Crew Fatigue : Own Up or Man Up?

[Arty Fufkin]

Over on the Rumours and News forum, a long thread has developed regarding a recent(ish) incident. The crew of an A340 did their takeoff calculations with a 100 ton error in the aircraft's takeoff weight. The result was a tailstrike followed by multiple impacts with obstacles beyond the departure end of the runway as the aircraft clawed it's way into the air. In short, a very narrowly averted disaster. Cited as a contributary factor was the fact that the captain had slept 3.5 hrs in the previous 24.

The posts on the afforementioned thread fall loosely into two categories, namely:

1) With that level of fatigue he should have declared himself unfit for duty. Regardless of the pressure to get the job done, saftey always comes first.

2) Knackered is normal and not reason enough to scrub the trip. Double check things if you're tired but fatigue is part of the job.

As military aircrew in time of conflict, we are under considerable pressure to get the job done. That said, quality rest before flying is often impossible.

My questions are:

How much support do you think you would get from the command chain if you assessed the risk to be unnacceptable and cancelled or delayed a sortie due to fatigue?

How much extra risk should we accept in an operational theatre? Is it OK to bend or break peacetime rules at time of war?

I'd be interested in your thoughts.

[Tankertrashnav]

I clearly remember on one of those seemingly interminable 10 day NATO exercises coming to the end of a long spell on standby when we had already flown a longish sortie. It was unlikely, but not impossible, that we would have to fly again. I remember remarking to my captain (a flight commander) that I was already unfit to fly having had virtually no sleep for the previous 24 hours except for the odd catnap in a noisy crewroom . It was made pretty clear to me that if I declared myself unfit this would be letting the crew and the squadron down, and I should just buck up (this was an exercise remember, not a shooting war). I vowed then that would be the last time I would admit to being too tired to fly, but I don't somehow think that the interests of flight safety were best served. I doubt if things have changed. Time of war - yes rules can be bent, but if you bend them in peacetime conditions, whose neck goes on the block when things go wrong - the poor sod who made the mistake or the exec who applied the moral pressure?

[Romeo Oscar Golf]

The military were and still are a special group who have to be exempted from many (but not all) civilian H&S regulations. This is particularly pertinant in a war zone but equally applied in the "cold war" exercise days. I remember only too clearly the scenario drawn by TT above, and the "encouragement" from the Boss. When I was non flying SFSO for Tacevals etc., I had the authority to suggest flight safety principles to the various bosses and often there was a way to mitigate fatigue.
To answer the questions for todays aircrew and support personel is probably beyond my competence, particularly as I have no idea as to the format or intensity of todays exercises. Notwithstanding my ignorance I feel that war time operations demand exceptional effort from everyone and that if rules have to be bent to achieve the task, so be it. Training and exercises must be conducted with flight safety as the priority.
Who carries the can (or should) if things go wrong? In my experience and still valid today, it must be the Sqn Cdr.
A little simplistic perhaps, but I was fairly brief.

[minigundiplomat]

I have finished taking days on HERRICK and quite happily slept standing up, though at least our efforts allow the guys on the ground to see the night through with ammo to see the night out.

It's a trade off based on some very grown up decisions. The most important thing is for those who are fatigued to speak up so those in charge can man up.

[StopStart]

Is it OK to bend or break peacetime rules at time of war?


Yes most definitely but only with support from on high and for sensible, operational tasks. I can only speak for my fleet (C130) but if they applied all the peace time 2Gp rules to our current deployments then there would be no flying at all. Ever. Shared rooms, no meals, disturbed sleep etc etc. Crews generally get on and do the job because they can appreciate that the peace time GASOs are overly restrictive and that many of them can't and shouldn't apply in an operational theatre. The flip side of this however is that crews must be able to recognise their own limits and balance those against noddy tasking like shifting another pallet of pallets to BSN and back and be able to say no where appropriate/necessary.

I generally try and remind myself what part it is my sortie plays in the grand scheme of things, what impact my saying no would have on ops and balance that against how tired etc I actually am. People that get precious about crew duty/rest and try and apply the minutiae of the regs generally need to have a bit of a chat with themselves and perhaps should be reminded of what it is they're involved in. Interestingly they're generally the people who will happily smash it up til all hours on a Vegas nightstop without subsequent complaint.

Any gibbon can quote the rule book but an effective, military operator in a time of war needs to be able to interpret and apply them realistically to ensure that the job gets done. At the same time, the command chain (and support staff) need to recognise this and ensure that the tasking given to crews is sensible and that at least a modicum of thought has gone into it (to be honest, this is where these things generally fall down with crews facing poorly thought out loads and pointless repetitive re-roles).

If you're not able to interpret and effectively apply the rules in a time of high tempo ops then poke off to EasyJet or 216 :hmm:

PS. As for the chap and his A340, he should have said no but one would have to ask why he'd only had 3.5hrs sleep. If the company had put him in a hotel that was still being built or was over a nightclub then it's easier to say no and lay it at the feet of the company. If however he'd been on the lash or deliberately chose to engage in activities that prevented him sleeping then would have question his suitability to command large jets full of people...

[VinRouge]

I understand what SS is saying, but are we at war?

Or are we just busting a gut because we are under-resourced?

Who are we to just go off and break GASOs? Surely, if that is the case, then we need to change the rules or get dispensation from up high?

Way I see it, its not my right, to the crew or the PAX to go outside of GASOs. I dont own that risk, someone with more braid and higher pay owns the risk, not me.

If the guy with the braid is reluctant to auth, I am reluctant to fly. Simple as.

[Redcarpet]

I agree with SS and the sentiments about needing the flexibility to operate to your own limits during a 'sensible, operational task'. Is a routine AT flight back from a peaceful country in the Middle East the same thing? I understand that there is a worrying blur regarding adherence to ASOs between operational environments and routine AT flights in busy civilian domestic airspace. Once pax are out of an IMMEDIATE threat environment 'normal' crew duty rules should apply. It is not the responsibility of those AT crews getting people home to do so 'at all costs' just because we are under re-sourced. :*

[Dan Winterland]

Although there are some parrallels, the civil situation is different. In my time, the 2 Gp GASOs had crew duty limitations which followed CAP371 - The Avoidance of Fatigue in Aircrews. This document is itself not limiting but it does lay down guidelines for which CAA approved operations manual duty and fatigue avoidance procedures are laid down.

I know the GASOs were peacetime limits only and there isn't much peacetime flying these days. But the difference between civil and military is that although exercises and operations are concentrated effort, they don't go on forever. The civil pilot will be faced with his debilitating work pattern for the whole of his working life. While in the RAF, I flew exercises and operations where I got very fatigued. But the short term nature of these meant that the fatigue was largely acute. Chronic fatigue sets in over a period of months and when you put acute fatigue on top of chronic fatigue, then you really are entering the danger zone.

After my 16 years was up, I started Long haul passenger, then long haul freight and have now settled into the much more benign world of short haul pax. In my long haul career, I acheived levels of fatigue I hadn't seen in the military.

And someone mentioned he couldn't understand why the Captain of the EK 340 only got 3 1/2 hours sleep. This is what I wrote on the thread regarding the incidient.


"Take this example of a pattern I was very familiar with.

Departure from LHR at about 7pm UK time. Land at JFK about 10pm NY time, but 2am body clock time. By the time you get to the hotel, it's now 4am body time. Go to bed. Wake up at 3am NY time which is 8am body time because it's when you usually get up and the wake up time your circadian rhythem is programmed for. So you've just had four hours sleep.

You mooch around for most of the morning, then at about 1pm NY time you go back to bed and try to sleep. Except you can't because it's 6pm body time and you're circadian rythem says it's not time to sleep yet.

It's now 5pm NY time and the wake up call goes off which is a bit of a b#gger because you finally dropped off to sleep about 20 minutes ago. You get up, go to the airport for the 8pm NY departure time, for which you aren't feeling at your best for because it's now 1am UK and body time and you have had 4 hours and twenty minutes of low quality sleep in the last 36. You now fly for 7 hours back to LHR landing at 8am feeling like death.

Now imagine you do this 5 or 6 times a month, for 900 flying hours a year, but not always to New York. Perhaps to other time zones in the opposite direction. Now some of you now may begin to understand how this pilot felt at the start of his duty."




However, there may be some some justification for working hard in operational circumstances, but to risk your life and others by flying too hard in an exercise to help your Flight Commander get his promotion, that's nuts.

[DummyRun]

Well shed Shtoppers,

In AFG the Detco can call any crew at anytime to do a casevac, yes, technically, we might be out of "crew hours" but I will fly the a/c even if it means I'm a "little bit tired"

Could anyone reading this thread, actually stand up in Wooty B High St and say " sorry Mrs, abahrt yre son and all that but y'now, its more than me jobs wurth, and all that and I'm out of hours............

