Cougar & Bond - What Now ?

[Ned-Air2Air]

Had a question come up today with some friends I was chatting with and thought I would post it here for members comments.

In the case of two tragedies like this, the Cougar S92 and now Bonds Puma, what sort of repercussions happen to those companies.

Does the oil company turn around and say no to using that operator again, or do they keep using them with a raft of changes to the ops manual or what. Do the oil companies cancel contracts with operators ?

Obviously this isnt the first loss on offshore ops and wont be the last so was wondering what actually happens once all the media attention has gone away.

Ned

[chester2005]

Surely the oil companies would not be able to just cancel contracts willy-nilly?
If they did the Heli companies could sue them for £££$$$

Chester:ok:

[HeliComparator]

chester

I guess you have never seen a contract between an oil company and an operator? They are normally very 1-sided and typically the oil company can terminate the contract whenever they feel like it, with as little as 30 days notice.

HC

[What Limits]

60 days is typical in my little world.

This is going to be a very interesting question to answer for the customer.

How are they now going to select their contractors, on the basis of short-term accident rate (in which case Bond tragically have increased exponentially in a short time) or on long-term safety record.

Its about time the Oil and gas companies did their due diligence properly and let contracts on the basis of a true Risk Management Strategy rather than strictly on price.

Ned - I think your Editor feels quite strongly about this !!

(No direct criticism of any oil and gas company, air operator, national aviation authority, citizen of any country or member of the law enforcement community intended or implied !!)

[leading edge]

Let's look at a few things here and then consider what has happened in the past.

Both of the companies concerned would easily pass any safety audit in terms of their systems, SMS etc.

Neither helicopter company would have systemic issues contributing to either of these fatal accidents. The oil company just wouldn't contract companies that they thought would in any way impact their safety.

(Any training or fleet management issue which may or may not pertain to the EC225 ditching could and will be easily rectified)

Both of the companies have excellent records.

Empirically, unless either operator has a history of audit failures (they don't) request for improvement from the oil company (unlikely to be anything significant) then the contract will likely stay with the incumbent until normal tender time.

[SASless]

I will be cold and heartless here....trying to live up to my newfound reputation.

These three accidents are nothing new to the offshore helicopter industry.

They have happened before and they will happen again.

Today it is Cougar and Bond and next time it will be other operators.

None of the operators want these things to happen....no one does.

We have to accept the fact that helicopters are very complex machines that have the potential of incurring faults that will cause horrible results.

We fly in some very inhospitable areas where survival is not a sure thing if you survive contact with the surface....in fact that is usually when the most risk occurs.

For an oil company to terminate a contract as a result of a crash or even crashes.....barring proven negligence or a defective aircraft design they are not making a reasonable or logical decision.

Other operators than Bond and Cougar have had bad runs of luck or whatever you want to call it and did not lose their contracts thus why should these two operators. In fact, these two operators are probably better choices for two reasons. They are looking at their operations and trying to find every way to improve them they can.....and it is some else's turn at bat.

The key is to figure out how to improve the safety of operations as we find out the causes of these tragedies.

[paco]

I think a bigger problem is more likely to be their next insurance bill.

phil

[Epiphany]

Short-term accident statistics seem to have little relevance when oil companies are awarding contracts. Bristow (who have been pushing the Target Zero accident approach for some time) have just lost Mauretania to MHS who have a less than enviable accident record. I think cost is more relevant to these companies.

Kind makes you question the 'If you think safety is expensive - then wait till you have an accident' theory.

[nightjar1]

To WIN contracts though, do these companies not have to cut costs/staff levels to be the >> cheaper<< option ?

[daisy120]

All companies, fixed and rotor have a built in hull loss element to their business models before insurance premiums are reshaped. The cliche regarding the expense of an accident, only kicks in when this threshold has been reached and it is also country dependent. Indonesia is a great example here and so is PNG. But as the fat of safety is picked back to the bone and cost and super regulation get closer together in CAA land, where will it all end?Philippine operators in the Peterhead lane?:confused:

[Epiphany]

The loss of the airfarme is only one aspect of the insurance question. What about the crew, passengers, families, operator reputation etc. The true costs of accidents goes much further.

[gasax]

As noted above the oil operators contracts allow termination on any number of grounds, with little warning.

