Boeing Postpones 787 First Flight

[fjouve]

EVERETT, Wash., June 23 /PRNewswire-FirstCall/ -- Boeing (NYSE: BA) today announced that first flight of the 787 Dreamliner will be postponed due to a need to reinforce an area within the side-of-body section of the aircraft. The need was identified during the recent regularly scheduled tests on the full-scale static test airplane. Preliminary analysis indicated that flight test could proceed this month as planned. However, after further testing and consideration of possible modified flight test plans, the decision was made late last week that first flight should instead be postponed until productive flight testing could occur. First flight and first delivery will be rescheduled following the final determination of the required modification and testing plan. It will be several weeks before the new schedule is available. The 787 team will continue with other aspects of testing on Airplane #1, including final gauntlet testing and low-speed taxiing. Work will also continue on the other five flight test aircraft and the subsequent aircraft in the production system.Scott Carson, president and CEO of Boeing Commercial Airplanes said a team of experts has already identified several potential solutions."Consideration was given to a temporary solution that would allow us to fly as scheduled, but we ultimately concluded that the right thing was to develop, design, test and incorporate a permanent modification to the localized area requiring reinforcement. Structural modifications like these are not uncommon in the development of new airplanes, and this is not an issue related to our choice of materials or the assembly and installation work of our team," Carson said. Boeing's financial guidance will be updated to reflect any impact of these changes when the company issues its second quarter 2009 earnings report in July.Boeing will hold a conference call with Carson, Pat Shanahan, vice president and general manager of Airplane Programs, and Scott Fancher, vice president and general manager of the 787 program, to discuss the 787 program today at 10:00 a.m. EDT, 7:00 a.m., PDT. A webcast of that call will be accessible at The Boeing Company (http://www.boeing.com).

[green granite]

That's the sort of problem you tend to get using cutting edge technology.

[BoeingMEL]

Considering this is an evoltionary aircraft rather than a revolutionary one, there has been so much hype (from the manufacturer and some airlines).
The actual aircraft bears a resemblance to early hype but, apart from materials used in construction and measly performance improvements... where's the beef? Son of sonic-cruiser? Er, no! Cheers anyway bm :ugh:

[Michael Birbeck]

Dreamliner - The project manager's project from either heaven or hell.

Mostly hell I suspect. If this this "reinforcement" requires further significant engineering changes at this late stage then expect a delay in terms of months rather than weeks.

[Michael Birbeck]

Methinks that Boeing's airline transport customers might argue that another delay in this programme represents an issue for them.

Qatar Airways issues stern warning to Boeing to quickly resolve 787 delay issues (http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2009/06/19/328527/qatar-airways-issues-stern-warning-to-boeing-to-quickly-resolve-787-delay.html)

[poorjohn]

Rather different from the way the 777 development went, iirc. Then it was all about the great CAD system that gave them parts that fit together like a swiss watch, and away we fly.

As an engineer who's worked in aerospace since the days of Apollo (but never on airplanes, and almost always military, not commercial) I've lived with the management trends that were supposed to give us cost and schedule accountability but instead have given us meeting rooms full of committees making shared in-decisions with far worse results.

I hope Boeing Airplanes is better than that, but have no reason to believe they've been immune. They bet the company on a new way to build an airplane - new materials, global outsourcing - and so far it doesn't look like they're going to end up with a "Boeing".

Fire away.

[Locked door]

I can't believe the slack you guys are giving Boeing!!! Does no one remember the vitriol airbus copped off this forum when the A380 had a few delays?

[742]

It seems as if no one can do anything anymore.

I blame the business schools (and their product), but that is a topic for somewhere else.

[ECAM_Actions]

The problem is companies hold too many meetings, and have too many discussions on doing things as cheaply as possible. If we could just get on with the job, we might actually get things done for a change.

How much of this problem was created through cost-cutting in the initial design, shaving another mm out of the thickness of the material?

Ironically, if it was as a result of a cost-saving decision at some point, the delay is going to cost FAR MORE (as always) in the future.

It will be interesting to see if anyone cancels any orders as a result of this. As said further up - this is going to be a delay of months, not weeks. They obviously think it is serious enough to even postpone the first flight.