[Dan Winterland]

Yes, if it means there may be another five coffins to parade through WB.

[DaveyBoy]

My 2p:

GASOs are not 'peacetime' rules, they're orders which always 'apply to you' (even if you quite rightly and with full consent of your supervisors choose not to follow them) -- AOC 2Gp is your AOA no matter where you're flying and in what circumstances.

There are no end of circumstances when we choose to fly contrary to those orders. It's almost always appropriate to flag this up on the auth sheet before going (and perhaps ask someone else to auth if you're not overly happy with all aspects of this, or you at least want to make the point that you had made others aware), and often note in the misrep afterwards, so the ACC tasking you knows what you're having to do to complete his missions. If you don't do this, you're not 'risk managing' correctly -- risk management involves those above you being aware of the risks. If you hide them, you're not managing risk, you're just taking a chance, and we've seen people caught out with that too many times already.

[Gainesy]

Some of the views on this topic are quite interesting when contrasted with the views expressed about the, arguably knackered, US Navy CO who wrecked his EP-3.
http://http://www.pprune.org/military-aircrew/379667-co-writes-off-p-3-a.html (http://www.pprune.org/military-aircrew/379667-co-writes-off-p-3-a.html)

[Mick Strigg]

Q. Why do we have regulations?
A. To prevent us from making the same mistakes as our predecessors!

Q. Can we ignore these regulations in wartime?
A. Yes. You can ignore them for a justifiable reason in wartime and in peacetime operations (see front of JSP550).

Q. Is it wise to ignore them?
A. No. You are increasing the risk beyond ALARP, thus putting lives at risk; yours and others in the air and on the ground.

We are a Military Force with Military Regulations to do a Military Task. Therefore the regulations apply all the time and when the rulebook gets thrown out of the window on Ops. that's when it all goes wrong.

Furthermore, if you don't 'fess-up to being knackered, you will probably kill someone; more than likely, yourself!

[StopStart]

No one is suggesting throwing the rule book out of the window (although much of it does need it) - that is indeed daft and generally leads to smoking holes in the countryside. Notwithstanding mealy mouthed talk of "managing" and "owning" risk :rolleyes: there is still an element of the buck that stops with you, the aircraft captain. You have to manage that and decide if and how the rules apply to your immediate situation. You're employed not as a droid to regurgitate the rule book but as an intelligent, responsible (responsible to both your crew and pax but also to the overall military effort at hand) officer who should be able to make intelligent, informed decisions within the guidance of said rule book.

You need to decide if you have had enough rest and if you and your crew are fit to operate. The default option of the quoting the black and white rule book verbatim merely serves to identify you as a wheelchock that has become self aware. If you get 4 hours kip, are woken by a mortar attack for an hour or so and then get another 4 hours kip do you delay your subsequent departure? Or do you accept that as a fact of deployed life and get on with it? I'd suggest the latter; note it in the auth sheets/misrep if it makes you feel better but it's worth reminding yourself that the folk servicing, loading and guarding your aircraft all experienced the disturbance too. The ACC may indeed note that you were disturbed by a rocket attack but I don't for a minute expect him to ring the Taliban and ask them to stop.

I'll also reiterate that as well as making decisions on your own fitness to operate you need to maintain a sensible approach to the tasking. Getting airborne when you're borderline knackered simply to deliver a pallet of nets is not a sensible use of anyone's time or assets and again this comes down to you, the aircraft captain to make the call.

As for the difference between the operational theatre and general trash hauling - sure, if you've worked a 17 hour day out to the States and your subsequent min ground time is disturbed by the accomodation being rebuilt around you then you're within your rights to delay to get some decent sleep. If, on the other hand, your sleep is disturbed by you ripping the arse out of Vegas til the early hours then you don't have the right to delay. My massive gripe with the AT fleet (and i've been in it for 14 years and a captain for 11) are the pondlife that pick and choose between these two scenarios as it suits them. If your crew rest is excessively disrupted by say, a rocket attack, then you are either fit to complete your subsequent tasking back to the UK or you're not. You're not fit to operate as far as a comfy Middle Eastern airport before poking off down to the local hotel leaving all your pax in the rubb hangar for the night. :mad:

[Arty Fufkin]

Since when did rules become advisory only? If they need to be broken, shouldn't they be re-written?

[Bob the Doc]

StopStart

While I see where you are coming from, I would take issue with part of your comment. If you are unfit for routine, non-emergency work due to fatigue, whatever the cause for it, you are duty bound to delay the flight. Anything else is dangerous. If you choose to put yourself in that position by carousing the Strip/Sunset Blvd/Oz equivalent then that is a serious issue with professionalism and airmanship isn't it?

Likewise, on the mil side, if the crew are knackered and the mission non-essential then the mission should not be flown by that crew. Ideally, the mission plot should be altered to allow for another crew to fly that sortie or it should be delayed.

I am not naive enough to think that this situation is possible or likely in the current op tempo with the overstretch we are experiencing. As SLF either on MERT or doing Aeromed missions, we have similar issues in the back with fatigue but no rule book (whether outside or inside the window) to fall back on other than the general rules of professional conduct set out by our registering body (Gen Med Council/ Nursing & Midwifery Council). Research is being undertaken at the moment (those current 99/101/216 Sqn people may have seen the laptop with the testing software) to try and quantify the levels of fatigue. I will be interested to see how the issue will be managed when this research is completed.

I think the rules can be bent/broken/destroyed when operational necessity dictates but this should be a decision for higher authority (notwithstanding the a/c capt is making the final go decision)

Obviously these are non-pilot views and our CRM lags years behind the aircrew.

I stand by for correction/flaming

BtD

[Grabbers]

Surely it is incumbent on all within the military to both recognise when they are unfit for duty for whatever purpose and to flag it up. Similarly, their superiors/chain of command have to engender a decent level of responsibility and two way trust. When Bloggs pitches in and says he can't fly/drive/fix/control because of fatigue then that should be taken at face value and respected. There is no such thing as Crown Immunity anymore. We are all, at every level, professional and should behave as such. Leaders such as Officers and NCOs must promote this at all levels.

[Throttle Pusher]

Stop Start you confuse me.

Are you saying the crew you refer to should have stayed in a war zone with their passengers for another period of disturbed crew rest rather than proceed to their next planned destination which is safe?

The captain did everything you allude to in your post, assessed the situation, the amount of rest his crew had received and their level of fatigue. He made a decision that it was not sensible to accept a 5 hour crew duty extension to get passengers out of a SAFE environment. This decision has subsequently been supported by his chain of command up to the highest level.

"Any gibbon can quote the rule book but an effective, military operator in a time of war needs to be able to interpret and apply them realistically to ensure that the job gets done." I agree, but there is not a war in OOMS.

If you're not able to interpret and effectively apply the rules in a time of high tempo ops then your no bloody use to 216 Sqn.

[StopStart]

TP

I confuse you? How’s about you lot join the rest of RAF and accept the fact that there may be minor, infrequent disturbances during the crew rest period however that’s just a fact of life on deployed ops. The numerous Herc and RW crews out there seem to cope (and have done for the last 6 years +) and they put in far more arduous days/nights than certain others I care not to mention.

Fine, matey boy made his decisions based on what he knew and he’s supported by all and sundry. Tick VG. Personally, I just wouldn’t be able to hold my head up and tell my pax that having just rescued them from the “warzone” we were now all going to poke off down to the hotel for a bit of high-fiving in the pool to recover from our stressful day. Still, each to their own.

If you're not able to interpret and effectively apply the rules in a time of high tempo ops then your no bloody use to 216 Sqn.
I laughed so hard so wee came out. Keep up the good work – I look forward to my next interminable delay somewhere safe.

Grabbers

Correct. If you're too knackered to fly then you are duty bound to flag it up. If on the other hand, Ascot ring you by mistake in the middle of the night for less than a minute do you apply the rules and delay for another 14 hours or do you shrug it off and go back to sleep?

Bob the Doc

See my reply to Grabbers above. If you are unfit to operate then you don't. End of. I'm interested in the fatigue resaerch you mention though although how's about it includes the Herc crews based in theatre who work stupid hours? That would skew the stats somewhat...

People are missing the point slightly here. There is a chain of decision making required before the rule book can be lobbed out the window. The aircraft captain is integral to this and you can't just dodge it all off onto the senior hired help.

[Grabbers]

StopStart

I agree totally and I don't think I am missing the point. If Ascot Ops do call you mistakenly and you are disturbed then only you can decide whether that will impinge on your ability to do your job safely. Leadership at all levels has to promote that. Of course, would sufficient assets in theatre with sufficient personnel to operate them help negate the insidious over tasking that promotes this sort of debate? That is a totally different thread...

