Jet Airways check pilot pulls CB on finals

[Hotel Mode]

From the Times of India Check pilot's prank nearly crashes Jet flight - India - The Times of India (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/i...Jet-flight/articleshow/5290059.cms)

Pretty unbelieveable if true.

MUMBAI: A Jet Airways flight coming in to land in Mumbai in October lost height faster than the prescribed rate of descent as the auto-pilot
tripped, the flight director disappeared and the ground-proximity warning system went off. The flight finally landed safely — with none of its passengers hurt or even aware how close they had come to disaster, but for the experienced pilot and tons of luck.

The dangerous turn of events began — about 3,700 feet above the ground — when a check pilot, seated behind the commander and the first officer on the Jet Airways Delhi-Mumbai flight, pulled out a circuit-breaker. He did it ostensibly to check the pilot's ability to handle an emergency. Only, such checks are always done in simulators — never with a plane load of people.

The unthinking act set off a chain reaction, tripping the autopilot, making the flight director indications disappear and turning off the ground-proximity warning system. The aircraft went sinking at a rate faster than the maximum prescribed descent of 1,000 feet per minute over the hills behind Jarimari, Andheri, but — despite all this — the aircraft managed to make a safe landing.

Jet Airways has ordered a probe. But it has not derostered the check pilot though both aircraft manufacturers Boeing and Airbus have a strict policy warning flight crew against use of circuit-breakers during flight — they are not pulled even on a check or a test flight. A Jet Airways spokesperson said: ``The flight had a normal approach and landing, carried out safely within the acceptable parameters. An internal inquiry is in progress.''

But inquiries and investigations are not carried out for flights that are ``operated safely within the acceptable parameters'' and an exceeding high sink rate is not an acceptable parameter, say aviation experts. The matter is over a month old but the inquiry is still in progress and no action has been taken against the pilot concerned.

The Directorate-General of Civil Aviation too has initiated an inquiry. ``I will be able to comment only after I have the facts from the air safety department,'' director-general Nasim Zaidi said.

When the commander was interrogated, he said (and gave it in writing) that after the aircraft landed, the ACM revealed to him that he had pulled out the circuit-breaker on Radio Altimeter 1 ``just to see his reaction to failures''.

The incident took place on October 20 on flight 9W 332 around 8.50am, during the morning peak hour. The check pilot was flying as an additional crew member (ACM) in the jump seat located behind the pilots' seats. An ACM's status is that of a passenger and s/he is not supposed to touch the flight controls. ``The aircraft was established on the Instrument Landing System (ILS) for runway 27,'' an official said, implying the aircraft was coming in to land from the east and was about 3,700 feet high and had got visual guidance to help it descend and touch down on the runway 27 centre line.

``At that instant, the autopilot tripped and the flight director disappeared,'' he added. A flight director gives visual cues to the pilot who follows it by, say, turning left or right or pitching the aircraft up or down to take it to its destination.

So, with both vital navigation instruments failing, the commander took over the flight controls to bring in the plane for landing entirely manually. ``But the aircraft started sinking fast. It was going down faster than 1000 feet a minute, the maximum prescribed descent rate. It was a dangerous situation as the approach to runway 27 was over hilly terrain,'' the official said.

When an aircraft has a higher-than-normal descent rate, the enhanced ground proximity warning system (EGPWS) blares out a loud aural warning, ``sink rate whoop whoop pull up'' continuously till the descent rate is slowed down.

But no such alarm went off in this cockpit. ``A pilot can do the job of an autopilot; he can land, albeit with difficulty, without the help of a flight director. But neither can he nor any other instrument in the cockpit do the job of an EGPWS,'' said the source.

It is such a critical equipment to prevent crashes that the International Civil Aviation Organisation mandates that no passenger aircraft should fly without a functioning EGPWS. Jet Airways confirmed that the EGPWS warning was not received. This confirms a system malfunction or a deactivation of the system.

``Since the sink rate was very high, the Digital Flight Data Recorder showed up an `exceedance report', which was picked up by the airline's flight safety department after the aircraft landed,'' said the source.

``It is a very dangerous thing to do as pulling out a C/B can render unintended systems to fail, like the EGPWS failure in this case. No pilot would want to fly without an EGPWS,'' an official said. Aircraft manufacturers are so careful about C/Bs that these switches are not installed at locations easily accessible or even viewable from the pilot's seat. It is located behind the seat as Airbus and Boeing did not consider the possibility of an ACM pulling out a C/B.

[FLCH]

Prank ?

I'd call it dereliction of duty. What do you suppose he thinks simulators are for ? I hope he flies a desk for a while, just to clip his ego.

[RoyHudd]

He deserves to be pulled off-line and smacked.

[Pugilistic Animus]

reminds me of a bad redition of EKG's 'matches':E

[DownIn3Green]

Messing around with systems in flight????

Remember the DC-4 (Air Pennsylvania, I believe) in the 1940's???

Check pilot engaged the gust lock during cruise @ 4,000 ft. The aircraft started to climb, the Capt added nose down trim, Ck Pilot disengages the gust, and voila...the first half of an outside loop...A CAA (pre-FAA) Cessna was behind the flight and witnessed it....

60+ yrs later and we still haven't learned...

[Airbubba]

Remember the DC-4 (Air Pennsylvania, I believe) in the 1940's???

Actually, I think it was American Airlines near El Paso, here's a contemporary account from Time magazine:



TRANSPORT: Boys Will Be Boys

Monday, Oct. 27, 1947

Fortnight ago the heads of American Airlines faced an embarrassing task—explaining why one of their DC-4's had gone into a violent dive, on a clear, calm day near El Paso, had flown upside down, and dumped 48 fear-stricken passengers* out of their seats. After some consideration they decided not to talk at all. But last week the Civil Aeronautics Board revealed the simple, if startling, truth. The whole thing had been a, witless practical joke.

Its perpetrator was the plane's veteran chief pilot, Captain Charles R. Sisto, of Los Angeles. Captain Sisto was riding as a check pilot while another pilot, Captain John Beck, familiarized himself with the route. As the plane snored west at 8,000 feet, Sisto reached down from a jump seat behind Beck and fastened the gust lock—a device used to lock the rudder, elevator and ailerons while the plane is on the ground.

The plane began a steady climb. Puzzled, Pilot Beck adjusted trim tabs on the plane's control surfaces to bring the nose down. Then, still undetected, Sisto released the gust lock. The plane immediately went into an outside loop. Both Sisto and Beck, neither of whom had fastened his safety belt, were thrown from their seats. Two things saved the plane. Sisto struck buttons which feathered the propellors of three engines. Copilot Melvin Logan, who was securely belted in, was able to roll the ship right side up, a bare 300 to 400 feet from the ground.