That this came out as a result of results from the static test at this point is even worse.

ECAM Actions.

[Michael Birbeck]

Read this guy's take on the respective A380 and 787 programmes. It is an uneven read and I certainly don't agree with all his stuff but it is interesting.

Lonely Scientist (http://www.lonelyscientist.com/)

What did Boeing think would happen? They have pushed the envelope simultaneously at too many points across the programme (materials, engineering, methodology, partners ... you name it).

This new delay appears to represent the triumph of rationality over hubris and wishful thinking.


flight should instead be postponed until productive flight testing could occur.


I wish them the best. The 787 is brave step forward and I bet the programme will come to be seen to be ground breaking (not Boeing breaking) in years to come.

Listened to the Boeing conference call. They are talking about stress concentrations that were not compatible with their computer model at an attachment point between the wing and the body during static testing. The issue affects the upper portion of side of body at 18 locations. A one or two square inch area is affected (on both sides of the aircraft) and the problem doesn't appear to extend down the wings or into the fuselage.

They are talking about a small number of parts (a handful of parts) comprising of titanium integrated with aluminium and composites.

The problems affects integrated structures (produced by Boeing, Mitsubishi and Fuji). It is envisaged that any proposed fix/mod will be able to be retro fitted to production aircraft in situ or on the production line.

[simonchowder]

Quite amusing really,:) given all the stick they gave airbus over the A 380

[protectthehornet]

the XB70 was pushing the envelope

the 787 is licking the envelope.

I remember when planes really turned heads...now they all look the same...plastic more, computers more...but not really faster...cheaper yes.

the last plane that turned my head was the Concord...and here we are 40 years later with something that looks like a 757.

[Cacophonix]

PTH

From an engineering/manufacturing point of view the 787 programme is a big leap forward (some might say in the dark).

Can't argue with the asthetic point you make. Most modern passenger aircraft look the same and seem to represent the spirit of the bean counters that ultimately drive the whole thing.


The XB70 still looks futuristc.

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/7c/North_American_XB-70_in_Flight_EC68-2131.jpg

[protectthehornet]

engineering and manufacturing...always high on the sex appeal quotient (NOT!)

thanks for the posting of the XB70 picture...and it was some 600 mph faster than concord!

but wouldn't you really rather be flying an XB70 than a 787?

I do like the idea of the 787 having a better . ..lower cabin altitude at cruise...but come on !

[daikilo]

How on earth can you move this thread to spotters corner when the subject is probably the one technology project currently under the world spotlight.

[ATSA1]

This latest delay doesn't surprise me.....

I have just come back from the Paris Air show, where the silence on the B787 was deafening!
2 years ago, at Le Bourget, the talk was all of the imminent roll out of the 787, and how Airbus had missed the bus with the A350....

Here we are, a full 23 months after the roll out, and no first flight....OK, so Boeing have 800+ orders for it, but how many will it have, if this charade goes on much longer?

So far we have had... "fastener problems with sub contractors".... "Machinist's strike".........."Flight control software problems"....."Management changes"...and now "Structural questions".....

Come on Boeing, sort it out, even the Concorde had flown by now! (Dec.67 - Mar. 69)

The A350 is looking a much better bet as every day goes by...unless Airbus are plagued by similar problems....but I wouldn't put any money on it!

What a mess!

[Cacophonix]

The Boeing stock price was -6% down at last time of checking. No doubt the analysts will be trying to get some view of the likely delay to the production schedule.

Once that figure is known based upon the reality of the technical/engineering issues that Boeing faces then one might expect a couple more airlines to make a decision about baling or staying in or invoking penalty clauses in the existing contracts.

One shudders to think of the daily burn rate on a programme this large. I am sure they will be burning the midnight oil down at Everett and stress and antacid pills will be issued free to all departments.

How on earth can you move this thread to spotters corner when the subject is probably the one technology project currently under the world spotlight.


This one's all over the place. There is another thread relating to 787 schedule slippage on DG&P. Oh well, one might get a fresh approach down here in Spotters Corner. One thing's for sure, nobody is going to be spotting the 787 any time soon!

