Nimrod Grounded [Archive]

airsound

9th Mar 2009, 15:42

Thought I'd try and find the words from the horse's mouth. Eventually, after much unsuccessful and frustrating searching of MoD/RAF sites, found this, lurking in 'Equipment and Logistics News'

Ministry of Defence | Defence News | Equipment and Logistics | Nimrods requiring safety modifications to temporarily cease flying (http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/EquipmentAndLogistics/NimrodsRequiringSafetyModificationsToTemporarilyCeaseFlying. htm)

Noted that neither the coroner nor the inquest was mentioned.

Also, in the Minister for the Armed Forces' statement, he says
....in order that the risks involved in operating the aircraft remain tolerable and as low as reasonably practicable,.....
I wasn't aware the the risks had become ALARP - they were admitted as not being so at the inquest. Are we to take it that they now are, despite the fact that the modifications have not been completed?

Or have I missed something?

Edited to say - obviously I did miss DV's observation of ALARP being declared so soon after the inquest. Sorry.
airsound

Shack37

9th Mar 2009, 15:51

I wasn't aware the the risks had become ALARP - they were admitted as not being so at the inquest. Are we to take it that they now are, despite the fact that the modifications have not been completed?

Or have I missed something?

Other than the politician economy/truth equation, don't think you've missed anything.

s37

Distant Voice

9th Mar 2009, 16:31

I have now read Bob Ainsworth statement, and once again he dances around safety. If these modifications are needed in order that the risks remain "tolerable and as low as reasonably practicable", (safe), then without them the aircraft can not be SAFE. And because these defective ducts have been known about since 2005 then the aicraft was not safe in Sept 2006.

DV

FATTER GATOR

9th Mar 2009, 19:07

There are a few hundred aircrew (all volunteers) at Kinloss who are in the know on this matter. We all climb the steps to go flying, week-in and week-out. We don't lose sleep over Nimrod flying and we aren't scared of it.

The measures put in place since that dreadful day have worked and I take great comfort in the fact that airworthiness is constantly being assessed and the findings acted upon.

We still have a very important job to do and will keep doing so until the MR2 is relieved of duty by the MRA4.:ok:

phutbang

9th Mar 2009, 19:29

and also on the MoD site as of today...THIS REPORT (http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/95A1FA79-E5B9-4725-9D30-16A064CC9C9E/0/NimrodMRMk2GeneralConditionSurveyReport.pdf)

drustsonoferp

9th Mar 2009, 21:13

I think there is a fairly widespread misconception on this forum that there is one certifiable level of risk that can be defined as ALARP. The practicable part of the acronym allows for timely work.

If, for example a fault was found with fleet wide ramifications for any airliner you care to think of, the chances are the entire fleet of hundreds of aircraft would not be grounded, but given a suitable timescale to effect a modification. In the case of the RAF, faults which require immediate rectification will in effect ground the aircraft until rectified, whereas those deemed acceptable within a given timeframe will be given that time for rectification and afterwards would be grounded until the work was complete.

Continuing to operate with a level of risk that is understood and tolerated within banded limits, whilst working towards a higher standard is reasonable whilst remaining practicable.

Biggus

9th Mar 2009, 21:36

So who decides the timeframe, and on what basis....

airsound

9th Mar 2009, 21:54

I think there is a fairly widespread misconception on this forum that there is one certifiable level of risk that can be defined as ALARP. The practicable part of the acronym allows for timely work.
That may be true, drustsoe, but I was present at the inquest when the IPT Leader (holder of the airworthiness delegation for the MR2) confirmed to the coroner, on oath, that the MR2 risks were not ALARP because of the state of the fuel couplings and the hot air ducts.

These risks were not expected to become ALARP until the end of 2008. But apparently, the RAF decided only about a week after the inquest that the risks were, after all, ALARP.

But now we discover that these modifications have not been made to all aircraft - and will not be completed until “early summer”. In the meantime, some of the fleet, but not all, will be “temporarily withdrawn”.

Not only that, but Mr Ainsworth seems to have chosen a very, shall we say, untransparent, not to say opaque, way of announcing this in a written statement well concealed in the ministry’s publication processes.

With the best will in the world, doesn’t that all smell a bit fishy?

airsound

Wensleydale

9th Mar 2009, 22:43

I wonder if the date I heard on the news of 31 Mar is a coincidence, or has something to do with a new financial year. It is always the way of IPTs that work goes ahead at the start of a new year!

Mr Point

9th Mar 2009, 23:45

The work has been going on for months and DOES NOT start on 1st April. As has already been stated, aircrew at Kinloss have known about this for months but political interference has muddied the water regarding the rigidity of the date for completion.

Only aircraft that have not completed the hot air duct replacement programme cannot be flown. The 31st March is not a magical date beyond which the aircraft is not safe, this is a date that has been forced on the Kinloss engineering staff to have the work completed by.

Although this has not always been the case in recent years, aircrew at Kinloss are being kept up to speed with the engineering situation. Sky News announced to the world that "the Nimrod is grounded" due to "fuel seals that brought down a Nimrod in 2006". I am announcing that Sky News does not have a clue what is going on with the safety or engineering programmes of the Nimrod.

I believe that the media can have a very important role to play in exposing political malpractice, but ill-informed and poorly researched reporting gives all journalists a bad name.

sumps

9th Mar 2009, 23:53

...and just out of shear intrigue...whats going to take its place in the mean time?

Self Loading Freight

10th Mar 2009, 00:22

I believe that the media can have a very important role to play in exposing political malpractice, but ill-informed and poorly researched reporting gives all journalists a bad name.

To whom should a journalist talk, then, to avoid being ill-informed and poorly researching their stories? Official or unofficial channels? Who would you trust enough to tell the truth, that you'd tell it to them?

R

JessTheDog

10th Mar 2009, 09:19

My question is this:

Have unmodified aircraft been flying, and if so, why have they been grounded at this particular time? Is there an engineering reason, or a political reason?

I have the greatest respect for those who fly in these airframes, based on past experience and especially since the XV230 tragedy. However, as we all know, there have been many failings identified in airframe and equipment procurement and maintenance which have led directly to the loss of lives. Hence the widespread cynicism and distrust.

EdSett100

10th Mar 2009, 17:59

Hi Jess:Have unmodified aircraft been flying, and if so, why have they been grounded at this particular time? Is there an engineering reason, or a political reason?
The HP air pipe replacement program is borne out of an incident on XV227 in Nov 04, when an SCP pipe burst and nearly caused the loss of that aircraft. Among many of the recommendations in the subsequent investigation report was a requirement for all HP air pipes on a selection of aircraft to be examined for condition and then a lifing and maintenance policy be considered depending on the outcome of the examinations. BAeS carried out the work and they found some areas of concern in both the crossfeed pipe and the engine bays. They suggested a pipe life which was less than the existing age of all the pipes in service (except the SCP pipework; already replaced). Given that BAeS are also the design authority, the RAF had no alternative but to immeditely declare all of the pipes on all of the aircraft as LIFEX at that time. But, we didn't have spare pipes and we didn't have the manpower, so it was declared that we will change them all before 31 Mar 09. Thats the politics.

Regarding the safety side of this subject, use of the SCP and the crossfeed pipe in the air is prohibited and those pipes are at low temperature and depressurized in flight. The pipes in the engine zones remain in daily use, without any restrictions, and become more vulnerable to failure as each day passes and they are doubtless a growing hazard. However, and this is a very important point, those pipes are monitored by hot air leak detectors, instrumentation, a fire warning and suppresant system and the crew have robust drills to deal with even the most explosive failure. The worst case failure will result in an engine being shut down by the crew (not an engine fire or failure). This robust mitigation reduces the risk of losing the aircraft, due to a pipe failure, to a neglible level. We are more at risk of crashing due to birds, fuel contamination or pilot error than an HP pipe failure. Consequently, the impending grounding is not a flight safety issue at all. All the aircrew know this.

Having stated that all the pipes on all the aircraft will be replaced before 31 Mar 09, the IPT is worried that if a pipe fails in flight after that date, regardless of any drill that will successfully and safely deal with it, that they, the IPT, will be seen to have been negligent with airworthiness. Therefore, those aircraft without the new pipes will not fly on or after 1 April. Unfortunately, we will not have enough aircraft with new pipes to meet all of the tasks. The task that will drop off is the overseas operational one.

So, its a polical issue within the IPT to ground some aircraft. IMHO its a flawed decision to ground them, for these self serving reasons within the IPT, when those aircraft are all needed. Soldiers on the ground will suffer due to the absence of the Nimrod. I despair that the IPT, having been briefed ad nauseum that the aircraft is not at risk of a catestrophic or critical failure, is allowed to do this to the troops in theatre. They risk a bullet in the head and we risk an engine-out on an overpowered aircraft. Someone needs to re-think his risk analysis.

Ed Sett

Distant Voice

10th Mar 2009, 19:12

Hi EdSett, good to see you back on this and the other thread.

It is true that the duct replacement program stems from the incident involving XV277, but the statement from BAES that certain ducts within the system were "life expired" goes back to June 2005, in is not a recent event. MOD did not accept that there was a problem until early 2008, almost 3 years later. Between June 2005 and 2nd Sept 2006, Nimrods flew with the cross-feed duct activated and with "life expired" ducting in the system. Since then Nimrods have continued to fly with suspect parts of the hot air system.

The completion date of 31st May, 2009, was set by the Nimrod IPTL at the inquest, when he agreed that the system was not ALARP, but he was moving towards it. I am not surprised that IPT do not want to go beyond this point, because if it is not ALARP it is not safe.

With regards to the hazard risks in the engine bay and wing areas, I must ask if you have had time to read up on Hazard H66 and the QinetiQ report of Feb 2008. (We have talked about this on the other thread).

Finally, detectors, fire suppression etc do not mitigate a hazard, they mitigate the accident. QinetiQ's words, not mine.

Regards DV

countdeblades

10th Mar 2009, 19:47

sumps...and just out of shear intrigue...whats going to take its place in the mean time?

If you have to ask do you really need to know?

tucumseh

10th Mar 2009, 20:24

Ed Sett

Given that BAeS are also the design authority, the RAF had no alternative but to immeditely declare all of the pipes on all of the aircraft as LIFEX at that time.

