PHI Crash in Louisiana Jan 2009 - 8 Dead, 1 Injured

[alouette3]

Word from the dark side is that a PHI S76 crashed in the GOM today at about 3:30 pm.Thoughts and prayers with the people who have lost their lives.
Alt3.

[206Fan]

Seven people are dead after a helicopter crash in Terrebone Parish.

Coast Guard officers said that the crash happened at about 3:30 p.m. Sunday near Bayou Penchant, La.

Nine passengers were onboard the helicopter owned by Phi, Inc.
Rescue units from both the Coast Guard and Terrebone emergency services responded to the scene and began a search.

One passenger has been taken to a hospital for treatment and another has yet to be found.

The cause of the crash in under investigation.



:( Very sad, RIP!

[Limumark]

Helicopter crashes in Terrebonne, seven dead

One hospitalized, another missing

By MATTHEW PLEASANT/Staff Writer Published: Sunday, January 4, 2009 at 6:07 p.m.
Last Modified: Sunday, January 4, 2009 at 7:25 p.m.
HOUMA – Seven people died in a helicopter crash this afternoon in a marshy area near Bayou Penchant in western Terrebonne Parish, according to the U.S. Coast Guard.

The helicopter, owned by the Lafayette-based Petroleum Helicopters Inc., was carrying nine passengers. One was sent to Terrebonne General Medical Center and another remains missing.
The helicopter’s operator sent a distress signal at 3 p.m., said Jaclyn Young, a Coast Guard spokeswoman.
The U.S. Air Force Rescue Coordination Center in Virgina picked up the signal and alerted the Coast Guard station in New Orleans, she said.
Officials aren’t yet sure what caused the crash. The Terrebonne Sheriff’s Office Water Patrol is searching waters and marsh near Bayou Penchant, in the far western end of the parish and a Coast Guard helicopter is assisting as well. Officers are also using an airboat to aid their search, said Maj. Thomas Odom, water patrol commander.
Allen Boudreax Sr. of Franklinton said he was notified by PHI that his son, 23-year-old Allen Jr., was on board the helicopter when it went down. He had not been advised of his son's status, however.
Boudreaux Jr. is a welder and fitter for Dynamic Industries, and was en route to a job site when the wreck occurred, his father said.

[gwelo shamwari]

Oilfield helicopter crash kills 8, injures 1 in Terrebonne (http://www.nola.com/news/index.ssf/2009/01/eight_people_were_killed_this.html)

Anyone know if weather was a factor or not?

Very sad... RIP :(

[S92mech]

Todays observations at Houma.
04 18:50 SE 7 7.00 Overcast OVC010 70 NA 30.10 NA
04 17:50 SE 7 7.00 Mostly Cloudy BKN017 72 NA 30.09 NA
04 16:55 SE 9 7.00 Mostly Cloudy BKN025 75 NA 30.07 NA
04 13:50 SE 12 7.00 Mostly Cloudy BKN025 75 NA 30.06 NA
04 12:50 SE 12 7.00 Mostly Cloudy BKN020 73 NA 30.07 NA
04 11:50 SE 12 7.00 Mostly Cloudy BKN020 68 NA 30.09 NA
04 10:50 SE 12 7.00 Mostly Cloudy BKN025 68 NA 30.10 NA
04 09:50 SE 7 7.00 Mostly Cloudy BKN050 68 NA 30.11 NA
04 08:50 SE 9 7.00 Mostly Cloudy BKN050 66 NA 30.09 NA
04 07:50 SE 5 7.00 Mostly Cloudy BKN020 64 NA 30.07 NA
04 05:50 S 5 7.00 Mostly Cloudy BKN020 63 NA 30.02 NA

[zalt]

Aircraft had just departed from Amelia outisde of Morgan City according to PHI. Crash scene site about 10 miles south in the bayou. The one survivor is reported as 'critical'.

[tottigol]

Our thoughts and prayers go to the families and the survivor in critical conditions.

[Carbon Bootprint]

Eight people died and another was injured when a helicopter bound for an offshore oil platform crashed Sunday afternoon in Louisiana's marshlands about 100 miles southwest of New Orleans.
The helicopter, operated by PHI Inc., crashed about 3:30 p.m. shortly after taking off from PHI's base in Amelia, said Richard Rovinelli, a spokesman for the company. The cause of the crash isn't clear. Rovinelli did not know the type of helicopter or its exact destination.


Link to Full article (http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/front/6194088.html)

Condolences to the victims and families. Not a good start to the year in the GOM.

[Gomer Pylot]

Pilots identified here (http://www.nola.com/news/index.ssf/2009/01/seven_of_nine_terrebonne_paris.html).

[Troglodita]

The cause of the crash isn't clear. Rovinelli did not know the type of helicopter or its exact destination.


Obvious condolences - not a great start to 2009 at all, but why would you let this guy Rovinelli say anything until he had something to say?

Trog

[GeorgeMandes]

IDENTIFICATION
Regis#: 748P Make/Model: S76 Description: S-76, H-76, AUH-76, Spirit, Eagle (HE-24
Date: 01/04/2009 Time: 2040

Event Type: Accident Highest Injury: Fatal Mid Air: N Missing: N
Damage: Unknown

LOCATION
City: AMELIA State: LA Country: US

DESCRIPTION
N748P, A SIKORSKY S-76C ROTORCRAFT WHILE ENROUTE TO OFFSHORE OIL PLATFORM,
THERE WERE 9 PERSONS ON BOARD, 8 WERE FATALLY INJURED, AND ONE SUSTAINED
SERIOUS INJURIES, 10 MILES FROM AMELIA, LA

INJURY DATA Total Fatal: 8
# Crew: 0 Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:
# Pass: 9 Fat: 8 Ser: 1 Min: 0 Unk:
# Grnd: Fat: 0 Ser: 0 Min: 0 Unk:

WEATHER: KMSY 042053Z 17010KT 10SM FEW025 SCT130 BKN200 23/18 A3006

OTHER DATA
Activity: Business Phase: Unknown Operation: OTHER


FAA FSDO: BATON ROUGE, LA (SW03) Entry date: 01/05/2009

[Old Skool]

I flew with Tom on many occasions, a sad loss, his dry dark sense of humour was great, Rest in Peace mate.

A sad day for all involved.

[leading edge]

The FAA notification appears slightly inaccurate.

It lists 8 fatalities and 1 seriously injured under passengers. However, earlier in the thread, the pilots were also listed as deceased.

The FAA notification doesn't list crew as fatal, serious or unknown?

Was it 7 passengers and two crew on board?

[206Fan]

Leading Edge

The two pilots and seven passengers were bound for two Shell oil platforms

The two pilots and six other passengers were pronounced dead.

PHI helicopter crashed in Louisiana swamp less than 10 minutes after takeoff - Breaking News from New Orleans - Times-Picayune - NOLA.com (http://www.nola.com/news/index.ssf/2009/01/phi_helicopter_crashed_in_loui.html)

Theres a pic of the crash site at the link above, what a mess.

[leading edge]

Thank you Davy.

It would have been good if the FAA had got it right, they are, after all the Federal Agency responsible for regulating aviation.

Its a sad picture.

[Gomer Pylot]

The FAA preliminary reports are frequently gibberish. I've seen the wrong type aircraft remain there for weeks, as well as many other types of errors. If you want accuracy, you need to read the NTSB reports.

[loav8r]

The spokesman in which you are referring is the Chief Admin. Officer, not a pilot. He is in charge of running the business, under Mr. Al of course, so why he is speaking on behalf of the pilots is beyond me. I would rather here from the DO or the CP, they have a better understanding of what is going on and the background to support it.
God Bless those who left and best wishes to PHI.

[Capt.Gonzo]

:( Very sad, RIP

[flyingchief]

From the picture of the CG it looks like it was quite a steep vertical fall, since the rests of the helicopter do not seem to be spread along a path in the marsh but they're quite limited to the crash spot...I wonder what happened....May your souls rest in peace fellows aviators....

[Outwest]

Is that the head and one main rotor blade visible in the crater? I cannot recognize anything else that even looks like part of a 76.

Deepest regrets to all involved.........

[Foggy Bottom]

Can someone tell me if Tom was an older gentleman. I flew with a 412 guy named Tom who's last name escapes me, but it was similar to this guys. We only flew together 3 or 4 times, but I enjoyed his company. When I left PHI he had just been offered a 76 transition.

[Carbon Bootprint]

Can someone tell me if Tom was an older gentleman.
According to the article linked by Gomer Pylot, he was 63 and lived in Eufala, Alabama.

[SASless]

At least the good news out of this is the weather was good, there were recorders on board and perhaps we will know fairly quickly what caused this tragedy.

It should remind us of the differences between fixed wing aircraft and the mechanical complexity of helicopters and the diligence required to ensure the aircraft is in an airworthy state.

[AirWon]

There is no good news out of this. What are you thinking, man?

[Foggy Bottom]

Thats the guy that I flew with, a real pleasure to fly with and a pretty good stick. Really sorry to hear of his passing...

[flyer43]

Although I understand what you mean by your comment, SASless does indeed have a point that hopefully some good should come out of this catastrophe by way of preventing a recurrence. The quicker the information regarding the circumstances of the accident are made available, the quicker improved safety measures can be introduced.

[212man]

NTSB INVESTIGATING CRASH OF HELICOPTER FLYING TO OIL
PLATFORM

************************************************************

The National Transportation Safety Board has dispatched four investigators to investigate the fatal crash of a helicopter in Louisiana on Sunday shortly after it took off to transport workers to an offshore oil platform.

At approximately 2:09 p.m. (CST), January 4, 2009, a Sikorsky S-76C++ helicopter (N748P), operated by PHI, Inc., crashed into swampy terrain just north of the Gulf of Mexico coastline near Morgan City, Louisiana. The aircraft was on a Part 135 revenue flight to oil platform number 301B. It had taken off from Amelie, Louisiana about 7 minutes before the crash. There were no radio reports of problems from the crew before the crash. Weather at the time is reported to have been visual flight rule conditions, with scattered
clouds at 1,000 feet and 10 miles visibility.

An Emergency Locating Transmitter (ELT) emitted a signal following the crash and helped search and rescue personnel find the wreckage. Eight of the nine persons aboard perished, and one person is listed in critical condition.

The investigator-in-charge is Bill Gamble from the Board's Central Regional Office. He and another investigator have traveled to West Lafayette, Louisiana, where PHI's headquarters are located. They will review aircraft maintenance records and flight crew records, and interview company personnel.

Another NTSB investigator is at the accident site. He is documenting the wreckage and will oversee the recovery of the wreckage later today. The wreckage will be moved to West Lafayette for further examination.

A fourth investigator arrived yesterday at West Lafayette to supervise the download of data from a maintenance recorder that was recovered from the wreckage. A second maintenance recorder is expected to be recovered today and will also be sent to PHI's facilities for readout.

The aircraft's combination cockpit voice recorder and flight data recorder was recovered from the wreckage on Monday and arrived today at the Board's laboratories in Washington, D.C. for readout.

Parties to the investigation are the Federal Aviation Administration, PHI, Sikorsky Aircraft and Turbomeca, the engine manufacturer.

Information on the progress of the investigation will be released by the Board's Public Affairs Office in Washington.

Will this be a first - CVFDR and HUMS data all available to the NTSB?

[Gomer Pylot]

Well, we can hope for accurate information. The NTSB seems as bad as the FAA with the preliminary info, though. It's Amelia, not Amelie, and there is no West Lafayette, LA. Nor East, South, or North. It's not that big. I suspect they confused it with the one in Indiana. Easy enough to do, I guess, since they're only a dozen or so states apart. :ugh:

[SASless]

AirWon,

The good news is the aircraft wreckage has been recovered. Too many times it is not.

The weather was unremarkable. Usually it is just the opposite.

The aircraft was equipped with data/CVR recorders. Usually they are not.

There was a survivor that might be able to describe what happened. Usually there are not any survivors.

That means the investigators have a much better chance of determining the actual cause of the mishap as compared to the other worst case scenarios.

The ability of the investigators to accurately determine a cause will advance the safety of the aircraft and hopefully go a long ways towards preventing another event from the same cause.

There is bad news of course....people have died and one is very badly injured.

If we find the CVR and data recorders playing a key role in the investigation and subsequent finding of the actual cause then the need for such equipment as standard fit on offshore aircraft will be strengthened and maybe....just maybe...the GOM will take another step forward by embracing new technology and getting closer to escapiing from the sad state it has been in for all of its existence.

Your comment is the typical narrow minded response we seem to get when we try to discuss accidents and their probable causes.

We should learn from every single one of these tragedies and do so as soon as possible with a view towards preventing yet another loss of life event.

Our hearts go out to the next of kin of those lost but learning from their loss is important.

No one has cast any dispersion upon the crew or PHI staff regarding this event and that is as it should be. We have to wait for the facts to be presented in the accident report before we begin that process.

[Persch]

No this is not the first NTSB rotorcraft investigation with FDR/CVR. the Copterline S-76 accident in 2005 had both. Neither has a lateral accelerometer though.

[twisted wrench]

Persch:
This one just might have a lateral accelerometer mounted.

From what I understand this C++ was on contract to Shell who usually demand all there aircraft have a HUMS system installed.

212man´s contribution shows that the investigators were recovering maintenance data recorders along with the CVFDR and I am assuming this will mean a HUMS or VXP recorder depending on what PHI fit to there aircraft?

[PHImech]

PHI's S76C++ have the cvrfdr, hums, and VXP. I think these boxes will be a big help in determining what happened.

[zalt]

Most SK76C++ only have VXP so no exceedance monitoring. No one has VXP AND a full HUMS on the same aircraft for obvious reasons.

[212man]

Persch,
I meant for an N registered, and in particular, GoM aircraft. The Copterline accident report was not an NTSB report - it was an Estonian investigation with NTSB (and others) support.

Why the interest in a lateral accelerometer (which clearly it will have, just not recorded on the FDR)? The FDR will have pitch, roll and yaw rate information as well as vertical acceleration. What additional value would lateral 'g' yield?

[AirWon]

Sasless,

Your long winded justification of your "good news" post was almost palatable; until you had to patronise me by calling my post "typically narrow minded". You make a long list of the bloody obvious without reflecting on the very phrase that you used that pissed me off in the first place.

Yes we learn by acccidents; yes it's just super to have some flight recorders to open up and check, and how wonderful that the weather was so good so we can probably rule that out. Oh, and yes; too bad some guys died.

Methinks you have a little too much time on your hands and are a little too full of yourself.

Take some time, reflect on your thoughts and be brief. I look forward to your 6723rd post on this forum......

[rotorsailor2]

AirWon

Totally agree with your post, both first AND second. It's about time someone questioned Sasless - what current professional pilot has all that time for posts?

[John Eacott]

It's about time someone questioned Sasless - what current professional pilot has all that time for posts?

