BEagle
26th Jul 2009, 06:54
A rather scathing view of Incapability Brown's attitude towards the Armed Forces in today's paper:
http://i14.photobucket.com/albums/a341/nw969/Internet/zxzxz.jpg
From The Sunday Times
July 26, 2009
The army’s been hit by Brown’s unfriendly fire
Michael Portillo
Britain’s military forces are characterised by self-discipline. They submit to a code of conduct which includes the cheerful acceptance of orders from above. Generals are no exception and cope uncomplainingly with the demands placed on them by ministers.
The public criticisms of the resources provided by the government for the Afghan campaign, voiced by Sir Jock Stirrup, the chief of the defence staff, and Sir Richard Dannatt, the chief of the general staff, are extremely unusual. That the two most senior officers in the chain of command have broken with the restraints of a service culture imbued in them since they enlisted as young men suggests an unprecedented level of exasperation.
Their frustration is evidently caused by Gordon Brown in particular. The generals have muddled along well enough with half a dozen defence secretaries since Labour was elected. During Tony Blair’s premiership, the army absorbed the unreasonable strains of deployment in two war zones and alarming casualty rates with no more than a sigh. But now the generals are engaged in a very public row with this prime minister. As though Brown had not already suffered enough humiliation, he is now to be seen contradicting those who command the soldiers sacrificing limb and life in Helmand.
The armed forces rarely get from politicians what they have a right to expect, even though their requirements are simple. Commanders want to know what is the mission and what is the exit strategy. They request they be given the tools for the job and political support from start to finish. Except perhaps during the second world war, politicians have always been fuzzy about objectives, failed to make the adjustments necessary to supply a campaign with men and equipment and wobbled in the face of public anxiety.
Generals recognise those political weaknesses and so normally settle for less. They can manage if ministers at least recognise the value of what the forces do. It used to be that prime ministers and ministers of defence had served in the armed forces and imbibed their ethos. Since the 1970s that has ceased to be the case. The military have met that new challenge by impressing their civilian political masters with their enthusiasm and efficacy.
When I was defence secretary I was deeply struck by those qualities. I felt duty-bound to do everything I could to provide the forces with the money and political support they needed. Most politicians react that way and are equally seduced. Brown appears to be the exception. He has remained aloof.
A former chief of the defence staff, Lord Guthrie, has complained that when he was chancellor, Brown refused the offer of a briefing from the chiefs. That has clearly caused lasting resentment. Any chancellor normally avoids being drawn into departmental policy. His life would be made more difficult if he had to listen to the complaints of every lobby group. Brown took that generally sensible approach to extremes. Over 10 years at the Treasury he cut himself off from the consequences of his policy decisions. In that sense he was no more discourteous to the armed forces than to doctors or teachers.
His indifference to the military is surprising because he always saw himself as a future prime minister. As Margaret Thatcher and Blair appreciated, one of the privileges and joys of entering 10 Downing Street is to become de facto commander-in-chief; and Britain’s armed forces must still be counted among the most effective on the planet. Brown appears unconscious of that honour.
Perhaps because Blair enjoyed the role so much, Brown has set his face against it. Certainly the relationship between Blair and the armed forces was one of mutual infatuation. He may have starved them of resources (or maybe his chancellor did) and he may have made a typically hubristic blunder in committing to Helmand when more soldiers were needed in Basra; but despite that, Blair clearly valued the military and made time to hear their concerns. The army is not alone in missing his charisma today.
Brown’s mood cannot be improved by reflecting that Britain has suffered two military embarrassments since he took over, both traceable to his predecessor’s period in office. British forces lost control of Basra and had to be reinforced by Americans in Helmand. But the army seems to pin blame more on the last chancellor than on the last prime minister.
Whatever the armed forces think of the support they get from governments, they have no complaint about the royal family, which has shown them complete devotion. Its princes have risked their lives on the front line. Brown’s incompetence – or arrogance – in failing to secure the Queen’s attendance at the D-Day anniversary events in France can hardly have endeared him to the military.
