Southwest Airlines jet catches fire after landing in Houston

[st7860]

Video - Breaking News Videos from CNN.com (http://www.cnn.com/video/#/video/us/2009/05/12/vo.tx.plane.fire.ktrk)
A Southwest Airlines plane at Houston's Hobby Airport caught on fire after landing, forcing passengers to evacuate.

[Jofm5]

Video of the landing here: abc13.com: Houston News | Houston Weather, Traffic and Sports (http://abclocal.go.com/ktrk/index)

As SLF I cant really comment but looks like a tyre failure resulted in an undercarraige fire - dealt with by emergency services whilst evacuation from the plane via slides.

Apparently flight 519 from new orleans to houston.

[Peter Fanelli]

Spot the stupid women with their carry on bags.

:ugh:

[Airbubba]

Wow, great video, it appeared to be somewhat preplanned from the camera shot. Still, that was the longest three minutes watching that wheel burn before the slides popped.

Good job, I had a lot better angle than the pilots on that call!

[bpp]

Not just the women, how about the guy at end with papers flying out of his briefcase.:ugh:

[Airbubba]

Looks like the action starts here about 15:50 into the recording:

http://archive-server.liveatc.net/khou/KHOU-May-13-2009-0030Z.mp3

Sounds like the tower freq that WN 519 was on is not captured on this recording.

[visibility3miles]

Fine, some passengers took carry-on out, but why was a fireman the first person to catch passengers coming down the slide?

Isn't breaking ankles a hazard after coming down slides fast? As a SLF, I recall preflight briefings saying a few people (one or two) should assist fellow passengers at the bottom of the slide to speed evacuation.

Or perhaps that was then...

[eliptic]

Still, that was the longest three minutes watching that wheel burn before the slides popped.


I agree, why so long time stand still and no action?

[Totally_Bananas]

Interesting to see the passengers go down the slides and start filming with their mobiles... perhaps there's more footage now on youtube!

Nice crowd control by crew and the F/As knee high skirt ;)

Why no sign of the FO Hanging out the window to have a look for signs of smoke or fire?

Looking forward to hearing more..

[stilton]

Very poor response by the fire services, and why the long long delay evacuating ?


With the fire allowed to burn that long it could easily have got to the fuel tanks, shades of the China Air 737 in Taiwan..

[GE90115BL2]

wow good video. I too bit my finger nails whilst waiting for something to happen after the aircraft stopped. I thought the video was looping back but it wasn't.

Maybe a bit slow to initiate the evac BUT at the end of the day all pob got out ok, so that's all that really matters. :ok:

[manraketen]

looks to me like a perfect evacuation(at least from crew side, agree that pax should leave theire crap behind)

it's nothing you would want to rush so time wise from full stop until he stows the ground spoilers indicating they have made up there mind to evacuate seems very reasonable.
Not the easiest thing to evaluate since they have no flightdeck indications of fire and you know that evacuating meens a high risk of personal injury.

:ok: to the crew!!

M.

[silverelise]

The so called "delay" doesn't seem that bad? Presumably there is a decision to be made and communicated once the aircraft has come to a halt safely and you don't want to evac passengers into running engines etc.

[old-timer]

I agree, it seemed an AGE before any fire crew arrived on scene, however I was VERY pleased to see common sense prevailed & they exited the safe side of the a/c & presumably after No 1 eng' had spooled down, good job by everyone as all safe & sound by the looks of things :D

[bizdev]

Looks like they used water to put out the fire - I thought that this was a no no with brake fires - can explode with thermal shock?

[badgerh]

"and you don't want to evac passengers into running engines etc."

After the view of a container in an engine earlier in the week, the mind boggles at the carnage of an early evacuation of SLF (or SSF - self slicing freight :\)

[hetfield]

@silverelise

Fully agree with your post.

That's the way we are trained.

[ballyctid]

Just proves that people don't listen to the safety briefs, the guy with the papers blowing in the wind actually threw his bag down the slide first then went chasing his documents!

On a flight last week (BMI Baby), A pax sat near me was talking on his mobile whilst the safety demo was taking place, the steward giving the demo never said a word to him during or after the demo finished, this guy was also sat in an exit row.

Although all turned out well in this incident, if there had been a wing fuel leak in the vicinity I think that the 3 minute delay in getting the rescue services to the aircraft could possibly have resulted in a more horrific outcome, hopefully much can be learned from that video.

[Sam Bee]

Why was this being filmed in the first place? Did the news helicopter have a heads up that something was wrong? If so why wasn't this communicated to the airfield so the fire brigade would be ready?

Or in America do the news stations systematically film every landing on the off chance they can 'luck-out' with a crash / fire / disaster?

[Tediek]

that is always my biggest worry on a flight. All this luggage in the bins. People do not care about others and will do everything to get it out of a plane when there is an emergency. To my opinion they should take legal action on those people who take luggage with them after an emergency situation. my 5 cents to it.

[airtags]

can anyone advised how many CC onboard?

[tarjet fixated]

From what one can see from the video this has been just another good job done: they gathered information on what had happened and what the actual situation was, they made the right decision to evac on the opposite side of the fire, they carried out the evac procedure in an orderly and disciplined way (you can see the speedbrakes being lowered and the engines being shut with the emergency lights coming on and after everyone was out the flight attendants controlling the crowd on the outside).