I’m afraid this rather gives the impression MoD always listens to the DA (or DC) and acts on their engineering advice. Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, the refusal to listen has in the past been directly linked to other accidents. Furthermore, and far worse, senior staffs and Ministers have consistently ruled that non-engineers can over-rule decisions to heed such engineering advice and are permitted to sign-off on contracts knowing the design is unsafe.

In this case, it would seem the IPT has listened and, regardless of the underlying reasons, I applaud them.

Hot 'n' High

10th Mar 2009, 20:49

Distant Voice,

if it is not ALARP it is not safe

That is a slightly erroneous statement – though I think I understand what you are trying to say. However, your use of the word “safe” as an absolute term is incorrect. “Safety”, however quantified (HRI for example) is a range. Absolute safety is simply not possible – hence someone defining ALARP which is deemed as safe as "reasonably practicable" – i.e. the best we can do given funding, value of life etc, etc. In simple terms, you get

100% Unsafe
Watch out!
V
V
V
V
ALARP
Best we can do.
V
100% Safe
The Holy Grail!

where the ALARP position is shifted as far down as we can get it given funding, blah, blah, blah! Therefore, if something is not ALARP, it is just not as safe is it could be; it is slightly above the old ALARP position. It’s not a question that it is now magically “unsafe”, it is just less safe, or, rather, in this case, probably a greater risk of ocurrance than the previous ALARP position.

Just because something is deemed to be at ALARP does not make it 100% safe. You just will be less likely to be sued in Court because you can demonstrate that you have done as much as you could practicably be expected to do! By how much less safe it is (i.e. how far up has the point moved) requires a futher Risk review - possibly using existing data - reposition the ALARP point - and justify that.

I am not surprised that IPT do not want to go beyond the TL's stated point because they would then have to justify why they moved what they effectively defined as part of the ALARP criteria in the first case; in other words they would need to justify the shift in what was considered ALARP. Or, perhaps, "politically" the TL made a statement which they feel they are honour-bound to adhere to without any recourse to "scientific consideration"! I don’t know the details so I won’t comment further.

Anyway, hope that has helped vis-a-vie the if it is not ALARP it is not safe statement!

Cheers, H ‘n’ H

Distant Voice

10th Mar 2009, 21:56

H 'n' H; I am using the definition as stated in MOD Def Stan 00-56, which states that for a system to be safe the risk has been demonstrated to be tolerable and ALARP. So clearly, if it is not ALARP it is not safe. MOD's definition not mine.

DV

nigegilb

10th Mar 2009, 22:11

Keep it Tidy;

"This is not new news this has been planned for months,did get a scare when it was plastered all over the news fleet is grounded !!!

This reduction in numbers has been on cards for a long time and this is the date we all knew it was going to happen. Nothing new about this except and official release from Defence secretary."

KIT is absolutely right. I was told about this decision months ago. Nobody has mentioned the new ALARP plus standard which I was also made aware of, months ago.

Stand by for the long awaited report by the QC. These events are not unrelated.

Hot 'n' High

10th Mar 2009, 22:37

DV,

Safe - Risk has been demonstrated to have been reduced to a level that is ALARP and broadly acceptable or tolerable, and relevant prescriptive safety requirements have been met, for a system in a given application in a given operating environment.

Agreed that is the definition in 00-56 (I think I have the latest definition!) – which, in itself, I would suggest is incorrect! :eek: The description better defines the following phrase – “Acceptably Unsafe”! Substitute the word “Safe” with “Acceptably Unsafe” and have a read and you will see. Effectively, the MoD agrees to accept that part of the Risk beneath the ALARP point (see el cheapo diagram in my last post!) as “life”. In a Court, that is what you are banking on them agreeing as that is the acid test! Above the ALARP point and you are now “Unacceptably Unsafe” and you can safely assume a Court will agree amd go to town for as much as they can sting you!

What the MoD are actually are saying is that, if it strays above the original ALARP point, the MoD cannot justify the additional Risk in Court without a proper reassessment/redefinition of the new ALARP point - at which point they can then take the additional risk - and hope the Court will agree. Clearly, common sense (looking after crews, hardware, bystanders etc) has a huge part to play but, in deciding what is ALARP, at the end of the day, you have to convince a Judge/Jury! Thank the Americans for that I guess! :ugh:

Point taken that you were using the 00-56 definition – my point is that we should all become slightly more adept in the use of Risk Management terminology – and change Def Stans where they are incorrect. Such situations (Def Stans etc being incorrect/behind the times) has been known! :eek: On many occasions!!! :eek: :eek:

I know what you were trying to say – and perhaps I am being picky – but not to score points – maybe just help evolve the art of RM in the world! :ok: And for my next trick, there is a Damsel who is about to be eaten by a lion in darkest Africa – H ‘n’ H is needed there!

Rgds, H 'n' H

tucumseh

11th Mar 2009, 06:31

It is important to understand the definitions, but practical Risk Management always boils down to human factors - the willingness of people to notify risks, the ability to classify them correctly, of the Risk Manager to allocate tasks and for those charged with mitigation to carry them out.

Ask ANY Risk Manager in DE&S, or what was PE, AMSO, AML, DLO or DPA, if he/she was given the correct resources and, equally important, the support of his line management AND all other stakeholders; most will laugh. The last time I called a RM Committee on a major programme, nobody turned up, having been told not to. Upon recommending to a senior officer that we should perhaps recognise major safety risks and mitigate them, his answer was “You’re beginning to grate” and, as I mentioned in my last post, continued to permit over-rules by unqualified staff.

The Nimrod 2 Star agreed with him.

nav attacking

11th Mar 2009, 07:31

DV, H'n'H and Tecumseh

Yet again you manage to turn the thread into a bicker over definitions of ALARP. Didn't you get it last time you did this on the XV230 thread, nobody else took part because it was BORING. Nobody is interested in a petty fight over definitions, unless you are a lawyer of course and stand to make some pretty large sums of money by convincing families it is worth fighting the MOD. Maybe you could start a thread about ALARP and its definition. You might just see how many people are interested in it! Better still I have started one for you!!

As current Nimrod aircrew we are ALL convinced that we are now operating an ageing aircraft as safe as we can possibly be otherwise we wouldn't venture onto the old lady, we do still have some choice in the matter. These arguments about whether she is SAFE or UNSAFE only cause anguish and pain for the families of those who still operate the aircraft. For :mad: sake take your argument elsewhere, preferably by PM.

The biggest question that should be asked by everyone is - Why did the MOD decided to release this information before the event?

Crews are still flying unmodified aircraft at home and more to the point in theatre. The timing of this press release just shows a total lack of sensitivity towards the families and people flying them, yet again. The plan has always been in place to recall the jet from theatre before the end of March because the work was supposed to have been done by then, and numbers of modified ac are too low to support higher priority commitments back home. So why not wait until the last aircraft is back home and the non modified aircraft are grounded before announcing the fact. It would have saved a lot of very awkward questions being asked by anxious families such as " why are you still flying in an unsafe aircraft?".

We could still be continuing our support to theatre if it had not have been for a very misguided statement from a Minister (shock horror surely not!:ooh:) last year when he stated that the work on the fuel seals and hot air ducts would be complete by 31 Mar 09. Better still the Minister could have actually apologised for a poor decision and allowed a extension so the in-theatre aircraft could continue to support our troops on the ground, I wouldn't have held my breath for that though.

The aircraft doesn't turn into a pumpkin at midnight on 31 Mar 09 and could still be operated in a safe manner as it is now TFN whilst modifications continue. Maybe they thought that the Shadow R1 would be around by now, or that all the Pred that we bought would still be flying. The old lady is still a very capable platform, albeit old and ageing, and still provides vital information for the ground commanders who are still crying out for more ISTAR.

I hope that the Taleban are as accommodating and will agree to a lull in their operations at the same time or a Minister may just have blood on his hands. Maybe the lawyers would relish persuing that claim as well.

Distant Voice

11th Mar 2009, 08:12

Nav Attacking, you said the problem has been caused by:a very misguided quote from a minister

Sorry, you are wrong. The date was made public by Gp Cpt Hickman (IPTL) at the inquest last May.

Before you give subjective statements about Nimrod safety, I suggets that you go away and read some relevant reports on the subject under discussion; namely ducts and seal. To start with there are 3 BEAS reports, a QineiQ report on hazard H66 and several on FRS couplings.

DV

Hot 'n' High

11th Mar 2009, 08:13

Sorry Nav Attacking, you are indeed entirely justified and correct in your moan and I stand suitably chastised! It is very boring - but this whole thing is caused by senior staffs, who are out of their depth, playing at RM rather than doing it!

All I will say is that, for the guys and gals trying to provide you guys and gals with the kit to do your job in relative safety, so you can provide the service to those you are tasked to look after/take out (depends on who they are that bit!), it is very frustrating. This is down to senior staff who demand we use a given system, then (as DV says) don’t provide the resources (or even personal support) to get the job done properly. Then, and this is your point and mine, they seemingly arbitrarily remove a capability based on the fact that they are Senior Officers/Ministers who came up with a seemingly random date in the first place – nothing more scientific than that!

Your comment about anguish and pain (ie confusion) for the families is very relevant, and is generated, in the main, by the MoDs total inability at a Corporate level (I’m definitely not having a go at the RM “worker bees” here) to accurately and consistently explain and manage Safety (see para above for reasons why!). So, when Senior Officers are caught sweeping issues under the carpet they, as a result, totally over-react to protect their 6 o’clocks, spouting all sorts of Safety-related rubbish to “demonstrate” just how keen they are to protect people like you and all the others affected by your work! No wonder people are confused and worried! Muppetry is hard to hide – it tends to shine out!

Major Bloodknock was such an accurate character! Sums up so many AD’s and above. Many good guys up there – but, boy, are there some “politicians” up there too. And we all know what “politicians” are like! Thank heavens I'm out of it. Rant over!

H 'n' H

PS. Like the idea of an ALARP "playpen"! Think I will give it a miss tho as, you are right, it is boring! ;)

Sideshow Bob

11th Mar 2009, 08:21

Distant Voice,
Before you give subjective statements about Nimrod safety, I suggets that you go away and read some relevant reports on the subjust under discussion; namely ducts and seal. To start with there are 3 BEAS reports, a QineiQ report on hazard H66 and several on FRS couplings.
Before you start berating the aircrew that actually fly the aircraft, why don't you get off your REMF arse, go somewhere else and stop boring the hell out of all of use with your superior knowledge of engineering reports and practices. I used to fly the aircraft, my friends still fly the aircraft, some of my friends died flying the aircraft. People like you tend to forget the human side to these things. You sit in your nice safe world, scoring points off each other, proving your superior intellect, whilst the rest of us have to get on with the job of dealing with these things in the real world and still get the job done.