[Michael Birbeck]

Oh well, one might get a fresh approach down here in Spotters Corner

Wouldn't bet it on it!

Down here you are only likely to meet the occasional guy with a pair of binoculars and an anorak and the odd airline pilot who, unless he is Willie Walsh, woudn't recognise the Boeing stock price if it bit him on the ar*se.:).

[John Farley]

To design, develop, certificate and produce a new top level civil or military aircraft is a complex undertaking. It is very tempting (and pretty much normal practice) for the marketing and PR side to assume all will go according to the original plan and so ‘oversell’ the delivery timescales and costs.

At least let us be glad when the engineers have the final say re critical issues as seems to be the case with the 787 and unlike one past Shuttle launch for example.

[Michael Birbeck]

Down here you are only likely to meet the occasional guy with a pair of binoculars and an anorak and the odd airline pilot who, unless he is Willie Walsh, woudn't recognise the Boeing stock price if it bit him on the ar*se


And then John Farley drops by.:\

[safetypee]

Good points John, but in this instance it appears that the problem has surfaced during structural testing after reworking the ‘fastener’ problems, i.e. the correction back to the original 'weak' design (pun intended).
Also, it has been reported that the first flight could have proceeded – presumable with more than the usual calculated risk, but in this instance, all test flying has been delayed. Presumably this is because little benefit could be gained from a flight (and risk) vs the grounding the first aircraft to fix it.
This hints at an interesting internal debate – why not fix the second aircraft etc vs getting a first flight (PR); was the first aircraft the only one configured for ‘structural’ / flight envelope testing, etc, etc.
Oh to be the carbon-fibre ‘fly on the wall’.

[Michael Birbeck]

Oh to be the carbon-fibre ‘fly on the wall’.


One of the external delegates on the Boeing teleconference asked directly if, as a result of the test and the anomalous stress reading, there was any visible evidence of stress in the materials involved (he may have even used the words debonding - my memory fails me).

The Boeing representative's answer was that of the consumate politician. He didn't answer the question.

[mickyman]

Its all very worrying not just for the future of the dreamliner
but the future of the company.
Surely a 'weakness' like this should have been picked up a long
time ago.If the fault was not predicted in the computer generated
model it makes me wonder if Boeing will find out other problems
a little too late next time.

Meanwhile the long gestation period for the A350 does not sound
so strange now.

MM

[John Farley]

Listening to the Q&A session I was struck at the apparent limited engineering common sense of most of the questioners. They were asking questions that THEY should have known it was not possible to answer simply.

Mind you deliberately asking questions that YOU know they cannot answer potentially makes for good headlines for disemination to the masses who know nothing about aircraft testing and development.

The original problem is that when Boeing (but it could just as well have been Airbus) announced the original programme schedule they did not say something on the lines of

"This programme is very provisional. Given the reality of the work that has to be completed before we can deliver a brand new certificated aircraft this X year programme must be assumed to have a worst case scatter of Y% of X. But then I am sure people in your position are bright enough to realise that anyhow. We shall inform potential customers of our progress in reducing Y to zero but if you leave your orders too late don't be surprised to find you are at the back of a very long queue"

[Michael Birbeck]

Michael Birbeck's comments

Read this guy's take on the respective A380 and 787 programmes. It is an uneven read and I certainly don't agree with all his stuff but it is interesting.

Lonely Scientist (http://www.lonelyscientist.com/)


I wish them the best. The 787 is brave step forward and I bet the programme will come to be seen to be ground breaking (not Boeing breaking) in years to come.


With respect to my comments Lonely Scientist PM'd me. I post his message to me (with his permission).

I don't endorse his thesis but am rereading it in the context of his book preparatory to responding to him personally.


@Lonely Scientist



I agree that it is still an uneven read - has yet to be edited - and of course I do not expect everyone to agree.

However I am not in total agreement with your further remarks on the 787 and I do not bet - actually I am convinced - that the 787 and the A350 and the (wings of) the A400M will prove to be failures, sooner than later. I challenge ANYBODY to come forward with one single argument that justifies the application of composites in aircraft: In the way they are applied here for externally exposed primary structures. On the other hand there are numerous reasons not to apply composites for these purposes - as have been detailed in my book. Plain composites do not save any weight and have very low damage tolerance - these materials are just not suitable and there is nothing that can be done about that.

