A military pilots view....utility or dedicated attack...

[Yeoman_dai]

ok chaps and chapesses, I put this to you. I was recently interviewing an Infantry Colonel (retd), who led one of the battalions in 1st Gulf, and also on ops in Bosnia and N.I. Anyway, his view, as a footslogger was that he'd rather have a 'utility' helicopter, decked out with rockets and guns, to support him and his battalion, rather than dedicated attack helo's, as they could in a pinch land and pick up troops, and also have the loiter ability - plus don't need the pinpoint timing needed for fast air. Plus, in his view, we could have streched the defence budget futher if we'd bought, say, (as an example that i'm fitting in) Kiowa Warriors, or future Lynx as opposed to Apache - would have had more, and lets face it, in the kind of modern wars we have been fighting, Falklands onwards, we havn't needed a heavy duty attack helo - more, still armed utilities would be more useful to us?

I'm just wondering what the other side of the role says...so, fire away!

[Tourist]

He's right, we should buy Hinds

[taxydual]

If there was only a way to fit the Landrover (and it's multiple derivatives) with rotors......OK, Hind would do.

[Pontius Navigator]

Introducing fast air into the argument is an irrelevance.

While it is true that troop carrying helos can have some armament, an AH can carry rather more, is more agile and can engage targets in the ahead sector.

Added

and of course what size of helo would he want? Huey or Chinook? The Huey needs far more aircrew for the same lift. Don't know about the comparative cost for the same capacity too.

When it comes to shifting guns and ammo, no contest. But lose a Chinook doing AH work and you are really stuffed.

[airborne_artist]

He of course has the benefit of hindsight. Apache replaced Lynx TOW, in the expectation that most of our enemies would have large quantities of MBTs.

No-one imagined that Apache would first see action against an irregular opponent whose most complex battlefield vehicle rolled off a Japanese production line 10-20 years ago.

[Tourist]

Pontious,
I say again.
Hind

[Evalu8ter]

"But lose a Chinook doing AH work and you are really stuffed"

PN, the US Army would agree with you. They trialled a dedicated gunship Chinook (ACH-47A, aka "Guns a go-go") in VN. Good news was persistance - it could carry an order of magnitude more ammo than a Huey Hog, was faster and arguably more survivable. Bad news was wasting a valuable gun/troop/materiel mover out of role...and a propensity for shooting itself down..

This is not a new arguement. In Algeria the french field-modified their RW assets to carry cannon/rockets/bazookas as FW CAS couldn't fly in the same weather conditions. The US Howze board (which led to the airmobile concept and "We Were Soldiers") recognised the French predicament and developed the various armament subsystems for the Huey. The US eventually identified that a dedicated Gunship (ie the AH-1 Cobra) was required for survivability and accuracy reasons. Interestingly, the Soviets bought into both doctrines at the same time by developing the Mi-24 and putting a shed load of rockets & guns on their Mi-8s.

Those forces that don't have a dedicated AH persist with the "armed utility", think UH-60 DAP and Romanian Puma. The simple question is always that of instant prosecution of a "pop-up" threat. Is it better to let an SH mate blatt of a volley of FFARs instantly or wait 30 seconds and get a well aimed Hellfire? This was part of the great UK Blackhawk debate with the AAC bitterly opposed to the RAF getting WS-70 due to the threat an armed varient would be to the Lynx / AH programmes.

IMHO - Arm BH with good door guns / grenade launchers for platform protection. Anything more requires a dedicated and trained asset to prevent some potentially nasty errors.

[microlight AV8R]

Oh to return to the simplicity of a bygone era.

UH1 and AH1 with same dynamic components must have been a very cost effective path to follow. Stood the test of time also.

Westlands (Future)WG30 with uber powerful modern donks might have been more practical than FLynx as a utility workhorse.

In answer to the question..Both please.

1. As AAC now has Apache, a bigger utility type would seem more
appropriate than FLynx. Or,
2. If we hadn't bought Apache, A mix of armed FLynx and FutureWG30
could have been a practical proposition.

Still, UK PLC is bankrupt. We can expect massive cuts over the next couple of years. Just hope this government sees sense and realises that the present level of ops is not sustainable in the face of further cuts.

Any aircraft replacement programmes are likely to see acquisitions replacing on a lesser scale than current numbers. Much as has happened with Flynx.

Sad, but inevitable if we are to maintain the Chavs in the style to which they've become accustomed.

PS: :ok: to the Apache crew that flew by my homestaed yesterday.

[OilCan]

Weight.....

as they could in a pinch land and pick up troops,

.....only if they ditch some of the rockets & guns first.

weight=fuel+rockets+guns+troops....

