoke via cell phone.

Although Fox are reporting that the flight originated in Washington,it appears to have been via Miami.

Hope everyone walked away.

[timmcat]

Associated Press

AP) – 6 minutes ago

MIAMI — An American Airlines spokesman says a flight from Miami has overshot the runway in Kingston, Jamaica, but came to a safe stop. He says there are no reports of injuries or fatalities.

Charley Wilson says all passengers are off Flight 331. It took off from Miami International Airport Tuesday evening. He says it was almost a full flight. He says normally a flight carries 140 passengers plus the crew.

He says more information was not available.

FAA spokeswoman Laura Brown says the plane was a Boeing 737.

Heavy rain reported at the time. METAR currently MKJP 230500Z 35002KT 33000 +RA BKN014 BKN090 20/18 Q1013

[silverelise]

On the BBC here:

BBC News - American Airlines plane 'overshoots runway' in Jamaica (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/8427628.stm)

An American Airlines plane has overshot the runway at an airport in the Jamaican capital Kingston, reports say.

Initial reports suggested Flight AA 331 from Miami had broken apart after landing at Norman Manley International Airport in heavy rain.

Jamaican information Minister Daryl Vaz said at least 40 people were injured but there were no reported fatalities.

A journalist from the Jamaica Observer told the BBC the plane came to rest on a roadway.

He said survivors thought the plane was landing normally before there was a series of jolts and luggage fell from overhead lockers.

Kingston police officer O'Neil Hinds told AP some people had been taken to hospital.

[ArcticTurn]

It appears that current info is unreliable as some reports here say the plane didn't break up and there were no injuries. Will have to wait and see. Nothing much more to offer from the west side of the pond.

[p51guy]

Googled a few minutes ago and reports were 40 injuries and plane damaged but did not break up. The pilots originated in MIA and were not involved in the storms earlier this week.

[DocSullivan]

AMERICAN AIRLINES STATEMENT REGARDING FLIGHT 331 Release #1 @ 11:58 (p.m.) U.S. Central Time

PRNewswire
FORT WORTH, Texas

FORT WORTH, Texas, Dec. 22 /PRNewswire/ -- On Tuesday, December 22, 2009, American Airlines Flight 331, a Boeing 737-800 aircraft, overran the runway on landing at Kingston, Jamaica's Norman Manley International Airport. The flight originated out of Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, operated into Miami International Airport, and then operated into Kingston's Norman Manley International Airport.

Preliminary reports indicate there are no serious injuries. The aircraft was carrying 148 passengers and a crew of six.

American Airlines is in direct contact with officials from the National Transportation Safety Board and the Federal Aviation Administration and is cooperating fully with appropriate authorities. American Airlines will not speculate as to possible causes of the incident. At this point, no additional details can be confirmed.

SOURCE: American Airlines (http://aa.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=2812)

[akerosid]

Acft reported to be N977AA:

Photos: Boeing 737-823 Aircraft Pictures | Airliners.net (http://www.airliners.net/photo/1012516/M/)

Reported by NBC that one engine came off and gear collapsed.

Jetliner misses runway in Jamaica - Americas- msnbc.com (http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34566869/ns/world_news-americas/)

Unconfirmed reports on A.net suggest plane came to rest on a beach.

[cactusbusdrvr]

Doesn't sound like they missed the runway, more like they found it a little too enthusiastically.

It will be interesting to see what the flightcrew had for a duty day before they flew to Jamaica. A nasty approach after a long day is very condusive to errors happening. Little Rock cmes to mind. We shall have to wait and see.

[Whiskey Bravo]

@akerosid: I think the story reported that they 'lost' an engine, and the gear collapsed, which could mean that they lost power on the engine, not necessarily that it departed the airframe.

[Flight Safety]

"One engine came off and the gear collapsed" sounds like a reference to impact damage and the condition of the airframe when it stopped.

[SP2H]

Bit of a grainy photo on the BBC web site but definately a broken aircraft

[silverelise]

Picture on the beeb website shows the rear section of the fusilege "snapped" relative to the rest of it.

http://newsimg.bbc.co.uk/media/images/46982000/jpg/_46982354_jamaica_plane.jpg

[SP2H]

Associated Press are now quoting airport and airline officials. Injuries and a broken aircraft

[N1 Vibes]

Notice that there is no runway behind the a/c, and 'behind' here refers to the rear of the a/c, not the rear of the photo. So it's current position seems rather odd. How much has it slewed/spun I wonder?

[GOLDEN LION]

American Airlines rep on CNN here in the US stated aircraft ran off the end of the runway, through the perimeter fence and ended up on or near a road at the end of the runway. Right engine departed the wing and left gear ripped off.......

Unsure of casualty numbers but no life threatening injuries reported.

[spinnvill]

... has a rather non-hysterical interview with a passenger claiming that there was turbulence where the flight attendants had to stop serving drinks 3 times, before finally giving up althogether.

Just before landing the flight crew warned against even more turbulence.

Sounds like they were in for some nasty weather for sure...

[SaturnV]

Flight apparently originated in Washington DC

Several passenger comments here:

washingtonpost.com (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/23/AR2009122300146.html?hpid=topnews)

[Super VC-10]

Would the experts like to cast their eyes over the METAR in the Wikipedia article and make any corrections if necessary please?

American Airlines Flight 331 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Airlines_Flight_331)

[Darkrampage]

Good to see somebody fixed it up from 33,000 feet of visibility to 3000m. But seriously 2 knots of wind?

[CptRegionalJet]

What`s the RWY-length at KIN?

[RaInZ]

hey guys...... Here are the two metars closest to the time of touchdown.......

MKJP 230228Z 31009KT 5000 TSRA BKN014 FEW016CB SCT030 BKN100 22/19 Q1013
MKJP 230200Z 30012KT 5000 SHRA BKN014 SCT030 BKN100 22/20 Q1013 RERA

Obviously winds where ideal for a RWY30 approach. My guess is they used RWY12 to use the ILS @ KIN.

I have personally seen this same aircraft land on my home airport's ILS with a 6kt tailwind and similar conditions. our runway is 8,595'.

Glad everybody survived..... kudos to the AA flight crew ,Ops and ARFF crews @ Manley....

Regards

RaInZ

[BigHitDH]

We can assume they landed on runway 12 - there is no beach off the other end, just a 7-8m drop into the bay.

Runway length is 8786ft.

[Telstar]

I have personally seen this same aircraft land on my home airport's ILS
with a 6kt tailwind and similar conditions. our runway is 8,595'.6 kts tailwind should be no factor on this aircraft type on this length runway. My company has approval for 15kts tailwind landings on quite a number of tricky airports where there are no instrument approaches or terrain considerations to the opposite runways. It's no problem even in wet conditions. Let's not get sidetracked by single engine light aircraft mentality by people who have never flown jet aircraft!

[RaInZ]

Telstar i agree with you and nobody is getting sidetracked........... it was a simple point i made to show that they used 12 surely because of the ILS... or you think it was for another reason?

regards

RaInZ

[Spooky 2]

The B737-800 has been in service with AA for several if not more years now. Nothing new about the AA operating this airplane.

[White Knight]

Broken left wing, broken back - you can see the video on BBC...

Whoops.....

[BreezyDC]

The choice of words of the AA spokesman, as cited in the WSJ, certainly minimizes the violence of the crash (hopefully without fatality):

"Fort Worth-based American spokesman Tim Smith said Wednesday that 'both engines were removed or taken off the wing as it happened,' as designed to do for safety reasons." :rolleyes:

[PantLoad]

Well, anytime you're landing on a wet runway with a tailwind, you're asking for trouble.

Not so bad:
1. Light weight and,
2. Long runway and,
3. Touchdown at proper speed and,
4. Touchdown at proper point on runway and,
5. Immediate and full braking efforts and,
6. Runway not contaminated.

Very bad:
1. One or more of the above not satisfied.....




Fly safe,

PantLoad

[Brit50483]

The NOAA site states RVR as 3000

SACA31 KWBC 230300 RRA
MTRKJP
METAR MKJP 230300Z 32008KT 3000 +SHRA BKN014 FEW016CB SCT030 BKN100
21/20 Q1014 RETSRA

[reverserunlocked]

Passengers injured as American Airlines plane misses runway in Jamaica - Times Online (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article6965913.ece)

Better pic on the Times website. Port wingtip snapped off, fuselage rutured aft of the wing and the detached starboard engine visible in the background. A mess. There are some injured pax but no lives lost. 5th hull loss of a 737 NG.

[captjns]

Well... not need to speculate here. DFDR... DCVR... and OFDM (aka Big Brother) will supply the information.

[BigHitDH]

That's a good photo. Confirms the aircraft's location as being on the grass verge between the Norman Manly highway and the beach (lets hope they don't find a car under there). This makes is approx 80m past the numbers.

Also looks like the aircraft has completed a 180 - presumably before coming off the 2-3m drop at the end of the runway, judging by the fact the tail is still co-located with the rest of the fuselage.

Starting to look like a lucky escape indeed.

[sjc123]

I live and fly privately in Kingston. Norman Manley International is built pretty much on reclaimed land across Kingston Harbour just south of the city. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Norman_Manley_International_Airport (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Norman_Manley_International_Airport)
There is a link on this page to the Google Earth map of the airport.
The day of the crash was extremely wet in Jamaica with widespread flooding. As seen from the METAR report flight AA331 landed with a tailwind on a wet runway. Aquaplaning and a tailwind landing were possible contributory causes of the run off. The passengers and crew were very lucky that the airplane stopped where it did as 5m more and they would have been in the sea. Interested to see from the news footage that the door slides did not seem to deploy.

[fescalised portion]

AP video of damage to be seen here...Jamaica plane crash: American Airlines flight AA331 to Miami overshoots runway (photo, video) (http://www.examiner.com/x-29916-Davidson-County-Headlines-Examiner~y2009m12d23-Jamaica-plane-crash-American-Airlines-flight-AA331-to-Miami-overshoots-runway-photo-video)

[Telstar]

Well, anytime you're landing on a wet runway with a tailwind, you're asking for trouble.

Sigh.

No it ain't bubba. That's what we have performance charts and tables for. I've landed with 15kts tailwind on snow and the -800 is a good performer. That kind of mentality is light aircraft mentality. Fuel in the bowser, runway behind you, only taking off into wind and full power takeoffs don't apply to Performance A aircraft. They land and takeoff with tailwinds, depart from intersections and don't fill up the tanks on every flight.

[captjns]

Well, anytime you're landing on a wet runway with a tailwind, you're asking for trouble.

And that folks is the opinion of a simulator/microsoft pilot.

A pilot (be them a simulator/microsoft operator or newbie) is asking for trouble if they continue into conditions beyond their capabilities. That's why crews have the option to hold outside the airport area until conditions improve, provided their egos don't get in the way.

[Shore Guy]

I like the sophisticated EMASS system they had in place....some rocks in the ground.

[protectthehornet]

I don't think that one should rule out tailwinds as part of the equation. I am surprised that anyone would comment about jet vs. light plane mentality... If the plane landed in accordance with known conditions and approved methods/wind speed that is ok...but if the pilots received faulty information as to the exact speed and direction of the wind, this could be an area of concern.

I would hope someone would post the gradient of the runway in question as well (slope).

I would hope P51 guy can look up the max tail wind component that American uses and verify the runway used.

The plane did break in half according to new pictures. Aft of the wing.

Lucky there was NO fire.

I wonder where the initial touchdown was along the runway? One report says the landing was very hard followed by a ''bounce'', according to passengers.

There are many factors in any landing to consider. Speed, correct selection of speed vs weight. Flap setting (hope someone can see it in the pictures), use of spoilers, thrust reverser use, auto brakes or manual brakes.

If the landing was ''firm'' that might be considered a good thing...but one must ask who was flying and their experience on the plane.

Please recall the midway/southwest over run...18 seconds elapsed between touchdown and deployment of thrust reversers. There was a kiss of a tailwaind there too.

[Telstar]

I will NEVER do a intersection TO.....
does that make me a light plane hysterical pilot?
WHY TAKE THE RISK?


I do all the time, sometimes from an intersection WITH a tailwind, gasp! So let me get this straight, if the intersection departure was say 2800m in AMS but in London the runway was only 2600 full length you would not depart? What's the difference. If you calculate your V1 on a balanced field length are you trying to tell me you'd still try and stop anyway because you had runway remaining? If you have past V1 you are going regardless of runway remaining, the runway remaining is in fact useless.

Back to the thread.

[captjns]

Please recall the midway/southwest over run...18 seconds elapsed between touchdown and deployment of thrust reversers. There was a kiss of a tailwaind there too.

Deployment of thrust reversers would be a bigger factor than the light tailwind component.

I wonder where the initial touchdown was along the runway? One report says the landing was very hard followed by a ''bounce'', according to passengers.

There are many factors in any landing to consider. Speed, correct selection of speed vs weight. Flap setting (hope someone can see it in the pictures), use of spoilers, thrust reverser use, auto brakes or manual brakes.

If the landing was ''firm'' that might be considered a good thing...but one must ask who was flying and their experience on the plane.

The OFDM and FDR will tell the story.

[Flight Safety]

I don't think the aircraft did a 180, as it's beyond the Norman Manley highway, and the nose is 3m from the water. Landing in heavy rain, in turbulence, downwind, with a possible bounce on the runway...

Obviously something went wrong with the stopping bit.

[Telstar]

Please recall the midway/southwest over run...18 seconds elapsed between touchdown and deployment of thrust reversers. There was a kiss of a tailwaind there too.

Wouldn't you say that has more to do with incorrect landing technique rather then the wind conditions?

[Avman]

FLIGHT SAFETY, what makes you think "possible bounce"? In actual fact, according to one of the interviewed pax, it was a smooth landing. If that is indeed the case (we'll all find out in due time) it could well be a contributing factor on a soaking wet runway!

[WhatsaLizad?]

Here we go again.

Like any other recent accident, this thread is well on it's way to 45 pages, of which only 5 might have coherent, valid, sensible and valuable information that commercial/military flight crews and ops personnel might find useful and educational. Most of the time this information is buried by the questions and comments from the uneducated and an impediment to the sharing of it to crews worldwide.

My humble suggestion is when an unfortunate incident or accident occurs, the MODS create two seperate threads. One would be for aircrews, engineers, dispatchers, cabin crews or any other ops or manufacturer types, the second could be for others that are basically just interested in aviation, and may have questions about basic aircraft, airport or procedures. Questions read on one thread could be asked on another thread.