My involvement with this is only to save lives - a late wake up call may be, although my first reports are from January 2008; that was, when the first delay with the 787 was just announced.

As you stated in your comment - ‘stress concentrations that were not compatible with their computer model’ - and this is at the root of problems. The computer simulation programs that are in place don’t work. Engineers at Boeing are completely in the dark – may be difficult to believe for you, but true. Mind also that aircraft are dynamically loaded in flight and static testing that has been performed so far provides only an approach. A 150% safety margin is applied, similar to aluminum aircraft, but based on what?

The first six 787 test aircraft - four to fly - are heavily overweight, some 20,000 to 25,000 lbs, and were already patched up. The problem that now surfaced are not the first one. The centre wing box - the foundation of the aircraft - failed at an earlier bending test, actually before the plane was rolled out the first time July 2007. It took some two years to design and test a new wing box but the old planes were left with provisionally strengthened wing boxes. History is repeating itself, when two years later just before second roll problems were detected with static testing with again the centre wing box involved and now also the connection of the wings to the centre wing box has to be provisionally strengthened - but how to do this without reliable models - and than static tests have to be repeated. In the meantime another most worrisome development were the thousands of wrongly placed fasteners that were discovered during the blow test September 2008. No provisional strengthening this time: Boeing decided to replace these fasteners after test flight - which is both stupid and irresponsible, to say at least, given the circumstances.

What is the point of testing a plane for certification that is heavily overweight and is held together by a provisionally strengthened wingbox, a provisionally strengthened connection of the wings to the centre wing box and thousands of wrongly placed fasteners - to mention only a few of the structural problems.

What you see here is a pattern of failures each time when the structure is loaded. And these are still the least of problems. The main concern with composites is their very low damage tolerance. On impact the windows perform far better than the composite skin. Composites provide no protection again lighting strike and you are not going to believe that a couple of hundred pounds of wire mesh inserted in the composite skin are going to provide a Faraday cage as is obtained by some 25,000 pounds of solid aluminum with traditional aircraft. With fire the resin adds fuel to the flames – at the same time the carbon fibres break up producing large amounts of respirable fibrels probably more dangerous that asbestos. To mention only a few of the problems.

As I tried to point out in my book, the future is not to all-composite but to composed aircraft where aluminum reinforced composites, that are already successfully applied with the A380, will play an important role next to plain composites that can be used for parts that are not externally exposed (centre wing box, keel beam and so on) together with monolithic aluminum (aluminum lithium has very poor impact performance) and of course titanium.

[Michael Birbeck]

Mind you deliberately asking questions that YOU know they cannot answer potentially makes for good headlines for disemination to the masses who know nothing about aircraft testing and development.




Thing is the questioners were analysts with the big financial institutions!

In theory these guys should know their stuff.

Their message is for those who are looking at exposure with respect to the financial positions held in Boeing and partners.

[Grunf]

hello.

Statement from "Lonely scientist" that:

The centre wing box - the foundation of the aircraft - failed at an earlier bending test, actually before the plane was rolled out the first time July 2007.

is pure and utter LIE. This guy is not on the stress team, not on the test team otherwise he would be braking the NDA (non-disclosure agreement) by this b/s he is spreading here.

He has the right to his opinion but to know what is really happening is too much. As for his theory on what will happen in due time - let us wait and see. Too many competent engineers were fooled by their knowledge, history shows us.

He is neither the first nor the last.

Cheers

[glad rag]

ROFL @ grunf, so it didn't fail then?????????????????????????????????????

[HarryMann]

I blame the business schools (and their product), but that is a topic for somewhere else.

Think I know where you're coming from there...

On the other hand, whoever said penny pinching has resulted in thinner composites than really required, has never worked in an aircraft design office.. :ugh:

And to XB70 being 600 mph faster than Concorde...

But it never carried or was certificated for 100+ pax :D

[Grunf]

@glad rag

There was no such test...that Lonely Scientist claims (allegedly) it was in 2007...