By the way a tire burst/fire has no indication in a 737 flightdeck making situation assessment and subsequent decisions a tough job that involves experience, skills and training.
Well done everyone!

[M.Mouse]

Three minutes is only a long time sitting in your armchair watching.

On the flight deck making an accurate assessment, then carrying out the procedure, then ordering the evacuation takes time. If the situation was clearly catastrophic it would have happened much quicker because the assessment would be easier and quicker. Ordering an evacuation is not something to be done lightly.

The fire services attended as quickly as I would imagine it was possible to do if you think about it.

Apart from the bozos evacuating with bags a nasty situation well handled on the face of it.

[911slf]

While there is no limit to human foolishness, it might be good if passengers who took their bags out in an emergency evacuation had them confiscated by security. A few well publicised cases (!) might be salutary.

[dustyprops]

I TOTALLY agree with Tarjet and M.Mouse.

Job well done, let's for once not try to pick holes in the manner in which a crew dealt with a situation that was thrust upon them. They didn't have the luxury of watching it on video and i'm sure just got on with what they had to do in that circumstance. Nice one lads :ok:

[Old Fella]

Some comments are critical of the time taken to begin the evacuation, about three minutes seems the figure. Pales into insignificance compared to the evacuation of QF1 at Bangkok, which admittedly had an inoperable PA system, which took about 20 minutes to initiate the evacuation as I recall.

[draughtsman99]

Well done to that crew but I hope efforts are made to track down the selfish pratt who effectively blocked the chute to gather his paperwork.
Jail is too good for that :mad: moron.
Well done again to the crew.:D:D:D

[adverse-bump]

Leave your bags! i think 1 in 3 people struggled with there bags!

and one stupid guy chasing his papers along the runway!

i cant believe that!

[one post only!]

I was just waiting for his papers to blow into the fire and really get it going! Muppet!

[Selfloading]

Well done to that crew but I hope efforts are made to track down the selfish pratt who effectively blocked the chute to gather his paperwork.
Jail is too good for that :mad: moron.
Well done again to the crew.:D:D:D

Anyone who blocks an escape chute in front of me will find themselves very swiftly moved out of the way :ugh:

[aerolearner]

Looks like they used water to put out the fire - I thought that this was a no no with brake fires - can explode with thermal shock?
To put it simply:
Hot brakes=no water (natural cooling, fan, short bursts of water mist)
Wheel fire=plenty of water

For reference, see the bottom-right corner of page 7:
http://www.boeing.com/commercial/airports/arff/arff737.pdf

It seems that the tires on the right MLG had already deflated, so the risk of explosion was no longer a factor.

Any comment about the ARFF service response should take into account the time when the alarm was actually received.

BR,

aerolearner

[aulglarse]

3 minutes can be broken down to a number of tasks:

1) WTF just happened?....Call tower re stopping on the runway & observe anything unusual..check wheel/eicam page.....call cc check for any signs? 1minute

2)preselect fire commander freq

3)grab emergency evac c'list and start

4)tower advises eta of fire commander... so far 2minutes passed

5)tower/fire commander/chief/cc notice flames from wheel(s)

6)announce evacuation

7)crew and ABP's evacuate..3minutes (which may feel like 30 seconds to the flight crew)
Well done:D!

[Bealzebub]

I hope efforts are made to track down the selfish pratt who effectively blocked the chute to gather his paperwork.
Jail is too good for that moron.

This only highlights a very common problem. Many people pay scant attention to the safety briefing. As a result when this sort of rare event takes place the individual goes into a panic/survival mode. Having not refreshed their short term memory with the vital information, their brain relies upon what it instinctively knows. Why do they show me how to fasten and unfasten a seatbelt? Because the one you instinctively fasten and unfasten every day is in your car, and it fastens and unfastens in a different location, and in instinctive mode, guess what you are going to try first! Likewise without paying attention to the modification requirements those same people will often instinctively seek the exit that they came on board by. They will seek to leave the aircraft with the posessions they brought with them. What was of value to them then, will remain so unless they have accepted a behaviour modification requirement.

This problem doesn't just lie with the passenger (although they are the ultimate beneficiary) the airlines themselves have no desire to impart any sense of fear in their customers, and so the emergency briefing is delivered in a manner that rarely attracts interest, or reinforces the imperative. This is day to day public transport, not a space shuttle launch. As ever it is a compromise. The people you see in this evacuation are in all probability, no different in their typical responses to many others, on any number of flights around the world.

People often do get hurt in evacuations, and this is one reason why their use is not advocated lightly. The need for an evacuation and the decision to undertake one, is often made after information from a number of sources is assimilated and processed. In a case like this it may very well involve communication and feedback from the control tower, emergency services, cabin crew etc. None of this happens in a split second, and normally takes much longer than the casual observer might imagine.

[Pelican]

Whilst I share all your concern about people that take their bags or other belongings during an evacuation, let's just accept it as an unfortunate fact. It happened here, it happened at probably every previous evacuation and it will happen again. Not sure what we can do about it without getting draconian.

However, if this person would delay me because they need to fetch their Prada bag or all important briefcase, I would not be terribly patient. To say the least.

[bizdev]

Thanks aerolearner

[Capn Bloggs]

Unless I'm missing something obvious, that took far too long.

[Shore Guy]

It's not just the passengers who sometime jeopardize an evacuation by wanting to take their bags........

FedEx Flight 647 Crash Evacuation - Video (http://www.metacafe.com/watch/687197/fedex_flight_647_crash_evacuation/)

Full load of jumpseaters......

[Ancient Mariner]

So many self-righteous posters here, all knowing exactly what to do and how they themselves would react in an emergency situation.
Well I’ve been in a few emergencies, including fires in my life and trust me, you know nothing until you’ve experienced one.
Per

[Oakape]

The thing that bothers me the most is that the guy with the papers going everywhere actually sends his stuff down the slide first, then goes down himself & then sits at the bottom while he collects everything. Even then he doesn't get it all & ends up chasing the papers towards the rear of the aircraft!!!

Some of the other passengers should sue him for endangering their lives by slowing down the evacuation.

And what was the F/A at that particular exit doing? There were quite a number of passengers with hand luggage.

[SWABrian]

Now that things have calmed down, I have some more info for you. There was no advance notice of any problems, and the tire burst upon landing. The crew did not declare an emergency prior to landing. A lof of speculation may have been fueled by the one television station that was at the airport with cameras running at the time of landing, but they had no advance notice. Another television station, the ABC affiliate, had its helicopter returning to the airport at the time of landing. The aircraft was N371SW, which is currently out of service. It will not return to service until it is thoroughly inspected.

Brian Lusk
Southwest Airlines

[TiiberiusKirk]

Seems the crew did OK.
Listening to the ATC recording, I was impressed by the calm way the controller handled things too, telling the pilot what she'd seen, then just getting on with re-directing other aircraft. I reckon the controllers deserve a credit mention too.:ok:

[TFlyguy]

If paasengers arrive at an exit with handbaggage let them exit with them.

It can take longer and cause more delay trying to wrestle it off them.

Having said that the man in question was an absolute idiot to worry more about his bag than his life

[RetiredCrewDog]

Thanks for the inputs Brian. From the reports that are out now it appears they had a locked brake on landing thus causing the tire(Tyre for you Brits ;-) ) to blow. From the video it looks like both tires must have been flat. The right engine nacelle looks very close to the ground as if both tires are down.

I'll call my buddy who flies for SWA and get the real scoop.

[ReverseFlight]

The irony is if the man had left his briefcase on the plane, his (or worse, his client's) papers would've been safely stowed rather than lost all over the tarmac. It could be an important contract or someone's will ... :{

[Bearcat]

good job and yes that clown of a pax, threw his brief case down the slide first and then followed......flustered at the end of the steps gathering his crap. That fire could have been sooo much worse.

:ok: to the crew......why the tyre deflated, well thats for the investigators.

[Northbeach]

Peter,

It's not just the "women", how about the bloke with his briefcase who ends up chasing papers? Nothing personal, but your focus on "stupid women" seemed out of place

[tightcircuit]

Not only that but he sat at the end of the slide collecting his papers whilst there were others behind him still to evacuate. The bloke should have been summarily shot!

[Duck Rogers]

Points made on the idiotic passengers, back on topic please?

[fmgc]

The pilots should be chastised for carrying out a landing which caused the tyre to burst and catch fire.

They should be then further chastised for not seeing the fire immediately and evacuating straight away, engines running or not.

The CC should be chastised for not realising straight away that there was a fire and initiating and evacuation immediately.

The CC should further be chastised for not wrestling bags off the PAX no matter how much that might block the exit.

The fire services should be chastised for taking so long to get to the aeroplane, how come they were not there waiting and ready!!!

They should then be further chastised for using the wrong extinguishant!!

:ugh::ugh::ugh::ugh:

[eliptic]

fmgc (http://www.pprune.org/members/8053-fmgc)

one reason to have a forum like this,,to argue and ventilate!

I think the most people that argue about "the long time" already understand and no longer have that impression,,they listen and learned :ok:

[tightcircuit]

fmcg,

I don't know if you are being serious or not. An immediate evacuation is not always the best way to deal with a fire. If it is possible that the fire can be contained and extinguished then it may be much safer for the passengers to stay on board at least until the true extent of the danger is known. If the behaviour of those passengers is any indication then imagine the chaos and injuries if they had evacuated from a much larger aeroplane, acheiving nothing but preventing the fire services from doing their job efficiently. It's all a difficult matter of judgement, based on as much information as you can gather but fire should not automatically indicate evacuation.

[fmgc]

My tongue was firmly planted in the cheek, just a small dig at the amateurs who pass judgement without any knowledge!!

[tightcircuit]

fmgc,

Yes sorry I should have read through your post again. You are quite right.

[IGh]

Hmmm, dispatched with the AntiSkid System Inop???


NTSB Identification: CEN09IA294

Tuesday, May 12, 2009 ... Houston Hobby ... BOEING 737-3H4 ... N371SW ... landing on runway 22 (7,602 feet) ... three ... main landing gear tires blew-out ...
"...There were several inoperative items on the minimum equipment list (MEL), including the anti-skid system. A landing on runway 22 was required because of MEL landing weight restrictions.... in the touchdown zone of runway 22 and came to rest on the runway approximately 3,000 feet from the end. Smoke and fire became obvious soon after touchdown ..."

[falcon10]

WOW!! Shocking to see so many obese passengers lumbering off the plane!

[p51guy]

I had to order one evacuation in my airline career. It was a bomb threat and the push up stairs I asked for never showed up. I hated it when I said use the slides,because I knew people would be hurt but had no choice. Of coarse it was a false threat and we knew it probably was, but still we had to do the drill. I can understand the crew delaying the evacuation checklist until they knew they had to for the same reason. If they had declared an emergency in the air the fire trucks would have probably put the fire out and the evacuation wouldn't have been necessary. They didn't discover the problem until landing however.

[fr8tmastr]

I think the crew did a fine job with the evac. It takes time to assess something you cant see, then inform the FA/s on what the problem is and more importantly where it is.

Bottom line is the evacuation proceeded quickly and out of the undamaged side of the aircraft.

The only thing I would change is to equip the FA's with a club, so that when the self important ignoramus appears with his luggage he/she can whack them on the head, thereby allowing the previously mentioned self important ignoramus, to slide down the slide without his precious and more important than any other life on the aircraft briefcase.

Well done SW

[Graybeard]

A $10K penalty for carrying an item out of an airplane during evacuation would discourage the act.

[Diamond Bob]

I think the evacuation took too long to get started. "Assessing the situation", "checklists" -- not buying any of this. What's to assess? The plane's on fire! You need to get everyone off pronto. People die in plane fires -- sometimes many people. There are some sad examples of this such as Air Canada in Cincinnati, the Saudi L1011 fiasco in which 287 died:

After touchdown, the aeroplane continued to roll, and stopped on the taxiway (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taxiway) 2 minutes 40 seconds after landing. The captain did not immediately order an emergency evacuation of the aircraft; rather the flight crew were instructed not to evacuate. The engines were not shut down for another 3 minutes and 15 seconds, preventing the rescue forces from reaching the aircraft. One final transmission was received after the plane stopped, indicating that the emergency evacuation (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emergency_evacuation) was about to begin. With a delay in evacuating the passengers, fire consumed the aircraft on the ground, killing everyone aboard. The fire rapidly progressed forward through the cabin. All of the victims were found in the forward half of the fuselage, but no doors were opened. The cause of the lack of coordination of emergency efforts is not known.
Saudia Flight 163 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saudia_Flight_163)

[ray cosmic]

Bob, to compare this one to the Saoudi disaster is a bit over the top methinks.

[BryceM]

Strongly disagree that the delay in evactuation was necessary or satisfactory. Read about the BA 737 accident at Manchester (UK) in the mid 80s (56 fatalities, from memory).

If it's a serious fire every single second counts. From the cockpit, you can't tell what's happening in the cabin - whether there's fire visible outside or not, how fast it's spreading. So you have to assume any reported fire is serious.

If someone you trust tells you that your aircraft is on fire on the ground, stop it and evacuate immediately. Think about your heading relative to the wind and the position of the fire, if known (in the Manchester accident they stopped in a position where flames from the burning fuel prevented use of at least one of the exits). I don't believe anyone on board an aircraft is in a position to make an educated judgement about the severity of a fire, and then use that judgement to delay evacuation on the ground.

I don't for one second believe that it takes several minutes to run the checklist for this occurrence.

I don't have any special knowledge of this incident, so I can't comment on what the causes for a delay might have been. Conceivably it may not be the pilots' fault.

I'm not a firefighter; but I've received a reasonable amount of firefighting training (for work in the offshore oil and gas industry). I've also been on platfroms/rigs where fires have broken out, and seen how quickly the situation goes from 'under control' to 'f**d up beyond belief'. If the delay in evactuation was elective, the situation wasn't being taken seriously enough.

Lucky this time...

[merlinxx]

Check AAIB.gov.uk for B737-200 G-BGJL operating KT28M 22/08/85 @ MAN/EGCC. Has anyone learnt from this I wonder ?

[einhverfr]

On the other hand, folks get killed in evacuations due to false fire alarms too.

http://www.flightsafety.org/ccs/ccs_nov-dec02.pdf

In some of these cases, note that smoke detectors went off because the overpressurization of the cabin caused false alarms there. (Basically, the smoke detectors measure the absorbtion of radioactive alpha particles as this causes a drop in voltage across the air gap-- as particulates enter the gap or as air density rises beyond a certain threshold, the alarm will sound.)

Secondly, even in the case of an actual fires too it is important to ensure that folks are not evacuated into the fire, or spinning engines, or the like.

[merlinxx]

Exactly what was (or should have been) learnt from JL @ MAN:ugh:

I rest my case:ugh:

[IGh]

SWA 519 / 12May09 Ldg HOU Rwy22 B737-3H4 N371SW,"... Prior to the flight, the flight crew and dispatcher were aware that the anti-skid system was inoperative...."
NTSB released the official P.C. on January 7th 2011 --
CEN09IA294 (http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20090513X31333&key=1)"... Safety Board determines the probable cause ... :
"The pilot's inadvertent application of excessive braking after touchdown, which caused the right wheels to lock and several tires to blow and resulted in a subsequent brake fire."
Similar mishaps where the company dispatched MEL- ANTI-SKID INOP'

DFW08IA087 (http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20080404X00426&key=1)
Continental /27Mar08 B737-524, N23661, landing Houston IAH 26R,
“… departed … knowing that the anti-skid system was inoperative…. crew briefed the operational procedures for landing with an inoperative anti-skid system ...
MIA06IA133 (http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20060908X01321&key=1)
USAirways 431 / 31Aug06 B737-400 N425US, lndg MIA
"... upon landing a 'popping sound' was heard from the left side of the airplane. Shortly thereafter, the airplane settled ... flightcrew felt a series of bumps and vibrations. As the airplane slowed to a halt, the left main gear tires caught fire, and the captain initiated an evacuation ..."

[4potflyer]

How frequently are aircraft dispatched with no anti-skid? Is this practiced in the SIM?

[SeniorDispatcher]

Since the airline's inception in June 1971, an inop anti-skid was deferral was possible under the MEL. They didn't fail and get deferred all that often, but when they did, and it couldn't be repaired, the MEL relief was utilized, the performance penalties and various MEL-mandated provisos complied with, and off the aircraft went until it could be routed into MX.

All that changed post-incident. Although relief still exists in the MMEL, we've gone more restrictive and it's no longer deferrable.

[grumpyoldgeek]

The thing that bothers me the most is that the guy with the papers going everywhere actually sends his stuff down the slide first, then goes down himself & then sits at the bottom while he collects everything. Even then he doesn't get it all & ends up chasing the papers towards the rear of the aircraft!!!


I live in a small college community in the US and I see this behavior and attitude every day. Self-absorbed, oblivious to risks and utterly unconcerned about the welfare of others. We aren't all like this, but there's far too many that are.

[etrang]

A $10K penalty for carrying an item out of an airplane during evacuation would discourage the act.

It would make no difference at all. People act instinctively in situations like this. They don't sit down and do a cost benefit analysis. If you want to stop people taking hand luggage with them during an emergency evacuation, the only way to do it is stop them taking it into the cabin in the first place.

[PJ2]

gog...
I live in a small college community in the US and I see this behavior and attitude every day. Self-absorbed, oblivious to risks and utterly unconcerned about the welfare of others. We aren't all like this, but there's far too many that are.Doesn't matter where you live.

I'm often grumpy too and for a number of good reasons aside from the fact that I'm an old :mad:, (George Carlin, "It's Bad For Ya (http://www.google.ca/#q=george+carlin+it's+bad+for+ya&hl=en&prmd=ivnso&source=univ&tbs=vid:1&tbo=u&ei=R6suTculNIj2tgO08-WkCQ&sa=X&oi=video_result_group&ct=title&resnum=1&sqi=2&ved=0CCUQqwQwAA&fp=53f5b2d5013db888)).

The reason such individuals at the bottom of evacuation slides are so oblivious to others waiting for him, in this case, to gather his papers carried by the wind, is that we are an atomized society where "the commons" does not exist.

The "locus" of "rights" is, these days, oneself. Others have rights, "academically" but "mine are real." One listens to Limbaugh, O'Reilly, etc in the solitude of one's car or home, without the luxury of others around to perhaps question or disagree with us. Psychological isolation permits a host of notions to survive unchecked, permitting self-examination to pass by, endlessly, as one lives in a self-reifying world of one's own construction.

Even with many "close" friends with whom one shares comments about one sports team or one's job or whatever, one can still be alone with others. In an atomized society where we are psychically and even physically "cubicled" at home or in our cars, listening to media, where is the challenge to our nodding heads and notions of what's right and what's appropriate?

Such isolation, which, with social networking sites and the other crap that passes for "friendship", our fundamental selves are neither known, nor challenged.

Those self-same rights we proclaim by our many acts, in this case by gathering one's "important papers" at the bottom of an evacuation slide in an airplane accident, do not obtain in and for others, because "the Other", quite bluntly, does not today psychologically exist for us. "Our advantage" exists; "others' right to advantage will have to wait".

It is not merely the notion of, "every man for himself"; - it is far deeper, more philosophically serious than that; It is as though "the other" is not even a real entity which (not 'who') has those self-same collective rights and privileges which oneself enjoys and advantages him/herself thereby. In an atomized society, the legitimacy of "every man for himself" is complete only describes the behaviour we can observe; atomism goes to the bone.

The act of delaying an evacuation (or blocking a fire exit in a burning building), is not even in the realm of the notion of "selfishness" because for selfishness to be legitimate, two must be involved - the one who is taking advantage "inappropriately" and the other who is disadvantaged thereby. In this man's psyche, "the other" (likely at the top of the chute in the airplane, waiting), didn't even exist, but this man's briefcase and papers did.

Our society places such extreme importance on the legitimacy and the mock-importance of the individual and our individual rights that innate awareness (and therefor thought towards) the "other" is impeded, atrophied, the notion of "public manners" long since becoming anachronistic, a "fool's game".

Unbridled competition for advantage does this to people and they forget where they are and what they are doing, so psychologically atomized are they...are we.

The result of calling attention to such an act would be a shrug from the individual and perhaps a mildly hostile repost in some self-justifying manner. What public discourse legitimates such thinking? It is no longer existential anomie, but a curious self-righteousness and self-assuredness which invisibly motivates and guides one's public behaviour.

"How dare you", seems an abiding challenge in public life as though one's rights were themselves innate and somehow "god"-given, and without the slightest sense of reciprocation. And these are mature, adults not teens or twenty-somethings.

But...there it is, on video: one person gathering his important papers while others wait for his briefcase to be collected out of the way. Us old :mad: ask why is such an act even possible today?

[sevenstrokeroll]

then there are people who will use their own body to protect someone else from being shot

and how did this thread get active again after a year or so?

[PBL]

how did this thread get active again after a year or so?

Because the NTSB published probable cause on Jan 7 2011. See the reactivating post by IGh above.

PBL

[paulg]

Yes PJ2 you get it. Nothing exists for that man except his briefcase. Such is the human condition.

[spanish no fly]

PJ12,
What a superb post:D. You sum up today's society perfectly.
May I pass it on to others outside of Pprune, please?

[sevenstrokeroll]

thanks PBL

dispatching without anti skid is just asking for trouble. it takes alot of THINKING to take it easy on the brakes with inop anti skid.

and SOUTHWEST always seems to hit the brakes hard to make that intersection...planning to roll to the end of the runway would have been more prudent.

and where inop anti skid REALLY GETS YOU, is if you reject/abort a takeoff with anti skid inop.

[VFD]

it takes alot of THINKING to take it easy on the brakes with inop anti skid.
The key here seems to be allowing time for the wheels to spin up before applying the brakes with inop-antiskid.
So now you have allowed for additional length due to inop-antiskid now you have to add an additional couple seconds for the wheels to spin-up before using the brakes with anti-skid inop when the gray matter says get on the brakes right away.
The spin up issue seems to be listed in the "what happened" reports by the NTSB but not tied to the MEL other than distance.

VFD

[PJ2]

S.N.F.;

The post is off-topic I know, but, like millions of others, I'm trying to come to terms with last Saturday's tragedy in Tucson and the pattern of American public life, discourse and the values being expressed, and I guess it boiled over, here, as well as other dialogues elsewhere entered into. The man's behaviour seemed to epitomize that model of private and public life which we now carry around in our heads and which governs much of what passes for "rational" behaviour, which today is executed without the slightest sense or comprehension of grace under fire.

Just as it wasn't "selfish" in the usual sense of the term, it isn't even describable as "arrogant" - it was a man chasing his papers after leaving an airplane involved in a serious ground incident where fire was involved, a spectacle to be sure, but it was far, far more than that. Wth apologies to the thread's contributors for enduring the diversion, I thank you for asking if you can use it...of course you can.

[IGh]

On the technical details, there were several problems exposed -- but IGNORED by the NTSB. Note they failed to mention prior cases. Several recent NTSB- P.C.'s (final rpts) demonstrate a lazy-IIC, or misinformed investigator, or lack of any management-oversight: More frequently, even after months & years of investigation, the Board finally releases a poor quality product, worse than a third-world country, & their disregard for detail is of increasing concern. Nothing has changed -- "reconsideration" is NEVER possible (claiming they lack resources to correct blatant errs); and their managers never face any review-checkride, or any investigative "professional-standards" committee.

There are several good thoughts posted above (this thread since the 12th).

SeniorD mentioned:
"... an inop anti-skid was deferral was possible under the MEL ... that changed post-incident ... no longer deferrable..."What struck me was that the B737 MEL still offered that permissible-exception to the certificated- configuration -- ANTI-SKID INOP'. This item, anti-skid protection, shouldn't be posted as a permitted-exception (MEL-item) on aircraft with mass greater than about 80,000 pounds: The human just can't sense "skid" in machines of that mass, and so can't respond to the wheel lock-up. There have been repeated cases (dispatched per MEL or inflight loss of Electrical Bus) which show that the human pilot needs the anti-skid protection to prevent immediate wheel lock-up & tire failure (with any pilot-input to Brakes).

Re' the certificated- configuration, and permissible-exceptions (MEL- Antiskid Inop'), SevenStrokeRoll's COMMENT says it all:"... where inop anti skid REALLY GETS YOU, is if you reject/ abort a takeoff with anti skid inop...."

[PJ2]

sevenstrokeroll;
and where inop anti skid REALLY GETS YOU, is if you reject/abort a takeoff with anti skid inop.
Echoing IGh...yes indeed, given that antiskid brakes are the only basis for the certification of performance during a rejected takeoff. While the MEL may provide numbers for longer distances, this would place most crews who actually had to reject without antiskid, in test-pilot territory.

Dispatching with anti-skid u/s is a serious matter which requires much thought before accepting the airplane and thorough briefings. Can't recall for the B727/B767 regarding brake pressure information but the Airbus series provides pressure indications which must be kept below 1000psi when the antiskid is u/s, which the PM monitored and called out if the pressure was getting close to the limit. Works well on the A330...

[grumpyoldgeek]

On the other hand, he might have been a diplomat with secret cables in his briefcase... No, that wouldn't be right.

[lomapaseo]

Nothing has changed -- "reconsideration" is NEVER possible (claiming they lack resources to correct blatant errs); and their managers never face any review-checkride, or any investigative "professional-standards" committee.



The predictive words of "reconsideration is Never possible" need some examination here.

If the expert opinion is that critical contributors were overlooked than at the least a petition for rexamination need be made. If that is not disposed in a professional manner than there is room for further collective action.

So please get back to us after a pertition for reconsideration has been made and rejected without foundation and maybe we can do something about it.

Meanwhile thanks for the heads up

[SeniorDispatcher]

Dispatching with anti-skid u/s is a serious matter which requires much thought before accepting the airplane and thorough briefings.

Agreed, and from my standpoint it gets just that, or did. More than once in my 30+ year career I've dispatched an inop anti-skid into HOU, and as long as one could land on something other than the normal 12R (displaced threshold for landing) and comply the other restrictions, it was a non-issue.

If restrictions could not be complied with, "careful thought" dictated that I didn't launch the flight and get an aircraft swap, or take other action if it was in the air at the time of the anti-skid failure. I can recall one specific situation where HOU's 04/22 was closed for construction, SE winds were out of tailwind limits for 30L, and with the aircraft now too heavy for 12R, I diverted them to IAH. Another time I had a similar situation with a flight inbound to BUR, and sent him to LAX. After a swap there, the aircraft stayed LAX-OAK (on the long runways of each) for the rest of the day and was fixed overnight.

Whether SWA's internal prohibition on an anti-skid being deferred continues, or is perhaps rescinded (now the NTSB has issued their final report) remains to be seen.

On one hand, if the Company wants to stay conservative despite MMEL permisiveness, that's perfectly fine, and it's certainly their call to make.

On the other hand, should the internal restriction be rescinded, that's fine too, and it can be reasonably be argued that if dispatching an aircraft with an inop anti-skid was supposedly so inherently unsafe then FAA would have already forced Boeing to delete MEL item 32-2 from the MMEL as well as all airline MELs. Ditto for other transport category aircraft.

Just my humble personal opinion here (and nobody else's), but the fact that inop anti-skids have occasionally cropped-up in the last 60 or so years since jet-powered aircraft* like the 707, 727, 737, and DC-9 family, and perhaps other types were deployed and that they have been routinely and safely deferred (and operational restrictions complied with as a part of that MEL deferral process), that suggests to me that there's no real systemic issue involved here, only an issue associated with a specific flight.

I'll live with whichever way it ends up going. Like I said, anti-skids don't fail all that often, and when one does, we'll deal with it, just like we deal with any other out-of-service event.

(*The recip and turbo prop aircraft of the 1950s and early may well have also had anti-skid systems, but that was before my time)

[sevenstrokeroll]

one more thing...it was just a brake fire...with CFR present...and while I don't have access to the videos (old computer, cheap pilot), why use the slides when air portable stairs might be better used? unless the plane was burned beyond recognition, sometimes waiting makes sense...of course we had this argument for the jet blue a tire in sacramento. (parking brake set for landing!)

[IGh]

Lampo's comment on the 13th, re' NTSB rule 845.41(a):"... at the least a petition for rexamination need be made. If that is not disposed in a professional manner than there is room for further collective action...."
No. There is no recourse.
Have you submitted any Petition in the past few years? Any worthy response?

Hauter wrote back two years ago on one Petition (a decades- ago AAR still awaiting correction) -- he honestly admitted that there would be little chance of any action, "lack of resources". Over the past few years (check some of my posts) the Board has failed to make correction (even after admitting the errs and stating that correction would be done): But the Staff/Board seems eager to aim their P.C. at the human operator -- case closed, avoid any mention of deferred-Mx as contributing factor, or revealing an MMEL-problem area.

Nothing has changed regarding NTSB- errs & their lack of "reconsideration"--
C.O. Miller offered this critique way back in the early 1980's"The deteriorating scope, depth and accuracy of the NTSB/FAA aircraft investigations is approaching the level of a national embarrassment. Instead of being a leader in this field, the United States government seems to be unwilling to provide the resources, leadership or motivation necessary to improve investigative techniques and procedures. . . ."

"There is reason to believe that because of the excessive workload, the inadequacy of investigations, or the questionable nature of some board members' qualifications, some views of parties associated with a particular case are not communicated or understood by the Board's members. Petitions for reconsideration of the determination of cause or, more importantly, for changes in the report to present a fuller presentation or discussion of the facts, appear to be treated summarily without the objectivity which normally characterize the Board's actions. It is rare for the Board to present in its report the contrary views of competent parties unless one of the members elects to write a minority opinion supporting such a view. Such dissents are infrequent."

Excerpts from "Aviation Accident investigation: Functional and Legal Perspectives," an article by Mr. C.O. Miller, past Director of the Bureau of Aviation Safety of the NTSB; Journal of Air Law and Commerce (Dallas, Tx.: SMU School of Law), Winter 1981, Vol 46, #2.

[IGh]

SeniorD, on the 13th, kindly explained his recollection of history on MEL-Antiskid inop': "... if dispatching an aircraft with an inop anti-skid ... so inherently unsafe then FAA would have already forced Boeing to delete MEL item ... inop anti-skids ... in the last 60 ... years ... 707, 727, 737, and DC-9/MD-80 family ... routinely and safely deferred ..."
Hmmm -- that option hasn't been the case for some years. For example, look at the DAC-transition from DC9 through their MD8 family, the MMEL does NOT offer the permissible-exception to the heavier models:FAA's DC-9 MMEL ... 32- 4. ... Anti-Skid System ... (Series 10, 20, 30, 40, 50)
(O) May be inoperative provided:
a) Operations are conducted in accordance with performance data of the AFM ...
Note that the MMEL only offers the deferral option for the "little" DC9 series 10 thru 50 [NOT offered for the heavier DC9-80 models]. That is what caught my attention in this B737 MMEL -- still offering the deferral for Anti-Skid Inop'. That MEL-option seems wrong for later B73 models. [Edit: the MMEL Policy letter #113 (Dec2002) "MMEL Relief for Anti-Skid Inoperative" offers history, with the B737 under the pre-Amendment 92 customs:
Flight Standards Information System (FSIMS) (http://fsims.faa.gov/PICResults.aspx?mode=Publication&doctype=MMEL%20Policy%20Letters)

[INTERESTING point that PJ2 mentioned about A330-instrumentation with the sensor at the Brake Valve, to prevent crew from inciting "skid" [I've not seen that option on TBC nor DAC line aircraft].

Senior D -- for SWA employees, this case raises a PRIVACY issue: The NTSB ceased including NAMES in their "final" reports: Until about 1993, the NTSB's final AAR included an Appendix usually titled "Personnel Information", which printed the names of various pilots, FA, others involved. Recently, the Board has posted its "DOCKET" on the web for their investigations -- so now again anyone can easily find the NAMES of pilots, dispatchers, F/A's. Seems the management pilots attempted to have their names redacted -- but SWA dispatcher "P.S.", and the pilots, & FAs NAMES are again easily available in the newly available "docket" on the web.

[SeniorDispatcher]

Hmmm -- that option hasn't been the case for some years. For example, look at the DAC-transition from DC9 through their MD8 family, the MMEL does NOT offer the permissible-exception to the heavier models:

FAA's DC-9 MMEL ... 32- 4. ... Anti-Skid System ... (Series 10, 20, 30, 40, 50)
(O) May be inoperative provided:
a) Operations are conducted in accordance with performance data of the AFM ...

Note that the MMEL only offers the deferral option for the "little" DC9 series 10 thru 50 [NOT offered for the heavier DC9-80 models]. That is what caught my attention in this B737 MMEL -- still offering the deferral for Anti-Skid Inop'. That MEL-option seems wrong for later B73 models.

I stand corrected on the MD-80s (a DC-9 carryover assumption on my part), but my essential point is unchanged. While the 737 MMEL relief might "seem" wrong to you, Boeing/FAA would appear to have their own justifications, and ones I'm not privy to. ;)

[lomapaseo]

Lampo's comment on the 13th, re' NTSB rule 845.41(a):"... at the least a petition for rexamination need be made. If that is not disposed in a professional manner than there is room for further collective action...."



No. There is no recourse.


so status quo is OK ?

Well there are other ways to get at this if the NTSB rejects what we were to collectively want.

[MPH]

Everybody safe that's great!! But, I did not see any assistance on the ground for the pax coming off the slide?

[IGh]

Insight into the common-element in each of those three landing mishaps, offered by "VFD" message #74 on 13Jan:"... The key ... allowing time for ... spin up before ... brakes with inop-antiskid.... due to inop-antiskid ... additional couple seconds for ... spin-up ... spin up issue ... not tied to the MEL ..."
Earlier, over years, there had been repeat cases of TIRE FAILURE during landing, after inflight loss of the associated Electrical Bus (loss of electrical power to the AntiSkid System). 



When I first read VFD's observation (re' too early application of Brakes), it made no sense, because it seemed crazy that any pilot would ever want to ride-the-Brakes during the touchdown-SpinUp phase (too early in the landing roll-out). [Only a few decades ago, such Braking-behavior meant a plume of smoke following pilots into the parking-spot (hot-brakes), with the local Crash-Fire-Rescue vehicle on standby nearby. So we avoided use of brakes.]



Anyway, based upon VFD's comment about too-EARLY Braking, I went back to reconsider those three similar B737 occurrences:-- 31Aug06 / MIA MIA06IA133 (http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20060908X01321&key=1)
-- 27Mar08 / IAH DFW08IA087 (http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief2.asp?ev_id=20080404X00426&ntsbno=DFW08IA087&akey=1)
-- 12May09 / HOU CEN09IA294 (http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20090513X31333&key=1)
YES, as suggested in VFD's observation: Each of those three mishaps (multiple tire-failures/fire), included BRAKING (Tire Failures) at, or soon after, TOUCHDOWN.



The idea that any pilot -- even with a perfect Anti-Skid System -- would elect to initiate Braking so early, had seemed out-of-the-question. Maybe today's pilots, flying modern aircraft with massive Brake Energy capability, can routinely begin braking soon after TOUCHDOWN, as a regular habit [& routinely do it without encountering Hot Brakes, smoke, &CFR]. Just a few decades ago, pilots waited until slowed below 80Kts before thinking about Brakes. So, lacking Anti-skid protections, it seemed unreasonable to imagine any pilot initiating Braking at TOUCHDOWN. [This assumes pilot input to Brake Pedal; but pilot's Brake-Pedal FORCE / displacement was not recorded on the FDR. Might be possible that the the Pilot had input ZERO Pedal FORCE, investigators don't know that pilot's Brake "Pedal Force" input.]