Classic purple dilema....How much of each does he want?

[Wiley]

There's a VERY long (and at times quite passionite) discussion currently on this very point right here on the military forum. See "The ADF buys another lemon" thread.

http://www.pprune.org/military-aircrew/356079-adf-buys-another-lemon.html

[Pontius Navigator]

I had a similar argument several decades ago when I was being interviewed by a 1*. The arguement then was between 'lots' of small tankers (Victor 1) or a few large ones (KC10). While a single KC10 could take a number of aircraft along a whole route with no pre-loading the route, a single failure could abort an entire reinforcement. Of course the smaller tankers needed to pre-deploy and again a single failure could still cause an abort or serious interruption.

So a combined SH/AH force, say 10 Hinds, could take 50% attrition and you would still have an effective force. A force of SH/AH and who says they would be 5-5 and an attrition of 50% but not necessarily equal on each force, could leave you an unbalanced force.

Also, in a situation where you do not need AH you have 10 SH and vica versa.

So yes, there are arguments either way.

[Yeoman_dai]

I find it hard to believe that the west could not develop an aircraft as capable as the Hind... its very fast (for a helo), well armed...and the thought of hordes of these things surging over the horizon and dumping loads of Soviet troops then loitering to give immediate anti-tank and airborne fire support to the disgorged troops gave Western Military planners kittens during the Cold War!

And its not like the hind isn't an effective anti-armour helo as well? With more survivability than the Apache?

Only problem I can see is the things are bloody HUGE! but if it does the job....

[fallmonk]

I wonder if a heavily armed EH-101 Merlin would be on the cards then?

Maybe using extended wings like the Blackhawk/Hind? gives you the best of both worlds a fast heavly armed troop carrying helo along the soviet doctrine?

[Yeoman_dai]

Plus the merlin already has the capacity to fit a 20mm chin turret, I read somewhere...

[Evalu8ter]

Yeoman Dai,
The Hind is undoubtably a capable cab, even more so with modern avionics (as offered by the Israelis amongst others). Indeed, I believe it was recognised as the perfect aircraft for Noerthern Ireland; quick, armoured, armed and with a section of troops in the back. I think it was politically a dead end though..

However, it also has some significant weaknesses. It has real manoeuvre restrictions, and rumour has it that some were even observed crashing while trying to copy US Cobras doing wing-overs at the Inner German Border. Sov tactics were therefore very much one (fast) pass unloading all ordnance & scooting home.

Merlin would be a waste of time as a gunship. It has some positives - noise signature, speed and modern systems. However, it will always be power limited until a new Xmsn is fitted and it would need a large amount of armour to enable it to stay and fight, having an impact upon any weapon/fuel load. It would also need some work on signature management. The Merlin also has some manoeuvre restrictions, which is why it makes quite a good "aggressor" Hind for ACM training.

If you want to copy the Sovs then buy a shed load of Mi8/17s (lots around....) or, finally, just buy -60s.

[TheWizard]

http://www.hh71proven.com/wp-content/themes/hh71-wp-theme/gallery/flying4.jpg

:E

[Solid Rust Twotter]

ATE Super Hind.

Advanced Technologies and Engineering - Aerospace engineering (http://www.ate-aerospace-group.com/)

[Evalu8ter]

Wizard, nice picture...from a brochure..
There is a world of difference between that photo of an upgraded CSAR cab and a fully configured attack varient. That Merlin is still less armed and capable than a SF Chinook for example and is nothing like as potent as the full combat configured CSAR-X HH-47 Block 10.

Just hanging a couple of M3Ms off the side and fitting a FLIR doesn't do the job. You'd need to fit pilot aimed and fired forward facing weapons with greater stand-off range than a .50 cal, such as 2.75" FFARs, CRV-7, Hellfire or a decent long arm such as a 20mm chain gun or, even better, the twin 23mm from the Hind. Then you've got to fit loads of armour over vulnerable systems (including bulletproofing those mahoussive windscreens...) up to 23mm calibre, IR suppressors, targetting systems etc etc. Suddenly you need 3 engines to just hover with a decent fuel load and you're in the same quandry as the YB-40 of WW2 and the Hogs in VN; you can't keep up with the slicks on the way home....

[Yeoman_dai]

The Sikorsky MH60L DAP - USASOC CAPEX demonstration (http://www.janes.com/defence/land_forces/gallery/fortbragg/gallery/4a5.shtml)

25chaingun, carry troops, fast, hellfire/2.75rocket capable.... need we look further?