[Throttle Pusher]

SS

"If you are unfit to operate then you don't. End of." Unless you are a Tri Star crew and you're on your way home?:ugh:

Hope your weak bladder problem clears up soon.

[Arty Fufkin]

Hey c'mon fellas. In with the hate, out with the love.:)

I've seen ALL fleets pull the stops out for an aeromed or comp A. That's in our nature. Maybe we need to draw a line between what constitutes an operational task and a routine, scheduled AT task:

Is a Trimotor from KAF to the UK really operational flying? Or is it just AT flying in support of operations? If it's the latter, then why tolerate any factors that degrade flight safety?

How happy would you be taking the wife and kids on holiday flown by a crew who were busting their crew duty limits and had crap rest during their layover because their company put them four to a room on a daystop? Particularly if it was highly likely that they would be operating a jet with a list of unserviceabilities adding to the.... interest factor!!

Take care out there.

Arty F

[Occasional Aviator]

A few years ago, I had to do some serious soul-searching over fatigue. It was on TELIC, in support of a big ground op, and involving all the types operated by JHF(I). It was a little while after the regulations had all been brought into line so the three services were all operating under the same regulations.... now in this operation we bust them, and I mean bust them badly - however there ensues a sort of stand-off where nobody was going to be first to fess up - the RAF, Junglies and AAC were all hanging off their chinstraps but weren't going to let their service down in front of the other two. The JHF(I) commander at the time effectively colluded in this. We operated well beyond what I think was safe and it is probably just because the op did not proceed to its most complex phase that we didn't have an(other) accident. Sure, the op was important, but on reflection it was a very poor decision (on my part amongst others) to press for home in the morning once the op was over - a couple of hours of non-op flying that we didn't really NEED to do.

We are a lot more joint now, and there were some specific circumstances that may have influenced a couple of the det commanders to push it, but I still suspect that this sort of thing could occur again..... any thoughts?

[Dave Angel]

My 2p:

GASOs are not 'peacetime' rules, they're orders which always 'apply to you' (even if you quite rightly and with full consent of your supervisors choose not to follow them) -- AOC 2Gp is your AOA no matter where you're flying and in what circumstances.

I agree with Davey Boy,
Some 3 years ago during an operational 'push', our crew was authorised to go over the 130Hrs GASO limit for the period and ended up doing 148 Hrs in 26 days. This was done after the capt was asked to consult with the crew to ensure eveyone was ok with it (there was no pressure applied) and it was auth'd all the way up the chain. This restored my faith in the supervisory chain at the time as it was done in the right way and for the best of reasons.

Regards,
DA.

[The Apprentice]

Leadership, In an nut shell...

Aircrew, fess up and discuss, thats why you are SNCO`s or Officers.

Captains/Aircraft Commanders....thats what you get paid for.

Authorisors, it your job to assess and make a decision.

Chain of Command...ensure you place management controls that crews don`t get to this point and if they do they know the your position, dependant on the situation.

Ops or not On Ops, fatigue causes incidents and accidents. We all push the boat out on ops....but what difference does it make post incident if you were on an operation or not - None what so ever to the board of inquiry.

[bayete]

What irritates me is when crews are tasked by operations beyond the normal crew duty limits and when questioned as to the validity of the flight are told that it is OK because the Capt has the ability to extend the flight by 2hrs beyond normal crew duty.
I have seen/heard of this both in Mil (non-operational) and Civil Ops several times, although not personally to me.
My response would be no-go, that extension is for unplanned reasons and only if at the time the Capt & crew feel up to it. How do you know how you will feel in 16hrs?
I have heard of crews accepting the tasks and it p1sses me off because I believe it is illegal and sets president with operations to continue planning unachievable tasks!

[Xercules]

May I, a long way removed from current operations, throw in my view.

Many years ago I was Sqn Ldr Ops at Upavon (or ASCOT Ops). I was frequently asked for a crew duty extension ("if we need it") when a Herc had been re-routed through Goose Bay before carrying on to Gander for the originally planned night stop. Strangely, we were never asked the same question if GB was the night stop. My response was always wait until you are at Goose (maybe 10 + hours away) and then see how you feel.

My second second-hand experience was during Gulf War I. I was then back at Lyneham and we had a detachment with DetCo in Akrotiri. CDT had already been extended to 19 hours for all operational flights but the DetCo wanted to have the authority to extend it further if necessary. Wg Cdr Ops thought we should let him. Mindful of the distant pressures I used to get whilst at Upavon I disagreed, saying that the DetCo would be faced with unfair pressures from possibly self-important senior officers insisting that their presence in theatre overrode all other considerations, and insisted that Wg Cdr Ops and I took the issue to the Stn Cdr - he listened to both sides but then agreed with me.

My final experience was more personal. Down at 1312 Flt in MPA we had a flight party one Saturday night. It was a reasonably sober affair, ending by 2300 (by the rules). We cleared up and then went back to the Mess to bed. At 0300 on Sunday morning (this was in the days when Capt Beaky had decided Wednesday would be the day of rest) the Stn Cdr had a Stn (Exercise) Call Out. I reported to the Flight, checked that my Gd Defence Commander had everything in hand and then retired to the Crew Room along with the rest of my and the 2 other crews to snatch some rest in case we went flying. Capt Beaky then decided to call in and was incensed that I should be resting ande not running round like the traditional blue a***d fly. That night I and my crew were on QRA and were called out at about midnight to go look for a reported fishing vessel on fire and act as top cover for the helo sent to assist. We remained in the area for about 5 hours but returning to MPA on the PAR (chosen for prudent safety's sake) I "woke up" to hear the T/D controller saying "You are well below the glide path ACKNOWLEDGE". Capt Beaky was a fighter/bomber puke and could never understand that I was one of only 3 Captains and not one of 15 aircrew as he saw it. As they say I learnt about flying from that and it is probably that that coloured my approach to CDT extensions whilst at Upavon and after.

From my experiences, it is all very well breaking the rules and getting away with it but the man who said that rules were for the guidance of fools was entirely correct. As an aircraft captain, you can always "break" them with good reason (when really necessary) but you surely have to be there after the event to defend your actions. If you are not, others will make that judgement for you - witness the never ending thread at the top.

[Uncle Ginsters]

This is a very interesting discussion and has to be one of the most valid for a long time on Pprune!

My thoughts:

1. Talk of things being OK 'on Ops' or 'at war' is fine when that line is clearly defined. The over-tasked frequency of our outfit now means that our steady-state has become 'on Ops'.

2. I fly an aircraft, usually as Captain, carrying a great many people in support of HERRICK (clue: it's got more than 3 donks!). It has been made very clear to us that any major incident/accident would almost certainly be a stopper for the whole Op. That, like all things, has to be balanced against the task in hand. We regularly work in excess of 24hr days to get the injured to BHX. The would not be true of other 'loads'.

3. SS - Yes, the Captain is a major part of the decision-making loop, but he's only one link in the chain. Levels of risk have to be taken at the appropriate levels of command. It is impossible to define those levels, but it is incumbant on us all to understand and flag upwards exactly what risks are being taken on a trip-by-trip basis.

Just my thoughts,

Uncle G :ok:

[glum]

I think we all understand the 130 crews will take more risks than the rest of the fixed wing AT fleet, and no doubt fly very fatigued a lot of the time. Nature of the beast. Does that make it right?

The Tristar Captain who declares his crew is unfit to fly home is perfectly aware that the guys down the back have had a bloody hard six months and would really like to go home now. Even more so with a Comp or CCAST on board.

You think 216 is new to this?

Thank God they stopped the routine 24 hour augmented crew days, whoever thought that was enduring had never obviously done that route week after week after week.:sad:

Who benefits from extremely tired crews flying through the busy Western European airspace? The civvies in those other planes passing 500 feet away on the way to their holidays?

Maybe it'd be easier to remain alert if there was the threat of small arms fire or SAM attack, but when all you have is your own willpower it is a real battle.

This isn't a pissing contest. Why do some feel the need to drag everyone down to their level of operating, rather than trying to raise everyone's game to the highest level? To prove how macho they are?:ugh:

Good for you fella, have a medal. But when it's me or my family involved, get a good night's sleep would you? There's a good chap.:E

[cornish-stormrider]

A little aside, does anyine remember that fifh gear survey of driving while pi$$ed verses driving while absoultely chinstrapped.....?

Whose driving was worse?

Now I surmise flying of any type is far harder than driving a car and you can sit there and discuss various situations. Let us play devils advocate for a moment and apply Xercules's lamp swinging :ok: to a big jet coming back from the 'stan and the crew does not hear the call from air tragic and augers in.