In addition: I assume he is heavily experienced in commercial (transport category) composites applications on structures:hmm:...with the knowledge of all the loads, flight profiles, loads spectra, specific design solutions, test methods etc.

it is easy to criticize (just look at film critics)...it is hard to work hard and make mistakes from which you learn...so easy to criticize...so easy...

[daikilo]

Peicing together sound bytes, what if the flight test pilots suggested that they would be delighted to fly the plane if and when the engineering community could explain why the delamination at the bolt-holes (?) on the test specimen would not lead to a more significant failure if they approached the limit of the flight envelope or made a hard landing?

[lomapaseo]

daikilo

Peicing together sound bytes, what if the flight test pilots suggested that they would be delighted to fly the plane if and when the engineering community could explain why the delamination at the bolt-holes (?) on the test specimen would not lead to a more significant failure if they approached the limit of the flight envelope or made a hard landing?

Always interesting to read earth shaking news just before a major publicity coup (First Flight).

Stress analysis even in composites is not a black art conducted in dark rooms with sweaty half dressed engineers sitting at their consoles staring at their plasma screen monitors. The Boeing knowledge of this problem must have been known since the first finite element crashed into another over two years ago.

Their choices were obvious, fix it then or fix it later. Fixing it later probably meant that they could still meet the public milestones and visible measure of sucess, but then there are those pesky oversight problems with the test pilots who have to decide what additional risk they are taking, let alone the FAA types who decide that they haven't been satisfied with all the promises for the last three years.

Yes I know just more wild speculation suitable for Jet Blast, but then who does know what is behind all this?

What's Airbus saying about all this, they should really know?

[Dani]

How on earth can this guy (in Lonely Scientist) say that composites are not working? They work all the time! There might be the fear that they are not maintenance friendly in a commercial environment, we don't know, he doesn't know. As far as I can see it (as an outsider like everyone here) all problems in the Dreamliner's case are not founded in the composite area. Of course, everything on that thing is composite, so it's easy to blame. We all know these scaremongers when new technology is involved. That wasn't different with the first jet, with the first hydraulics, with the first FBW, with the first rocket, with...

btw if this guy compares Boeing's composites with Airbus', I really don't know. Doesn't he know that 787 and 350 are two completly different cups of tea?

Dani

[mrmrsmith]

well said mr John Farley
I agree with every thing you say but " one past shuttle launch for example" is a bit cutting for our US friends, they'll be line'n up the misslies on you home as we speak. But oh yes funny about all that Boeing said about the A380 and now its flying daily and more and more will be flying soon, Dear Mr Boeing what go's around come around

[llagonne66]

I guess that the trouble encountered by both Boeing and Airbus on the 787 and the 380 (not to mention the Russians or the Chinese with their RJs that are also late) comes from the fact that bean counters and finance guys have taken over this industry. Every reasonable program manager knows that to develop a widebody a/c in less that 6 to 8 years is pure suicide. But the "finance analysts" that are counselling the shareholders (not ordinary guys like you and me but those big banks and finance outfits that ran into the wall lately) cannot bear that ! What ! Spending money for 6 to 8 years without revenue ? Where is the "creation of value" ??? So program managers bow their heads to the new gospel and propose irrealistic development schedules on 4 to 5 years. And in the end, the program is developed in 6 to 8 years and instead of costing 100, it costs 150, not to mention the bad press it is giving to our industry.

[Grunf]

lomapaseo
Stress analysis even in composites is not a black art conducted in dark rooms with sweaty half dressed engineers sitting at their consoles staring at their plasma screen monitors.

Well, it seems to me that you were hidden somewhere to see our little secret:O:O

In general, media hype about this mod is still the management failure - not the engineering failure. These types of modifications do happen very often and they are expected. in addition, pressure from the likes of Wall Street (or City, for that matter) is not helpful.

Shareholder value is so important that you end up with financial analysts asking technical questions in Boeing's news conference (like that matters!) :eek:...


To add an answer to Daikilo:

it is up to Flight test pilot to make a final decision depending on Engineering briefing. Go-no go decision depends on his/hers final word and that can be just a "hunch", for that matter (I've already seen that!).

Cheers

[HarryMann]

The time to certification and then service of an airliner was about the same, sometimes more, way back when (70's)

What would worry me, was if we heard that the engineers were saying that these static load test results were invalidated somehow and based on best structural model design estimates (e.g. finite element analysis etc...) they would go ahead anyway...

Boeing (and others) learnt a helluva lot from the Brits pioneering efforts (e.g. Comet Disaster mistakes and enquiry findings) and subsequently Airbus' experiences as well as having kept a large foot in the military field.

In most respects they have always been if anything, conservative in approach (large less critical wings, more conservative flight control systems, noted for strong durable airframes ), always with the odd exception to the rule of course.

I cannot see them now stepping into the great void of 'not knowing what thoust does' just to get ahead... and am sure many of their major sub-structure contractors are as much risk sharers in all this, financialy as well as legally.

We've also all seen over the last few years in several aviation accidents, how catastrophically & demonstrably winged aluminium tin-cans can fall apart at the seams, either in the air or on the ground. For all we know, these new high composite content structures might well prove to be better in many useful respects than metal ones (Formula 1 cars are just one example). Any weaknesses should be known & mitigated - just as with fatigue in metal structures!

Boeing made the 747 as big a success as it ever could have been. Ditto the 777.

This is pioneering in the spirit of the aviation industry to always move forward... Boeing have surely earnt the right and respect to be allowed to take this on and set their own timeframe without undue or artificial (non commerical) pressures from external critics.

Its up to them to manage their customer and order base, and take whatever risks with that they see fit, but not to risk all by treating project timescales as overarching constraints .. taking a deep breath about now, for a final looksee, after what has been quite a rapid schedule for such a mammoth step forward - yup, they should be allowed that and respected for it. I'd say good luck to them too, but for the fact they are quite capable of making their own luck just by doing things the Boeing way... :D

[fdcg27]

I am rather confused.
Is this the same Boeing that bet the company on the 707, the 727 and the 747? The 747 nearly killed Boeing, but the company survivied through grit and determination.
Is this the same Boeing that has delivered more 737s than Airbus has aircraft?
Is this the same Boeing that developed the now old-school, but still widely used, and in demand, 767 and 757?
Is this the same Boeing that developed the 777, which made the A340 irrelevant?
Is this the same Boeing that can do endless development to an old design, and keep it fresh and competitive way past any reasonable lifespan (I'm thinking 747-400 and 737NG).
It's not as though Boeing has never developed a new type before.
What is going on with the 787?
Are the finance guys really running the show now, and ignoring the engineers?

[BYALPHAINDIA]

This 787 dreamliner has already made an unsuccesful name for itself, And it isn't even in service yet!!

Sorry, But I will stick with the 757 for another 15 years or so!!

I don't understand what all the excitement is about - Frankly!!

[Tyres O'Flaherty]

BYAlpha, HarryMann, et al


That appears to be the problem.

And it's been commented upon elsewhere in many different contexts, its the amazing ability of media, whether it be online, print, TV or whatever, to ratchet up interest/scares, & essentially a shallower understanding of complicated processes & their resolutions.

We are ( hopefully not ) looking at a paradigm shift - not in engineering, or Aviation, or the approaches to advances in these, but how much effect/power this mass media is apparently having upon business decisions, whether they be for Boeing ( I very much look forward to the day I take a sched flt on the 787 ), or witness the current attempt of the witless to make some sort of scare about the (possibly) safest airliner flying :ugh:

[safetypee]

lomapaseo, an interesting and valid ‘engineering’ view (#32). However, as a retired pesky overseer I am puzzled why the management decided on the fix now.
If the problem was previously known then decisions on the oversight issues could have be made at a much earlier date; if they were, then the decision might have been political – no disclosure pre Paris etc. Alternatively the management changed their plan, or there is new management.

A more serious situation is that this problem was not known, it really is something new; then oversight, flight test content, test aircraft allocation, timescale, all enter a new decision at this late stage.
Whilst the decision is unlikely to have been taken on just one of these parameters, there is also the consideration that the Boeing management’s faith in engineering might not be as strong as everyone would wish for at this stage of the project – "will the next fix work", "what other surprises are to come".