[Evalu8ter]

Yeoman,
As mentioned in post #7 the DAP (Direct Action Penetrator) is a good cab, and the 160th use it just as you postulate; organic fire support and (at a pinch) the ability to pick up a couple of guys (depending on Ammo / fuel load / density altitude). The reason why the 160th have the DAP is their lack of AH64, and they needed something with more firepower/loiter than the "Little Birds"- the DAP fulfills that niche perfectly. I had the pleasure of flying a sim with a DAP OT&E pilot a while back; he certainly enjoys his work!!

However, for "routine" SH the lack of disposable "lift" would make the DAP unworkable as anything but an escort to ease the AH workload. To get to a cab with true utility you need to go to an armed Mi8/17, upgraded Merlin or Chinook.

[Yeoman_dai]

cheers evaluator, this is very useful - especially as its helping towards my dissertation! (MoD procurement and maybe how UK PLC should adjust its forces to cope with future threats lol)

Could we look at the V-22 form? Same job (utility/attack), longer range, more power... has the capacity to carry plenty of ordnance?

Also, I don't know if you've seen it - Sikorsky has developed a helo-form with contra-rotating rotors, and a pusher propellor in place of the tail rotor, which gives comparable performance as the V22, only with less cost! Sikorsky X2 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sikorsky_X2) (i apologise for the WIKI link, but it's the best I can do and there are 'good' links at the references)

[Modern Elmo]

... which gives comparable performance as the V22 ...

Says the Sikorsky ad.

Comparable? Yes, one can compare a Dodge Neon to a BMW.

[Yeoman_dai]

Not really fair, I think the marketing team are thinking in the future, not right now. You a massive V22 fan then? We'll have to see where this technology goes, really.

[Engines]

A contribution to the thread....specially for Yeoman Dai...

Problem here is that people are looking at a range of rotary wing aircraft, all designed to do different things, and discussing why or how to strap various weapons on them, to meet various roles. This leads to things like ACH-47A (really off the wall, dangerous to the user and not much use as evalu8ter sagely points out), the MH60L DAP (tons of clout, but not at all cheap and is burning the airframe hours up at a huge rate) and finally Hind (actually designed for the job, properly integrated weapons, but traded off handling characteristics to get the wings and weapons on).

It all comes down to buying a combination of weapons and platform that (a) work and (b) meet the requirement.

Now here's a thought....we want a tough, low maintenance, aircraft, can operate from poor and short strips, carries tons, lots of loiter, and tough. Doesn't need to be fast, in fact low speed cruise preferable. Ok, how about a fixed wing solution?

http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/upload/img_400/Skyraider.jpg

Yes, I know, 'it's not a helicopter' and 'where's the cabin?' but stop and think - is it realistic to expect a mid sized utility helicopter ever to be an effective dedicated attack ship? And a modern A-1 (Turbo Mustang springs to mind) would be DIRT cheap compared to any rotary wing solution.

As ever, the answer lies in the requirements.

Hope this helps the debate along,

best regards

Engines

[LowObservable]

A turboprop Skyraider?

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/58/A2D_Skyshark.jpg

Bibbedy bobbedy boo, your wish is granted!

But be careful what you wish for...:E

[Yeoman_dai]

haha thanks chaps. I love the Skyraider, for example, but you miss the critical point that the aircraft needs to be able to land to collect, and, in the case of modern brushfire conflicts, can transport wounded, supplies as well as give gunfire support...

Although it would be great seeing Skyraiders roaring around Afghan ;)
Loved then, and they'd be loved again.

[Evalu8ter]

Engines - you tease....!! Ah, a spad..the Skyshark (?) never looked right, and I bet it didn't sound as nice without the -3350 up front..

Yeoman Di, you CAN fit a few troops in a Skyraider's cabin (depending on the model) and on at least one occaision they were landed behind the lines to extract fellow pilots. As was the OV10 which has a useful sized cargo/pax bay in the rear of the pod. There is a great account of landing OV10s on a road in Vietnam to conduct a hot extract in "A lonely kind of war" by Marshall Harrison. On another thread there's talk of the OV-10 going back in production - if we ever buy them I'm first in the queue!!

I'd rather have a tooled up Spad / Bronco on my wing than a fudged AH-Lite created from a BH...or, how about an armed BA609?

As Engines will remind you - "Where's the requirement...?"

[Yeoman_dai]

Defense Tech I read that, its been found a low flying slow aircraft with an observer with eyes on is better directing airstrikes than high flying fast movers using high powered cameras....who'd have thought it lol

Skyraiders can pick up? ha, you still need a decent length of clear area to land on, and regardless you'd find it hard to fit a fireteam of tooled up squaddies inside. Plus I know if I was wounded I'd hate to have to try fit into the cabin!