Nav Attacking,
ou said the "S" word better look out the window and see if the Black Vauxhall is here LOL :ok:

Distant Voice

11th Mar 2009, 09:42

Sideshow Bob;

Sorry if you see it that way, but it is not my intention to berat aircrew. It has always been my aim to ensure that the crews who fly the aircraft are made aware of what the true state of the aicraft is, as seen by specialist such as BAEs, QinetiQ and Eaton Aerospace. This is what I have tied to get across on this thread. However, it has been my expirence whilst posting information on pprune that there some aircrew members who simply do not want to know. I once likened this attitude to the man who believes he has cancer, but is afraid to go to the doctor to have it confirmed. He would rather carry on in the belief that he must be OK because he is still alive.

The crew of XV230 believed their aircraft was safe, because no one had told them of ducting that had been declared "life expired and should be replaced" in June 2005. The crew of XV235 believed their aircraft was safe, because no one had told them about fuel line alignment tolerances and the distortion of seals. And of course no one is telling you that hazard H66 has a risk index of "A" (catastrophic/occasional). This according to the Nimrod Safety Case in an INTOLERABLE tisk.

Finally, your claim that I forget the human side is far from the truth, as I am sure you will discover one day.

DV

Ivan Rogov

11th Mar 2009, 10:27

FWIW I appreciate almost all the comments (technical, engineering, etc.) on the MR2 threads, except those who seem to take it on themselves to speak for me or tell me what to think. By all means give information, explain technical aspects and pass your opinions if you want, but please try to refrain from personal attacks and telling people what to think. I have my own views on the subjects but recognise that it would be inappropriate to post them on the WWW.

Having read most of the threads relating to the MR2 (and the C130) it is obvious that Airworthiness/Flight Safety/Procurement etc. should be proactive and not reactive. I believe that it is currently (generally), that is why I am willing to continue flying. Nigegilb, I think many have forgotten about the QCs report, hope it's worth the time taken on it.

Serving members walk a fine line when posting on any work related subject. Due to our current knowledge, giving information or asking pointed questions is not a good idea and could well end up with a witch hunt, official or otherwise. Many of us will not post in any detail on here, so to the guys/girls that do please be professional and consider carefully whether you are being helpful or just venting your spleen. Before clicking submit, imagine you are in a room with the people you are posting to, would you speak to them like that?

Stay safe everyone :ok:

nigegilb

11th Mar 2009, 10:30

OK, seeking clarification here on the word that shall not be said, for fear of upsetting some Nimrod crews and engineers on the front line- ALARP.

I was pulled aside a few months ago and told that the risks on Nimrod at that time were considered to comply with the ALARP standard and that as of March 31 2009 a new standard would be complied with ALARP PLUS for want of a better description.

I read this thread and I am now wondering if that accurately refects the last few months. EDSett please put me out of my misery? I am only interested in the official party line, not what others, described as REMFS might consider to be ALARP. Specifically, do you on the front line think you have been flying/maintaining an ALARP aircraft for the last few months, or one that is moving towards the ALARP standard. If you don't care, then please don't bother replying to my question. The word, from on high and repeated by the Minister, backed up by Industry was that Nimrod was ALARP throughout this period.

Further to my heads up, I was also told that Nimrod might be grounded sooner, if the QCs report were to hit the streets. It would appear that not everyone agrees on the ALARP standard as it applies to Nimrod.

b377

11th Mar 2009, 10:44

whats going to take its place in the mean time?

The RAF could opt to hire fully crewed surveillence planes from the Americans, French or Italians. Nimrod is ugly and by no means unique in its attrubutes other than being unsafe.

Ivan Rogov

11th Mar 2009, 10:50

DV excellent analogy, like hiding under the duvet rather than seeing what that noise was, I believe it is also a river in Africa?

Hi Nige, I thought the MR2 was working towards ALARP with a cut off of date of 31 MAR 09 for airframes to comply?
BTW thanks for all the hard work you do representing us from the outside, it is a sign of the times that we need people like yourself lobbying the MOD etc. to make things happen. :D

nigegilb

11th Mar 2009, 11:00

Hi Ivan, there is a bit more work to do on other aircraft types, I have had a few months off, but am just about to get stuck in again!

My question was genuine, I was told that this work was peripheral to the question of achieving ALARP and that the considered view, was that some of the evidence presented at the Inquest was inaccurate, for another want of a better word.

I note that there have been several changes of personnel since the Inquest, both military and civilian. It is not for me to speculate why.....

Gp Capt L Mandrake

11th Mar 2009, 11:02

Distant Voice telegram for you:

If you are so concerned why not identify yourself and the position of authority from which you appear to speak.....STOP

Do you honestly think that the crews flying the aircraft would get onto the jet if they were not convinced it was safe to do so....STOP

If you are so intent on making sure the crews have not had the wool pulled over their eyes why not use a more public vehicle than pprune in which to air your concerns.....STOP

Why don't you just....STOP

Regards

Distant Voice

11th Mar 2009, 11:29

Nige, just re-read Gp Cpt Hickman's (Nimrod IPTL) statement at the inquest:

Hickman: Yes. I am stating that the aircraft is tolerably safe but is not yet ALARP because there are a number of measures we have yet to take to reduce the risk to as low as reasonably praciticable, we have not taken them yet.

Coroner: What are these other matters, these areas you have not taken yet?

Hickman: There are several, but the major ones are the semi fuel coupling inspection and replacement has to be conducted on every aircraft. In addition, we want to replace the hot air ducts that are still used, that are still hot, and have not been switched off. Now, these are the measures we need to take to reduce the risk and we have not taken them yet and therefore we are not ALARP.

So clearly, without the modidifications the aircraft is not ALARP.

DV

Sideshow Bob

11th Mar 2009, 11:32

Distant Voice,

Firstly let me apologise for my outburst this morning, having received a message pointing out who you are I know you have the crews best intentions at heart and perhaps I am a little too close to the coal face to be able to take a step back at times. I do believe though that your reply to Nav Attacking was a little curt and dismissive, especially as it was directed at current Nimrod Aircrew.

Distant Voice

11th Mar 2009, 11:41

Sideshow Bob;

Thank you, and no offence taken.

DV

nigegilb

11th Mar 2009, 11:45

DV, I am aware of what Hickman said at the Inquest. I am also aware that some evidence presented to the Inquest is considered to be inaccurate. Check out what the Minister said after the Inquest. We are being asked to effectively discount what Hickman said and consider this work to be applicable to ALARP plus standard.

At least this is how it was described to me by a credible source.

Is Hickman still in post?

airsound

11th Mar 2009, 12:05

We are being asked to effectively discount what Hickman said
An interesting twist, Nige. If I understand you correctly, the MoD is effectively rewriting history, since whatever the Gp Capt said at the inquest was said under oath, to HM Coroner. What he said clearly influenced the coroner's findings.

I wonder what else that was said in that legally constituted courtroom is being 'discounted' - and by what right.

airsound

nigegilb

11th Mar 2009, 12:15

Yes, perhaps I should clarify my own post. I understand that some of the evidence presented to the Coroner was considered by the RAF/MoD to be inaccurate. Quite whether the RAF/MoD have informed the Coroner of any alleged inaccuracy I have no idea. Quite why the RAF/MoD did not send an even more knowledgeable/senior witness to correct any alleged inaccuracy I can only guess. From my experience of these things it is most useful, from the Ministry's point of view, to keep the damage away from the higher military echelons and God forbid, the Politicians.

Damage limitation?

KeepItTidy

11th Mar 2009, 12:52

I just find it strange the word ALARP is always used, Flying is never safe and things will always happen. The checks on Nimrod these days im surprised they ever get airborne as it takes so long to get one ready for flying .
Its just a shame the poor guys on the ground will now be without a good bit of kit above them. I guess now there ALARP status on the ground will change too or is ALARP only allowed on aircraft. Im sure they will have to take risks without top cover to carry on there job which Im sure is about 1000 times more dangerous that flying safely at altitude.

Hot 'n' High

11th Mar 2009, 13:21

Ivan Rogov,

consider carefully whether you are being helpful or just venting your spleen

Being well clear of the MoD, I hope my “rant” at Post #36 simply outlines what was, and from my contacts, appears still to be the norm within the MoD as a whole. It is really a mix of a cultural and knowledge issues when it comes to RM. I hope none of what I have said has been taken as a personal attack on anyone on the Nimrod team. I don’t know them (or the details of this case) so could not/would not comment on the decisions taken in this case – even if I did know. Besides, those who knew H ‘n’ H in the Mil were well aware that if something needed saying, it got said. Blew my promotion prospects to hell :\ but, as one AD once said “at least I know he will tell me what I don’t want to hear … but, sadly, I need to hear!” :ok:

I guess all we all want to achieve is a robust Safety Case for a platform to enable the crews to conduct their tasks in relative safety. This is an ongoing cultural and knowledge change throughout the procurement/support chain. A lack of real knowledge-based cultural support to RM in the MoD means that, either we miss the simple opportunities to improve levels of safety or, unnecessarily, we artificially restrict capability because it seems that to assess the situation is too difficult. Everyone is trying (some just to save their skins – again, no link to the Nim IPT intended here!) and it will get better.

KeepItTidy - There will be a link to the Risk Assessment for those on the ground - but that should be included in any withdrawal of capability decision - and may also be mitigated by operational changes on the ground. No further comment there! Also, the "A" word is used precisely because flying will never be 100% safe. Therefore, we need to make sure it is acceptably safe. Again, end of that (see my noddy diagram in my first post if you want). Any more on ALARP and I'll be sent to the "ALARP Playpen" by Nav Attacking so I'm off!!!! :O

Hopefully not too many effigies of H ‘n’ H have been constructed and I’ll leave the specifics of this topic to those in the “know”! Thankfully, not my problem – but would still like to see things improve – particularly for the guys and gals currently being shot at in sunnier climes!