Is the fact they were short of sleep and felt pressure to man up any justification? Or what about if they mid-air'd into my holiday flight because the RAF are too cheap to buy some "look out look out" system and they were too knackered to keep a good watch?

I appreciate and sympathise with the pax having to spend another night in a rubb but which would they rather?

The converse is true, if you are given crew rest then please use it for the purpose it is intended, spending time inspecting the inside of your eyelid. Not Hookers, Blackjack and Booze!

And surely there must be some legal and safe tablet that can get you a smooth 8 hr kip with no side effects? if not maybe you could get someone to make them - we'd all be millionaires.

The bottom line is, unless there is a cast iron, one off, reason for it you should not be exceeding rest hours and if it coming up regularly then you are understaffed and you owe it to yourself, your crew, your pax, your families and all the people that a pilot error crash would affect to do something about it.

I would rather fly with an airline who delays my flight because there is no safe pilot available rather than one who pushes the envelope to get some more money.

Fly Safe - Not Tired.

[BEagle]

In 2002, I experienced what I would term cumulative fatigue even under 'peace time' conditions. Several long UK-Calgary instructional trips interspersed with AAR instructional flights in the UK, simulators, course management niff-naff all due to the 'Won't say no' attitude of the kids in high places masquerading as senior officers conspired to wear me out. To the extent that, having hopped back into the seat just before TOD to act as handling pilot (that leg required the LHS pilot to be non-handling) after a long night Atlantic pond-hop, I got so far behind the jet that I wasn't able to sort out the student navigator's cock-up TOD call (staff navigator hadn't bothered to check it....) and, as a result, we were very hot and high and I ended up having to go around from a rubbish approach. Why had I got into this sitch? Well, apart from forgetting about diurnal effect and not being alert enough to do the (3 x height split plus 10) cross-check, I was basically completely knackered, made wrong calls ("Flap T/O" instead of "Landing Gear down") due to brain dump and simply wasn't working properly....

http://i14.photobucket.com/albums/a341/nw969/Internet/zxzxz.jpg

The only time you know you're too fatigued is when something happens - it creeps up on you insidiously.

In my case, there were 'no wrecks, nobody drownded' (as the saying goes). But no sympathy whatever from the wheels - I later worked out the actual number of days rest I'd had in 3 months and told the 'management' that they needed to think again about their absurd policy of never saying no to ever more stupid demands from on high. Did they do anything? Did they hell - so I then took the decision to leave them to it, pulled the B&Y and got a life again.

Even in civilian, non-flying roles you can get fatigued. I used to work a full week in Europe, getting up daily at 0630 and working from 0800-1800. Then, on the last day, flying to FRA after 1700, then eventually getting to BHX at 2230 (or 2330 'body time'). Home in the dark, arriving at about 0030. After one such 19 hr day, the TV news reported the sad accident which happened to the chap who fell asleep and drove onto the railway lines causing a disaster. I decided there and then that I wouldn't do any more 19 hour days, so nowadays I stay an extra night and have a relaxing journey home instead. It's a lot safer.

The modern world is a high pressure environment and people are often far too eager to please, whether in military, aviation or other spheres. Supervisors must respect the rights of subordinates to say "NO!" to unreasonably fatiguing work demands.

As for the pratt who once said that "Post-route stand-down doesn't apply to Sqn Execs....." :\ Fortunately he's no longer inflicting himself on anyone in the RAF.

[cornish-stormrider]

Beags, I admire the honesty and integrity, I really do. What worries me is how many more close calls are there that people are not reporting - ISTR the old condor and murphy etc etc etc. Would the young and the overstretched fill these in nowadays and would the spineless managers up the chain ( yes I do not think of many of them as leaders) actually do something about it.

As an ex liney I am now in the position I really did not want to be in - to be in a position to say to all my mates still in that "I told you so, etc". The scary thing is how short a timescale it has come about in.

Those still in have my greatest respect (generally) but they must keep the "I can do this as well as all the other stuff" in perspective. Keep an eye on each other out there and fly safe.

[The Real Slim Shady]

One of the major issues, fatigue apart, is how the legal eagles would interpret the rules and analyse your part in an accident.

Are you at war? Well, the Government doesn't call it that: it's called an Operation. Given that, are you then required to follow the "normal" peacetime regulations? Are you exempt those"normal" peacetime regulations when on a NATO exercise, or national exercise, Operation Homebase?

What exactly does "being on Ops" mean?

Are the "peacetime", "normal" regulations only applicable to training flights? If that is the case when is it decided that your training is complete? Are you, or your masters able to provide documentation to show that your training is complete to the required standard?

Once your training is complete what new set of regulations do you work to?

I won't go on, but you get my point.

The reality is that you need more specific guidance to cover your backs when the caw caw hits the fan. It's all very well pressing on regardless, finest traditions of the Service, Unit, Squadron etc but there may come the time when Sqn Ldr /Flt Lt /Fg Off Bloggs is called to account for " actions at variance with the published regulations" and finds that the top cover / back up has mysteriously vanished.

[Occasional Aviator]

I couldn't agree more with Uncle Ginsters when he says

3. SS - Yes, the Captain is a major part of the decision-making loop, but he's only one link in the chain. Levels of risk have to be taken at the appropriate levels of command. It is impossible to define those levels, but it is incumbant on us all to understand and flag upwards exactly what risks are being taken on a trip-by-trip basis.

The pushing down of the decision to the ac comd (I think the term captain ceased to be in the military regulations around 2002) is an insidious form of smoke and mirrors. If the chain of command are going to ask the crew to go beyond the limits, then the must own at least part of the risk. It's not what decision is taken that's important, it's that the right people are involved and own it.

[VinRouge]

YEp. Which is why taking on risk that you dont own is actually screwing your mates in a way. It becomes the accepted "norm" for a fleet, meaning those with much less experience feels as if they have to perform to the same level.

This is what will cause accidents in my mind.

[BEagle]

On another occasion, Ascot Ops hadn't bothered to note that the delayed departure of another aircraft from Brize meant that our return itinerary was impossible to complete legally. Although they'd known in plenty of time to ring me before busting any crew rest, they didn't. As a result, the first I heard of it was when my truly excellent groundcrew rang me to say they'd gone in to the airport early - and the jet hadn't even landed....it was still 2 hours out.

The itinerary, as usual, had about half an hour's 'fat' in it. Thus any departure delay of more than 30 min would make the itinerary illegal.

Why hadn't those useless beggars at Ascot sent a 'RevItin'? Because in the usual dumbing-down way of things, Ascot Ops was no longer the empire it once was; contrary to the airlines who put some of their brightest folk in roster management, Ascot Ops jobs were regarded as 'bad boys' postings, or twilight years posts....

So I rang them and asked for my RevItin. But first I'd checked with the DAMO at the airport to confirm that delaying the pax wouldn't cause an issue for them and was assured that they'd be 'kept in barracks'. So I worked out a plan with the Duty Ops bod - we would depart the next day at a time that would give us the maximum permitted crew duty within the rules. It was either that or arrive at Gander at 0100 local with 140 people to accommodate with nothing organised. Then I told everyone else the plan, thinking that would be the end of it.

Next day, off we trotted to the airport. After a de-icing faff (which would have busted our itinerary if we'd departed with minimum crew rest time...), we had an incident free trip home.

It was only some time later that I was hauled up before the boss. Some Bwigadier had moaned that his people had been late back (they were needed to fill in for striking firemen, sorry, 'firefighters', it seems..) and had caused trouble. Which had got to SASO, then down to station level. For it turned out that, contrary to the assurance I'd been given, the passengers hadn't been 'kept in barracks' - the poor sods had had to kip on the floor at the airport. No wonder their Oi/c had been sufficiently annoyed to moan to his boss about the feather-bed truckies... Why on earth the DAMO hadn't found accommodation for them, I was never told.

However, the station threw the problem firmly back at Ascot Ops, basically telling them to do their job and to support, not to hinder and harrass downroute crews when something unexpected happens.

Aircraft captains can only work on the information they have and the flight time fatigue rules laid down. If someone in a comfy office in the UK can't be bothered to assess the effect of delays on the often ludicrously tight itineraries dreamed up by their planners, why should the crew be expected to sort out the resulting mess?


I'm afraid that my perception of Ascot Ops was that it was keener to try and lean on crews to break the fatigue rules in order to save money than it was to ensure that itineraries were properly planned.

Is it any better these days?

