Ainsworth's assurance over "safe" Nimrod

[Distant Voice]

See Times Online

Ainsworth's assurance over 'safe' Nimrod - Times Online (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article6545684.ece)


DV

[Sun Who]

As I have said elsewhere, this man is not clever. I seriously suspect the subtleties of a safety case, or indeed an airworthiness argument in general, are beyond him. Unfortunately for the families involved, he doesn't realise this, so he'll continue to use his own words instead of taking the counsel that's available to him.

Sun

[Distant Voice]

Of course it is not just Ainsworth, it is all the people who advise him. They get the reports then do some selective reading, and adjusting.

DV

[tucumseh]

Ainsworth repeatedly said defence consultants QinetiQ agreed the aircraft was safe to fly, despite the company warning that “no statement can, or has been made” to this effect.


Ain't it funny how MoD quote QinetiQ when it suits them but totally reject their advice when it doesn't comply with the political imperative? Example - Boscombe's recommendation that Chinook Mk2 be grounded.

Jobsworth is a non-entity. He is also a fool, witnessed by him placing in writing that he supports rulings that the airworthiness regs can be ignored. But the people in MoD who advise him to say this are dangerous fools - which is much worse.

[Tappers Dad]

Bob Ainsworth should remember the words of Richard M. Nixon, who said shortly before being exposed over Watergate "I condemn any attempts to cover up in this case, no matter who is involved."

He may find himself being forced to eat his own words when he reads out the findings of the Haddon-Cave review to Parliament in October.

[anita gofradump]

It reads to me like Mr Ainsworth has mis-quoted QinetiQ:

the company warning that “no statement can, or has been made” to this effect.

I am of the opinion, however, that Jimmy Jones is as much of an arse as the SoS Def, and should probably keep his dated and useless knowledge to himself.

[Tappers Dad]

anita gofradump

Are you saying Jimmy Jones is unable to quote from a report and are you also saying that a permanent heat sensor with real time display of the temperatures of the cross-feed duct has been fitted to all Nimrods then.

Or has your head been buried in the sand for too long ?

[anita gofradump]

Read this very carefully TD, and do your best not to twist my words....

It reads to me like Mr Ainsworth has mis-quoted QinetiQ:

Quote:
the company warning that “no statement can, or has been made” to this effect.
I am of the opinion, however, that Jimmy Jones is as much of an arse as the SoS Def, and should probably keep his dated and useless knowledge to himself.

My head is far from buried and I will not be baited by you into a childlike, online slagging match.

Not everyone is trying to do you an injustice Mr Knight, in fact, some of us are actually more behind your final objective than you think.

[sanddancer]

Anyone asked Ainsworth if he wants to go for a nice long flight in one? . . .

[Softie]

Gents, this record is getting rather worn. Give it a break!

[Distant Voice]

Has anyone seen this QinetiQ report?

DV

[Distant Voice]

anita gofradump

Like TD I am not sure what can be "dated and useless" about quoting from a QineiQ document, dated Feb 2009. If we put to one side Bob Ainsworth and all the people under him who have mislead families and MPs regarding Nimrod safety, we are left with advice that unaccepteble risks still exist. What is suggested is that whilst the x-feed ducting is selected "closed" and the indications show "closesd" there is no guarantee that the temp of the x-feed is below auto-ignition. How many Flight Engs know that? And what is wrong with suggesting constant monitoring? If shut-off valves "leak" in flight, and temperatures rise, there is no way crews will know of this with the current set up.

If anyone has a copy of the report can they post the important sections?

DV

[PPRuNeUser0139]

From his own ePolitix website:

I was born and raised in the constituency that I represent. I was educated at Foxford Comprehensive School, Coventry Library Service and the University of Life.
Worked for Jaguar Cars in Coventry and held various offices in the trade union and Labour movement including Shop Steward, Secretary of Joint Shop Steward Committee, Sheet Metal Workers Union Branch President and Constituency Labour Party Chairman.
Coventry City Councillor between 1984 – 1992 during which time he held the positions of Deputy Leader of the Council and Chairman of the Finance Committee.
Elected to Parliament in 1992 and served on the Environment Select Committee. He was appointed a Whip in 1995.
In Government he has been; Lord Commissioner of HM Treasury 1997-2001 (Government Whip), Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the Department for Environment, Transport and the Regions January 2001- June 2001, Home Office Minister with responsibility for Drugs and organised Crime 2001 – June 2003, Government Deputy Chief Whip 2003-2007, when he was appointed to the position of Minister for the Armed Forces at the MOD. In 2009 Bob was appointed as Secretary of State for Defence.

Wikipedia adds:
During 1982 and 1983, he was a candidate member of the International Marxist Group, but he was never a full member of that organisation.
Ainsworth is one of the 98 MPs who voted to keep their expense details secret. In 2007-8, he claimed the maximum permissible amount of £23,083 for second-home allowances, making him the joint highest claimant. He has been criticized for alleged excessive claims for repairs to his second home.

His rock-solid Defence pedigree stretches all the way back to 2007.
Now, what was the question..?