It was disgraceful that the monarch, who served in uniform in the second world war, was forced to be absent while Brown represented the UK alongside heads of state from America and France. If there is one thing worse than a prime minister who is unsupportive of the troops, it is one who supplants the monarch and seeks the kudos of being associated with great military successes.
The debacle over equipment shortages in Afghanistan is hard to comprehend. In the early days of operations in Northern Ireland, deaths by bombs and ambushes led the army to operate across “bandit territory” almost exclusively by helicopter. The annual fatality rate fell to single figures, sometimes zero. That improvement was vital to maintaining public support and winning the campaign.
Why are there too few helicopters? Ministers usually decide only the numbers of personnel to be committed, since that is a headline figure they must defend. They would not normally judge how many vehicles should accompany those forces. Either ministers have become involved in settling minutiae well beyond their competence, or under their stewardship the logistical support systems in the Ministry of Defence have collapsed.
In my experience, the armed forces readily give their loyalty and support to the government, however much ministers may fail to live up to the military’s high standards of conduct. Shortly after I became defence secretary I made a crass party political speech in which I cited the SAS motto “Who dares wins”. The military had every right to be affronted and I felt bound to make an abject apology to the chiefs for my error of taste and judgment. They responded by accepting it without reserve. We were able to wind back the clock and start afresh. We then made difficult decisions together and supported each other in defending them.
Today the chiefs’ public show of unhappiness indicates that something has gone very wrong in the relationship between elected politicians and the armed forces. It is extraordinary that the head of the army subjects himself to the humiliation of being flown across Afghanistan in an American helicopter, thus wordlessly demonstrating the shortage of proper equipment available to his men.
The army has embarked on an offensive against the Taliban without being reinforced. Too often it is approaching the enemy overland, squandering its technological superiority. The rate of death and injury is high and, as Stirrup has said, more helicopters would “quite patently” prevent casualties.
Brown (and, to be fair, Blair too) has tried to fight the Taliban with too few troops and on too little money. The government hoped that a small commitment would mean a small death toll, whereas the opposite is true. The paradoxical outcome is that there will now need to be a substantial surge in the British presence in Helmand and the cost will escalate sharply. The only doubt left is whether those decisions will be made by this prime minister or by his successor.
http://i14.photobucket.com/albums/a341/nw969/Internet/zxzxz.jpg
From The Sunday Times
July 26, 2009
The army’s been hit by Brown’s unfriendly fire
Michael Portillo
Britain’s military forces are characterised by self-discipline. They submit to a code of conduct which includes the cheerful acceptance of orders from above. Generals are no exception and cope uncomplainingly with the demands placed on them by ministers.
The public criticisms of the resources provided by the government for the Afghan campaign, voiced by Sir Jock Stirrup, the chief of the defence staff, and Sir Richard Dannatt, the chief of the general staff, are extremely unusual. That the two most senior officers in the chain of command have broken with the restraints of a service culture imbued in them since they enlisted as young men suggests an unprecedented level of exasperation.
Their frustration is evidently caused by Gordon Brown in particular. The generals have muddled along well enough with half a dozen defence secretaries since Labour was elected. During Tony Blair’s premiership, the army absorbed the unreasonable strains of deployment in two war zones and alarming casualty rates with no more than a sigh. But now the generals are engaged in a very public row with this prime minister. As though Brown had not already suffered enough humiliation, he is now to be seen contradicting those who command the soldiers sacrificing limb and life in Helmand.
The armed forces rarely get from politicians what they have a right to expect, even though their requirements are simple. Commanders want to know what is the mission and what is the exit strategy. They request they be given the tools for the job and political support from start to finish. Except perhaps during the second world war, politicians have always been fuzzy about objectives, failed to make the adjustments necessary to supply a campaign with men and equipment and wobbled in the face of public anxiety.
Generals recognise those political weaknesses and so normally settle for less. They can manage if ministers at least recognise the value of what the forces do. It used to be that prime ministers and ministers of defence had served in the armed forces and imbibed their ethos. Since the 1970s that has ceased to be the case. The military have met that new challenge by impressing their civilian political masters with their enthusiasm and efficacy.
When I was defence secretary I was deeply struck by those qualities. I felt duty-bound to do everything I could to provide the forces with the money and political support they needed. Most politicians react that way and are equally seduced. Brown appears to be the exception. He has remained aloof.
A former chief of the defence staff, Lord Guthrie, has complained that when he was chancellor, Brown refused the offer of a briefing from the chiefs. That has clearly caused lasting resentment. Any chancellor normally avoids being drawn into departmental policy. His life would be made more difficult if he had to listen to the complaints of every lobby group. Brown took that generally sensible approach to extremes. Over 10 years at the Treasury he cut himself off from the consequences of his policy decisions. In that sense he was no more discourteous to the armed forces than to doctors or teachers.
His indifference to the military is surprising because he always saw himself as a future prime minister. As Margaret Thatcher and Blair appreciated, one of the privileges and joys of entering 10 Downing Street is to become de facto commander-in-chief; and Britain’s armed forces must still be counted among the most effective on the planet. Brown appears unconscious of that honour.
Perhaps because Blair enjoyed the role so much, Brown has set his face against it. Certainly the relationship between Blair and the armed forces was one of mutual infatuation. He may have starved them of resources (or maybe his chancellor did) and he may have made a typically hubristic blunder in committing to Helmand when more soldiers were needed in Basra; but despite that, Blair clearly valued the military and made time to hear their concerns. The army is not alone in missing his charisma today.
Brown’s mood cannot be improved by reflecting that Britain has suffered two military embarrassments since he took over, both traceable to his predecessor’s period in office. British forces lost control of Basra and had to be reinforced by Americans in Helmand. But the army seems to pin blame more on the last chancellor than on the last prime minister.
Whatever the armed forces think of the support they get from governments, they have no complaint about the royal family, which has shown them complete devotion. Its princes have risked their lives on the front line. Brown’s incompetence – or arrogance – in failing to secure the Queen’s attendance at the D-Day anniversary events in France can hardly have endeared him to the military.
It was disgraceful that the monarch, who served in uniform in the second world war, was forced to be absent while Brown represented the UK alongside heads of state from America and France. If there is one thing worse than a prime minister who is unsupportive of the troops, it is one who supplants the monarch and seeks the kudos of being associated with great military successes.
The debacle over equipment shortages in Afghanistan is hard to comprehend. In the early days of operations in Northern Ireland, deaths by bombs and ambushes led the army to operate across “bandit territory” almost exclusively by helicopter. The annual fatality rate fell to single figures, sometimes zero. That improvement was vital to maintaining public support and winning the campaign.
Why are there too few helicopters? Ministers usually decide only the numbers of personnel to be committed, since that is a headline figure they must defend. They would not normally judge how many vehicles should accompany those forces. Either ministers have become involved in settling minutiae well beyond their competence, or under their stewardship the logistical support systems in the Ministry of Defence have collapsed.
In my experience, the armed forces readily give their loyalty and support to the government, however much ministers may fail to live up to the military’s high standards of conduct. Shortly after I became defence secretary I made a crass party political speech in which I cited the SAS motto “Who dares wins”. The military had every right to be affronted and I felt bound to make an abject apology to the chiefs for my error of taste and judgment. They responded by accepting it without reserve. We were able to wind back the clock and start afresh. We then made difficult decisions together and supported each other in defending them.
Today the chiefs’ public show of unhappiness indicates that something has gone very wrong in the relationship between elected politicians and the armed forces. It is extraordinary that the head of the army subjects himself to the humiliation of being flown across Afghanistan in an American helicopter, thus wordlessly demonstrating the shortage of proper equipment available to his men.
The army has embarked on an offensive against the Taliban without being reinforced. Too often it is approaching the enemy overland, squandering its technological superiority. The rate of death and injury is high and, as Stirrup has said, more helicopters would “quite patently” prevent casualties.
Brown (and, to be fair, Blair too) has tried to fight the Taliban with too few troops and on too little money. The government hoped that a small commitment would mean a small death toll, whereas the opposite is true. The paradoxical outcome is that there will now need to be a substantial surge in the British presence in Helmand and the cost will escalate sharply. The only doubt left is whether those decisions will be made by this prime minister or by his successor.