My intention is not to denigrate or insult those who have an interest in aviation, I am also helpful and heartily welcome those here on Pprune that are interested in aviation. IMHO, I think the current format hinders the sharing of information.

Would it work? I have no idea.

Thank you all for your interest in aviation

[jonathon68]

Yes, indeed, here we go again.

If this is yet another FAA ops over-run, then one could easily point fingers about the very slow incorporation of Boeing advice on "landing on a slippery runway", some 2 years and 3 months ago. The FAA have yet to mandate the calculation of actual landing performance for operations, and many operators have been sitting in limbo.

[Zenj]

Latest NOTAM from Norman Manley Intl

RUNWAY 30 THRESHOLD DISPLACED. RUNWAY 30 NEW DECLARED DISTANCES: TORA
2440M ASDA 2440M TODA 3660M LDA 2440M RUNWAY 12 NEW DECLARED
DISTANCES: TORRA 2440M ASDA 2440M TODA 2440M LDA 2440M THE DISPLACED
THRESHOLD WILL BE MARKED BY LIGHTS. 23 DEC 09:00 2009 UNTIL 31 DEC
11:00 2009 ESTIMATED. CREATED: 23 DEC 10:46 2009
Effective Dec 23, 2009 09:00Z

[1sloth]

FYI:

KIN: Offset ILS DME (LLZ 120°, RWY 117°) 3° GS, DA 278, RWY Elev 8

Runway 12 Elevations - Landing end, 8. ARP (mid-runway) 10, far end 17.

SALS NOTAMed U/S last night

Not long before this event:

WX heavy rain in discrete showers,

Wind calm below 1000 feet,

Runway 12 wet, BA good.

REILs not operating

PAPI operating

HIRL operating

[Machaca]

http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n385/motidog/AA-KIN.jpg

[Machaca]

http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n385/motidog/AA-KIN0.jpg


http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n385/motidog/AA-KIN00.jpg


http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n385/motidog/AA-KIN01.jpg


http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n385/motidog/AA-KIN04.jpg


http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n385/motidog/AA-KIN02.jpg


http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n385/motidog/AA-KIN03.jpg

[Machaca]

http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n385/motidog/AA-KIN05.jpg


http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n385/motidog/AA-KIN08.jpg


http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n385/motidog/AA-KIN06.jpg


http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n385/motidog/AA-KIN09.jpg


http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n385/motidog/AA-KIN10.jpg


http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n385/motidog/AA-KIN07.jpg

[Captain Bob]

Looking at the photo in post 49, its looks like the Capt had his HUD deployed. This is a great aid in low visibility operations such as landing in a heavy downpour. Our carrier only has them on the Capt's side, can someone say whether AA has them fitted on the Co-pilots side as well?

Unhooked,

No HUD on FO's side.

Bob

[captplaystation]

Well, the first photo that appeared earlier today didn't look TOO bad, but now I see these I have to say, lucky lucky escape.
That must have been very close to a fatal accident with that level of disruption to the structure I would imagine.

[reverserunlocked]

Aye it looks a lot worse in the cold light of day. I thought they'd lunched the engines and gear but essentially the thing was intact. Odd that this was survivable for the FD crew but the Turkish crash in AMS wasn't, especially when you look at the deformation of the nose.

[wingview]

With the last pics in mind it looks like the Turkish in AMS. Differend crash ofcourse, but the flight crew and the people near the cracks are lucky survivors!

Edit: Reverseunlocked was ahead of me (phone phone phone).

[FPP]

As for operations, I think that you would find that 10kts tailwind limit is pretty standard for airliners operating in the U.S. -- of course further reduced by charted performance limitations. Also, weather classified as heavy rain is avoided for takeoffs and landings.

I heard an opinion from guys who have flown into KIN often, that the controllers range from good to bad, and tend to issue the weather that they believe you need in order to operate.

The runway isn't grooved, and will puddle in heavier rain. Also, I heard that the touchdown zones have a lot of residual tire rubber.

The fracturing of the fuselage looks like, from the photos, to have happened with crossing the rocky embankment.

When the "real" accident investigation reports come in, we should be able to change the focus of the pprune discussion away from the rampant speculation, including my own.

[captplaystation]

The difference was the type of impact, overrun with horizontal deceleration resulting in the @rse being torn out of the ship as it passed some rocky ground (although it looked like there had also been a drop off the end of the R/W ) versus crashing with a high vertical descent rate (magnified for the cockpit probably, as it was pivoted into the ground)
In fact it reminded me of the one that went rallycrossing off the side in a crosswind a year or so ago, except this time the terrain was even less friendly.
For the avoidance of doubt, 4x4 capability does not figure in 737 highlight features.

[suninmyeyes]

For the PPLS who wondered why someone might land with a tailwind at Kingston.

The only instrument approaches approaches at KIN are for runway 12 because the wind is usually easterly. An ILS was put in a couple of years ago on RWY 12. This ILS is offset requiring an adjustment by about 400 feet to align with the runway.

If you wanted to land on RWY 30 and it was raining heavy it is unlikely you would be able to see to descend visually below the MSA which is about 9000' due to the mountains to the North.

Therefore to land on R/W 30 you would have to fly down the R/W 12 ILS to the circling minima of approximately 1000 feet. In heavy rain you may well not be visual. You would have to either goaround at that minima or fly a visual circuit and maintain visual contact with the runway. A visual circuit at 1000 feet in heavy rain in an airliner at night is not something a professional pilot would choose. Therefore it is far more preferable to choose the ILS with an acceptable tailwind.

It is not appropriate to compare this accident with the Turkish 737 at AMS. The only similarity is they were both 737 accidents. It is probably more akin to the Air France accident at Toronto, ie an overrun in heavy rain. The important aspects in the investigation will be to establish

1) Was the last part of the approach stable.
2) How far down the runway the point of touchdown occurred.
3) What the braking action was.
4) How quickly reverse thrust was engaged.
5) What autobrake or manual braking was used.

If the pilots land and stop safely, great. If they go off the end they are accused of pushing on regardless into adverse conditions, Littlerock etc.

Inappropriate criticisms from those who are not yet in full possession of the facts are unhelpful. The opposite is also true. I cannot understand why one poster wrote "Kudos to the pilots". Presumably because they missed a hospital or school?

[protectthehornet]

why don't we all just accept pprune for what it is...the good, the bad, and the ugly

I will even acknowledge myself as the ugly.

so...we also have to at least consider that the pilot flying screwed up...it happens...sorry to say.

think air france in toronto

think southwest in chicago/midway

think american in little rock.

ooopppssss

I hope they find that the brakes were screwed up...that the thrust reversers went inop on touchdown, or that the spoilers didn't deploy

but

oh well...a good go around is pretty darn important

[alouette3]

Experts from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Massachusetts_Institute_of_Technology) (MIT) created a study recording behavior of pilots landing at Dallas/Fort Worth Airport; the researchers check to see whether the pilots land in thunderstorms. Within a total of two thousand thunderstorm encounters, two out of three pilots landed in a thunderstorm. The study states that pilots exhibited more recklessness when they fell behind schedule, if they landed during the night, and if aircraft in front of them also landed in bad weather. Greg Feith (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greg_Feith), the lead NTSB investigator, said that he felt surprised that pilots exhibited this behavior. The MIT study illustrated the industry-wide trends that factored into the Flight 1420 crash. Feith added that the pilots may have exhibited "get there-itis" as the pilots knew that they were approaching their 14 hour duty limits.[3] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Airlines_Flight_1420#cite_note-Racing-2)

There are no new accidents. Only new people making the same mistakes again and again.
Alt3

[1sloth]

If you wanted to land on RWY 30 and it was raining heavy it is unlikely you would be able to see to descend visually below the MSA which is about 9000' due to the mountains to the North.

. . . unless you made the RNAV (GPS) Rwy 30 approach, which has a DA 0f 440 . . .

[radial090]

All the links in the chain were connected. Weather, tailwind, wet ungrooved runway, rubber deposits, offset ils approach with higher minima, no tdz lighting...End result a broken airplane!

Fly Safe

[Machaca]

Has anyone heard news of the FD crew's condition?
http://i337.photobucket.com/albums/n385/motidog/AA-KIN11.jpg

[ZQA297/30]

Due to mountains (nearly 8,000') close by, winds can be quite unpredictable at Manley, and even more so at Sangster. I have seen winds 180 degrees opposite directions at 15 kts, at each end of runway at Sangster.
At night, some wierd catabatic effects occur at both airports.
Anytime there is a northerly wind component at Manley, look out for turbulence.
I have seen a B-707 (BOAC) bounce 50' after being ambushed by shear at Manley.
I bet JM pilots could tell some tales.

[737forever]

A little off topic perhaps since most of you are disqussing the cause,but one thing strikes me.This seems to be another crash of a more modern 737 where the aircraft is not catching fire .Neither did the thurkish one in Amsterdam or the BM in Kegworth.There is also several other NG and Classic crashes where you don,t have a post crash fire.So my question to the many Pro,s on this forum is if fuel tank design have been much improved from the 60,s and 70,s?

[Airbubba]

As for operations, I think that you would find that 10kts tailwind limit is pretty standard for airliners operating in the U.S. -- of course further reduced by charted performance limitations.

Isn't standard tailwind limit for the 737 15 knots at most operators? I agree that it's 10 knots for most other planes.

[lomapaseo]

So my question to the many Pro,s on this forum is if fuel tank design have been much improved from the 60,s and 70,s?

The answer would have little bearing on this accident unless the specifics are known.

Fire is predicated on aircraft breakup (how the g-loads were distributed) as well as sources of ignition coupled with misting effects of any leaking fuel.


Rain and snow on the ground are your friend.

Eventually we'll get a report on the amount of fuel laying on the ground that the rescuers and passengers walked through.

[737flyer800]

No need for them, all the passengers had to do was step out. If they had been deployed they might have hindered evacuation.

[protectthehornet]

I read one published report in which a passenger said the plane was bouncing on the runway

can we at least consider porposing?

[N1 Vibes]

Just to correct my inaccurate suspicion in post #14, the runway is of course still behind the a/c. Just beyond the beach, the slope and the road....

And for those who keep saying the a/c broke "in half" - can you use the term broke up? The a/c is after all now in a number of pieces (2 airframe structural failures, wingtip broken off and engine departed the wing and apprently one main gear - or two?).

Brgd's

N1 Vibes

[slf4life]

Just heard an interview on local tv news. It was a frequent flyer into NMIA, and like many of us buffs, he had a window seat. He claims the aircraft appeared to cross the threshold higher than (his concept of) normal and did not appear to have contacted the runway until about 'half way down the runway length'. Also says he saw the far end threshold bars flash past his window and automatically went to brace position. He was unhurt.

Hearsay I know, and uninformed hearsay, but interesting hearing his account. Of course the fdr will tell the real story. I'm thankful for the outcome, could have been far worse. Looking at aerial footage that embankment was a godsend.

Regards

[misd-agin]

post 66 - suninmyeyes - KIN RNAV Rwy 30. Gets you to 390'(373'), vis 2.3 km required. If qualified there is an approach to Rwy 30.

post 75 - Machaca - that is allegedly a deadheading crewmember and not an operating crewmember.

iwalkedaway - Two reports - one said 4 hospitalized, including both pilots. Another report said 6 hospitalized, all crewmembers. Again, news reports so the second statement might mean 6 hospitalized which includes both pilots and not the F/A's.

The picture taken from the front left angle shows damage up to the post between the R1 and R2 windows. It appears that there might be a hole under the outboard edge of the Captain's glareshield, where the clock is, indicating the cockpit firewall might have been breached.

[protectthehornet]

Sounds like this:

Landed long...a bit fast...perhaps spoilers did not automatically deploy...though it appears thrust reversers are in reverse position.

Perhaps during rollout, breakdown in cockpit procedure to verify spoiler deployment.

So much like Air France in toronto.

a go around is almost always an option.

[Weapons_Hot]

Protectthehornet:

You might be able to suggest to all of us out here which airlines permit a go-around after touchdown and after reverse thrust is deployed; I know mine doesn't.

The posted pictures show that the reversers on both engines were deployed, but were they developing full reverse thrust? A wet runway, tailwind (and perhaps landing long) would suggest that the commander would indeed select full reverse thrust.

Unfortunately, after paxing/positioning around the planet on various airlines, I am noticing a worrying trend that on landing, most of these airlines' pilots select only idle reverse, and not select full reverse thrust (I do like the sound of full reverse being applied). This trend seems to be the norm, which leads to the problem when things go south, people tend, in the heat of battle, to revert to what they do normally, ergo idle reverse. I am not suggesting that the AA commander selected only idle reverse, but the trend is out there.

[goldfish85]

"a go around is almost always an option."

Not once you've deployed reverse thrust.


Dick Newman

[p51guy]

Go around is not recommended after using reverse thrust but can quickly be changed to go around thrust. I never left that option out if things were going to hell in a handbasket,
FUBAR. Who cares if it is legal or operationally correct for your operator. Do what ever it takes to survive.

[protectthehornet]

I said ALMOST always an option.

And I know you can't go around once tr's have been deployed...key word ALMOST always.

Any landing in difficult conditions should always be a max effort...max reverse, max braking effort

[p51guy]

I made 600 landings at Tegucigalpa, Honduras up in the mountains. It has a 70 ft cliff off the end of a 5400 ft runway. Taca killed a bunch of people about two years ago going off the end in an A310.

Lets say we are touching down, select reverse, and find we have no brakes on any system. Do we follow the manual and go off the cliff or stow the reversers and go around and land at San Pedro Sula? What would you do? Would you follow company procedure? I hope not.

[mingocr83]

@p51

small correction of your statement about the plane... it was an A320. Reg EI-TAF.

[goldfish85]

You are right, sir. I should have paid more attention to "almost."

Dick Newman

[malr]

this thread is well on it's way to 45 pages, of which only 5 might have coherent, valid, sensible and valuable informationWell said WhatsaLizad? :D It's impossible to just dive in to a thread, pick up the salient points / updates without wading through infantile nausea from (plane spotters and) people who clearly have no idea what they're talking about... Makes me wonder why I bother PPRuNing anymore http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/sowee.gifAgreed! I wish these people would just take their opinions and observations to some kind of a rumour network...oh, wait...

