Risk Aversion & the Command Structure.

[ORAC]

IIRC, during WWII, over 90% of all officers over the rank of Lt Col had been moved sideways into non-combat posts by 1941, and replaced by those who had seen combat.

An Officer and a Creative Man (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/20/opinion/20moyar.html?_r=1&ref=opinion)

As President Obama and his advisers planned their new approach to the Afghan war, the quality of Afghanistan’s security forces received unprecedented scrutiny, and rightly so. Far less attention, however, has been paid to the quality of American troops there. Of course, American forces don’t demand bribes from civilians at gunpoint or go absent for days, as Afghans have often done. But they face serious issues of their own, demanding prompt action.

The American corporals and privates who traverse the Afghan countryside today are not at issue. They risk life and limb every day, with little self-pity. Despite the strains of successive combat deployments, they keep re-enlisting at high rates.

The problems lie, rather, in the leadership ranks. Although many Army and Marine officers in Afghanistan are performing well, a significant portion are not demonstrating the vital leadership attributes of creativity, flexibility and initiative. In 2008, to better pinpoint these deficits, I surveyed 131 Army and Marine officers who had served in counterinsurgency operations in Iraq or Afghanistan or both, asking them each 42 questions about leadership in their services.

The results were striking. Many respondents said that field commanders relied too much on methods that worked in another place at another time but often did not work well now. Officers at higher levels are stifling the initiative of junior officers through micromanagement and policies to reduce risk. Onerous requirements for armored vehicles on patrols, for instance, are preventing the quick action needed for effective counterinsurgency. Of the Army veterans I surveyed, only 28 percent said that their service encouraged them to take risks, while a shocking 41 percent said that the Army discouraged it.

The climate of risk aversion begins in American society at large, which puts a higher premium on minimizing casualties than on defeating the enemy. It continues with American politicians and other elites who focus on the abuses at Abu Ghraib and Haditha in Iraq, but rarely point out the far more numerous instances of American valor.

It doesn’t need to be this way in the Army. After all, the Marine Corps has succeeded in inducing its officers to operate independently. More than twice as many Marine survey respondents as Army respondents — 58 percent — said that their service encouraged risk-taking. Marine culture is different because the career Marine officers who shape it are, on average, less risk-averse than career Army officers.

Researchers have found that the leadership ranks of big organizations are dominated by either “sensing-judging” or “intuitive thinking” personality types. Those in the former category rely primarily on the five senses to tell them about the world; they prefer structure and standardization, doing things by the book and maintaining tight control.

In the late 20th century, the Army gravitated toward standardization, as peacetime militaries often do, and consequently rewarded the sensing-judging officers who are now the Army’s generals and colonels. But this personality type functions less well in activities that change frequently or demand regular risk-taking, like technological development or counterinsurgency. Organizations that thrive under such conditions are most often led by people with intuitive-thinking personalities. These people are quick to identify the need for change and to solve problems by venturing outside the box.

Today, the Army has more intuitive-thinking people among its lieutenants and captains than at the upper levels. Too many of these junior officers continue to leave the service out of disillusionment with its rigidity and risk aversion. To their credit, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and the Army chief of staff, Gen. George Casey, have been trying to fix this problem, directing promotion boards to value creativity and initiative. But more drastic treatment is required.

The military should incorporate personality test results into military personnel files, and promotion boards should be required to select higher percentages of those who fall into the intuitive-thinking group. Many highly successful businesses factor personality testing into promotion decisions; the military, with far more at stake, should be no less savvy.

More immediately, our generals should repeatedly visit the colonels who command brigades and battalions to see if they are encouraging subordinates to innovate and take risks. Commanders who refuse to stop micromanaging should be relieved. The change may be disruptive and painful, but in the long run it will save lives and shorten wars.

Mark Moyar is a professor of national security affairs at Marine Corps University and the author of “A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency From the Civil War to Iraq.”

[jimtherev]

Isn't there another strand to this, implied by the aphorism that the military is always geared up to fight the last war?

[Rossian]

I had this explained to me by a former A-6 Sqn commander who said that the USAF worked to "if it hasn't been specifically authorised, it's forbidden" whereas the USN worked to "if it hasn't been specifically forbidden, use your judgement and be prepared to give it a go".

He cited escorting a badly damaged B-52 which was leaking vital fluids all over the place back from a raid over N. Vietnam and trying to persuade the young man driving it to follow him back to his base. The lad said he couldn't divert to that base because he hadn't been authorised to go there. The long and the short of it was the B-52 crashed with the loss of all on board trying to make his authorised destination. My informant was vitriolic in his condemnation of the USAF system controlled from SAC by as he put it "Monday morning quarter-backs left over from Korea"

The Ancient Mariner

[Pontius Navigator]

Officers at higher levels are stifling the initiative of junior officers through micromanagement and policies to reduce risk

Happens here too in any sphere.

Command should be devolved to the lowest levels.

Instead even a demand for a minor T&S subsistence has to be approved by a Lt Col. :*

[Op_Twenty]

It’s called empowerment and is a significant leadership tool. I have seen young airmen that I have empowered, deliver such impressive results when left to their own initiative and not micromanaged. Unfortunately, for a commander to empower subordinates he must take a risk and this is where problems arise. As the services continue to reduce in size and with less and less posts to be promoted into, taking risk is a risk in itself. Much better, surely, to tweak with the ‘long screwdriver’ to be certain of an outcome. I recognise how I too have become a product of the leadership that I have served under and can honestly say that I struggle to not reach for that screwdriver too. I also recognise that I too was close to leaving due to the rigidity and risk aversion shown by senior officers that I served under. It’s a very interesting debate about how we develop intuitive-thinking people that can take the initiative and balance risk. Invariably when I empower my subordinates then my contemporaries tell me that I’m taking a risk – that to me is a start.

[E L Whisty]

In my day, when we did leadership and thought that management was for retailers, we called it delegation. And a good leader understood that what you delegate is authority and that you retain responsibility. So if you delegated to a numpty who cocked things up, your boss, quite rightly, questioned your judgement as a leader.

It was, of course, a long long time ago and well before the the loyalty flow pipe was fitted with a non-return valve.

[Tourist]

"It’s called empowerment and is a significant leadership tool. I have seen young airmen that I have empowered, deliver such impressive results when left to their own initiative and not micromanaged"

The exact opposite of the current trend for more and more supervision in the Authorisation chain.
Nobody senior likes self auth anymore

[9.81m/s/s]

In my opinion the RAF is no different. We are so bound by bureaucracy and possible litigation that no-one is prepared to go out on a limb anymore and take risks. Risk taking is/should be endemic to military operations and we have strayed very far from on the spot decision making to get the job done versus on the spot decision making in line with AP/JSP/QR or worse, political correctness/equality and diversity/health and safety.

Our higher echelons are more concerned about their careers and how they are perceived as individuals by their poilitical masters than man managing a talented group of individuals and letting them get on with it. Unfortunately this mindset is, in my opinion, filtering down through the ranks ie ' well if the boss doesn't like it for these reasons and wouldn't sanction it then why should I ?'.

Not good.

[minigundiplomat]

Long since held the opinion that Afg is nothing more than an informal staff college for the legions of SO2's in acting rank out there. That goes for all 3 services.

[Op_Twenty]

An interesting example of a man who was willing to take risk is summed up nicely in 'Tell Me How This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search for a Way out of Iraq' by Linda Robinson. It shows how General Petraeus supported innovation in his junior commanders and allowed them to innovate. It's worth a read.

[c130jbloke]

Try " The Gamble " by Thomas Ricks.

Describes Patreaus' surge into Iraq 2006 - 08. He worked out pretty quickly that leadership was shot to pot in the US Army and that things needed to be changed.

[SASless]

Ya'll need to read Sean Naylor's book...."Not A Good Day To Die....Chaos and Courage in the Mountains of Aghanistan"!

It is the analysis of the Operation Anaconda fiasco prompted by risk aversion, remote commanders ignoring on-scene commanders.....and the fallacy that an Air Force C-141 pilot (having made General) knows something about commanding Army Infantry, Rangers, and Navy/Army/Air Force/SAS Spec Ops personnel engaged in close combat.

Brave men fought and died.....some needlessly...due to a complete meddling in someone else's business.

As the story unfolds.....you just cannot help but shake your head knowing what is going to happen despite the best efforts of the commanders on scene to prevail over the command structure, ROE's, and decisions that placed the troops in the field in great jeapordy and ultimately cost lives.

It was an eye opener!

[minigundiplomat]

Ya'll need to read Sean Naylor's book...."Not A Good Day To Die....Chaos and Courage in the Mountains of Aghanistan"!

It is the analysis of the Operation Anaconda fiasco prompted by risk aversion, remote commanders ignoring on-scene commanders.....and the fallacy that an Air Force C-141 pilot (having made General) knows something about commanding Army Infantry, Rangers, and Navy/Army/Air Force/SAS Spec Ops personnel engaged in close combat.

Brave men fought and died.....some needlessly...due to a complete meddling in someone else's business.

As the story unfolds.....you just cannot help but shake your head knowing what is going to happen despite the best efforts of the commanders on scene to prevail over the command structure, ROE's, and decisions that placed the troops in the field in great jeapordy and ultimately cost lives.

It was an eye opener!

Audacity, Audacity, Audacity. At least one guy knew what he was doing. Good book.

[c130jbloke]

I will third that book :ok:

[Pontius Navigator]

.and the fallacy that an Air Force C-141 pilot (having made General) knows something about commanding Army Infantry, Rangers, and Navy/Army/Air Force/SAS Spec Ops personnel engaged in close combat.. . .

...due to a complete meddling in someone else's business.

despite the best efforts of the commanders on scene to prevail over the command structure, ROE's, and decisions that placed the troops in the field in great jeapordy and ultimately cost lives.

I would venture to suggest it was not a fallacy but a charlie uniform. A 4-star general should be able to lead and use his experts subordinates. He should then represent their expert views to his Command Authority. It would appear the wrong man was selected.

[Kitbag]

and the fallacy that an Air Force C-141 pilot (having made General) knows something about commanding Army Infantry, Rangers, and Navy/Army/Air Force/SAS Spec Ops personnel

So, you don't have to be a fast jet pilot or even aircrew to make CAS anymore? After all, it seems there are nearly as many Rock squadrons rotating on Ops out there as fast jet sqns, and facing danger more regularly these days.

[[email protected]]

No, we just need someone with a spine who knows the difference between management and leadership:{

[E L Whisty]

Roger that Crab!

[SASless]

The situation described in the book where the Ranger QRF had secured the top of Takr Ghur and had taken numerous killed and wounded, some who were in urgent need of care, being denied a Medavac flight until several hours after dark, just makes one willing to strangle (read that...choke the life out of a useless piece of sh@t while gazing into his dying eyes!). The whole time that was going on....some Recce guys from a separate location was confirming what the Ranger commander was saying by means of a different chain of command. A young USAF PJ bled out and died as a result of the decision.

The Air Force General called his next higher and was supported in that decision....all by Tele Conference between Bahrain and the USA. It must be a comforting thought to be in a fierce firefight with superior numbers of the enemy, freezing on a mountain top in Afghanistan, with dead and wounded all around you, and know some General tens of thousands of miles away has your best interests at heart.....all the while ignoring your assessment of the situation.

We owe this generation of Warriors much better than what they have gotten from their commanders!

[Diablo Rouge]

if it hasn't been specifically authorised, it's forbidden
This is the reality of RAF circa 2009. Everybody likes to think that we have faith in the youth and that empowerment exists, but it does not, and when the brown stuff hits the fan, commanders run for cover and I am afraid that the old, old, story of poo rolling downhill is the order of the day. It may well be that the said commanders have a chat behind closed doors but the system is punishing those who when faced with decisions to make, have the morale courage to go ahead and make a decision.
if it hasn't been specifically forbidden, use your judgement and be prepared to give it a go".

I know of an ongoing disciplinary case that should never have seen the light of day. Ironically the individual concerned has had enough and is now leaving the service, and leaving a service that gave him no support, so you cannot really blame him. In fact it was dissapointing to watch how many war dodgers were happy to put the boot in whilst the man was down, thriving on their own self importance.

Whatever happened to "Praise in public / bollock in private", but get the job done to the best of your ability, and if your in the quano make sure the boss knows so the deflecters can be raised.

It is indecision and the selfishness of self centred individuals that are surviving. IMHO this means that it will get worse in the future as traditional military leadership and ethos decline.

[Andu]

Wasn't the first glaring example of this imbecilic 'micromanagement from afar' (made hugely worse by improved comms, which allow the armchair generals at HQ 'real time' contact with the PBI in the field) the debacle of attempting to rescue the hostages held by the Iranians, (when was it?) back in 1980?

From what I've read, the small cheese decisions in that cluster***k went as high as Jimmy *** Carter himself.

I've head similar comments made about the (again unsuccessful) attempt to rescue prisoners from North Vietnam (the Son Tay raid) in the early 70s.