[Chugalug2]

Not sure what era you are referring to Beags, but as the subject is Ascot Ops I assume it to be mine. As a Hastings/Hercules Captain 1966/73 I had little problem with them. My experience seemed to be much like yours and like you as captain I'd make the required dispositions but then send them an "unless" signal, ie "Unless instructed to the contrary intend to depart XXXX at ZZZZhrs for YYYY with Tech Stop at AAAA". Always worked for me, usually dug them out of a hole and allowed me to exercise my "Command Powers". As to the lying toe-rag of a DAMO the only recourse would be a Voyage Report, though that could be two-edged. One at AKR actively encouraged me to submit one against him following a "Mal-Load", reasoning that it might ensure his section be at last brought up to strength!
As regards Crew Duty Limitations, I assume that they are as clear cut as in my day, and you should stick to them. It is for the AOC to decide when and where his GASO's do not apply and to promulgate that accordingly. Ours did scrap Crew Duty Limits once for a reinforcement exercise backwards and forwards to AKR (again!). The top bunk rapidly became a hot bunk!

[flipster]

Many fine sentiments and anecdotes chaps and I'm glad the willy-waving has stopped - most of us seem to agree.

To paraphrase all above

Fatigue is insidious - it creeps up on you and only when its too late to do anything about it, do you notice it. The only thing that will cure fatigue is rest - caffeine will only stop further degradation but it is a useful short-term fillip.

Fatigue must be thorougly understood and respected by everyone involved in aviation, otherwise there will be more smokin' 'oles; 'On Operations', or not - and we can't afford to lose any more ac/people.
(Note -There is a good (recent) book that would be a fine start/refresher on fatigue:
'Fatigue in Aviation - A Guide to Staying Awake at the Stick' - by Caldwell and Caldwell.) It comes recommended and should be issued to all aircrew, ops spt staff and senior officers!)

Fatigue is an oft misunderstood facet of flight safety and as we all know, flight safety is actually more important in war than it is in peacetime (because we have so few assets).

To operate or not? The buck stops with the Captain .....but Sqn Execs/Company Management/Ascot should forsee any fatigue problem and the Capt should be supported, not be left hung out to dry; doing the latter is very poor leadership.

Furthermore, it is no use just ignoring the rule book or bending the rules - Rules and Regs on fatigue are normally put in place to learn from others' mistakes and to prevent you from repeating them. They have been learnt the hard way. Therefore, ensure dispensation/extension is authorised from above if it is a truly 'op necessity' task/det and only then if there is no other option. If you leave this to the last minute - you and the execs have probably have not been thinking far enough ahead.

If anyone thinks they can routinely (eg more than 3-4 consec nights) get by with less than 7-9 hours shut-eye and still perform at the top their game, then they are deluding themselves. Look what that did to Maggie Thatcher and Tony Bliar - gibbering wrecks, the pair of them!

Those that get back to their rooms half an hour before wheels need to reassess their attitude and airmanship (yes, I've been a idiot too - but I learnt my lesson)!

Bottom line - If it is not a 'life or death' flight and if you or your crew are not rested - then go back to bed! As they say

It is "better to be late, than dead on time"!

Good discussion - now I'm off to bed to get my 7-9 hours!!!!

[AHQHI656SQN]

There are few events in modern life that exceed the news making potential of an aircraft crash; regardless of make or model. Quite often we have two choices:

1. Tell the powers that be, we cannot do the job because of factors a, b & c; don't make the news!

2. Tell the powers that be, we'll give it a bash, ignoring factors a, b & c. Don't get the job done; make the news, big time. Get no support from those above you, allow the BOI to make sense of your decisions and your actions, allow some poor sod to tell your wife and kids you're not going to sign down the aircraft.

You can apply fatigue or skill to options above, given that skill-fade, due to lack of training opportunities, experience levels diminish (as our experienced pilots’ haemorrhage), is a prevalent as fatigue due to over work and under-manning. More pressure is placed upon our aircrew now, than at any time in my (meagre) 18 years of aviation. People will forget that you said "you couldn't do it" a lot quicker than if you proved you couldn't do it.

What we do is inherently dangerous. Stay safe, regardless of aircraft make and model.
:ok:

[Arty Fufkin]

The problem we face now is that many captains genuinely believe that they "will not be able to hold their head up high"(to quote StopStart) if they decide not to extend their crew duty or bend the rules to the same effect. The feeling on the street (for instance) is that a delayed or cancelled airbridge trip will incur the scrutiny of some very senior bods who will be at the very least...unsympathetic to the arguments of the captain who makes the call.
Unfortunately, the blurring of the lines between operational and non-operational tasking (not that there should be a difference, particularly if the bulk of that tasking occurs in civil airspace) means that it is always assumed that a crew duty extension will be applied for and granted.
As for quality of rest, the GASOS that stated what was suitable accommodation for aircrew ( all aircrew, not just shineys) were removed afew years back. It seems to me that what would have been deemed unsuitable ten years ago is now deemed the norm. Why? Because once standards lower out of temporary necessity, they quickly become the accepted standard. And that goes for most things, accommodation, rest, exprience, saftey, documentation, airworthyness etc etc. And before someone cries foul for the emotive nature of that last one, how many of you carry snags these days to get the job done that a few years ago would have sen the A/C declared U/S?

Unfortunately, if a big accident does occur in the next few years, there will be a lot of people quietly saying to themselves that they knew it was comming.

All abit of a shame really. :(

[Redcarpet]

Arty Fufkin,

Think you summed it up perfectly. :(

[Bob the Doc]

Tourist

While I accept that our military aircrew are more likely to be of a higher calibre than some of their civvy counterparts, that does not change the fact that human beings have a certain tolerance to fatigue. This is completely unrelated to their level of experience and skill so I refuse to agree that different expectations should be made of military aircrew than their civilian counterparts. There may be different levels of fatigue caused by the aircraft itself and the situation experienced in the previous days but the fact remains that no pilot, however well trained, experienced and rested, will be able to continue to function at a safe level for extended periods of time. That's why the rules are there

[Rigga]

Forgive an old Rigga who is now in QA and Airworthiness for a civil company....

Tourist said:
"We would all agree, I think that the output level of training from the military flying training system is far superior to the civvy minimum cost route."


Wouldn't it be nice to think that, after all that superior training, some superior pilot morals came out of the other end too?

Surely it's not too much to ask for superior trained pilots to care about their performance drop when ill prepared for the mission ahead.

Yes, you are in the military, and there are some occasions when there is a 'military need' to complete a task, but these are relatively few and far between. All the other occasions described here can be put down to "performance pressures" and if you managed to tie more than a few to that label you would be a poor 'captain' in any case.

[flytrap]

Dear sweet Tourist, you're so far off beam it's rib-tickling. To purvey factually incorrect rumours as truth, whilst branding a long-serving, experienced captain as a 'disgrace', is a little rum, no?

'Hosties', as you so eloquently describe the hard-working cabin crew who do their best to make the unedifying surroundings of a Tristar a little more comfortable, will be the ones guiding you out of the aircraft should a fire break out, or, say, helping you (given that you seem to be something approaching moronic) put your oxygen mask on should the aircraft depressurise because its older than the wheel and its flying with lots of lovely red stickers all over the flight-deck. Its all well and good to spout tosh, but thats the kind of attitude that will put pressure on the inexperienced captain to extend just that little bit too long and fly his barely serviceable aircraft on a twenty-hour day into a dark, wintry and charmingly icy Brize on a Sunday morning, and bring together all those titillating factors into one horrifying accident. Then you have the largest loss of UK armed forces since WW2, and all for the sake of someone talking billy on a website, hmm? It's all fun and games still someone makes a three-engined hole in the ground.:ugh:

[cynicalint]

I certainly feel that the skill in this is the ability to differentiate between operational neccessity and pressonitis. The former is the preserve of the professional aviator; the latter the curse of the career chasing, promotion hungry individuals we have all worked for at some time. I would rather fly with the captain who has more concern for the effect his sortie has on the campaign effort that his career prospects.

[Chugalug2]

Tourist, people in glass houses....If there is one abiding image that has stayed with me through the years of posting on the Iraq Hercules thread, the Afghanistan Nimrod thread and the Mull of Kintyre Chinook thread it is a scene that tucumseh described. He was then a Civil Servant at the MOD concerned with the provision of airworthiness. He and other team members were summoned by an RAF 2* who was their ultimate boss. Not to put too fine a point on it, they were individually harangued by the 2* for failing to accede to his orders to ignore their mandated duty to comply with MOD Airworthiness Regulations, but none the less to declare them fulfilled. No doubt he would have told those who expressed their doubts to "man up". The real men in that room were those who carried on in defiance of his illegal order to ensure that at least their bit of airworthiness was provided for. The cost to date of the failure of the UK Military
Airworthiness Authority to ensure that its own Regulations are complied with amounts, by my calculation, to 60 lives lost; 29 in the Mull Chinook, 7 in the two colliding Sea Kings, 10 in the Hercules and 14 in the Nimrod. You and what you stand for is what is wrong with the MOD and Military Aviation today. Flight Safety is about avoiding avoidable accidents so that aircraft and crews remain available for Military Operations. The total enemy presence in those 5 crashes was most probably a single round that penetrated a needlessly unprotected fuel tank.