The 'losses' are going to be largely covered by insurance, that is why it's bought.

Loss of reputation and/or share price does have a real effect and usually one you cannot insure against.

With the oil operators refuse to use them? Of course not. I seem to recall the Jigsaw contract was given to a company that had no aircraft and virtually no personnel - which you might think makes many procurement prerequisites impossible to fulfill.

Only if there was a systemic problem with the company are the oil operators likely to pull out. With the more responsible oil companies that should be addressed much earlier than any incident.

The amazing thing is how static insurance premiums can be in the face of deteriorating accident / incident rates (unlike motoring for instance).

[topendtorque]

I think a reasonably hypothetical question Ned.
All of the helicopter providers undergo stringent auditing to win and maintain these contracts.
If all the boxes are ticked then the companies are operating as per the manufacturers specs and recommendations, also those of the relevant regulatory authority.

The boot may well be on the other foot in the event of an unexplained accident and if the contract be cancelled, that "Breach of contract" could well come into play for the provider.

The oil companies and helicopter providers 'Assure' themselves with that established audit protocol, but as Paco points out the "Insurance" is another thing entirely, for hull and third party.

[Sikorskyfan]

I had the opportunity to visit Cougar's facilities in St. John's in 2006. Maybe a little off topic here but I just wanted to add; one of the finest and most professional organizations I have ever had the pleasure of spending time with.

[Squat switch]

Interesting discussion, another viewpoint is what weight is to contractor preference of Helicopter Type when a new/renewal contract is negotiated,
And does the contractor therefore have to shoulder some responsibilty?

[EESDL]

I'm sorry - was someone suggesting that these contracts do not go to the company who undercuts competition - regardless of 'like-for-like' comparisons?

[xny556]

It may come as a surprise to some observers of the offshore oil support aviation industry to find that the relationship between the oil company ( client) and aviation provider is completely different to that which occurs when we fly on a scheduled airline.

Offshore oil operations are chartered flights. i.e. the aviation services provider undertakes to transport people and cargo for the client at the clients request only.

This explains why the clients have ( sometimes) extensive aviation departments providing advisors and auditors to oversee operations conducted on their behalf.

The true test of which party is ultimately responsible will be the courts.In many cases the oil companies ( some of whom are headquartered in the USA) are the final defendents of legal actions brought by injured parties,hence their highly intrusive intervention in the day-to-day operations of their chartered aviation providers.

Given the propensity of US courts to sometimes award substantial monetary payments to victims of offshore helicopter accidents it is no wonder that contracts between aviation providers and oil companies reflect this reality.

[SASless]

Whoa....hold on here!

We have been told the oil companies only consideration is "safety" and not mere "costs".....you cannot have it both ways.

Is it "safety no matter the cost" or safety at the "minimum cost"?

BP sets high standards.....look at the very positive improvements they have forced on the Gulf of Mexico operators....and at the same time paid for those improvements.

[TWOTBAGS]

So its been Cougar with a 92 and this week Bond with an L2, last month it was PHI and a 76 that in good weather rolled back the power and descended into a swamp for whatever reason.

I saw it when CHC had a 76 go swimming off Angola and again later when Heli Union tried to remodel the deck with a Dauphane……

Its happened before and will again, every operator has had a run of “un-luck” but more often than not is luck and the use of well trained people in the front that the oil companies have not had more people go swimming.

Personally I have for close to the last 9 years in one way or another had my job rely on the oil industry and yes mostly the contracts are very one sided in favor of the oil companies.

In all that time I have only come across one auditor who was not really just ticking boxes to qualify the safety of each and every particular organization he visited.

Why? You ask, well this individual started out in the cockpit and had a wide and varied experience before he went the safety route.

Thorough yes, but more importantly he knew within 5 mins of meeting a guy if they had the right level of competency. Accurate about 98% of the time.

There is a difference between audited safety and actual competency, which I would hazard to guess that most readers here agree that sometimes the crews shake their collective heads when a event happens and it turns out benign….. out of pure luck.

It will happen again, and we will all be saddened by the loss, but in the mean time “we” will be the last line of defense in the swiss cheese and numerous events both self induced and unexplained will happen and many will never be know about.