What a strange thing to say. SASless has been around Rotorheads for many, many years, and his post count has nothing to do with the price of fish :=

At the age of 60 (see his bio) he may not be as current as you, but he is perfectly entitled to spend time here: as much as he should want IMO, he's earned it :ok:

Anyway, this thread is supposed to be about a tragic accident, not about having a pop at another pilot's posting history :=

[Fareastdriver]

I'm with you there , John.

[Revolutionary]

SASless, the problem is, you didn't preface your post with the requisite, trite, 'RIP & Godspeed to all involved' and went straight to making a valid point. What were you thinking?

[WhirlwindIII]

Red flag stuff.

[griffothefog]

AirWon,
Look forward to your 43rd post..... :( Should we give up on discussion and put our heads in the sand? We ALL suffer from these events and ALL want to learn from the tragic events of other brothers in the industry...
Grow up man.....

[AirWon]

Hang on a minute, lofty. You make a post with one of those little blue icons "things", presumably to emphasise some lame point; and then tell me to grow up. Even my 7 year old doesn't draw little pictures when writing.........

Some of you fellas are posting on the wrong forum.

...and just incase my post goes completely over your head.

Yes, we learn from all this.
Yes, cockpit voice/data recorders make this easier.
One none-dead passenger might give us a few more clues.
We know this ALREADY!
All the above does not qualify as GOOD NEWS!

See what you did? Now I'm using capitals in my posts!

I'm done. Working early tomorrow.

[zalt]

It is rare that GOM accidents make national news, certainly more than the day after. This one has, as USA Today has picked up on the 406MHz ELT beacon sparked a search.

Pilots slow to buy new digital emergency beacons - USATODAY.com (http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2009-01-07-beacon_N.htm)

Before anyone else states the obvious:
Good News: that in the event of this unfortunate accident one was fitted a one person was rescued
Bad News: so few other aircraft are equipped. - As usual - well done FAA for being a proactive regulator...:ugh: At least as a marine regulator the Coastguard have the smarts and the balls.

Am I right in thinking that Shell's PHI aircraft have European style Automatically Deployable ELTs (ADELTs)?

[Outwest]

Am I right in thinking that Shell's PHI aircraft have European style Automatically Deployable ELTs (ADELTs)?

I sure hope not.

IMHO, the most useless piece of kit I have ever seen and a danger to ground and maintenance personnel as well.

[tottigol]

All Shell twin engined aircraft have deployable CPIs.
I believe those come standard in all new S-76s, AW-139 and larger helicopters.
All ours have them anyway, that led to some pretty interesting calls from the USCG early on.
With my thought to the families of the crash victims I am really looking forward to finding out what the various recorders were able to do for them, but it seems to me that something very very bad must have happened very very quick, too quick.
In our hearts most of us probably know and in this forum we are adult enough to keep it to ourselves.

[bast0n]

There should be a filter in here somewhere so that we can weed out almost all of apart from SASless, 212man, John and a couple of others. They talk unemotional, informed sound common sense, with the stress on unemotional. Too much trite on the sleeve stuff around here.

[Fareastdriver]

IMHO, the most useless piece of kit I have ever seen and a danger to ground and maintenance personnel as well.

I don't get pissed off that often but that statement does. Equipment that hits the water and tells the whole world that you have ditched and where you have done it without any input from the pilot must be manna from heaven.

The Adelt has been a compulsory fit in the North sea for twenty years and I cannot remember an inadvertant discharge.

Useless pilots and useless ground and maintenance personnel if they can't cope with it.

[CH274]

It is rare that GOM accidents make national news, certainly more than the day after. This one has, as USA Today has picked up on the 406MHz ELT beacon sparked a search.

Pilots slow to buy new digital emergency beacons - USATODAY.com

Before anyone else states the obvious:
Good News: that in the event of this unfortunate accident one was fitted a one person was rescued
Bad News: so few other aircraft are equipped. - As usual - well done FAA for being a proactive regulator... At least as a marine regulator the Coastguard have the smarts and the balls.

Am I right in thinking that Shell's PHI aircraft have European style Automatically Deployable ELTs (ADELTs)?

From link given, it does indicates that the aircraft is equipped with a CPI which works on 406 Mhz. It is deployable, by a small spring, if trigger it'll probably drop by the side or at most spring about 5-6 feet away... and it can also be trigger by 'G' switch.
The old, 'shoot' out ADELT works on 121.5Mhz.

But more important the thoughts and prayers goes to all that are directly affected.

[Troglodita]

without any input from the pilot


So exactly what causes this piece of "magic" to deploy? Correct me if I'm wrong but does it not require arming and the pushing of a button in the cockpit to cause it to deploy?

Whilst not agreeing at all with Outwest that an ADELT is absolutely useless, I personnaly feel that a 406 MHz beacon that stays with and transmits from the actual (moving with wind & tides) ditched or crashed aircraft is more beneficial.

The statement "manna from heaven" also seems a bit OTT when referring solely to an ADELT.
A Company which fits ADELTS will (unlike most if not all GOM Operators) also usually provides Pilots with PLB's such as the SARBE transmitting on 121.5 and 243 MHz or with personal 406 MHz transmitters so a survivable crash/ditching will usually permit surviving crew members to summon assistance individually.

Unfortunately the Switlik or similar with a strobe and a whistle still seems to be considered perfectly acceptable to far too many Operators.

Trog

[SASless]

212Man might be a better source...but I do believe there has been one for sure loss of an Adelt on the North Sea....without anyone hearing of until the post flight by an Engineer who discovered the thing missing. It was not heard or ever found as I recall.

At a failure rate then of something like one of zillions...I suggest the Adelt is a very good thing.

Trog's post is spot on!

It was a great leap backward when I saw the American way of flotation devices having been spoiled by Bristow...it was comforting to know you had both a homing beacon and ability to communicate with SAR aircraft in your PFD.

There is only one way the wee orange whistle compares to the SARBE and that is cost....other than that....it is totally useless.

The USCG requires I have one on my inflatable dinghy I use to get to the beach from my sail boat....the whole hundred yards or so....thus I reckon they figure I can summons help from afar. They also require a PFD for each occupant.

Funny thing....I have a boat kit that includes a portable VHF radio, flares, mirror, and human lung operated HORN that can raise the dead along in addition to the inflatable PFD's I carry for each person.

The minimum requirement set by the USCG and FAA are just that.....minimums. Careful consideration usually suggests going beyond that minimum to be adequately prepared.

[Old Skool]

The ADELT can be activated from the cockpit, either deployed or just transmitting, it also has a frangible switch on the belly should that be broken by sea or land contact the ADELT is deployed.

[Outwest]

The following comments are directed to the ADELTs historically fitted to S61s, as they are the only ones I am familiar with. If there are newer, safer ones, then some may not apply.

There have been numerous cases of accidentally deployed ADELTs, not sure how many in flight, but I know of at least 2 on the ground, and if someone had been standing near they would have been seriously injured.

I have had maintenance personnel describe the scheduled maintenance to these things like working on a hand grenade. I know of one instance where the spring shot the ADELT thru the shop window while in for annual check.

As to effectiveness, if they do deploy as designed, where is it going to be when they come looking for you? 5 miles downwind/upwind? I would much sooner have them homing on me than a cork in the sea.

A PLB is the only way to be assured of finding all pax and crew on a dark and stormy night.

I don't get pissed off that often:D

Sorry for the thread drift......last comment from me on this.

[soggyboxers]

Our latest S76C+ is equipped with an ADELT as it was a North Sea SAR machine. We also used to have ADELT fitted on our S76Bs when I was with Schreiner. These operated on both 121.5 and 243.0 MHz and also had an "I" band radar transponder. I never heard of a problem with inadvertent deployment from an aircraft on the ground. The beacon can be deployed by the pilots in flight and the spring ensures that the beacon is deployed far enough away from the aircraft that it isn't damaged. If not activated by the crew it deploys automatically by either:
- Frangible switches when a fragile structure deforms - in the case of the S76 this is normally on a chin window.
- Inertia switches which activate at 6G or a velocity increase of 3 feet per second
- A hydrostatic switch which normally activates at 5 bars or 10 feet
There is no magic switch which deploys it automatically until it contacts either land or water.

As Trogs says all our aircraft are also equipped with 406 Mhz transmitters, crew jackets have some form of SARBE and most of our aircraft also have beacons with the dinghy (ies) and often crew deployable beacons close to the pilots.

It is useless to speculate as to the cause at this stage and with all the information sources available to the various agencies investigating it shouldn't be too long before there is some indication as to the cause. It is notable that there has been no requirement to ground the S76 fleet.

Whatever the cause, i extend my condolences to the families of all the victims.

[oheightvette]

I was scheduled to fly PHI offshore Monday however I was told the PHI fleet is grounded at Amelia. Does anyone know the status of the Sabine Pass helicopter accident on or around Dec 11th 2008?

Thanks

[zalt]

soggyb You are correct in the case of FAA but not in terms of PHI's customer.

oheightvette:- On Monday are you still going by helicopter or by boat?

I wonder how long Shell Oil can refuse to use the 76 before they have to give in and reintroduce it? :eek: But first will other PHI 76 customers follow suit (BP & BHP)? :confused:

And - without wishing to restart the 'news' debate - what 'good news' is possible from NTSB would allow them to reverse their current position? :ugh:

Footnote: I asked about the ADELT because it could just have been a fixed 406 ELT. I hope others found all the information about but can some one actually confirm if PHI have fitted ADELTs or not?

[Revolutionary]

PHI's C++ models have ADELTs.

[zalt]

Thanks for a straight answer!

[leading edge]

Currently, Shell personnel are going to the nearest S-92 capable platform and then being shuttled by EC135 to their destination platform if its not S-92 capable.

[tottigol]

............or they are using the heck out of the competition's 139s.

[tottigol]

Yes, that's Louisiana south of I-10 for ya'll.
She just walked out of the mobile home that morning and someone read her the news from the local Times Picayune, so she called her lawyer cousin and got the thing started.

I love the first three words:"The estranged wife"...

[CycColl]

Guys, I can share some info with you. My reasons for releasing this info are only so that people with a REAL interest in this terrible event i.e people who fly and operate these helicopters every day, can understand a little about what happened - nothing more, nothing less

1. Weather at the base (Approximately 9 miles away from accident site)
was reported as winds 150 degrees at 7 knots, visibility 10 statue miles, with scattered clouds at 7,000 feet and a broken layer of clouds at 8,000 feet.
2. Aircraft was on a Company VFR Flight Plan.
3. No distress call was received.
4. No evidence of post accident fire.
5. Initial analysis at this date indicates that at the onset of the
event, the aircraft was:

A. Aircraft in cruise flight and cruise airspeed with auto pilot
engaged.
B. Data indicates a significant reduction in torque on both engines
and an increase in collective pitch followed by a rapid reduction in Nr (Rotor RPM).
C. Pitch and roll data becomes erratic prior to loss of all recording
system power.
D. The aircraft experienced apparent loss of control and impacted in a
marsh area.

Factual Information:
No evidence of an in-flight deployment of the aircraft’s emergency
flotation system or externally mounted life rafts.
Air Traffic Control historical radar information was reviewed. It did
not provide a return of aircraft information. Radar coverage of the
area is not provided to the surface.
Main Transmission is intact with no anomalies noted at this time.
Intermediate Gear Box is intact. With no anomalies noted at this time.
Tail Rotor Gear Box was found with damage; case is separated. Internal
gearing appear to be as designed.
Tail Rotor Hangar Bearings currently show no evidence of pre-impact
failure.
Main Rotor Bifilar shows no failure other than those related to impact
Main and Tail Rotor Blade tip caps show no failure other than those
related to impact.
On preliminary inspection, Engines show no obvious anomalies. As noted
in the Investigation Status below, they are being shipped for further
inspection.
To date, no eye witnesses have been located. A few individuals have
been located that "heard" something, but did not actually see the event.

Investigation Status:
Analysis continues on Cockpit Voice Recorder, Flight Data Recorder,
Vibration Monitoring Acquisition Unit, and Digital Engine Control Units.
Engines are being shipped for further examination.
Investigation Team is currently inspecting aircraft wreckage.
Hydraulic servos have been shipped for further analysis.
Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS) actuators have been shipped for
further analysis.

[212man]

Frankly, whatever your good intentions, I find that less than helpful. Those of us who are professional pilots understand the rigour and detailed analysis involved in a proper investigation - be it by the NTSB, the AAIB, the operator or client, and do not expect answers overnight. We are not Fox reporters! Be assured that for all the reasons stated before, the cause of this accident WILL be ascertained and the results published.

[SASless]

I hate to be the one to upset someone's apple cart.....but there is a very successful business extant in the Gulf of Mexico oil related industry.

That being legal firms which specialize in taking on helicopter operators following helicopter crashes.

That is part of life in the oil patch in the GOM.

Lawyers know helicopter accidents are excellent sources of income.

A part breaks....the manufacturer pays.

An engineer or pilots makes a mistake...the operator pays.

Sometimes.....everybody pays!

Every time the insurance company or the defendant's lawyers will strike a deal.

It should come as no surprise to anyone a law suit should be filed following a fatal crash.

As to estranged wives....perhaps there is a couple of kids involved who will need supporting?

They were estranged....but still married....reckon there was no formal separation agreement in effect....thus still the wife and next of kin by law!


212man,

I disagree with you on this one. I do not see a post containing information of and by itself as being a bad thing. So long as the facts are credible and come from a reliable source and are presented as a summary or statement of facts without the author rumbling off down the trail "guessing" at causes then I have no objection.

In fact...discussion of the results of an on-going investigation serve as a vehicle for professionals to keep informed.

We can draw conclusions from information as it is presented but the final determination will as you rightly say....come from the official investigative report.

By the way.....Fox News...has been proven to be the more fair and balanced of our media outlets thus perhaps you should shift your barb to using CNN, MSNBC, NBC, or the decidedly crook CBS.

As I suggested, logical, professional, and unbiased reports and discussion are what we should seek both from those of us peeking through the knothole and the professional experts conducting the investigations.

[zalt]

212man

Your response is that of a company man;)
How long will Shell refuse to use the 76?:(

SASless

I agree that -

discussion of the results of an on-going investigation serve as a vehicle for professionals to keep informed

But is this actually from the on-going investigation? Who is CycColl [# posts 1]? Is CycColl a reliable source?:suspect:

[Old Skool]

With the C++, if george is flying 'two or three cue', and he notices a loss in altitude he will pull pitch in order to regain that altitude, regardless of RRPM. The 92 had a diferent system and should a loss of altitude be detected it will maintain RRPM.

[Phone Wind]

Old Skool,

Actually, if you're flying the S76C+/C++ in 2 cue it will use a cyclic pitch cue to maintain altitude. It's only if you're flying 3 cue e.g with ALT, AS and HDG engaged it will use collective pitch to maintain altitude and then once the limits of the SPZ 7600 are reached, you will get an AP warning as collective pitch is disconnected. Thus RRPM will be unaffected.