As Ivan wisely says, Stay Safe!!! H ‘n’ H

Sideshow Bob

11th Mar 2009, 13:26

KeepItTidy,
As it says in the Press Release, there will be assets available to the guys on the ground, one being a new(ish) system being introduced under a UOR. We always said, when we first started this role back in 2001 and again when we deployed to PSAB for the Iraq war with the new camara (which my crew nearly lost due to bracket failure during the first sortie), you don't need a crew of 13 to operate a flying camara, we pushed for min crew whilst in arms way, but were told to put up and shut up

airsound

11th Mar 2009, 13:42

Its just a shame the poor guys on the ground will now be without a good bit of kit above them. I guess now there ALARP status on the ground will change too or is ALARP only allowed on aircraft. Im sure they will have to take risks without top cover to carry on there job which Im sure is about 1000 times more dangerous that flying safely at altitude.
You're quite right, KIT, to remind us of the broader picture about why the airborne guys and gals are putting themselves in harm's way.

However, I think it's also worth remembering that the risks for troops on the ground come, at least partly, from the enemy.

On the other hand, the risks we're talking about on this thread are exclusively home grown, and have been shown to be due to failings on the part of officials, both civilian and military. Surely, we need to take all possible steps to minimise those risks.

airsound

nigegilb

11th Mar 2009, 14:14

KIT, anyone familiar with the previous thread will understand the commitment that is omnipresent on the front line. At the same time it has to be remembered that the loss of XV230 represents the greatest single loss of life to UKAF since the Falklands War. As Airsound has reminded us, the guys were not killed by the enemy, they were killed by a studied indifference to safety management which I view as negligent.

Us REMFs as we are so eloquently described are just as keen as you guys to prevent unnecessary loss of life. The hardened bods on the front line might not give a stuff about this legalise "nonsense", doesn't mean to say they are right.

I have an interest in issues regarding SH in Afg that is totally unconnected with XV230, but just wanted you to know that I do not have tunnel vision on this issue and I share your concerns about the protection of the guys on the ground.

Distant Voice

11th Mar 2009, 14:48

Nigegilb: You asked me to check out what the Minister said after the Inquest.

Of course we we all know the answer, he claimed that the aircraft was ALARP. His statement was based on the "Notes of Minutes from the Extra Ordinary Nimrod platform Equipment and Environmental Safety Working Group held on 4th Jun 08 in RM 044 Bazalgette Pavilion RAF Wyton"

The minutes indicate that "The Chairman asserted that, in principle, they (the IPT) were content that the risk is ALARP. However to substantiate this, the IPT agreed to produce an ALARP statement that formally identified the mitigation measures already taken to date and why they reduce the risk to ALARP"

The minutes go on to say that BAES stated that "Given that BAES has not been directly involved in all the factors leading to the statement that the system is ALARP we, BAES are unable to support the statement directly."

So we go from a statement from Gp Cpt Hickman on 21st May 2008 that the Aircraft is not ALARP, and will not be until specified ducts and seal are replaced, to a total reversal at a quickly arranged meeting less than two weeks later.

Clearly, the latter was damage limitation, and an attempt to discredit the inquest findings.

DV

airsound

11th Mar 2009, 15:02

Clearly, the latter was damage limitation, and an attempt to discredit the inquest findings.
I'm no lawyer, but might it not also be contempt of court?

airsound

KeepItTidy

11th Mar 2009, 15:03

"At the same time it has to be remembered that the loss of XV230 represents the greatest single loss of life to UKAF since the Second World War"

Well Im sure for the majority of families involved they are trying to remember in a good way , not to see this quote constantly splashed across every TV report/newspaper.

Either way thats not a personel dig at anyone , it just seems to be the same story everytime Nimrod is on the news. So much has happened that outways the bad press but needless to say that fails to make good press.

nigegilb

11th Mar 2009, 15:45

DV, the Defence Minister assured MPs at a Parliamentary meeting following the Inquest that BAeS fully supported the Govt view that Nimrod was ALARP. Perhaps BAeS should clarify the situation? Is Angus Robertson aware of your info? It is the first time I have seen this.
Certainly when I was given my mini-brief Iwas told that Industry concurred with the Govt line.

Tappers Dad

11th Mar 2009, 15:51

I think the argument as to if it is ALARP, Tolerable or whatever has been answer by Bob Ainsworth.

From the MOD website
Our technical experts have advised that in order that the risks involved in operating the aircraft remain tolerable and as low as reasonably practicable, no Nimrods should fly after 31 March 2009, unless their hot air ducts have been replaced.

Ergo after the 31st March they remain neither ALARP or Tolerable, otherwise they would continue to fly them. I understand from the media that the MOD are refusing to say how many of both types of Nimrods have had the modifications done. And will not say why those operating in the sand can't be replaced with Nimrods that have had there modifications completed.

I will leave you to draw your own conclusions. It does mean that a number of NImrods will be grounded , whoops I mean in maintenence when Mr Haddon Caves report comes out in early June. Are they hedging their bets ?

Distant Voice

12th Mar 2009, 21:27

I understand that only ONE Nimrod has been modified (ducts and seals), and a new series 10 seal is being used. What was wrong with the old series 1?

DV

EdSett100

12th Mar 2009, 23:32

I understand that only ONE Nimrod has been modified (ducts and seals), and a new series 10 seal is being used. What was wrong with the old series 1?It contains the wrong amount of carbon. I can't remember from the brief to aircrew if was too much or too little. Suffice to say, that a number of them have been found, on routine removal, to be split or similarly damaged due to incorrect carbon content. The damaged seals were not leaking at the time of discovery. Seems like the MOD was supplied with dud seals from the turn of the century. This adds weight to the probability of a fuel coupling leak on XV230, due to either misalignment (XV235 incident) or seal failure, rather than a 1 Tank blow-off.

EdSett100

13th Mar 2009, 01:02

DV:It is true that the duct replacement program stems from the incident involving XV277, but the statement from BAES that certain ducts within the system were "life expired" goes back to June 2005, in is not a recent event. MOD did not accept that there was a problem until early 2008, almost 3 years later. Between June 2005 and 2nd Sept 2006, Nimrods flew with the cross-feed duct activated and with "life expired" ducting in the system. Since then Nimrods have continued to fly with suspect parts of the hot air system.I wasn't aware that BAeS had inspected all of the HP air ducts and pronounced them lifex as early as Jun 05. Are you confusing the examination of the SCP system with the HP air system? The SCP system was certainly examined and declared dangerous the day after the XV227 incident, resulting in the immediate banning of its use. BAeS later (Jun 05?) confirmed the SCP was lifex.

The completion date of 31st May, 2009, was set by the Nimrod IPTL at the inquest, when he agreed that the system was not ALARP, but he was moving towards it. I am not surprised that IPT do not want to go beyond this point, because if it is not ALARP it is not safe. IMHO Your last few words are not quite correct. ALARP, in the context of Nimrod risk analysis refers to the degree of risk of losing the aircraft due to a hazard caused by a single failure. Hickmans use of the term "ALARP" was misplaced and has led to a lot of confusion. Yes, in terms of the hazard presented by the old ducts, the risk of a single failure was not as low as practicable. They are lifex and they need to be replaced and, arguably, it is practicable to change them at the first opportunity, hence it can be said that the risk of a duct failure is not as low as practicable until the duct is changed. But, importantly, that is only in reference to the ducts, NOT the AIRCRAFT. The risk to the aircraft, created by a single duct failure (for whatever reason, including lifex) can be mitigated by the structure around the ducts and well practised crew procedures. Granted, there were no crew drills for a duct failure in the bomb bay, due to a lack of detection capability, and that part of the system is now out of operation in the air. Therefore, although the duct failure risk is not as low as reasonably practicable, the risk to the aircraft of a catastrophic or critical failure is bordering on negligible due to mitigation. This high degree of mitigation provides the control required for safe operation even in the event of pipe burst at the most critical time. Therefore, regardless of what Hickman said at the inquest, there is no legal need to drive towards ALARP then, now, or in the future. A HP air duct might be about to fail, according to Qinetiq, but the structure and the crew can handle it, safely.

With regards to the hazard risks in the engine bay and wing areas, I must ask if you have had time to read up on Hazard H66 and the QinetiQ report of Feb 2008. (We have talked about this on the other thread).Yes, I read Hazard 66 some time ago, but the discussion was inactive and I thought it sensible to leave it so. Now, due to "Bob" its back in the headlines. I haven't been able to read Qinetiq's report, but I know the conclusion and I don't have any argument with it. It centres, quite rightly, on the age and condition of the pipework and they have upgraded the hazard accordingly. However, I'm led to believe that QQ did not comment on how the loss of the aircraft due to a pipe failure is mitigated by airframe structure, warnings and drills. Is there anything in H66 that you want to know more about? Please believe me, the loss of a hydraulic system (we have 5), an electric supply (we have 4), an air conditioning system (we have 2), and airframe de-icing system (we have 2; each capable of supplying everywhere) or a CDSU cooling pipe (I don't know why they mentioned that, but we have 4, anyway) an engine fuel fire (we have detection and extinguishants) all due to a single hot pipe failure is not a problem. Even our least experienced crews will deal with the problem very effectively. It has been practiced regularly since the day the aircraft first flew. Its a formal Basic Training Requirement to be able to deal with a hot pipe failure in an engine compartment. But it appears that Hickman doesn't want to account for our training in his narrow decision making process. On that basis, every max weight take off is dangerous because if an engine fails, the crew procedure is not accounted for as the only mitigation against a crash.

Meanwhile, the troops on the ground will not know where the next bullet is coming from. I wonder what the Army chiefs would think if they find out that we are not flying one their most valued air assets because we are "worried" about an insignificant problem.

Finally, detectors, fire suppression etc do not mitigate a hazard, they mitigate the accident. QinetiQ's words, not mine. Agreed. And to summarize, we can easily avoid the accident and we can live with pipe failures ad infinitum.

Regards
Ed Sett

nigegilb

13th Mar 2009, 05:49

Ed Sett, so do you agree with my summary that the AIRCRAFT has been ALARP these past few months and that the new standard WEF 01 Apr is effectively ALARP with bells and whistles-ALARP PLUS?

drustsonoferp

13th Mar 2009, 07:12

NigeYes, perhaps I should clarify my own post. I understand that some of the evidence presented to the Coroner was considered by the RAF/MoD to be inaccurate. Quite whether the RAF/MoD have informed the Coroner of any alleged inaccuracy I have no idea. Quite why the RAF/MoD did not send an even more knowledgeable/senior witness to correct any alleged inaccuracy I can only guess. From my experience of these things it is most useful, from the Ministry's point of view, to keep the damage away from the higher military echelons and God forbid, the Politicians.

There can be a world of difference between senior and well informed. The inquest put a lot of focus on seniority. Questioning on engineering that requires considered thought, close evaluation of documentation etc is not something best done with individual witnesses on the spot in a court room. It is an environment that, imho is almost guaranteed to give inaccurate results.

FrustratedFormerFlie

13th Mar 2009, 09:55

MOD admits only 1 Nimrod with modification completed (http://www.pressandjournal.co.uk/Article.aspx/1120826)

Article from Press and Journal (Aberdeen) 13 March

KeepItTidy

13th Mar 2009, 12:38

"The MoD is facing a £20million claim for compensation from relatives of those who were killed in the crash"

I shocked and in disbelief that the family members are after this sort of cash. I am in utter shock .. I will leave the keyboard now as I dont want to say anything I will regret ............ I really am astounded as I thought a substantial payout was done not so long after the crash but for a few more million each

Distant Voice

13th Mar 2009, 13:54

Ed Sett;

The June 2005 BAes report, to which I refer lists the following;

(a) 15 ducts - engine to cross feed cocks

(b) 12 ducts - between cross feed cocks

(c) 7 ducts - downstream of 5-way duct pressure reducing valve.

Note: Many of the above had already been identified in an earlier "quick look" report, dated 7th Jan 2005.

Ducts listed under (a) and (b) are now being replaced in the duct replacement program, four yeras after they were dclared "life expired".

Hope that helps.

DV

Lazer-Hound

13th Mar 2009, 14:34

BBC NEWS | Scotland | North East/N Isles | Only one RAF Nimrod 'fit to fly' (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/north_east/7942123.stm)

KeepItTidy

13th Mar 2009, 14:56

Like I said I smell Shiite , WTF does the BBC know

Im not even going to start at this utter complete bullcrap

nigegilb

13th Mar 2009, 22:06

drustsonoferp, not sure the Inquest should be blamed for placing a great deal of focus on seniority. The Coroner would have wanted to have heard evidence from the people who had responsibility for decision making. I am sure Tuc has a view on this, since the IPT system came into being a lot of the specialist engineering knowledge and experience has either been lost or overridden.

The MoD and RAF would have had a degree of flexibilty as to who was forwarded to give evidence. I happen to know that a number of presonnel have been "moved on", "retired" etc since the Inquest. I spent a lot of time at the Herc Inquest it was very obvious, even to the layman who were the strong witnesses, who were struggling, who were being economical with the truth. I am sure the Coroner formed his own opinion on the reliabilty of the witnesses.

I do understand your underlying point. For a long time I did not believe the Nimrod was ALARP, EdSett's answer was most helpful in understanding this issue.

EdSett100

13th Mar 2009, 23:12

Ed Sett, so do you agree with my summary that the AIRCRAFT has been ALARP these past few months and that the new standard WEF 01 Apr is effectively ALARP with bells and whistles-ALARP PLUS?

I agree completely. I would add that it has been ALARP ("as safe as it needs to be"' as CAS clearly stated at the time) since 4 Sep 06.

Ed

Tappers Dad

13th Mar 2009, 23:37

Ed Sett,

If it is, and always has been ALARP how come they can't fly them. In the letter sent to me by Bob Ainsworth on March the 10th 2009 he said that the Nimrod fleet remains airworthy as long as the ones that haven't had the ducts done don't take off.

I'm confused !!!!:ugh:

EdSett100

13th Mar 2009, 23:51

DV:Ducts listed under (a) and (b) are now being replaced in the duct replacement program, four years after they were declared "life expired".Do you have documentary evidence that BAeS signed a report declaring those pipes LIFEX in Jun 05? I was led to believe that they made their report in 2007. If so, I could understand, to some degree, why only one aircraft has had the new pipes fitted so far, in response to that report. I believe they have to be tailor-made for each aircraft. I still stand by my assertion that the Duct Replacement Programme should never have compromised flying operations, anyway.

Today we were informed by the BBC that only one of our aircraft is airworthy. Who the hell is releasing this rubbish to the media? We are losing our way, here, big time.

Ed Settt

Distant Voice

14th Mar 2009, 08:41

Ed.

The report that have was issued by BAES in reply to PDS task 06-3487. An ealier report from BAES, dated 7th Jan 2005, identifying the same ducts, was in reply PDS Task 16-3468. Neither report, nor the one issued in 2007 (but prepared in 2006) was made available to the BOI for XV230.

DV

JFZ90

14th Mar 2009, 08:55

I may have this wrong but I read the story as :

5 aircraft have had their ducts done, but it seems only 1 aircraft of those aircraft has had fuel seals changed (is this MoD info?)

I think the MoD have implied those 5 can fly - as presumably the ducts were the Mar 09 grounding issue - hence the fuel seals are not a grounding issue -
EDIT on checking they have actually stated this explicitly - "Delays to the replacement of fuel seals will, however, have no impact on flying since our experts assess that the risk is tolerable."

The BBC has seems to have ignored this to imply that only 1 is airworthy, and stated in earlier reports that the MoD had not clarified the issue (despite the fact that I did a 10 sec search on the mod site to produce the quotes above where it seems pretty clear to me!).

Ministry of Defence | Defence News | Equipment and Logistics | Nimrods requiring safety modifications to temporarily cease flying (http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/EquipmentAndLogistics/NimrodsRequiringSafetyModificationsToTemporarilyCeaseFlying. htm)

Hence on this occasion, the MoD appears to have had their facts completely twisted by the media to create a better story.

-----

This issue of timeliness in ALARP has been raised on this thread many times as another dimension to any ALARP assessment - but this continues to be misunderstood it seems by many on here.

A good example is that the 777 are still flying today with unmodified Trent 800 engines & its current Fuel Oil Heat Exchanger (FOHE) technology - the FAA have given operators around 6 months after a Rolls Royce modification is developed (so 6 month clock not even ticking yet - it will only start when Rolls have a fix) to get it fixed - until that time the risk of a heathrow crash repeat is quite real (noting the workarounds to minimise the risk). So is it ALARP? Well you can argue the aircraft is not really ALARP as you can improve the FOHE and fit it - but this hasn't been installed yet and can't practically be done for 6-12+ months. The FAA are content that there are workarounds to mitigate the hazard so are content that it is reasonable to keep flying as long as the mods are embodied within a reasonable time. Hence you could say they are working towards an ALARP build standard of the 777 fleet - this is where the terminology can get confusing, as it is also true to say the whole situation is ALARP, as the the risks have been minimised by outlining an timely upgrade plan. Hence you can say the risks to current 777 ops are ALARP, even though the new FOHE won't be fitted for months. Hope that makes sense, and the parallels to Nimrod are obvious.

Roland Pulfrew

14th Mar 2009, 09:07

I love some of the conspiracy theories starting to abound on this topic; they do make for amusing reading.:hmm:

Please remember that tour lengths are getting shorter (for various reasons including overstretch and the rediculous size of the RAF today) so if people are getting "moved on" it's probably just that they are tourex! The only people who tend to do longer than 2 years in post are aircrew on squadrons, for anyone else (including sqn ldr+ aircrew on squadrons) it will only be about 2 years. It shouldn't come as a surprise that some people have been posted.

Distant Voice

14th Mar 2009, 10:55

Ed Sett 100: I believe that over the past year you and I have come to respect each others views and opinions. Having said that, views and opinions are one thing, evidence and statements presented by specialist is something else. And whilst it may run contrary to our views and opinions it has to be respected and taken seriously.

Whether we like it or not, hazard H66 has a hazard severity rating of CATASTROPHIC. It is currently set on the data base has having a probabilty of IMPROBABLE. Is was recommended by QinetiQ in 2008 that because there had been two duct failures this should be reset to OCCASIONAL. This would give it a HRI of "A".

According to the safety case developed by BAes a failure in this area has the "Potential for hot air leaks from the LP & HP ducting on rib 2 to impinge on the engine bay top scin and electrical wiring. The leak would also impinge on the CSDU cooling oil pipe installation together with fuel and hydraulic pipelines creating a potential for overheated systems"

So, unfortunately, I am unable to agree with you on your ALARP approach, and remind you that detection and suppression and drills do not mitigate the hazard, only the accident. If some one told you that the electrical wiring in your house was unsafe and could cause a fire would you simply go out and buy a smoke detector and extinguisher, or would you have the wiring replaced/redesigned?

DV

Tappers Dad

14th Mar 2009, 11:12

Naval Air: Nimrod Withdrawal (http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htnavai/articles/20090314.aspx)

According to this publication two U.S. Air Force electronic monitoring aircraft (RC-135 Rivet Joint) have been leased to fill in because of shortages. The aircraft will have joint British and American crews, but will be painted in Royal Air Force colors. Britain is also buying three RC-135s from the United States, at $350 million each.

EdSett100

14th Mar 2009, 12:26

DV:If some one told you that the electrical wiring in your house was unsafe and could cause a fire would you simply go out and buy a smoke detector and extinguisher, or would you have the wiring replaced/redesigned?
I would have the wiring replaced, as a matter of urgency. But I wouldn't move out of my only home and make myself homeless and a burden on my friends while the house is re-wired. I would switch off the electricity where I don't need it and, where it is needed, I would employ someone to watch it like a hawk, who would switch it off and deal with it, while the repairs were being carried out.

Ed Sett

Green Flash

14th Mar 2009, 12:36

According to this publication two U.S. Air Force electronic monitoring aircraft (RC-135 Rivet Joint) have been leased to fill in because of shortages. The aircraft will have joint British and American crews, but will be painted in Royal Air Force colors.

US aircraft in UK colours - so who owns it?

US and UK crews - so who tasks it? And who fix's it? ROE's?

I'm all for Combined/Joint/Coalition etc etc but I do hope someone somewhere has got the management chain well and truly nailed down! Potential for some large SNAFU's methinks.