[nigegilb]

I doubt he could even answer a question on international marxism, well we're all marxists now eh Bob?



YouTube - International Marxist Group (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WuhbWpHAyds)

tw**s.....

[Distant Voice]

EDSett100;

Where are you?

You have read these reports, what are you telling your Flt Engs?

DV

[anita gofradump]

DV, you are such a troll!

http://www.spiesonline.net/trolls.jpg

[Distant Voice]

anita g;

I think you are sick.

DV

[anita gofradump]

You are entitled to your opinion, but fact would show you to be far from correct.

(A1 G1 Z1, in the green and free from H1N1, at this juncture)

You, however, are still an internet troll, laying bait for poor souls to take the bite. Your 20.51 post shows this to be true.

[Two's in]

You may have a long wait if you are looking for a politician with Defence or Duty of Care credentials. As avoidable and tragically predictable as all this is, you will find that the Rt honourable Member for Coventry North East has only 2 objectives;

1. Get re-elected.
2. Try to avoid any payouts for MoD Liability.

Of those, 1 is clearly the prime directive for Bob. He is the original empty vessel, so don't look for any kind of justice or integrity here. As for the role of Qinetiq, is that the highly regarded bit, whose recommendations are sometimes embarrassing and uncomfortable, or is that the "sell your granny to the natives as long as it makes a profit bit? Hard to be sure with the bipolar nature of that very political organisation, no wonder the Government uses them at its convenience.

Sadly, there is no real news here, just more abrogation of responsibility and dereliction of duty by politicians and senior officers. Will the last Senior Officer in the Armed Forces with a set of balls please stand up?

[Mick Smith]

DV you asked for anyone to post key pages of the report if they had it. I am not going to post the entire report. It would take far too much work I'm afraid. There are only two references to ALARP in the final report in February this year and both are reported in the article. But this is the executive summary.

Executive Summary

This report presents the results of an assessment of the Nimrod MR2 hot air components and has been developed using zonal analysis, examination of supporting document sets and a physical inspection of the aircraft's hot air components. ln addition, briefings from Suitably Qualified Expert Personnel (SQEPs) at RAF Kinloss were used to improve understanding of the Nimrod's operational and maintenance activities. These SQEPs were also utilised as a resource to answer technical queries as they arose throughout the course of the zonal analysis. Additionally, expert advice was sought from industry to underpin conclusions reached regarding the physical construction and operation of hot air system components.

During the analysis, due consideration was given to the risk mitigation actions already put in place by the IPT. It should be noted that, throughout this report, the term "risk" is used in its broadest sense, and is in no way indicative of any statistical or quantitative risk analysis being performed (as per Section 1.7). As there is no defined hot air "system" for Nimrod and, consequently, no quantitative safety target, this analysis is of a purely qualitative and subjective nature. Furthermore, due to the lack of any safety target, no statement can or has been made as to whether the hot air system risks identified in this report have been reduced to As Low As Reasonably Practicable( ALARP) in line with the requirements of JSP 553.

Overall, the analysis of the Nimrod hot air components has resulted in 18 zonal observations and 12 recommendations for the Nimrod IPT. These observations and recommendations are provided in Sections 8.2 and 10 of this report.

The observations made during the review were mainly related to hot air ducting, its insulation and its proximity, and interaction with, other aircraft structures, services and components. This interaction can be separated into two categories:
1. A potential failure of the duct and,/or its insulation causing an escape of hot gas, which adversely effects another aircraft structure, system or component.
2. A potential condition where a combustible fluid finds a migratory route to a section of hot air duct, which then acts as a source of auto-ignition.

Currently, there is insufficient information available regarding the hot air ducting and its insulation to draw any demonstrable conclusion on the overall level of risk being carried. Any such conclusion will not be possible until information on the damage limits, tolerances, performance, temperature attenuation, and any damage effects on these parameters, becomes available.

[Distant Voice]

FZ; Many thanks, but the BOI report is not the one being talked about in the news item.

DV

[Mick Smith]

FZ The article is about a QinetiQ report into the hot air system that reported in draft form in June 2008 and in final form in February 2009.

Whatever people might think about Ainsworth is irrelevant. He is of course taking the rap here but he is not the expert, he is only a politician spouting what he is told by senior RAF officers. I doubt Ainsworth personally read the report, it is the senior officers who told him QinetiQ backed what they were saying that are the ones to blame here.

[nigegilb]

Mick, you and I were in the room when Ainsworth went out on the airwaves to rubbish the coroner's conclusions at the nimrod inquest. He hadn't read the coroner's conclusion, if he is that stupid, he shouldn't be in office. And he really is that stupid, this being another example.

I do agree that it appears senior military officers do not have a clue about airworthiness requirements and safety management systems. Their advice and the advice of civil servants was misguided and incorrect driven by the narrow minded approach of achieving the task at any price. Doesn't detract from the awful, self regarding instincts of the new man and "former" marxist in charge of the MoD.

I am not sure if you realise, but Sec State for Defence has overall responsibility for implementation of airworthiness regulations. The buck really does stop with him.

Scary, hey?

[FantomZorbin]

MS & DV

Apologies ... post deleted :uhoh:

[Vage Rot]

Gents,
A touch of realism from a sarcastic old b45t4rd.

Aviation carries risk - ask Airbus about pitot tubes, the ATR42/72 about tail plane ant-ice, the Boeing 737 about uncommanded rudder deflection. I'm not saying that there isn't another non reflective object in the pile of wood with Nimrod, simply that the case is the same with any aircraft. Test and evaluation can only go so far.

As a Nimrod aviator with 23 years on type, I am as happy as I can be flying an aircraft that is older than I am. I still have some doubts but then again, if I strapped in without a care in the world then I wouldn't be a professional.

Stop bleating please and stump up with some proper evidence. we had a tragic accident. Measures were taken, some right, some based on guess work. However, we are now at a stage where the aircraft is as safe as it can be. Just please take the line out of the RTS thst refers to the Safety Case!!! We haven't got one yet as far as I know!

Hurry up Mr Haddon Cave - put the story to bed once and for all - the aircraft will be out of service before you report - or is thst the intention?

[BEagle]

However, we are now at a stage where the aircraft is as safe as it can be.

Sure of that, are you?

It might be serviceable, but is it airworthy?

[fergineer]

What a stupid remark Beags if it were not airworthy the guys would not fly it.........what is the status of any aircraft these days if you want to be really picky......am flying back to the UK in the next few weeks and have no fear at all of flying and if it were a Nimrod would be happy to fly in that as well. Why do you people all want to try and scare people.......the only people that you are upsetting are the true blue crews that are flying the aircraft and more importantly their families if they keep having to read this rubbish......if the crews aint happy they would not fly the aircraft end of story and I hear none of them refusing to fly.

[BEagle]

Whilst your loyalty towards the old beast is commendable, despite the intemperate tone of your post, the question really is do you know that the aircraft is really airworthy? Which is not the same thing as having a snag-free F700, for example.

'True blue crews and their families' need absolute assurance that they are not being lied to by a cash-starved MoD glossing over airworthiness issues.

[fergineer]

Did I know that any of the aircraft that I flew were airworhy?????Do I know that my car will not fall apart tomorrow........will the rescue boat I go on sink next time we get a call out......so I suppose the answer to your question is no I dont know the aircraft is airworthy but do you know that its NOT.

[Distant Voice]

fergineer:

if it was not airworthy the guys would not fly it

The trouble is, the guys who fly it do not have the full story. The guys in XV230 believed that the aircraft, along with the rest of the fleet" was airworthy, but it wasn't. This was agreed by MoD at the inquest.

DV

[fergineer]

DV the guys that fly it know exactly what they are flying in, they are proffesionals and the Air Engs are the best in the world. That goes for all fleets. They will know what is what, they will have been over the NMSU hanger and seen for themselves and they in turn will tell the rest of the crew, thats how it works they trust each other.

[BEagle]

fergineer, your blind faith is touching, but misplaced; no-one is casting aspersions on the professionalism of the crew.

DV has summed up the situation very well.

One thing I find hard to comprehend is why some in the Nimrod force simply cannot seem to understand the difference between serviceability and airworthiness - and seem to take any adverse comments concerning airworthiness as a personal affront.

[fergineer]

No blind faith Beags.......when I fly now I put my trust in the ground crew who service the aircraft and the flight crew who fly me.......I have heard and read lots of things about other aircraft/ airlines read many reports but still have faith in the airline business.......would I fly on an A330 yes would I fly on older generation 737's yes......hercs nimrods even the old L1011....I trusted the people who serviced the aircraft when I was in service and flying civvy trusted the men and women who serviced the aircraft. If it is not airworthy they will ground it trust me no-one will sign an aircraft off if in doubt.

[Snow Dog]

Why is it that everyone outside the Nimrod world appear to be enlightened, yet those who fly it are posted as apparently ignorant. No, those words don't appear in the posts, but what effect are those implications having on those who still climb into the dear old aircraft?
Yes, questions need to be answered. Yes, worryingly, it could have been anyone of us and yes, we have the deepest sympathy for lost friends and their families.
If the aircraft was to be in service for a lot longer, more changes would be implemented. That doesn't mean that the aircraft is unsafe as it is, it just means that it has lost some of its capability; the obvious being AAR.
I have no problem getting into the aircraft and flying it. Please stop telling the crews that you understand something that they don't - I am sure they are more up to date and in the midst of it than you are.

[Distant Voice]

Snow Dog;

How many crews have read the latest QinetiQ report on the hot air system? How many crews are aware that a temperature sensor is recommended for the cross-feed pipe, because the in-flight temp is unknown?

OK, I am no longer a member of the Nimrod fleet, but I can assure you I am more up to date on the underlying problems than most crews.

I am sure that when the QC produces his report in Oct, you will then realise how much you have been kept in the dark. Of course there will still be those who will reject the report because the QC is not a Flt Eng. Sometimes when you are sick, you need to see a consultant, not a GP.

DV

[Softie]

DV
Why are you going on about the cross feed hot duct? One, it is longer in use in the air - and never will be used again. Two, even with QQ recommending a cockpit temp sensor, there is not enough life left in the MR2 fleet for it to be designed and embodied before the out of service date. You know it has taken long enough to manufacture and fit new hot pipes within the present design. Therefore, it does not matter - it will never happen.

[Distant Voice]

Softie;

We are talking about a simple mod, involving a simple thermocouple and a connecting wire to a display. It could have been installed during the pipe replacement programme. Complex equipment was fitted to the aircraft, in double quick time, for opertions in Afgahistan.

I think you, and others, are missing the point regarding the need for this mod in the interest of flight safety. Yes, we all know that the cross-feed is de-selected in flght, but we do not know what the residual temp is after a ground start. Data has been collected, but not reported on. Also, in the event of "leaking" cross-feed valves in flight, the ducting will rise in temp without the crew knowing.

DV

[Softie]

DV
We are talking about a simple mod, involving a simple thermocouple and a connecting wire to a display.There is no such thing as simple mod.

It could have been installed during the pipe replacement programme. Complex equipment was fitted to the aircraft, in double quick time, for operations in Afgahistan.As someone who knows, there is a major difference from installing new mission equipment (down the backend) under an Operationally-driven UOR as a Service Designed Mod and a manufacturer designed Mod under peacetime conditions.

Such effort is not warranted when it is not needed.

we do not know what the residual temp is after a ground start. Data has been collected, but not reported on. Also, in the event of "leaking" cross-feed valves in flight, the ducting will rise in temp without the crew knowing.The temp in the crossfeed at engine start is too low to represent a danger (around 160C). On XV230 it took 4 engines running at full power for 10-15 mins with the SCP switched on to provide the very high temps (450C+) and a place for the fuel to pool for several minutes (ie. SCP pipe insulation) to obtain auto ignition conditions. No leaks in the crossfeed values without a flow of air would recreate these conditions.

[BEagle]

As a UAS APO many years ago, I flew on a C130 sortie. The air engineer pointed out the duct pressure gauge and explained why it was needed - and the consequences of a bleed air duct failure.

Some years later I flew the Vulcan. That also had a crossfeed air duct, access to which was controlled by 'engine air switches'. But it had neither pressure gauge nor temperature gauge. So you never knew whether the engine are switches had closed off their respective valves. However, remembering the words of that Herc Air Engineer, I worked out a method of my own. Hold the AVS valve open with one's finger, just before take-off turn off all the engine airs and see whether the AVS flow stopped - if it didn't, then one valve was probably not closing fully. Exercising the engines up and down in turn would allow the faulty valve to be identified. One day we binned a late night take-off to Akrotiri because an engine air valve wouldn't shut.

A Waddington crew later suffered a hot air ducting leak. This was obvious before they set out across the Atlantic due to a multiplicity of unconnected system failures. But, with Offut in their sights, on they pressed....and were very lucky not to have suffered an in-flight fire or critical structural failure. If I recall correctly, the aircraft stayed at Goose and was subsequently written-off due to the severity of the damage.

The moral of this lantern-swinging being that a bleed air duct leak may happen in anyaircraft so equipped. Without any temperature or pressure indications, you are very poorly placed. Even a simple thermocouple and display is better than nothing but blind faith.

[Distant Voice]

Softie;

"allowing for a reasonable margin of error ...10%" QinetiQ came up with cut-off temperature of 180 C for auto ignition.

I think you with find that IPT expect leaking valves will cause the cros-feed duct to rise above 200 C. (Read UTI 051A)

DV

[Chugalug2]

fergineer:

Do I know that my car will not fall apart tomorrow........

I think that you can at least be pretty confident that the Type Approval from the DoT means that your car was constructed in accordance with UK vehicle regulations and that, for example, fuel lines will not be placed above exhaust pipes so that a clip failure would not allow the former to impinge on the latter with disastrous results. The same would apply to manufacturer type mods where problems might have been observed and corrected. Given the evidence on this forum no such confidence can be placed in UK Military Aircraft as the Airworthiness Authority (ie the MOD) has deliberately and recklessly subverted its own regulations to produce a situation where no type can be assumed to be airworthy. This is not simply a crisis for the Nimrod fleet, though its tragedy has been to be one of the tragic recipients of the consequences of such recklessness. The failure to maintain safety audits across the military fleet means that all our military aircraft suffer compromised airworthiness. The extent varies from critical to minor, but which fleet is which? You may rail against doomsayers such as I, but instead of shooting messengers a more fruitful course of action would be to demand that UK Military Airworthiness Authority be removed forthwith into a separate and independent MAA. Likewise with an MAAIB to replace the inadequate and flawed standards of Military Accident Investigations by BoIs.

[cornish-stormrider]

Chug,

Very well said. I think that your post sums up the problems and situation very well. No-one has ever said the engineers and crews are working their damndest to put out the very best jet available.
It is upstairs where the problem lies.

[spanners123]

Let’s assume for a minute that a thermocouple has been fitted to the X-feed duct with associated gauge and warning light, said warning light illuminates, indicating a X-feed overheat, what would be the correct action to be carried out by the crew and how do you confirm which side is leaking?

[Distant Voice]

spanners123:

If you are sitting at the end of the runway, you abort. If you are in flight, you monitor the bomb bay for leaks and get down quickly.

In accordance with the UTI, you change both valves for bay testing.

DV

[spanners123]

DV, change both X-feed valves IAW which UTI? You stated earlier that it would be a simple mod to fit the thermocouple, so why a UTI would be issued I’m not too sure. Also, why change both? A ground run would show which one is leaking.
I can see a case for these thermocouples being fitted, just not too convinced about their usefulness.
By the way, no such thing as a simple mod.

[Rigga]

I dont know if I can articulate this properly, but here goes...

I believe the problem of an apparent lack of airworthiness duty of care has been brought about by several years (or more) of deeper and deeper defence budget diversions towards "the front line".

Diversions that didn't show as defence cuts.

Diversions that probably included transferring funds from "Back-Office" jobs, that top brass didn't see any real value in, to pay towards the direct operating costs of running a war. In the commercial world this would amount to a corporate manslaughter liability.

The new MAOS system uses the titles "Accountable Manager" for Maintenance (Pt 145) and the Operator's Maintenance Management responsibilities (one for Pt M and one for Subpart G - the CAMO).

If what I read here is true - then there is no real regulatory department within the MOD to force the accountable managers to use of funds where it is needed - or to close down a Fleet until the problem is fixed.

Is it possible that the "Accountable Manager" titles will actually mean something to the Top Brass or IPT's if they are HELD Accountable to ensure they take control of their Type Airworthiness and maintenance issues? Not with todays management environment, I feel.

Again, in civvy street these titles are given to people who can actually make the funds move to where they are required - not to some poor "lackey" who's brief is to "get on with it!"

If you want big badges - you've got to prove you're worth the money.

I'm starting to take bets on how long it will be before "Accountable Manager" disappears from MAOS?

Rigga

[Chugalug2]

Well the $64,000 question is accountable to who, Rigga? Given testimony here that an RAF 2* ordered his subordinates to disregard the Airworthiness Regulations which they were mandated to uphold, and further to falsely certify that they nonetheless had been upheld, the nature and extent of titles becomes academic. We are back to the old rules that require all ranks to disobey an illegal order. It is to his eternal credit that there is at least one who posts here who did just that. Most didn't.

[EdSett100]

DV, the problem with your idea about monitoring the temperature of the closed crossfeed duct is that you are moving into a triple failure condition if the sole reason for a gauge is to avoid a fire.

In no particular order the following failures must occur for there to be a fire on the surface of the closed duct:

1. Hot air leakage into the duct across a crossfeed valve with its dedicated indicator showing SHUT. The leak must therefore be very slight, bordering on insignificant, unless you want to add a 4th failure (defective indicator).

2. Air leakage out of the duct through a failed NRV, loose clamp or simply a hole. There must be flow for the leaked air to raise the temperature of the pipe skin. Yes, this could be a pre-existing fault.

3. There must also be fuel on the pipe.

For the above reason, we do not need a temperature gauge if we want to stop a fire. A hot pipe gets dangerous only when fuel is in contact with it or is very, very close in vapour form.

I am aware that QQ suggested a gauge in their report, because the individual they spoke to about this aspect of their investigation was a flight engineer. He also added that, as an eng, he is interested in everything that can happen in the aircraft and that it would be useful to know if a closed valve had leakage, so that he could report it when he landed. Thats all very well, for the purpose of monitoring one system, but there has to be additional failures before that defect contributes to a fire leading to a crash. We do not mitigate against double or triple failures. We will not use up resources just to provide the air engineer with another "useful" gauge look at.

We maintain the aircraft to the highest standards, thus minimising the risk of single failures and we fly it likewise, thus preparing ourselves for the rare occasion when the single failure gets past maintenance.

XV 230 (and all the other aircraft) had a design flaw that negated the high standards that we operate to, on the ground and in the air. I recommend you and the other critics of the Nimrod examine the cause and contributory factors of that design flaw, rather than question the way we are moving forward now.

Incidentally, a single failed valve could be diagnosed in flight if a temp gauge was fitted and a (defective) point of exit also existed.

Regards
Ed Sett

[WeekendFlyer]

Chugalug 2, I completely agree with you regarding the need for a completely separate military airworthiness authority and accident investigation branch. Why should the military be any different from the civilian world in these areas?

To my mind there are several factors in the current military environment that, in combination, are not good for airworthiness, including: massive operational demands, political pressure, severe budget restrictions, a rather over-stretched "can do attitude", the military posting people in and out of key jobs fairly regularly, and peoples' natural desire to do well to get promoted. Add all of these up and to my mind it creates a culture that is potentially vulnerable to airworthiness being compromised, not because of the people involved (the vast majority of whom are good, decent, hard-working and competent), but because there are too many conflicting pressures and demands.

Separating out airworthiness responsibility from the "service providers" (i.e. the IPTs) and the end users (front line units) would provide less opportunity for airworthiness to be compromised IMHO.

[Tappers Dad]

Is there any senario however remote when the cross feed pipe could be needed in flight, even if it is a million to one chance of it happening ?

[Chugalug2]

Cornish Stormrider and Weekend Flyer,
Thank you both for your support. This is not some arcane discussion about angels on the heads of aerial pins, it is basic bottom line stuff about the foundations of our profession. Given that this is a site dedicated to professional aviators I find it surprising and rather sad that the running, both pro and con, is left to so few. To pick up Weekend Flyer's point, supposing that following "rationalisation" Civil Airworthiness provision was handed over to "substantial" AOC holders together with Accident Investigation. Thus the BA777 accident at LHR would have been investigated by BA. Perhaps the fleet manager would have acted as president. Sound man/woman I'm sure but would anyone here put money on the exemplary AAIB work being emulated under such a limited and partial arrangement? As ever self regulation does not work, either in the civilian or the military worlds.

[Distant Voice]

Angus Robertson (Moray)(SNP);

It has emerged that the now Defence Secretary told me and families of the 14 men who died aboard RAF Nimrod XV230 that the aircraft had been made safe despite being warned it was impossible to be sure this was true. We were repeatedly told that the defence consultants QinetiQ agreed the aircraft was safe to fly, despite "no statement can, or has been made" to this effect.

Can we have a debate in government time to learn which version is correct?

DV

[JFZ90]

Why no temp probe? I think EdSett has covered the multiple failure issue above - seems a reasonable explanation as to why there isn't a case for fitting one. Sounds logical to conclude the risk probabilities are just too low - and if you are spending money, its better spent elsewhere on higher risks to the aircraft. Does this argument make sense to those calling for one to be fitted? If not, why not?

Also...

I think that you can at least be pretty confident that the Type Approval from the DoT means that your car was constructed in accordance with UK vehicle regulations and that, for example, fuel lines will not be placed above exhaust pipes so that a clip failure would not allow the former to impinge on the latter with disastrous results.

...these are the same regs I take it that failed to prevent Audi from selling 1000s of cars which killed at least 5 people before they were all recalled for safety related modifications (Audi TT, circa 2000). There appears a blind belief that only military airworthiness is bad, everything else good. Why such a bitter blinkered view - couldn't get promoted?

[Chugalug2]

JFZ90, no Regulatory Authority can prevent accidents happening or indeed poor designs slipping through the net. The point is of course to reduce them to a minimum. How many people die because of badly designed and built cars, given the millions that are built each year and the people (like me) who are then free to exhibit their lack of driving skills with them? It is especially important that when such an accident does happen that immediate and effective action is taken to prevent the next one due to the same fault. That requires an objective and professional Accident Investigation and strong regulatory enforcement of the required corrective action. Think of the Manchester 737 abandon T/O due to No.1 engine fire. Terrible loss of life due to the aircraft stopping cross wind with the fire then working its way into the cabin. The corrective action was profound and far ranging; new drills, smoke hoods, floor track lighting, fire retardant seating, etc. A lot of expense for all operators and no alternative. Then consider the RAF's accident investigation and preventative action in this case. I would suggest that it was not effective nor objective, indeed the Coroners Service seems to have been a more effective conduit for what was wrong (it was unairworthy) and what should be done (grounded until made airworthy). The RAF used to do that sort of thing once, indeed it did so when I was a sprog co-pilot on Hastings. Not anymore though it would seem.

[Rigga]

To back up Chugs' thoughts on the RAF's past record of airworthiness issues:

Buccaneer Wings fell off in the very early 80s - the likely causes were well debated and the final remedy was to grind the damage out of the wing main spars reducing the usable carrying ability from 16,000lb to less than 8,000lb - the remedial methods used were to stop Buccs flying for almost 8 months to do the work - and all this during the Cold War and continuous preparations for NATO readiness commitments.
In those days of the 70's and 80's, it was only "almost" unthinkable to ground a fleet for airworthiness issues. And the Nimrods are even older than Buccs!

All the technology of todays modern aircraft is all based on what has been learned from accidents and incidents of the past. thats why a falsly reported BOI is an immoral and selfish waste of life, time and effort. All of aviation safety is based on past lessons. Moreover, there is NO new technology that is deemed infallible or fault free. Indeed, the most expensive and cosetted planes ever built (B117 and B2) still manage to crash.

We are always waiting for the next accident - and hoping it won't be "one of ours".

Chugs,
Even the unelected one-eyed scot at No 10 is accountable to someone.

[EdSett100]

Is there any senario however remote when the cross feed pipe could be needed in flight, even if it is a million to one chance of it happening ?


None that we can anticipate as realistic.

The Staneval has looked at the various scenarios that might need the use of a supplementary air conditioning system (ie open the crossfeed pipe), but there are no such scenarios that do not require multiple, unrelated, in flight system failures. Therefore, the SCP valve is now being replaced by a solid metal bar running between the 2 clamps that used to connect the valve to the adjacent pipes.

The only other possible use of the crossfeed duct in the air is for air starting engines. A published drill is in place to air start an engine from the adjacent engine, while keeping the crossfeed duct shut. We would be in a very complicated multiple failure situation if we had to use that pipe to start an engine from the other side, through the crossfeed duct. Nimrod peformance tables indicate that the 3 engine (climb) ceiling is above our normal cruise altitude. The aircraft is grossly overpowered and, therefore, with 3 engines running there is never any need to air start the single failed engine. Even a double engine failure just after take off at max weight in temperate climates is survivable if the drag is minimized. I doubt that most modern airliners can match that degree of performance. There is more to this aircraft, in safety aspects, that most people outside of Maritime, don't know about. sadly, the crossfeed pipe is the fabled Achilles Heel in all aspects.

Regards
Ed Sett

[Chugalug2]

Good post Rigga. There is never a good time to ground an entire fleet. The Hastings stayed where they were until Field Rectification teams arrived to do a major re-riveting job on the tail assembly as well as replacing the errant outrigger bolts. In my case that meant an enforced stopover in Sydney while the rest of the crew of our Mk4 Hastings were repatriated to Changi, leaving me, as Co and Imprest Holder, and two groundcrew guys to attend the old girl once a week at Kingsford Smith. Start the engines, taxi her onto a new heading, shut down, and complete the STI. Then recover from that ordeal until the following week. I think the two airmen were paying the RAF, rather than vice-versa, for months after but it was a once in a lifetime opportunity for them to... well 'nuff said as they say.
As to wee Gordon McBrown being answerable to someone, who's that then? It plainly isn't me! I'm afraid that "accountable" and "responsible" have both become discredited words in the modern lexicon. Until people are prepared to stand up and fight against the perverting of airworthiness or the rigging of inquiries, if necessary at the cost of their own careers, such abuse will go on happening. That is why I am convinced that only by taking responsibility for both away from the MOD and the RAF to a separate and independent MAA and MAAIB will we be assured of regaining the old standards that you and I recall.

[Tappers Dad]

Thanks Ed Sett I feel reassured that all senarios have been looked into. However I do feel that the QinetiQ report on the hot air system that recommends a temperature sensor or the cross-feed pipe, because the in-flight temp is unknown should not be ignored.
QinetiQ and BAE are I am sure very aware of the consequences should the worst happen again, but it appears that once again the RAF are reverting baclk to their cavalier we know best attitude which I find very disturbing.
I am no flight engineer but I am aware of the transfer of heat though conduction, the cross feed valves may be switched off and secured as you say but heat can be conducted along this pipe though the hot air system.
If QinetiQ are saying that the inflight temperature is unkown then it is unknown.
If the the RAF has carried out their own research and are 100% sure of the temp then perhaps they should inform QinetiQ if not then they should follow the expert advice that Ainsworth ensures the families the RAF is doing.

[Softie]

TD
I refer you to the BOI report, who conducted ground trials to determine the hot air pipe surface temps (which backed up theoretical temps from BAES) and allowed them to identify the SCP pipe as the most likely source of ignition.
You are correct that heat will conduct but even if there is hot air on the engine side of the crossfeed cock it will not reach full engine exit temp unless it is allow to flow ie. through the cross feed to the other engines or to the SCP. As Edsett has stated the SCP has been permanently blocked. As I mentioned earlier, it would require the engines to be at maximum rpm to produce temps approaching the XV230 scenerio - and fuel held in close prox to the crossfeed pipe (if used) and this is very unlikely. I think you should accept that the risks have been addressed and that your fears are unfounded.
It is wrong to keep suggesting that the MOD/RAF is running rough shot over safety issues. Advice from QQ is and has always been simply that - ADVICE on which to base decisions.

[Distant Voice]

Softie:

What is the engine situation, on task at low level? It use to be two running and two shut down. I have heard that it is now, two running, one shut down and one at idle.

DV

[Ginger Beer]

We do not shut down engines "routinely" on task any more.

[Distant Voice]

TD.

As a result of the XV249 incident, when there was evidence of a small fire on the "isolated" cross-feed pipe, two UTI's were issued in order to deterime the temp of the duct during engine start. With the aid of a simple thermocouple and a meter display, the aim was to check the serviceabilty of the shut of valves and determine the residual temperture after starting the engines on the ground. One section, dealing with remedial work states:

"Where temperatures of cross feed ducting recorded during engine ground runs exceeds 200C, both port and starboard cross feed valve and actuator assemblies are to be removed and replaced"

So it has to be assumed that it is IPT's belief that with the cross-feed selected "closed", a defective valve could result in a duct temp in excess of 200C. Although the UTI was carried out some time ago, an official report has yet to be produce. QinitiQ comment on this in their report.

I do not see what all the fuss is about in fitting this monitoring device. In the XV249 report, a guard was recommended for the selector switch. This was rejected because checks are in place, and people do not make mistakes. Now QinetiQ are saying fit a sensor because the temp of the cross-feed duct is unknown for some conditions, this is rejected, because it is believed, by none specialist, that the duct temp will never get near auto-ignition.

Lets think of the plus side of this recommendation. We would take care of the possible inadvertent selection of the cross-feed switch, highlighted in the XV249 report. If the switch was left in the wrong position the Flt Eng would see the temp rise, and question it. A defective cross feed valve would be brought to the attention on the aircrew and necessary action taken. And finally, energency engine starts in air (and they do exist) could be carried out with the Eng monitoring duct temp.

I really can not understand why crews appear to be opposed to a mod which improves flight safety, significantly.

DV

[Duncan D'Sorderlee]

DV,

Have you seen where the Start Master Switch is? It is extremely unlikely that this switch could be inadvertantly used to open the cross-feed air supply whilst in flight: especially as engines are no longer routinely shut down. The cross-feed air supply is closed after successful engine start and is to remain closed - a 'red line' limitation in the F700.

Duncs:ok:

[Distant Voice]

DDS:

Have you seen where the Start Master Switch is?

Yes, and I am looking at it right now. According to the Human Factors Report, associated with the XV249 investigation, the probability of inadvertent operation (being left open after engine start, or being knocked in flight) was set at "probable" (Will occur several times in life of item). A red line entry does not guarantee anything.

This is not my judgement, it is the judgement of the RAF Centre of Aviation Medicine.

DV

[Distant Voice]

Ginger Beer,

The operative word in your posting is "routinely"

DV

[Dave Angel]

Ginger Beer,

The operative word in your posting is "routinely"

DV

Meaning that engines are only shut down if they suffer a failure and as so will not be relit.

We no longer conduct 'routine engine shutdown for fuel economy'.

[EdSett100]

DV,
There is no hard guarantee that the crossfeed valves will remain closed in every future flight, due to human factors. Somebody will probably make a mistake one day. But, on that exact same flight when the mistake occurs, there has to be a fuel leak onto the crossfeed pipe for that mistake to be serious. This would have to be a new fuel leak, that starts during that flight, because the maintenance schedules require 100% examination of all fuel pipe couplings in the bomb bay and rear pannier before and after every flight.

Flight safety is definitely not compromised by not guarding the switch.

Incidentally, the only possible mistake that could be made in flight is to leave the switch at AIR ASSIST after ground starts, and a guard will not stop that mistake. The switch incorporates a positive action mechanism, which means that it cannot be accidentally brushed from one position to the other. It is effectively self-guarding against accidental operation. The officer who recommended the mod is a ground engineer because the incident with XV249 occured during ground maintenance. Had he been a flight engineer (and I'm not suggesting that the investigating offcer shoud have been an FE), I know that the thought of guarding the switch would not have entered his mind.

If the groundcrew want to protect the switch during engine runs, thats their business, not mine. I know that they start and stop the engines more than once during the runs and if they have an agreed opinion that proposes a guard, then they should start the process. However, they have a solid checklist that prevents the switch from being left open, so I would be very surprised if they want the guard.

Finally, that incident gave rise to RPM limits during engine ground starts to ensure that whenever the crossfeed pipe is open it cannot get hot enough to ignite any fluid (that should not be there anyway). This is a sensible precaution because it mitigates against a single failure during normal operation. The single failure being a fluid leak onto a hot crossfeed pipe during engine ground starts.

Ed Sett

[Distant Voice]

EdSett100;

At post #48 you stated:

"I am aware that QQ suggested a gauge in their report, because the individual they spoke to about this aspect of their investigation was a flight engineer. He also added that, as an eng, he is interested in everything that can happen in the aircraft and that it would be useful to know if a closed valve had leakage, so that he could report it when he landed. Thats all very well, for the purpose of monitoring one system, but there has to be additional failures before that defect contributes to a fire leading to a crash. We do not mitigate against double or triple failures. We will not use up resources just to provide the air engineer with another "useful" gauge look at. "

Then at post #67

"The officer who recommended the mod is a ground engineer because the incident with XV249 occured during ground maintenance. Had he been a flight engineer (and I'm not suggesting that the investigating offcer shoud have been an FE), I know that the thought of guarding the switch would not have entered his mind"

In the first case you seem to reject the idea, because it is a Flt Eng's view, and then you reject the second suggestion because it came from a ground engineer. What type of engineer do you accept? Surely fitting a sensor would satisfy both and improve flight safety. You are not mitigating against a "double" failure, but a "single" fuel leak onto a high temp cross-feed pipe caused by a pre-existing shut off valve defect. This defect would not be detected by any pre or post flight inspection.

To accept additional monitoring, is not a sign of unprofessionalism, or going soft, it is common sense. Just to remind you that airworthiness is defined as the ability of an aircraft to operate without significant hazard to aircrew, or to the general public over which it is flown.

DV

[Duncan D'Sorderlee]

DV,

Thanks for pointing me in the direction of the XV249 Human Factors Report. Personally, I am not convinced that a Nimrod pilot could PROBABLY inadvertantly select AIR ASSIST; although, I admit that the after start checks do not require confirmation the the MIs are SHUT; only that the start selector has been selected to WINDMILL. However, after engine start, there is no reason to have your hands anywhere near the Start Master Switch - the switches next to it are for alternative start procedures. However, as you rightly stated, the judgement of CAM was that it was PROBABLE.

Duncs:ok:

[Not Long Here]

Duncan,

After start checklist used to have - WINDMILL, 2 MI's SHUT as the acknowledgement but like may other checks has become abbreviated over the years.