[Old Skool]

You know it's been a while and i don't have the books with me, you are correct on 2 cue, but in 3 cue as power is lost the A/P will pull pitch regardless of RRPM to maintain the altitude set.

[212man]

To be correct, the 'cue' figure is simply how many Flight Director Cues are selected, so you can be 2-cue or even 1-cue and still have the collective engaged (ALt + IAS, RALT) though colloquially the term 2-cue is used to denote no collective coupling. In the C+ (so I assume the same for the C++) the Sperry 7600 only limits on engine parameters (N1 and Tq) not Nr.

Why is this a topic for discussion? Is anyone seriously implying the AFCS had anything to do with this? The certification requirements for AFCSs are such that pilot intervention is assured before loss of control can result from it's action.

Zalt
no, not a company comment, simply that of a professional pilot who hates to see this kind of consumer culture "now now now" approach to a tragic accident, which will be investigated by appropriately qualified people in a meticulous and thorough manner. The information contained is almost certainly a breach of the company's confidentiality clauses within that individual's employment contract, and serves no useful purpose (weather was fine, aircraft was in the cruise, lost control and crashed - I think we kind of guessed all that!)

SASless,
I disagree - this information should come out as an interim statement from the NTSB. That way we know it to be credible (though I suspect it probably is) and not simply from someone whose ego is getting in the way of their ethics.

[ramen noodles]

212Man is right, this speculation has gotten way out of hand! One has to believe something very bad happened very quickly to cause this thing, and that small splash in the press photo shows something probably nowhere near controllable. Other than that, we must wait for the vast amount of data to know what happened.

Regarding the S76 family AP's. they will not suck the rpm way down, since the engine limits are monitored by the FD/AP, and the collective cue is limited by limit engine Temp or Torque. Since the Nr drops when the remaining engine exceeds those limits, the Nr will stabilize in a very comfortable place if an excessive OEI climbout is attempted.

[McRotor]

CycColl:

Thanks much for taking the time (and 'extending' yourself a bit I'm sure) to provide what appears to be some initial factual information.

I'm sure most of the 76 drivers greatly appreciate this cursory look into the event. Obviously no clear answers yet, but I know I appreciated the information before i hit the starter today, as did many of my colleagues :ok:.

Cheers

[HeliComparator]

I know I may get a flaming for this - but by way of an excuse, my point is a general one and not specifically related to this accident...

We have heard from various sources that the S76C++ autopilot will not pull the lever up so as to exceed an engine limit. Therefore my question is, if ALT is coupled on the collective and there is a double engine flameout, how would the AFCS handle it?

Software can be pretty dumb and perhaps it would see the aircraft descending, see that torque and N1 were pretty low, and raise the collective?

To be fair, even if it did this it would not be an airworthiness issue because with or without the AFCS trying to raise the collective, unless the pilot lowers it very quickly, rrpm will get too low to recover.

HC

[malabo]

If you lose both engines on the C++ the flight director will decouple, because one of the AP has dropped off line, because you've lost one of the electrical busses.

To go down that road you'd have to be speculating that with horns going off in their ears and the caution panel lit up like a Christmas tree, both pilots would keep sitting there with their arms folded.

I think this lead is a dead end, but if it leads to an awareness that automation needs to be properly understood by the pilots, then it is not necessarily a bad thing on this thread.

Will any helicopter continue to fly coupled to the Flight Director with both engines flamed out? How about your 225 HC?

[212man]

Will any helicopter continue to fly coupled to the Flight Director with both engines flamed out? How about your 225 HC?

EC Don't use Flight Directors. The types I know of drop out of coupled status.

I'm sure most of the 76 drivers greatly appreciate this cursory look into the event. Obviously no clear answers yet, but I know I appreciated the information before i hit the starter today, as did many of my colleagues

Yes, we can all sleep easier now, knowing that for no apparent reason, whilst in the cruise on a nice day, the aircraft catastrophically lost control and speared in. I'll bear that comforting thought in mind next time I press the starter. Any more gems of info? :ugh:

[SASless]

212man,

That is a chance we all take on every flight.....every now and then one of our cabs suddenly and catastrophically destroys itself.

The Finnish report answered the question about that crash and I guess we all felt a bit warmer and fuzzier as a result.

Is the source and completeness of the information that will allow for that warm and cozy feeling?

I reckon we can fly around and keep our eyes open looking for indications we are going to have both engines suddenly and without warning develop zero torque on us....but what would one look for that would give you more than a flash to do something about it.

The more information we have the better.

Perhaps the quality of preflight checks has gone up....or the increased scrutiny upon engineering will be a positive thing.

I suggest knowing one of the cabs did come apart in the air for some as yet unknown reason....will in itself at least momentarily boost our awareness of the need to be vigilant day in....and day out.

Complacency in aviation kills people.

I do not accept the "wait and see" but do it in complete silence and darkness attitude held by some here. I believe in the waiting for the official report but until then the more I know about a fatal event the better.

[HeliComparator]

malabo

As 212 says, there is no flight director in the 225. The AFCS is rrpm aware so I think it would try to lower the collective following the second engine flameout, however it certainly wouldn't be quick enough to save the day. Since the AFCS is all-dc and powered from the essential bus, it would not drop the coupling from any electrical supply reasons (and anyway the alternators are driven by the transmission, not by the engines).

Although you mention that the coupling would drop out, would there be a few seconds between the generators going off line and the bus couplers opening (therefore unpowering the FD coupling system)? -its 5 seconds on the Super Puma family aircraft. Sorry, I know nothing about an S76 electrical system.

The purpose of my post was not to start another EC vs Sikorsky argument (that argument was won a long time ago!) but just to point out the flaw in some of the previous posts - as you say, pilot's knowlege of how their automation behaves is sometimes limited to "normal ops" - and, if I am honest, to suggest a scenario that might explain an element of the alleged data CycColl posted.

You mention pilots sitting with arms folded, I am not suggesting that but as a trainer I see pilots flying OEI on checks with hands nowhere near the collective. Twin-engine pilots don't have the same mentality as single-engine pilots - the latter will dump the lever at first sign of trouble, the former will spend time analysing the situation before doing anything. With a simultaneous flameout of both engines, maybe you don't have that time...

HC

[FH1100 Pilot]

Who said anything about a double-engine flameout? All CycColl reported was a "significant reduction in torque of both engines." Maybe the engines just went to IDLE? If the engines did not completely flame-out, then all the electrical stuff could have (would have?) stayed online. Would the autopilot even have disengaged? How quickly would the first indication (light or horn) come on, and what would the RRPM be at that point?

So. The Big Question: Is there any way that the FADEC in the C++ can command *both* engines to come offline, say to IDLE, at the same time? Is there a single-point failure mode that could allow this?

Think of this bizarre situation: Both engines begin a decel to IDLE and the autopilot commands the collective UP! You, Mr. PIC are sitting there going, "WTF?!"

Heli-Comparator is quite right about one thing - pilots of larger helicopters are reluctant to do anything quickly or abruptly. And, if what some people are saying is true about how quickly an S-76 will bleed rotor rpm, the corrective action to such a "crazy" scenario would need to be both quick and abrupt: Ergo, significant (abrupt?) nose up cyclic input to get the disk up and loaded, and right-now! down on the pole. You'd have...what...a couple of seconds to make that happen?

One-thousand-one, one-thousand-two.

Too late! While you were sitting there trying to figure out what was going on, the RRPM just went away.

I can understand people not wanting to speculate about this accident. But for pilots who fly these aircraft with all the new technology, you have to wonder if there are hidden failure modes that are still to be discovered.

An S-76 pilot on another forum described it as, "edge of the seat stuff." And it's an apt description. For if something in a helicopter can fail in such a way that it causes *both* FADECs to bring the engines offline, while at the same time the autopilot is in a mode that would cause it to command the collective to come *up* in response to a loss of altitude, this is some serious sh*t. Because I'm not sure that even I, the super-pilot skygod that I am, would be quick and sharp enough to handle that one.

Are you?

One-thousand-one, one-thousand-two, one-thousand-three. Did you interpret all of the indications properly and do the right thing? (I gave you an extra second there because I'm generous.)

[SASless]

212man, HC, FH-100,Zalt.....funny thing how we are now discussing possible scenario's that modern avioinics might be able to be our undoing....and as I see it....stemming directly from Cylcol's post with some data about the PHI crash.

Does this discussion we are having not prove the point that professional pilots benefit from receipt of information about crashes?

It is going to be very hard for you to say we would be having this discussion absent that post.

HC...that argument was not won....best I saw it was a tie. But...that is your story...stick to it. The winner of that argument will be won in the market place and not here at pprune.:=

[212man]

SAS I was in no way shape or form suggesting automation was a causal factor - I'm merely answering questions directly. The C++ is hardly cutting edge technology- let's give this mysterious double FADEC throttle back phenomenon mumbo jumbo a break, eh?

[malabo]

Want to drift the thread back to CPI's and TorqueStripes comment of never an inadvertent deployment? Seem a few have not been on the aircraft on RTB in 212man's turf (third-hand rumors and innuendo, both S92 and S76). The really bizarre thing is that they have never been found!!! You have to appreciate the irony of a Crash Position Indicator that deploys but is never found! Give me a PLB with a built in GPS anyday.

[Phil77]

I quite agree with SASless: in my company we are discussing possible causes a lot. The result of our talks might not be the reason for the crash the discussion started with, but definitely raises awareness and activates the thought process of everybody involved. It is a learning experience especially for the less-experienced (like myself), but like HeliComparator rightfully said; a lot of older/experienced colleagues might just be a little too laid back at times (and the younger guys just might not know better).
I also agree that blaming and unpreventable, catastrophic failure doesn't help anybody.


An example my boss (long time helicopter and f/w driver - very experienced in the S-76 as well) gave me yesterday:

What happens if both AFCS/SAS go offline/fail during high power cruise?
- due to the elevated T/R, the aircraft will snap into a roll; the unaware pilot will try to correct with opposite cyclic input, rolling the helicopter back through the other side into an upside down nose dive.
- the corrective action for the initial roll would be full left pedal followed by slowing down the aircraft to reduce torque and restore a somewhat flyable helicopter.

My boss said, that he failed the Heliflight e.g. on a few very seasoned guys and due to the fact that it was never taught in the sim almost all of them did not see the T/R as the cause for the roll and would have rolled it straight into the ground.

The above seemed to be a likely explanation, but doesn't go well with the apparent loss of torque/system power CycColl quoted.

[twisted wrench]

Wow this is getting interesting.

We have either a dual FADEC shut down or/and a dual Auto-pilot failiure.

Both the Engine FADEC and Sperry SPZ-7600 auto-pilots are totaly independent systems, the likely hood of either of those systems to have a dual failure at the same time is very unlikely if to happen at all.

I think the speculation is getting out of hand!!!

[SASless]

I can think of several reasons why the "zero torque" situation can happen....starts with a huge "BANG" and a loosely joined set of extremely spare parts. At some point in the break up of an aircraft...assuming the recorders are still doing their thing....would not that be an indication we would expect to see?

As what led to that break-up.....is anyone's guess.

The engines could still be running...but not connected to anything...or connected to something but the rest of the dynamic components have departed for other places...again...no torque needed.

The 76 is very slippery at high speeds...as is the 109....even the venerable 412 can be a hand full when the AFCS kicks off at high torque and airspeeds.

Airline pilots undergo "upset" training....do helicopter pilots? Or is that another one of those "verbal brief only" items on the check ride?

[Phil77]

Easy Mr. twisted wrench! I did not say or speculate that my story is the likely cause in combination with a dual flameout, although reading SASless post that was posted while I was responding, I think as well that the timeline is important. We do know that usually a chain of events lead to an accident.

I did however mention at the bottom of my previous post, that it sounded like a possibility to somebody who did not read the statements of CycColl.

My comment was merely intended to underline the benefits that can come out of a discussion ("speculation" sounds so negative).

[HeliComparator]

SAS

I never said the argument was won on Pprune (and neither did I say who the winner was) however it has been won on the street (well in the sky I suppose):ok:

F1100 / twisted

You should not find the suggestion of both engines going offline simultaneously that impossible. Both engines are controlled by the same design of FADEC with the same hardware and the same software inside. Something affecting one engine that is software related (a bug) or from an external source (RF interference, icing etc) is going to have just the same effect on the other engine. If the probability of having a single engine failure is 1 in 10,000 hrs then the probability of a double engine failure is most definitely not 1 in 100,000,000 hrs - its much more probable than that.

On the EC225 fleet we have had 2 cases of double complete AHRS failure, we have had no cases of single complete AHRS failure. The 2 cases were caused by a software bug that didn't agree with the Montrose A platform. Fortunately the third AHRS system uses different hardware and software and remained OK. Had we had 3 AHRS systems of the same design, it might have been an accident (btw the bug was fixed a year or so ago). This is why fly-by-wire fixed-wings have different flight control computers manufacturerd by different companies using different hardware and software (though trying to achieve the same behaviour), rather than just installing 3 of the same kind of control system.

Also bear in mind the 777 that crash-landed at Heathrow the other year - both engines failed to produce power within a few seconds of each other, in that case I think it was fuel icing. The equipment (engines, AFCS computers etc) may seem to be separate, but there are always common elements.

HC

[Rusty Bifilar]

I’m not a C++ guy so you people that know tell me if this scenario is possible. A false main rotor overspeed signal causes both DECU’s to rapidly reduce power. N1 does not go below idle so both generators stay online. Would the AFCS decouple with an overspeed or would it try to maintain speed and/or altitude depending on which mode was engaged?

[twisted wrench]

The C++ monitors N2 input signals to the DECU and not NR speed, so the likely hood again of both engines showing a overspeed (real or false) again very unlikely.

The common link is the collective lever postion anticipator that will sense increase or decrease in collective position to adjust power settings.

I noticed in Sasless comments the Torque went to zero , in CYCCOLL report only stated a significant reduction in torque.

I also am very interested to see what happened to this C++, I have many of them on the base I work at.

[SASless]

I probably used "zero torque" when thinking along the lines of what Cylcol had reported....but was talking about a generic event and not the one that happened to the PHI aircraft in particular.

My conjecture also would have to allow for the differences between shaft driven transmissions vice direct input drives. My thinking was more along the lines of a mechanical failure vice a digiital brain unit running amok. The main discussion was more along the lines of how the various digital brains interact.

[HOSS 1]

77-

So, let me get this straight. You actually believe that if the AFCS/SAS were to immediately go offline while in high speed cruise, the t/r thrust will somehow cause the aircraft to immediately roll? Kind of like a loaded spring that is released? That the AFCS is normally counteracting?

The AFCS TRIMS the aircraft controls to the current flight condition. That is, the t/r is providing the correct amount of anti-torque for trim coordinated flight. (Which by the way, is not all that much due to the sizable aerodynamic anti-torque.) So while the the aircraft will quickly be marginally stable and very "loose", it certainly is not a wound up spring waiting to flip you inverted. The inverted flight comes later, from the pilot's inability to fly the unstable dutch roll mode.

Do you not practice non-augmented (sas off) flight? I suggest you do so. How do you know your skills will allow you to fly the aircraft after a dual SAS failure? Remember, the aircraft is certified VFR SAS OFF up to Vne.

Hoss

Also, The -76C++ DECUs do indeed use Nr in the control laws, but close the loop around N2 in normal operation.

[FH1100 Pilot]

With respect to this specific accident, barring catastrophic structural or engine failure, I think we can safely - let's be honest - rule out: 1) The pilots deliberately pulled both engines off in high cruise; 2) Fuel contamination/exhaustion.

But helicopters don't just fall out of the sky. "Something" happened and the ship hit the ground hard - really hard. It's difficult to tell from the pics, but it doesn't look like they hit nose first. So, no "lawn-dart." Whatever "it" was, it happened fast, however.

twisted wrench, who at first thought that the speculation about this accident was getting "out of hand" wrote:The common link is the collective lever position anticipator that will sense increase or decrease in collective position to adjust power settings.
Aha! Is this the mysterious "potentiometer" I keep hearing about? If this collective lever position anticipator fails, could it "fool" the DECU's into a mode where they reduce power on both engines simultaneously? Is the CLPA a single unit, or are there two of them for redundancy?

Mumbo jumbo, eh?

To me, it doesn't sound like an autopilot failure. The autopilot was probably doing what it was designed to do. The crew was probably cruising in "three cue" which, as others have noted is not such a great idea.

[If all else fails]

Quotes

77 - "due to the elevated T/R, the aircraft will snap into a roll;"

Hoss - "So while the the aircraft will quickly be marginally stable and very "loose""

So, agreement? that some level of instability will likely ensue following an unexpected loss of AFCS/SAS. Surely then, response/reaction time becomes the key as to whether the secondary and further effects (e.g. of yaw - induced by sizable aerodynamic anti-torque) have placed the helicopter in a hazardous attitude. The immediacy of any divergence being a factor of airspeed and the amount of divergence, a factor of the time before recovery/intervention.

But this is the bit that surprises me.

Quote 77

"My boss said, that he failed the Heliflight e.g. on a few very seasoned guys and due to the fact that it was never taught in the sim almost all of them did not see the T/R as the cause for the roll and would have rolled it straight into the ground."

Why would this not be taught in the sim?

[ramen noodles]

Having done a vast amount of stability flight test in several helicopters, including the S76 series, I find this entire line of speculation factless and groundless.

1) Switching the dual AP off in high speed flight will not cause any awful response. Could the Charles Lindburghs who think so just try it to see what happens?

2) A simultaneous (within 1 sec) dual engine failure or a dual stability failure is virtually impossible, unless you do it on purpose, even if a self-appointed expert thinks otherwise. Unless you deliberately turned them off together, they will not fail at the same time.

3) The Tail Rotor does not cause any wild roll in an unstabilized S76, all you have to do is let go of the stick to see that.

My Lord, we have entered that black hole that accident investigators dread, where the "could have happened" starts to dominate the scene, in the absence of real knowledge and real understanding.

Give pprune a D- for this thread.

[Phil77]

Why I would give some posters a D- here on pprune, is the fact that if they have a different opinion on a theory, they can't help but chastise any good discussion... oh, but not without elaborating at length on the topic themselves to prove their impressive knowledge! :D


I haven't tried it myself no, but also no reason to question the chief pilots reports what happened on several checkrides - why would he pull that out of his a**? Anyway, I will inquire about the mechanical reasoning for the upset I was talking about.

Hoss: As If-all-else-fails said, I think we're not that far apart; except maybe that I could have used a better word than "snap".
You said "The inverted flight comes later, from the pilot's inability to fly the unstable dutch roll mode", that is exactly what I was getting at: the pilots inability to correct the situation properly. Apparently there are a few people out here that think that the S-76 becomes pretty unstable without all her helpers. Again, I will try to quote the expert a little more detailed.

As far as the not practicing that behavior in the sim, I stand to be corrected.

Phil

[tottigol]

Pardon my ignorance, but does the C++ have any sort of Manual or Mechanical reversion mode for its FADEC?

On a different subject, I know for a fact that one of our C++ had an inadvertent (pilot induced) dual AP disconnect and the ride very quickly turned into a very exciting one, on par with some of the world's most famous roller coasters.

[Hippolite]

In the old days, I remember doing a short SNS Leman shuttle (about 6 stops) for Amoco using an S76A BJVZ (vice an unserviceable Bell 212) in which both lanes of the Hamilton Standard Phase 2 were U/S.

Stabilization was not required in the Ops Manual at that time for day VFR so we just flew the trip from start to finish raw without any stabilization.

Its no big deal and if you don't, you should be practicing it regularly. Granted, the Sperry system of actuators does give the aircraft a slightly different feel than the Hamilton Standard.

[High Nr]

1) Switching the dual AP off in high speed flight will not cause any awful response. Could the Charles Lindburghs who think so just try it to see what happens?

Suggest you inquire about a C++ operated by a large US based company in Australia a year ago.
Crews were PBI trained and current, but when the AFCS failed, the aerobatic airframe was "Overstressed" in the recovery efforts.

Took two weeks of inspections to get the airframe flying again.

[HOSS 1]

77- Yes. My point is there is no tail rotor "pre-load" waiting to roll you over when SAS is removed. But, I believe most pilots have little appreciation for just how demanding an unaugmented -76 is above 145kts. This is why I suggest all have a look at it first hand.


Also, the C++ certainly has a manual reversion mode. Controlled by a small DC motor on the fuel controller, commanded by a incr/dinker thumb switch on the collective. Again, something everybody should be practicing, especially in the C++ since you can't hurt the machine. The DECU will kick you out of manual mode and resume engine control if you go outside any limit.


HO5S

[ramen noodles]

High Nr said, Took two weeks of inspections to get the airframe flying again.

Slow lookers.

[cpt]

A bit like an F117 then ? :ooh:

[High Nr]

No.

I understand that the Factory Aeronautical Engineers took a while to formulate the inspection criteria, as the loads measured via the onboard HOMP were very scary and not covered by the normal inspection manuals.

Then NDT and the eyeball took up the rest of the time

The bottom line is that a fast S76 with no AFCS and no Attitude Force Trim is a real handful, even for experienced crews.

Now throw in some IMC in the wee hours, and that crew will be working very very hard.

Not sure how all this relates to a Dual Reduction in Tq and the consequent drop in Nr.

Now back to the main topic.

[Flapwing]

No AP's you have a handfull..... if you are a ham-fisted pilot!

[SASless]

So...night IMC...both of you tucked into your nosh on the way home...George driving....talking about the football pools...and you get a sudden call to arms.

By the time you put down the carry out boxes...pick up your serviette...wipe off the crumbs from your 'statche....deposit the serviette back into the rack....would you possibly be in a situation that would call for a bit of first class handling skills?

[ericferret]

MITCHAA,

I think that in the event of a major main gearbox failure leading to sudden loss of torque on both engines the result would be both engines trying overspeed.

The overspeed control system would shut down the first engine to hit the target speed (120% N2???) then it would self disable and the second engine would runaway.

This would probably result in an engine explosion as the free turbine gave out.

An indication of what happens when the overspeed system is inoperative is given by the Helikopter service Super Puma that crashed in the mid nineties.

In this case the drive to the main gearbox failed and the thrashing driveshaft cut the cables to the overspeed sensors. The engine FCU control system could not react fast enough and the engine exploded.

None of the above is intended to suggest that this is what may have befallen the S76 in question.

[HOSS 1]

True the overspeed circuit will shutdown the first engine to 120%. But remember, the engines are N2 governed. The DECUs would be pulling back fuel as fast as possible. So the fantastical Hollywood 190% explosion is not really likely.

[ericferret]

HOSS 1

Just to clarify the first engine to reach 120% N2 would shut down completely not stabilise at 120%. The second engine would loose it's overspeed protection.

The explosion situation is exactly what happened to the HS Super Puma.

Working from memory I believe that when the driveshaft failed and the overspeed system was destroyed the electronic fuel control was unable to react in time. The engine oversped and exploded with some parts cutting one of the control linkages to the main rotor resulting in loss of the aircraft. Parts of the engine also penetrated the aircraft hitting some of the passengers.

I believe that the logic behind the overspeed system is that if you loose an engine then you don't want an overspeed system failure to shut down the only good engine.
This clearly is not designed to cater for the simultaneous loss of drive from both engines to the main rotor.

It is possible that the S76 with a more modern system would react faster, but that is outside my knowledge.

Again no intent to suggest this has a direct relevance to the loss of this S76.

At the risk of prolonging this thread creep I just spoke to a friend of mine at work and his take on this is that the overspeed system will cope with a driven overspeed i.e the engine fuel control has failed and is demanding the excess speed. He reckons that an instantaneous loss of the drive would result in an overspeed that even the overspeed system would not contain.

Engineers are clearly like Greek politicians, 3 individuals having 5 different opinions!!!!!!!!

[Shawn Coyle]

The engines are required to survive a sudden loss of drive at contingency power during testing. This is done by running the engine on a test stand at the maximum contingency power rating and explosively severing the driveshaft. Tests (or prediction) somehow showed that the N2 wheel would disintegrate at about 150% N2 for the model of engine in the Bell 407. So the initial speed at which the overspeed protection would shut off fuel was set at 110%N2 in order to prevent the N2 from exploding. Later found to be too low (you could actually get the NR to 114-115% if you really worked hard at it in auotorotation. Thanks to the 'soft rejoin' feature of the fuel control, the N2 would run up to try to meet that value when you raised the collective to recover. Ensuing accident where the engine shut down at 110% N2 during a practice turning autorotation required the N2 overspeed value to be re-set at 116% if memory serves me well. Tests showed you couldn't get the NR there.
The original value had been chosen too conservatively without due regard to the big picture.
But the overspeed protection is required to demonstrate that it can survive an explosive immediate loss of drive at the worst condition.

[ericferret]

Interesting that Bell fit an overspeed system to a single. I believe that most singles don't have an overspeed system.

I was told that Bell 205's had a sytem and normal procedure was to pull the C.B so it wouldn't operate (ye of little faith) inadvertantly.

I suppose it's a balance of risk, which is worse an uncommanded shutdown where there is nowhere to land or an exploding engine if the drive fails.

[SASless]

Bell 205's had an over speed system?

Where did you hear that?

[FH1100 Pilot]

Man, now the two brain cells are fired up! Wasn't it the 206L-1 that had an overspeed system at first? Which we ended up disabling because it activated prematurely?

[HOSS 1]

The above poster is correct. Once an engine is shutdown by the overspeed system, protection is inhibited on the remaining engine. But, I wonder just how high the N2 would get. The DECU is pretty responsive. But, purely conjecture on my part.


HOSS

[carholme]

Yes, the Bell 205 had an overspeed system but there were too many faults with the frequency counter resulting in spooldowns at the most inappropriate time. You will find the press switch contained in a round guard at the top middle to right hand side of the pilot instruments.

I will see if I can find an instrument panel view.


Regards

carholme

[carholme]

Here is the schematic showing the overspeed trip system installed between the gearbox and the N2 tach on the -13 engine.

http://www.huey.co.uk/images/servicebook/T5313A%20Overspeed%20Trip%20System%206-22.jpg

and here is the instrument panel showing the guarded swith just to the top left of the ADI.

http://www.huey.co.uk/images/servicebook/Instumentation,%20Warning%20and%20Control%20Systems%203-1.jpg

carholme

[soggyboxers]

Can we get back to the PHI crash now and have another discussion about engine overspeed systems on various types on another thread please? I keep thinking I may see something relevant to the accident or S76 and find it isn't so and as I fly the S76 I'd be happier if I didn't keep thinking I may find something which may be relevant to what I'm doing. Thanks, Soggy

[carholme]

Soggy;

Sorry to have offended you in your singular world. Have at it!!!

carholme

[ramen noodles]

The engine overspeed systems are part of the design of all turbine engines so that any runaway is stopped before the engine speeds up so much that it comes apart. In older engine designs, the protection system was mechanical, in newer aircraft (virtually all by now) it is electronic, and predicts the failure state by using both trhe actual N2 speed and the rate of increase of the N2 speed. Thus it triggers at lower N2 if the turbine is accelerating.

[ericferret]

SASLESS

No idea where I got that bit of info from.

Chickenhawk is my normal source for Huey info!!!!!!!!!!!!

However in this case I think it came from someone who had worked with the Sultan of Omans armed forces. I shall now agonise over who it might have been.

Specifically I understand that S76's are now subject to a repetitive inspection of all indicating chip detector systems every 25 hours. 4X Gearbox and 4x Engine chip detectors.
Full system test.

Not sure if this is Sikorsky driven or just local.

[Brian Abraham]

Bell 205's had an over speed system?

Where did you hear that?
Tis true SAS. At least the ones we flew in civvy street Australia. Always flown with the breaker pulled though. One chap found why when he accidentally pushed the breaker in on start up and on approach to destination found himself with fluctuating power, resolved by rapidly pulling the breaker.

[SASless]

Brian,

My alcohol ravaged brain must be getting really bad....flew the civvie 205A-1 a bit but don't recall that bit of kit....but then I have trouble remembering my address after dark too.

I know the UH-1 series did not have it.

Of course....most of the places I flew the civvie 205 would not have had it working after the first time it got snagged either.

But as they say....we live and learn....and forget.

[albatross]

Yes the 205 had an overspeed system - it didn't work - it was always disabled on any 205 I flew.

[Flapwing]

Any more information regarding this accident for us C++ drivers released yet? CVR, FDR, VXB??

[loav8r]

As a former PHI C++ pilot, I can pretty much assure you the pilots were not flying in 3 cue. We were trained to climb/decend in 3 cue, but not cruise in 3 cue. We were aware of the torque demands due to wind gusts so cruising in 3 cue was pretty much prohibited. :=

[Shell Management]

I am not able to comment on the accident for various reasons but I will say I am disgusted at the lack of accurate proof reading by the NTSB on a very critical, sensitive and easy to confirm aspect of this fatal accident. After 19 days haste is not an excuse and a caveat that the report may contain errors will not alleviate the disgust that I share with the family and freinds of the deceased.

It again confirms, as IHST's accident analysis has shown, that the NTSB should be ashamed of their lack of attention on rotary wing accidents.

Sunday, January 04, 2009

Preliminary (http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20090104X12037&key=1) Morgan City, LA SIKORSKY S-76C++ N748P Fatal(2) NSCH Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Preliminary (http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20090105X05515&key=1) Indiana, PA PIPER PA-28-160 N5212W Fatal(1) Part 91: General Aviation
Preliminary (http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20090106X42651&key=1) Wilmington, NC CESSNA 550 N815MA Nonfatal Part 91: General Aviation

NTSB Identification: CEN09MA117
Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Accident occurred Sunday, January 04, 2009 in Morgan City, LA
Aircraft: SIKORSKY S-76C++, registration: N748P
Injuries: 2 Fatal, 1 Serious, 6 Uninjured.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
On January 4, 2008, at 1409 Central Standard Time (CST), a Sikorsky S-76C++ helicopter, N748P, registered to and operated by Petroleum Helicopters , Inc.(PHI), as a CFR 49 Part 135 air taxi flight using day visual flight rules (VFR), crashed into marshy terrain approximately 7 minutes after take-off and 12 miles southeast of the departure heliport. Both pilots and six of the seven passengers on board were killed. One person was critically injured. The helicopter departed Lake Palourde Base Heliport, a PHI base (7LS3), in Amelia, Louisiana, en route to the South Timbalier oil platform ST301B to transport workers from two different oil exploration companies. No flight plan was filed with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), nor was one required. A company flight plan was filed with the PHI communications center that provided weather updates and flight following for the helicopter crew.

According to representatives of PHI, the flight was being tracked via Outerlink, a satellite based fleet-tracking system used by the PHI communications center. The departure from 7LS3 was reported at 1402. The track suddenly ended about 7 minutes after departure at 1409. There were no reports of any problems from the flight crew on the PHI radio frequencies or emergency transmissions on any monitored air traffic control frequencies. A search and rescue operation was initiated at 1414 after the US Air Force notified PHI and the United States Coast Guard of a distress signal being transmitted with the unique identifier that is part of the Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) signal that transmits the Aircraft registration number and latitude and longitude coordinates. The helicopter wreckage was found shortly thereafter near the location of the loss of the track and transmitted ELT signal location by the U.S. Coast Guard. The wreckage was found partially submerged and exhibited very little main rotor blade damage.

The twin-engine, 14-seat, 2-year-old helicopter was equipped with glass cockpit instrumentation, a combination cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and flight data recorder (FDR), an enhanced ground proximity warning system (EGPWS), solid state quick access recorder (SSQAR), and a VXP vibration recorder. The two Turbomeca Ariel turbo shaft engines were equipped with digital engine control units (DECU). All of these devices have been recovered and are being evaluated by the NTSB IIC and the investigative team. Additional electronic components and flight components are scheduled for further detailed examination. The wreckage was recovered to the PHI maintenance facility in Lafayette, Louisiana and secured.

The weather conditions reported at Amelia, Louisiana at 1430 CST were; scattered cloud layers at 1,500 feet and 3,500 feet, a broken cloud layer at 10,000 feet, visibility 10 miles, winds at 160 degrees at 6 knots, temperature of 24 degrees Celsius, and dew point of 19 degrees Celsius.
Index for Jan2009 (http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/AccList.asp?month=1&year=2009) | Index of months (http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/Month.asp)

[rotorbrent]

Fairly entertaining watching everyone give their guess on basically no valid or verified information and act like the actually know something when they do not. The investigation continues, No smoking guns have been found and the actual cause could possibly never be found.

No emergency AD's on any component of the S-76 or systems no changes in any operating or maint procedures and nothing interesting found on any of the other sister ships looked at. It all takes time and knee jerk emotional reactions do nothing to find the cause. Until a actual cause and problem is found then solutions can be proposed, studied and implimented.

This thread looks like a good study in the game of "telephone" for adults

Your all are going to look funny if say it was like the A/C condensor blew up and one pilot kicked the pedals and the other thought they lost the tail rotor and shut down the engines without telling the other pilot and during the confusion no one was flying and did not enter autorotation. See I can come up with a weird story as well.

It would be fairly obvious soon to investigators if something like a gearbox went but the longer it takes the more interesting the plot becomes. The boxes everyone puts thier faith in are not the Holy Grails of accident information that you think they are.

Over 100 experts in every field of aviation accident investigation are working on finding a cause and solution. But in the real world some problems are never solved.

Our hearts and prayers go out to familys that hopefully a cause will be found for thier sake but also to those of us from the first of aircraft circling overhead the accident that afternoon continue to climb into S-76's and thankfully fly them with valid factual information and not a colomigration POH from PPRuNe

[SASless]

Yes....you are quite correct.

I reckon there has not been the first bit of talk or discussion in any of the PHI crew rooms, house trailers, or email exchanges either. Why I would bet you even the Air Log gang never uttered a peep about the event either as they sat around the dinner table.

Yep...this pprune gang really are a bunch of dorks aren't they!

[topendtorque]

Calm down shell man,
The caveat is standard beer, and covers the fact (apart from anything else, even that inital info maybe incorrect) that they are still searching, at least.
Some comfort should be taken from the fact that as well as every one else who has said nothing (quote sasless) neither has NTSB, before enough info, if ever, can be gleaned.

I'm sure they'll be doing more than looking into their tea leaves on this one.
cheers tet

[Carbon Bootprint]

This was the 11th GOM crash in five years. While a bit light on specifics, an article in today's Houston Chronicle (http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/front/6240688.html)summarises current NTSB efforts on offshore helo and EMS operations.

[Phil77]

tet:
my guess is what p**** Shell off (and me too, btw.), is the lack of attention to detail. I mean preliminary or not, initial findings or thorough investigation, a mistake like this shouldn't have happened and indeed questions their efforts in general:


Injuries: 2 Fatal, 1 Serious, 6 Uninjured.


:ugh:

[helimutt]

Rotorbrent, you state:-
No emergency AD's on any component of the S-76 or systems no changes in any operating or maint procedures

So maybe I can ask you why CHC are having all S76 mag plugs pulled every 25 hours for checking after this accident? At least they are where I work, and the engineers wouldn't just do this unless told to by someone. ???:confused:

[ramen noodles]

helimutt asked a good question, "So maybe I can ask you why CHC are having all S76 mag plugs pulled every 25 hours for checking after this accident?"

The answer is that if the investigators have no idea what happened, they do something, anything to make things safer.
We are groping for word from inside the closed room where experts try to understand what happened. Anything that comes out is taken as a Sign Of What Happened, but more likely, anything that comes out is more likely the answer to a concerned management that asks, "What can I do to get safer, in the mean time?" Then the next best idea is tried, and so on.

I've seen it a hundred times. The worst case was when a Black Hawk went down, and while the cause was being determined, the generals that ran the show had the stabilator claw switch installed on every Army Hawk. Most of the unwashed thought this confirmed the stab as the cause. Later, a disconnected control rod (due to lack of safety) was found, but the stab has carried this guilt ever since.

Speculation is worse than warm spit, IMHO.

[rotorbrent]

Its all emotional not base on factual information to show you are proactive to the accident ,without any real basis of increased chip plug inspection. For example we do more corrosion inspections and care because of the hot humid conditions. That is a factual response to finding corrosion due to being in the Gulf of Mexico.

My questions is by pulling all the chip plugs have you found anything?

I bet there has been zero increase safey or reliability by doing this and the emotion that your are safer now is just a illusion

You just increased your chances of damaging the plugs by removing and re -installing then so much. Plus extra cycles for the engines to do the leak check and you have no benefit or cause to do all this extra work or inspections and are really increasing you chances for additional issues not reducing them.

And when they find it was some weird electrical relay failure and computer fault or they were struck by lighting? are you going to still pull the chip plugs ? Or are you going to apply correct maint procedures to prevent this again.

There is nothing wrong with being proactive. But shooting in the Dark on Zero comfirmed information would not be good safety, or management pratice.

And once again there have been no smoking guns found and no emergency AD's. So I can choose to go out strap in and do my job to the best of my knowledge and keep studying in my profession or I can get wrapped up in pointless grade school rumors and be a chicken little and feed the rumor mill or choice to be a pro. If they find a accident cause I will adjust my actions as the facts are discovered. Not react to every rumor until then.

There are more workers killed driving to and from offshore work bases than at work. Equipment drops and falls second, boat accidents third and helicopters are way down the list.

[helimutt]

I saw that memo this morning just before going flying. It said the 76 was a 'low inertia' head. R22's do teach you something useful then, although I did manage to fall out of the sky in the 76 sim at FSI when I had a double eng failure. :(

Funny how eng chip warnings could appear only minutes after the last mag plug check. The thing is, as an ex engineer, I know fine well how quickly a high speed rotating part can fail with little or no warning at all. Been a bit close to a few of them over the years!

High speed rotating machinery stores huge amounts of kinetic energy. When one or more rotating components burst, that energy is released. For example, a rotor weighing 272 kg (600 lbs), having a diameter of 76 cm (30 in) and spinning at 14,000 rpm has an energy equivalent of 2.1 x 107 Joules. This is equivalent to the power of some bombs. Even small rotors spinning at high speed can cause catastrophic damage during a burst.

[topendtorque]

Duly noted Phil77, surely the data on the electronic storages will not take too long to interrogate?\tet

[rotorbrent]

Data is based on the assumption that power is supplied to the components. The Orange Boxes are not the "Holy Grail" that the press and the safety guys make them out to be.

For example if your accident event took 25 seconds to get to the crash site but power was lost to all components at 6 seconds into to event you would have 19 seconds of zero data.

There are several NTSB reports in which list. notes such as "CVR power lost" or "FDR power lost" no further information.

[unstable load]

Helimutt,I think you'll find that the mag plug inspection is irrelevant to this crash. Long before I joined CHC we were pulling the mag plugs on the Arriel series engines every 25 hours. I started off on the 1S series and we still do it on the 2S engines and if my memory serves it was on a similar schedule on the 2C engines as well.
By the way, those mag plugs are not connected to a light in the cockpit.

[helimutt]

By the way, those mag plugs are not connected to a light in the cockpit.


This I know, but I was told of one event, recently, not sure exactly how accurate the timing is, where the mag plugs and chip detectors were all checked and found clear and 11 minutes into the next flight afterwards, the eng chip warning light came on, a/c returned to base, and all plugs found covered in metal. Engine required changing!

Things happen very quickly once an engine starts to break up, so the 25 hr check, I feel, is probably going to just create more work for engineers and more chances of damage to plugs/wiring etc.

Anyway, whatever the cause, I just hope they find some clue and can pass that information on.
Flying the 76, and after the copterline accident where waterspouts and pilot error were all possible causes!!:hmm:, I just prefer to have some sort of closure, and I think many others do too. No point in speculating too far but discussion on accidents is a good thing if done with consideration.

[FloaterNorthWest]

Pulling and checking the mag plugs on the Arriel 2S2 is a 30hr scheduled maintenance item in the Turbomeca maintenance programme. Usually this item is moved if a company has an approved maintenance programme. We included the mag plug check in the daily so unstable load is correct.

The North Sea guys won't know this as they have a man that does all that messy stuff for them. :ok:

[ericferret]

There is a difference between mag plugs and chip detectors.

Mag plugs on the Arriels are being pulled every day as per normal.

It is a full test of all the chip detectors and their indicating systems that is being carried out every 25 hours. 4x Engine, 2x Main Gearbox, 1x IGB 1x TRGB.

[topendtorque]

Re the data recorders having power shut down and no more recording.
This is a bit of a problem for sure and must be a hindrance when primary sensor logic has not given enough clues as to why the aircraft may be descending. No doubt recording the pilot’s subsequent actions would help to build a better picture. I note the other thread where it talks about transmitting copious quantities of video data back to a monitor during EMS work. (Safety solution for helicopter EMS sorted)

Certainly transmitting coded bursts of information has been around via satellite comms for a while. So while I was tooling along the other day in a straight line I figured maybe the new 406MHZ ELT’s could be put to a more profound use.

Not only can they now send GPS co-ordinates but of course each ELT is coded to a particular aircraft. Perhaps they could also be enhanced to record, on say a fifteen minute loop, coded data from selected inputs such as the famous black boxes, and then transmit that data via satellite along with their distress call to be recorded back at search headquarters.

The other issue of power loss also needs to be overcome via a redundancy package of standby power which will drive the sensors on the critical control points (HACCP) independently of the main power sources.

Patent issues on the data recorders may mean that this would all have to be done externally to the devices.

The ELT may be positioned in close proximity to the data recorders for ease of data transfer via hard wire, but easily breakable, or a discreet UHF frequency.

Recently Nick Lappos invited us all to contribute ideas to be valued for inclusion in new generation helicopters. These issues may gel with him.

HACCP or Hazard Analysis on Critical Control Points was given to us by NASA as a result of a certain O-ring falling out of a fuel tank on a space shuttle. It is now widely used in many industries, particularly the meat industry at abattoirs and processing works in searching for the elusive E-coli, and anything to do with meat safety.

Besides there must be at least a small amount of silver lining in the dark cloud that this accident so far seems to be.
Cheers Tet

[ramen noodles]

topendtorque told us, "HACCP or Hazard Analysis on Critical Control Points was given to us by NASA as a result of a certain O-ring falling out of a fuel tank on a space shuttle."

Are you serious? After the horrendous safety record of NASA, with the last catastrophic shuttle reentry accident based on the foam impacting the wing, where management ignorance and indifference were the principal cause, please spare us any of their safety advice. I believe they need a lot more letters in the acronym before they would get me to believe they knew much about flight safety.

[SASless]

Ramen,

Are you talking about the same NASA that runs the GISS that employs James Hansen.....Al Gore's Global Warming Guru? The same NASA and GISS that does not use Space based technology in their scientific models that predict the end of the world as we know it in the next couple of weeks?

As we all know....AL Gore and Hansen are considered experts and thus by association alone NASA must be experts.

That must be logical as the Shuttle Program's safety record is as about as good as GISS Global Warming Models are.

[Brian Abraham]

I think what topendtorque is referring to is the developement of the "normalization of deviance" theory by sociologist Professor Diane Vaughan, Columbia University, as a result of the "Challenger" accident. Her NASA analysis was awarded the Rachel Carson Prize, the Robert K Merton Award, Honorable Mention for Distinguished Contribution to Scholarship of the American Sociological Association, and was nominated for the National Book Award and Pulitzer Prize. As a result of her analysis of the Challenger accident, she was asked to testify before the Columbia Accident Investigation Board in 2003, then became part of the Board's research staff, working with the Board to analyze and write the chapters of the Report identifying the social causes of the Columbia accident (Chapter 8 of the report).

[tistisnot]

Sounds like it should be on the What's New In West Africa thread ..... or more like included in the requisite psychometric testing!

[squib66]

The Hazard Analysis 'and' Critical Control Points technique is the food industry's preventative risk assessment process. It was derived from NASA work on astronaut food (not o-rings).
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HACCP (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HACCP)

Nor does it have anything to do with Diane Vaughan.

Er now what was this thread about again? Oh yes...

topendtorque

It would be better to run a proactive FDR analysis programme after every safe landing to learn about near-missses than add the capability to transmit a few seconds of data prior to the occassional impact.

In this case assuming if the FDR survived as designed it either has data to answer 'why' or it doesn't, and If not, transmitting limited data before impact would not help.

[topendtorque]

requisite psychometric testing!

I reckon that definately would be something to do with rotary aviation, perhaps the H269?

Ramen
Unfortunately I am serious, however the poor old yanks still demonstrate massive divergance in their own beef export industry by three times failing to remove bone from shipments to Korea /Japan after they have been suspended for each of the previous four years. One day they'll work it out, meanwhile we're laughng to the bank.
One good thing about it is that crocodile abbattoirs now do three salmonella swabs instead a washdown with a hose.

They could do thirty three and I still wouldn't eat the stuff.

HACCP has got processors toidentify risky areas, we are supposed to use checklists. That to my mind should enough , but in the vein of the runaway politically warm alGore it's now suggested that we have ISO9002 cred or in the meat industry its now ISO 14002.

Its all a bit like the zim currency, as you point out and to draw an african parallel. bloody worthless when it comes to real safetly SKILL and ATTITUDE

[unstable load]

The companies offering sat-comms for aircraft these days posess the necessary technology to satisfy topendtorques needs.

Take the E-HUMS on the new 76C++'s that records literally dozens of channels and link it to the sat-comm and hey presto, you have realtime monitoring of all the selected parameters including FMS, GPS position and a telephone line if you want one too!

[skiddriver]

Press Advisory (http://www.ntsb.gov/pressrel/2009/090205.html)

[Aser]

Sad, after the report I can only speculate (yes I speculate) about a flock of birds taking out the engine levers and the pilots...

R.I.P.

Aser

[ericferret]

It says no evidence of a birdstrike ASER, I think a flock of birds would have left one or two feathers!!!!!

[Aser]

ericferret you are very right, of course I just read it too fast :suspect: ,but the absence of problems in servo/gearbox etc etc. it's amazing...

Regards

[helimutt]

Just a question, has there ever been a recorded incident of maybe a front screen failing in the 76? Sounds like something broke a window if background noise increased. Wild speculation, shot at?

I bet no-one expected that report!:oh:

[Outwest]

Could it be windshield blowing in and taking the engine levers back? Posting at the same time as Helimut......

[SASless]

What other flight parameters are recorded besides Airspeed and Altitude? Such as heading, turn rate, attitude......?

[Shawn Coyle]

Flight control positions, engine parameters, G loading, a ton of stuff is recorded.

[SASless]

So they will know what the controls were doing....and whether the control positions coorelate to the flight path of the aircraft then?

I wonder what the tail rotor gear box and blades looked like and where they were found?

[helimutt]

Portions of the windscreen and composite center post have been recovered and sent to the NTSB laboratory in Washington, DC for further examination and analysis of the composite structure and windscreen.



My highlight, Has this been modified in any way since A,A+, B, C etc?
It's one of the things in the report being looked at further from how I read it.??

[JimL]

Extremely interesting update mainly because it concentrates on aircraft systems and remains totally silent on the control positions.

My first impression is that this report has been provided to restore operator's/crew's confidence in the aircraft systems whilst not speculating about the actions/behaviour of the crew members.

In the AS355 'Harding' accident report in the UK several years ago, there was also reference to a noise 'heard on the CVR'; there was speculation about the source of the noise but it was never resolved.

Jim

[drop lead]

Following on from Helimutts line of thought....was it hunting season in that area at the time, at 700 ft and 138 Kts and if you were very unlucky could a bullet shatter the windscreen? Is 700ft the normal altitude for flights on that route?

[SASless]

What was the "Loud Noise"? What kind of noise was it....sudden sharp of short duration or was it sudden sharp and prolonged....one big "Bang" or a long duration noise?

Why would the Engine Levers be in any position other than forward in the normal setting?

Who....What....moved them aft? Human, failure of some kind, or impact?

[FH1100 Pilot]

SASless:Why would the Engine Levers be in any position other than forward in the normal setting?

Who....What....moved them aft? Human, failure of some kind, or impact?
I haven't seen any official word as to the position of the engine levers. (Has anyone?) But apparently, by admitting that they are focusing on the windshield and centerpost, the NTSB is looking down that avenue.

I'll say one thing. If they've examined the various data recorders as they say, then they are not telling us the full story, but only what they want us to know. Their report leaves out many important details and only gives us crumbs. The FDR certainly could have given us the position of the ECL's, and the collective. And the CVR certainly contained some messages from the pilots (or did they sit there for 10 seconds-plus and say and do nothing?).

Is the NTSB now hinting that the cause of this crash was external and not internal? If their intention was to "throw something out there" to assuage the nagging fears of S-76 community, they did more harm than good. There are more questions now than before. We must believe that this is merely a very carefully crafted "press release" and not meant as anything more.

[Phil77]

"carefully crafted" is probably a good description, much better than the initial report.

I agree, it sounds like they want to assure the rest of us, that it was something other than a inexplicable instantaneous combustion; rather - as you said - something external or structural, something unique that doesn't seem to endanger the rest of the fleet. They very much want to make sure to cover and exclude the engines, drivetrains, hydraulics and rotors.

It looks like they have a pretty good idea, but unlike us, can't speculate (:oh: :uhoh:) until they have prove.

(one would think PHI has tried (and found) every flaw on that airframe - how many of all S-76 AD's are the result of an incident at PHI? 85%?)

[SASless]

FH-1100,


It was my assumption the engine levers might not have been fully forward....following up on the thought of a bird strike or structural failure as has been discussed such as a windscreen pushing backwards with a resulting movement of the engine levers. What their position really was is anyone's guess.

The center post remains is being examined and might surface some indication of if that was a cause or not perhaps.

[Shawn Coyle]

And it would depend on where the sensors for the ECLs were located. Were they at the ECL or at some place downstream? If the sensors were at the ECLs, and the damage actually just shifted the whole ECL block, but stretched the cables downstream to the point where the cables moved the fuel controls, we'd still not know if the something hitting the ECL block was the culprit...

[Old Skool]

When PHi gets a new 76 they remove the heavy heated glass screens and replace them with lighter plastic versions. When i was in 748P and her sister 745P we had a couple crack for no obvious reason.

[Brian Abraham]

Just a comment re birdstrike. One of our aircraft took a bird on the top of the windscreen divider, result being it knocked both fire handles out of the detent which of course dropped both generators off line, ergo the loss of helipilots ++++++++

[flingwinging it]

Drop Lead, funny you should mention hunting season.

Within days after the crash I heard a rumor along those lines down here...

[wobblybob]

Whatever happened to the survivor, they should be able to give some insite in to what happened. Especially if a windshield should have failed.

[HOSS 1]

Shawn-

From my FSI training, the ECL "sensors" are located directly above the throttle handles. There are a couple linear potentiometers for each throttle. Reversed polarity for fault detection.

This was a C++. It is these sensors that control the DECUs. No cables, just wires.

HOSS

[mgbgun]

Not a pilot. Been flying PHI, Air Log, ERA for the last 30 yrs. Good men on the stick at all Co's. Flew with one of the guys who went down out of Amelia. It's been a hard month.
My question.....Why was the collective, autopilot and other data contained in the post dated 1-11-09 not included in the NTSB report? It seemed all other data from the poster matched the NTSB report so all seems valid.
My HS friend is corporate fixed wing but his Dad retired from the GOM with Evergreen. The windscreen coming in was my friends first thought after reading the NTSB report. It seems structural is where this is all going or am I missing something?
Sorry if I've asked redundant or idiot questions but this accident has really consumed me for some reason the past few weeks.
Keep all the families in your prayers.

[mgbgun]

Been keeping tabs on Steven Yeltin, the sole survivor. He got off the ventilator a week or so ago. Eyes are open and kinda responding to stimuli. Previous report said severe head trauma so lets hope nothing lasting comes of that.

[JohnDixson]

Old Skool, the original windshields are heavier , and are so not only because of the heating elements, but also to meet some rigorous design requirements. I'd be interested to see the structural substantiation for the replacement windscreen design and the QA standards and records for its manufacture.
Thanks,
John Dixson

[psyklik]

AMC had a BK117 bird strike at cruise a couple years so ago--knocked back both throttles. Thinking he had a double eng failure, pilot entered auto, yet noticed prior to touchdown and advanced throttles for much more controlled and successful landing. I don't remember the alt at which the strike occured.

p

[JohnDixson]

One would think that a bird big enough to create an impact heard on the recorder and large enough to do the damage to the windscreen/backup structure would leave some remains for the investigative team? Certainly, you raise a possibility that must be considered.

Thanks,
John Dixson

[helimutt]

No evidence of birdstrike.

[SASless]

OK...assume it was a bird strike...or a windscreen failure...or a structural failiure...or some other DECU simultaneous dual engine dual mode failure....why would it necessarily result in a crash?

Both pilot's incapacitated simultaneously....both sets of flight controls rendered useless simultaneously?

There's more to this crash than meets the current line of assumptions here.

Put yer thinking caps on.....and start thinking through what is being suggested in each of these scenario's that have been brought up and discussed.

Was it a single windscreen....both windscreens....windscreens and center post....what would have rendered both pilots unable to cope with what happened?

Has there been trouble in the past at PHI with aircraft that had the windscreens replaced?

Any reports of problems with the windscreen center posts?

There are bound to be PHI pilots or engineers (mechanics) that could answer that for us.

Everything is conjecture here....but at least make it "constructive" conjecture.

[rotorbrent]

We get information updates from time to time as pilots at PHI but they usually raise more questions.

NTSB basically has released the known true facts at the time.

Many persons are running around responding in interesting ways.

From additional aircraft inspections based on No known S-76 defeciency to
going back to 20,000 hour A++'s because "they do not have DECU's"

It will be months before the final report is out as all fatal accidents of this nature take time to do the job correctly. And again no emergency AD's from the FAA, Sikorsky or NTSB.

I would rather fly in a new C++ than go back to a 20,000 hr A++ anyday of the week ,but few persons making the decisions have not flown the GOM in years which compounds the issue. Or asked those of us professional pilots what we think and know from being at the point of the spear day by day.

So whatever the final outcome Tom and Vyarl will be missed. And hopefully people will learn on how or not how to respond to a fatal accident until the investigation is complete. With that correct information we will go out and apply that additional knowledge to our art of flying helicopters.

[buckeem]

I recently reviewed the "Sikorsky S76C++ Helicopter Offshore Oil Mission" technical information download from the Sikorsky Website. Sikorsky reports The Standard Offshore Oil Configuration consists of the Baseline Configuration plus the following options. Of those options it list “Plastic windshields – replaces baseline glass windshields”.

The Data was published in 2007. I do not know if this option was available in late 2006 when N748P received its Certification.

However, Old Skool inferred that PHI changed out the glass to plastic. Did PHI’s AP’s do this conversion or was it a factory conversion per the Options listed above?

Like JohnDixson, I too am interested to see the information regarding the replacement windscreen.

[unstable load]

rotorbrent,

I would rather fly in a new C++ than go back to a 20,000 hr A++ anyday of the week

If you are serious about that statement then you need to take a long hard look at the maintenance department of your company, because before long all your shiny new C++'s will be that age too and by your account as dangerous/unsuitable for you.

The plastic screens have been around as an STC for years. I fitted a few in the mid '90's, if I recall they were from T*** ***l.

[rotorbrent]

Our S-76C++'s have a lot more installed equipment that makes the workload ,situational awareness and creature comfort a lot better than the older A++'s. Not to mention better single engine performance and better payload at higher temps and DA's. And our customers agree as we have very few A's left and most are flying C++'s. I said nothing about the maintenance which is the best in the world in my 30 years of aviation experience . You are truely your handle.

[unstable load]

OK, I got it now. I thought you had an issue with the state of the A++'s not their specification, Apologies for that.

No need to get your rotorbent after all.

[JCJC]

Bird Strike Was Likely Cause of Chopper Crash - WSJ.com (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123473768054991121.html?mod=googlenews_wsj)

[havoc]

FEBRUARY 15, 2009, 5:49 P.M.

Bird Strike Was Likely Cause of Chopper Crash

By ANDY PASZTOR

Federal investigators increasingly suspect that a collision with a bird led to the crash of a widely-used Sikorsky helicopter model last month that killed eight people in the Gulf of Mexico, according to industry officials and safety experts.

The Jan. 4 crash of the Sikorsky S-76C chopper, manufactured by a unit of United Technologies Corp., had initially stumped crash investigators, who had previously ruled out engine, transmission, electrical or hydraulic failures. The National Transportation Safety board, which is heading the probe, also said the chopper didn't run out of fuel, hit some other aircraft or suffer a problem with its rotors. Now, investigators believe a bird strike destroyed the windshield and somehow resulted in nearly turning off the engines.

The initial difficulty in determining a cause raised widespread safety concerns. The Sikorsky chopper is a workhorse for many offshore-oil operations, emergency-medical transport firms and other commercial services world-wide, and there are currently 600 in operation. The chopper was being used by Royal Dutch Shell PLC's U.S. unit, to transport workers to offshore facilities in the Gulf of Mexico. After the crash, Shell temporarily grounded its entire fleet of S-76C choppers, and instead used boats to transport most of those workers.

If a bird strike is ultimately determined to be the cause, the chopper crash would be the second instance over a period of less than two weeks in January that bird strikes caused high-profile aviation accidents in the U.S. A crippled US Airways jetliner ditched in New York City's Hudson River in mid-January, after birds seriously damaged both of its engines, but there were no fatalities.

The NTSB had initially said it didn't find any evidence of a bird strike in the helicopter crash. But investigators have since changed their focus, according to people familiar with the details. The NTSB has sent material taken from inside the cockpit to wildlife experts at the Smithsonian Institution to determine if they came from a bird, a board spokesman confirmed over the weekend. The spokesman also said the board is examining the center post of the windshield. That's near the suspected point of impact with a bird.

Analysis of the sounds captured by the cockpit voice recorder reveal a sudden loud bang followed by an intense rush of wind, according to people familiar with the details. The board has said that one second later, power from both of the helicopter's engines simultaneously dropped to almost nothing. Airspeed decreased slightly for the next 10 seconds, according to the board, while the helicopter descended and ultimately crashed.

One theory is that a remnant of the windshield, or some other force created by the impact, retarded the throttles and nearly shut off the engines.

Other signs point in the same direction. Sikorsky, the manufacturer of the helicopter, appears poised to issue a letter warning operators about the potential dangers of installing certain kinds of acrylic windshields. Such windshields are sometimes retrofitted in helicopters in order to save weight, but the crash has raised questions about the strength of some of them.

A spokesman for Sikorsky didn't have any immediate comment. A spokesman for PHI Inc., Metairie, La., which operated the helicopter, has declined to take questions on the crash or the investigation.

The crash happened in clear weather while cruising at roughly 140 miles per hour at an altitude of 700 feet toward an offshore oil platform. At such a low altitude, the pilots would have little time to respond to such a near-shutdown of engines.

Write to Andy Pasztor at [email protected]

Copyright 2008 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved

[tottigol]

At such a low altitude, the pilots would have little time to respond to such a near-shutdown of engines.

Provided the pilots themselves were not severely incapacitated by the bird strike, that being a very likely event.:(

[Old Man Rotor]

Just what the Lawyers have been waiting for!

An airframe that has been modified from standard is a legal dream [and a goldmine].

No wonder the powers are very very quiet.

[SASless]

What if the original glass windscreens had not been replaced? Are the plastic windscreens as strong as the glass re bird strikes?

Let's hear about test data for the plastic vice the glass before we get too carried away.

But.....if there is a difference and the plastic are shown to be less able to withstand a bird strike....then it is a good case for the lawyers who sue the operator in the name of the dead.

[ericferret]

The relative strength of glass v plastic is not necessarily an issue. What is relevant is whether the plastic screens meet FAA requirements and are approved for the purpose.

In the case of the AS365 Eurocopter offers plastic or glass, glass being normal when screen
de-ice is required.

[SASless]

I really begin to wonder what was on the CVR?

If it was in fact a Bird Strike that caused the problem....were both pilot's incapacitated? Were they communicating to one another about the problem? Was just one pilot heard on the CVR? Were there any cockpit actions taken....flight controls moved....switches thrown...that would show a pilot or both were still able to respond?

[Phrogman]

I can tell you from personal experience that when it comes to sounds and vibration analysis, those folks at the NTSB have really got it wired. Voice analysis from the CVR however, can unfortunately raise more questions than it answers, especially if it is an analog system (wind noise really messes things up there).

I suspect that the other systems were ruled out via the black box system analysis, hence the big mystery as to what brought it down, and that is of course assuming that all operating systems have a feed into the FDR. There are some big dam birds down that way, and hitting anything center mass on your window that weighs a couple pounds at 140 kts is always going to be dramatic. I am curious to see about the strengths of these modified wind screens, and if they can be shown to be a causal factor.

I would also like to know if the pilots were wearing helmets, with visors down? Are they even required to wear helmets?

Best of luck to the investigators.

[Gomer Pylot]

Nobody wears helmets in the GOM, except for the Coast Guard and MMS operations. If a birdstrike did cause this accident, it's the first fatal accident I know of over the past 25+ years, with close to a million hours per year flown consistently. I've hit lots of birds, but never had one come inside. So far I've managed to avoid pelicans and buzzards.

[Phil77]

A friend of mine hit a duck right on the (glass-) windshield in a S76. Apart from a bloody mess, no real damage - was probably very well deflected.

On the other hand there was that incident in another company, same guy flew a Gulfstream 2 into something bigger on approach; one half of the bird went through the left engine, the other half came through the radome and penetrated the pressure bulkhead (!) behind the pedals (about $70k price tag on the repair btw.)

I guess my point is, that the question is at what angle the bird hits. But I feel safer behind glass, rather than plastic.

[I Build 92's]

I can recall (in my younger years while still turning a wrench!), a VIP A model that took a seagull thru the pilots glass windshield and deposited the remains above the divan at Sta. 213. While the pilot was understandably shook up, al escaped without any serious harm.

[bb in ca]

Just heard a story about a 76 at night in West Palm experiencing a bird strike several years ago. Apparently it was bad enough to damage the center post and knock both t-handles back far enough to knock both DC gens off-line.

If anyone knows the details or can find them online they might share alot of similarities.

bb

[unstable load]

In the back of my memory is an account of a 71A in Australia that hit a Pelican.
Apparently made quite a mess. Be interesting to know it that was plastic or glass screens.

[Brian Abraham]

bb in ca and unstable load, I told the story back at post #170. We had glass wind screens. Another bird strike we had hit the wind screen, ricocheted up into the rotor and the rotor then slapped it down through the roof into the cabin. Don't recall if the birds responsible were ever identified.

[TheVelvetGlove]

In the not so distant past, PHI had a bird strike that busted the plastic windshield and pulled one throttle all the way back to idle in a 76. That aircraft was landed safely. If this 76 accident turns out to be a birdstrike, it will not be good for PHI, because they had first hand knowledge that the plastic windows do not provide sufficient protection for the throttle quadrants.

Also, it is a widely-known fact that there are many bird strikes each year in that bayou which is filled with millions of seemingly retarded migratory birds.

If it was a birdstrike, then I believe that this accident could have been prevented- if only operators were willing to accept the small extra weight that glass windows bring with them. But they receive pressure from the oil companies to carry as much weight as possible.

If Shell was really all about safety, they would allow pilots to download weight for CAT A take-offs.

Who is to blame for all these plastic windows on helicopters with overhead throttle quadrants? No doubt, a jury will decide.

God rest the the souls of all who were onboard.

[helmet fire]

Assuming of course that these reports about Bird Strike possiblities are accurate, I remain a fan of the helmet and visor and this tradgedy gives me another reason. At least it might provide you a fighting chance and I guess we will never know if helmets may have provided enough protection for these guys so that they were then able to bring the aircraft back under control.
There have been bird penetrations of B206 cockpits, so speed is not always the culprit.
A possible cause of this accident it is yet another scenario that makes helmets the go...always. For me, anyways.
It also re-enforces my belief that throttles belong on the collective where they can be manipulated from the flight controls. The experiment with roof throttles should be over now, and the wheel re-invented to return them to the collective a la the EC145 v the BK117.

Condolences to those lost in this accident - no matter how unlikely we might argue it to have been. RIP. I hope they determine the cuase so that we may learn from it and help avoid the next one.

[aheoe26104]

(forgive me if I have missed something, I only read pages 1, 8 and subsequent)
Has any body started doing things differently as a result of this accident? (Yes, it is true, we do not KNOW what caused it) I would think that if I were flying in an area where birdstrikes are a more than average likelihood, I would be thinking – “Is there something I can do to reduce the risk?” We have to learn something from this, as usually – the safety manuals are written in red (blood) and we have a duty to ensure those people did not die for nothing.

[helimutt]

Of course there are things you can do. Stop flying everywhere at 700'? Isn't it true that the higher you are, the less likely you are to hit a bird?

[SASless]

What about the flock of Geese that took out the US Air Flight at 3000 feet for a starter?

80% of Bird Strikes occur below 1000 feet AGL but the majority of them are during landing and takeoffs at airports.

80% of all Bird Strikes go unreported.

Taken from BASH data.....

Some Myths

* Myth - Bird strikes never occur at high altitudes,

* Fact - Over 1,300 bird strikes involving civil aircraft at heights above 5,000 feet AGL were reported from 1990-2003.

* Highest reported bird strike …A 747 struck a large bird over the South African coast at 37,000 feet.

* Fact – Migrating geese have been reported above the summit of Mt. Everest (29,035 ft.) and typically cross the Himalayas at altitudes above 30,000 feet.

[Shawn Coyle]

Does anyone know if the helicopter was fitted with alternately flashing lights to warn birds away? Seen it on some Canadian Helicopters S-76 in Ontario.
Seems to work pretty well (unless you're overtaking the bird of course).

[SASless]

Sven,

I will spell it out for you in simple terms....

ICAO, Boeing, and other studies show the probability of Bird Strikes increases as the frontal area of the aircraft increases, the closer one is to an airport, the lower one flies.

The most dangerous phase of flight is landing and taking off.

Cruise flight generates the fewest bird strikes.

80 percent of all bird strikes occur below 1000 feet AGL.

95 percent of all bird strikes occur below 2500 feet AGL.

80 percent of all bird strikes go unreported.

Highest recorded bird strike is 37,000 feet.

So Sven....if you can hit them at 37,000 feet.....there is no guarantee you can evade a bird strike altogether by flying "high". That being said....flying at 5,000 feet or higher does mitigate your chances of whacking a Bird.


Shawn is right....flying with a landing light on helps deter birds....the flashing light system is better than a single steady light.

Avoiding thermals is another way of decreasing your chances of smacking a soaring bird....Hawks, Buzzards, Eagles. (If that sounds silly....talk to a glider pilot who will be able to explain both thermals and soaring birds to you.)

[ericferret]

Is the throttle issue not something of a red herring.

It would appear to me that crew incapacitation or the inability of the crew to react in time was the real problem. I seem to remember that tests following the loss of the Bristow Wessex showed that a failure to lower the lever within 9 seconds lead to an irrecoverable
situation. I dont know what the time for the S76 would be.

A double engine failure due to any cause should be surviveable. If this was a strike which did not incapacitate the crew then the mess in the front and distraction could have lead to a late reaction from them.

If the crew were taken out by the strike, even if both engines were running perfectly the aircraft would still have been lost.

Just out of interest we had one a pilot who flew with a helmet on the North Sea. Management asked him to stop as it was "upsetting the passengers". Maybe the correct response would have been to insist that all crews wore helmets so the pax became used to it and it was no longer an issue. No different to everybody wearing immersion suits.

[rotorbrent]

Sikorsky has just come out with a new CCS for operations with the Acrylic windshields as a result of this accident.

[WhirlwindIII]

Our experience has been that alternately flashing lights fitted to the front of a helicopter do work, and well, to part the sea of birds ahead.

[malabo]

Acronym of the day. What is a CCS?

Is it advisory, compulsory, affecting the airworthiness, background fluff?

Go ahead and "spell it out in simple terms", I can take it.

[bb in ca]

Not sure what CCS stands for but it appears to be the first 3 characters of their "All Operators Letter".

Example: All Operators Letter (AOL) CCS-76-AOL-05-21

[PO dust devil]

Sounds like an apology for poor manners might be in order back a few posts. People should be able to place objective comment on the page without being belittled or ridiculed....moderators?

DD

[buckeem]

Since I am not a Owner/Operator of a Sikorsky, and cannot log on, nor register for one. Does anyone have a link or a source that I can refer to and see a copy of this? (Sikorsky CCS-76-AOL-09-0004)

If you have a Sikorsky log in you can read the letter at http://wcs.sikorsky.com/detailswcs/0,9602,CLI1_DIV62_ETI209,00.html (http://wcs.sikorsky.com/detailswcs/0,9602,CLI1_DIV62_ETI209,00.html)

[helmet fire]

Hi Eric,
As I dont really yet know the detail of the accident, I am not sure if the throttle thing is a red herring or not. But....I am thinking swiss cheese model here. IF there was a birdstrike. IF the bird penetrated the cockpit. Would roof or collective throttles be better?

Pilot incapacitation from bird strike is extrememly varied from total through to no injury. In the initial few seconds after a big hit, it is possible that pilots could be momentarily incapacitated, by shock, by fluids, by wind rush, by eye injury, even by being winded by the bird mass hitting the sternum. Would'nt it be nice if the aircraft engines were still fine and beaut regardless? How could a PNF even see the aircraft display systems through all the broken plexiglass, bird guts and wind? What if the PF took the bird in the head? To many IFs!!

So, if you dont lower the lever, how long before you lose control of the aircraft at 700 ft, 140 KIAS (high collective setting) with a very low inertia rotor system? I am thinking 5 or so seconds would produce an irrecoverable situation, probably a lot less. Would you be able to take a bird and plexiglass to the face (no helmet) or chest, at 140 Nautical Miles Per hour and do anything but scream "WTF?" in the next 3 or 4 seconds? Seems like the throttles staying on would be an enormous help. Especially with the autopilot systems the C++ has.

So if a manufacturer has the choice (and many do and will have in future designs), why not put the throttles back on the collective? Engine emergencies, RRPM issues, tailrotor malfunctions, bird strikes, and more would benefit from throttles on collective. My opinion anyway - remember I dont think there is enough detail in this particular accident to use it to back my opinion - it is just a discussion point.

[TheVelvetGlove]

It is standard operating procedure for all aircraft in the GOM that are within a 10 mi radius of their departure base to maintain 700 feet while outbound. That is probably why they were at 700 feet.

They don't fly the 76 that low unless they have too.

And most all PHI aircraft have pulse landing lights. Unknown as to whether they were on.

[unstable load]

buckeem,
The AOL was to check the type of screens fitted to the aircraft. There are 3 types of screens that can be fitted, vis- glass, stretched acrylic and cast acrylic. The 2 types of acrylic have different characteristics due to the manufacturing process.

It details a way of checking the type of acrylic you may have fitted and has a form to fill in with serial number/reg/type of screen that then gets sent off to Sikorsky.

[twisted wrench]

I find it interesting the thought is the bird or broken plexiglass windscreen took both throttles back but no talk of the T -handles.

They are just forward of the throttles and one would think they would have come back to! Which would have given them a indication on the FDR data that the generators came off line.

[helimutt]

The 'T' handles seem to sit further forward and more 'out of the way' than the engine levers. Just a thought.

[twisted wrench]

With the throttles in the fly gate they sit about one inch lower then the T handles and yes the T handles are more forward about 5 inches.

I was just thinking a piece of material large enough to catch both throttle levers and not hit a least one T -handle must have been just the right trajectory?

Definelty wasn´t there day.

On the plastic wind screen issue now with the letter out from Sikorsky I wonder what make of wind screen was PHI using? The Sikorsky one, Aeronautical accessories or Tech Tools?

[buckeem]

Unstable Load,
I read on another site (See Below) that there were speed restrictions listed for the cast plastic windows.. Can you tell me if this is true? If so what where the speeds listed for each?

In addition, thank you for your reply, I truly appreciate yours and everyone else’s insight on this situation.

"CCS-76-AOL-09-0004 states that if you have cast plastic windshields you should fly no faster than 109 knots."

[skadi]

Does anybody know whether the only survivor is now in the condition to bring more light in this suspicious tragedy or not?

skadi

[SASless]

"CCS-76-AOL-09-0004 states that if you have cast plastic windshields you should fly no faster than 109 knots."

Some one please tell me PHI was not using cast plastic windscreens!:uhoh:

[buckeem]

This is the last news release - jd

Associated Press - February 10, 2009 5:54 AM ET
NEW ORLEANS (AP) - The sole survivor of a helicopter crash that killed eight offshore workers last month may be able to return to Texas after one more surgery.
Steven Yelton of Floresville, Texas has undergone eight surgeries since the Jan. 4 accident. Doctors say Yelton may be transferred to a rehabilitation facility in Texas after one more surgery, according to Paul Sterbcow, a family lawyer.
Sterbcow says Yelton is conscious, but sometimes he does not recognize people and his surroundings. He said Yelton suffered skeletal damage, internal injuries and chemical burns.
A trust account has been set up for the family. His wife is six-months pregnant and the couple has two young children.

[sox6]

Sikorsky says:

As an alternative to the use of the Sikorsky approved windshield types, operators with aircraft possessing cast acrylic windshields can attain an equivalent level of impact tolerance by limiting the maximum speed
of the helicopter to no more than 109 knots.

[buckeem]

At this time, all we know is that 748P had acrylic windshields. The type has not been verified outside the investigation.

No one has posted any information concerning speed restrictions for the Stretched Acrylic. I would like to see those as well, if availabe on the CCS. I am interested in the difference in impact strength between the two. Is it marginal or significant?

[TheVelvetGlove]

The latest Sikorsky release was simply to advise us that IF we desire impact protection equivalent to glass windows, we need to fly it at 109 kts.

Now we just need to decide whether or not we desire that protection....or will that be decided for us? A total crap-shoot, really.

I would expect that the larger operators to begin replacing their plastic windows, especially those who still have possession of the original glass.

Since I have never flown one with glass windows, I assume that they are the laminated safety glass type??

[Swamp76]

Don't forget that with 2 engines at idle there is no warning horn. No ENG OUT, no LOW ROTOR. If the windshield is busted there is no reason to suspect a low rotor until too damm late.

Depending on rigging friction, the engine levers can be a lot easier to move than the T-handles.

[unstable load]

buckeem,
That is correct. A speed restriction of 109kts is mentioned in the text.
The text from sox6 sums it up.

TheVelvetGlove, yes, the glass ones are laminated and heated.

[ABZ155]

Bird Strike Is New Suspect in Helicopter Crash - WSJ.com (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123473768054991121.html)

[buckeem]

I understand that is correct. However, I am interested in the V-speeds for something other than cast acrylic. Did the CCS list any other recommended V-speeds for Stretched or Glass?

Is there a reason that no one will post the CCS so that it can be read as published?

[The Governor]

Swamp 76 Don't forget that with 2 engines at idle there is no warning horn. No ENG OUT, no LOW ROTOR.

I would think the Engine Out audio would activate if the engines ran down below 66%N1 with the weight on wheels switch inactive? During a dual flameout drill in the simulator both engine out audios annunciate passing 66%N1.

[unstable load]

buckeem,
My reading of the AOL is that the stretched acrylic and glass are the same restriction for speed.
The only reason I have not posted it is cos I don't know how to...:ouch:

[helimutt]

The Governor: A quick question, does this occur, not with a flameout, but with both engine levers pulled back to at least the idle position?


Just wondering. Hope WPB is nice and warm, you git!!!

[The Governor]

Back in the cold now unfortunately.

The eng out audio will sound if the eng control levers are retarded to idle in flight. When carrying out auto's with the eng control levers pulled back to illustrate the rotor rpm the eng out annuciates at 66%N1. Would do the same if both T-handles were retarded.

[rotorbrent]

Directly from the S-76C++ flight manual

The NO. 1 or NO. 2 ENG OUT - RESET TONE warning light on the master
warning panels (Figure 1-93) will go on and an alternating tone (550 Hz and 700
Hz) will be heard in the headset when the DECU engine failure detection logic
detects an engine out condition for that engine or when N1 for the corresponding
engine drops to 48%

[Shawn Coyle]

I'm curious as the position of the rotor disk in cruise - how far down is it with respect to the fuselage - that is, doesn't it provide some protection from a bird coming at the machine from directly in front, level with the top of the windshield?

[Swamp76]

Sorry, thinking about a C+ and talking about a ++. My mistake.

I would expect no warning in this scenario in a C+.

Shawn: I've had too many birdstrikes and seen first hand that, no, the disc is no protection.

[helimutt]

Swamp76, just out of interest, you say you have had a few birdstrikes. can you say what phase of flight and level/height/speed you were at when it occurred?

[buckeem]

Is this a plausible scenario? A bird of considerable size, hits the window near the center post and towards the top. The force of the impact pushes in the window, and or center post in, leaving an air gap. Due to the sloping angle with the instrument panel acting as a brace, and with the oncoming force of the 160 mph winds, it in effect, acts as a funnel that shoots the bird straight up to the inside top of the cockpit.

The only reason I am throwing this out there, is, it seems to me, in my uneducated opinion, that regardless of the initial angle of impact, the equal and opposite reaction would be altered somewhat due to the cockpit structure. This due to the center post losing its structural support strength by removing the glass. In addition a somwhat
cushioning effect of the more pliable acrylic windshield.

This is a good link for the business office of a S-76 (???model) http://www.sikorskyshares.com/s76cockpitvr.html (http://www.sikorskyshares.com/s76cockpitvr.html)

[rotorbrent]

Bird Strikes are usually messy especially those that penetrate the windshields with lots of bird stuff every where.
No evidence of a bird strike has been found and they are scraping the windshields, center post, cb panels ,looking for bird DNA.
That was over a week ago and nothing has been found or identified yet.

[Swamp76]

At the risk of exposing my identity to plenty of people:

Hit a hawk with a 76 a few days ago, sparrow(?) yesterday. Saw the hawk in time to pull up and was able to alter the impact to the nose, about 6 inches ahead of the windshield. Bird goo from point of impact to the rotor head. Took a long time to wash off. Impact at approx 145 KIAS, 800'. Impact was very loud and broke the left wiper.

The little one was just like a big bug. No time to see it, just a bloody mess in the center of the copilot's windshield. He didn't notice until he looked up.

All others were too long ago to recall the details (longer than this tour :-).

[FH1100 Pilot]

Remember guys, the ECL's would not have to come all the way back to IDLE. If they even came out of the "fully open" position it might cause the torques to go to zero and the NR to wind down . Unlike our fixed-wing brethren, helicopter throttles only have one working position: FULL OPEN. Anything in between can be considered OFF (or IDLE but in any case no power is delivered to the MR to sustain flight). Is the C++ any different?

Hypothetically: So the windshield post fails and the windscreens fail inward, knocking the ECL's back "just out" of the fully-open position. Off go the torques, down goes the NR, but the crew is preoccupied with the windshield failure and doesn't get any immediate notice of LOW RPM or ENG FAIL (because the N1's are still above 66%) until it's too late.

We can only imagine how confusing, chaotic and disorienting it must have been in that cockpit from the time of the "loud noise" (whatever it was) to the crash.

By the way, if memory serves, the S-76 crew was not restricted to 700' outbound from the base. Unless I'm mistaken, the general rule is "500' inbound, 700' or higher outbound."

Helicopter pilots will give you a million reasons they like to fly low...why it's even necessary.

[buckeem]

Are they looking for or trying to differentiate the DNA?

Granted, we do not know at this time. The first responders did not treat the accident site with kid gloves. In the pictures that I have of the accident site, you cannot see center post attached the ship. Most likely walked on and left soaking in the marsh for two days. Then after the second responders left, the cabin and cockpit are areas are completely decimated. They even repositioned the tail section.

[unstable load]

buckeem,
That is a C+ office.

FH1100 Pilot, rotorbrent, The Governor,
I get the bit about the engine out warnings, but what about the Low Rotor RPM warning? I appreciate that the guys would have been pre-occupied with the chaos, but that circuit is independant of the engine warnings is it not?

[rotorbrent]

There is no Low Rotor warning system on any of the S-76 series aircraft.

[gittijan]

A quick search of the NTSB data base shows 11 accidents since 1970involving bird strikes with helicopters. In most of them the pilot(s) was in some way incapacitated or unable to react in time to prevent the outcome.
They were geographically spread all over the place. The most common situation is that they nearly all happened below 1000 feet.

Keep your eyes open friends.

[helofixer]

I work in the GOM for a small operator. And in the last 3 years we have had 2 bird strikes. One on a 206L4 in cruise flight around 800 feet agl inshore in which the bird came down thru the rotor system and smacked dead center into the servo cowling and left a hell of a dent and mess and cracked some of the underlying support structure of the cowl. To those not familiar with the 206 series, the servo cowling is the forward most cowling on the aircraft that hinges up and forward. Its right above the pilots head.

Second was to one of our Bell 407's. Again in cruise flight around 800-1000 feet. Bird went into the area above the transmission cowling and the rotor head impacting somewhere on the pitch change links. No damage to the aircraft, but I found dark bird feathers and lots of guts all over the p/c links, mast, main rotor head, transmission, transmission deck all the way back to the vertical stabilizer. From the size of what was left, I figured it was either a large crow or a turkey buzzard. Imagine throwing a bird into a food processor and then chucking the contents down the transmission cowling. Stunk to high heaven.

I had a close encounter with an American Bald Eagle in the area near NAS New Orleans. I was riding copilot seat doing track and balance work with a RADS system and we were in a high traffic area near the Air Station heading back to base around 700 ft agl with some readings. I looked up from my rads box and saw this rather large bird @ 12:00 and close in same altitude. The pilot was looking for military traffic advised to us from Navy tower out his side window. If we stayed on course and altitude this bird would have been in our laps. I yelled "break right right now!" over the icom and the pilot yanked it hard over. I watched this large white headed brown bird cruise past my window pretty close aboard. He didn't dive away like most birds do. Eagles are top predators and don't seem to scared of bigger birds like us. If that bird which averages between 7 and 15 lbs had hit us in the windscreen, I don't think I would be writing this right now. Birds in south Louisiana are a constant hazard. Stay safe.

[HOSS 1]

FH-

On the 76C++, yes, the PCL's do need to come almost all the way back for idle. The engines govern on N1 (rather than N2) when you come out of fly. So, when you come back, you can slew the power back evenly.

BUT, given the lack of PCL friction in the C++ quadrant it is entirely feasible that anything that has enough energy to force the triggers over the little ramp and out of FLY, would knock them all the way back to idle.


BTW, the -76D will have low rotor warning, so I've heard.

[FH1100 Pilot]

HOSS, thanks for the explanation! I do get that the PCL's control N1. But the point I was going for was that as far as the MR is concerned, once the PCL's come out of "fly" to the point where the rotor is ungoverned it will bleed off just as if you pulled them all the way back to IDLE. Is that not correct? My thinking is that they don't have to come back very far for the rotor to sign off. My question is just how far that is?

Airplanes can modulate their thrust with the PCL's, but we can't. Or can we in a C++?

[buckeem]

214, Can you direct me to the the information concerning the details above

[buckeem]

I also found it as a press release on the NTSB site. Thanks for bringing it to our attention.

jd

[SASless]

Someone correct me if I am wrong....wasn't there a mention of a Vne of 109kts for the cast acrylic windscreens and the aircraft was in standard cruise configuration of 140 knots which would be based upon the glass wind screened configuration?

Who did the testing on these windscreens....the manufacturer, PHI, or Sikorsky?

What was the participation of the FAA in approving the STC? Did they fail to insist upon adequate testing? Did the FAA POI fail to identify the problem during his oversight of PHI?

Did the STC require a Flight Manual Section and thus the reduced Vne?

Does PHI have a modification to the OpSpecs for the plastic windscreen Vne?

Does PHI publish any information for Crew use that would educate them on the reduced Vne requirements?

[skiddriver]

There isn't a 109 knot Vne for the cast windscreens. Sikorsky released a letter about 1 1/2 weeks ago (6 week after the PHI accident) that said that the bird strike resistance of the cast acrylic (non-Sikorsky) windscreens could be considered the same as the Sikorsky acrylic and glass windscreens only if the cast acrylic equipped aircraft was flown at 109 knots or less.

The letter also said that the design standards for the aircraft type did not require bird strike resistance, but that Sikorsky had done it anyway as a product improvement to meet an unspecified international standard. Bird weight stated was 2 pounds but with no associated airspeed listed.

[rotorbrent]

Here is on of many STC's for windshields and there is no Vne limit listed,

Supplemental Type Certificate (http://www.airweb.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgstc.nsf/0/222EA711F9B4EE9385256CC200622715?OpenDocument)


The STC pre dates the Sikorsky letter. Which is not a ammendment to the flight manual,

There is no Vne listed in any of the windshield replacement STC's for the S-76 or any other of the STC's for door or chin bubbles.

Just about every installed piece of equipment is a STCed item on the S-76

There is no FAA Ops Manual that has anything about windshields in it.

Plastic windshields are the norm for most of the helicopters flying in the world I do not see that changing.

Fatal Birdstrikes to aircraft are rare, plastic or glass windshields they will and have come thru both on a S-76.

Its more dangerous driving to work down here in the Bayou than flying offshore.

[SASless]

A recent conversation with a PHI Captain confirmed no mention was made to the pilots re a reduced Vne for plastic wind screens.

That Captain also stated the real motivation for replacing the glass wind screens was not weight but rather costs. The Glass screens were prone to cracking if nicked by FOD kicked up by rotor wash.

Also a quick google visit shows a Red Tailed Hawk weighs from just below two pounds up to almost four pounds. That would on the order of almost twice the testing parameters used by Sikorsky.

Anyone care to calculate the impact force of four pounds at 140 knots?

Also heard is PHI is rapidly replacing plastic with glass for some reason.

One passenger's family has filed suit against PHI and I hear (rumour only at this point) one of the pilot's families have also filed suit against PHI.

[skiddriver]

Sec. 29.631

[Bird strike.]

[The rotorcraft must be designated to ensure capability of continued safe flight and landing (for Category A) or safe landing (for Category B) after impact with a 2.2-lb (1.0 kg) bird when the velocity of the rotorcraft (relative to the bird along the flight path of the rotorcraft) is equal to VNE or VH (whichever is the lesser) at altitudes up to 8,000 feet. Compliance must be shown by tests or by analysis based on tests carried out on sufficiently representative structures of similar design.]

Amdt. 29-40, Eff. 8/8/96

*****

Unfortunately, the S-76 is only designed to amendment 29-11 and parts of 29-12, 13, 24, 26 & 30. So while Sikorsky claimed design compliance with 29.631 above, it would not have been a requirement for STCed windscreens.

[buckeem]

Suit#1 – vs. PHI - There is a wrongful death suit filed in a Terrebonne Parish state court on behalf of Britain Boudreaux, passenger, accuses Lafayette-based PHI Inc. of negligence. This one was filed within 7 days of the accident.

Suit#2 - vs. PHI - The suit, filed by the wife of 35-year-old Jorey Anthony Rivero Sr., of Bridge City, who worked for MMR Offshore Services, was faxed Thursday to the Terrebonne Clerk of Court’s Office. Lawyers for Toni Rivero, his widow, allege Petroleum Helicopters Inc., of Lafayette, is liable for the fatal crash.

****Both lawsuits claim the company is responsible under the legal doctrine of “res ipsa loquitur,” Latin for “the thing speaks for itself,” which in this case means that the deaths of the passengers in the crash could not have occurred unless the company was negligent in some way, lawyers contend.

Suit #3 – vs. Sikorsky - PHI Pilot Thomas Ballenger’s (PIC on flight), widow has filed suit against Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation. Her suit is blaming the accident on the “defective condition” of the chopper. Greg Allen, lawyer for Ballenger, said the noise reported by investigators points to "some form of catastrophic failure" before the crash, even if the engines didn't fail. He said "other components" that could have caused the noise and the crash still haven't been ruled out. "The complaint alleges the crash resulted as a direct and proximate result of defective conditions existing in the S-76C++ helicopter," a press release from the law firm states.