[Arty Fufkin]

Tourist,

You're not AOC2Gp are you?:confused:

Joking aside, I'm touched that you hold RAF multi engine pilot training in such high regard. Unfortunately your post demonstrates that you have absolutely no experience of it or, I suspect, direct involvement with any sort of military aviation other than as a passenger. At least I would hope not!
Consequently your opinions relating to decisions made by crews or the complexity of the task they carry out are worth a good ignoring.
However, assuming that you might have been transported by RAF AT at one time or another, your opinions taken in the context of those of a passenger are worth taking note of. They clearly show why RAF AT will always have a less than startling reputation with their customers. Because the decisions made for reasons of fatigue, weather, serviceability etc are the final preserve of the captain. He will act in the interest of your saftey, but if you think you know better, then you will always be dissapointed with the call.

Take it from me , you don't know better:=

Cheers, Arty

[Arty Fufkin]

Tourist,

Sorry if I over-relegated out of the aircrew set. You may well be an aircrew mate, but I maintain that you don't know much about operating fat planes or the training system that produces their pilots. I hope that will be enough to negate any requirment for willy waving.

Two points for you to ponder:

1) These days, an RAF multi co-pilot will have recieved a shorter course, involving less hours, and FAR less academic tuition than his civvy counterpart. Some years ago it was publicly stated that we no longer train for excellence, merely adequacy. To think that military aircrew possess inate ability far in excess of civilian aviators is conceeted in the extreme.

2) The (very well respected) captain who called a stop to his day at Seeb did so in the knowledge that his crew duty would expire over four hours before he landed at Brize. This coupled with the fact that he and his crew had been unable to rest properly during the day prior to departure prompted him to make the most sensible decision I have seen for some time.

I know that you would disagree with the decision made in point 2, but for that reason, you would not be trusted with the lives of 230+ passengers and crew.

Cheers.

PS, You're right about one thing, Flying a Tristar about is no more tricky than flying an airliner.....

It is an airliner.

[Sideshow Bob]

I'm sat here writing an HF course lesson plan on Fatigue and Stress, working my way through all the evidence from RAFCAM and DARS, and I have to say that it is hardly surprising that the accident rate is on the up again. Some of the attitudes on here, that the task is more important than safety is astounding.

Yes, if there are people on the ground in immediate danger or people on the ground who will die if not immediately airlifted, push the limits, I have. The problem we have now is that some people believe any in theatre tasking, whether an actual operation or in support of an operation, is cart balance to ignore the rules. Some people have even stated that some of the rules should be thrown out, perhaps you should take a little bit of time to work out exactly why the rule is there and what happened for the rule to be created. The rules are not there to hinder you, they are there to keep you safe and alive.

After 12 hrs your mental capacity is at 90%, after 18 hours you are at 60%, after 24 hours you are at 40%. You are 4 times more likely to have an accident if you work more that 13 consecutive hours. This is all based on having a proper rest cycle; with disturbed rest the figures are much worse.

Some people need to grow up and realise that sleep and rest rules are there for a purpose, killing you, your colleagues and destroying one of our scarce assets is not big and it's not clever.

[Chugalug2]

Tourist:

Chugalug
Quite frankly,I despise your attempt to drag the Bagger crash into your personal Airworthiness crusade. I know, and every RN crew knows what caused that crash,and it was not the aircraft.


That's just something I'll have to live with. In 40 years of aviation, both military and civil, the people who made me most nervous were not the wet behind the ears newbies but people like you that "know". On the whole they have been driven out of the civil flight decks by the likes of CRM, but they seem to be well in evidence in the military still, witness Wratten, Day and yourself. The reason I "dragged" the Sea King tragedy in (and it isn't my "personal Airworthiness crusade", its the Armed Forces Airworthiness problem whether they acknowledge it or no) is that in concert with the Chinook, Hercules and Nimrod those two aircraft lacked airworthiness at the time of the accident. That airworthiness deficiency, just as with the Chinook, the Hercules and the Nimrod had a direct bearing on the circumstances of the accident. That the respective BoI's were reluctant to acknowledge that strikes me as a comment on them, and Military Air Accident Investigation in general, rather than anything else. What has all this to do with enforcing Flight Time Limitations? Those five accidents are an example of what happens when Senior Officers renege on their duty, in this case to enforce Military Airworthiness Regulations. What you propose for Tristar captains would inexorably lead eventually to a similar outcome. Keep the aggression for the enemy and stay safe if at all possible, please.

[airborne_artist]

Tourist wrote:

The whole purpose of military flying training is because we want a far larger margin of competence over the safety level under normal circumstances. In fact we want excellence.

Two little sayings come to mind:


Truly superior pilots are those who use their superior judgement to avoid those situations where they might have to use their superior skills.
It's better to be down here wishing you were up there, than up there wishing you were down here.

[StopStart]

Folks, whilst my original postings may have been a bit OTT (if so I apologise but claim being “tired and emotional” post det in mitigation :)) there was no intent to “willy wave”, be macho, chase medals or to incite others to flagrantly break published rules. To reiterate, the rules are there for a reason and yes, there is a command chain that bears the brunt of the responsibility, however the aircraft captain (or Commander or whatever bullsh*t bingo word we’re using today) has a responsibility to effectively apply the rules balancing both the needs of the crew and the needs of the task. To reiterate my point - If you’re physically too tired/sick/ginger to operate then you don’t, regardless of how vital that pallet of bubble wrap may be. If, however, you use a rigid application of the rules to get a nightstop somewhere nice (and I’m not accusing anyone of anything here – just making an observation borne of 15 years AT flying) then you are not the sort of person that should be operating a military aircraft.

Earlier comments about being “macho” or “medal chasing” display a fairly poor grasp of reality. Anyone who considers AT flying to be macho probably needs something of a chat with themselves. The views on and subsequent application of CDT regs in theatre will differ between fleets; the C130 crew that lives in KAF for about 6 months of the year will be used to and accept the minor disturbances that go with being on det much more readily than will the Tristar crew that drops in very often but doesn’t stay there. Similarly the Chinook pilot that flies into some scary HLS 3 times a day dodging RPGs et al will have a much different viewpoint to both the above. Who's right?

The problem we face now is that many captains genuinely believe that they "will not be able to hold their head up high"(to quote StopStart) if they decide not to extend their crew duty or bend the rules to the same effect.

You twist my words. If I’m exhausted, haven’t had a hot meal in 4 days (because the “support” staff don’t understand that we don’t all work 9 to 5) and got no sleep in the last rest period because I’m sharing accommodation with the admin day shift who spend the day playing corridor football then I will quite happily go and stand in front of the pax and tell them the trip’s canx because the Imaginary Air Wing can’t manage their crews properly and I’m knackered. If, on the other hand, I decide that I didn’t receive my full “8 hours available for sleep” (because I was disturbed once) and that I'm not going to fly because of it then I shouldn’t be able to hold my head up. Again, rules is rules but if you’ve got a brain in your head you should be able to interpret them effectively. If not, cut along.

No one disputes the cumulative effects of lack of decent sleep coupled with continuous, under-arousing repetitive, dull tasking; we’ve all done it and we’ve all seen performance nose-dive as the effects accumulate. Anyone working in our world should (and/or “has a duty to”) be aware of this and the gruesome consequences of ignoring it. But I come back to original point – military aircraft captains are not droids and as such have a duty to effectively apply the rules that protect them from this (as do senior commanders) and not to just cherry pick whichever reg will get them down to the hotel pool quickest. There has to a difference between military and civvy pilots - surely?? If not then lets cut our loses, blow a load of cash sticking DAS on Monarch's 767 fleet and get them to operate the airbridge. I'd have no problems getting delayed by a civvy crew's concerns over crew duty because they are, er, civilians (plus they'd probably have it written in the contract that the crew be replaced asap and the aircraft/pax kept moving)....

And we wonder why the rest of the military have such a dim view of the RAF AT fleet....

PS. Just to reiterate for the hard of thinking:

1) I know the command chain must bear responsibility for overworking crews and extending their CDT.

2) I know that being sleepy can be v dangerous when flying.

3) I know we can't pick and choose which rules we like or don't like.

4) I believe that military AT pilots should have the moral courage not to just blindly accept rules in black and white but to interpret them where necessary and to make accurate and honest assessments of their ability/fitness to operate their military aircraft in support of operations.