Fly safe out there :ok:

[What Limits]

My experience of the oil company 'extensive aviation department' is that the people in it, if they have any aviation experience at all is completely the wrong type of experience for that operation.

Even though they may demand certain types operated a certain way, ultimately its the corporate departments who let the contracts and their priority is 'value for money'.

[Flyt3est]

I'm just waiting for the "Sue Eurocopter" posters to swing into action like they did on the Cougr thread..:rolleyes:

SAS - Perhaps safety at reasonable cost is more accurate?

[SASless]

How do we define "safety".....what metrics do the oil companies use to arrive at the intersection of the lives lost curve and the cost of prevention curve?

[Flyt3est]

SAS - To be blunt, as it was put to me by a senior safety advisor from one company "When we are in court, and the judge asks what steps we took to prevent this accident, we have to show realistic risk reduction"

I took that a resignation that accidents will occur (Its a helicopter, of course accidents will happen) but if systems and procedures can be implemented, without eating into too much of the profits, since OGP is actually a profit making business and not a civil service. I think thats a point many of us overlook, we work in a profit making business, not a charity. You get in that helicopter knowing that you are part of that business. Costs will always be trimmed to make a business as lean as possible, its called market competition. Sadly safety has a budget too:(

[seawings]

I believe that a good aviation advisor walks a thin line. On the one hand he is responsible to his employer to propose, develop and defend the company’s position. On the other hand he is often the intermediary between the contractor and his company, explaining and mitigating positions by the company that unduly put the contractor at risk. A thin line to be sure.

[Flyt3est]

Seawings

Yeah and you wouldn't want his job either, especially at times like this right??!! Worse than being a referee in a Rangers V Celtic game!

FT

[Offshorebear]

BP will resume crew change operations with Bond Offshore Helicopters commencing Monday 18th May

[helimutt]

So, I presume any extra work that CHC/Bristows have been doing in place of Bond will come to an end?

[madrock]

"The oil companies held townhall meetings in St. John's with hundreds of offshore workers Monday about resuming helicopter flights offshore - something that could happen as early as next week.

Helicopter flights were suspended following the March 12 helicopter crash that killed 17 of 18 offshore workers and crew aboard a Cougar Helicopters Sikorsky S-92A bound for the White Rose and Hibernia oilfields.

The townhall meetings have a three-fold purpose, according to the head of the Hibernia Management and Development Company (HMDC).

"The purpose of the briefing tonight was to provide information to our workforce based on the industry's review of helicopter operations, firstly," said Paul Sacuta, president of HMDC.

"Secondly, it was to answer their questions ... and the third thing was to be able to discuss why the industry is confident that it's safe to get back on a helicopter."

He declined to elaborate, saying employees will get the details first.
Sacuta and other oil company executives are flying offshore this week, weather permitting, for more townhall-style meetings."I'm confident because I've seen all the work that was done by the task force and by the industry in general," he said. "That's the message we're going to take offshore."

Meetings are scheduled today for Husky Energy employees at the White Rose oilfield, Wednesday for Terra Nova and Thursday for Hibernia workers.

The Telegram has learned that offshore workers could be given a one-time right to refuse a helicopter flight, if they don't feel comfortable with it. But they won't be able to refuse a second flight.

The companies weren't commenting on any of the details of their presentations to employees Monday."[/font]

[parabellum]

I think it is unlikely that Bond's premium will go up at the next renewal.

If underwriters have doubts about an operator they will commission an audit, in the case of Lloyd's, Lloyd's Aviation and in the case of the major insurance companies, Airclaims, (it will depend on whether the leading underwriters are from Lloyd's or a major company). Provided that the audit is satisfactory then it is unlikely that rates will increase for that operator by more than the market average. Underwriters will look in to the 'pot' for Bond, for example, and see how premium income over the last, say, ten years, compares to claims and base their decision on that. Excluding seriously bad operators insurance rates tend to go up or down depending on the overall trend of claims in the preceding year for that market, (Industrial use helicopters), rather than on the basis of the isolated experiences of one operator.

Just general stuff to give some idea of, (roughly), how the market operates.

[InsuranceGuy]

I would have guessed that bond got an increase on renewal this year for their first loss, the second loss happened on their renewal. The pot for off shore heli's is empty, All offshore ops might be paying more one way or another for their insurance. Lets not forget operators are not crashing small value heli's anymore they are dumping $15m + machines and therfore the payback is much longer. We were hoping that with the glass cockpit the frequency of losses will deminish but so far that hasn't happened.

[madrock]

VOCM St. John's News-Info (today)

There is still no word on when Cougar Helicopters will resume regular passenger flights, but officials hope it will be in the next week or so. In the meantime, a company spokesperson says there was nothing to an incident yesterday which involved crew and oil company officials switching aircraft on the tarmac. A light came on in the cockpit as the helicopter was preparing to take officials to the offshore for a town hall meeting. The helicopter never left the tarmac, and in the interest of time, the crew and passengers simply switched to another helicopter. Maintenance identified and fixed the sensor in a very short time.

[paco]

InsuranceGuy - interesting, that, just as I suspected, but just curious - how would you expect the glass cockpit to improve things? I know they are supposed to make the assimilation of information "easier", but isn't that it?

Phil

[212man]

Insurance Guy - is that information in the public domain? If not, I'd suggest it's extremely inappropriate to post it!

[madrock]

St. John’s, The Telegram, May 16th 2009 :
“ These are excerpts from the question-and-answer presentation provided to offshore employees about returning to helicopter flights to the Grand Banks......
Q : There have been comments that the gearbox should be able to run dry for 30 minutes. If this is the case why did this not happen ?
A : Sikorsky states that there is no “30-minute run dry” requirement for civilian certified helicopters.
The S-92A main gearbox is fully certified, without waiver or exception, to the latest (U.S.) federal aviation regulations (FARs), including Part 29 through Amendment 47.
Sikorsky states that total loss of oil is considered an extremely remote event based on system design.
Further, that for all gearbox failure modes that are not deemed as extremely remote, continued safe operation of the S-92A helicopter main gearbox has been demonstrated in excess of three hours running time.
In the circumstance of total loss of lubrication, a “land immediately” instruction is directed.”

....flights resume tommorrow (Monday).

[paco]

"Sikorsky states that total loss of oil is considered an extremely remote event based on system design"

So does that mean they are able to wriggle out of testing?

Phil

[madrock]

........to find the elusive answer, try the S92 thread..............

[connel flyer]

Not a good start for Bond today.

Flight onto the PBLJ pax got off helicopter, refueled pax boarded HLO and fireman noticed oil coming from engine compartment running down the side to the deck notified the pilot who said it was ok.
chopper lifted and on the way back to Aberdeen made a landing at Wick all pax had to get off and wait for another helicopter to come up from Aberdeen with engineers. Some very unhappy people on the rig at the moment :confused::confused:. This does nothing to help the low confidence that most offshore workers have at the moment.

CF

[Oldlae]

As an engineer with many years experience and IMO no MGB can run without any oil at all whatsoever for 30 minutes. I suspect that any oil loss for the purposes of certification, if this is the case, (I suspect not) is expected to occur from leaking seals over a period of time, not a instant total loss through a faulty oil filter attachment, causing all oil to be pumped overboard very quickly.

[HeliComparator]

I suspect that any oil loss for the purposes of certification, if this is the case, (I suspect not) is expected to occur from leaking seals over a period of time, not a instant total loss through a faulty oil filter attachment, causing all oil to be pumped overboard very quickly.

You would probably suspect wrong then. Here is an extract from AC 29-2C which is the advisory material for FAR29. In the para on how to test for compliance with para 927 (the one on continued running following oil loss) it says:

A bench test (transmission test rig) is commonly used to demonstrate compliance with this rule. Since this is a test of the capability of the residual oil in the transmission to provide limited lubrication, a critical entry condition for the test should be established. The transmission lubricating oil should be drained while the transmission is operating at maximum normal speed and nominal cruise torque (reacted as appropriate at the main mast and tail rotor output quills).

I suppose you might be able to find a smoke-and-mirrors alternative interpretation for the word "drained" but to most people, it would mean undoing the drain plug.

One cannot be surprised that Sikorsky continue to bluster that there is nothing wrong with the aircraft - after all, the only alternative would be to admit that it didn't comply with 927, which would ground all the aircraft indefinitely until a hardware fix was installed. There might be a few operators wanting their money back...

HC

[madrock]

I wonder what official position (if any), the FAA is taking regarding what the intent of the "30 minute" wording in their Regulation is ?

Is the "extremely remote" design calculation still valid based on current total TIS of the aircraft ?

Is there an ELS "bolt-on" fix possible ? Don't see why the FAA couldn't issue a new Amendment to FAR29 to push the whole thing forward - commercially it could be consdered an "upgrade" and given the current climate wouldn't a "flow-through" cost be acceptable to all, in the interest of pushing the safety envelope forward ?

[maxwelg2]

So, for the S-92 why not give us SS6 on top of enforced RFM to land immediately now that everybody knows there is no 30-minute MGB run dry capability.

One more failure in a MGB lube oil system component should then revoke the FAR29 compliance and ground the S-92 until a proper engineering solution is found. How long until a steel stud snaps due to vibration/some other as yet unknown factor? Will this be blamed on something else to ensure FAR29 compliance is retained and this helo still flys?

We now have HUEBAs, but still the same garbage Helly Hansen Nautilus E-452 "boil-in-the-bag" strait jackets, is this real progress? The shark suits are IMO a far superior suit than these aviation and marine standard compliant body bags that don't even self-right an unconscious casualty. I don't see any pilots wearing the passenger type, I wonder why...

I accept risk, but don't accept sub-standard design/equipment in an industry that should have nothing but the best in use. The human cost to me is too high.

Like most PAX I will just get on with it and accept the now all-too aware additional risk that comes with the job, and wait for improvements to work their way through the system via outside influences e.g. CH-148 MGB re-design.

[Hilife]

One more failure in a MGB lube oil system component should then revoke the FAR29 compliance and ground the S-92 until a proper engineering solution is found. How long until a steel stud snaps due to vibration/some other as yet unknown factor? Will this be blamed on something else to ensure FAR29 compliance is retained and this helo still flys?

The design practise of retaining oil filter bowls with only 3 studs is very common among helicopter OEM’s, so if you are suggesting that this design is suspect, then you have to question all other OEM’s that also use 3 steel studs. Until we know what the root cause was for several of the studs being missing, it would be wrong to point fingers at this stage.

Compliance with the Revised SB (Installation of steel studs) should result in a more robust bowl retention and as there are no dynamic seals on the filter bowl, I would be surprised to see any similar issues arise again within the design criteria.

I’ve experienced levels of vibration in Chinook helicopters that frightened the hell out of me, but never once came across instances of missing studs on any of the numerous on-board components attributed to vibration alone. Your comment “some other as yet unknown factor” could be a multitude of reasons that the OEM has no control over and therefore they cannot simply be blamed for any and all loss of studs.

I suspect that a multitude of lessons will be learnt by all in the industry when the AAIB publish their report.

[unstable load]

The design practice of retaining oil filter bowls with only 3 studs is very common among helicopter OEM’s,

S61 has ONE!!

[[email protected]]

Sikorsky seem to be displaying the same disappointing lack of integrity as many of our MPs and the same level of arrogance. The FAA are clearly employing the same sort of people who inhabit the House of Commons fees Office and between them they have been deceiving the general public and, in the case of Sikorsky, the whole helicopter industry.

[Droopystop]

As I understand it (and correct me if I'm wrong) the requirements are 30mins dry run or show an extremely remote chance of failure. To be honest I would rather sit under a gearbox whose failure rate is negligable rather than one which might fail but get you down within 30 mins, (ok I would rather have both). So whose fault is it? Sikorsky or FAA? If the regulations are poorly written, they are open to misuse, deliberate or otherwise.

As I have said elsewhere, I don't think 30 mins is appropriate for IFR aircraft flying over hostile terrain. There should be redundancy in the lubrication system that will mean a forced landing is never required.

Certainly the certification should ensure that catastrophic (non survivable) GB failure should never happen.

[js0987]

Re: Concern above about the steel mounting studs on the filter bowl. This may be a little bit of apples and oranges, but those of us that flew Hueys all raised our eyebrows when we were first told that the entire tail boom was held on with only 4 steel bolts. Not withstanding all the vibrations they were exposed to, I once saw one that had a hard landing such that the tail stinger was about 6" off the ground and the entire belly was crumpled like an acordian (landed on a dirt mound and the skids never touched the ground). Maybe that's why the Bell 214ST (17500lbs) has 4 steel bolts holding its tail on as well.

[Variable Load]

So whose fault is it? Sikorsky or FAA?

I'm not sure I would use the word fault, but it is the regulator's responsibility to write the regulations and then ensure compliance with them.

As such the FAA/EASA know what they wanted (they wrote the regulation) and fully certified the S92 against those regulations.

The reality is that there is not (yet) a heavy helicopter that can loose all of it's MGB lubrication and run for 30 minutes at a cruise power setting without the help of additional backup systems. The only two heavy helicopters certified against the latest FAR29 requirements, the S92 and the EC225, both failed there "run dry" tests. Each manufacturer then took a different route to then obtain compliance and certification. The EC225 MGB was modified with a glycol injection system, giving it 30 minutes until a "Land Immediately". The S92 introduced an oil cooler bypass valve that Sikorsky and the regulators anticipated would stop the only likely cause of oil loss. This scenario does not come with a 30 minutes "Land Immediately" requirement. However we now know that another failure mode is possible with the S92.

So back to the manufacturer and the regulator! Time will tell if any of the parties (FAA/EASA/TC/Sikorsky) are looking to change their position with regard to the S92.

Bottom line is that the buck starts and stops with the regulator IMHO. But Sikorsky does have product image and duty of care/liability to worry about.

[madrock]

Max –
I understand your frustration with the situation – the current official response regarding the MGB itself – nothing wrong with it, doesn’t need 30 minutes run dry, extremely remote etc..etc..etc...no change.
In the industry you’re in you should not have to accept any additional risk or wait for improvements from outside influences. If the initial intent of the “30 minute” wording was to ensure continued operation after complete loss of oil from the MGB, the only thing that will address the issue (outside of an escape clause) is to have an ELS system installed. If back during original Certification the “extremely remote” argument was presented, and accepted, therefore removing the obligation for an ELS system to be fitted, ok lesson learned, but what about the current situation, i.e. if you do the math again on Occurrence vs. Total fleet hours it would seem to be a substantial change from “extremely remote” based on actual operations , which could possibly be interpreted as additional risk ? Lesson learned ? Who is going to do anything about it – FAA ? SAC ? TC ? With a TSB report pending ?
I’d say the only mandated Authority who could force the issue to be addressed starting right now regarding NL offshore operations (given the silence from the other regulators, or unless FAA were to issue a new amendment to FAR29 enforcing a minimum run dry time with no escape clause), is CNLOPB, if there was enough industry and/or political pressure to do so.
.......there is an office way, way up top, not exactly in an ivory tower, but in that great tall building up on the hill in St. John’s, wherein may lie the answer – unconventional maybe but if you want some real action ?..........
p.s. while you’re at it, push for a lot more than 30 minutes – Flemish Pass is a long ways off !!
Best practices are only best until somebody decides to do it better !:ok:

[maxwelg2]

I suspect that a multitude of lessons will be learnt by all in the industry when the AAIB publish their report.

Hilife, it will be the TSB who release their findings, not the AAIB.

On the main S-92 thread there is more specific feedback on various other issues such as increased vibration levels noted by PAX on the two flights preceding 491. I wonder if any HUMS thresholds were exceeded, I'm hopeful that the TSB will release this type of data in their report if relevant.

Madrock, I'm on the flight path in my St. John's East End house, strange hearing the loud S-92 rotor noise yet again knowing that these are not test flights but "back to normal" flight operations.

As this thread is about Cougar and Bond -what now, my take is that for Cougar at least it's back to flying, but hopefully keeping a real close eye on the MGB lube oil instruments and being ready to land immediately if/when the situation arises. That's the only hard lesson learned right now over here. For Bond all seems to be quiet, I'm assuming that when more hard facts are available there will be more discussion, hopefully pro-active with positive impact on that helo's perceived safety ranking.

For both Grand Banks and Flemish Pass flights we should be pushing for better flight suits and SS6 capability, these are both possible with currently available equipment and would give us PAX an improved safety/survival margin. IMO the UK is still streets ahead of us with the Shark flight suit.

Until the S-92 MGB design is improved IMHO there will be no change in this helo's safety ranking. Hopefully additional diligence by the maintenance crew and pilots will prevent future stud failures until the design is over-engineered and an additional safety factor is incorporated. What will it take for this to happen, well unfortunately more than likely the unthinkable...

Max

[madrock]

max -
the HUEBA's you're now using - are they the high pressure bottle type ? Do they stay on the helo or go with the suit or transfer at heli-admin ?

[heli1]

Hate to tell you MAXWELG2 but according to Sikorsky ( Globe and Mail ) the MGB redesign is only for the military version of the S-92 , not the civil variant.

[maxwelg2]

Madrock, the HUEBA's are the removeable type that attach to the LH breast pocket on the E-452 Nautilus suits. To my knowledge you get issued them with your suit at Cougar and then hand them over with your PLB to heli-admin offshore at your final destination. They require a 3-hour in the pool training session at the princely fee of $475, and the refresher training on them is added to the BST-R. I've still to do mine, but you apparently get a quick briefing on them at Cougar. From the townhall safety briefing I attended offshore on these, you'll get between 10 and 30 breaths out of one depending on many variables (lung capacity, fitness level, etc) as they're basically a mini SCUBA set.

heil1, yep, I'm fully aware of Sikorsky's current stance wrt. the CH-148 MGB re-design for compliance with the current Canadian military contractual requirements only, but the common theme here is pilot & PAX survival, whether it be from a hot zone or an unforgiving marine environment, so IMO the re-design should be applicable to both models.

For our specific civilian use in the Grand Banks, an additional 30-minute dry-run time would improve safety options, e.g. fly back to base/nearest heli-deck, but we should still have SS6 to allow for a ditching scenario, plus better flight suits. The HUEBA is a step in the right direction for S-92a land immediately scenarios as they can improve cold-shock survivability if used properly, much better than the old Shark rebreathers we used to use in the North Sea.

[sooperscoop]

I've done the HUEBA course in Halifax and it's 30 mins in the pool, two dunks, once with the mouthpiece in and once with it stowed. They just dunk you in a chair contraption, not the simulator.

The E-492 suit is so tight around the mouth I found it it less than easy to get the mouthpiece in, not that it matters to me because like 50% of anyone who wears it, I've never been able to fully zip it up while sat down, not once.

I heard a rumour that a redesigned suit is in the works, with a lighter lining and a new hood/seal arrangement. I hope they fix the nose clips too, they seem to be for a 5 year old, and they are much more necessary when using the HUEBA.

At least we have Sable Island to put down on if it goes awry, I guess.

[madrock]

ss -
....great suit design, guess it's the old "now don't you worry it meets the standard" mentality? What's the drill re. zipper/hoods-up in N.S. - up for t/o & landing ?
Interesting they'd put you in the military "hotseat" for the HUEBA training not the sim. - they tell you the reason why ? depth ?

[sooperscoop]

madrock - Yeah, zip up for t/o & landing. I'm guessing they use the chair for safety & ease - only takes 2 instructors and only your head and shoulders are underwater. I'm in NL next week, it'll be interesting to see the differences.

[madrock]

TS - try the S-92 thread, post # 1595.

[Flyt3est]

So, for the S-92 why not give us SS6

The aircraft has a SS6 Emergency Flotation system as an option, SS5 standard.

Cougar do not have SS6 as far as I know. (Sponson Floats)

I hasten to add, they aren't the only ones not to have it. Interestingly the North Sea boys do have it for the most part.

[sox6]

From Flightglobal


Heavies are the future, says Barry Clouter, regional director for the Americas. As oil and gas reserves go dry, oil companies are looking to deeper waters that only the heavy helicopters can reach, although some contracts are not renewedand others are not bid for.

It has been six years since this strategy led CHC to sell off the contracts and flights that got it started. The forestry, mining and oil and gas contracts in Canada requiring medium and light helicopters are now under the separate company Canadian Helicopters.

That leaves only one base in Nova Scotia (http://maps.google.co.uk/maps?hl=en&q=nova+scotia&ie=UTF8&z=6&iwloc=A)keeping Canadian flights aloft for CHC.

"We want to grow the Canadian side of this company," says Clouter. "There are opportunities off Newfoundland. There are opportunities off Greenland in the Labrador Sea." Those resources are mostly untouched and promising, he says.