Captain Sisto resigned (many airmen thought he should have been fired, many others thought he should have been jailed). If the plane had crashed, killing passengers and crew, it would doubtless have been added to the list of unexplainable accidents.

*A Frenchman, doused with the contents of the plane's chemical toilet, was apologetically informed: "This is not normal operating procedure in American airplanes."



TRANSPORT: Boys Will Be Boys - TIME (http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,854796,00.html)

Sisto's pilot licenses were pulled and he appealed unsuccessfully:

179 F2d 47 Sisto v. Civil Aeronautics Board | Open Jurist (http://openjurist.org/179/f2d/47)

Apparently, he later got at least a commercial license back since he flew as a copilot for Transocean Airlines a few years afterward (another version of the gustlock incident is here):

One of the More Unusual Pilots a (http://www.transoceanairlines.com/sisto.html)

[Graybeard]

Are pilots really so out of touch that a single radio altimeter failure (at any altitude, btw) would cause an accident? Heaven help us.

GB

[lomapaseo]

Are pilots really so out of touch that a single radio altimeter failure (at any altitude, btw) would cause an accident? Heaven help us.

GB

dunno ... maybe that was what the check pilot was trying to find out.

Did he pass?

[Brian Abraham]

Graybeard, SLF here, but post 1000 on the Turkish Schiphol accident.

http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/363645-turkish-airliner-crashes-schiphol-50.html
It sounds like the left radalt failed, and the pilots may not have noticed, or handled it correctly. Also sounds like Boeing will discuss radalt issues and their effect on the AT system.

[Jetjock330]

Have the check pilot arrested on landing in Mumbai for endangering the safety of the aircraft!:ok:

[Guttn]

2 things are disturbing to me about this incident;

1. In VMC conditions (they called for a visual appr), with the AP failed as well as the EGWPS, the crew is back to godd old fashioned stick, rudder and power to land the aircraft from an altitude higher than approach minimums. It appears that this was very surprising to them, and it took a little bit of "manoeuvering" to re-establish somewhat of a final approach. Is this the state of aviation nowadays? Is this perhaps what sublimely lies behind why the FAA wants more thourough pilot training and screening? BTW, did this crew pass?

2. Was the check pilot trying to prove a point to someone (himself, the training sept, the crew?)?. In any case it appears he unveiled rust of handling skills by the crew, as well as a confidence with the auto-systems onboard. But with pax onboard!?!?!? On a ferryflight, sure, but not on a commercial flight. That`s what the sim is for (and one can always argue the value of knowing that you are in a sim vs the real thing, but that`s another thread). But, does this call for disciplinary action by the company, or evn the local CAA?

Or.... is this just more journalistic sensationalism to feed the hysteria fire?

[Mach E Avelli]

Arresting him could be a bit harsh. Ever watched 'Slum Dog Millionaire' ?
I would simply demote him to First Officer for five years, and in that time make him responsible for learning then teaching CRM, TEM and all those other exciting subjects that we get to do these days to make us more aware of our limitations.
It's called rehab.

[fatbus]

Just revoke his ATPL and let him survive on his big EGO, what an idiot can a pilot be any more stupid. The pax should sue Jet Airways and then see what Jet does to the guy.Very unsafe, out right dangerous

[Clandestino]

Absolutely! The article clearly states that both autopilot and flight director are "vital navigation instruments". We have to ask questions about the safety of aeroplane design that lets AP and FD fail after radalt CB is pulled!

If you wonder, my tongue is firmly planted in cheek.

[bucket_and_spade]

What a nightmare scenario to be in. To look down and see no flight director commanding a left/right or up/down correction must be bloody scary, I think we can all agree on that. Especially with the runway and PAPIs out the window to confuse the already assaulted senses. It's all very well sitting in front of a laptop screen in a warm lounge and spouting out stuff about setting appropriate pitch and power and keeping the TDZ stationary in the windscreen but you're missing the point - THE FLIGHT DIRECTOR had failed. Manually landing an airliner is next to impossible with the failures they got. Bravo I say.

P.S. Agreed, the check pilot was a numpty.

[max alt]

I hope that the so called check pilot is suspended and then sacked as a result.To pull Cb's on a chk flight is crass stupidity and very dangerous.It reminds me of the "The right stuff flight training regime" that we all recognise today could not be further from the ideal.Unbelievable.
The simulator is the place to have highlighted this potential fault to demonstrate its effects.That's called training.
Joe,TRE Retired.

[Juan Tugoh]

The aircraft landed safely after the radalt cb was pulled, pilots should be able to fly an ILS raw data no AP and no FD. All true.

Modern aircraft are highly complex and the systems are hugely interrelated, the failure of one system is rarely a single event with no other consequence than the single failure. In this case the AP FD and EGPWS all failed. The MEL will tell you whether it is legally acceptable to fly in this situation and what maintenance and operational actions are required for the flight to be undertaken. In flight events are dealt with by the QRH.

The problem here is the astounding actions of the check pilot who deliberately degraded the aircraft's systems during a critical phase of flight. Apart from the manufacturers instructions about not pulling a CB except as mandated as part of a QRH drill - it is common sense that you do not do this.
The mere fact that this Check Pilot thought he knew more than the manufacturers and was so smart and able that he could deal with any situation that arose as a result of his actions FROM THE JUMP SEAT beggars belief. We are all aware that accidents are the result of all the holes in the swiss cheese lining up - why on earth would any professional aviator deliberately reduce flight safety by lining some holes up intentionally. There is a place for these actions - the simulator, as any half decent pilot, let alone check pilot knows.

This man should be grounded by the company pending a full investigation. Failing that the regulators should pull his licence until the full facts are known.

[Basil]

I suspect a line checker did that to me on a Cat3 approach - and pulled another little stunt.
You know who you are :*

[Clandestino]

If the news report (and that's one big if) bears some semblance to what has actually happened, than we have at least two issues here:

1) jumpseating checker pulling illegal and not quite smart stunt.
2) his stunt uncovering deficient manual flying skills on the part of the flightcrew.

However, I'd wait for official word before getting overly excited over it. I won't hold my breath though.

OFFTOPIC:

DownIn3Green, DC-4 dive at Bainbridge was suspected, but AFAIK not proven, on "unporting" - elevators losing balance and going fully nose down because of the missing hinge bolt. EK Gann's "Fate is the hunter" has a fantastic chapter on it.

Interestingly, capt Sisto was at Lester's groundschool with mr. Gann and he was described as "defiant" and "incorrigible" by the later.

[Allocate_on_Arrival]

I suspect a line checker did that to me on a Cat3 approach - and pulled another little stunt.
You know who you are

MOR and CHIRP with the offenders licence number attached - it has to be done as what the offender did (if he did in fact do it) is wholly unacceptable.

It's not about the handling skills of the crew. To me that's completely irrelevant. If the check pilot suspected handling deficiencies then he reports his concerns and recommends a sim-check, it's not a massive deal. All crews should be able to fly a manual approach, no arguments there!

With regards FD/AP off approaches: They are not in themselves dangerous or even non-standard, but there is a time and a place. To say they are essentials is plain wrong (with the obvious exceptions) and smacks of over-reliance on technology - they are in the category "Nice to have, but can deal without"

What is a massive deal is the deliberately pulled circuit breaker (and it doesn't matter a jot which one is was) and the operation of the aircraft in a manner which is not only forbidden by the aircraft manufacturer but is also in violation of SOP's, no doubt, the TR manual, one's common sense and finally, is illegal ... not to mention the fact he wasn't even flying (or in a seat where he would be able to do so if something had gone wrong).

At the very least his licence should be revoked and he should be sacked. In my opinion he should also face appropriate criminal charges.
(and I'd quite like to see a poll of people who agree with me)

Less focus on the ineptitude of the crew and more on the outrageously dangerous actions of the idiot on the jump seat.

A_o_A

[p51guy]

I am amazed that crew was able to get that crippled airliner with no FD, autopilot and EGPWS from way up at 3700 feet to the runway with no damage or casualties. I know they were doing a visual approach but that doesn't take away the heroic way they saved the day. Phew.

[weido_salt]

The time and place for creating situations out of the ordinary is in the simulator, not in the aircraft, whether it is ferry flight, empty flight or a flight with pax. Common sense would dictate that surely? We try and stay out of trouble in the aircraft, not look for it.

My recommendation would be to certainly pull his check certificate. I don't believe he should have his livelihood lost by taking away his licence. I would recommend he be demoted to F/O until he learns some common sense, maybe a year or two as an example to others with huge egos and nothing between the ears.. believe me when I say most of them are well up on the theory. Oh yes they can recite manuals etc., word for word but a lot of them "cant see the wood for the trees."

If the checker was an expat he would be gone of course and rightly so in my opinion. However if it was a local, then he will be put off flying duty on full pay until it all blows over. The speed of which, will be determined by the next incident, or god forbid accident.... then he will be back, rest assured.

[IweinVanCaelenberg]

it's almost as bad as having to ditch in the Hudson river. let's give these guys second prize as aviators of the year

[latetonite]

``A pilot can do the job of an autopilot; he can land, albeit with difficulty, without the help of a flight director.


Times have changed, if now a single circuit breaker in the cockpit pops, we are e all in serious danger of crashing and burning. :\

[Basil]

Allocate_on_Arrival,
I just suspect but cannot prove. Anyway, it's all water under the bridge. Next time I meet up with anyone from that particular outfit, I'll make discreet enquiries.

[Graybeard]

The pilot flying should have been sent back to recurrent to develop flying skills. The crybaby pilot reporting the incident should have been fired.

There are critical, essential and nonessential categories of equipment on airplanes. The radio is only critical during Cat III autoland. That's why it has a backup or two. At any other time it's only essential, which means the flight can be completed without hazard. Whether a CB pops, or the radalt fails internally, which can and will happen at any time, it must be accommodated as routine. I don't fault the check pilot at all. He did that in benign conditions.
He may have overestimated the competence of the pilot, however.

I'll be riding SLF across the US on A320 today. This pilot incompetence display and all the condemning of the check pilot on here has me wary..

GB

[captjns]

Ahhh the gadgetry that separates the Microsoft pilots from the stick and rudder pilots.

[ZEEBEE]

I believe that failing a radAlt on short final has more implications than just no GPWS.

Perhaps some A320 jocks can correct me, but as I understand it, the system needs the RadAlt to overide the Alpha floor function when the intention is to flare and land, otherwise, the thing wants to power up and maintain height.

Recognising the failure and reverting to a lower law is part of the exercise.

[akindofmagic]

Graybeard: Are you for real, or have I missed some hidden irony in your post?
The training captain in this case has done something that is, on the face of it, illegal; he has wilfully gone against the manufacturer's recommendation, and therefore by extrapolation will also have gone outside his own company's SOPs. There can be no excuse.
Your post displays a quite staggering lack of understanding of airline operations.

[Cough]

ZeeBee - A 737 remains in normal law all the time!

[ZEEBEE]

ZeeBee - A 737 remains in normal law all the time!

Yes it does Cough :ok:

I understood Jet operated A320's and there was a reference to an A320 in one of the posts .

[Allocate_on_Arrival]

A 737 remains in normal law all the time!

More like direct law with 2 missing tray tables...

[Monom]

Many years ago I had a wing a/ice problem. Outstation engr isolated the system. On finals at base - Ldg Ckecks ..." Ldg Gear ... Oh dear, no greens. G/A. Check everything. No greens. Briefed No 1 Should be no problem, but if expensive noises, you will know the worst." Later turned out that pulling Wing A/Ice CB's also isolated the gear wngs - but obviously not EICAS because it stayed mum (but don't worry, it was soon changed!). Manufacturer's engr told me that up to 10 different functions can be routed through any one CB (and you are rarely let into the secret).

[DownIn3Green]

Airbubba...You're right...The AA crew was at 8,000 ft and survived because the props were "feathered" because the 2 Capt's hit the feathering buttons with their heads....

Their testimony solved the earlier accident I mentioned, as they were at 4,000 ft and didn't have the alt for recovery...

See or read Robert Serling's "The Left Seat"...fiction based on real events...

Great post BTW...

[IGh]

Cited by Down3Green above:
"... testimony solved the earlier accident I mentioned ..."

Prior similar DC-4 tuck-under mishap: Eastern DC-4 30May47 day light cruise upset at 4000' near Bainbridge MD (Port Deposit); pitched down dived into ground. Capt Bill Coney, FO K.V. Willingham, 53 fatalities. Upset had been observed by by "government investigators" flying three miles behind: first it "tucked-under" then entered vertical dive. Investigators tested the DC-4 Gust Lock engagement with pitch trim use, and duplicated the upset. CAB AAR included the Gust Lock hypothesis as only one of ten possible causes. [Solberg's "Conquest" pg 324, AW 47:12 Ag 25 '47.]

[thepotato232]

A lot of the PPRuNe crowd is evidently unfamiliar with the sensationalist tack of most media with regards to air travel, especially out of India. Nothing in that article leads me to believe that the aircraft was ever in any danger after the pilots lost their "vital" navigation instruments. There is plenty in that article, however, that leads me to believe that the check airman needs to be sacked, at the very least.

It's a shame we still hear of incidents like this from time to time. Reminds me of a story I heard of a check airman out of a country in Central America who pulled one of the throttles back on a heavy B727 to see if the pilot could handle a V2 cut. He was removed from service soon after. I know that if any check pilot on one of my flights were to concoct a "test" like that, he would witness a sterling example of the methods by which a crew member should deal with an in-flight saboteur.

[Flight Detent]

hey "AoA"...you can't get away with that...

quote "A 737 remains in normal law all the time!
More like direct law with 2 missing tray tables..."

should refer as "A 320 remains in normal law most of the time!
More like direct law with 2 missing control columns..."

arhhh...looks much better!

Cheers...FD...:)

[kotakota]

Gentlemen , Jet only operates 737 ,so all 320 speculation is pointless.

[Huck]

A pilot can do the job of an autopilot; he can land, albeit with difficulty, without the help of a flight director. But neither can he nor any other instrument in the cockpit do the job of an EGPWS

Jesus God.

411A's going to stroke out when he reads that.....

[411A]

Quote:
A pilot can do the job of an autopilot; he can land, albeit with difficulty, without the help of a flight director. But neither can he nor any other instrument in the cockpit do the job of an EGPWS


Just fell off the chair, laughing...:)

[Flightdeckone]

My goodnes me, imagine having to land a 737 raw data in visual conditions. I'm amazed that this didn't make media headlines around the globe. Terrified passangers fearing for ther lives etc.........:D

[weido_salt]

When I read the quote I didnt know whether to laugh or cry. I still have tears in my eyes.

[BSD]

Good Lord, that is what the simulator is for for heaven's sakes.

One of my earliest pals in aviation lost his life in a Westwind that plunged into the water after departing Sydney in the late 70s.

The reason: a circuit breaker pulled by the training Capt. on a line check. A subsequent further failure rendered the situation irrecoverable.

Google it and read it for yourself. The real tragedy was that the trainer had a history of such stunts, was known for it, and was left to his own (stupid) devices. If he'd been "given correct guidance" my mate O*** would b e here today.

Cross Jet airways off my list of acceptable carriers.

BSD.

[BOAC]

I'm still innocent enough to have a strong suspicion that some of our posters have allowed themselves to be caught on a fly line.

[BSD]

BOAC me old, I hope you are right: if not it's an almost risible act of crassness.

BSD.

[p51guy]

Maybe some people actually believe the sarcasm posted by real pilots is true. God help us if they really meant it.

[Capt Pit Bull]

I don't think anyone disputes that a pilot should be able to fly a raw data approach. But if a checker has a legitimate need to see it done, then it should be done by turning off the FD, not pulling circuit breakers!

And sudden unexpected failures should be reserved for the sim, you never know when a real failure is going to crawl out of the woodwork. Or if it already has, and you just killed the redundant system.

And as an aside, on the topic of raw data flying: Whilst being able to do it is clearly essential before any gets too smug about their ability to manage it do bear in mind that if you have too, then it usually means the aeroplane is a lot sicker than just not showing its magenta bars.

pb

[potkettleblack]

Assuming of course that this is true then I would have called the go around. When we were nicely stabilised in the climb out (or level off potentially depending on the MA altitude given that they were at 3700ft allegedly) I would then reach for the PA handset and pass it to the checker and ask them ever so nicely if they could let the passengers know what is going on and the reasons for us going around. We would then enter a hold, sort ourselves out and brief for the next approach. The rest can get discussed on the ground when the parking brake is set.

[sabenaboy]

If a check pilot would have done that to me in benign conditions in light traffic conditions, I would probably not have noticed the FD failing as it would have been OFF already, just like the autothrust. I fly the A320. Time permitting I would have handled the associated ECAM warning quicky or simply assessed it as being "disregardable" until after landing.

Although there are a lot of comments here dripping with irony in this thread, it does scare me that there are some here that really appear to think that having to fly an airliner without FD and AT is dangerous or an emergency.

Even though I don't think it's a good idea to pull CB's on a commercial flight with pax, I do agree with Greybeard (reply 28 (http://www.pprune.org/5355893-post28.html) ) on this one.


@akindofmagic:

Graybeard: Are you for real, or have I missed some hidden irony in your post?
The training captain in this case has done something that is, on the face of it, illegal; he has wilfully gone against the manufacturer's recommendation, and therefore by extrapolation will also have gone outside his own company's SOPs. There can be no excuse.
Your post displays a quite staggering lack of understanding of airline operations.

Akindofmagic, From your profile I know that you're a 24 yr old CPL who spends most of his time in "the Interviews, jobs & sponsorship"-forum on the CTC wings (cadets) thread. You're really not in a position to be telling others they display a quite staggering lack of understanding of airline operations.

[captain.diperkosa]

Pay peanuts you get monkeys

[akindofmagic]

I'm a pilot for a major UK charter carrier. Hence, I feel qualified to comment.

I find it quite simply shocking that some people on here seem to think it's absolutely acceptable to deviate from the airframer's recommendations for no good reason. It should not be in dispute that a pilot should be able to fly on raw data; however, there can be no excuse for the behaviour of the training captain in this case (assuming of course that the facts as presented are correct).

[despegue]

Completely agree with Sabenaboy:ok:

It is stunning that we continue to see (mostly young) pilots who think that SOP's are more important to flight safety than decent stick-and rudder.
Makes me even more convinced that if it ain't with a Belgian I ain't goin':} (just a joke, but I do want to see a good standard in the cockpit, not merely button pushers )

Although I don't pull CB's "just for fun" and would NOT appreciate it when a jumpseater pulled that one on me...The operating crew should get some flight-training and the jumpseater his/hers rights removed.

[Capt Turbo]

What I hear from my Indian friends is that this guy is a checker all right, but was just flying jumpseat as a pax. He apparently is not a regular with Jet, but a DGCA (Indian CAA) kingpin who is attached to Jet to overlook their flight safety standards. That explains why Jet did not deroster him on the spot, since these types seems to be above the law.

In India with its runaway expansion in aviation in recent years there has not been time to indulge in such details as the ability to handle big aircraft in raw data. A not uncommon career path is quickly through a pilot factory in the US and then - without any further increase in qualifications apart from a quick type rating- on to a 737 or 320. That is why the government has decided that all expat pilots must leave India in 6 month to make room for thousands of highly skilled (250hrs) local heroes. And that is why it is an established fact (by the Indian press) that flying without all support systems constitutes a near emergency.

Incredible? - no, it´s India. :eek:

[Zippy Monster]

It is stunning that we continue to see (mostly young) pilots who think that SOP's are more important to flight safety than decent stick-and rudder.

I've just read through the whole thread and can't see anyone suggesting that anywhere.

Surely both are equally important. It goes without saying that one should be able to land manually on raw data where appropriate, but SOPs are there for a reason.

[sabenaboy]

Surely both are equally important. It goes without saying that one should be able to land manually on raw data where appropriate, but SOPs are there for a reason.

Absolutely. GOOD SOP's are very important but...

SOP's are made for the blind obedience by fools, and as guidelines for wise men!

To me that means that I will follow the SOP's as long as there is no good reason not to, but if necessary and safe, I will deviate from them!

Isn't that the reason why airliners are still being flown by humans and not by computers! (No, even A320's are not captained by computers := )

Best regards,
Sabenaboy

[sky jet]

Those picking on the flying pilots skill should back off a bit. If when the auto pilot kicked off the aircraft was in a config change and triming for it, a high RATE of decent could begin. If close enough to the ground it does not take much of a deviation for this to be flagged on the DFDR reports. Other media reports and local comments state that this incident was discovered by DFDR monitering. If less than 1000' agl and greater than 1000' per minute that would be "high rate of decent" per most companies SOP's. The papers here in India are the most sensational I have seen anywhere in the world when it comes to aviation. If it is a slow enough day a wx deviation can and has made the front page of national newspapers and "breaking news" on television. Having said that the ACM should at the very least lose check airman status and be returned to the FO seat for a while. As for the flying pilot, I will hold judgment for more information. The Times of India when covering anything aviation has been on more than one occasion been refered to as the TOI let of India.

Jet

[akindofmagic]

I don't think that anyone has suggested that blind adherence to SOPs is either necessary or indeed desirable, and there will be occasions where deviations are required.

However, in this case the deviation from SOP (again, assuming all the facts are correct) was completely unnecessary, and could potentially have resulted in a dangerous situation developing.

Can you explain, sabenaboy, how you consider that it was necessary and safe to pull a circuit breaker in this case, in contravention of explicit instructions from the manufacturer?

[Allocate_on_Arrival]

I've stated in a previous post about the over-reliance on 'puters and the clearly less than acceptable standard of manual flight.

It's the stunningly cavalier attitude that many of you have towards the actions of the check "pilot" that really gets me!

Akindofmagic's point still stands - the thought that the check "pilot"'s actions were anything other than grounds for dismissal - regardless of the wx conditions or his experience or any other factor you may feel is relevant - is dangerously over-confident, illegal and completely at odds with normal airliner operations - fact.

There can be no grey area here, it's black and white. It's about how to legally/safely operate an aircraft - experimenting with CB's in a serviceable aircraft when travelling as a passenger(!) doesn't even begin to fit into either category.

Sabenaboy - I do agree with your points about SOPs, there is flex - they don't and can't possibly cater for every situation. Thankfully most of us are capable of independent thought.

[RoyHudd]

Off to Indian airspace very shortly. I trust the British line trainer who is a member of our flight crew...he would never randomly pull a c/b. to test a crew's response.. (Although the c/b's are in fact highly inaccessible on this type).

The Jet Airways/Indian Aviation Authority check airman is an idiot. Period.

[sabenaboy]

Akindofmagic, you are deliberately twisting my words and you know it.
(#60 (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/397678-jet-airways-check-pilot-pulls-cb-finals-3.html#post5358313) ) Can you explain, sabenaboy, how you consider that it was necessary and safe to pull a circuit breaker in this case, in contravention of explicit instructions from the manufacturer?

Didn't I say: "Even though I don't think it's a good idea to pull CB's on a commercial flight with pax..." in #52 (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/397678-jet-airways-check-pilot-pulls-cb-finals-3.html#post5358024)

Of course it's not wise to do stuff like that on the flightdeck. And I do not condone the actions of the check captain. But it should and would have been a non-event with a competent cockpit crew. So, Greybeard was probably right that the captain f..ed up to some extent, was pissed off and tried to get even with the check captain... Very similar to what you're trying to do to me after my message #52 (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/397678-jet-airways-check-pilot-pulls-cb-finals-3.html#post5358024). Very childish, I'd say.

I thank you, akindofmagic, for your friendly PM in which you call me a cretin :sad: and accuse me of belittling you!

Belittling someone? Isn't that what you did to Greybeard in #31 (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/397678-jet-airways-check-pilot-pulls-cb-finals-2.html#post5355959) The fact thay you are a rookie F/O with a major UK charter carrier does not put you in a position that would allow you to belittle Greybeard, especially if he makes a valid comment.

I won't be going any further in this discussion with you. A waste of time it is.

[akindofmagic]

I didn't belittle Graybeard in the post you mention, sabenaboy. I was raising a serious concern with his comments.

What I, and others such as Allocate_on_Arrival, objected to is the fact that some people seem to seek to excuse the actions of the check pilot in this case.

Comments such as

The pilot flying should have been sent back to recurrent to develop flying skills. The crybaby pilot reporting the incident should have been fired.and

I don't fault the check pilot at all. He did that in benign conditions.
He may have overestimated the competence of the pilot, however.are incredibly worrying, from two viewpoints. First, they suggest that there are people who are opposed to a free and open reporting system for incidents which, I would suggest, is a necessity in this industry, if we are to do anything but pay lip service to "safety first" cultures within airlines. Secondly, they seem to suggest that there are those who would willingly break SOPs for a reason unrelated to flight safety, and see no issue with senior captains doing, seemingly to tick off a training item.

Neither of these attitudes, in my opinion, have any place in an aviation (or indeed any safety critical) environment. I, and I would venture a majority of pilots, would find very little "valid" in Graybeard's comments.

I stand by all of my comments in this thread.

[SIUYA]

akindofmagic..........

You said at Post#31:

The training captain in this case has done something that is, on the face of it, illegal; he has wilfully gone against the manufacturer's recommendation...

WRONG!

Disregard of a recommendation does NOT make the action illegal! What does seem to make the action illegal though is what appears to be (on the face of it) the idiot's intentional and unlawful interference with the aircraft! :ugh:

Boeing recommendations for C/Bs (applies to both 737 and 777):

Flight crew reset of a tripped circuit breaker in flight is not recommended unless specifically directed to do so in a non-normal checklist.

Flight crew cycling (pulling and resetting) of circuit breakers to clear non-normal conditions is not recommended.

I don't know about Airbus as I never flew them, but from what I do know about the bus is that loss of radalt would probably have resulted in some unexpected handling differences re transition from flight mode to flare mode. Any bus drivers care to comment?

Irrespective, as Allocate on Arrival says in Post#61

It's about how to legally/safely operate an aircraft - experimenting with CB's in a serviceable aircraft when travelling as a passenger(!) doesn't even begin to fit into either category.

I agree! :D And I also agree with sabenaboy's sentiments in post#63 that:

...it's not wise to do stuff like that on the flightdeck.

[DB64]

The hubris displayed by some of the posters on this thread is quite frankly shocking. Your first responsibility as pilots should be the safety of passengers and crew. Should the actions be true they are indefensible. The berating of junior officers is also telling....it is perhaps your fragile egos that need addressing rather than their flying skills. :ugh:

[AlexGG]

If one does a test, they should be prepared for the failure of what is being tested. Otherwise the test is not needed. The folks who flight-tested low speed automatics in the Airbus (Perpigan sp?) paid dearly for not being properly prepared for the failure of the equipment being tested.

I do not think the check captain had the technical ability to take over the aircraft (from the jumpseat)?

[paperdragon]

Ohh come on, it wasnt a brilliant move, but give me a break, dangerous?!. Where has the aviate, navigate communicate, that was once teached gone here? Lean back, relax and fly the bl...y aircraft, how hard can it be???:ugh:

[paperdragon]

I should probably reply to my previous post here...as an (tech)pilot on the B737NG it´s not very vise to start popping CB´s, since they may enact with other systems, speedbrakes etc, but manual flying, equalls; emergency??? Give me a break!

[Condor]

Was the check pilot ex military?

Certainly this sort of thing (pulling cb's to create a malfunction) was a military philosophy and unfortunately I have seen over the years that a few people carried such attitudes and behaviour over to civil flying.

Also, (in my experience) this sort of action probably contributed (if not caused) a number of (some fatal) military training accidents that I can recall - yet as far as i am aware the practice continues unabated...

Not with civilian pax onboard - but similar arguments apply - should crews be subjected to potentially life threatening malfunctions outside of the sim? Answer NO!

[Brian Abraham]

Playing with CB's. Remember National Airlines Flight 27? DC-10 cruising at 39,000 feet experienced an uncontained failure of the #3 engine fan assembly. The cabin was penetrated by shrapnel from the engine and lost pressure. One seat belted passenger was violently ejected out the cabin through a failed window. The remains of the body were never found. The shrapnel penetrated the #1 engine oil tank which began to leak oil and had about one minute of usable oil left upon landing. Two of the three aircraft hydraulic systems were also inoperative. The #2 engine sustained minor damage from ingested shrapnel. The aircraft made an uneventful landing in Albuquerque, New Mexico.

During the flight, while on autopilot, the flight deck crew decided to experiment with the relationship between the fan speed indicator (N1) and the automatic flight control systems. The engineer disconnected the electrical circuit breakers for all three N1 tachometers while the pilot reduced the airspeed by 5 knots. Once the throttles automatically retarded, the pilot disconnected the autothrottle. The crew then heard the explosion.

The CF6 engines used on the aircraft were designed to be "red-lined" at 111% N1. The #3 engine failed at 99% N1 while the other two engines reached a maximum 107% N1. While the failure mechanism that triggered this event was never reached conclusively, enough was learned to prevent the occurrence of similar events.

[lomapaseo]

The CF6 engines used on the aircraft were designed to be "red-lined" at 111% N1. The #3 engine failed at 99% N1 while the other two engines reached a maximum 107% N1. While the failure mechanism that triggered this event was never reached conclusively, enough was learned to prevent the occurrence of similar events.

Just coincidence my friend, just coincidence :)

[ExSp33db1rd]

Remember the Runaway Stabiliser drill on the 707 ?

Identify the emergency, stop the wheel - best to grab the one on the other side of the centre console, until they invented and installed a brake lever by the F/O's thigh ( no, grab the brake, not the F/O's thigh ), cut off the two hydraulic switches also on the centre console, then PULL THE CIRCUIT BREAKERS on the overhead panel.

On a training flight - simulators were still new and some checks were carried out on the real aeroplane - the Training Captain quietly ran the stabiliser nose down until the trainee caught on to what was happening, everything went to plan, tho' the aircraft started earthwards, and with the drill complete the crew then attempted to restore the hydraulic systems, which meant that the circuit breakers had first to be pushed in - except that the 'G' force being experienced was too great for the engineer to reach up above his head, and with both pilots pulling hard, and the engineer with both feet on the bottom of the intrument panel and a hand on each control column ( no mean feat in itself ) they managed to level out just above the water.

After that runaway stabiliser drills were only practised in the simulator.

[chainsaw]

DB64.........

The hubris displayed by some of the posters on this thread is quite frankly shocking. Your first responsibility as pilots should be the safety of passengers and crew. Should the actions be true they are indefensible. The berating of junior officers is also telling....it is perhaps your fragile egos that need addressing rather than their flying skills.

I have looked and looked and looked and looked at your post to try to work out the message you're trying to convey. :confused:

Hubris = exaggerated pride or self-confidence.

Ummmm........sorry, DB64, but after looking at most of opinions here on this thread which seem to all come to the conclusion that it's not wise to do stuff like that (pull C/Bs) on the flightdeck (particularly on a revenue flight), all I can conclude is that the stuff that you're smoking must be pretty strong!!! :eek:

Perhaps you need to rebase and 'moderate' your opinions? :ooh:

[Jetjock330]

This is not about the ability to fly the aircraft on reduced automation or the ability to hand fly, but rather about some check airman who broke the rules, which in turn clearly falls within the pretext of endangering the safety of the flight.

Here with is the CAR OPS and it is clear: No CB is to be pulled!!!!!!!!!!!

3.2. PROCEDURES TO ENSURE THAT ABNORMAL OR EMERGENCY
SITUATIONS ARE NOT SIMULATED DURING COMMERCIAL AIR
TRANSPORTATION FLIGHTS
3.2.1. Regulation (CAR OPS 1.965 (2) (ii) Appendix 1)
a. Exercising abnormal and/or emergency situations (including “pilot incapacitation”)
during commercial air transportation flights is not permissible
b. All instruction and checking personnel shall be briefed accordingly.
c. Such training shall only be performed in the simulators. During commercial flights
no simulation of any technical system malfunction whatsoever is allowed which
includes but is not limited to;
(1) No circuit breaker will be pulled or abnormal switching will be used for training
purposes
(2) No artificial limitation of outside visibility is permitted during revenue flights
(3) No simulated failures, stall recovery practise or asymmetric flight training are
authorized
(4) No abnormal situation will be intentionally established
d. Engine-out maneuver training is not permitted.

[weido_salt]

Yes the 707.

Reminds me of the time the RAAF lost one and the crew a few years ago, playing around in the aircraft, switching off the rudder boost, among other things.

Pulling CB's and switching various systems off in the aircraft, you are looking for a reaction. It may not be the reaction the check pilot is looking for but a reaction none the less.

If you look for trouble often enough, you will find it. Dont try and re invent the wheel, as it's all been done before. Boeing built the the aircraft, not the military, the airlines or the Indian DGCA, so it is complete folly to disregard their recommendations. :suspect:

[ohreally]

If the middle seater was indeed travelling as pax.....(even though a TRE)

If this was in a European airline....(well anywhere who claims to have any form of safety culture)

If the operating Captain was so inclined....

This check airman would be in prison

From the instant just after the c/b was pulled, well that could be the subject of another and I suspect rather long thread!

[IGh]

Previous messages mentioned the role of CHECKAIRMAN / Jumpseater ("Chuck Sisto" upset 8Oct47), and mentioned cockpit experimentation (pull Circuit Breaker aboard National DC10).

There are many instances where working-pilots were affected by the actions -- or the mere presence -- of a "jumpeater" (Additional Crew Member) riding along in their Cockpit, for example: -- Aero Mexico / 19Jan61 DC-8, Reg = XA-XAX, wintery night T/O accident at at NY Int'l A/P; 2017 EST; though the 97 pax survived, four of the nine crew were killed. PIC=AeroMexico ATP; F/O = Aero Mexico ATP; fwd Jumpseater = EAL designated checkairman (only cockpit survivor); Joint trng agreement AeroMexico/EAL DAC. \\ Wx: quarter-mile vis, light snow and fog, wind NE 18G24 kts, Rwy 4R. \\ First 6200' of T/O roll seen by Twr. Survivor described F/O's call "100 knot", and then at 130 kts "V1" and Vr; rotation was quick and and excessive; IAS decreased to 110 kts, Capt spoke and pointed to his A/S indicator. The EAL jumpseater sensed that they just would not get airborne, he unfastened his belts, stood forward and shoved the throttles forward while observing the EPRs respond in the expected range of 2.52-2.54 EPR; then he pulled the throttles to Idle. PIC then selected Reverse Thrust, Brakes; the EAL jumpseater deployed the Spoilers. \\ A/c traveled through the end blast fence (caught fire), continued through the boundary fence, across boulevard, hit car, finally stopped (in flames) 830' beyond rwy end. \\ Rwy 4R surface condition ... P.C. = unnecessary discontinuing of T/O as a result of checkpilot (not in either pilot seat) reaching forward and pulling throttles back (power decrease). Contributing: marginal poor wx, snow on Rwy, possible Pitot Heat _not_ ON....

-- British United Airways 14Jan69 BAC 1-11 G-ASJJ T/O phase at S. Donato Milanese, Italy. (Report not dated, Director General of CA-Italy.) Three captains in cockpit: a Pilot-in-Charge occupied left seat (Capt A); a "Capt B" served as co-pilot in the right seat; and a Pilot-In-Command occupied center seat (Capt C). Aircraft and crew had WX diverted to Milan after try to get from Gatwick to Genoa, landed Milan/Linate Airport at 1430 hrs. Spent five hours on ground. De-iced & inspected aircraft; Engine TAI on for taxi and T/O; Ignitors ON for T/O; ... normal airspeed indications during T/O roll. After V1 and VR rotated crew heard "dull non-metallic thud." Witnesses saw sparks. Capt C looked at TGT gauges, observed #1 Engine TGT indicated 20˚C higher than #2 Engine: Capt C spoke, "I think it's #1 . . . throttle it." Capt A (PF) then closed #1 Power Lever, lowered pitch attitude from 12˚ to 6˚; Capt B (NFP) raised the LG. Climbed to 250' AGL, lost momentum: from 140 to 145 KIAS after Rotate, airspeed fell to 127 KIAS after #1 Engine throttle-back. Stick-Shaker activated three times as speed slowed between 125 and 115 KIAS. Ground contact seemed inevitable and imminent; aircraft touched-down on snow cover, slid 470 m. Both Fire Ext shot by co-pilot. "Capt C" ordered pilots to evacuate through sliding windows -- during ground slide an orange glow illuminated the cockpit windows (however there later proved NO fire). TESTS: #1 Eng found normal. #2 Eng revealed damage (aside from ingestion during the emergency landing): all 16 (HP 1 & 2) turbine Dowel BOLTS had failed in fatigue at the nut end, then jammed under the Connecting Flange. [Previously many engines were found with similar condition during overhaul -- undesirable, but unrelated to power loss.] #2 Eng damage = one of the 16-HP2 Turbine Labyrinth Seal segments displaced from slot, fouled HP2 Sealing Ring; 3 previous instances, in 2 cases that defect caused "Bang" during grnd runs. RR's test-bed run concluded defect would cause only momentary compressor stall, with recovery; effort to re-create or simulate defect on test-bed: "could not provide a simulation of the dynamic condition existing at the moment of displacement of the seal." RR conducted testing of surged on #2 Eng. Report Summary: 1) there was a compressor Bang/Serge of #2 Eng; 2) intervention of "Capt C"; 3) erroneous diagnosis of malfunction/wrong engine; 4) prompt execution of an "order" by "Capt A"; 5) crew didn't recognize mistake. Analysts suspect crew had inadvertently displaced the #2 Thrust Lever while they pulled #1 to Closed (further reducing thrust); Company instructions for engine malfunctions during T/O: do nothing until safe height. Analysts said "Presence of a pilot of a superior grade on the flight deck tends to disrupt the even tenor of the activities of the crew . . ."

Just the presence (proximity) of extra-humans on the Flight Deck was generally regarded as a DISTRACTION after the mid-air collision of 25Sep78 (PSA B727 collided with Cessna 172) near San Diego. (See Mac Job, Vol 2, pgs 23- 35.) However, AAR 79-05's "Findings" nor PC state nothing about excessive conversation, nor extra cockpit-jumpseaters' chatter (deadhead PSA Captain's comments are recorded as "-4" in the CVR transcript, and mentioned on AAR pgs 32-33). Safety pro's insisted that any extra-pilots not ride in cockpit if seat is available in cabin. From the AAR79-05:
“While extra persons may aid in the scan, the pilot must manage his cockpit to insure that the extra person either assists in the scan, or does not interfere with it. In this instance, although the captain and first officer saw the aircraft, there is no evidence to indicate that it was pointed out to any other cockpit occupant. Although company procedures urge the flight engineer to plan "routine paperwork and radio contacts . . . to be accomplished ataltitudes above 10,000 ft," he was involved with radio contacts with the company … extraneous conversation within the cockpit … cannot be considered a contributing factor. However, this conversation persisted until the flight descended to 3,200 ft and while a checklist was being accomplished. … CVR, at 0857:44, while the extraneous conversation was in progress, a company flight preceding … was advised of the presence of the Cessna and its future flightpath…. no assumption can be made as to whether or not its flightcrew heard or understood the advisory ... Although the conversation was not causal, it does point out the dangers inherent in this type of cockpit environment during descent and approach to landing." [ CVR transcript (AAR pg 51) “-4 Voice indentified as off-duty PSA Captain.” Then “-4” chatter on AAR pg 59 and 62.]