:zzz:

[Romeo Oscar Golf]

4) I believe that military AT pilots should have the moral courage not to just blindly accept rules in black and white but to interpret them where necessary and to make accurate and honest assessments of their ability/fitness to operate their military aircraft in support of operations.

http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/sleep.gif

That's how I would sum it up as well. If you can't do that then get out and let someone who can, sit in your seat.
I would add that an ability to defend vigorously and if necessary, publicly any actions taken, would be advantageous.

(This comes of course from an ex mudmover who had no pax to consider and where just about every flight bent if not broke some rule or other, including fatigue issues.)

[BEagle]

Stoppers, I'm somewhat perturbed that you share accommodation with those who commit Kevball, even though it might be in a corridor. Did you learn nothing when you were one of my students...:eek:

4) I believe that military AT pilots should have the moral courage not to just blindly accept rules in black and white but to interpret them where necessary and to make accurate and honest assessments of their ability/fitness to operate their military aircraft in support of operations.

A reasonable sentiment, one might think. However, 'selective observance' of GASOs will one day bite you on the arse. If the rules don't let you do your job, press for the rules to be changed - don't just 'interpret them' to suit your situation. For to do that is a recipe for disaster; when the cack hits the fan, your superiors will turn their backs on you. Trust me on that one!

[Chugalug2]

Wise words Beags. The force strong in you is think I.

[retrosgone]

With 25 years and 10,000 hours in the military - including over 6000 hours on multi-engined jets in all pilot capacities including OCU instruction, IRE, ACO responsibilities etc - I found myself relatively late in life (mid 2005) starting out as a twin-jet airline captain.

I would have to say that I would previously have assumed that the military training system better prepared people and more ruthlessly weeded out the weaker candidates for the Right Hand Seat of large aircraft. I would also have to say that I was wrong about that. I have not ceased to be impressed by the overall standards and abilities of the young First Officers I fly with on a daily basis. Compared to their RAF brethren, they will not have had to go quite as far into "stick and rudder" basics - but their level of technical knowledge, situational awareness and general airmanship is every bit as good and, on average, probably better.

It is worth remembering that a lot of these young people have put themselves into considerable debt to get where they are, and jumped through a lot of selection hurdles after completing their courses. Their level of motivation is often very high, and they have also been learning to fly for all that time and gaining pretty concentrated experience - as opposed to the distractions and hiccups involved in becoming an Officer first and a pilot second.

The civilian pilot also builds hours and numbers of flights rapidly, and thereby quickly gains familiarity with the working environment, the aircraft and the "tricks" of the trade. While abilities vary of course, the airline use of CRM and adherence to SOPs tends to iron out most individual inadequacies.

I would have to agree with some of the posters on here that any assumption that the RAF way of training things results in a higher quality output is really based just on ignorance of the facts. I really would have been glad to have had most of these guys and girls on my Squadron.

[flipster]

Well, apart from Tourist, we all seem to be in general agreement that

1. fatigue kills
2. a lot of civvies are very good aviators
3. not all Service-trained pilots are 'flying gods'
4. Service ac are 'well-worn'

most importantly, don't EVER trust senior officers!

Fly Safe

Flip

[Redcarpet]

Tourist,

Fatigue is fatigue. Civvy or military. It makes no odds to the loved ones if you stack it in and 200+ die. You only need to look at the differences in CDT between 2Gp and Civvy operators to realise our rules are already way in excess of anything they would consider working before we even think about extending our CDT. Studies into fatigue have been conducted by people way cleverer than me or, judging by the tone of your posts, you.

[Logistics Loader]

Nat Geographic channel aired the tale recently of China airlines flight which nearly crashed.

cause:

Crew fatigue..

aircraft 747 callsign Dynasty 006 was at FL410 en route to LAX.
relief crew allowed the operating crew to get heads down for rest period.

a/c capt returned to flight deck due to being restless. rejoined later by his 2 other crew.
they encountered CAT and No 4 engine flamed out..
re-light was attempted at FL410 on capt orders...
a/c started to roll right and was not counteracted by capt using left rudder..

crew believed both ADI's had failed, airspeed was decaying all the time.
aircraft "flipped" on its back and believed to hit speed of sound on the dive..
possibly hitting 5g
crew recovered aircraft at 10,000ft....

aircraft suffered structural damge but crew landed it safely..
wings were bent up by several inches...

NTSB and FAA stated crew fatigue led to near loss of aircraft..
Capt had flown several routes in last 2 weeks and flew through 16 time zones which contributed to lack of judgement..

what this does show though, is the 747 is quite a tough jet !!

[[email protected]]

Tourist - as a SAR boy who has done lots of 0400 sorties I can tell you I am not at my best then but I have the ability to say no as the captain if I feel the crew is too fatigued to be safe.

BUT, because we adhere to fatigue rules and maximum flying times during the day to preserve our capability at night, it is only likely to occur when there has already been several hours of operational (SAROPS) flying. That is when the rules and proper supervision help - if you have already had a long crew duty day and done a shedload of flying, you are fatigued (whether you know and admit it or not) and as such you are probably the worst person to make the decision about whether or not to continue flying. Your judgement and ability to balance risk/reward is severely affected by the insidious nature of fatigue - that is why the rules are there, to protect you from yourself. Plenty of crews have completed demanding SAROPs and then fallen asleep/frightened themselves on the way home during low arousal transits when they should have landed away from base and got a hotel.

So, do I think breaking crew duty/flying times is a good idea? No.
Do I think supervisors and senior officers ought to look after their crews interests more robustly? Yes
Do I think one of the reasons this thread is running is because everyone at the coalface knows we are under-resourced in theatre? Yes

Don't slag others actions off when you don't know the circumstances, fatigue levels are difficult to assess, either in yourself or in others so erring on the safe side is a pretty good maxim.

[AHQHI656SQN]

:D
That is it in a nutshell. :ok:

[Roger D'Erassoff]

Tourist

As the Tri* incident in Kandahar seems to have upset you and your 'AT, FJ & Rotary' friends so badly, perhaps you could please recount the 'facts' of the case as you know them?

Knowing the details of the case myself, I can then score your accuracy or, as I suspect more likely, prove that you are guilty of outrage over second-hand, ignorant hoop.

Still, why let the facts get in the way of a chance to have a good PPrune outrage frenzy?! :bored:

[Nomorefreetime]

BGG

I don't know the story about the Mover driving into steps, But ground incidents can sometimes be caused by fatigue too.

I had it with a MT incident, I found one of of vehicles with a dent in the car park in a ex dusty place early days , I manned up and reported to MT. They wanted to blame me for the damage. When the report was filled out and they wanted me to sign it, I told them I would only sign it if they added I had been working 2 weeks 16 hours days no down days and no air-con. Subsequently report was binned because they would not add my request.

[pwwuk]

Options:

Obviously do all you can not to find yourself in the position whereby others will suffer if you take your self 'offline' due to fatigue. If its not a P1 shout .. the odd 'too fatigued to fly with my usual level of safety' could be a worth while and forgive the pun a good 'wake up call' for those higher up the chain.

But of you 'need' to fly shattered:

1. Crew Naps (During transit .. own up to being shattered and take a nap with the others covering

2. Own up in flight so the less fatigued crew members are at least aware and can take more of the critical workload.

3. Red Bull ( or Pro Plus for OOA) half an hour before intensive phases or flight.


I'm not suggesting downing a tin of RB as SOP ahead of pulling the red handle when the bell rings ...

P

[Pontius Navigator]

I remember remarking to my captain (a flight commander) that I was already unfit to fly having had virtually no sleep for the previous 24 hours . . . I should just buck up (this was an exercise remember, not a shooting war).

Same time frame and not even an exercise but a period when we were chasing the chinagraph line. It was also a case where we had very specific fatigue rules - no more than 3 x 10 hr sorties in 5 days. Four x 9 hr was no problem.

Over 10 days and we were crisp crackered and this was peacetime. Absolutely no leadership to preserve fatigue. Read APACHE, they had very strict control of crew rest and the OC had a minder to ensure he complied too.

A good number of years ago there was an RAAF AvMed report that noted that fatigue was accumlative. A good night's rest was OK after a prolonged duty day. Where the prolonged days were not followed by proper rest so fatigue would accumulate and after a few days (can't remember the exact stats) you needed first 24 hr and then up to 72 hr proper rest.

On one sqn we could take up to 14 days leave, ie Saturday to Friday fortnight. On Monday or Tuesday following, most people could not remember having been on leave. That was fatigue.

[Juan Tugoh]

The problem with GASO's is quite simple: senior officers feel free to tell you to operate outside them until you ask for something in writing, then they don't have the moral courage to "man up".