[411A]

Several possibilities...none of 'em especially good.

Tailwind landing,
Runway wet,
Possible TS in progress, or at the very least, very heavy rain,
Landing long, perhaps.

Combine them all into one scenario, a bad result usually guaranteed.

One would have thought...AA would have learned a very valuable lesson at Little Rock, some years ago.:rolleyes:

[vapilot2004]

Would I take a fighting chance clawing my way upward over the alternative: An earthbound downhill run? You bet, if I knew we could get airborne again and miss by at least a few inches, any obstacles.

Buckets open, boards up, brakes applied, consider two seconds or so to stow, another 1/4 second for the commanded TOGA to register, add in spool up, the few hundred milliseconds until wheels are freely spinning post-braking (relating to AA's situation here) , and we have ourselves a do or die horse race. How much surplus smooth concrete ahead do we have?

[Telstar]

p51guy Go around is not recommended after using reverse thrust but can quickly be changed to go around thrust. I never left that option out if things were going to hell in a handbasket,
FUBAR. Who cares if it is legal or operationally correct for your operator. Do what ever it takes to survive.

It worked so well for TAM in Brazil, tell me, how many people survived that one? Guys like you are so dangerous because you convince people that your own half baked ideas are based on fact when they are not. Boeing knows from flight testing it's not going to work, hence the big bold letters in the books: " Once TR have been deployed you are committed to a landing"

Unfortunately, after paxing/positioning around the planet on various airlines, I am noticing a worrying trend that on landing, most of these airlines' pilots select only idle reverse, and not select full reverse thrust (I do like the sound of full reverse being applied).

Good grief, this one again. All they do is make noise and use fuel and long runways. *When* they aren't needed they aren't used. We don't lick our finger and hold it to the wind, we use such things as performance charts to decide.

[Redbeard]

:rolleyes: so the captain / co-pilot.. just simply announced , just like at a normal gate.. crew disarm doors ? If so.. good crew management and :D but i wonder..

[PantLoad]

411A is correct. Gosh, you must be a Microsoft-trained pilot, too!
(I now feel in good company.....)

Question: Is the runway they landed on, the runway on which most landings are made at that airport? If so, when was the last time the rubber was cleaned off the runway?

Question: Was the runway they landed on just wet or contaminated?

Question: What was the condition of the other end of the runway....
rubber deposits....water depth?

Question: Was the tailwind component (the actual tailwind component) what was reported, or was it greater than reported?

Question: Was the wind gusting? That is to ask, was the touchdown speed higher than Vref?

Question: Did the runway have standard grooving? Non-standard grooving? When was that cleaned?

Question: Did the crew fly the aircraft perfectly? Did they land exactly on speed, exactly at the proper touchdown point?

Question: What was the condition of the tires? Where the treads worn? When was the last tire pressure check?

Question: Did the speed brake auto-deploy correctly? Or, did the crew make a 'greaser' landing on a 'floating' runway, and have to pull the speed brake themselves?

Question: Did the spool up time for the engines into thrust reverse occur promptly? Or, was there a second or two delay, as there sometimes is?

Question: Did the anti-skid system work properly?

Question: Did the aircraft weigh more than the load sheet stated? During Christmas, many times the overhead bins are so full of XXXX, the plane surely weighs at least 1000 lbs more.

Question: According to 'the charts', would the aircraft have enough runway to land considering: contaminated runway, rubber-coated runway ends, higher-than-reported aircraft weight, higher than Vref touchdown speed, etc., etc. (You get the idea.)

These are all questions on the ATP exam of the Microsoft Simulator disk....


Just retired, after 37 years of incident-free, accident-free, violation-free flying....hell, I never realized how incompetent I truly am....

(OK, I'm ready for more insults!!!!)


Fly safe,


PantLoad

[411A]

Once TR have been deployed you are committed to a landing"


AA found out first hand about this many years ago at STT...landed, boards up/reverse selected, then....boards down, reverse cancelled, go-around thrust, then...tried to stop once again.
Opps.
His a petrol station off the end of the runway and all consumed in a big ball of fire.
Poof.
Once on the deck, best to stay on the deck...and accept the possible overrun, unpleasant as that might become.

[Piripi]

P51. Next time you are holding short of a runway look how long it takes for the buckets to deploy, and then look how long they take to retract. Then spool up again, 4-7 seconds...now you are out of runway and REIL lights are getting bigger on your windshield.

[AMF]

PantLoad quote;
..... If so, when was the last time the rubber was cleaned off the runway?

Question: What was the condition of the other end of the runway....
rubber deposits....water depth?

Question: Was the tailwind component (the actual tailwind component) what was reported, or was it greater than reported?

Question: Was the wind gusting? That is to ask, was the touchdown speed higher than Vref?

Question: Did the runway have standard grooving? Non-standard grooving? When was that cleaned?

Question: Did the crew fly the aircraft perfectly? Did they land exactly on speed, exactly at the proper touchdown point?

Question: What was the condition of the tires? Where the treads worn? When was the last tire pressure check?

Question: Did the speed brake auto-deploy correctly? Or, did the crew make a 'greaser' landing on a 'floating' runway, and have to pull the speed brake themselves?

Question: Did the spool up time for the engines into thrust reverse occur promptly? Or, was there a second or two delay, as there sometimes is?

Question: Did the anti-skid system work properly?

Question: Did the aircraft weigh more than the load sheet stated? During Christmas, many times the overhead bins are so full of XXXX, the plane surely weighs at least 1000 lbs more.

Question: According to 'the charts', would the aircraft have enough runway to land considering: contaminated runway, rubber-coated runway ends, higher-than-reported aircraft weight, higher than Vref touchdown speed, etc., etc. (You get the idea.)

Just retired, after 37 years of incident-free, accident-free, violation-free flying....hell, I never realized how incompetent I truly am....

(OK, I'm ready for more insults!!!!)


Fly safe,

PantLoad

Thank you Pantload, those are all the appropriate, pertinent, and looming real-world questions that the Chart and Tables crowd I hope asks themselves and considers when they're poo-pooing landing with a tailwind on a wet runway where there's possible ponding and a more likely chance of hydroplaning even on airspeed due to higher groundspeed at touchdown. No strut compression, WOW, and/or wheel spin-up means no/or delayed spoiler deployment, therefore reduced braking effectiveness, not to mention antiskid probs. Those systems provide the crucial, immediate stopping power for the aircraft, not TRs.

Deriding those concerns by pretending they only apply to "light aircraft because big jet aircraft have charts" is a major sign of inexperience and/or disconnect from the real world where conditions exist that aren't conveniently found in the Performance Section.

[PantLoad]

Yes, and St. Thomas is a classic case to illustrate....

As a result, many times, AA now operates the 757 in there. That aircraft stops fairly well.

Also, they've extended the runway....that helps, too.

But, you're still landing, many times, downwind, downslope runway, sometimes wet, (sometimes more than wet), lots of rubber deposits.

It's a "Put in on...Get it Stopped" landing! If something ain't right, anything at all, GO AROUND! I don't care what the charts say, you're asking for trouble!!!!

I've done this runway under the above conditions in a 737...which doesn't
stop worth XXXX. (Yes, that's my opinion...but, I flew the damn thing for over 17 years with over 12,000 command hours. I certainly am entitled to an opinion.) And, I've done it in the Bus. A little better at stopping...but,
I'd still rather have my old faithful 727. (Never flew the 757, but I'm told that thing will stop even better than the 727.)

The charts are based on assumptions....just like any piece of engineering.
In the real world, we don't have those exact assumptions. So, we have to season our data with our experience.

I say again, "If your landing with a tailwind on a wet runway, you're asking for trouble."

Southwest went by the charts in Midway.....

I'd rather have a skipper who knows what the plane will do and not do. If he's more conservative than the charts, we go by him. If the charts are more conservative than him, we go by the charts.

This comes from my extensive training with Microsoft Simulator.


Fly safe,

PantLoad

[AMF]

PantLoad
The charts are based on assumptions....just like any piece of engineering.
In the real world, we don't have those exact assumptions. So, we have to season our data with our experience.

I say again, "If your landing with a tailwind on a wet runway, you're asking for trouble."

Listen you, I just flip past the Contaminated Runway section of the AFM and refer to the well-known "Reverted Rubber Hydroplaning, Water Ponding on an Uncrowned Runway Landing Distance Chart" and apply the exact tailwind component. No worries for us big jet drivers! :suspect:

[bluemic]

Attempting a go-around after T/R deployment? Definitely a heart-in-mouth desperation move methinks.

Aaah...but if you can manage to get away with it...?

Here's one that tried – and sadly - failed:

11 February 1978; Pacific Western Airlines Flight 314, a Boeing 737-200; Cranbrook Airport, Canada: The aircraft crashed after thrust reversers did not fully stow following a rejected landing that was executed in order to avoid a snowplow. The crash killed four of the crewmembers and 38 of the 44 passengers.

FWIW...

[akerosid]

Some interesting photos of the wreckage from the "Miami Herald":

American Airlines flight AA331 crash landed in Jamaica - Miami Herald (http://www.miamiherald.com/924/gallery/1396208.html)

[BusyB]

akeroskid,
Good link for photo's. Was that the skipper pushing someone off in a wheelchair in pic 26?:confused:

[westcoastflyer]

whatever happened will be found out,but after looking at the pictures of the plane I can only but congratulate Mr Boeing for building planes that can take all that beating without blowing up:D:D

[Finn47]

Neighborhood rumours say the captain suffered a broken arm and a concussion, for what it´s worth:

Juno Beach pilot on Jamaica flight |West Palm Beach News, South Florida Breaking News, Forecast, Video from WPTV (http://www.wptv.com/content/news/northpbc/junobeach/story/brian-cole-american-airlines-jamaica-runway-crash/uU-o48o9nUmUq19CEjdN7Q.cspx)

[GBV]

It worked so well for TAM in Brazil, tell me, how many people survived that one? Guys like you are so dangerous because you convince people that your own half baked ideas are based on fact when they are not. Boeing knows from flight testing it's not going to work, hence the big bold letters in the books: " Once TR have been deployed you are committed to a landing"



That TAM crash was not about trying to go-around after having the TR deployed. You should read the Accident Report before saying such thing.

[lomapaseo]

One would have thought...AA would have learned a very valuable lesson at Little Rock, some years ago

:=

Too early to blame this on poor training by citing the operator and lessons learned.

[robertbartsch]

How many hull losses has AA suffered in the last 10 years?

Thx.

[BigHitDH]

2 not including this one (if you discount sep 11)

[MPH]

One MD11 in St Maarten landed, deployed, stowed and T/O again. Mind you with not much RWY left and ontop of it, having to make a sharp turn to the right on the the G/A. That squeezed a few buttocks!!!:oh:

[Flight Safety]

Forgive me, but I don't really undertand why some of these overrun accidents keep happening.

It seems to me that if you're going to land and you KNOW ahead of time that your stopping margins are going to be NARROW (due to tailwind, short-contaminated-sloping-wet runway, etc), then you KNOW the landing and stopping has to proceed correctly. Since TR deployment is the commitment point, what is so hard about making sure that events prior to TR deployment have happened correctly?

It seems to me you will KNOW if you touched down long or not, or if you bounced the airplane or not (and thus have to brake late). Once down you can quickly know if the spoilers deployed or not, and if the brakes are slowing the aircraft or not. If these things don't happen correctly, then go around because you KNOW the stopping margins are NARROW. Since a NARROW stopping margin landing is an "alert and focused crew" landing, you will quickly know that touchdown, spoilers and brakes happened correctly, then you can deploy the thrust reversers.

This seems very straight forward to me, or am I missing something? Why not treat TR deployment on landing, something like V1 is treated on takeoff?

[IGh]

Problem stated in slot #105:"... I don't really undertand why some of these overrun accidents keep happening...."
Excerpts from

“Pressing the Approach”
A NASA study of 19 recent accidents yields a new perspective on pilot error.
By Benjamin A. Bermin and R. Key Dismukes,
Aviation Safety World December 2006 | Flight Safety Foundation (http://www.flightsafety.org/aerosafety-world-magazine/past-issues/aviation-safety-world-december-2006)

Pressing the Approach (http://www.flightsafety.org/asw/dec06/asw_dec06_p28-33.pdf) 6 pages. [PDF 297K]

_Aviation Safety World_, December 2006, pgs 28-33

Some interesting concepts here, subtly implicated in “unstable” approaches, eg: -- Plan Continuation Bias,
-- late cognitive demands may overwhelm the human’s capabilities, and then inhibit his decision for go-around;

-- mixed messages from the airline (merely suggesting guidelines rather than imposing standards).
The cognitive-limitations described in this FSF paper (from Bermin and Dismukes) suggest the earliest activation of Honeywell’s hosted RAAS [Rwy Awareness Advisory System] and SAM [Stabilized Approach Monitor].

[A special thanks to FSF’s K. Ehrlich, Production Coordinator, Flight Safety Foundation, for her sending the un-locked pdf file. That protection-free file made these excerpts easily available for you to read below.]

= = = \/ = = = EXCERPTS = = = \/ = = = =

“... two of the most common themes in the 19 accidents studied: *** plan continuation bias — a deep-rooted tendency of individuals to continue their original plan of action even when changing circumstances require a new plan — and

*** snowballing workload — workload that builds on itself and increases at an accelerating rate....
“... the problems encountered by the crews seem to have centered on these two themes....

“Too often, pressing an approach ... is attributed to complacency or an intentional deviation from standards .... To understand why experienced pilots sometimes continue ill-advised approaches, we must examine the insidious nature of plan continuation bias. Plan continuation bias appears to underlie what pilots call “press-on-itis,” which a Flight Safety Foundation task force found to be involved in 42 percent of accidents and incidents they reviewed.Similarly, this bias was apparent in at least nine of the 19 accidents in our study. Our analysis suggests that this bias results from the interaction of three major components: -- social/organizational influences,
-- the inherent characteristics and limitations of human cognition, and
-- incomplete or ambiguous information....
“... Our study suggests that ... -- when standard operating procedures are phrased not as requirements ... that may appear to tacitly approve of bending the rules,
-- pilots may ... place too much importance on schedule and cost when making safety/ schedule/ cost tradeoffs.
“Also, pilots may not fully understand ... that the cognitive demands ... from an unstabilized approach severely impair their ability to assess ... the approach ...”

“...Although plan continuation bias is powerful, it can be countered once acknowledged. One countermeasure is to analyze situations more explicitly than is common among crews. This would include explicitly stating the nature of the threat, the observable indications of the threat and the initial plan for dealing with the threat. Crews then should explicitly ask, “What if our assumptions are wrong? How will we know? Will we know in time?” These questions are the basis for forming realistic backup plans and implementing them in time, but they must be asked before snowballing workload limits the pilots’ ability to think ahead.

“ Airlines should periodically review normal and non-normal procedures and checklists for design features that invite errors....

“... Operators should carefully examine whether they are unintentionally giving pilots mixed messages about competing goals such as stabilized approaches versus on-time performance and fuel costs. For example, if a company is serious about compliance with stabilized approach criteria, it should publish, train and check those criteria as hard-and-fast rules rather than as guidelines....”

= = = = /\ = = = END excerpts = = = /\ = = =

[captplaystation]

Or, to put #106 in a form dummies like me can understand
"if it doesn't feel right it probably isn't. . . do something about it " :ooh:

[Huck]

what is so hard about making sure that events prior to TR deployment have happened correctly?


Wow. That there is quite a step out. On a pro pilot board at that.

[Flight Safety]

I hope this isn't thread drift, as I think this discussion may be relevant to this accident and others.

Here's a link from a retired NYFD fire chief, on the subject of training for life and death decisions.

Life and Death Decision-Making (http://vincentdunn.com/dunn/newsletters/may/FDNYHP_13.html)

Pilots are also confronted with life and death decisions, however pilots are generally required to decide and act within seconds, unlike most first responder life and death decisions. However I wonder if much airline pilot training focuses on this aspect of emergency procedures training. It's the emotional impact of being confronted with a sudden life and death decision, that must be responded to correctly within seconds, that may need special attention in training. My general understanding is that when someone is immediately confronted with a life and death situation that requires an immediate response, the reaction is usually one of fear and strong emotion rather than reason, the fight or flight reaction. I think training could help overcome the expected strong viceral reactions, if the training treated the problem for what it really is, a life and death decision. The simulator seems like a good place to do this.

[lomapaseo]

I think training could help overcome the expected strong viceral reactions, if the training treated the problem for what it really is, a life and death decision. The simulator seems like a good place to do this.

any of us are faced with life and death decisions, and some are even required within seconds. For those required within seconds you are better off reacting by rote (turn the steering wheel or hit the brakes).

The idea around training is to reinforce planning that does not get you boxed in to life and death decisions within seconds.

So we have the investigating challenge, is this equipment failure, knowlege based misteps, skill based misteps or failure to follow procedures that got them into the seconds preceding the overrun?

[Flight Safety]

lomapaseo, you're right that good planning avoids most life and death decisions, but not all of them. It's the later I'm referring to.

[Finn47]

How many hull losses has AA suffered in the last 10 years?Four hull losses between 1999 - 2009, if you leave out 9/11

Aviation Safety Network > ASN Aviation Safety Database > ASN Aviation Safety Database results (http://aviation-safety.net/database/dblist.php?sorteer=datekey_desc&kind=%&cat=%&page=1&field=Operatorkey&var=6516)

[misd-agin]

I'd take any of the news reports with a grain of salt. The official reports will be the ultimate fact providers.

With that said, the latest news said 92 taken to hospital for treatment, 13 admitted(USA Today, 12/24/09).

The allegation that the pilot pushing the wheelchair is NOT the operating Captain is supported by the statement that the operating Captain suffered a broken arm. If true, why would the guy with the broken arm be pushing a wheelchair, especially when other able bodied people are available?

Take the longevity numbers provided by the West Palm Beach News with a grain of salt.

[kappa]

Don't think this view has been posted here yet. (http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/ABPub/2009/12/23/2010582574.jpg)

[protectthehornet]

you simply cannot regulate and train for every conceivable situation. sometimes a pilot just ACTS and sometimes it works out for the best and sometimes it doesn't.

What you can do is train and discuss and hope for understanding. IF a pilot doesn't landin the first third of a runway, then you should go around...but if going around would cause a midair collision then stay on the ground.

What needs to be done is simply this. Acknowledge that there will be overruns...put 1000' of EMAS over run material on all runways. IF this plane had hit EMAS...it would be flying again by now...think about that.


I am all for more training, better training...more frequent training. In fact I think three times as much time in the sim/classroom and at least 3 times as much money should be spent. I also think a good amount of flying in a REAL PLANE loaded with sandbags should be part of the equation.

Why not? MONEY...that's the answer for all crashes...MONEY.

[misd-agin]

kappa - You can see the drop behind them. If the perimeter fence is 6' the 90 degree drop to the roadway is about 12-15', followed by an 45-60 degree, 10' incline on the other side.

Ouch.

[WhatsaLizad?]

The allegation that the pilot pushing the wheelchair is NOT the operating Captain is supported by the statement that the operating Captain suffered a broken arm. If true, why would the guy with the broken arm be pushing a wheelchair, especially when other able bodied people are available?

Take the longevity numbers provided by the West Palm Beach News with a grain of salt.

The news probably screwed it up when someone said he's been flying for 30 years, not all with AA.

The 20 year number is probably accurate. Regarding the broken arm; could be small fracture with the pain covered by pure shock. Totally understandable in a breakup as severe as that. Never had a sim session that covered something that bad, and how to handle the aftermath after evacuation.

[bearfoil]

Continental, Denver. Schiphol, Turkish. Colgan, Buffalo. Now AA. Functioning a/c get into the weeds, and that doesn't happen.

"The Hatch blew, dammit, she just blew......" Virgil 'Gus' Grissom. (rip).

bear

[goldfish85]

Flight Safety: It seems to me that if you're going to land and you KNOW ahead of time that your stopping margins are going to be NARROW (due to tailwind, short-contaminated-sloping-wet runway, etc), then you KNOW the landing and stopping has to proceed correctly. Since TR deployment is the commitment point, what is so hard about making sure that events prior to TR deployment have happened correctly?

It seems to me you will KNOW if you touched down long or not, or if you bounced the airplane or not (and thus have to brake late). Once down you can quickly know if the spoilers deployed or not, and if the brakes are slowing the aircraft or not. If these things don't happen correctly, then go around because you KNOW the stopping margins are NARROW. Since a NARROW stopping margin landing is an "alert and focused crew" landing, you will quickly know that touchdown, spoilers and brakes happened correctly, then you can deploy the thrust reversers.

This seems very straight forward to me, or am I missing something? Why not treat TR deployment on landing, something like V1 is treated on takeoff?

While jumpseating during my former employment, Isaw a technique for slippery runways. Land with the autobrakes set to medium. If you don't feel the deceleration at touchdown apply thrust and go somewhere else. Only apply reverse thrust after confirming that the brakes are working. During aircraft certification, there is no performance credit for R/T giving the pilots some margin. However in operations, some operations eat up this credit leaving no margin.

Dick Newman

[strawpile]

Thinking about the go-around decision after touch-down, it occurred to me that in 13 years in the airline industry, I have never once had training in a go-around after touchdown. Go-arounds are indeed trained, but it is always a go-around at DH. Maybe it is time to include go-arounds after touch-down in the annual recurrent training syllabus.

[protectthehornet]

Bounce recovery.

Let's say the copilot landed...and it didn't go well and the captain started to takeover control and didn't go around as bounce recovery...but things happened too far down the runway.

and he didn't check for spoiler deployment...after all things are a bit hairy after an unexpected change of control...and he tried to salvage the landing....

I had to salvage a bounced landing in a 737 once ...but I had a long runway, dry day vfr condtions. IF i had to recovery a bounced landing at night, rain, short runway...I might have just ''cobbed it'' and flown around again.

we trained for a go around off the deck...after all in a CAT II manual approach/landing it is possible to touch after a go around decision.

[misd-agin]

Let's say...

no, let's say....

no, let's say....

:ugh:

[waves-dubai]

I wonder why the pf did not initiate a go-around after 500ft?..
According to pax, the aircraft touched down halfway on the runway..

I saw this article where they have are looking at the approach lights at the airport..

AMR Jet Had to Use Jamaica Runway Lacking Some Approach Lights - Bloomberg.com (http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601209&sid=a_jfsOadTo0E)

[RobertS975]

Miami Herald photo gallery... some interesting photos.

American Airlines flight AA331 crash landed in Jamaica - Miami Herald (http://www.miamiherald.com/924/gallery/1396208.html)

Edited to state that I am sorry for the duplication as this link has already been posted!

[GlueBall]

Flight Safety ". . .a life and death decision. The simulator seems like a good place to do this.

Keep in mind that any simulator lacks true airplane fidelity, especially on the ground, . . . with emphasis on true aquaplanning, airplane inertia, split screen visual acuity, lack of side views, noises, heavy rain on windscreen, windshield wipers' smears, etc . . . .

As previously mentioned: Simulator training has more to do in avoidance, rather than in extricating yourself from the snafu of landing too far down the length of a wet pavement. Because if in the simulator you were to touch halfway down the pavement, you would fail your sim check. :{

[lomapaseo]

protectthehornet

Why not? MONEY...that's the answer for all crashes...MONEY

and you like so many others are WRONG WRONG WRONG

It ain't money. It's time and assurances that you are not going to just move the problem someplace else.

It sound easy to say money solves everything, but when you are told to submit a budget to fix it, you spend most of your time trying to figure out what's broke and then how to fix it.

In this accident we don't even know why it happened yet.

[protectthehornet]

listen...if pilots didn't have to fill out paperwork for every go around...

if they didn't feel a silent pressure about MONEY and the cost of every minute of fuel maybe there wouldn't be a reluctance about going around...

it is money pal and if you don't know it now...you never will

[Zeffy]

According to pax, the aircraft touched down halfway on the runway..


Where did that report appear?

[misd-agin]

listen...if pilots didn't have to fill out paperwork for every go around...

if they didn't feel a silent pressure about MONEY and the cost of every minute of fuel maybe there wouldn't be a reluctance about going around...

it is money pal and if you don't know it now...you never will
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Paperwork required for go-around? None.

:ugh:

[misd-agin]

lomapaseo - In this accident we don't even know why it happened yet.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Post of the year, forever.

No facts on where the plane touched down.
No facts on the speed at touchdown.
No facts on any aircraft problems.
No facts on any environmental problems(standing water, hydroplanning, etc).
No facts on....

[VFD]

listen...if pilots didn't have to fill out paperwork for every go around...

I noticed the captain pushing the wheelchair had a pen in every pocket


vfd

[400drvr]

Inappropriate criticisms from those who are not yet in full possession of the facts are unhelpful. The opposite is also true. I cannot understand why one poster wrote "Kudos to the pilots". Presumably because they missed a hospital or school?


Yep, lets wait and see what the facts have to say. Glad no one was killed.

[Huck]

Anyone figured out what happened to the left wing? It looks almost like an overloading fracture.....

Oh, and I'm pretty sure the captain made the landing. Adverse conditions and all that.

[WhatsaLizad?]

Paperwork required for go-around? None.

:ugh:

misd-agin,

At a certain airline mentioned in this thread, yes, it's a required report for a go-around.

Look in required reports.


Sad thing our clueless bunch of Chiefs tossed in the mix not long ago

[Airbubba]

listen...if pilots didn't have to fill out paperwork for every go around...

Most major U.S. carriers, including American, have a 'no-fault' go around policy. No paperwork, no second guessing. Does yours not have this? You are actually in trouble if you don't go around if the approach is unstable and the company finds out.

I realize many third world carriers still give you a visit to the chief pilot's office if you go around, been there done that in years past.

_____________________________________________

Wait, does American have a 'no-fault' go around policy and still require a written report? I thought the lack of a report for a missed approach was part of the 'no-fault' safety culture philosophy.

[West Coast]

According to pax, the aircraft touched down halfway on the runway..


I have a hard time believing someone with no forward vsby at night can discern when they are half way down the runway. Assumes the pax knew the runway length. I've had comments from pax about long landings when I put it down at the 1000 ft mark. Many non pilot friends assume we land as close to the threshold as possible, believing any runway they see that we haven't landed equates to a long landing.

[protectthehornet]

paperwork is required on a go around below 1000' agl.
at least at my major airline, which starts with a vowell...I will defer to an american pilot who truly knows.

touchdown zone lights would help...but there are other clues/cues to use...someone might want to post runway lights from the AIM.

[Finn47]

The aircraft was probably lucky still to have enough energy to cross the road at the end of the runway and not fall down there, see the video here:

American investigating after plane crash lands in Jamaica | kens5.com | News (http://www.kens5.com/news/AA-sends-team-from-DFW-to-scene-of-Jamaica-crash-landing-80079962.html)

[RWEDAREYET]

On duty for 12 hours, bad weather, possible short night or just not a good nights rest....could have been a lot worse. Glad no-one was killed.

Merry Christmas to all safe flying!!

[Dream Land]

With the odd chance that an over-run does occur, why do we allow airport designers build such a perimeter at the end of the runway, if the ground would have been level beyond the runway surface, how many injuries could have been avoided.

Paper work
Any captain that is so intimidated by doing the right thing in lieu of filling out a bit of paperwork or visit to the cp's office shouldn't be in the left seat, just my 2 cents.

[411A]

Sad thing our clueless bunch of Chiefs tossed in the mix.
One wonders...would this be part of the problem that sent the MD80 (of the same airline) off the end at Little Rock...a chief was directly involved with that flight.....flying.:rolleyes:

[Telstar]

A report for a go around is required where I work too. It's to do with statistical analysis and trend monitoring, not to critique a decision or second guess anyone. It's a no blame policy for going around, pushing on and busting stabilized approach criteria is very much a blame policy and you will have a meeting with the Chief Pilot. It takes about 2 mind to fill out the form.

Can we also drop that one now?

[waves-dubai]

As a pax, when you are familiar with an airport, it is not uncommon that you use landmarks to decipher your exact location...KIN has two exits and it is very rare for a narrowbody to use the second exit even in the worst of conditions....To answer your question as to how a person with no forward visibility can tell their location, you use the landmarks, e.g the airport fire station..

[Check 6]

The mishap crew relieved the JFK at MIA.

The CA pushing the wheelchair was not the mishap CA.

[ReverseFlight]

why do we allow airport designers build such a perimeter at the end of the runway
Presumably is not to stop the aircraft crashing into the sea, but to stop the sea crashing onto the runway ? :eek:

[DC-ATE]

protectthehornet -
listen...if pilots didn't have to fill out paperwork for every go around...
if they didn't feel a silent pressure about MONEY and the cost of every minute of fuel maybe there wouldn't be a reluctance about going around...
it is money pal and if you don't know it now...you never will

I NEVER worried about filling out paperwork [Irregularity Report for those interested] for making a go-around. And I made few. I actually liked filling out the form to show where OTHERS had screwed up.

The LAST thing I ever thought about was the "cost" of any phase of my flight if it was for safety reasons. Can't tell you how many times I got called in for carrying too much fuel. Any pilot that has cost in the back of his mind while flying better be riding in the back somewhere.

Glad I'm outta this racket !! [ I know...you all are too !!:D]

[FullWings]

Having operated in and out of KIN a fair bit, I always thought of it as being in the "accident waiting to happen" category. Storms can blow up very suddenly and as others have pointed out, getting in on RW30 with cloud and rain about is easier said than done.

I've been badly misled by wind reports in the past: I don't think it's an ATC failing, more that the velocity isn't being measured accurately or from the right (or enough) places. Landed there some years ago in "calm" and it seemed a bit fast - brakes noticeably hot & more rwy used than should have been necessary. Checked the QAR data later and it was 23kts tail on T/D. :eek:

Out of interest, do AA have a FDR analysis program running to pick up operating trends? I positioned to KIN on AA once and the approach certainly felt 'rushed' and we ended up near the far end of the runway (not saying that this has anything to do with the current accident).

[Flight Safety]

Glueball, good points. I also think the sim could never really produce the genuine emotional shock of a real life and death decision. I also agree landing long in the sim is not a good idea. However one can still set up the tight margin landing in bad weather, and then throw in a spoiler or brake failure. That would get the heart going.

One could even set up 2 or 3 of these landings (covering various aspects of the tight margin landing), and then randomly select on which one the failure occurs.

[Intruder]

I NEVER worried about filling out paperwork [Irregularity Report for those interested] for making a go-around. And I made few. I actually liked filling out the form to show where OTHERS had screwed up.
There is no requirement for an irregularity report for a go-around at my airline. IMO, there should NEVER be a requirement for such a report for a go-around, because a go-around is NOT AN IRREGULARITY!!!

If airline MISmanagement treats go-arounds as irregularities, then they are putting Captains on notice that they are not to be trusted to make the decisions they are trained, certified, and paid to make. That MISmanagement should then expect to bend more metal and hurt more people, since their Captains are effectively told to think like beancounters rather than aviators.

[bearfoil]

Did a goround at SFO once. The Tower had cleared both of us for the same runway, seemed irregular to me.

[misd-agin]

Whatslizad - You are correct, it is a required report. Didn't know it became a required report. I feel so naughty for any reports I should have sent, but didn't. :ok:

[waves-dubai]

This video tells the tale from a passenger's view..

YouTube - American Airline Crash in Jamaica:Clips courtesy Jamaica TV news-CVM&TVJ (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lz6FEQLmL9Q)

[in my last airline]

Excess speed might have caused this accident. I am speculating of course, but, in my opinion 70% of pilots flying the 737 do not land at ref period. That is based on 15,000 hours on type and more than a decade of training and checking on type. This a/c is NOT a great stopper and when landed flat and fast simply eats up the Rwy. Throw in a couple of non standard techniques or a bit of hydroplaning and it's curtains. Pilots of the NG are very reluctant to close the thrust levers until it's virtually on the ground. With these new wings and also winglets you can close the thrust at 30ft followed by a flare at 20 without it 'falling' out of the sky. So many also gun the engines coming into the flare, normally, totally unnecessarily! the old gen 737s did fall out of the sky if you closed the thrust at 30ft and I wonder if there needs to be a reevaluation of landing technique across the board with the latest aerofoils providing much more lift (and less drag).

Some have mentioned cancelling reverse and flying away again. Depending on weight etc I reckon if you canx reverse at 110 kts and applied firewall thrust, it would take about 1500m minimum to get back to say 130 kts and hopefully fly away again. This is based on a simulated attempt just to satisfy my curiosity.

Safe flying.

[hec7or]

Not to mention how some pilots can't keep the thing anywhere near the GS in the last 200' which also eats up air distance like anything.

[DC-ATE]

Intruder -
There is no requirement for an irregularity report for a go-around at my airline. IMO, there should NEVER be a requirement for such a report for a go-around, because a go-around is NOT AN IRREGULARITY!!!
If airline MISmanagement treats go-arounds as irregularities, then they are putting Captains on notice that they are not to be trusted to make the decisions they are trained, certified, and paid to make. That MISmanagement should then expect to bend more metal and hurt more people, since their Captains are effectively told to think like beancounters rather than aviators.

Sorry, but a go-around or missed approach IS an irregularity. If you don't land on the first attempt, it is NOT a 'regular' operation. And I don't know of any Captain at my former airline that was in any way intimidated by having to fill out the report.

[Intruder]

Nope. Go-arounds and rejected landings are clearly described in the NORMAL PROCEDURES section of our Flight Handbook / FCOM -- not even in "Supplementary Normal" procedures! Demonstrating a go-around from a Cat II ILS is a NORMAL requirement of a PT or PC session, before any "Non-normal" situations are introduced.

Do you file an "irregularity report" every time you deviate around a thunderstorm? A go-around, absent other "non-normal" situations or indications, may likewise be considered simply another option when encountering unexpected or worse than expected weather.

I've gone around maybe 5 times in 11 years of 747 operations. While they may not be "common" to an individual pilot, neither are actual Cat II landings for most pilots. "Uncommon" does not equate to "irregular" or "non-normal."

[Huck]

Go-arounds specifically exempted from any reporting requirements at my airline.....

[Murexway]

I don't believe that any "reports" are required for a G/A at AA. A G/A is considered a successful conclusion to an approach, if that's the Captain's decision.

I believe AA's Ops Specs state that puddles of water 1/2" or greater on the runway make that runway unusable except for emergency (who's out measuring puddles at night in heavy rain? ).

Personal Opinions:

1. While not prohibited, a tailwind on a wet runway at night with the approach lights out, etc. certainly adds to the pucker factor.

2. No cockpit crew would take such an approach and landing lightly.....and is certainly aware of the need for proper speed and glide path control, proper touchdown point, proper use of autobrakes, spoliers, reverse thrust, etc.

3. It's always easy when you're not the guy in the left seat of the accident aircraft.

[slf4life]

Exactly waves-dubai. I know I am familiar enough with landmarks/objects on the field to tell if td is going to be a bit long or more 'normal'. In fact it did happen years ago on an Air J 727 - told wifey to hang on and sure enough by the time it settled the subsequent braking force had the galley a-rattling and all of us straining against our seatbelts. Uh - I must admit I kind of enjoyed it :O - whoever said the 727 is a stopper - whoa yes!

[DC-ATE]

Regarding Irregularity Reports -

Now, again, this was nearly twenty years ago, but in part the "BOOK" said under Non-Mechanical Irregularities, amoung other things:

"Go-Around or missed approach caused by reasons external to cockpit, i.e., ATC handling, windshear, mechanical problem, etc."

Again...it was no big deal to fill one of these out and no one was "worried" about what the company would say/think about it.

OK.....enough of this. On with the accident in question.

[stepwilk]

Okay, okay. Different companies have different regs anent whether go-arounds are normal procedures or irregularities. Can we get past that and move on?

[hauxdeu]

Is there any mold growing on the runway? It gets pretty slippery when wet, I hear!

[SPA83]

http://nsa11.casimages.com/img/2009/12/26/091226081116448364.jpg (http://www.casimages.com)

[strawpile]

"In my last airline" I agree with your analysis of the tendency for most pilots to land the 737 fast. But, I think this is a result of the design of the airplane. The 737 has been lengthened over the years, but the height of the landing gear has not changed. The reason why it has not changed is that SWA did not want to order the NG 737 if it had a different type rating than their existing fleet. So, Boeing accommodated SWA and built a very long-bodied airframe that sits too close to the ground. Every pilot has heard stories of pilots hitting the aft fuselage during landing. These events have occassionaly resulted in the termination of the crew. The potential of hitting the aft-fuselage during landing is a concern that sits in the back of every 737 pilot's mind when flaring to land. An easy way to minimize this risk is to carry power until almost on the deck, and thereby land above v-ref. Landing a few knots hot is usually not a problem, and can more easily be managed than erring on the other side: i.e. chopping the power too high, and running out of airspeed prior to touch-down. This is why most of us land above v-ref.

[Chu Chu]

Pax Landmarks -- Those big black signs with the white number can be a clue as well. . .

[Bamse01]

Check 6


Join Date: May 2000
Location: Florida
Posts: 787 The mishap crew relieved the JFK at MIA.

The CA pushing the wheelchair was not the mishap CA.



Are you sure about that?

[sussex2]

The strength of modern airframes, given what that aircraft did, is to be commended. I haven't see such a thing since the Mohawk/Piedmont (stand to be corrected on the company) 1-11 left the runway, went across a road, between two buildings, and, despite having lost both wings, the pax and crew walked away. This incident was used as training for Bcal crews when doing their conversion, to the 1-11 in Pittsburgh, with regard to the strength of the airframe.
If aircraft had Ncap ratings (safety ratings to our US contributors) then this one would have got 5 stars, at least.

[bearfoil]

From the pics I'd say the Nosegear saved the lives of the flightcrew, if not most of first cabin. On the other hand, it killed the Turkish crew. The Continental 737 at Denver saved some lives as well.

Haven't seen anything about the crew being MD80 typed for the better part of their career, versus Guppy. The accident a/c was delivered in 2001, to United? UAL is off all guppies, one assumes this one was purchased by AMR?

Two very different types, needless to say, transition and experience issues?

bearfoil

[sb_sfo]

I'm not aware of UA taking any NGs. Where did you get that info?

[lomapaseo]

It's a waste of time talking about good aircraft vs bad aircraft when it comes to crashes.

Even the designers can't assess an overdesign. All these type aircraft meet the same standard and after that it's the luck of the exact rock or hard point that they hit.

[in my last airline]

Bearfoil, just to let you know, the Turkish pilots were killied by their seats detaching from the rails and both pilots launched into the roof. All pilots dead when emergency crews arrived. That's why they left the cockpit scene to the AAIU. Cockpit door was warped and emergency crews could see in.
Sorry, but had to set the record straight.

[bearfoil]

My understanding was that when the nose slammed into the turf, the lid kept going, down onto the crew who were planted on the nosegear reinforcements of the cockpit floor, not right?

[WhatsaLizad?]

Couple of other observations as an airline pilot for 15+ years into KIN, including flying the 737NG there.

-There are limited vision cues outside the runway. The bay is on the threshold and left side, city lights far in the distance. Limited street lights far to right also. Other end is ocean of course. It makes for the "aircraft carrier" effect at night, especially in rainy conditions that further isolate the runway.

-In rain, like many commercial jets, I've found the 737NG visibility can basically suck even with the wipers on high. The 1950's window design is already limited as it is. Rain repellant isn't installed anymore. The airlines are too cheap to RainX the windscreens each night also.

-KIN. It may just be me, but it seems the white runway markings seem bright enough during the day, they seem to blend into the runway color at night with little reflectivity from the aircraft lights, even worse when wet.

-KIN. There are limited physical cues other than the runway markings as to how far down the runway one may be. At places like Grand Cayman, I use the FBO as a point on the left side where I brief I expect to be on the ground or a GA will probably happen. KIN is basically the same appearance for most of the runway until the firehouse, where it's waay too late by that point. Runway distance remaining markers are tough to see at night, rain or in a flare, and can't recall how easy they can be seen at KIN. With the rain, and maybe windshear, and possible MEL's such as reversers or ground spoilers, the crew could have found themselves with degraded cues to the problem until it was too late to GA. Fatigue issues could also be a factor.

We also still don't know if there were any other mechanical problems with the aircraft. I also think the general public would be surprised as to the acceptable tire wear on the typical commercial jet. This too would affect stopping ability compared to the deep tread on a new set of main tires (is it spelled tyres here?:E)

More than enough factors for the NTSB. Doubtful all the facts will be correctly analyzed here, including mine.

[IGh]

"... enough factors for the NTSB ..."
Is this an NTSB investigation?

Re' factors, the 8000' Rwy sounds sufficient at first thought. But when I grab a B737 manual for REQ'd Rwy length [with the tailwind increments (+1500 feet)], seems there's not much room for err.

Their pilot's association released a statement that aluded to a long DUTY DAY prior to late night approach, with TRW near airport.

??? ANY CONFIRMATION on the pilots' time on-duty prior to landing????
?Was it 12 HOURS since they went to work??

[Captain Bob]

Bamse01 said

Check 6
Join Date: May 2000
Location: Florida
Posts: 787 The mishap crew relieved the JFK at MIA.

The CA pushing the wheelchair was not the mishap CA.

Are you sure about that?


More than likely yes. There was a Deadheading Captain Check Airman on the flight? The Captain flying the aircraft sustained a broken arm? More than likely the one in the picture of the Captain pushing the wheelchair was not the Captain that flew the aircraft?

Approach Light system has apparently been out of service for almost a month?

I have been to KIN many many times over the years. Mostly in the Astro Dinoliner (727.) Best I can remember the Runway is Asphalt. Non grooved. Many parts of the runway have pools of standing water during rainshowers. Slicker than owl discharge.

Tail wind, Slick Wet Runway, Max Landing Weight, High Ref Speed. I am thinking a bad bad case of Hydroplaning.

[Carbon Bootprint]

Is this an NTSB investigation?NTSB will not be the only ones investigating, but they they are definitely on it. Matter of course when a US carrier and/or US manufacturer is involved.

[Old School Flyer]

Saw a video today on CNN of the Captain Brian Cole being interviewed briefly with his son standing next to him. He was the same Pilot who was pushing the wheel chair with the PAX in it.

Dec 27, 2009 7:56 am US/Eastern
Pilot Praises Crew After Plane Skids Off Runway

Miami Flight Overshoots Runway In Jamaica (http://cbs4.com/local/Miami.Flight.Jamaica.2.1387023.html)

The pilot of an American Airlines jet that skidded off a runway in Jamaica last week praised his crew for their professionalism and was thankful that he was able to be home with his family for the Christmas holiday.

"This is the best Christmas," Cole said, "I am just so happy to be home with my family."

Captain Brian Cole said Saturday from his home in Juno Beach that he had the "highest praise" and "eternal gratitude" for the way his crew reacted and helped their passengers.

"It's a testament to the professionalism of American Airlines," he said. "I have the highest praise for my first officer and eternal gratitude for the way the flight attendants reacted in their professionalism to get all the passengers home to their families, as well."

Cole suffered bruises on his forearms, chest and stomach, but no broken bones.

Flight 331 was landing in Kingston, Jamaica, late Tuesday in heavy rain on a flight from Miami when the plane skidded off the runway. Both engines were torn off on impact and the jet cracked open in three places, but all 154 people aboard survived.

The study of the plane's wreckage will end Sunday, and officials will then review flight data recorder information that is expected in the next few days, said Oscar Derby, director general of Jamaica's Civil Aviation Authority.

"We are investigating every possible factor," he said. "We are leaving no stones unturned."

http://www.wptv.com/media/lib/90/a/1/c/a1c1c267-092d-454e-815a-a17d2f3aec4e/Original.jpg

[GlueBall]

Captain Bob: "Tail wind, Slick Wet Runway, Max Landing Weight, High Ref Speed. I am thinking a bad bad case of Hydroplaning."

"Max Landing Weight" would be unlikely for a 90 minutes flight. Unless there was a mechanical failure, there is no reason for a B737 to run off the 8900+ feet pavement. Larger, heavier wide bodies have landed on that "wet, slick, non grooved" pavement for decades. Practical reality suggests that the crew had touched down too far, and perhaps too fast, on the runway. :ooh:

[Captain Bob]

Glueball I agree, however the flight was carrying Ferry Fuel. Aircraft was at Max Gross Landing Weight or there abouts. True others have flown in there for years (myself included) in other aircraft. Different crew, different night, different circumstances.

Respectfully,

Bob

[p51guy]

Glueball, get ready for a bruising after that statement.

[misd-agin]

Glueball -

1. Max landing weight isn't linked to the length of flight. I'll be surprised if the flight was more than 1000, or perhaps 2000 lbs, less than MLW.

2. I've been qualified on 6-9 different airliners. The 737-800 has the worst landing performance. Fact, not opinion.

3. Absent other issues(mechanical, weather, etc) of course the plane should have stopped. It didn't. The investigation should be able to tell us why.

[protectthehornet]

overbuilt or underbuilt

It is just so funny to me that Boeing discontinued the 757, yet stretched the 737, re-winged it and off you go.

I like things that are overbuilt...not stretched.

see previous comments on money.

[Bamse01]

Captain Bob said:

More than likely yes. There was a Deadheading Captain Check Airman on the flight? The Captain flying the aircraft sustained a broken arm? More than likely the one in the picture of the Captain pushing the wheelchair was not the Captain that flew the aircraft?



The Captain pushing the wheelchair is indeed the Captain of the flight.
He did not break his arm. According to his hometown paper, he got bruises
on his forearms,chest and stomach, but no broken bones.

[Captain Bob]

To some it was a Christmas miracle that all 154 people aboard an American Airlines flight survived.

In the middle of a rain storm Tuesday night, Flight 331 came to a crashing halt on the runway in Kingston, Jamaica.
Story continues below ?advertisement | your ad here

Capt. Brian Cole, who lives in Juno Beach, was in control of the landing.

"I have the highest gratitude for my first officers and the flight attendants that were with us on the flight, to be able to get everybody home to their families," said Cole.

The Boeing 737 split in two and 92 people were taken to hospitals. Thirteen people were admitted but none of the injuries were life threatening, officials said

"It's just crazy to think my mom's boyfriend was the one involved but I'm just really glad that he saved all those people," said Sam Faria.

Faria and his mother live just down the street. He said Cole suffered a concussion and a broken arm.

The pilot's sister released a statement saying, "If you were ever on a plane, he's the guy you'd want as your pilot. He cared about each and every person on that plane."

Cole had planned a Christmas gathering at his home with his three sons, but plans were up in the air.

Cole's neighbors said they hope he will make a speedy recovery in time for the New Year.

"He's the nicest person you can wish to come into your neighborhood or your life," a neighbor said. "He's just wonderful."

[Old School Flyer]

Please see post #178.

[protectthehornet]

the captain seems like a nice guy...I don't want it to be pilot error.

But, a good pilot knows about hydroplaning, about tailwinds that increase, about wet runways, about stable approaches, about landing in the first third of the runway (TD), about checking spoiler deployment, about getting into reverse right away and the myriad of things about a firm touchdown and when to get the heck out of a situation.

So, what happened? Did the engines fail on touchdown due to massive rain ingestion? Did the brakes fail? Did the reversers fail?

Like I said, I don't want it to be pilot error.

[Wino]

Even if he did everything right, If the aircraft did not start hydroplaning untill after the engines were in reverse, then the correct action is to ride it out, even if it means going off the far end of the runway. There are times where you can do everything right, and still bend the airframe.

Everyone walked away from this one, sometimes the correct action is to sacrifice the airframe for the lives of the passengers... Another example of that was the ditching in the Hudson river...

Cheers
Wino

[protectthehornet]

while I flew an earlier version of the 737, I really don't know the NG/800 version.

Can you ''firewall reverse" power? Or does a computer say no?

In this case, of sacrificing things, one could firewall reverse and sacrifice the engines a bit.

[p51guy]

I flew the earlier versions too, 100,200,300. They would have done well into Kingston. Until we get more data I don't know why they went off the end. Their landing performance charts showed they should have been fine. We will have to wait and see. The metar reports on visibility were useless because they were so out of touch but the winds seemed normal, 10 knot tailwind for an hour before landing until after the crash. That is normal to land with a 10 knot tailwind at AA along with all other airlines. All the visibilitiy reports from 0300Z were wacko. Shift change?

[SK8TRBOI]

I'm a Godson of a retrired "PanAm-then-United" 747 check airman. I don't recall what particular accident had recently occured involving weather and landing, to get us on this path, but he told me at dinner one night eons ago:

"I don't understand these kinds of accidents, this landing in atrocious weather...I've never flown anywhere in the world where simply waiting 45 minutes to 1 hour won't let the worst of the stuff pass. I've had a very boring flying career and I intend to keep it that way!"

Worked for him in his 35+ year career - safely retired (with a much diminished pension! Another crime that can be taken-up elsewhere). I, too, have succesfully so far, used his philosophy.

So, IMHO in this case: What's was the rush?

Just something to consider as a possible "takeaway" from this accident.

Thanks for reading.

Cheers, SK8TRBOI

[p51guy]

Yes, I agree with him. I give myself at least 2 freebees every year when I am flying so even though it is legal I don't land until I want to. Let the storm pass and make it easy. So far I have only used one but the one approach that could bite you is illiminated. why push it.

[captjns]

I'm a Godson of a retrired "PanAm-then-United" 747 check airman. I don't recall what particular accident had recently occured involing weather and landing, to get us on this path, but he told me at dinner one night eons ago:

"I don't understand these kinds of accidents, this landing in atrocious weather...I've never flown anywhere in the world where simply waiting 45 minutes to 1 hour won't let the worst of the stuff pass. I've had a very boring flying career and I intend to keep it tha way!"

Worked for him in his 35+ year career - safely retired (with a much diminished pension! Another crime that can be taken-up elsewhere). I, too, have succesfully so far, used his philosophy.

So, IMHO in this case: What's was the rush?

Just something to consider as a possible "takeaway" from this accident.

Thanks for reading.

To the general aviationist... it's referred to get there-itis... to some in the airline industry from former lives... it's called complete the mission. But to the majority of professional crewmembers we don't let our limitations or egos get in the way of safety of operation.

[captjns]

Yesterday, Colonel Anthony 'Bunny' Stern, a veteran aviation expert, dismissed the insinuation that the absence of the approach lights could have contributed to the crash.

Dead nuts on!!!

Our airline performed subservice for Cayman Airways in the 727 to Cayman Brac... at night too... witout Papi... Vasi... or ILS sometimes with driving rain... sometimes a full moon with calm winds.

Part of a rate ride in the US is to accomplish a visual approach without any visual cues other then the runway environment. Our company required the manuever be demonstrated every 6 months in the simulator as well as in the aircraft too.

Wish I had the features of the NG... but we didn't. With that being said for over 9 months it was our safe operation with the disciplines and adherences to SOPs that kept is a safe operation.

[waves-dubai]

THE pilot of American Airlines flight 331, which crashed at the Norman Manley International Airport (NMIA) in Kingston last Tuesday night, opted not to utilise a mis-approach, as suggested by local air traffic controllers, the Observer has learnt.
The mis-approach option -- which would require the pilot to circle and make another landing attempt -- was offered as the Boeing 737-800 approached the runway with a tailwind and in driving rain which, according

to local aviation sources, was not heavy enough to prevent the aircraft from landing without problems.
"Three flights landed in the hour before the American Airlines flight," a source at the airport told the Observer yesterday. "It was raining just as heavily at the time they landed. I know the option was communicated to him, but I can't say anything more as the matter is under investigation."

Before AA331 crashed: Pilot opted against mis-approach - JamaicaObserver.com (http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/Before-AA331-crashed)

[Avman]

More likely that they were given the "in the event of a missed approach" instructions by ATC and not invited to g/a. Newspapers!

[protectthehornet]

Tri-colored VASI

This is a single light that appears amber above the glide slope, green on the glide slope and red below it. It is rarely used, partly because pilots who are unfamiliar with them have been known to misinterpret the lights, causing them to 'correct' in the wrong direction. Despite this shortcoming, it is (reportedly) in widespread use in Eastern European countries, especially Russia and Ukraine.

...

I've flown a tri color vasi once...what can I say...it works as advertised.

[p51guy]

Went into the dominican republic one night in a 727 15 years ago trying to follow the lights and knew looking at the runway I was too low so leveled out and ignored it. Everything worked out fine but guess a mule stepped on one side of the vasi and made it 1 degree instead of 3. Also all notams said the vor was fine until 3 miles out before starting the approach when I was advised the vor was out of service and the ndb was now in use. Also they said it was clear skies and we broke out of the ndb approach over the water about 800 ft. It was an airport we never flew in to so dispatch sent us charts. One of those nights when you know you have to look out for your selves.

[p51guy]

waves,

Tower never suggests a missed approach. That is the pilots job. He probably offered a circle to land approach to land into the wind. The pilots didn't think it was required. The tower is concerned about separation not operation of a flight.

[waves-dubai]

P51guy...

I think the wrong terminology was used in this published statement......The tower offered a runway 30 approach which the captain declined...
All these statements will be released in the NTSB data...

[Kyprianos Biris]

Many similarities ...
TACA 767 skids off the runway at Guatemala Airport (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UgZtHNulQgo)

[Shore Guy]

Jamaican Officials Probe AA331 Touchdown Point


Christopher Read An American Airlines plane that careened off the end of a runway, crashing and breaking into three pieces, landed approximately 4,000 feet down an 8,900 foot runway, investigators in Jamaica said Monday. Investigators are now trying to determine why the pilots flew over nearly half of the runway before first setting the wheels down, leaving significantly less distance to bring the jet to a stop.
Jamaica's Director of Civil Aviation, Col. Oscar Derby, told NBCDFW that investigators are also looking into what role tailwinds, and a rain soaked runway may have played in the crash.

"We are looking at all of the indicators to to figure out what the main contributor was to the runway excursion", Derby said.
Flight 331 landed in rainy weather, shortly after a thunderstorm passed over Kingston, Jamaica, on Dec. 23. Dozens of people on board the plane were injured, but there were no fatalities.

Stronger than expected tailwinds, equipment malfunctions, or pilot error could all be contributing factors, investigators said. The 737-800 involved in the crash is equipped with a "heads-up" display system designed to help guide the plane in for landing within the first 1,000 feet of the runway in inclement weather, if the system is functioning properly. It's not clear whether the pilots were using that system at the time of landing.
The union that respresents the American Airlines pilots would not comment on the specifics of the investigation, but defended the pilots actions.

"The landing overrun accident was a scary event in challenging weather conditions, said Scott Shankland, spokesman for the Allied Pilots Association. "We remain confident our pilots did everything possible to try and stop the aircraft before the end of the runway", he said. Shankland added that the union believes crew's actions in evacuating the plane after the incident saved lives.
U.S. sources familiar with the investigation said the plane was carrying extra fuel for the return trip to Miami, a practice known as "ferrying fuel". The weight of the extra fuel may have made the plane harder to stop. It was still moving fast, at a rate of about 60 knots, when it left the runway, sources said.

The asphalt runway surface at the Kingston airport does not have grooves to collect and disperse standing water in heavy rain, a feature that's common at many large U.S. airports.
"We're looking into that as well, Col. Derby said, we don't know the extent to which it would have contributed."

Fort Worth-based American Airlines spokesman Tim Wagner said he could not comment, because of the on-going investigation involving Jamaican authorities and the National Transportation Safety Board.
Jamaican Officials Probe AA331 Touchdown Point | NBC Dallas-Fort Worth (http://www.nbcdfw.com/news/local-beat/Investigators--AA-Plane-Landed-Nearly-Half-way-Down-Runway-Before-Jamaica-Crash-80278032.html)

[protectthehornet]

touchdown point.

well, this says alot. 4000' down a 9000' runway sure says something to me.

Now, why? Was the tailwind worse than reported? Were there lighting issues on the runway?

And it sure is easier to land in bad wx on a runway with tdz lighting system.

While there are many lighting cues on a runway even without the tdz lighting system, it is time to realize....EITHER DO IT RIGHT or don't do it at all. All runways should be great, not mediocre.

[IGh]

Brief video offers one of Honeywell's available alerts when pilots become fixated-biased toward task:
Honeywell : Runway Safety (http://www.honeywellrunwaysafety.com/demos.php) , click on "Long Landing (or Deep Landing) (http://www.honeywellrunwaysafety.com/flash/100109/DeepLanding.swf)"

For a more complete overview of alerts, click on
"Air Transport Runway Safety Animation (http://www.honeywellrunwaysafety.com/overview.swf)"

A software solution: minimal downtime, minimal crew training.

Additionally, ATSB published a TWO PART study of Rwy Excursions (2009):Runway excursions: Part 1 - A worldwide review of commercial jet aircraft runway excursions (http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/2009/AR2008018_1.aspx), ar2008018_1 [http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/Assets/dl_acrobat.gifPDF: 3.43MB (http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/27370/ar2008018_1.pdf)]

Runway excursions: Part 2 - Minimising the likelihood and consequences of runway excursions - An Australian perspective, (http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/2009/AR2008018_2.aspx)ar2008018_2 [http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/Assets/dl_acrobat.gifPDF: 2.76MB (http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/440007/ar2008018_2.pdf)]

Excerpt from Pt 2, pg 39:
Runway camber and transverse slope
"Runway cambering or transverse sloping allows water to drain to the side of the runway, which stops standing water pools from forming. ... Standards ... runways over 30 m in width to have a transverse slope between one and two per cent of the runway width.
Runway macrotexture
The provision of adequate runway surface macrotexture is a proven, cheap and effective way of reducing the likelihood of runway excursions. It improves the runoff of water and impedes the formation of standing water ..."

[DownIn3Green]

PTH...You'd never make it in Africa, parts of the Mid-East or Eastern Europe...

[protectthehornet]

down inthreeegreen

I've flown from many crummy runways, even dirt strips...and I have no desire to fly in the middle east, africa or anywhere but the good old USA (Canada is quite fine too).

I said they should be great runways...how much money does it really cost do things right?

[misd-agin]

ATC does 'offer' G/A's or missed approachs - "You guys going to make it from there? Or do you need to go-around?" etc, etc.

[misd-agin]

SK8TRBOI - We don't know if the weather was so bad that even your mentor wouldn't have landed. It had rained for hours, several flights had landed in the previous hour, and the videos after the accident showed significant rain.

Sometimes rain is just rain. And it can last for hours with little risk to aviation.

[Doors to Automatic]

An American Airlines plane that careened off the end of a runway, crashing and breaking into three pieces, landed approximately 4,000 feet down an 8,900 foot runway

Sounds ominously similar to the AF crash in Toronto.

[non iron]

Yes, and sometimes the accompanying colder air, which may, or may not, be providing an increasing tailwind is a killer.
l obviously have no clue as to the real prevailing conditions but l`ve certainly had a few shocks over the years, and not all warned by lightening.

[Shore Guy]

The Honeywell "Smart Runway" system (formerly RAAS), is one of the most incredible safety programs in recent memory. All an "add on" to EGPWS (GPS direct to EGPWS required).

In recent history, would have kept Comair from taking off on inappropriate runway, Delta landing on taxiway at ATL, Continental landing on taxiway at EWR, and would have helped/prevented AA at Jamaica.

But with today's economic climate, few airlines will expend funds for non-mandated equipment.

Sad......

[320DRIVER]

Airbus has introduced a similar system called BTV ROW/ROP possibly one notch up (smarter :-) ) from the HW version.

EASA certifies "Brake To Vacate" (BTV) and "Runway Overrun Warning and Prevention" (ROW/ROP) systems on the Airbus A380 (http://www.airbus.com/en/presscentre/pressreleases/pressreleases_items/10_26_09_easa_certifies_btv_row_rop.html)

It will continuously assess the aircraft's energy state during the approach and compare it to the runway length stored in the OANS database to see if a stop can be accomplished in a dry or wet runway scenario.

The BTV function allows the autobrake to modulate the braking as required to allow the aircraft slow down to a safe vacating system at an exit previously selected by the pilot.

[barit1]

More photos (http://www.marvhamm.com/kingston-737.html)

[barit1]

The BTV function allows the autobrake to modulate the braking as required to allow the aircraft slow down to a safe vacating system at an exit previously selected by the pilot.

The A380 visit to AirVenture 2009 (Oshkosh) was an example of this. Only 1 r/w exit could accommodate the A380 and the r/w was too narrow for a 180 and taxiback. They did their sums quite well, thank you, and made an appropriately spectacular arrival.

[protectthehornet]

so, we have pilots missing MSP 'because they are working on laptops.

and now we need gadgets to tell us if we are going to stop on the runway in time.

what a waste...what would you do if you had to MEL your runway judgement gadget?

sure, have proper lighting that tells you where you are on the runway...but so many gadgets will bring even more problems.

[PEI_3721]

A major limitation of high-tech solutions (#212, 213) and humans is that they do not know the exact conditions on the runway.

The Smart Runway / Smart Landing systems provide alerting for an unstable approach and the potential for a long landing; the alerts should enable the crew to fly a go-around.

Although the Airbus system allows the crew to select braking parameters corresponding to the reported runway condition, once on the runway the system cannot achieve any greater maximum deceleration than could the crew. Thus if the runway condition is not as expected, then the calculated landing performance may not be met. In extreme, the system would not be able to prevent an overrun. Also, the crew’s realization of poor conditions could be too late to allow a go-around.
The other warnings (ROW/ROP) appear to be similar to the Honeywell systems, and have the ominous note that pilots can override (ignore) alerting information.

Part of the solution for reducing the risks of an overrun is to provide crews with better descriptions of runway braking conditions, but this is a complex and difficult task, which IMHO is unlikely to be solved in the immediate future.
A more significant item is to provide crews with better guidance of how to implement the regulations, interpret the calculated landing performance, and how to judge the many variables which provide a margin of safety during approach and landing – what do these things mean and ‘how’ should they be used in the decision to land, i.e. how do we teach ‘experience’, how do we manage risk.

In situations like Jamaica and Toronto, pilots often over focus on the immediate tactical decision associated with Cbs – airborne problems; avoiding turbulence, windshear, lightning etc.
Crews should consider more aspects of the ground phase of the approach and landing – have a strategic plan; e.g. what is the effect of heavy rain on the runway, how quickly does it drain, physical runway state, RESA, likely wind shifts, and any other aspects affecting landing performance safety margins.

A simple rule of thumb could be to delay landing for 15 min after a red WXR area has cleared the runway; this provides a reasonable time to the surface to drain. However even this rule may require modification for particular airports or specific weather conditions, e.g. runway slope / crosswind damming water drains, or ‘dished’ concrete surfaces.

[Doors to Automatic]

More photos

Jeepers! I guess that won't be flying again. Pax had a very lucky escape there.

[Dushan]

From the new, aerial, photos, it seems that the he was considerably to the left of the centreline. It also appears that there is very little damage to the fence, given the distance between the two engines. Is it possible that he porpoised from the threshold of 30 and the beach?

Please do not consider these questions as any criticism or un-informed opinion. I am simply asking and those who would know may be able offer a clarification.

[Doors to Automatic]

Possibly down to the fact it swerved to avoid the approach lights once the overrun was inevitable.

[Old School Flyer]

"In situations like Jamaica and Toronto, pilots often over focus on the immediate tactical decision associated with Cbs – airborne problems; avoiding turbulence, windshear, lightning etc.
Crews should consider more aspects of the ground phase of the approach and landing – have a strategic plan; e.g. what is the effect of heavy rain on the runway, how quickly does it drain, physical runway state, RESA, likely wind shifts, and any other aspects affecting landing performance safety margins."

Excellent comment. This is why forward, critical thinking and preparedness is such a crucial part of any decision making in all phases of flight and in particluar take off and landing. While I am not going to pass judgement on these Pilots at this time, I have seen and am familiar with similar scenarios in the past. It is disturbing for me to see these types of occurences take place. When the proper details and data are released, this will serve as a valuable learning tool for many. One should never let their experience work against them. Every piece of the situation that you miss, ignore, or assume, makes for unexpected and sometimes, disastrous consequences.

[p51guy]

I think pilots are fully aware of the runway they need. Getting there when conditions are right come after you know you can legally land on that runway. I think they were legal to land and we will have to see why it didn't work that night.

[fireflybob]

All things equal landing in a tailwind gives an airspeed increase due to shear (reducing tailwind). So you are already landing with a tailwind and then you can end up a few knots fast - something to watch for.

Also the energy is proportional to the speed squared so a few knots fast makes a big difference in terms of stopping. Throw in a wet limiting runway with poor drainage and you may not make it.

[411A]

The union that respresents the American Airlines pilots would not comment on the specifics of the investigation, but defended the pilots actions.

No one should be surprised...APA initially supported the crews actions at Little Rock and with the A300-600 accident ex-JFK.
After all, APA considers their guys can do no wrong...:rolleyes:

[FullWings]

All things equal landing in a tailwind gives an airspeed increase due to shear (reducing tailwind). So you are already landing with a tailwind and then you can end up a few knots fast - something to watch for.

Also the energy is proportional to the speed squared so a few knots fast makes a big difference in terms of stopping. Throw in a wet limiting runway with poor drainage and you may not make it.
Very pertinent, especially if the runway is effectively only 4,900' (<1,500m) long by the time you touch down. I'd think the wet/contaminated plus tailwind figures for that length would be marginal if not a guaranteed overrun.

I think some of the problem is that rejecting a landing, i.e. a G/A after T/D, is a difficult manoeuvre to initiate psychologically, especially if you've never attempted it before or haven't discussed the option previously. I did a sim module recently combining theory and practice and it was most educational; shortly afterwards I came within seconds of doing it for real after a poor & floaty attempt of mine at landing.

There's a "I'm going to land" mindset that (I find) develops during the approach as you put the gear down, are given landing clearance, get the appropriate reference at "decide", pass over the threshold, retard the thrust levers, etc. Each of those events in the past were normally associated with a successful landing, so they act as a sort of reassurance that all is well. It's bordering on hypnotic and I have to almost sit on my own shoulder and say to myself: "No, something could still happen to mess up this landing - be prepared to throw it away, even after T/D." I have to say it's easier said than done...

[captjns]

As stated by 411A

No one should be surprised...APA initially supported the crews actions at Little Rock and with the A300-600 accident ex-JFK.
After all, APA considers their guys can do no wrong...


You know??? I find it fascinating how the unions, groupies, and wannabees are the first to jump on the “it was fatigue”, or “weather was the primary cause of the accident” band wagon.

The crew was aware of the prevailing conditions, and the amount of runway that wizzed by before they decided to continue the landing phase.

So I ask the groupies, wannabees, staunched union supporters, and pundits alike, let’s hear the defence.

[protectthehornet]

remember when a commercial pilot (let alone an ATP) had to demonstrate that he was master of the craft and could land within 200' of his chosen spot?

We are losing certain skills. We seem to go for a smooth landing so often that we lose the spot landing skill.

Now...maybe something happened to really screw up this landing...but more than likely the pilot had lost that special skill of planting the wheels exactly where you want them.

Day or night, a narrowbody plane (ok, I might give a very long narrowbody like the 757 a break) should touchdown on those nice big rectangles painted on the runway...(certainly if you are following a heavy jet, wake turbulence may make you choose to land past the preceeding plane's touchdown point). And if you can't see white rectangles, then use alternate methods of determining a touchdown point equivilent with the above. (See Davies' "Handling the Big Jets" for a description of this)...or touchdown abeam a standard vasi, or where the ILS GS is taking you, or count a certain number of runway lights down the runway.

Always AIM for something...don't just get near the runway and hope for the best.

Now I know this airport didn't have touchdown zone lights...that certainly would have helped...but all runways have different colored runway lights to let you know where you are...check AIM for thorough discussion.

Now, if someone changed the color of the lights...that would be a hell of an excuse...but it probably didn't happen.

Spot landings...make them a habit...be as skilled as Lindbergh or our forefathers in aviation...(and you navy guys...don't gloat!)


I just read that the FAA is monitoring the American airlines pilots for landing skills now.

[captjns]

Excerpt of post from Portectthehornet---

Now I know this airport didn't have touchdown zone lights...that certainly would have helped...

Still... landing some 4,000 feet beyond the threshold is not justified... don't you think?

[UALSIC]

Does AA have circling approaches in their OPS Specs?

[Zeffy]

MKJP has RNAV (GPS) approaches to both runway ends.

Rwy 30 minima are 373' HAT and 1.9 Km.

[misd-agin]

411A - when has any organization thrown it's members 'under the bus', especially before the investigation is complete?

[misd-agin]

fireflybob - "Also the energy is proportional to the speed squared so a few knots fast makes a big difference in terms of stopping. Throw in a wet limiting runway with poor drainage and you may not make it."

We can debate "a few" and "a BIG difference", but your performance pages will show you what each knot of speed equates to in landing distance. Touchdown point is much more critical than speed.

[Doors to Automatic]

If crews are used to crossing the threshold, closing the throttles within 2-3 seconds and touching down a second or two later then surely they must have known something was a miss. 4000ft would equate to 20 seconds or so after crossing the threshold.

[galaxy flyer]

In this day and age of FMS/IRS wind readouts, doesn't anyone check and "call-out" winds on final? Maybe an USAF habit, but I always call out the wind component during final and over the lights on short final. This goes a long ways to awareness of wind and its effects.

GF

[vapilot2004]

The crew was aware of the prevailing conditions, and the amount of runway that wizzed by before they decided to continue the landing phase.

I find fault with this statement.

[SK8TRBOI]

But VA...it's much worse if they did not have this awareness! So whether or not you find fault with that statement, the alternate 'aint no better. Consider: "The crew was clueless as to the prevailing conditions, and the amount of runway that wizzed by as they decided to continue the landing phase." Yikes!

I mean, what's left? They either were aware and blithely "kept to the mission", or were ignorant of their speed, position, condition of runway...and options.

It'll have to be an uterally fantastic set of circumstances for this not to be primarily PE.

Not that this might not happen, though. Take a look at the preliminary NTSB report on the recent taxiway landing(!) at ATL by a DL 763...indeed, a truly amazing set of events really does mitigate (not eliminate) some of the PE. It's very intersting reading - check it out.

[PJ2]

Doors to Automatic;
If crews are used to crossing the threshold, closing the throttles within 2-3 seconds and touching down a second or two later then surely they must have known something was a miss. 4000ft would equate to 20 seconds or so after crossing the threshold.
Exactly right.

To your excellent point:

Touchdown from an altitude of 50' above the runway, (our FOQA event uses time from 30'), nominally occurs within 3 to 5 seconds. All other factors being equal, (threshold crossing height, approach speed, rate of descent all nominal), a touchdown longer than six seconds from 50' indicates the landing is "going long". Timings greater than about 10 seconds correlate to a touchdown beyond the TDZ and heighten the risk of an over-run accident.

While a number of factors likely were in play in this accident such as a higher groundspeed through the contributions of a tailwind and a slightly higher TAS due to slightly higher-than-standard SAT and possibly higher airspeed than Vref +5, varying visibility in heavy rainshowers (+SHRA), night-time with possible "black hole" phenomenon in the transition from "inside to outside" leading to lack of depth perception and subsequent long (floated) landing, wet, possibly flooded runway, possible late/no spoiler deployment, choice of landing flap and possibly other, less likely factors, FOQA data still has a role to play in examining the historical record of the fleet type's approach and landing performance.

Examining it from a safety investigation pov, if the record indicates that the performance of this aircraft during the approach and landing rollout was a relative outlier, a different causal chain and airline response may be indicated.

If on the other hand the FOQA data indicates that long landings with higher than normal approach speeds with reduced flap settings and idle thrust, (not the case here, we must assume!), both of which are being widely implemented as fuel saving techniques, then examination of this accident will necessarily take a different approach. The ATSB Report of the QANTAS B744 over-run accident at Bangkok made just such an observation. We will have to wait for the final report before we know which is the case.

Along with ASAP, (which has been reinstated I believe, after the APA withdrew their cooperation/participation, accusing AA management of using such safety information to go after individual pilots - anyone?), American also runs a FOQA Program. Such a Program will have a number of landing events which would monitor approach and landing performance.

Depending upon available parameters for the NG, (like the 320, they should number in the thousands), LFL design/installation and other FOQA Program features and protocols, such events, with associated levels of severity, may include:

Glideslope & Localizer deviation below 500',
Heading Changes Below 500',
Rate of Descent Below 500',
Airspeed Deviation from Vref+5 at 50', (greater than 20kts),
Thrust/N1 levels near/at Idle thrust,
Landing distance from 50' AGL,
Time from 30' to touchdown,
Time from main gear compression to nosewheel compression
High Vertical 'g' at touchdown
High Longitudinal 'g' during rollout
High Lateral 'g' at touchdown
Heading Changes During Rollout
Excessive Aileron, Rudder Deflection During Rollout
Non-standard/Reduced Flap Setting for Landing

and other events, again, depending upon the FOQA Program design and how interested the airline is in actually knowing what its fleet is doing on a daily basis. There are carriers around who don't want to know, mainly to avoid the higher costs of "knowing", a point raised numerous times in other threads.

Each of these events would have nominal performance numbers, the exceedence of which would produce a FOQA Event, the greater the exceedence, the greater the severity of the event.

This information would be trended, the outliers examined and so on. Where the outliers are signficant, a call to the crew to further understand the event can be made.

So, for example, if the 737NG fleet was showing a trend to long landings including long hold-off times greater than the times you mention, (eight seconds is about the upper limit from 50' to t/d and will likely produce touchdowns outside the TDZ which is normally the first 3000' for 1/3 of the runway whichever is less, but practically speaking anything longer than beyond the first 2000'), then questions will arise about what was done, if anything, about the trends in terms of flight crew awareness programs, during recurrent training highlighting the importance of landing within the TDZ, etc.

If the landing was indeed as reported, about 4000ft past the threshold, the question clearly becomes why and was it inevitable and if so, from what point might it have been rescued. Most pilots are reluctant to initiate a go-around after touchdown and before reverse has been selected but it can be done, (certainly NOT after reverse is selected, the associated risk being far higher than the risk of a lower-speed over-run). Both the aircraft's DFDR/CVR and the broader "upstream" safety tools described herein will assist in answering this question. This is the second serious overrun accident of this specific kind in a decade for American so establishing these facts, including an examination of the operational culture, is important to either rule out or deal with any related factors.

PJ2

[SK8TRBOI]

Good post...quite the read!
A few 'off the cuff' remarks (dangerous, I know):

#1 If the 738 does prove to have unusual, um, 'tendencies', I would "think"(hope) an experienced crew in-type would be intimately aware of these tendancies. Heck, I'd like to think I would...the -11's sure got plenty of 'em!:rolleyes:

#2 I think you may have it it at the end of your article...um, POST I mean:). And that would be "an examination of the operational culture (@AA)"...

[Doors to Automatic]

At a landing speed of 140kts the aircraft would cover 3000ft in approx 13 secs and 4000ft in approx 17 seconds.

[protectthehornet]

Yes, 4000' is way too long, touchdown lights or not.

to my knowledge, all big airlines in the USA don't do circling approaches....unless the weather is above basic VFR mins.

Indeed, my ticket even says something like: circling not authorized below basic vfr.

(just another cheapening of the sim time)

ok...the crew screwed up badly...shall we move on?

[fireflybob]

We can debate "a few" and "a BIG difference", but your performance pages will show you what each knot of speed equates to in landing distance. Touchdown point is much more critical than speed.

misd-agin, I couldn't agree more and I was not playing down the importance of touching down at the correct point on the runway but merely pointing out that if you are landing in a tailwind other factors can also come into play. Also, if you have a few extra knots the tendency is to float.

[p51guy]

AA can circle to land if it is 1000 & 3. The weather that night was but they decided not to. We should get some FDR and CVR info to see why they chose to land downwind. We get reporters saying they landed in a driving rain storm but METAR reports say it was VFR. I know, things can change in minutes, but only when the real time data comes out will we be able to see how this happened.

[pattern_is_full]

I've been eyeing those yellow cement(?) landing light pylons and imagining the effects if the plane had skidded another 20 meters or so - especially now we know there was fuel for the return flight still on board....
________

On the larger question of rejected or aborted landings, is there anything to be learned from naval aviation, where the operating assumption, at least as built into the procedures and hardware, seems to be to assume a go-around when conducting carrier landings, arguably the most critical form of fixed-wing aircraft landing?

1. First action by the pilot after touchdown is to firewall the throttles in case a GA is needed.

2. Auxiliary stopping device (tailhook) does not impede flying characteristics of the aircraft if a GA is required (except for a touch of drag).

3. The "other brain" monitoring the landing - the LO on the deck - is primarily there to order a wave-off if the approach is flawed in any way.

Not suggesting arresting gear for airliners:eek: Just wondering if there is some room for more of the Navy mindset that "Every landing is a likely wave-off unless the approach is nailed all the way."

[misd-agin]

GalaxyFlyer - "In this day and age of FMS/IRS wind readouts, doesn't anyone check and "call-out" winds on final? Maybe an USAF habit, but I always call out the wind component during final and over the lights on short final. This goes a long ways to awareness of wind and its effects."
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Personal technique - I pull up the wind page, gives headwind and crosswind values, on all approaches. Compare tower reported winds vs. FMC winds vs. outside visual clues, to include windsock if visible.

[vapilot2004]

But VA...it's much worse if they did not have this awareness! So whether or not you find fault with that statement, the alternate 'aint no better. Consider: "The crew was clueless as to the prevailing conditions, and the amount of runway that wizzed by as they decided to continue the landing phase." Yikes!

I mean, what's left? They either were aware and blithely "kept to the mission", or were ignorant of their speed, position, condition of runway...and options.

I can tell you with 98% certainty the crew was well aware of their speed and options Mr. Skates.



Runway condition - braking reports on water contaminated runways are moderately uncommon and have inherent inaccuracies compared to their cold weather counterparts. All the same, the industry standard 15 percent fudge factor has worked reasonably well thus far.

Runway position - this is where I found the most fault. Obviously, had they known where they were, the crew would have gone around. What could have led to this lack of positional awareness? Severely restricted visibility is the number one suspect whose accomplice could most likely have been a gust of wind from the rear.

[p51guy]

Where did you come up with this
wag?

[rottenray]

vapilot writes:

Runway position - this is where I found the most fault. Obviously, had they known where they were, the crew would have gone around. What could have led to this lack of positional awareness? Severely restricted visibility is the number one suspect whose accomplice could most likely have been a gust of wind from the rear.
Agree - at least one pax familiar with the field has expressed his [unqualified] opine that 331 touched down much later than he's accustomed to.

It's been mentioned here and elsewhere that the 738 doesn't cool its heels as quickly as some other 73s

Not faulting PIC/PNC with this.

If I HAD to place a blame somewhere, I'd lay it right on the airport itself. NMIA is a tight situation in the best times, should be lit up and should have "real" reports for runway contamination.

Nice, though, that nobody was killed, and looking at the pix, one must appreciate the engineering that allowed the engine to depart without ripping the wing apart.

While we're trying to suppose exactly what went wrong with the hope of seeing the same not happen again, let's not overlook what went right - no lives were lost.


RR

[411A]

If I HAD to place a blame somewhere, I'd lay it right on the airport itself.
'Atta boy, spoken like a true APA guy...it was the 'airports fault'.:rolleyes:
Naw...nothing to do with the pilots inability to actually land the airplane within the confines of the requested runway.
We can now see the true arrogance of AA guys...blame everyone/else...but them.

[GlueBall]

Captain rottenray . . . Please tell us how much longer than 8900 feet of non grooved, slick-when-wet pavement would be necessary for a B737-800 to land safely? :confused:

[Flight Safety]

I recently exchanged PMs with a former Navy carrier pilot.

Those guys have both a fixation to get an aircraft down on the deck, and at the same time have an automatic go-around built into their procedure. Their landings on carriers have the tightest landing requirements of all for speed control and touch down point, and yet they still anticipate a need to go-around if things don't happen correctly. Doesn't it make sense that when tight landing and stopping conditions are encountered in the civilian world, that both fixation to land and the need to go-around can co-exist in the same mind?

Naval aviators do it all the time.

[411A]

Doesn't it make sense that when tight landing and stopping conditions are encountered in the civilian world, that both fixation to land and the need to go-around can co-exist in the same mind?


Yes....and I wasn't in any Navy, either.

[Sciolistes]

Personal technique - I pull up the wind page, gives headwind and crosswind values, on all approaches. Compare tower reported winds vs. FMC winds vs. outside visual clues, to include windsock if visible.
That's good, but I think there are a couple of more fundamental tell tales when experiencing a significant tailwind.

[PEI_3721]

misd-agin the touch-down point is an important factor (#232), but so too is the speed at the threshold as this contributes to higher energy and an extended flare.
I assume that you refer to the difference in distance shown in the performance manual, which relate to landing at the correct speed but at different weights (at the correct point); thus this difference may not be representative of an over-speed landing.
If the aircraft lands fast with respect to the correct speed for the weight, then there is a distance increase due to the energy and the long touchdown point from the extended flare.
AC 91-79 gives an example of such an event where typically a 10 kt speed excess increases the landing distance by 500 ft, but the extended flare contributes a further 2500 ft (3000 ft total). The touch-down point part appears dominant, but it originates from excess speed.

Given these figures as representative of the Jamaica 737 landing, then with the additional hazard of the tailwind, a touch-down point at 4000ft down the runway may be easier to understand.

I do not agree with the view expressed by p51guy I think pilots are fully aware of the runway they need. (#221).
The landing data supplied by many operators only shows the maximum landing weight (MLW) for a runway in specific conditions (wet/dry, wind, alt, etc). Many crews only check that the actual landing wt is within limits (‘we’re legal’ syndrome), whereas a more circumspect crew might asses the actual wt as a % of MLW and judge the required level of braking, but in either case, not checking the actual or required distance.
Greater professionalism might result in checking the actual distance charts and applying a factor, considering previous operations – experience, or by adding a safety factor for items not considered by the data.
For those aircraft with auto brake / distance charts, the data is only as good as the assessment of the runway conditions, which is also a major weakness in the crew’s situation assessment and decision to land (see #217).

Regulated landing performance has a safety factor, but the often quoted 1.92 (wet/jet) value is most unlikely to be achieved. A significant proportion may used up in the difference between a ‘certification’ minimum distance landing and that routinely practiced in every-day operations. Furthermore the data assumes a level of friction appropriate to wet conditions, but how wet is ‘wet’ – what are the exact conditions on the runway.
Manufactures rarely fly certification wet landings; the wet performance is based on dry landings and an assumption about the runway condition. Overall the safety margin during a wet landing is probably less than that for a dry landing.
After considering other distance reducing factors such as runway texture, wind error, contaminant (rubber, paint, dust), none of which are in the performance data, the overall safety margin could be very small.
Thus pilots must strive for accuracy during the approach and landing, taking responsibility for both the judgement to land and the execution of the manoeuvre. There is no hiding behind ‘legal requirements’.

It is the pilot’s professional duty and responsibility to form and adjust a plan for a safe result – taking hindsight and turning it into foresight.
The Jamaica 737 landing might have been ‘legal’ – the plan apparently met the requirements, but due to any one or a combination of the many possible errors, misjudgements, or malfunctions, the execution of the plan and thus the result was incorrect.

Considering what can be done whilst we wait for the investigation report, the following questions may be worthy of debate:-
Why didn’t operators know that the runway was contaminated with rubber (slippery when wet), or what precautions to take with that knowledge.
How do pilots report these conditions to the authority? Similarly for poor runway draining characteristics.
Do operators take account of the non-existent RESA? Are operators landing distance charts adjusted to allow for this?
Do operators specify additional approach / landing accuracy for difficult or ‘limiting’ runways – and mandate a go-around?
Do crews adjust landing distance for increased Vref (gust factors)? If so, how; - not knowing the required landing distance (as discussed above)?

Finally, and perhaps a major concern in the industry, is that there appears to be too many open questions about marginal landing conditions.

[OD100]

It's pretty safe to say the runway was wet. And if they landed in heavy rain or after it had rained heavily, there would have been significant amounts of standing water on that non-grooved runway. And the chart even tells you that!

Throw in a potentially long-landing that was maybe a bit fast, and I don't think it's hard to image at all going off the end if there was any type of hydroplaning occurring.

[aa73]

The mishap crew relieved the JFK at MIA.

The CA pushing the wheelchair was not the mishap CA.

Incorrect, there were no deadheading crewmembers on AA331. The CA pushing the wheelchair is indeed the CA of the flight.

73

[captjns]

As posted by VAPILOT2004

I find fault with statement

So VAPILOT2004, why did you find fault with my statement? Most of my fellow colleagues don't think it acceptable to chew up of 4,000 feet of runway? How about you?

Again, maybe its just me and the majority of the pilot world, but the touchdown zone is where you are supposed to land the jet, and not the departure end of the runway.

Also, during training with every airline, and documentation contained with FCOMs, if in the opinion of the crew the landing will not end in a satisfactory manner; ie... staying within the borders of the runway, then a go around shall be executed.