[Easy Street]

Illustrating the title of this thread nicely, and showing that risk aversion is starting earlier and earlier amongst the greasy-pole-climbers, I heard scuttlebutt* around the crewroom that an individual recently elected not to apply for his type's QWI/QHTI/QMETI course (left deliberately vague to obscure identity). So what, you might say? Well, his reasoning (apparently) was that attempting and failing the course would not look good on his career profile, and simply not having the qualification was good enough. This spineless decision was duly rewarded with promotion on the recent list. It makes you wonder what kind of stuff is floating to the top of our wonderful organisation - whatever happened to leading by example?

* well, this is meant to be a rumour network!

[[email protected]]

Easy - just goes to show that you don't get promoted for being good at your job - I bet this guy had some great high-profile secondary duties though:ugh:

[Pontius Navigator]

I have always had the feeling that becoming a QFI was the kiss of death. How many SOs are Q qualified? I know there are exceptions, I think BEagle's friend B Bill was a QFI. The difference there was that he was one of the initial QFI on the F4.

[BEagle]

PN, I understand he was a 'creamie' on the Vampire T11 before his first Lightning tour.

[Op_Twenty]

CAS ACM Torpy was a CFS QFI apparently, but I agree, QWI is the way to the top, not QFI - they don't tell you that when they need people to go instruct the baby pilots though - creates real problems with your OJAR!

When I was at baby staff college, a lecturer from a local Uni asked the class of 40 to name a senior officer who had inspired them. Honestly, nobody could, I felt that was pretty bad - let's not get into a 'who inspired me' type bit here but I feel that the Americans have some pretty inspirational senior guys right now, ours seem too political and remote.

[threeputt]

Dec C in C Ops at Air Command was a Bucc and Tornado QWI, CJO a Tornado QWI. However, on the counter point to that, AOC 2 Gp was a feckin creamie!

3P:ok:

[dallas]

It is the analysis of the Operation Anaconda fiasco prompted by risk aversion, remote commanders ignoring on-scene commanders.....and the fallacy that an Air Force C-141 pilot (having made General) knows something about commanding Army Infantry, Rangers, and Navy/Army/Air Force/SAS Spec Ops personnel engaged in close combat.
A 4-star general should be able to lead and use his experts subordinates.
Bingo, Pontius. One of my ex-bosses noticed this phenomenon coming to the fore not long after 9/11; he said it had become cultural among senior officers never to admit or imply a lack of subject matter expertise - no matter how arcane that subject - for fear it would at least appear as a sign of weakness, if not be exploited by a peer.

[Wiley]

It’s endemic, I think, and not new. To quote Major Harry Smith (CO D Coy, 6RAR) in part 5 of the 5 part documentary that can be seen here YouTube - THE BATTLE OF LONG TAN (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vDK0epYqDVo&feature=related) , as his unit was looking like it was about to overrun by vastly superior forces:

(With classic understatement...) “We looked like being in trouble so I asked (the Arty FOO) to drop the guns by 50, which means they come 50 metres closer to us... and the word came down the line from the Task Force Operations Centre: ‘We consider that is unsafe.’

“Well... that was like holding a red rag to a bull with me, and I think my words were: ‘Look, just put the effing guns down where we want them, otherwise you’ll lose the whole bloody lot of us.’ I just got a little bit upset that people from somewhere else were trying to direct a battle we were involved in.”

(I suspect there'd be quite a few junior and middle ranking officers in today's armed forces who'd echo those sentiments with some feeling.)

Earlier in the same engagement, Sergeant Bob Buick, 11 Platoon Commander after his officer had been killed, called for the arty onto his own location – not, I would imagine, a fire order that too many arty FOO’s have received.

The documentary is well worth watching. (The links to the other four parts are in the sidebar.) And it has an aviation aspect. The resupply sorties to the beleaguered company by two RAAF Hueys at the height of the battle were seriously 'John Wayne' affairs.

[Diablo Rouge]

To broaden the scope of what is an interesting debate. I suspect that pretty much all readers here will have been fed doctrine regarding leadership styles at some time or other. ....and most military analysists in history have decreed that a different style of leadership is required in a peacetime force to that of a force in conflict. How often is "politics" or "lining his nest" used when condemning the leadership qualities of starred officers.

So to get to the point: Are we mismatched with our current leadership across the board, as in a peacetime politically correct band of brothers as opposed to slightly autocratic leaders of men engaged in battle. (Apologies to lady viewers for the terminology, please treat it as men and women) The alternative is that we are perhaps balanced or compromised and not actually providing what is needed in war or peace.

......and with that little hand grenade; over to you.

[E L Whisty]

To my mind, the fundamental problem is that military service has become intellectualised. In the late 60s / early 70's the Royal Air Force started working towards an all graduate officer corps. It became a self fulfilling prophesy.

Naturally, degrees were seen as an attribute that outweighed other officer qualities and, in my opinion, some poor officers were promoted beyond their military ability. Decision making authority, inevitably, drifted up the pay grades.

The problem was exacerbated by the fact that many of the graduates had not been immersed in the military culture from youth. Some were most definitely not the sort that one would want to 'share a fox hole with'. These tended to be, I suspected, those who saw the service as a career and thought their ambition a virtue. My view was that it was a vocation and my duty was to serve to the best of my ability, whatever the post or rank.

I served on one squadron, as a senior Flt Lt, with a bunch of execs (Sqn Ldrs) who were virtually ineffective as they devoted the great majority of their effort into management initiatives that would appeal to their reporting officers. Little effort was put into maintaining, or even building, operational effectiveness and we had a large number of, IMHO, lazy and incompetent junior officers.

I left the service, got a degree and became an academic. I found to my horror that the problems became worse. An American very senior officer told me that it was planned that no officer might become a colonel without a PhD. I wondered how much operational experience an officer of that rank might have - at say 40 y.o.a. - having done a Bachelors (3 yr) , Masters (1 yr) and PhD (3 yr) degrees.

It may be that the services (I have been out a long time now) have become far too management oriented and not enough people oriented. Certainly, I find laughable the management guff that one sees coming out of the MoD. The very idea of 'customers' would have been laughed at out loud up to the mid-70s. The procurement management scandals have not become fewer nor less ludicrous since the adoption of 'new management practices'.

If we have to go to war big time, i.e. to directly defend our sovereign territory again, we are going to need some pretty amazingly strong politicians because the first thing they will need to do is fire all of the managers in uniform and find some leaders with a bit of back bone.

[Stitchbitch]

It doesn't just happen at the top end, there are some JOs & seniors who think they must keep creative thinking underwraps, thus tieing the hands of some very capable people. High profile secondary duties and arse licking can only get you by so far, you get found out eventually when others have to pull in the slack to do the job for them. IMHO.:ugh:

[Brakes to Park]

Slightly off topic but can anyone tell me the difference between "leaving the Service" and "retiring from the Service". Someone I joined up with 32 years ago and who has made it to Air Cdre is doing the former so just curious that's all.

[Modern Elmo]

... and the Army chief of staff, Gen. George Casey, have been trying to fix this problem ...

No, wrong, Casey is part of the pee cee problem. The sooner he's retired, the better.

[Pontius Navigator]

There is certainly a miss match between leadership and management, between say Lt Col and Col (I used Army ranks advisedly).

The organisation I just left has a CEO and a COO. These are civilian terms and readily recognisable in industry. It helps in arguing for pay comparisons and also transfer between the public and private sectors.

The CEO I have in mind is 3* admiral and the COO a 2* civil servant who has come in from industry.

[dallas]

High profile secondary duties and arse licking can only get you by so far, you get found out eventually when others have to pull in the slack to do the job for them. IMHO.:ugh:
After just missing out by one place on the last board that was of interest to me - I was 6, they needed 5 - my decision to leave was reinforced when I met one of my 'winning competitors' who was crap at most things except posturising. He mentioned one day with some glee that his previous boss wasn't interested in writing reports, and had let him write his own for his signature. Irrespective of how good or not I was at my job - and many would say quite good - I couldn't compete with people writing their own reports, and I'm afraid to say this wasn't a one-off case. I'm not sure if the guy mentioned above arse licked or not - I suppose he didn't really need to do much more than show up for work on time...

[endplay]

Forgiveness is much easier to obtain than permission.

[trap one]

Leaving the Service implies that they are exiting at a point other than the retirement date originally set. So for example if you exit at an option point you are leaving if you exit at your 55th birthday then you are retiring. Conversely not sure that "stars" can retire as they are subject to imediate recall and get a higher pension because of it. But then again I left a while back and it could all have changed the "stars"

[hello1]

name a senior officer who had inspired them

Gibson
Cheshire
Nelson
Slim

[SASless]

You served with these fellows? You must be getting a bit long in the Tooth!

[Pontius Navigator]

Gus Walker, and yes I did serve with him.