It is almost inevitable that if a T* captain does something that causes inconvenience to the system they will be villified. If that same captain bowed to the outside pressure and pressed on and had an accident, he will be condemned for needlessly putting lives at risk.

One thing is for certain, if you have an accident, you or your estate, will be sued by someone should you step out of the protection of the rules because you think you know better. Crown immunity will disappear faster than you can imagine if you have operated outside GASOs and senior officers will amaze you at how quickly they will queue up to condemn you.

It has been pointed out that flying a T* is as easy as flying an airliner - okay cast your eyes at the fatigue issues in the Colgan Air crash at Buffalo. It could easily be argued that the scientifically based CAP371 rules regarding crew duty should be those that the T* operates to. It is not and the easy RAF crew duty rules allow a lot more flexibility than a civil charter operator would be allowed to utilise.

BEagle hit the nail on the head you cannot choose what rules you want just to fit the day. If the rules are wrong get them changed. People with the moral courage to apply the rules when it causes a lot of disruption are what the RAF needs for the its non-operational AT flying. If no one is shooting at you there is no need to to extraordinary measures.

[CirrusF]

We would all agree, I think that the output level of training from the military flying training system is far superior to the civvy minimum cost route.

Well you are wrong there in my experience. I work part-time as a TRI on a light jet and see lots of students - both mil and civ - coming through the FTO. I see no appreciable difference in standards. I do notice, however, that civ pilots always score higher on the multi-choice theory exam we set to new entrants.

[The Curator]

CessnaPete...
I am sure that someone will point out (in the very near future) that there are actually 3 people on a Tri* Flight Deck.......:=
P.S........Congratulations on just giving their 'slip pattern' away.......:ugh:

[[email protected]]

Curator - what difference does it make how many are in the cockpit if they are all fatigued??

I'm sure Terry Taliban won't worry about trying to sabotage the crews now he knows their secret 'slip pattern' - the MoD seem quite capable of doing the enemy's job for them by not addressing the real concerns over crew fatigue.

[cessnapete]

I said two pilot crew. The flight eng cannot fly the a/c when the other two are knackered.

[Redcarpet]

Curator,

Last time I checked there were, as cessnapete quite rightly points out, only two pilots on the flight deck. There is also another life form there but he is not a pilot ;)

[Arty Fufkin]

Let's not forget that slipping the crew 8 to a room on a daystop is being done for one reason only - COST.
The slip patern mentioned turns every trip into at least a 4/5 days so it is more thirsty on crews. Furthermore, there are a few other pitfalls (which I cannot mention) aside form fatigue/saftey that make the new pattern far more fragile than what you have now.
Overall advantage...nil , BUT, you don't have a crew staying overnight in a hotel. This saves some cash and has the added bonus that everyone is seen to be treated the same - crew and passengers similarly tired and hacked off. I hope that the crewmembers out there do own up and call a stop if they are genuinely too tired to operate safely, and realise the legal implications of anything going wrong if they do not. As it is, I'm sure those further up the chain are relying on peer pressure, fear of reprisal, and the desire of the crews to get themselves out of theatre will ensure they press on regardless, even if they haven't slept properly.
From what I've seen, every year something changes to the Herrick Airbridge, presumably so that someone in PJHQ or Group can make a name for themselves before the next promotion board.

I look on with interest.

[cessnapete]

A great way to operate!'' A bonus that both Crews and pax both fatigued and hacked off.''
We try and avoid that in my workplace. Do Senior Officers really not care about safety and go for cost savings only?
It could turn around and bite them.

[Wader2]

The crew rest issue is as old as the hills.

It is true operational crews may live in hot, sandy, noisy environments and will suffer interupted sleep etc. Curiously the body eventually gets used to the disturbance as a pattern and rest of some sort becomes possible.

Crews en route, continually changing environments, do not have the chance to acclaimatise to appallng conditions. One long running issue, especially for day slips, was the daily regularity of cleaners and their vaccum cleaners or the inflexibility of meals times with breakfast at 7pm consisting of Roast Beef when the body is crying out for a bacon sarni.

I am fortunate never having had to operate a crew slip system, but I can sympathise. It may not be everyone's idea of hell, but it still takes its toll.

[Wensleydale]

As Bob Monkhouse once said:

"My Father died peacefully in his sleep......

........unlike his passengers who were screaming in terror as the aircraft hit the sea."

[brit bus driver]

........unlike his passengers who were screaming in terror as the aircraft hit the sea."

Or the plethora of airliners between Lambourne and Brize on any given day. Always a good place to be when you're struggling to stay awake; just speak to anyone who's had a TCAS RA there. :ugh:

Whilst there are occasional operational imperatives to do so, one of the reasons the slip changes so bloody often (in my slightly out of date experience) is an attempt to appease their airships who in turn are bowing to pressure from the generals to improve its productivity. Yes, the guys going back and forth absolutely deserve to be on time but constant fettling with the programme won't change the fact that they are trying to achieve it with too few crews operating an aged airliner. I do hope the glass cockpit improves things....

Keep it up fellas...all good stuff for the incoming new incumbent :ok:

[glum]

I'm not sure what'll come first: triumph in Afghanistan, or the glass cockpit jet flying...

[collbar]

I am strugling to find a reason for airbridge crews to be bleating about having to share a 8 man room.(Unless there is 16 of them) Surely this is normally for only one day/night, two a push!
Couple of points here,
1) If you want hotels in down town kandibar.. your on your own!
2) Sleeping in the day, at this time of year, is the best thing to be doing, its kin hot out there
If they are so worried about fatigue they should have a crew change at every place they land. Yes its crew intensive but if they havnt the crews they need to look at thier manning levels, Its not as if we have just started an airbridge. Yes crews may be away from home for 4-5 days but its not 4 or even 6 months is it!
A Crew change at each stop surely gives max flexibity on these important flights, or would that give Ascot more flex to get away with ...........things!

[Wader2]

Collbar, did you read my post above?

Acclimatisation is the key. Even those on a regular stop over will be affected more than people inured to the discomfort.

[BEagle]

Yes its crew intensive but if they havnt the crews they need to look at thier manning levels, Its not as if we have just started an airbridge.

If 'they' haven't the crews, how can 'they' increase the manning levels? It's not as if you can just go to stores and ask for a new box of TriStar crews....

Surely by now the Ascot planners and operations people must have the airbridge down to a fine art? If not, what on earth have they been doing?

Or am I talking porcovolantly?

[collbar]

My point was, 6-5 years along the line, we should have the crews!!

[Wader2]

Collbar, the RAF trained manpower establishment is screwed down as tight as a ducks ^rse. Only this year has it been approved to increase the number of fire fighters and regiment personnel (IIRC).

We continue to fight an intensive and lethal war from a wholly peacetime posture.

There will be no grounds for getting more ST slip crews as there is no proven need. (That is tongue firmly in cheek).

The need could be proven if flights were delayed and ultimately cancelled with crews adhering to published rest periods and were supported all the way up the stars. Unfortunately would YOU want to be the crew that turned round to a couple of hundred squaddies UK bound on R&R and said sorry, I need another 8 hours kip?

The press-on-its, peer or boss pressure, and sheer comradship will mean crews wil operate when they really should not.

[cornish-stormrider]

and it will ultimately end, and trust me that I am praying very hard it does not come to pass, with some horrendous consequences.

All due to those up the chain not ensuring the gimp in the hot seat (a/c capt):E has had adequate food, sleep and sex (ok we'll aim for two out of three on this) will desert the pilot as fast as possible. Your duty as crew is to man up and admit the fatigue, your auth, boss and his bosses need to man up and support your decision

Fatigue is a bigger killer on the uk roads than alcohol. How many accidents are caused by drifting off? and how many driver own up to it? Flying is far more complicated than driving a car.

rant and random wibble moments off now

[Wader2]

We had a classic fatigue crash-out years ago and I had it published in Air Clues as was.

It was classic because our planned take-off of about 1000 was delayed 12 hrs IIRC. Instead of 1000 and a night stop it became a 2200 and a double stage. The incident happened on the first leg.

About 2 hours after take-off and heading east by north east over Iran, 4 of us were fast asleep and that included both pilots. Fortunately one crew member was hadn't dropped off.

It is simply too easy and with a 2 or 3 seat cockpit how do you ensure it doesn't happen?

[larssnowpharter]

I thought this extract might be appropriate albeit from another time:

a/c:Consolidated 28 Catalina IVB (Boeing PB2B-1) JX330
Date:March 9, 1944

On flight from Bermuda to Scotland landing at 15:08 (Foynes, Ireland). Flying 26 hours according to crew. They over nighted at BOAC camp and took off following refueling the next day. Pilot decided to stay the night due to the tired state of the crew.

Last sentence a bit of an understatement.:eek: