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SirPeterHardingsLovechild
11th Jun 2009, 08:32
Whitehall ‘bottled’ mission to rescue a British hostage | The Sun |News|Campaigns|Our Boys (http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/campaigns/our_boys/2475658/Whitehall-bottled-mission-to-rescue-a-British-hostage.html)

WHITEHALL “bottled” an SAS mission to rescue a British hostage just before he was executed, The Sun can reveal.

The elite unit were furious, believing they could have sprung tourist Edwin Dyer from al-Qaeda’s clutches.
Mr Dyer, 61, was shot dead at a desert terror camp in Mali, West Africa, ten days ago.
But it has emerged that the Who Dares Wins regiment had been planning a classic hostage rescue.
In a rare breach of protocol that reveals the SAS’s anger, serving members have given us details of the top-secret action.
Operation Aerobic was organised after al-Qaeda’s North Africa wing set a deadline for the release of hate preacher Abu Qatada in exchange for Mr Dyer’s life.

But with time almost up at the end of May, senior military officers in the MoD advised Foreign Secretary David Miliband that the operation must not go ahead.
SAS officers and other ranks across the board were left furious.
A senior SAS source said: “We knew where he was. We are convinced we could have got him out alive, but Whitehall bottled it.
“Whether it was the Directorate of Special Forces, the military chiefs or Government ministers, we don’t know. We have our suspicions.
“Of course there was risk, there always is in hostage rescue. The group said they were going to kill him anyway, so what was there to lose?
“And if we did it, it would have sent a powerful message to these sorts of people not to screw with Brits.”
More than 100 SAS troopers and expert infantry back-up from the Special Forces Support Group were kept on standby for a month.
An advanced party was sent to Africa to liaise with allies in the region.
The night raid would have hit the north and south sides of the terrorist camp.

Troops would parachute from 25,000ft, while Predator unmanned drones with infra-red cameras would circle at 10,000ft, giving commanders a real-time feed.
Once the terrorists were overrun a fleet of helicopters were synchronised to arrive to whisk Mr Dyer and assault teams to safety.
Mr Dyer, who lived in Austria and worked for a plumbing company, had a British father and a German mother.
He was among a group of tourists kidnapped in January after going to an African music event near Timbuktu.
His stepfather Paul Mead, 84, said last night: “We were not aware of an SAS operation, but if there was a chance Edwin could have been saved then they should have gone for it.”
Mr Mead, of Marlow, Bucks, who is married to Mr Dyer’s mother Ingeborg, added: “Edwin’s death came as a terrible shock to us.

“We were told to keep quiet for months after he was captured, and then suddenly ‘bang’ — he had been shot and that was it. It was a truly terrible thing.”
The Foreign Office last night refused to discuss any details of the operation, but senior sources insisted it was not Mr Miliband’s decision to scrap it.
A Foreign Office spokesman said last night: “Ministers at no point made decisions contrary to military advice.”

Fitter2
11th Jun 2009, 09:00
A Foreign Office spokesman said last night: “Ministers at no point made decisions contrary to military advice.”


That'll be a first, then.

CirrusF
11th Jun 2009, 11:09
There could be many reasons why the Foreign Secretary vetoed the operation. Firstly, the UK would not carry out an operation like that without the agreement of the host-country, and the Malian government may not have given their agreement. If they had given their agreement, they would almost certainly insist on having some element of control over the operation, which might not have been acceptable to the MOD. Second, FS may have decided that even with permission from the Malian government, the political risk to UK of it going wrong outweighed the benefits.

Utrinque Apparatus
11th Jun 2009, 11:46
No Cirrus, they bottled it.

Given Brown's and the New Labour lot's current low standing in the country, at the time any perceived "failure" af the rescue would have lain at Brown's door and we know how risk averse he is. He won't even chance a referendum or an election, let alone a risky mission out in the bundu.

The FO comment is full of the usual double negatives and yukspeak. Military advice will always include a calculated risk assessment. "They" didn't want to take the risk

At the end of the day, an innocent man has been murdered and perhaps justice will be served to the perpetrators, very cold, one day.................

CirrusF
11th Jun 2009, 12:41
The decision would not have been Brown's - it would have been Miliband's. In a previous career I have written many submissions of this sort to the FS - there is a very clear process laid down to obtain authoristation for these sorts of operations in the UK.

tonker
11th Jun 2009, 12:48
Well he's dead now and they are still sat in the desert puffing on their bongs.

What's stopping us now?

Ohhhhhhh for Maggie.

OFBSLF
11th Jun 2009, 13:55
Ohhhhhhh for Maggie.
Some of us cousins across the pond share your view.

XV277
11th Jun 2009, 15:57
Even Blair (for all I dislike him) might have been more decisive

OFBSLF
11th Jun 2009, 16:39
Brown made a decision, all right. Being undecisive wasn't the problem. The problem was the decision that he made.

green granite
11th Jun 2009, 16:56
He probably read the account of the Americans attempt to rescue the hostages in Tehran. :hmm:

crashtest
11th Jun 2009, 17:30
Hmmmm. Maybe he should have read the account of the Brits' successful attempt in Sierra Leone... Back me up here, Minigundiplomat?

TheSmiter
11th Jun 2009, 18:34
Regrettably, hostage release scenarios are rarely as clear cut as Prince's Gate, however much we would like them to be.

Read here for a more cogent argument than I can give:

BBC NEWS | UK | Hostages and limits on negotiation (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8081314.stm)

That said, I'm sure the strength of character of a Govt and its leader will make a huge difference to the eventual outcome of any situation.

In expressing heartfelt sorrow for the Dyer family, may I remind Prune readers there remain 5 (or maybe less) British hostages somewhere in or around Baghdad.

They've only been held for 2 years.

I wonder what Maggie would have done?

saudipc-9
11th Jun 2009, 19:24
He probably read the account of the Americans attempt to rescue the hostages in Tehran

That's a bit of a low blow!

Faithless
11th Jun 2009, 19:28
What about a rescue mission to save the UK from the clutches of Gordon Brown:sad:

West Coast
12th Jun 2009, 05:33
He probably read the account of the Americans attempt to rescue the hostages in Tehran

Terrible shame, but at least they went. If for politics only, but they tried.

parabellum
12th Jun 2009, 12:55
GG - You are capable of better. You cannot compare the American hostage rescue attempt to any SF attempt at a close quarter rescue mission in down town Baghdad. You have let yourself down.

FrustratedFormerFlie
12th Jun 2009, 14:52
Of course once you 'send in the SAS' to liberate one British tourist who gets himself kidnapped in a known problem area, you'll then have to send them in for all British citizens who bet and lose on their personal security in well-known and well-publicised high-risk environements.

If the FCO travel advice says 'here be bad people, don't go there', just don't go. And if you do, on your own head be it.

Sorry if that sounds harsh.

barnstormer1968
12th Jun 2009, 18:30
Colonel Beckwiths attempt to rescue the hostages was very well planned, and it seems was mainly ruined through bad luck (not poor planning, except the CH53 pilots lack of joint knowledge on blade failure warnings), which seemed to dog Beckwith throughout his career.
With his new unit, he attempted something few if any other country could mount, so I salute him for at least trying.

Whereas his president asked him to carry on, even though he did not have enough CH53's to continue, my own government seemed to have cancelled an operation where there was deemed to be enough support!

It was mentioned above that the UK would have needed host nation support to carry out the operation, and in our new labour PC country that may be the case. It's just as well the Israeli's did not need it for Entebbe, or it may not have gone quite so well if they had pre announced their arrival.:bored:

This kind of operation can be done succesfully, as has been shown by the live release of Mr Muse(sp) by US special forces.

Seldomfitforpurpose
12th Jun 2009, 18:44
Terrible shame, but at least they went. If for politics only, but they tried.

Don't usually jump to your defence but in this case you are spot on, excuse GG as I suspect alcohol had something to do with him posting in that rather child like fashion :=

Evalu8ter
12th Jun 2009, 18:51
At the risk of Thread creep...

Beckwith's plan for Eagle Claw was fundementally sound. However, he was let down by inter-service rivalry and bad luck.

In an outrageous piece of dividing up potential glory the Op was up-scaled and over-complicated. The various -53s (and pilots) had a wide range of backgrounds and qualifications (from Mine Counter Measure Sea Dragon, through USMC to USAF SOS...) hence not all were up to flying low level at night on NVDs in a sandstorm (believe me, it is bloody hard....). Incredibly, some pilots were flying aircraft they were barely qualified to fly with nothing like the appropriate experience for the conditions. Why? So that all services could claim a piece of the action. This lack of familiarity/experience was in no small part responsible for the aborts that robbed Desert One of enough serviceable ac to complete the mission.

It was bad luck that the -53's were unreliable that night, and in combo with the poor skills base, made the mission unworkable. It was also bad luck that the road through Desert One was unusually busy and that, of all things, an oil tanker came through and lit the sky for miles around when engaged by the cordon.

Don't assume that the US always get it wrong - the Son Tay mission was well planned and executed, only to be let down by poor Intel. Interestingly, Son Tay was a smaller, leaner Op. Most succesful Ops of this nature are small in scale and flown by the most experienced of aviators.

larssnowpharter
12th Jun 2009, 19:03
If the FCO travel advice says 'here be bad people, don't go there', just don't go. And if you do, on your own head be it.

Oh for Goodness sake!

Most countries in the World have a FCO 'travel advisory' including the USA.

I have made my home in a part of the World which has been under one as long as I can remember. I work in another part of the World also subject to a bloody 'travel advisory'.

NOT part of the equation in this case.

West Coast
13th Jun 2009, 04:39
One of the -53 pilots was a regular speaker at NAS Whiting. His is but one voice, but he portrayed a skewed vision of joint operations. As he was likely on Uncle Sam's dime at the time he was talking to classes, one had to read between the lines a bit.

Wiley
13th Jun 2009, 05:06
Son Tay was a smaller, leaner OpI met an ex-Air America helo driver who'd disgree with that asessment. According to him, when the rescue was first proposed, it was to a really lean and mean op. using Air America pilots who knew the area and each other well.

He maintained that when the op.was first planned to go in, the PoWs were still there, but the delay in working up the more complex plan and bringing in the USAF aircraft and crews meant the PoWs had been moved before they went in.

<<Conspiracy theory alert!!!>> It might seem highly unlikely to some, but he also said he wouldn't have been at all surprised if someone on Kissinger's staff hadn't given the North Vietnamese a headsup to move the PoWs so the political loss of face wouldn't be too great, thus screwing up the peace talks.

Some reports say the prisoners were moved as little as 48 hours before the raid. If that's true, given the (hopefully high level of) pre-op scrutiny the camp would have been under immediately before the raid, many would find it hard to believe the Americans (or someone at the top) didn't know they'd been moved. Even if they did, an op. like that develops a momentum of its own, and the political pressures (possibly within the US military) may have been too intense to see it cancelled.

Evalu8ter
13th Jun 2009, 06:53
Wiley,
By comparison to Eagle Claw the Son Tay raid was considerably smaller - though the Air America/CAA crew would still see it as too large given the way they went about business. Compare and contrast Son Tay to Op Barras as ways to approach a similar problem. Doubtless something similar was on the cards for the unfortunate chap in Africa recently.

Eagle Claw's biggest problem was always going to be the extraction of so many people - hence the need for C130s.

Wiley
13th Jun 2009, 07:24
Not sure I totally agree with you, Evalu8er. I was in Washington when the attack went in, and was mixing with quite a few people in uniform who, in the immediate aftermath, had quite a lot to say, (as you may well imagine), about what went wrong.

In my opinion, (from what I heard at the time), the major problem (of many, many major problems with the Tehran op.) was micromanagement from the Pentagon. The man on the spot was not allowed to make any decisions. They all came from someone sitting in a conference room way back in Washington. Anyone who's been involved in the field in something even 1/100th as complicated would agree this was a recipe for disaster.

barnstormer1968
13th Jun 2009, 09:52
At the risk of more thread creep.
I hope my post came across well enough for you to realise I agree with most of what you later said (I posted it in response to what I saw as an unfair bashing of the op).

From what I have heard, one of the downfalls of the operation what due to the mix of pilots from differing services, and their differing training to cockpit warnings relating to the CH53 rotor blades.

I cannot remember which way around the different levels were, but ISTR that USAF CH53's and Navy/marine CH53's had different blades, so when a blade damage warning flashed up (due to sand storm damage), some of the pilots had been trained that there would be an issue with the blades which would need servicing later, while others had been taught that blade failure was imminent, and so set down in the desert immediately, thus withdrawing their aircraft from the operation.

As I say, this is what I have heard, but I am happy to be corrected, or hear from anyone with a more technical knowledge.

Colonel Beckwith has often been cited to have been very unlucky in his SF career, but IMHO it was a good leadership call when he refused to carry on with less aircraft than he deemed he required. I suspect a less strong leader may have caved in to the president, with the result of more lost lives.

I too have heard conspiracies regarding the movement of the hostages, in order to ruin the image of Carter, and his hopes of re-election. It does seem odd when the eventual date of their release and that of the election of Reagon are somewhat linked!

I guess this just brings us back to the link between military ops and the interference of politicians.

Evalu8ter
13th Jun 2009, 11:00
Barnstormer,
The issue over mixed crews with different -53s is always raised as a reason for failure - imagine trying to get a mixed bag of UK Merlin Mk1/2 & Mk3/3A drivers with competing RTS, crew training and SOPs to mount something similar.

Wiley,
I defer to your experience, but would say that a lack of "Mission Command" delegated by senior officers/politicians is nothing new (just think Rolling Thunder...) and that a victory has many parents and a failure has an alarming lack of them...

Two's in
13th Jun 2009, 13:41
Thread drift back to the subject;

Wow, imagine The Sun using hyperbole and sensationalism to create an impression of "supporting our boys", while everyone apparently forgets all those reptile journo's following Military personnel everywhere (including their Royal Highness') desperate for the chance to report some inappropriate behavior (Harrier weekends to Spain?).

As to the story, well I'm sure Lofty and Dusty were ticked off not to get another Op in between their current cycle, but sadly there are a couple of points Rupert Murdochs toilet paper seems to miss;

The Army carries out tasks given to it by the democratically elected Government of the United Kingdom (UK).

Now I'm sure some punchy full-screw from the Hereford Hooligans may have some stunning ideas on democracy and justice, but we don't elect him, instead we elect this shower of shiat, so more shame on us.

Secondly, I have a bit of paper in a draw somewhere that says words to the effect;

And We do hereby Command them to Obey you as their superior Officer and you to Observe and follow such Orders and Directions as from time to time you shall recieve from Us, or any superior Officer, according to the Rules and Discipline of War, in pursuance of the Trust hereby reposed in you.

Try as I might, I can't find anything about 'as directed by some Antipodean mental pygmy's daily rag' or 'Subject to a cracking idea we dreamt up after a few beers".

By all means be outraged that we didn't even attempt to save the bloke, but don't subscribe to this claptrap that operatives decide National policy because The Sun says it's so.

November4
13th Jun 2009, 17:12
As much I like to bash the FS and the government but….practicalities need to be thought about before jumping on them too much. Yes the men from Hereford might have had a plan but was it in terms of support from the RAF?

100 troops plus their kit into theatre…at least a couple of Hercs or TriStars needed
Predator and the support kit
A Herc to remain in theatre (for airdrop)
Helicopters to insert and recover the troops – what’s that a couple of Chinooks?
So more AT needed to get the Chinook support in and out of theatre.

Mind you if the AT and Helo support is not available then lets bash the government for that!

sycamore
13th Jun 2009, 21:29
Could`ve given a contract to the Israelis ....

Mad (Flt) Scientist
13th Jun 2009, 22:05
Oh for Goodness sake!

Most countries in the World have a FCO 'travel advisory' including the USA.

Not quite true... the current FCO list (http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travelling-and-living-overseas/travel-advice-by-country/north-central-america/?action=noTravelAll#noTravelAll) is:
Countries the FCO advises against all travel to

* Somalia

Countries the FCO advises against all travel to parts of

* Afghanistan
* Albania
* Azerbaijan
* Burundi
* Cambodia
* Cameroon
* Chad
* Colombia
* Congo (Democratic Republic)
* Djibouti
* Ecuador
* Eritrea
* Ethiopia
* Georgia
* Haiti
* India
* Iran
* Iraq
* Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories
* Italy
* Lebanon
* Mali
* Niger
* Nigeria
* Pakistan
* Philippines
* Russian Federation
* Sri Lanka
* Sudan
* Thailand
* Uganda
* Zimbabwe

Countries the FCO advises against all but essential travel to

* Burundi
* Central African Republic
* East Timor
* Guinea
* Mauritania
* Yemen

Countries the FCO advises against all but essential travel to parts of

* Afghanistan
* Algeria
* Angola
* Armenia
* Bangladesh
* Chad
* Comoros
* Congo
* Congo (Democratic Republic)
* Ecuador
* Ethiopia
* India
* Iraq
* Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories
* Ivory Coast (Cote d'Ivoire)
* Kenya
* Kosovo
* Lebanon
* Liberia
* Libya
* Mauritania
* Nicaragua
* Niger
* Nigeria
* Pakistan
* Russian Federation
* Rwanda
* Sudan
* Thailand
* Turkey
* Uganda
* Uzbekistan
* Zimbabwe

There is travel advice for basically everywhere (including here in Canada, apparently our winters can be quite nasty it says; I have to wonder who needs some of the advice they supply) but it's not advice against travelling.