[wilyflier]

I see that we are moving to the opinion that the third man is a distraction and has caused accidents.
Ok pulling the cb and so on is pretty dodgy even when you are test flying (planned, considered , briefed, no pax)
BUT how many more times has the third man saved a situation, or been slagged off for NOT acting?
I reckon 3 heads are better than two

[TWT]

One of my earliest pals in aviation lost his life in a Westwind that plunged into the water after departing Sydney in the late 70s.
The reason: a circuit breaker pulled by the training Capt. on a line check. A subsequent further failure rendered the situation irrecoverable.
Google it and read it for yourself. The real tragedy was that the trainer had a history of such stunts, was known for it, and was left to his own (stupid) devices. If he'd been "given correct guidance" my mate O*** would b e here today
www.atsb.com.au/publications/investigation_reports/1985/aair/pdf/198502557.pdf (http://www.atsb.com.au/publications/investigation_reports/1985/aair/pdf/198502557.pdf)

[Pugilistic Animus]

I reckon 3 heads are better than two


depends on personality and company culture

PA

[Slickster]

I find it astonishing that any checker would, knowingly, degrade the systems on the aircraft, without telling the people actually flying the aeroplane. If it had been my check flight, I would have been hard-pushed not to punch the guy in the face. I'm still in charge of the aircraft, when I get checked, in my airline, and I would strongly object to this kind of meddling.

Regardless of the skills, or lack thereof of the pilots being checked, no one deserves that to happen to them on a route check. IMHO, the guy who did it is a moron.

Beware the Law of Unintended Consequences; you only have to look at the consequences on this thread. Not exactly good publicity, is it? Never mind the fact that said moron, would never be able to predict the end-result of his little "trick".

[thepotato232]

Remember the Runaway Stabiliser drill on the 707 ?

Identify the emergency, stop the wheel - best to grab the one on the other side of the centre console, until they invented and installed a brake lever by the F/O's thigh ( no, grab the brake, not the F/O's thigh ), cut off the two hydraulic switches also on the centre console, then PULL THE CIRCUIT BREAKERS on the overhead panel.

I'm afraid manufacturers' attitude toward CBs has changed greatly since the heyday of the 707. The P-Panels on the 707 are as clear-cut as things get. Each CB is clearly labeled and it is assured for the most part that, when they are pulled, power will be cut off to only those components depicted on the label. That is why the manufacturer set "pull the circuit breakers" as SOP for so many emergency and abnormal procedures on that aircraft. The problem with glass aircraft in this respect is that so many systems are now so interdependent, and the CBs so poorly labeled (in my opinion), even the manufacturer cannot always assure the crew of what can happen if CBs are pulled carelessly. This is why "pull the circuit breakers" is no longer SOP for Boeing in most cases.

An example from my own limited experience: As F/O of an Embraer 170 on the taxiway in Philadelphia, I heard the Captain announce the nosewheel steering had failed. As the plane came to a stop, I was under the impression that we would be stuck waiting for a tow. Instead, when the Captain called maintenance control, they directed me to pull three separate circuit breakers on my side of the cockpit. Sure enough, when I pulled and reset them, the control computers reset, and we regained control of the nosewheel. After a long review of the CB panel, I could see nothing that would have led me to believe that those three particular breakers would interact to lead to a reset of that particular system. There was clearly more going on in the workings of those systems than the manufacturer had deemed necessary to tell the lowly pilots. Take that for what you will.

Anyway, the wisdom of such a design philosophy is beyond the scope of this thread. The fact is, for a check airman to fabricate a system failure on a revenue flight with a load of passengers on board is not acceptable. What if the pulled breaker just happened to interact with a real failure that had yet to be noticed? What if the company's training had indeed been so poor that the crew had been unable to complete the flight within safe parameters? These are NEVER questions that should be addressed with an unsuspecting load of paying customers in the back of the airplane.

[aileron buzz]

Pulling a CB in flight is a classic example of a PINC event (procedural intentional non-compliance) PINCs seem to be occurring more often these days and they are a cause of a number of incidents/accidents. It is lack of descipline and rensponsibility. I do hope that jet airways will take the necessary steps to ensure that no stupid pilot trick will be perfomed by their flight crews.

[plugster]

interfering with the aircraft systems is clearly beyond the competence of a checker on a passenger flight and shouldn't be without consequence.
being unable to fly raw data approaches in limits in any kind of weather MUST not be without consequence ,is a more and more common and alarming phenomenon.
solely blaming the check airmen for this incident would be disguising the lack of handling skills ( provided the press tells the truth).
SOPs encouraging the use of automation may be well intentioned tools to reduce workload in busy situations, but they must not result in decreasing proficiency.
what's your excuse when the autopilot kicks out on a gusty and demanding approach?
remember the air france accident at toronto?
"After the autopilot had been disengaged, the pilot flying increased engine thrust in reaction to a decrease in airspeed and a perception that the aircraft was sinking. The power increase contributed to an increase in aircraft energy and the aircraft deviated above the flight path."

[p51guy]

I've been on a few coupled approaches when the autopilot disconnected or it was a bad glide slope signal because of unprotected ILS in DFW. Crosschecking DME and glide slope saying we were high and the autopilot trying to descend rapidly I told the FO to level out because something was wrong with the glide slope read out. Another time in ATL also on an MD80 at 500 ft in the clouds with a cross wind and turbulence both times , the autopilot disengages with the plane in a bank and throttles were wherever the last setting was. It wasn't a big deal but now I guess we are getting pilots that can't hand fly. How could this happen? Sully is right. When we all got hired by an airline we had to hand fly on one engine to a minimums landing or we were'nt hired. Now, with some airlines, it isn't so.

[p51guy]

My sim check was in an Electra and did a one engine approach into SNA to get my job. I have never flown an Electra. It worked out fine but you had to know how to fly in the 80's. A bored check airman pulled the only engine running fire handle at 200 ft to make it more fun. No visual display in that era, just instrument guidance. Everybody was qualified back then. If you needed the computer to get on the ground you couldn't get a job.

[777vs330]

Find it utterly amusing that there're actually views that support revelation of sub-standard raw data flying as a consequence of this check airman behaviour.
My views:

You retain, every single redundancy you could possibly find, to ensure a safe and sound revenue flight; let alone the fact that you're gambling with lives of so many pax onboard. The check airman should be sacked. Period. If my family member is onboard that flight, I'll sue the check airman.

If you wanna check for raw data flying competency, introduce more surprise elements on your SIM refresher/check session.

May the rest of check airmen not behave in this childish and irresponsible behaviour.

[Duffb]

Terminate the check pilots' employment.:ugh: