QantasLink knew engine flaw before failure: report

[topend3]

----------------------------------------------------------------------QantasLink knew engine flaw before failure: report
7th April 2009, 6:00 WST

A Perth-bound aircraft that experienced severe engine failure after taking off from Newman in 2007 had a serious engine defect that was known about, Australia’s safety investigator has found.

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau found in its report, issued yesterday, that the engines of the Qantas-Link Boeing 717, carrying 93 passengers, had a series of similar failures with other airlines as well as QantasLink.

The airline was in the process of replacing the faulty high-pressure turbine blades when the “significant event” occurred.

The aircraft had just taken off from Newman on July 13 and was climbing through 14,000ft when the passengers and crew heard a loud bang followed by vibrations.

The ATSB found that the failure of a single Stage 1 high-pressure turbine blade had caused all the blades on the Rolls-Royce Deutschland BR715 number two engine (right side) to shear off.

These turbine blades are directly behind the engine’s combustor and are at the heart of an aircraft’s motor.

At full power, each of the 80 blades generates the same capacity as a Formula One racing car.

In November 2004, Rolls-Royce and Boeing advised airlines to replace the blades “at the earliest opportunity” with new, higher quality ones that would not fail.

When the engine on the 717 failed, the blades had not been replaced but the operator was in the “process” of doing so.

But the operator, National Jet Systems on behalf of QantasLink, had conducted an ultrasonic inspection of all the engines as instructed to detect for any cracks in the blades.

Since the incident, all QantasLink’s 717s have had the high-pressure turbine blades replaced.

The 717, which entered service in 1999, has a perfect safety record.

The aircraft is used extensively in WA and is popular with passengers.

[AerocatS2A]

At full power, each of the 80 blades generates the same capacity as a Formula One racing car.
What does this even mean? :ugh:

[KRUSTY 34]

More journalistic nonesence Aerocat'. Perhaps he divided the "horsepower" of the BR175 by 80 (number of blades) and arived at a figure somewhere in the vicinity of the output of an F1 engine. You never know with these dingbats!

I wonder how quickly the blades were replaced once the failure ocurred? I'll bet it was given a level of priority perhaps greater than before the event.

Lucky for Natjet there were no injuries as a result!

[ZEEBEE]

In November 2004, Rolls-Royce and Boeing advised airlines to replace the blades “at the earliest opportunity” with new, higher quality ones that would not fail.

When the engine on the 717 failed, the blades had not been replaced but the operator was in the “process” of doing so.

But the operator, National Jet Systems on behalf of QantasLink, had conducted an ultrasonic inspection of all the engines as instructed to detect for any cracks in the blades.

So, I fail to see the issue here...

NJS had conducted the ultrasonic inspection AS REQUIRED.

It is simplistic to require an operator to ground it's fleet pending supply of some parts unless required to do otherwise.

Subsequent events showed that earlier replacement would have been better, but there are always issues like this with any aircraft and Airlines have to be guided by the manufacturers in conjunction with the regulators.

As to the Formula 1 reference....Well.....

[Engineer_aus]

I heard a hold up with RR was to blame for the slow progression of the engine changes.

[tipsy2]

Clever if not selective headline writing:

"QantasLink knew engine flaw before failure: report"

They could have equally written it as:

"CASA knew engine flaw before failure: report"

or

"Rolls Royce knew engine flaw before failure: report"

Blatant selective journalism(sic) but good for QANTAS bashing I suppose.:=

[newsensation]

Or
How about National Jet knew they are the ones that operate the 717 under contract...

[Capt Claret]

How about, every one knew there was a design/manufacturing flaw, there was a program to rectify a design fault, which I think has now been completed.

What a beat up.

[RYAN TCAD]

Yeh - it only took them three years to get around to doing it. But at least they did it straight after the first signs of it failing on them!

They are a safety conscious mob after all. I think they were a bit harsh on themselves by referring to it as a 'significant event', when really they could have gotten away with passing it over as a relatively minor event and that no passengers were ever in danger because the crew are highly trained to deal with these sorts of things. ;p

Bo!

[Capt Claret]

Yeh - it only took them three years to get around to doing it. But at least they did it straight after the first signs of it failing on them!

One should get one's facts straight if one is going to peddle crap.

The failures became evident with the previous operator, and a program of blade replacement was well underway before this particular failure, not "straight after the first signs of it failing ..."

From the report, one gleans that there was no "first sign of it failing".




Service bulletin compliance

Although not mandatory, the operator did comply with the engine manufacturer’s service bulletin requirements for the on-wing ultrasonic inspections of the LIP 3 HPT1 blades. The change in the service bulletin compliance for revision 2 of the ultrasonic inspection service bulletin indicates that the engine manufacturer had found that a time parameter was necessary as a measure to prevent further HPT1 blade failures.

Although revision 2 of the blade ultrasonic inspection service bulletin required a reinspection of the HPT 1 blades, the engine manufacturer’s report stated that the scheduled reinspection of this engine was not in time to avoid this event. However, the blade failure occurred only 77 cycles after revision 2 of service bulletin SBBR700-72-900361 was entered against the engine in the maintenance planning system. Had the operator scheduled an earlier inspection, it is most unlikely that this would have been completed before the engine failure event.

The time period allowed by the engine manufacturer between the intial ultrasonic inspection of the blade and the engine failure was too great to detect indications of impending blade cracking and failure. The previous ultrasonic inspection service bulletin SB-BR700-72-900361, assumed that a single inspection would detect any blades that were susceptible to failure. If there had been a requirement for repetitive inspections with previous issues of the service bulletin, the potential for blade failure may have been detected prior to the engine failure.

[RENURPP]

Note: Another misinformed moron amongst us.

There you go, I am a good speller now :oh:

[RYAN TCAD]

... and another **** speller!

Bo!

[Old Fella]

Some wonderful use of words in the original post, such as "each of the 80 blades at full power generates the same capacity as a F1 racing car." Nice to learn that in the RR BR715, at full power, each of the 80 HP turbine blades generates a few litres of something. I don't agree with the comment of Ryan TCAD describing the engine failure as a "relatively minor event". I think "significant event" was a fair enough description of what occurred. Afterall, a second "relatively minor event" would have seen the aircraft rigged for silent running. As they say in the classics "Sh*ts would be trumps"

[RYAN TCAD]

Hey Old Fella- notice the tongue in cheek at the end of my post?

That meant just that. It was a VERY serious event.

It's just that from time to time i am guilty of being a sarcastic individual - yes even cynical at times.

Bo!