It's not so much that we need such an aircraft, this is a hypothetical question, based on the fact we could have more airframes with more utility in the currrent conflicts, within the defense budget we have. Plus i'm always willing to learn, and this is certainly helping :ok:

[Bushranger 71]

Re Yeoman Dai of 31Dec08 (#1).

Hi; you have raised a lessons of warfare issue so kindly bear with my lengthy response which might be of interest to all forum contributors.

Please consider this data for 9SQN, Royal Australian Air Force Iroquois operations during the Vietnam War which were principally in tropical jungle, but there was also a fair amount of urban area activity.

5.5 years (2,000 days) of theatre involvement and 2.5 years (900 days) of Hotel model Iroquois gunship operations with 58,768 hours flown overall for 237,806 sorties (about 4 per hour). Aircraft availability averaged 13 of 16 online daily (about 83 percent) and all major aircraft servicing was conducted within the unit. 4,357 casevacs/medevacs were effected and weapons expenditure was near 16 million rounds of 7.62mm and over 29,000 2.75inch rockets. 7 aircraft were lost due multiple causes and 23 suffered mostly minor battle damage. 2 aircrew were killed by enemy action and 8 wounded.

Infantry and special forces support embraced hundreds of instances of casualty evacuation, ammunition resupply and extended winching or rope extraction of SAS patrols while still engaged with a very tenacious enemy and usually at very close quarters (sometimes within about 10 metres). To adequately support the guys on the ground, utility helos often had to hover above the friendlies gun muzzles in jungle up to 150 feet high directing doorgun suppressive fire as necessary near vertically downwards and almost directly behind the aircraft (which is possible on the Huey but not on most types with inboard gun stations). Supporting gunships had to deliver very accurate high density fire support from short range and as close as 10 metres from own troops in pressing situations which cannot be adequately accomplished using stand-off weaponry

US Army Charlie model Iroquois gunship support was usually quite good but availability became a problem so we developed our own unique in the world Hotel model Iroquois gunship. A first-hand account is available on CD titled The Bushranger Story – ‘…and so, a Gunship was born embracing about 200 images and accounts of operational events to emphasize the need for developing the capability (costs AUD25 so just fire me a private message with your email address if you would like a copy and I will send an order form).

In a nutshell, we acquired a standard US Army XM-21 system as fitted to Charlie model Iroquois and appreciably modified the system for adaptation to the Hotel model creating a fixed forward firing arrangement for twin 7.62mm miniguns with 2 x 7 tube 2.75 inch rocket launchers mounted rearwards beneath crewman and gunner stations where we also externally positioned 2 x twin M60 machine guns. Podded low recoil 20mm cannon in lieu of rocket launchers would have been preferred but were not then available. We installed swing down reflector gunsights for each pilot station enabling minigun and rocket firing by either pilot. A utility aircraft that had been wired for gunship operations could be so configured within about 90 minutes, including weapons system harmonization, and restored to utility configuration in around 30 minutes.

http://i599.photobucket.com/albums/tt72/Bushranger71/BushrangersMasterPainting.gif

Ammunition carried was 9,600 rounds of 7.62mm for miniguns, usually 14 x 17 pound warhead unguided rockets (some other types of warheads were also used) and 3,000 rounds of 7.62mm for the twin doorguns (1,500 rounds each side). Refuel was with engine running and some later modifications enabled complete refuel and rearm in 10 minutes with both armourers and aircrew working together.

So; let’s address gunships and so-called attack helicopters.

Intimate close air support of troops in contact requires:
simple and reliable weapons systems,
pilot controlled fixed forward firing gun/cannon weaponry (for accuracy),
accurate high density ball ammunition delivery within about 10 metres of friendlies,
all-round vision by aircrew to see and hear sources of ground-fire,
safe suppressive firing by door-gunners when necessary on target breakaway to near astern of the aircraft,
redundancy for all gun systems to assure continued fire support in the event of weapon stoppages,
sustainable weapon firing not unduly restricted by weapon cooling cycles; and
substantial ammunition capacity for all weapons.So-called ‘aerial rocket artillery’ using 2.75inch/70mm unguided rockets is grossly overstated in effectiveness – 10 or 17 pound warheads have nowhere near the explosive power of 35 pound (105mm) or 70 pound (155mm) artillery shells and unguided rockets are a poor close support weapon requiring safety distances of 150 metres or larger. The Hydra 70mm guided rocket under development will only have a 10 pound warhead and is intended for use against point targets. Rockets are also a significant logistical burden.

Cannon is much better for close air support than rocketry and can be delivered quite accurately from fixed forward firing weapons although not closer than about 35 metres from friendly troops with reasonable safety due to explosive and shrapnel effects. Rockets with contact fuzing mostly explode in treetops having mainly noise value in jungle whereas cannon ammunition is more penetrative particularly with slightly delayed fuzing. Cannon also provides a useful anti-armour capability and can be devastating on a range of soft-skinned targets. Much of Saddam’s armour that I saw after the first Gulf War had been disabled by a variety of cannon fire.

Many attack helos are an air-conditioned and somewhat sound-proofed cocoon with much more limited visibility than Huey style gunships. There is no direct connection between the separate brains of the flying pilot and gunner so there are potential aiming and shooting inaccuracies using turreted gun weaponry. Off-centreline firing from turreted weapons on target breakaway can also be very dangerous in close proximity to friendlies as we observed when working with Hueycobras in Vietnam. Single barrel cannon are more accurate than gatling weapons when fired at longer ranges but some guns have a quite limiting cooling cycle inhibiting sustained firing. Particular weapons also have high recoil likely to degrade airframes over protracted operations. Few attack helos have any gun redundancy unless fixed forward firing podded weapons are fitted in lieu of assorted missilery.

Complexity and cost also mitigate against attack helicopters depending of course on the roles for which they are acquired. Some can deliver Hellfire very effectively (cost per round?) as can Predator, but such sophistication is only appropriate for high value targets and probably unsuited for dense jungle operations in the wet tropics.

The Australian Defence Force has acquired the Tiger supposedly to replace both the Kiowa for reconnaissance and the Iroquois ‘Bushranger’ for the gunship role. Reality is that it can do neither adequately whereas the Kiowa could have been very cheaply fitted with a simple bolt-on weapon system for armed reconnaissance and the Hotel model Iroquois upgraded to Huey II (which has great hot and high performance) for an elastic USD2million with more Hotel models available from US stored reserves for conversion (Bell Helicopter - The Bell UH-1H (Huey II) (http://www.bellhelicopter.com/en/aircraft/military/bellHueyII.cfm)). Compare that with an estimated ridiculous project unit price per aircraft of around USD45million for Tiger which is technically very complex for remote area ops, significantly underperforms and is certainly quite unsuited for intimate close air support of the infanteers.

A conceptual Huey II version of the ‘Bushranger’ could be equipped as follows and fully refuelled/rearmed in 15 minutes:
2 x fixed forward firing 7.62mm miniguns with 9,000 rounds,
2 x fixed forward firing NC621 podded low recoil 20mm cannon with 500 rounds of HE; and
2 x twin 7.62mm door guns (4 guns) with 3,000 rounds

http://i599.photobucket.com/albums/tt72/Bushranger71/BushrangerNC621.jpg

That’s firepower akin to a Beaufighter and a little bit of armour around the engine and transmission would also be nice; but for those who get a bit neurotic about supposed helo vulnerability to ground-fire, consider these numbers. Approximately 200,000 of all sorties flown by 9SQN RAAF during Vietnam ops were operational so divide by 25 representing aircraft losses and battle damage due to enemy action. That was a 1 in 8,000 probability of your aircraft being hit and most aircrew flew between 3,000 and 4,000 sorties during a 12 month tour. Helo survivability is more about sensible operating practices than the physical characteristics of aircraft.

(I have kept the images below the preferred 800 x 600 pixels maximum dimensions and they could be seen in more detail if Engines would kindly downsize his big Skyraider piccy, perhaps also that inserted by LowObservable).

[Yeoman_dai]

Wow, thanks very much Bushranger! I'd only suggest a few alterations, insofar that if a Huey was to be used, the UH-1Y newly developed for the US MArines would be a better choice, as it takes advantage of better avionics and defense packages, uprated engines and such, which decreses pilot workload and enables them to work on other aspects of the job.

Hot 'n high performance was mentioned, and that is indeed key (i'm thinking of Afghanistan here) I believe that that is why Chinooks and Apache are preferred for use currently, due to those same charactersitics - FAA Sea King and Lynx, and USAF Kiowas and Blackhawks stuggle at that altitude, so good point.

Weapons, I see the point about 20mm, but you can get very light 30mm cannon - and although accuracy is important, gatling style weapons still have the advantage of being able to put a lot more rounds into a target in a lot shorter amount of time, meaning less time on the pass, as a target. And plus, too much accuracy isn't always the best thing, when you want a good beaten area for surpression. I would also like to make the point that hellfire/TOW/Spike are all very useful additions to an attack helo and fairly essential. I know for a fact that, for example in Afghanistan, the mud-brick building materials is highly resistant to even the 30mm shells fired from Apache, so where would 20mm be then? So it would need hellfire, with increases the price because of the need for a targeting system.

However, that example is exactly, generally, what I am getting at - and if they could do it 50 years ago, it must still be in our capability to make an aircraft the same. I guess the issue is always that modern aircraft are often made over-complicated for the job needed, which is why we are going back to OC-10's, and Hueys are still flying etc.



(oh and its still 2x20mm cannon and 4xmachineguns short of a Beu ;) although i'll admit if the 7.62's are miniguns you probably have the same overall weight of fire:ok:)

[Wiley]

Yeoman dai, I think you'd get some rather heated replies from your average Grunt to your comment:too much accuracy isn't always the best thing,The Vietnam experience was that the other side worked out very quickly that "holding the enemy by the belt", ie, getting in really, really close was an effective method of dissipating the US arty/air support advantage.

Looking at the recent Ross Kemp series, it would seem the Taliban have come to a very similar conclusion when the terrain allows it. Area suppression can be achieved with a slight tweak of the rudder bar - but I think you'll find the PBI would really like to have air support with the proven ability of putting accurate fire onto targets quite close to them.

[Yeoman_dai]

haha wiley, good point. However, I know a lot of those infantry - I've worked with them, from another ground perspective, and frankly they just want as much surpression on the enemy as possible! (they like big bangs and noise, bless'em) and for that a gatling is the superior weapon. As they will (frequently) tell me, and the artillery, and air support is that all we do is 'neutralize', we do not 'destroy' - we let them do that, and if any of use have killed them before they get there, well, that was a lucky side effect :P they'll even say the same thing to their own fire-support sections lol talk about a god complex....

[Evalu8ter]

Yeoman Dai,
What the infantry tell you and what a post blue-on-blue incident coroner's report will say are markedly different. What was acceptable in VN where accurate precision weapons were not routinely available is simply not acceptable now. Legally the person pulling the trigger is a lot more exposed nowadays, hence the push towards combat ID and precision weapons. It worried me when I went on a USMC Huey sortie where we "aimed" unguided rockets (badly...) using a china graph mark on the windscreen drawn by using the crewman in front of the cab putting his fist on top of his helmet....

Area suppression / sanitisation pre-assault is not the same as reactive fire once friendlies are on the ground. For that, the AH gun system is proving to be a popular weapon.

[Yeoman_dai]

Plus, I shouldn't have used an infanteer's view on air assets :\. Point taken.

I still stand by gatling weapons over single barrelled weapons. And i reference my point about precision guided rocket warheads... i've been trying to dig out the link, but I can't find it, bah...

[Engines]

Wow, what a great thread. Superb post by Bushranger 71 - thank you.

Dai, my suggestion of a FW solution was a little 'tongue in cheek', and yes LO, I DO know about the Skyshark - it achieved the mean feat of making a great aircraft (Skyraider) less reliable, lower payload, less range and half the endurance to get not much extra speed - NOT one of Ed Heinemann's finest...But if you want the ability to land and lift people out, the OV-10 Bronco still fits the bill - but not in a clearing.

Bushranger covers just about all the bases in his excellent post, and for sheer utility the Huey gunship still takes some beating - but there were good reasons for replacing it with the UH-60, and most of those still apply - survivability, avionics fits, and hot and high performance were all design drivers derived from US Vietnam experience. I have to add that I have enormous respect for the Australian air engineering approach - it has usually been both professional and pragmatic.

The only area where I would offer an alternative view is the use of 7.62 weapons. My view is that in anything but an 'in your face' fight, 7.62 is simply the wrong calibre to use from the air. Yes, at gatling rates, it's an excellent 'suppression' weapon, but lordy, gatlings are heavy (very heavy with all those rounds), expensive (alll those rounds) and use heaps of precious electrical power. To actually hit and kill a small target from the air with that round (it's actually just about a .303) leads to an effective range of about 4-500 yards max. At that range, the bad guy on the ground has lots of options to do damage. If all you want to do is suppress using 7.62, a single Spandau (MG3) is just as effective as a Gatling, at a fraction of the weight and cost (but Bushranger's point about duty cycle is valid if you fire off lots and lots of rounds). In WW2, the .303 was quickly supplanted in aircraft use by the 0.50 calibre weapon, or 20mm cannon.

For helicopters, the debate has apparently been limited to '7.62 or 20mm' simply due to the lack of a decent .50 caliber weapon. However, the FN M3M (fitted to UK Lynx) fits the bill very well, and is the best feature of the 'brochure' picture of the Merlin shown earlier. However, it's still basically a 1941 design, and a new technology .50 calibre gun really would make a difference to many aircraft and land platforms. The reason such a design hasn't appeared in the West is what some call the 'DC-3' effect - there are millions of existing M2 and M3 guns around firing the 'browning belt' - a new weapon would mean junking the old stuff and supplying a new round and link. However, there are excellent Eastern bloc designs around.

Hope this helps - as i said, a very enjoyable thread

Best regards to all

Engines

[Yeoman_dai]

Darn, considering my area is more ground weapons etc I'm irritated I completely forgot about the 'canavas sheet being ripped in half by a giant', 1200rpm MG3, bah. Great shout engines, it's always been an annoyance for me that we never adopted it after WWII. Ah well, FN MAG's good enough I guess...

The US is looking at M2/M3 replacements, but the issue their having is the calibre means massive overheating at the kinds of RoF you need - I think the current replacement their looking at fires at aound 200rpm, which is frankly ridiculous, and I don't care how recoil reducing the tripod is...but I digress.

So, we're back on the Huey... ok, but surely, somewhere, modern westen or asian defense industry must be capable of making an aircraft as cheap but effective? time and again, I believe, anyway, is that industry bolts on as much hi-tech equipment as possible - which raises weight, power needs and cost. This constant persuit of gadgets I think is sometimes counter-productive and maybe using a slightly less capable item, that costs a third of the price and weight, would be more efficient?

How about... taking all this into account... A NH60, with one of these CIS 50MG - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CIS_50MG) in each door, stub wings capable of carrying Hellfire and Hydra 70 rockets, and an chin mounted 20mm bushmaster cannon... uprated engines/avionics and space in the back for a fireteam (4 guys, for those not in the know on infantry matters).
Ditch the armour because as Bushmaster pointed out in his excellent post, Hueys didn't have armour, yet it was the way they flew that kept them safe.

on that note, and as a point I believe valid, (although i'm afraid upon checking the article I read has dissapearing into the defense news archives) the Apaches and HueyCobras, used over baghdad in 2003 tried hovering and providing fire support like that - yet they were found to be exceptioanllly vulnerable, despite the armour in place and quickly resorted to strafing passes again.

something else to think about, on the subject of armament...40mm rapid firing grenade launchers... discuss. From a ground perspective they have been found to be exceptional at 'beating up' troops in cover...

[Wiley]

Yd, the US Army habit of hovering over hot areas was met with horror and disbelief by RAAF helo drivers (and I assume - hope? - still is by the Oz Army chopper drivers of today).

I understand that the scenes portrayed in 'Blackhawk Down' where the first Blackhawk was lost were pretty accurate. I think if any RAAF helo driver ever put his aircraft into a situation like that, (unless on a Dustoff, [medevac], where he'd have had close and very aggressive gunship support), he'd have found himself manning the Ops Room for the rest of his tour - that's in the unlikely event he survived
(a) the sortie, or
(b) the quick trip out the back of the latrines immediately after his return to base that his copilot and crewmen would have insisted he take... for a quiet and possibly very physical chat about tactics.

The US Army lost a lot of Hueys in Vietnam - a lot more than the RAAF did on a loss per sortie basis. (See Bushranger 71's stats. above.) There were many reasons for this. I'll cite three here:
(1) the level of training of the crews. The RAAF helicopter crews had all completed the full fast jet pilots course and usually, (if not always) around 12 months of intensive chopper ops in Australia (where they qualified as captains) before being posted to Vietnam - where they spent the first few months of their tour as a copilot.
(2) the unquestioned fact that some areas (eg 'I' Corps up against the DMZ) were a lot hotter than Phouc Tuy Province where the Australians operated, but most importantly
(3) the tactics employed by the RAAF as opposed to those employed by the Americans, which were predictable, to the point where the third of fourth aircraft entering or exiting an LZ, following exactly the same flight path as the aircraft that had preceeded them, were predictable targets.

[Yeoman_dai]

Ah ha, excellent WIley, thank you very much. So, that lends itself to idea that it is speed, firepower, training and tactics that keep helo's safe rather than armour? Is that a fair statement to make?

[busdriver02]

Armor and aircraft design are important to bringing crews home (H-60 is vastly superior to the Huey it replaced, mainly because it's design built on lessons learned in Vietnam) but even more so are tactics. Planning to hover in place and shoot at a bad guy is stupid unless a.) said enemy doesn't know you are there or b.)you are outside of his effective tactical range. Both of these scenarios require a long range weapon, which any cannon is not. Fulda gap tactics for Hellfire simply do not translate to a non-linear battlefield.

[Yeoman_dai]

why bother buying them, for £55million a time? Why not buy more of the type i've been pushing at this entire time;)

[Engines]

YD, my last post here, hope it's of use to you in your dissertation.

For selecting helicopter guns especially, a good route is to go for 'effects based requirements'. Simply put, 'what do I want to do to who at what range' - you can usefully add 'under what conditions?'.

Example - you want to suppress lightly armed ground forces at close range from the air, for a fairly short time, without an effective ground to air threat - add that up and you probably get to a twin GPMG or single Spandau (incidentally, they are still in use in the air from Italian Chinooks) firing 7.62 at a high rate of fire from around 400 yds max.

Example 2 - you want to be able to hit and kill sandbagged positions, lightly armoured vehicles, and other light ground targets at over 900 yds - add that up and you get a .50 calibre or a low velocity 20mm (like the GIAT M621).

Some other points - The US efforts at M2/M3 replacements have been, to date, risible. The overheating problem is an M2 fault - the M3M goes at 1100 rpm with no real problems at practical usage rates. The real solution is a new design .50 calibre, in my view - just not been done yet.

Grenade launchers- the forgotten weapon - they were the first types fitted to the AH-1 and are exceptionally effective IF the requirement is to 'kill everyone in a 50 sq yd area' - they also require quite high angles of elevation to fire (at least Western ones do) which can lead to arcs of fire being limited.

Signing off, please PM me if you think i can be of help.

Best Regards to everyone

Engines

[fltlt]

Early on in our flight testing of the Mi-24 Hind helicopter, one of the dangers encountered in maneuvering flight was the perceived limitation in left and right banking angles. We were aware of limitations by design and some of these limitations had been documented during flight testing of the Mi-8 Hip and translated well into the Hind as the rotor systems were nearly identical in capability. But, the Hind had a much more insidious and dangerous low airspeed issue in that if you placed the aircraft near the maximum angle of bank, the aircraft had a tendancy to continue rolling over and there was limited effective cyclic input to counter the roll. We were convinced that if you pressed or failed to correct this event early, that the aircraft would roll over (the "dying cockroach" position) which is normally a bad, very bad, event for helicopters especially at low altitudes and/or airspeeds. We figured out that the stub wings actually produce lift. A great design characteristic which allowed the Hind to achieve a relatively high forward airspeed considering it's size and weight. The wings produced effective lift after about 45 knots of forward airspeed and after around 100 knots actually contributed substantial lift allowing the rotor to devote more energy to forward thrust to overcome drag. A nice trade off. Smooth higher speed without having to change to a more lift producing rotor design. The bad part was that at low airspeeds the inboard wing stalled first in a turn, the outboard or up wing continued to produce lift effectively inducing a roll input that had to be countered with cyclic input. What I discovered was that when the roll was induced by the wing it could be countered with a forward cyclic input to increase or at least maintain airspeed and allowing airflow to get to the inboard wing. Fly it like an airplane. Helicopter pilots had a tendancy to roll into a turn and pull aft cyclic to tighten the turn which bleeds of speed rapidly. This is not the most effective way to turn a Hind. Kind of boring now, wasn't boring back then.

[Solid Rust Twotter]

That you TM? How about the Rooivalk?

[Yeoman_dai]

problem with rooivalk it can't carry troops like Apache, which is what the Col was getting at in the interview.

[Solid Rust Twotter]

You can get a Rooivalk and a Super Hind for the price of an Apache. Link up a few of each as an operating unit capable of splitting up into two ship attack/armed transport teams and you have a pretty mobile force. Parts continuity may be a problem but both are pretty modular and designed for rough ops so hopefully the logistics aren't too complicated.

[Double Zero]

SRT,

I'm sure you're correct, but does that include the support costs of both airframes ?!

The Hind seems the obvious answer - being a gunship + troop carrier - but as we've just heard has it's limitations.

As I'm certainly not a helo pilot, I was intrigued to learn some of the Appache's weapons envelope limits recently; relevant people will know what I mean.

I'm sure I am not alone, however, in thinking that rescue flight by UK Appaches & Marines ( whether originally a blue on blue or not ) was a great effort, probably a future classic film if the producers get it right !

[Yeoman_dai]

Old old thread I know, but I think of everything discussed on here this

AH-60L / S-70 Battle Hawk (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/ah-60l.htm)

seems to be the answer to everything? A modern day version of the Huey mentioned earlier..

Gunship support, Medevac capable (although without the full MERT team found in a Chinook or Merlin i'll acknowledge) could resupply the smaller FOBS...