Whilst many major programs involve change, they usually occur well in advance of first flight or as a result of flight testing. In the first instance this might result from a design review, spec change, or static testing. For the 787 it appears that it originates from static or resonance testing on a much delayed test specimen due to the previous problems – hence the overall program slip.

[ptuomola]

Heidi Wood - Morgan Stanley - Analyst:
You saw stress on the plane, but did you see delamination?

Scott Fancher - The Boeing Company - 787 Vice President and General Manager:
Yes, the area that we are talking about has got multiple materials in that region. We've got titanium. We've got aluminum. We've got composites. So when we saw the strain gauges on the aircraft during the test not meet our predictions, we went in and did some inspections and saw a number of things indicative of what the strain gauges were saying.

I think that's politician-speak for "yes" :)

[protectthehornet]

as I mentioned in my post on the XB70

if the boeing company was coming up with a plane that would make it from New York to San Francisco in 90 minutes, that would be worth waiting for.

But to make a plane, whose sole advantage is using less fuel and a few comfort items...why bother?

Boeing made some brilliant strides in aviation and some of their gambles paid off well. I'm glad they gambled on the B17. They got a good deal from the USAF by making the B47 and the B52 and turning that info into a jet airliner by way of the tanker.

So there you go. they should have just kept building some of the planes that have proven themselves...and bean counters should not be allowed near airplanes.

[Willoz269]

Heidi Wood - Morgan Stanley - Analyst:
You saw stress on the plane, but did you see delamination?

Scott Fancher - The Boeing Company - 787 Vice President and General Manager:
Yes, the area that we are talking about has got multiple materials in that region. We've got titanium. We've got aluminum. We've got composites. So when we saw the strain gauges on the aircraft during the test not meet our predictions, we went in and did some inspections and saw a number of things indicative of what the strain gauges were saying.

I think that's politician-speak for "yes" http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/smile.gif


What a load of dribble....maybe Boeing should hire Leahy from Airbus???

[Michael Birbeck]

But to make a plane, whose sole advantage is using less fuel and a few comfort items...why bother?



Why bother?

We don't live within a Soviet style command economy! We live in a capitalist system dominated by dynamic, innovative and competitive markets.

Boeing are looking to produce a commercially viable aircraft that provides the appropriate amount of comfort in a market sector where even a 0.001 improvement across the overall performance index might mean the difference between sales success or failure.

Remember that failure means no sales. No sales means lost jobs, shrinkage, organisational sclerosis and corporate death.

Want to see what sclerosis and corporate death means? Take a drive through Detroit sometime. It is heart breaking! Forty years ago what has occurred there would have been thought impossible.

If you are asking whether Boeing is an engineering led company, I believe that the answer is still a very big 'yes'. Engineering pulses thought he veins of the company. If it didn't a concept like the 787 wouldn't have made it onto the digital drawing board, let alone into production.

At no stage, as has been theorised by some, have the so called "bean counters" taken over. Such a thing wouldn't work at Airbus, Boeing or anywhere where extremely complex engineering development is undertaken.

This is not to say that Boeing is immune from financial considerations. It has a duty to its customers, its worldwide workforce and to its shareholders to be profitable. It has to be aware of market perceptions and considerations.

Will Boeing succeed with 787. You bet it will.

Will the wings fall off ? :). No.

Get out out there and get a 787 rating. Prepare to travel it in. Buy a spotters guidebook .

The 787 is on the way.

[stepwilk]

It was some years ago, and I'm sure the composite art has advanced, but a Boeing engineer said to a friend of mine--the then-Editor of Air & Space Smithsonian--"The more we learn about composites, the better aluminum looks."

[protectthehornet]

I stand by my post.

and I love that bit about, the better aluminium looks.

no matter what you do, metal has a 40 year head start on composites, so it is better understood.

now if the 787 could do mach 3, that would be different.

[mickyman]

Michael burbeck

The 787 will not be flying any time soon so where is the profit
in that - bearing in mind your capitalist craving credentials?

MM

[742]

If you are asking whether Boeing is an engineering led company, I believe that the answer is still a very big 'yes'. Engineering pulses thought he veins of the company. If it didn't a concept like the 787 wouldn't have made it onto the digital drawing board, let alone into production.

At no stage, as has been theorised by some, have the so called "bean counters" taken over. Such a thing wouldn't work at Airbus, Boeing or anywhere where extremely complex engineering development is undertaken.

I don’t understand how anyone can look at the resumes of McNerney and Mulally, and the decision making that put them in their current positions, and conclude that “Boeing is an engineering led company”. It used to be, that is certain.

They can not even make a simple tanker conversion anymore (ref the Italian KC-767 program), and they have been doing that since what -- 1948?

The only good thing to have come out of Boeing recently is Ford’s CEO. And I bet that is a decision the Boeing board of directors would like to do over.

[fdcg27]

I don’t understand how anyone can look at the resumes of McNerney and Mulally, and the decision making that put them in their current positions, and conclude that “Boeing is an engineering led company”. It used to be, that is certain.

742, I quote you above, merely to point out that at the time Boeing made its first sucessful bets in the commercial transport market, the 707 and the 727, it was actually being run by a lawyer, a fellow named Bill Allen.
Engineers ran the programs, of course. One would think, both then and now, that once the decision is made to pursue a program at vast expense, senior management would do whatever it takes to speed the program to a sucessful launch.
I remain confused as to why the 787 program has had so much delay.
Could it be that the original timeline to first flight and certification was set without consulting the engineers at all?

[IB4138]

Quantas has cancelled it's order.

BBC NEWS | Business | Qantas cancels Dreamliner order (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8120276.stm)

[Groundloop]

Quantas has cancelled it's order.


QANTAS (note spelling) has NOT cancelled its order.

http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/379188-qantas-cancel-all-787-orders.html

[Michael Birbeck]

Boeing is crushed between two imperatives:

a) Delivering the 787 - the engineering perspective.

b) Keeping Wall Street on side - the capitalist perspective.

It is a huge juggling act!

To mangle Marshall Mcluhan's meaing when he said "the the medium is the message" the 787 itself has become the medium and the message. A flying 787 would itself be a message that would transcend anything else as far as the money men are concerned.

Wall Street want the plane now and the engineers can only deliver it when it is ready, which isn't now.

This tension between perception and reality is the biggest problem the programme faces and may act to destabilise rational debate in the organisation as evidenced in unrealistic schedules and communiication breakdowns.

In many ways the Boeing example may be akin to an organisation at its limits as was evidenced by NASA at the time of the Challenger and Columbia disasters.

Ultimately it all boils down to a question of engineering ethics in balancing cost, schedule and risk.


Fallout: Boeing 787 flight delay not even disclosed privately (http://blog.seattlepi.com/aerospace/archives/172258.asp)


Well, you've got to hand it to Boeing management for being consistent.
Two J.P. Morgan analysts said in a research note that multiple members of Boeing management assured them in private conversations that 787 Dreamliner would meet its first flight deadline.

So when Boeing said on Tuesday that first flight would slip -- again -- because the plane's body needs reinforcement at the wing, the analysts were surprised.

"We consider ourselves relatively steeled to disappointments on this program, but given everything we had heard recently, including in private conversations with multiple members of management just last week, we were shocked by this news," wrote analysts Joseph Nadol and Seth Seifman in a research note dated June 23. They titled the note, "Oh no, not again" and concluded that information dissemination is a "major problem" at Boeing.

[Groundloop]

Isn't it about time that Boeing dropped that stupid "Dreamliner" name? It became the "Nightmareliner" long ago!

[protectthehornet]

dreamliner, smurfliner, avroliner,airliner

what's in a name

after all, what self respecting pilot would want to fly a bus over an airliner, or a DC Jet!

;-)

[protectthehornet]

surprised that no one has posted that boeing will be buying a factory in south carolina (usa) as another place to build the 787

[11Fan]

Flightblogger and The Wall Street Journal reported online Wednesday that Boeing is in talks to buy the South Carolina plant where Vought Aircraft Industries builds the two rear fuselage sections of the 787. Both companies declined to comment.

Boeing news | Speculation grows for Boeing 787 plant in South Carolina | Seattle Times Newspaper (http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/boeingaerospace/2009409837_boeing02.html)