MOD rejects Chinook crash evidence

[massingbird]

More doubts about the Chinook crash?
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/uk/newsid_790000/790394.stm



[This message has been edited by massingbird (edited 14 June 2000).]

[AncientAviator]

Many people are unhappy about some of the technical problems which have been suggested - but the basic fact remains as the Minister said on the radio this morning that the pilot has always been and is still responsible for the safety of the flight and should not have put the aircraft in a position where any sort of failure could lead to an irretrievable situation.
Not sure where this leaves the guys flying on TFR, and there are obviously difficulties when relying on instruments - but in this case as far as I can see there was no need to ignore the usual rules on Safety Altitude.
Very sorry for the families, and hate to see it being dragged out like this, but if they insist on an answer I fear that the verdict should stand.

[paperchase]

"pilot has always been and is still responsible for the safety of the flight and should not have put the aircraft in a position where any sort of failure could lead to an irretrievable situation."

As soon as the aircraft gets airborne there will always be some sort of failure that could cause it to crash - no matter what the crew do.

To find deceased aircrew guilty of gross negligence the BOI must determine, beyond reasonable doubt, that they caused the accident. The original BOI could not positively determine the cause of the accident but were overruled from above. It may have been pilot error, it may have been something else. Until we know for sure what happened we cannot blame the crew.

A sad decision that refects badly, both on the Minister, and those who advised him.

[bandy]

How many times is this going to come around? Before you post previously explored items like 'flying below safety altitude', get to know the facts behind the subject! A trawl around the comments on this site should furnish you with more than enough information.

[Jackonicko]

Ancient Aviator (pseudonym for 'Bastard Bill Rotten'?)

Pompous, holier-than-thou, pprick.

If Boscombe won't fly it (let alone MAR it) then there has to be some doubt as to whether it should have been flying at all, surely?

[attackattackattack]

AncientAviator

Go away and read the contents of the two links below. If, when you come back, you hold the same opinion then so be it.

However, I believe that if you're at all reasonable, rational or open minded you will understand that your comments are over simplistic and fundementally ignorant.

http://www.pprune.org/ubb/NonCGI/Forum11/HTML/000291.html

http://www.pprune.org/ubb/NonCGI/Forum11/HTML/000111.html

There, I've even made them live links so you have no excuse.

[This message has been edited by attackattackattack (edited 15 June 2000).]

[Wee Weasley Welshman]

I've just finished reading the David McMullon book - Chinook! - he rsises cogent arguement validating the crewmen. Also a very good read.

WWW

[Nil nos tremefacit]

There is justice in this world - "Bastard Bill Rotten" has the pension the deceased's widows desrerve and is Military Adviser (for a huge fee no doubt) to Rolls Royce!!!!!!!(Ironic)

Knackered old aviator - I have over 1000 rotary hours in all sorts of weather - I don't recall ever going above safety altitude (seem to recall landing in fields all over the place and creeping under wires when the weather closed in).

[This message has been edited by Nil nos tremefacit (edited 15 June 2000).]

[Jackonicko]

Chinook HC.Mk 2 Allegations:

That Boscombe hadn't issued an MAR and had refused to fly it due to FADEC problems.

That Odiham's then-Station TP expressed similar concerns.

That the relevant Engineering Authority had fought hard against having FADEC, but were overruled and Boeing's preferred solution was accepted.

That the FADEC software was then a total nightmare.

But these are just unsubstantiated rumours. Can anyone flesh them out?

Ancient: Don't you aportion any blame to those who built this crock, those who should have been responsible for ensuring its airworthiness, those who authorised the trip, or those who maintained it? I suppose a pilot's walkaround and signature on the 700 absolves everyone else? And had it been a fatigue failure? Still their fault cos they signed the aircraft out?

You make me so angry that I could be sick. Bleeearggghhh!

Told you!

[This message has been edited by Jackonicko (edited 15 June 2000).]

[Talking Radalt]

Refernce the above comment I once witnessed the following:
FADEC fault code appeard on the No2 side.
Crew unable to clear caption by following the actions in the cards.
Enter the equally bemused groundcrew....
Remove the power supply to the FADEC
No Change
Remove the power supply to the aircraft (disconnect the battery)
No change
Swap the DECUs (for each other!)
Fault cleared! Lets go home!
Not so much a nightmare, more a miracle!

[Multp]

GICASI, you're absolutely right. I've just re-read my Post of 15/01/00 on the Rotorheads forum: see link given by attackattacketc. I've not changed my opinions since, despite following the Chinook threads on PPRUNE since then.

This business just rumbles on and on. We will never know the facts. But if the elements of doubt mean that the BOI was correct, then Justice was perverted by senior officers up the chain of command.
What surprises me most is that, so far as I am aware, the families concerned did not challenge this case purely on the legality of the imposed 'Negligence' finding by those senior officers.

It is too much to hope for that the Establishment will admit to an error of law, at least until the snr officers concerned are beyond further comment in this world. A (new) legal challenge would appear to be the only option.

Beyond this, I'm afraid that we are all wasting our time and effort wearing out our PC keyboards.

[Wee Weasley Welshman]

Could a legal challenge be presented by anyone other than kith or kin?

A fund from these fora could be established and I am sure we could rustle up an expert witness or two...

WWW

[John Farley]

It is with great fear and trepidation that I write this in case it will upset several contributors to this and the earlier threads – but I would genuinely like people’s views on the following couple of points.

If the system ordered the chaps to fly the wrong aircraft for all the wrong reasons on the wrong job and left them with no alternative but to do it at low level (and for the record I do NOT find it impossible to believe that it might have) then the first thing I have difficulty with is why the trip was not aborted at some stage after getting airborne and before there was any risk of getting to the high ground on track? (horse to water stuff)

Surely all of us agree that any modern military aeroplane is sufficiently complex that it is not difficult to find fault with it after getting airborne. Even if calling the fault has an element of judgement in it (which will be queried back on the ground) surely any crew that has reached the stage of doing a trip like this is both up to and entitled to such a call?

I guess that makes me feel the chaps were content to carry on.

But say I am totally wrong, and they were very unhappy (but did not think of the above way out) then would we not all slow down a bit or change track when approaching the land?

NB I am NOT saying it was their fault. I am just pointing out what a terrible and genuine puzzle the whole tragedy has become.

Perhaps that is why the topic will not go away - it is simply one of the most uncertain aviation accidents so far. So many things do not add up (including my two points above?).

[ShyTorque]

John, I agree with your view.

I do not believe that a FADEC runaway up /down occurred. My own view is that it is more likely that there was an error in navigation coupled with an intercom fault in poor visibility, resulting a CFIT. (It was discovered by the BOI that at least one i/c was in the "standby" position after the accident. The GPS was suspect although there was, I believe, no entry in the tech log reflecting the latter).

The aircraft was unserviceable prior to the flight (due to the lack of Controller of Aircraft clearance for the type due to a known, serious problem) and yet it seems the crew were ORDERED to take it when other, serviceable aircraft were available.

The pilots have been made scapegoats to avoid someone in high places taking the responsibility for his own arrogance and stupidity.

This was a very sad day in the history of the Royal Air Force.

[Talking Radalt]

ST, The only other aircraft available that day in theatre was another MkII which could be deemed equally unserviceable for all the same reasons. To suggest that a crew would be ordered to take an unserviceable cab over a serviceable one is ridiculous.

[Bag Man]

If the aircrew were at fault, who was responsible for their training?

Vicarious liability?

[Stoutnav]

Dear B-M

Ref vicarious liability, without the truth coming out about the circumstances surrounding the accident then the MoD are fire-proof on the training grounds. Simply stated the teaching is that you never fly IMC below SALT and that is the official party line. As an experienced TFR type I have never seen anything that actually contradicts this as policy with the exception of rules laid down for Auto-TFR flight and when on terminal approaches with a suitable ATC service. Where they may be at fault is in terms of custom and practice (I'm not certain so someone help out here).
However, it all comes back to the point that if the truth is'nt known then how do you prove it (and that applies to both system and crew)?

[John Farley]

ST you said

This was a very sad day in the history of the Royal Air Force.

Well said.

End of broadcast.

[Bag Man]

Any thoughts on the article in The Sunday Times today - News Review Page 5.

[psyclic]

At last Bill Wratten has stepped forward to explain the decision of pilot gross negligence as the cause of the Mull crash. His argument was clear; the crash evidence allowed no conclusion other than that of pilot negligence.

OK, Let's see what happens if we agree with his decision:

Let us also agree with a further statement of his: “ The responsibility of command cannot be shirked”

It is entirely reasonable then that further public enquiry be made now as to who allowed 2 pilots, so clearly capable of gross negligence, to fly so many important members of the NI security force. The vetting system of selecting pilots to fly such VIPs clearly failed.

The correct supervision of this flight also needs further scrutiny now. For example, with such an irreplaceable VIP passenger list and with such marginal weather expected, why wasn’t a straightforward IFR transit planned in the first place. (Surely this decision was not for the junior officer captain of the aircraft alone? Not with so many special personnel on board.)(edit note; please don't tell me I don't know the facts on IFR lims on that a/c, I'm trying to make a point about the importance of this trip, regarding the pax.)

It must be entirely reasonable therefore to expect a further public explanation as to why all those VIPs were flying a VFR planned transit in bad weather with 2 pilots so clearly capable of gross negligence.

Any further reticence to publicly clarify these points would allow only one conclusion; that there was also gross negligence in the chain of command involved in this flight. The relatives, the public the taxpayer all have a right to know who arranged for all those VIPs, and the rest of the crew, to end up flying with two "grossly negligent" pilots.

To all those who care about this matter, please don't give up.

(this also posted on similar thread in "rotorheads")


[This message has been edited by psyclic (edited 19 June 2000).]

[mindstorm]

An IFR transit was out because Boscombe had raised the icing clearance to +6 from 0 (because of FADEC!!)

Also about a month after the accident a incident report came out about a Chinook nav problem when the kit was about 6 miles out.

Did they plan an offset to the Mull and then find a problem with the TANS had pointed them at the Mull.

I still think it's more likely some sort of mechanical problem that contributed to this. Without proof it should be impossible to claim gross negligence against anyone.

[psyclic]

Mindstorm, I edited my previous post as you replied.

(was a current MK2 crew at the time)

Edit: the verdict stands---the only way now is to pull down every related command decision associated with this trip. The most important thing is to stress why no one took resposibility for all those VIPs on one airframe. Questions about IFR transits will reveal lack of supervision in the planning of this trip with its extremely high value cargo. Further enquiry by the public into all aspects of this VIP trip will ultimately
result in "grossly negligent" decision being found to be grossly negligent in itself.

[This message has been edited by psyclic (edited 19 June 2000).]

[droptank]

Loyalty to comrades is a laudable emotion, but clear heads make better judgements and bitterness destroys clarity.

Firstly, the President of a BOI has no 'get out' clause based on lack of evidence - he MUST arrive at the most likely cause, however slim the facts, because the lives of others may depend on his doing so to the best of his ability.

In this case, as I understand it, there was NO actual evidence of a malfunction. In fact, the evidence pointed to both engines being under normal power at the moment of impact.

Secondly, it is a long-standing RAF rule and tradition that the Captain of the aircraft is, alone, responsible for the safety of the flight. If you think about it, I am sure that no-one would really want it otherwise - it 'goes with the territory'.

Thus the conclusion of pilot error is the only viable alternative to an unallowed verdict that 'something unknown must have gone wrong' and, once that conclusion has been reached, the further finding of negligence (or gross negligence) is more or less inevitable.

This does not contravene any order (or QR). It is simply ADVICE to Presidents of BOI (in the FS Manual) that they should avoid findings of negligence if possible against those unable to defend themselves.

This may seem harsh, but is consistent with the facts (or lack of them) and no amount of speculation, point-scoring or teddy-throwing will alter anything unless there is evidence which actually alters the physical evidence recovered.

'The wings are pinned on your chest, but there are times when you need broad shoulders to wear 'em'.

[psyclic]

droptank: I wasn’t suggesting that the BOI could be changed. They did a fantastic job given the circumstances. In the end, findings of negligence could not be found. That came later and by more senior officers. And if you look at the way Wratten presented the evidence in his article, it is difficult not to agree with him. The only other way to fit the facts is if both pilots had an agreed suicide pact. So where do the interested parties go now? They must continue to take hold and not let go until they have answers relating to the reasons for this particular sortie. Who insisted so many invaluable security personnel be flown together? How often did it occur? How could pilots so obviously capable of gross negligence be permitted to undertake one of these sorties? How many fishing rods and sets of golf clubs were on board? Why was this trip necessary? They may not ultimately get the answer they want but they will unearth evidence that might take some of the pain away.

[Shut up or shoot]

I am not sure I should be here at all, but in reply to JF 17 June 2000 0830.

It is an exceptionally touchy subject but you have a very, very valid point or two. Sadly it remains a bitter talking point across all the services.

SUOS

[ShyTorque]

Talking Radalt,

With regard to your reply to my post of 17 Jul, which you described as ridiculous. You are thinking rotary only, I was thinking in more general terms. The flight could have been planned (at Group level?) to go FW IFR, or at least with a FW backup. If the SH force was so strapped that no serviceable aircraft was available, this should have been reported up the chain of command and alternative arrangements made or the flight postponed or cancelled.

This is the arrogance and stupidity of which I speak. (No, not yours).

Initial bad use of grammar and so

[This message has been edited by ShyTorque (edited 19 June 2000).]

[Corona Blue]

Droptank

You wear the pilots wings on your chest so you accept the responsibility - I agree but when you cannot defend yourself, the facts are inconclusive and any conclusions are speculation without CONCRETE evidence any negligence finding is unfounded.

[Bill O'Average]

Er...why do we have a chain of command and an authorisation procedure anyway?

Is it so that when it all goes pearshaped, we can blame the people doing the job or is it so the paper chase is so long winded, we don't find out the real reason for why an event happened?

Are those that auth'ed it being branded as 'grossly negligent' aswell?