Blind Reliance on Automation in Australian airlines

[Centaurus]

ATSB rarely publish foreign accident reports even though some may have valuable lessons for Australian pilots. Pilots are therefore left to their own devices to read accident reports from internet sources if they wish to improve their professional knowledge. Except for the occasional enthusiast, few Australian airline pilots and even fewer GA pilots can be bothered to look on the internet specifically for overseas accidents to their own aircraft type, and thus valuable lessons are never taken up, simply because of apathy and other interests outside of flying. The excellent flight safety record of Australian airlines may be due to the unique Australian character where flight crew (in some airlines) are all mates and they have no hesitation is speaking their mind to God in the left seat. That is not a bad thing provided a commonsense attitude prevails on both sides. First class ATC, few natural hazards and of course good year round weather, all contribute to the good safety record. Ergo - why bother about studying boring old overseas accidents (even if you can be bothered looking for the links) when all is well in sunny OZ?

Automation from lift off to short final in severe CAVOK is all the go in some Australian airlines - including the regionals who copy whatever the big boys are doing. We have a new class of pilots brought up by their company SOP's on a strict diet of blind use of automation which is seen as a Good Thing. Pilots happily press buttons with great aplomb so they can watch their highly sophisticated autopilots LNAV into the CAVOK circuit following beautifully crafted waypoints to downwind, base and final with both pilots glued on to flight directors and the thrust levers quietly adjusting the power.

There is bated breath as the PF announces gravely the dreaded words :Standby -standby – autopilot disconnected NOW” and the PNF hunches in great concentration to monitor the man on the controls. Jeez! It is a truly emotional moment in a pilot’s career when several times a day he actually gets to disconnect the automatics in the last few minutes or even seconds of a visual approach..

Levity aside – let us pray for the poor souls of 135 innocents who died at the hands of two automatic zombies in the Middle East in the Year 2004. These Zombies no doubt had been trained in the simulator that the safest way to fly – indeed the only way to fly, was to leave it all to the automatic pilot and its two friends the flight director and automatic throttles. Sound familiar?

This is part of the CVR transcript originally in Arabic of the last 30 minutes of Flash Air Boeing 737-300 Flight 604 departing Sharm El Sheikh for Cairo. Cairo is in Egypt, for the geographically challenged. For brevity the extract is edited but you will soon get the picture.

ATC clearance was delivered at 0235 GMT and read back by the F/O as follows:
ATC Flash 604 destination Cairo as filed climb initially flight level 140. 1673 on squawk.
F/O: Our clear to destination via flight plan route 140 initially 1673 on the squawk Flash 604 we have total pax 135. God Willing.

At time 02:42:02, TOGA mode engaged and then disengaged two seconds later. Aileron movements during take off roll and lift off were consistent with a crosswind. At 02:42:43, climbing through 440 feet, captain requested Hdg select. The F/O confirmed the command and the FDR records Hdg select mode engaged. At 02:42:48, captain requested “Level Change.” And F/O replied “Level change, MCP speed, N1 armed - Sir.”

ATC reported departure time and confirmed left turn clearance. The clearance was acknowledged by the F/O. This was the last ATC transmission from the crew. The aircraft rolled 20 degrees left bank and began a climbing left turn. At time 02:43:47 the captain calls for after take off checklist. No audible response from F/O. At time 02:43:55 captain called “Autopilot”. No immediate response from F/O or mode changes recorded on FDR. At 02:43:58, the captain states “Not Yet.”
02:43:59 FDR recorded autopilot was engaged and the roll mode transition to CWS-R mode resulting in loss of Hdg mode.
At 02:44:00 the F/O stated “Autopilot in command, Sir.”
02:44:01 captain says “EDEELO” an Arabic exclamation expressing a sharp response of some kind while at same time FDR records momentary aileron surface movements and soon after FDR records autopilot disengaged. Increase in pitch and decay in airspeed recorded.
At 02:44:07 FDR records a series of aileron motions that command right bank and subsequent right turn. One second later the captain says “See what the aircraft did”. The aircraft was now in a 12 degree bank to right.
02:44:27 F/O states “Turning right, Sir.” Three seconds later the captain responses “What.” Bank is now 17 degrees right and FDR records aileron movement to increase right bank.
02:44:37 captain states “how turning right”. At this point bank was slightly more than 40 degrees right bank then a momentary left roll rate before additional right bank to 42 degrees before further inputs to increase right bank.

02:44:41. F/O says “Overbank” with bank now 50 degrees as aircraft reaches max altitude of 5460 feet over water.
02:44:41.7 captain says “Autopilot” and repeats statement one second later. At 02:44:44 the F/O states “autopilot in command.” No autopilot engagement was recorded on FDR.
Bank angle now 60 degrees and pitch angle zero. At 02:44:46 the captain again says “Autopilot” and the F/O replies with “overbank, overbank, overbank” with bank angle now 70 degrees.
02:44: 52.8 F/O says “Overbank” as bank angle approached 90 degrees (still in night IMC) and 23 degrees pitch down.
02:44:56 F/O states “No autopilot, Commander” with bank angle 102 degrees pitch 37 degrees down and altitude 4100 ft.

02:44:58 captain says “Autopilot” with bank angle 111 degrees right and 43 degrees nose down. Altitude 3470 ft. 02:45:01 captain says “Retard power, retard power, retard power” Bank angle now 51 degrees right wing down and 40 degrees nose down altitude 2470 ft.

02:45.02 CVR records overspeed warning and airspeed 307 knots. At time 02: 45:03 the captain states “Come out” . Bank angle now 14 degrees right, 31 degrees nose down altitude 760 feet and airspeed 407 knots.

Aircraft impacted water at 02:45:06 with: bank angle 24 degrees right, pitch 24 degrees nose down, Vertical G load 3.9 and speed 416 knots.
……………………………………………………………………………………………..

Despite the intonation of “God Willing” made by the F/O during his read back of the ATC clearance, it was clear that on this occasion his God was not willing, before the impact of 416 knots…

Someone once said of automation: “Do you control the automated cockpit, or does it dominate you?” Well, it certainly dominated the crew of the ill-fated Flash Air 737 to a fatal extent. For many airline pilots in Australia, the answer would probably be that the automated cockpit dominates them too – although few would admit it in public. Blind reliance on automation is often used to justify laziness in the cockpit. When it comes to a visual circuit, some pilots regard auto-piloting an aircraft into the circuit on heading mode or maybe even lateral and vertical navigation, to waypoints scattered through a circuit area until short final, as the height of “cool”. The well known trap of automation is that its use inevitably erodes pure flying skills. The captain of the Flash Air 737 implored time and again for “Autopilot” even when his aircraft was in an impossible attitude. Proof positive he had lost all semblance of basic flying skills. It would never happen here in Australia of course - or could it?

[Capn Bloggs]

Not only Aussie airlines, I suspect, Centaurus. The Button Pushing Brigade is slowly but surely being dragged into the real world as aeroplanes spear in at an increasing rate due to the reducing ability of pilots to fly them.

Oh, the ultimate irony..."Pilot handling abilities under threat...Airbus calls for more focus on basic skills, as automation and reliability advances mean crew have forgotten how to fly"; page 12, Flt International, 22-28 Sep 2009. While slanted towards long-haul, the message is pretty obvious for all of the BPB.

[mainwheel]

Is it possible he wanted to turn it off?:confused:

[sleeve of wizard]

Direct quote from my companies ops manual:

In order to allow maximum monitoring of all aspects of the inflight operation, particularly during times of high workload, maximum use of the autopilot(s) is encouraged.

[chimbu warrior]

I agree with your sentiments Centaurus, and this appears to be a case of pilots letting the aircraft fly them, instead of flying the aircraft.

I'm sure the reason the autopilot would not engage was due to (pilot induced) control loading, but that is not the real point. The crew should have focused on recovery from the unusual attitude, rather than becoming obsessed with engaging the autopilot. As you inferred, there is a belief in the mind of some pilots that "the automatics will sort it all out".

I am sure you would agree that the recent policy change by Boeing to remove unusual attitude/upset recovery training from their simulator programs is a step in the wrong direction. What next, no assymetric training?

Regarding circuits flown on autopilot, if at night, circling in marginal conditions, I think that is wise, provided only basic modes are used.

Most airlines have a stated policy of no excessive FMS programming below 10,000 feet, yet this policy is rarely enforced.

In my view, if you cannot fly a circuit without relying on automatics, you should consider a different career.

[Zoomy]

I like to fly the aircraft. The autopilot has its uses though, I have trouble eating and flying at the same time? On a serious note now, the concept should be, that the pilot is still flying the aircraft with autopilot engaged, ie as much attention is need as without it.

[MrWooby]

Interesting reading in the CVR transcript. Note the constant replies of "Sir", "Commander" in the FO's responses. It says a lot about the cross cockpit gradient. I suppose more and more we will see this sort of accident as the airlines head down the path of basically single pilot IFR, ie one experienced pilot and one MPL assistant.

From what I have seen in Australia, we have have a healthy disrespect for the autopilot. We use it a lot, as should be with passengers on board, but if its not doing what it is supposed to do, we disconnect and hand fly without any problems.

[4Greens]

I've raised these issues on Safety and CRM and other arenas many times. Fortunately (?)tombstone safety is at last beginning to cut in! Hope the present post is followed up.

[hongkongfooey]

Our current PC includes 1 hour of no A/P no A/T, all OEI. No big deal I hear you say except that our glorious CP, on loan from the greatest airline in the world, is completely against practicing this stuff in the A/C.
So in theory the first time in 6 months you get to do this is when your ar5e is on the line. ( No, there is no training before the check in Dragonair, actually, there is no training :{ )

[Brian Abraham]

Understand what you are saying Centaurus, but a reading of the following would seem that its a problem that is only going to become more relevant perhaps.
4-D Nav Is Coming | AVIATION WEEK (http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=bca&id=news/bca0909p1.xml)

[The Butcher's Dog]

Departure and Approach profile design complexity, ATC requirements, software development and hardware processor speed have culminated in automated engine and airframe management – not piloting - it’s all data processing – confirmation and mode selection.
Walk into the most advanced simulators and its all the same, the first thing you are briefed on is – “don’t think of this as a hands on aircraft, its all about data and process management, once you have this concept you will have no issue flying the aircraft”. We fine tune our “gross error” management skills and are actively discouraged to “fly” the aircraft.
Automation has dramatically reduced hand skill and more importantly the confidence pilots’ have in hands on flying ability.
Mind you, the automation starts from the planning stage all the way to the post flight sign-off.
The automation in use that wasn’t in existence even 10 years ago is astounding – what used to take several hours to acquire, calculate and asses now takes minutes.
Professionally we are disengaging from the very aspects that develop and round our understanding and skill of piloting the aircraft even before we get into the cockpit, this fact is possibly lost on those born into this highly advanced tech laden era.
Aircraft flight system design, Organisational culture, Training and Checking programs will need to cater for this increasing concern.

[4Greens]

Its all about being prepared and trained for the moment when the lights go out.

[The Bunglerat]

I don't think there is any argument that the steady decline in basic flying skills is all too apparent these days. However, if I may offer a slightly different perspective, I find it less of a concern that too many pilots are reliant upon automation, than the fact that too many pilots relying on said automation do not fully understand the automation they are using. As has been mentioned elsewhere, the organisation I fly for does not encourage us to hand fly (with emphasis on the fact that we are discouraged, although not prohibited), and whilst occasionally there are opportunities to do so, I must confess to my own detriment that I don't take advantage of those opportunities as much as I used to. That said, automation mode awareness is just as critical as traditional "situational awareness," and failure to develop and maintain such skills can be just as dangerous as failure to maintain basic stick-&-rudder skills. The two go hand in hand, and both are vital parts of the equation to maintaining safety on the flight deck.

[Chief Wiggam]

I don’t see automation being too much of a problem in Australia where most pilots seem to get a solid grounding in developing hands on flying skills in GA or the Military. No one I’ve flown with has displayed ‘blind reliance on automation’.

I have seen a few strange ideas and quietly watch newbies mess around and learn the limitations of the box. When it all becomes too hard they disconnect the a/p or the lnav/vnav and it’s all under control again. All part of the learning process.

The problem lies with the introduction of the MPL and the reasons are obvious.

[Leatherdog]

I agree with Chief Wiggam.

In my experience, the guys who seemed to be blindly following LNAV/VNAV are within 12 months of their line training, but they tend to be very interested in applying basic modes when given a chance. Often, removing VNAV display is a great tool for forcing a newbe into managing their descent profile.

I'm sure that there are some exceptions as with all generalisations, but if you have an obvious issue with-in your operation, it's likely that the line training wasn't thorough enough.

Knowledge precedes Power, created by Education.

L/Dog.

(grammar edit.)

[hongkongfooey]

I don’t see automation being too much of a problem in Australia where most pilots seem to get a solid grounding in developing hands on flying skills in GA or the Military

Chief, what part of GA teaches us to fly a fully automated jet like an A320 ? Apologies if I misunderstood your post, but most of the A320 accidents have been caused by incorrect use or mis-understanding of automatics, the most infamous being the 1st crash which was, incredibly, flown by someone who should have known better, an Airbus test pilot :rolleyes:

[mates rates]

So when should we hand fly the aircraft? At the beginning of the 13 hour duty while we are "fresh" and "alert" making us more fatigued at the end of the day should an emergency occur.Or at the end of the day while we are tied and likely to make mistakes?It's a catch 22 brought about by excessive duty time fatigue on the day,possible accumulated fatigue from previous duty times or potential fatigue that may occur should the day be unexpectedely extended.It's not as obvious as we would like.

[Metro man]

The current generation of senior pilots learnt on and flew aircraft with little in the way of reliable automation and may therefore be prejudiced against relying too much on automatics.

The new generation of twenty year olds are getting used to reliance on increasingly reliable automation. As this generation move through, expect to see less manual flying.

Times change, we now have more reliable engines and allow ETOPS. Anyone fancy being three hours from an airport with a pair of PW R1830s or Wright Cyclone motors ?

Down the track expect to see automatics being a no go item and failure of the auto thrust being practiced for in the sim just like we practice engine failures.

[Captain Marvel]

Those with a sound understanding of the automatics most often tend to hand fly well also.

Those who don't understand the automatics, usually don't hand fly very well either.

Simple as that.

[ozbiggles]

I would suggest it also has a lot to do with the low cost model too.
Where training is considered by the accountants to be an additional cost and to be achieved in minimum time and cost.
How about some suggestions about how to improve peoples 'manual' flying skills and maybe this thread can become a help to all the newbies out there?

[Nuthinondaclock]

Spot on Captain Marvel. The former also tend to be the better managers with better situational awareness as well.

[missing link]

If monkeys were meant to fly ............God would have given them wings!!!!!!!!!!:ugh:

[Joker 10]

I can't see what the problem is, the Australian Banking system where all your money and loans sit is Automated, trust your bankers ??????

[RAD_ALT_ALIVE]

Hongkongfooey,

If you're referring to the Air France A320 crashing into the forest, then I'm afraid that your reference to Airbus test pilot is incorrect; it was crewed by two Air France Captains, one a training captain, the other a senior one of some sort.

Since the first three accidents; the one you referred to, the Air Inter and Indian Airlines ones, there hasn't been an Airbus FBW crash due to mode confusion.

Just off the top of my head, the other ones have been; driven off the runway in thunderstorm (at least twice), driven in TOGA into the sea (at least twice), loss of control due to reasons as yet unknown.

And to cut the pilots in the first three some slack, Airbus changed the modes as a result of two of the accidents. The accidents also occurred when the aircraft (and, more importantly, the quantum jump in technology) were quite new, and so the pilot fraternity had not had a chance to become fully conversant with it's idiosyncrasies.

The Airbus FBW range of aircraft is designed primarily to be flown with the A/P connected. But it provides the pilots with a more user-friendly manual flight system should they be inclined to do so. It effectively makes it less important for pilots to practise their manipulation skills - in the Airbus FBW types there is no manipulation expertise required; simply point and release.

Conventional aircraft, with all their quaint trimming requirements, by design have to have pilots willing to practise the art of flying them manually.

In the recent past there have been more than a few Boeing types stalled because no-one thought to push the power levers up! And this in an aircraft that has perpetually moving power levers...

My theory is this; we only wind up in the sim every six months. I think this is where we need to look at to see where the degradation in the competency of pilots stems from. I think that with the ever-increasing use of automation (as opposed to reliance) we have to get into the sim more often. Bring back the three-monthly sim routine! No, I didn't like it either, but I believe I felt more confident in that regime than I do under the six-monthly one.

Safe flying to all.

[astroboy55]

The new generation of twenty year olds are getting used to reliance on increasingly reliable automation. As this generation move through, expect to see less manual flying.

Hmm well if we were allowed to fly the thing once in a while.....but apparently only the experienced dudes with the dodgy eyes and slowing reflexes can do that....

I love my job, and the company I work for. However, the role of an SO/CFO or whatever...is a total crock of sh&t designed for one thing....to save the relevant company some dough.
Don't forget though, you must be 'P' at landings etc, even though you dont do them...ever...:rolleyes:

[Centaurus]

Bring back the three-monthly sim routine! No, I didn't like it either,

That is an interesting comment of: "No, I didn't like it either".

If pilots dislike flying in the simulator there must be a good reason. Is it because the check pilots or simulator instructors are too aggressive or demand the impossible to meet their own legendry (in their own mind) flight standards? It is a shame that some check pilots adopt that attitude and they should be removed from those duties and re-trained themselves. That never happens of course due to the hierarchy. One method to fix that problem is to ask the instructor to personally slip into the seat and demonstrate his "skill" to those who watch with interest. It rarely happens of course in case he made himself look foolish.

Back to the point. Check pilots in simulators need to learn a basic principle of being an instructor and that is training is the purpose of simulator flying with an occasional requirement for "testing." That way, pilots will actually look forward to their recurrent training rather than dread it. They will come out of the simulator more confident and in most cases, better pilots.

[Normasars]

Centaurus

Well said that man :ok:

[Feather #3]

Centaurus, you couldn't have put it better!!:ok:

Leaving aside an anecdote which could raise litigation. one that won't happened in another forum where it was suggested that it was so dangerous to hand-fly the a/c above F200 that you should only do so with the SeatBelt sign ON!!??:ugh:

Thanks for raising the subject in the Oz context.

G'day ;)

[higherplane]

Bang on the money Centaurus. My last two checks have been polar opposites due to first being with the sort of check captain you are talking about and the last being with a natural born instructor. I wasn't looking forward to the sim second time around, however with a good 'checky' I learned a lot and performed well due to the better atmosphere in the sim. I might not be eager to go to my next sim now (I'm not that much of a sucker for punishment) however I won't be stressing over it and will go up knowing I'm going to learn and come out of it a better pilot.

In regards to the use of the autopilot in the cct. My personal opinion is a good mix of both hand flying some days and using the autopilot others is the way to go. The manipulation of the FMP and power levers while using the autoflight gives a greatly improved confidence in using the autopilot. If you are confidant with the autopilot in high pressure situations you should still be able to make rapid changes to the FMP and get what you want out of the autopilot so you dominate it not it dominating you. Saying that I hand fly roughly half my ccts and about 75% of my practice approaches so that I maintain my stick skills.

If you're in poor conditions I think it is best to use the autopilot due to the lower work load giving you opportunity for greater situational awareness. You must be good at both hand flying and using the autoflight so both are available to you in adverse conditions.

[Kelly Slater]

Getting back to the original post, did two pilots sit by and watch as a serviceable aircraft flew itself into the ground or was there a problem with the manual controls or the automation? Did the Captain allow his plane to crash because his offsider couldn't manage to get the autopilot to engage because that is not blind reliance on automation, that is criminal incompetence.

[Like This - Do That]

I recall John Deakin wrote a column that touched on this several years ago, when he started flying G-IVs. His point was that it would be beneficial to let pilots loose in the sim to fly the thing from time to time, free of check capts walloping them with V1 cuts, multiple failures, etc. Give the converting pilot a sense of how the aircraft works, and letting them explore.

Given the cost of and demand for sim sessions I suspect this sort of thing would be a bit of a stretch, but food for thought, anyhoo.:hmm:

[rmcdonal]

Every time i have seen the Autos do something un-expected I have either hit the red danger money button or the captain has. Simply hand flown till the problem resolved itself then turned it back on again. George tends to fly a fair bit smoother then I can and so for the sake of the pax down the back I let him.

[training wheels]

I was on Melbourne Departures frequency the other day when an A320 inbound to YMML was offered track shortening and a visual approach by ATC. He refused it and said everything was going well and would like the full STAR. Is that an over reliance for automation and the FMC?

[hongkongfooey]

Semantics Rad alt, it crashed because of lack of understanding of the automatics/protections, in this case alpha floor, will get back to you on the rest :ok:
Capatain Marvel, agree

[slice]

training wheels - don't assume that because track shortening and/or a visual approach is refused that it is because of reliance on the AP / FMC. Depending on where you are in the energy matrix track shortening can get ugly. Crew may also want the full approach for currency.

[training wheels]

training wheels - don't assume that because track shortening and/or a visual approach is refused that it is because of reliance on the AP / FMC. Depending on where you are in the energy matrix track shortening can get ugly. Crew may also want the full approach for currency.

Ok, point taken. :ok:

[Shot Nancy]

the energy matrix

Oh for @#$%s sake.:yuk:

[Wiley]

This will probably be considered to be thread drift by some, but I think the final report of the accident that featured in Post # 1 mentioned that part of the problem might have been the captain's initial training on Russian equipment, (Egyptian Air Force), with the (to a Western pilot, incredible) Russian-style attitude indicator.

For those not familiar with Russian AIs, the horizon stays fixed and the aircraft symbol moves. Under high workload and quite obviously more than a little confused, the captain may have reverted to what he was used to. With the two totally different presentations, someone used to the Russian AI would bank the wrong way when trying to make a correction, (as he seemed to do).

It doesn't change the truth in what Centaurus says - basic flying skills aren't being maintained, and the policies of some airlines actively prevent even well-intentioned and diligent pilots from maintaining their manipulative skills.

[slice]

I'm sorry I used the wrong words!!! I should have said high and/or fast and/or heavy and/or large base tailwind etc. etc. Happy now Shot Nancy?:bored:

[chimbu warrior]

Wiley, that exact same scenario occurred in Russia a year or so ago when a B737 crashed at Berm. Crew were relatively new to western-built aircraft, and reverted to their instincts.

[Centaurus]

There is a tendency nowadays to keep the automatics in, even when the response is not as anticipated. You are criticised in the sim or on checks if you disconnect when the behaviour of the automatics is unexpected. I come from a generation of pilots where automatics were unreliable- we don't have a lot of patience when they go wrong and hit the disconnect button and aviate manually. A lot of younger pilots sit there with the aeroplane behaving odd and mumble 'what's it doing now?', and just watch a situation develop. I have to jog them sometimes with a discrete hint: 'why don't you just disconnect the damn thing and FLY IT? Who cares a flying f what it's doing- it's not doing what YOU WANT, mate!' As automatics become more complex, the 'paralysis' of watching, in a sort of cobra-like trance, automatics misbehave without actually doing anything about it is getting more of a problem

I hope that a regular contributor Rainboe doesn't mind if I copy and paste something he wrote on automation complacency which is currently under the Rumour and News Forum under the original post headline of "Turkish Airliner crashes at Schipol. This thread on Rumours and News is running parallel to the Australian thread and is really worth reading from the start.

[Capt Fathom]

track shortening can get ugly

Rubbish! That's what it's all about! :ok:

[Tee Emm]

EK has recognised the deterioration in manual skills and now includes one nil jeopardy automatics off sim session a year. (not enough in my opinion still its a start), ie no auto thrust, autopilot or flight directors. Good fun.


In another life as simulator instructor, sometimes you had a student getting quite uptight and tense and made worse by the PNF singing out all the time "support" calls with a continuous calling of 'SPEED - AIRSPEED - SINK RATE - TRACKING" and so on. Yes it was "shouting" too. Enough to drive anyone mad - although in theory he was only sticking to the SOP's. But of course there is a time and place for everything and this almost constituted stupidity

So depending on spare time of 15 minutes or so, I would haul the PNF away for a cup of coffee and close the sim door and tell the pilot to enjoy himself on a few touch and go circuits solo. Not a soul in the cockpit. In the simulator hall you could always hear the roar of reverse thrust on the final landing when time was up. Out of the simulator would step a smiling happy confident pilot. Worked wonders I tell you.

[Jabawocky]

My theory is this; we only wind up in the sim every six months. I think this is where we need to look at to see where the degradation in the competency of pilots stems from. I think that with the ever-increasing use of automation (as opposed to reliance) we have to get into the sim more often. Bring back the three-monthly sim routine! No, I didn't like it either, but I believe I felt more confident in that regime than I do under the six-monthly one.

Stick them in a C172 or a Drifter. Or better still a C185 once every 6 months between SIM's

Would remind them a heap, and reward many with fun and enthusiasm they have not had in years.

Many of the RPT pilots here do this anyway I know, and I wonder what they think it does for keeping their brains alert and muscle memory acute!

Chimbu Warrior and Chuckles would no doubt agree, what about the others?

[Capn Bloggs]

Kelly,
Getting back to the original post, did two pilots sit by and watch as a serviceable aircraft flew itself into the ground or was there a problem with the manual controls or the automation? Did the Captain allow his plane to crash because his offsider couldn't manage to get the autopilot to engage because that is not blind reliance on automation, that is criminal incompetence.
You'll go far with an attitude like that.

Fathom,
track shortening can get ugly

Rubbish! That's what it's all about!
If you're easily coping with track shortening, then you're wasting fuel. :=

[Capt Fathom]

Bloggs

From these two statements:

track shortening can get ugly and Rubbish! That's what it's all about!

you have skillfully deduced that easily coping with track shortening infers you are wasting fuel.

I must have skipped class that day. :E

[donkey123]

This is a good thread.

Regarding the last couple of posts.

Whether you are wasting fuel by being in a position to accept track shortening is irrelavent to this particular discussion. The original question was aimed at the use of automatics, not fuel.

I think we can all agree that refusing track shortening on a star does not neccesarily constitute an over reliance of automatics.

Donk

[Chief Wiggam]

hongkongfooey apology accepted.

I agree that GA doesn’t teach us to fly a fully automated A320 but, it does teach us to fly it when the automatics start misbehaving by reverting to the scarebus’s pseudo manual flight system.

It’s no different to a light aeroplane then. Pull stick back, aeroplane pitches up yada yada. The problem in my view is that the new gen pilots who learn the basics in the sim won’t see these automated jets as just user-friendly aeroplanes, but as computers to manage. Computers you can trust. They won’t know any different.

I feel that the experience gained in GA is under-rated by some for whatever reasons. Just because some developed countries manage to manifest airline pilots without a GA industry doesn’t mean it’s not the best training ground for countries that do.

[4Greens]

Just to add to the debate, unusual attitude training is a must for when things go pear shaped.

[Tee Emm]

Just to add to the debate, unusual attitude training is a must for when things go pear shaped

Quite right. I understand that Boeing have a simulation package to cover unusual attitude recovery training. The only problem is the simulated attitudes are relatively benign with a maximun bank angle of around 45 degrees and nose up of 25 degrees and nose low of 10 degrees. It does not address the severe unusual attitudes that were recorded on FDR's of accident aircraft such as those discussed in this and other similar discussions on Pprune.

[rmcdonal]

There is a big difference between seeing a screen at 90deg with the sim leaning to one side and hanging in the straps with your nav bag on the roof and all the dust on the floor falling into you eyes... not that I didn’t enjoy rolling the sim through 360deg :E:E :ok:

[neville_nobody]

It’s no different to a light aeroplane then. Pull stick back, aeroplane pitches up yada yada

If you're talking about boeing yes that is correct, if you're talking about an Airbus then that isn't necessarily true. You never control the aircraft until you start turning off the protection modes.

[abc1]

Maybe the allocated training sim sessions required to obtain a type rating do not go far enough. For the new age culture of pay as you go, how many for example have tried to cut corners by completing an outdated type followed by ''differences training''?
A fresh type rating barely scratches the surface especially when it comes to learning the automatics.
Automatics work fine in most instances until one is put outside their routine.

How many times has one announced''autopilot x to command'' without referencing the FMA?And lets not talk about AWR manual mode and its use.

Today's new culture and its direction was attempted to be addressed by the Hudson hero but how many actually paid attention to his emphasis on the lack of training and future consequences of such critical failure?
Latent failure introduction? And exoneration by the shrinking of op's manuals, and the PIC has final whatever.
But the press have better things to report on,and our unions something to lobby about and make public or the authority to actually address this ''human anomaly'' in the inexpensive cost effective culture that has migrated from the O'leary school of management.

[Capn Bloggs]

Interesting article in the latest Flight International:

Thomson crews undergo eye tracking evaluation

Thomson Airways has carried out eye-tracking tests of it's crews in the wake of a 2007 landing incidentinvolving a 737-300 operated by it's predecessor, ThompsonFly.

In the Sept 2007 incident at Bournemouth airport in the UK, the 737-300 crew nearly lost control during the approach when the speed was allowed to decay to a dangerously low level.

The tests have discovered that a few pilots' instrument scans are seriously deficient, even when their performance would have been judged, by an examiner on the flight deck, to have been good.

The implication is that some airline crews, possibly at all airlines, are surviving because nothing goes technically wrong on their watch. The worry, says Thomson, is that this aberrant pattern may not be correctable because, even with retraining, the pilots concerned tend to revert to their natural patterns later.

I wonder if a GA jockey with a couple of thousand hours hand flying would be better than a 200hr jet-SIM MPL in this regard? :ooh: I would say YES. We all need practice to stay good at it, But would an MPL ever have it in the first place?

[CubaLibre]

If you're talking about boeing yes that is correct, if you're talking about an Airbus then that isn't necessarily true. You never control the aircraft until you start turning off the protection modes.

Please explain

[neville_nobody]

In a Boeing you turn off the autopilot and autothrottle it becomes just like every other aeroplane you've flown. In an Airbus you turn off the autopilot and you still only have a rate of change controller. You don't actually control the aeroplane directly. In a boeing I could crank it over to a 45 degree AoB but I couldn't do that in an Airbus, the computer would overrule me. To make a Airbus something resembling an aeroplane you would have to turn off the protection modes and go to something resembling manual reversion.

[bloggs2]

In a boeing I could crank it over to a 45 degree AoB but I couldn't do that in an Airbus

Sure about that one Nev?

If you fly the bus you might want to do some more reading, if you don't you are making statements based on ignorance. Anyway, in airline operations, why would you ever want to "crank it over" to 45 degrees let alone more? Control laws in the Airbus allow a full normal range of control deflection, you would only find them intruding on your skygodlike inputs when reaching what would be considered by any normal definition, to be an unusual attitude.

To make a Airbus something resembling an aeroplane you would have to turn off the protection modes and go to something resembling manual reversion.

Thats just plain BS. The usual anti Airbus sentiment, probably from someone who has never touched one. By the way, Direct Law on the bus is nothing like manual reversion in the Boeing.

If you're talking about boeing yes that is correct, if you're talking about an Airbus then that isn't necessarily true. You never control the aircraft until you start turning off the protection modes.

Yet more BS. For a start there is no such thing as "protection modes". The aircraft has control laws. I am also pretty sure that Airbus aircraft aren't flying around the sky not being "controlled" by the pilots.

This is not a thread discussing the pros/cons of Boeing v Airbus, it is about the flying abillity, or lack thereof, of the people charged with the responsibility of flying them, whether Airbus or Boeing. Why do people feel the need to slag off Airbus or Boeing based on their own experience and lack of knowledge? I have seen pilots who would struggle to fly either with everything turned off (in this case I would prefer to be in the airbus). Conversely I fly with people who could fly a house brick if you could get it off the ground. Mainly because they are keen, interested and knowledgeable pilots who work hard to maintain their flying skills, both with the stick and the automatics.