EdSett100

14th Mar 2009, 14:27

DV:Whether we like it or not, hazard H66 has a hazard severity rating of CATASTROPHIC. It is currently set on the data base has having a probabilty of IMPROBABLE. Is was recommended by QinetiQ in 2008 that because there had been two duct failures this should be reset to OCCASIONAL. This would give it a HRI of "A".
Yes, I fully understand what has been written by BAeS and Qinetiq. I think we need to look at how the HRI is arrived at:

1. The published frequency of the hazard is based on judgement of both historical and technical analysis of the system. I have absolutely no argument with the upgrade to OCCASIONAL by QQ in the case of a duct leak. It is debatable what the degree of any leak or failure is likely to be, but OCCASIONAL is an acceptable failure rate.

2. The effect of the hazard is in 2 areas: local and overall. In the very worst case, a blown duct might burn out a hole in the upper skin, burn out a few wires, and/or overheat a fuel/hydraulic coupling seal. This is the local effect. However, the overall effect to the aircraft, which is where the HRI comes in, is minimal due to the fact there is a crew on board to deal with the problem(s). The aircraft will not be lost, it will not even have to make an emergency landing. The published procedures in the aircrew manuals will deal all the local failures in a structured and calm manner. The weight might need to be reduced, which could take up to 30 minutes, and then the aircraft will make a safe and controlled approach to land. The crew would not even need to make it a MAYDAY unless they received a fire warning, which, due to nature of the event, will either be spurious due to burnt wiring or a temporary hyd or fuel fire (which would require a sustained and very hot air leak), but easily extinguished. That is the very, very, worst case, and the aircraft is still flying and the rear crew are still eating their doughnuts. Regardless of the degree of the failure, the effect to the aircraft, by book definition, is not CRITICAL or CATASTROPHIC by any means. Therefore, there is no legal requirement to reduce the risk to ALARP.

I don't know how, or why, BAeS and QQ declared the hazard as CATASTROPHIC. I do know that they did not consult the aircrew when they erroneously calculated the effect to the aircraft when a HP air duct bursts on a Nimrod in flight.

I don't think I can bring anything more to this discussion.

Regards
Ed

Distant Voice

14th Mar 2009, 18:11

Ed Sett; Like your tone. You can stay with me whilst you house is made ALARP.

DV

Four Wings

14th Mar 2009, 18:53

RC-135 in RAF colours. Anybody around who knows how the B29s (aka Washingtons) were crewed/operated? Or did the RAF in those days work on the basis that once you could fly a four-engine piston type it didn't take long to convert? Please note: I am not ex-RAF or a flyer! - just a supporter.

Prop-Ed

14th Mar 2009, 22:27

Does anyone know the time scales involved for getting the UK crews into the Rivet Joints? Also, flying from Nebraska or the UK?

Sounds like a pretty good deal either way.

spanners123

14th Mar 2009, 22:43

With reference to what KIT said in post 68, are the families really suing the MoD for £20 million? If so, how many of the families is it and where would this money come from?
I notice that there has been no response to this claim but if it’s true, it makes me very angry!

bit-twiddler

14th Mar 2009, 23:04

The RC-135 link seems to be another variant of the Helix story - The project which still hasn't hit main gate and keeps getting mentioned in parliamentry questions.

e.g. Excerpts from Jan. 12 Debate in Parliament (http://www.defense-aerospace.com/article-view/verbatim/101333/uk-ministers-speak-on-procurement-programs.html)

or:
House of Commons Hansard Written Answers for 15 Dec 2008 (pt 0006) (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/cm081215/text/81215w0006.htm)

Duncan D'Sorderlee

15th Mar 2009, 00:14

Late, I know. £20m would scarcely cover the salary of CXX/3 prior to retirement. It makes me angry that the families have yet to get a penny from UK plc; although, I have a fair idea why.

:ok:

Duncs

WildRover

15th Mar 2009, 00:16

Surely the RAF aren't buying replacing clapped out Comets with just as outdated 707's.

EdSett100

15th Mar 2009, 01:34

KIT,
I know, as aquaintances, a few of the widows and their families. In monetary terms, there is absolutely no doubt that they have all been robbed of a decent income through the loss of their husbands and fathers. That income loss was undeniably caused by a failure of the MOD to adequately provide that crew (and all other crews who flew on both Mks of Nimrod before 2 Sep 06 who, but for the grace of God, could have been killed) with a safe aircraft. It has been proven to have been a deathtrap.

As it stands, the families are entitled to the standard AFCS/AFPS settlement which is also payable, on exactly the same terms, to any other family whose loved one is simply lost in the course of his/her duty where the MOD is not guilty of negligence. That standard settlement is a pittance in comparison with the amount of expected income that would otherwise have been received by the families of XV230.

I can assure you that all of the families have my unconditional support in seeking a reasonable settlement in compensation for the loss that they have suffered due to the failure of the MOD/RAF/BAe. The MOD is the current owner and operator of the Nimrod and is therefore the respondent in this case. To my knowledge, not one single claimant has said anything about punitive damages. This is a claim for reasonable compensation. Do you have any idea how much income an average pilot can expect to receive in a 36/18 career followed by a civilian flying career and RAF pension?

Might I politely suggest that you review your last message.

Ed Sett

nav attacking

15th Mar 2009, 09:34

KIT

Time you withdrew both if not most of your posts on this forum. The families are quite rightly concerned about further loss from what was and still is a tight knit community. They wanted answers as to why such a tradgedy was allowed to happen in the first place and they are slowly getting there, I take my hat off to them for their persistance. If we all roled over and accepted it like you seem to suggest, because others are in a worse boat or basher, then it would just be a matter of time before another XV230 happened.

If the aircraft operating authority was aware of problems but had not mitigated against them then they deserve full compensation and more. Al Squires alone would have earned a further £10M in his career, without going to the civvies.

KIt you need to think twice about who views these forums before posting such inflamatory comments that will only upset or antagonise. Get rid of the post before the moderator does.

Biggus

15th Mar 2009, 10:44

Nav attacking,

Don't want to be deliberately pedantic, or detract from a valid point, but your calculation is way off...

Duncan D'Sorderlee

15th Mar 2009, 11:00

Nav,

Your decimal point is in the wrong place. The correct amount (if my sums are right!) is IRO £1M till retirement at age 55.

:ok:

Duncs

Roland Pulfrew

15th Mar 2009, 11:12

Girlfriend sues MOD (http://news.scotsman.com/uk/Tragic-airman39s-family-furious-as.5030758.jp):hmm:

Nav attacking, I think you may be out by a factor of 10. Either that or I am in the wrong job. ;)

anita gofradump

15th Mar 2009, 13:33

For the rest tagging along and trying to be good or know what you are doing , not many from Kinloss are involved in the is forum or chat , most have the sense to not listen to the utter **** and contempt you all think you have and how special this place makes you feel.Incorrect. On at least two counts. You would be surprised at the level of interest from within the fleet - it seems that you see yourself as a Champion for the Cause. Maybe less time with the mouth open (or fingers on the keyboard) and more time using your ears (and eyes).

I'd think you would never be the choice of the Kinloss masses, as a representative of their beliefs........you're passionate to the point of being unhinged. Everyone is entitled to an opinion but there is no need to be so bloody personal with it. I disagree with many of the armchair experts on this forum but remember that the internet is hardly the place for an argument. If you know better than someone else, great. You then have a choice, put the facts up and argue or maintain your silence and enjoy the fact that you do, indeed, know better.

Sobering up and learning some manners might be a good place to start for you KIT.

nav attacking

15th Mar 2009, 14:59

Thanks for pointing out the error everyone. :*

However, I was of cause allowing for service to 60 or a second career as a training captain and index linking it for the outrageaous inflation that we are aboiut to suffer after Gb has messed about with the money supply.:ok: That plus a few sensible investments of the multiple FRIs that are bound to be offered once the pull from civvy street recovers.

Good bye to KIT though.

Distant Voice

16th Mar 2009, 16:59

Ed Sett;

Whether we agree with it or not, Hazard H66 is set to CATASTROPHIC on the Cassandra Hazard Log. It was recommended by BAEs and accepted the Nimrod IPT.

DV

EdSett100

16th Mar 2009, 19:04

DV:Whether we agree with it or not, Hazard H66 is set to CATASTROPHIC on the Cassandra Hazard Log. It was recommended by BAEs and accepted the Nimrod IPT.Well, I've said it before, but its incorrect. Lets not forget that H66 is part of the original Nimrod Safety Case, which has been severely criticised by the BOI. As I write, that safety case is under scrutiny by Kinloss engineers and aircrew, for the first time (see my comment below). Once I know how H66 fares under examination by the experts, I will let everyone, here, know. Given that it was Kinloss officers who found the flaws in the original hazard log, I suggest that H66 should have been sent to Kinloss, for an opinion on its "catastrophic" effect, before the IPT decided to take the drastic action it has.

A new safety case is currently being produced by BAeS, with all interested parties involved. I'm confident that the zonal and functional hazard reports will be far more accurate, and that the effect of HP air duct failure in the engine zones will be assessed as less than critical. Lets face it, BAeS built the Nimrod. The company designers were not so stupid, even in the late 60's, to create a system that would bring the aircraft down with one single failure. They knew that hot pipes were needed in the engine zones, so they designed failure warnings, isolation valves and crew procedures to cater for the failure and prevent a catastrophic or critical event. Now, in their niavety, the company safety staff have paid little or no regard for the company designers' provisions right at the outset of the aircraft's life. BAeS are truly British Waste of Space.

Ed Sett

PS. The BOI report, in Dec 07, recommended a review of the Nimrod Safety Case (NSC) by Kinloss engineers and aircrew. It is a collection of documents that have never been at Kinloss, AFAIK, until now. We didn't even know it existed. It is only now, nearly 15 months after the publication of the BOI report, and more than 4 years since the NSC was produced, that the NSC has finally arrived at Kinloss for examination. I blame the IPT for that one.

EdSett100

16th Mar 2009, 21:39

BGG,

OK, fair point.

However, it is the case that the original designers must have anticipated HP air duct failures because they fitted detectors, valves and surrounded the pipes and the engines with titanium walls to protect the aircraft. Sure, the top skin might suffer some damage. A complete top panel might even be blown off, but its not catastrophic to the aircraft.

Distant Voice

17th Mar 2009, 07:30

Ed Sett 100 you said:Let's face it, BAes built the aircraft

That is correct, and they set the hazard to CATASTROPHIC. The BOI comments relate to Hazard H73 (Zone 514/614), which had been set to CATASTROPHIC/REMOTE by BAes, but then downgarded by IPT to CATASTROPHIC/IMPROBABLE. You should read Martin Breakell (BAes) evidence at the inquest

Do you really believe that MOD are now replacing 37 sections of ducting per aircraft, four years after the 2005 "warning", as an act of good will? You should be very careful before you do any downgrading.

DV

EdSett100

17th Mar 2009, 08:40

DV:You should read Martin Breakell (BAes) evidence at the inquestDo you have a copy of the transcript? If so, do you know how I could also get a copy?

Pontius Navigator

17th Mar 2009, 10:54

"At the same time it has to be remembered that the loss of XV230 represents the greatest single loss of life to UKAF since the Second World War"

Not sure of the context of the quote and not to denignate the tragic loss of life in the Nimrod crash this quote is quite wrong. In 1965 a Hastings crashed at Abingdon with the loss of 41 lives.

Distant Voice

17th Mar 2009, 12:13

Ed Sett;

I have a copy of the transcript and his written statement to the court. You should be able to get a copy from MoD.

DV

ShortFatOne

17th Mar 2009, 20:43

EdSett
I have enjoyed reading your measured, considered discussions/arguments on this forum and you have done more than most to bring some levelheaded common to what is undoubtedly an emotive subject.

However, one small observation on a comment a few post ago where you said that no-one (aircrew?) at Kinloss knew about a Safety Case even existing? The fact that one existed but no-one knew about it isn't really the fault of the IPT. As professional aviators we should all take an interest in how our chariots/sports cars/double decker buses make it into the air. I don't mean just Mr Bernoulli and his theories but all the aspects of stress testing, fatigue life measurement and impacts, engineering processes and yes, aircraft certification process. An old and oft quoted saying "Ignorance is no excuse" is as relevant today as ever.

We should and must make aircraft safety our business as operators, we can't just hold our hands up and say "Nobody told me." Ask, question, learn, dig, pester and do it until we are satisfied.

Keep up the good work! :D

davejb

17th Mar 2009, 22:29

I'll have to disagree SFO,
during my long and illustrious career (ahem, just turn the bull**** alarm off for a minute) the further I got the more I realised how many things the average sh*g didn't get to know about. If you know that a document exists then you can ask for it, but if you don't know it exists then you don't even know that you do want to ask for it....

tucumseh

18th Mar 2009, 07:23

davejb

Couldn't agree more.

The fact that one existed but no-one knew about it isn't really the fault of the IPT.

Without going into the detail - PM me if you want it - there is a procedural Def Stan available on the MoD site that explains in infinite detail precisely why it IS the IPTs responsibility, and how they are meant to go about establishing and maintaining the lines of communication with Users.

If any IPT does not do this, it is negligence.

ShortFatOne

18th Mar 2009, 19:09

So the fact that JSPs refer to Safety Cases and the Airworthiness process etc is roundly ignored? These same JSPs that we, as professional aviators, are supposed to at least be familiar with? OK, I accept that we don't need to know them inside out but surely there must be some personal responsibility to ensure that we at least glance at them once in a while (particularly as we sign a currency chit as having done so).

I also accept that the IPT does indeed have a responsibility to transmit this information and there-in lies an issue that is slowly being addressed with the IPTs being pulled into the forward element. Internal communication has been one of our weakest areas, more so in the modern era (IMHO) as it is always assumed that t'interweb is the information super highway. That is only true if the information is available, accessible and clearly signposted, otherwise people lose interest searching endlessly for something that should be easy to find and lose interest(see what I did there, lost interest:O).

sumps

18th Mar 2009, 20:01

You might like to consider the fact that the engineers are not taught the meaning of airworthiness. They are taught good engineering principles and practices however I always thought it would be better if we were taught more of the regulations/law in which the aircraft will be operated as well as how to go about fixing it.

ShortFatOne

18th Mar 2009, 22:06

Sumps, I fully understand your concerns. I have met and worked with many engineers in my current job over the last 9 years and it still amazes me when I quote some aspect of JSP 553 and they look at me with that blank, eyes glazed expression (although that might just be their natural reaction to me!) meaning they have no idea what I'm wittering on about.

It may just be the mists of time and too many happy hours but I seem to have a vague recollection that we were first introduced to Airworthiness concepts as baby pilots on Jet Provosts. OK, so everyone was bored stiff, just not exciting bedtime reading is it? My next CPA with Airworthiness was when I went to CFS 10 years later and I paid a bit more attention that time. It was only an hour or so but it covered all the basics of fatigue, stress, design, testing, RTS etc.

Maybe Cosford, along with the other relevant training 'centres of excellence' should introduce mandatory Airworthiness awareness packages?

Rigga

18th Mar 2009, 23:10

There is a large difference between Manufacturing and Design Airworthiness issues (which, you say, is taught at Sleaford Tech) and that of EASA Part M Continued Airworthiness Monitoring - a job I've been doing for some 10 years now (leading up to ARC standards).

I believe the latter is what would be best required by most RAF maintenance staff and would them help in understanding why they need to do certain tasks in a regular manner.

All civil LAE's need to understand something of both Design and Continued Airworthiness matters for their Licence exams but some do tend to 'drop it' as soon as they can! I'm sure the same would occur in the RAF, but at least they would have some knowledge.

Excuse my ignorance but...you mention "JSP 553" (a publication?) - could it be too high in RAF docs Heirarchy to be read by "mere" engineers?

ShortFatOne

19th Mar 2009, 00:19

Rigga,

I realise that CAM is in itself a whole area of specialization and requires different skill sets/processes to implement through the 'life' of an in-service aircraft. What I was trying to suggest (perhaps wrongly, I don't know, I'm not an RAF engineer) was that perhaps our training systems (aircrew and engineers) are too narrowly focused sometimes. Whilst I wouldn't expect us to go down the whole Licensed Pilot/Engineer route I would hope that we are taking the 'best practice' elements from our civilian counterparts experiences. The Manufacture & Design element is as important for us as CAM I think, as it provides a good insight into the many considerations that go towards getting an aircraft into service. It would then provide a useful lead-in to CAM and 'through-life support'.

As far as I know(someone please correct me if I'm wrong - oh, wait a minute this is Prune:)), Manufacture & Design Airworthiness concepts are not taught or even considered at Cosford, my point was that maybe they should be (and not just Cosford, Flying Training units as well).

Sorry, forgot to say "Yes, Joint Service Publication 553 - Military Airworthiness Regulation" is a document and is the progenitor of JAP 100 which is the Policy implementation side (standing-by to be corrected!).

EdSett100

19th Mar 2009, 18:20

SFO,
Thanks for your kind words. I was writing from an aircrew perspective about the Safety Case. It is likely that the senior (ground) engineers at Kinloss were aware of its existance, but there was no knowledge of it on the aircrew front line or, I believe, the Staneval, who are only now involved with the IPT in this important area.

Should the aircrew have known about these matters at the outset, nearly 5 years ago? Absolutely, we should have. Should we have reached for the JSP 550 series before now? Well, thats a debatable point. The RAF is founded on teamwork and there has to be reliance on people, whom the aircrew and the front line engineers do not even know exist, to look after our best interests and that of the aircraft. Obviously, no one on the front line should be denied access to the 550 series, but they are clearly published for the guidance of the higher-ups, although we can all learn about front line Flight Safety matters from them.

From what little I have seen and heard of it, the Nimrod Safety Case is almost 2000 sides of A4 paper which was never presented to the aircrew for our input on the functional hazards that exist. Many assumptions were made by BAeS and IPT engineers on how and when we operated systems and how they believe the aircraft, as an airborne vehicle, would respond when some of those systems failed. In some cases, as highlighted by the BOI report, there was a reliance on warnings and suppressants that did not exist or, conversely, no reliance was placed on warnings and drills that clearly do exist. Its a rain forest that has turned into a bag of nails. Fortunately, the front line at Kinloss is now integrated into a deep review of the existing safety case and the production of a new one, as I write.

Too little, too late, sadly.

Ed

ShortFatOne

19th Mar 2009, 21:09

EdSett,

I agree that in many ways this is too little too late. You are correct in that many of the day-to-day decisons about the aircraft we fly are taken in remote offices, often by people whose knowledge of the way a particular aircraft type is operated is limited or misplaced.

That is why there has been a desire to increase the IPTs exposure to Front Line input, whether directly by first hand experience or indirectly by increasing the number of 'Blue' suits in IPT posts. The problem of the second approach is that many FL operators do not want to go to work for an IPT (the reasons for which vary). More problematical is that after 3 years, the individual is usually replaced so continuity is lost, the new guy spends 8-12 months getting up to speed, does about 18 months of effective and productive work and then concentrates on his escape plan.

You make an interesting point about JSP 550 series. They are most definitely not meant for higher authority consumption, they are meant to provide FL operators with a guidance framework within which they can grow their professional skills and abilities, whilst being given the boundaries of operational constraints and safety considerations. They were supposedly designed to provide much more detail and background than the preceding JSP 318 series (which I think they generally do) but, like the 318s, are deemed mandatory reading for aircrew (OK, I accept no-one is going to read something they feel doesn't have any relevance to them, that is a problem for higher authority).

Perhaps something that could be covered at the next Sqn training day?

My reason for droning on about this is that if we, as an organization, want to learn from dreadful days like 2nd Sep, we need to start educating our people at the grass roots. How much better prepared for my current job I would have been if I had had exposure to all the aspects of Airworthiness Regulation before I started (instead of learning on the job!).

Distant Voice

3rd Apr 2009, 16:41

Whilst the latest modification program calls for the replacement of many obsolete seals within the fuel system, there is still no documentation instructing tradesmen on how they can achieve 1 degree of alignment with the couplings. Latest AP information simply says "The pipe angular displacement is not to exceed 1 degree in any direction".

It has been made clear by specialist from Eaton Aerospace and QinetiQ that coupling misalignment causes stresses within the seal and results in premature fuel coupling leaks.

DV

Distant Voice

13th Apr 2009, 07:35

I now understand that we are still using the Gp Cpt Hickman Mk 1 eye-ball for fuel coupling alignment.

DV

anita gofradump

13th Apr 2009, 15:14

Talk about a dog with a bone!

DV, are you involved with Nimrod, at any level?

Distant Voice

13th Apr 2009, 16:10

Talk about a dog with a bone

Yes, you are right. However, having been told by specialist that fuel couplings must be aligned to within 1 degree in order to avoid seal distortion and leakage, I am interested to know how this is being achieved. Failure to comply will simply mean that seals being replaced on the latest modification program could suffer damage.

For the record, I no longer work on Nimrods, but I have taken an active part in the XV230 investigation, and continue to do so. Neither the Coroner, nor the QC have any Nimrod experience, but their views and comments are respected.

DV

On_The_Top_Bunk

13th Apr 2009, 17:20

Yes, you are right. However, having been told by specialist that fuel couplings must be aligned to within 1 degree in order to avoid seal distortion and leakage, I am interested to know how this is being achieved. Failure to comply will simply mean that seals being replaced on the latest modification program could suffer damage.

DV

Back in the early Eighties the Lightnings suffered with leaks form the couplings in hot areas. The solution was to X-ray all couplings post assembly to check for alignment.
I wouldn't know if this is standard practice on Nimrod but it would certainly be a solution.

Distant Voice

13th Apr 2009, 19:36

OTTB.

The latest instruction for assembling FRS fuel couplings (dated Nov 2008) includes a NOTE, which simply says "The pipe angular displacement is not to exceed 1 degree in any direction". There is nothing to say how this is to be achieved or measured.

Previous instructions made no mention of alignment requirements. In fact prior to Dec 2007 there was no technical iinformation regarding FRS fuel pipe couplings within the a/c Topic 1 publications.

DV

tucumseh

13th Apr 2009, 20:39

"The pipe angular displacement is not to exceed 1 degree in any direction". There is nothing to say how this is to be achieved or measured.

As a repair is incomplete unless verified, it would be interesting to know how maintainers are advised to deal with this. How did Tech Pubs verify the AP amendment? Surely the Pubs Authority raised a MF765 on themselves? After all that has happened, still so many questions on basic processes and procedures a first year apprentice would flag up.

anita gofradump

14th Apr 2009, 11:49

I think you will find that DV lost a brother on XV230..... which, at least in my opinion, gives him every right to be dogged, passionate, etc on the subject of Nimrod safety.....Simple question, directly put to DV, therefore did not need your input thanks Biggus. High horse..........dismount!

Thanks for your answer DV, best of luck.

Woodbine

22nd Apr 2009, 21:00

DV - In the dim and distant past when FRS fuel couplings were used on most aircraft manufactured in Britain, the MOD published an Air Publication on fuel couplings that covered the FRS coupling. I believe that approved data was added to Nimrod aircraft APs when everyone realised the coupling AP was gone!

Distant Voice

24th Apr 2009, 07:25

Woodbine, I am not sure what you mean by;
I believe that the approved data was added to Nimrod aircraft AP's when everyone realised that the coupling AP was gone

The information that I have indicates that FRS information was added to the a/c AP's under RTI/NIMROD/224A in Dec 07 because "There is currently no technical information regarding FRS fuel pipe couplings within the a/c Topic 1 publications". Even then there was no mention of the 1 degree alignment requirement. This was not added until a further amendment in Nov 08.

Is this what you are talking about?

DV

Tappers Dad

26th Apr 2009, 21:57

Here is the latest report on Nimrod from QinetiQ dated 17th Feb 2009
http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/95A1FA79-E5B9-4725-9D30-16A064CC9C9E/0/NimrodMRMk2GeneralConditionSurveyReport.pdf

A letter sent to all the families on the 6th March 2009 from Bob Ainsworth saying there were no airworthiness issues in this report and yet QinetiQ counted 26 !!!!. However the IPT mitigated 11 and the other 15 will be done at there next maintainence.(For some that is two years).

You can read the story that was printed in todays Sunday Independent
Defence minister glossed over Nimrod safety fears - Home News, UK - The Independent (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/defence-minister-glossed-over-nimrod-safety-fears-1674390.html)

Woodbine

6th May 2009, 14:11

DV,

Have you found the previous obsolete coupling-specific AP yet?

Distant Voice

7th May 2009, 16:46

Woodbine.

No, I have not found the "obsolete coupling-specific AP". I only have the documents mentioned in my post #123, plus a copy of the 1968 Declaration of Design and Performance.

DV

chappie

7th May 2009, 16:53

i just want to say i think you are all amazing!

betty swallox

9th May 2009, 11:15

Hey! Change the thread title. Flew the Mighty Hunter again, yesterday. Loverly...

Biggus

9th May 2009, 12:24

b s

Heard that the current serviceability rate was such that the title for the thread isn't far off?

Distant Voice

9th May 2009, 17:13

BS.

How many times have you flown in the past month?

DV

BEagle

9th May 2009, 20:24

Hey! Change the thread title. Flew the Mighty Hunter again, yesterday. Loverly...

And was the ancient old thing still serviceable after landing?

How much AAR did you do?

fergineer

10th May 2009, 00:09

Beags the Nimrod is designed as a LRMPA aircraft which it can do nicely without AAR as we used too before the Falklands war. I am sure there are many others who see the whole thing as BS does......If and I say If there were major problems with the aircraft they would not be flying at all. When are all you people going to let the crews get on with thier jobs they are the people who will make a decision on wether to fly or not not you.

Distant Voice

10th May 2009, 10:32

Fergineer.

You are quite correct, the Nimrod was designed as a LRMPA not needing AAR. To achieve that design requirement, the a/c needed to carry 84K of fuel, fly for over 9 hours, carry out double engine restarts whilst on task and have adequate equipment cooling using an SCP. Today, this LRMPA a/c has a restriction placed on fuel loads, can fly for about 7.5 hours, can not use the cross-feed for engine restarts in flight and has the SCP isolated. Not quite the same picture.

You also state;
When are all you people going to let the crews get on with their jobs they are the people who will make the decision on wether to fly or not not you

Sorry not true, you can only make that right decision if you have all the facts and it is clear from postings made on the thread that aircrews do not have all the facts. What did you know about fuel seals, alignment and the 37 life expired hot air pipes before the a/c was "grounded". Some of these problems were known about, by non-aircrew for over 3 years (i.e before XV230 accident). Furthermore, I would like to remind you that safety/airworthiness affects not only the lives of crews who fly the a/c, but the general public over whom the a/c flies.

In my opinion the Nimrod is currently being kept in the air as a "flying political statement of defiance" against the findings of the inquest and common sense. It has nothing to do with meeting a LRMPA task.

DV

Tappers Dad

10th May 2009, 16:25

DV
I agree, how many crews would have flown in it if they were told it wasn't airworthy and given the reasons why ?

MOA

10th May 2009, 17:53

Distant Voice

10th May 2009, 20:59

MOA;

That is why a/c are grounded until 37 sections od hot air ducting are replaced.

DV

Duncan D'Sorderlee

11th May 2009, 13:19

As Betty states - and I hate agreeing with her - the Nimrods are not 'grounded', they are in the process of having maintenance carried out - or flying! In the same way that an ac that has a bald tyre isn't 'grounded' - it is just getting the tyre fixed. Admittedly, this is taking a tadge longer.

Duncs:ok:

Distant Voice

11th May 2009, 14:17

Duncs you say,
In the same way that an a/c has a bald tyre isn't "grounded"- it is just having it fixed

Trouble is, this is a tyre that has been bald for over 3 years. You and I know that this is not a simple maintenance/modification program to replace hot air pipes and fuel seals, if it were then a/c would continue to fly until they could be phased in. This is far more serious, and someone up the ladder has said "no more, the risk is too great"

DV

SirToppamHat

11th May 2009, 15:07

...based on evidence from the independent assessor...

An Independent Assessor paid for by ... ?

STH

tucumseh

11th May 2009, 15:39

From the QQ report Executive Summary:

'On the basis of the information available from this assessment to date, it is concluded that there are no residual airworthiness issues of sufficient individual or cumulative concern arising from this assessment to warrant recommending grounding of the Nimrod Fleet'

A few observations.

“On the basis of information available” is the usual cop-out when (anyone) considers insufficient info is available; due to, for example, failure to retain an audit trail.

“No residual airworthiness issues of sufficient individual or cumulative concern…..” is not the same as saying the aircraft is airworthy. What they are actually saying, is that this inspection and corrective action process VERY BELATEDLY satisfies one component of airworthiness; that they (QQ) have only been asked to look at this one component, and the hundreds of others are not in their contracted remit. What they do not say, and it remains unclear if the wider MoD understands this, is that this extraordinary action would probably have been unnecessary if MoD had adhered to their own mandated regs and had the design and its safety under continuous review. (Remember, the MoD started pulling funding for this in 1991).

Of equal concern is MoD’s long standing policy of happily quoting QQ (DRA/DERA etc) when the report is positive, justifying their actions by saying “Look, our independent assessor says it’s ok”, but completely ignoring them when the news is bad – the prime example being Chinook Mk2 in the days immediately before the Mull of Kintyre crash.

In the latter case, MoD were criticised for referring to both “DRA” and “Boscombe Down” in the same paragraph, inferring they were different entities; when they were actually talking about the same people. Otherwise known as pulling the wool over the eyes of successive inquiries.

A few years ago I witnessed a rather unwholesome aspect of this “independent” system. People I trusted (aircrew on a tour at Boscombe) reported a “no-go” system as wholly unsafe. An “essential”, meaning it had to be fixed and made safe before a positive MAR recommendation could be made. My boss (a non-engineer with no understanding whatsoever of said system or its use) simply went above the RWTS aircrew and demanded the recommendation be downgraded to “desirable” – not even “highly desirable”. His demands were met, and the aircrew told to shut up. They did, officially (refusing to answer correspondence asking if they disagreed with the official line), but privately begged for the aircraft to be made safe. I suspect the Mull case has similarities.

A subsequent Board of Inquiry recommended precisely the same as the original RWTS report, on the same system.

My conclusion is that QQ are not truly independent. The day they had to start charging for their services was the day commercial imperatives overtook airworthiness – both in DRA/DERA and MoD. When “privatised”, and until recently, MoD still owned a major share. That this no longer the case, but today they are in real trouble, with staff facing a pay freeze and job cuts, and this imperative still exists. In short, keep the customer happy. And, lest it be forgotten, MoD is most happy when not spending money on silly little things like airworthiness.

Clearly I’m not having a go at the many dedicated engineers who do the real work. But I suspect the final reports are heavily diluted. Oh for the days before half a dozen levels of management had to justify themselves and have their say, when you got a straight no-nonsense statement from the coal face. I’d like to think what I describe above was an isolated incident (but one too many for the deceased and their relatives), but I fear not.