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dhc2widow
5th Dec 2008, 21:17
By Alan Levin, USA TODAY

Three large airlines have abandoned a safety program credited with helping to lower accident rates, prompting criticism of the airlines and unions by safety advocates and government regulators.

American Airlines, Delta Air Lines and Comair have dropped programs that encourage pilots to come forward and report their own mistakes without fear of being punished. Known as the Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP), the program has helped airlines and regulators uncover scores of potentially dangerous situations and make fixes before they caused crashes.
ASAP depends on a consensus among pilot unions, airlines and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), any of which can halt the agreement by refusing to participate.

Union leaders have charged that airlines have gone back on their word and unfairly punished pilots who voluntarily disclosed problems.

The airlines insist that they have treated employees fairly.

Several leading safety experts and the FAA's acting chief criticized the companies and unions in recent days, accusing the two sides of letting politics and bargaining get in the way of safety.

"There are at least two sides to every story, but I couldn't care less about either," said Bill Voss, president of the Flight Safety Foundation.

"Safety systems do not belong on the bargaining table. There is simply no excuse."
FAA acting Administrator Bobby Sturgell called the breakdown "disheartening," in a speech last week.

National Transportation Safety Board member Robert Sumwalt said the shutdowns represent a troubling trend. "The relevant players need to do whatever is necessary to ensure that these programs remain active and vital safety tools," Sumwalt said.

American, the first carrier to start ASAP 14 years ago, suspended its program in October after talks with the Allied Pilots Association (APA) broke down.

APA's safety chief, Mike Michaelis, said the program broke down because of a lack of trust. Capt. Billy Nolen, American's flight safety manager, said the company wants to renew a program that has operated for years.

Delta halted its program in November 2006 over disagreements with the Air Line Pilots Association.

Comair, whose pilots are represented by the same union, suspended its ASAP last October.

Three airlines drop self-reporting safety program - USATODAY.com (http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-12-04-airsafety_N.htm)

As unions charge “that the airlines have gone back on their word and unfairly punished pilots who voluntarily disclosed problems”, this does not bode well for the Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP), or Safety Management Systems. I feel that in order for Safety Management Systems (ICAO implementation) to work, it is essential that effective whistleblower protections are in place.

Thoughts, anyone? How do you make whistleblower protection work?

sevenstrokeroll
5th Dec 2008, 23:34
dch2 widow...interesting name...I hope it doesn't mean what I think it means.

anyway.

What we are seeing is the true commercialization of flying...with disregard to safety.

either do things right, or battle out pilots vs. management.

its all bull****.

framer
6th Dec 2008, 00:08
I get the impression here at the bottom of the world, that our airlines are run by people who don't fully understand how safety works within aviation. It seems to me that the management teams don't have enough (any) time at the coal face to understand how their policies often reduce safety. Does it feel like that up north?

Intruder
6th Dec 2008, 00:14
I suspect those airlines have refused to update the ASAP Memorandum of Understanding to the new template, just like our mismanagement. They want to keep the "hammer" to punish pilots who properly use the program. As a result, our ASAP stopped after the trial phase.

tbavprof
6th Dec 2008, 00:41
What we are seeing is the true commercialization of flying...with disregard to safety.:D

Self-regulation worked well in the financial services industry, didn't it?

The intent of SMS and the self-reporting is good. But there will always be the commercial and punitive factors to deal with in any voluntary reporting.

There has to be an independent 3rd party or some type of ombudsman to run this type of program. I'd suggest expanding the NASA program. Make the program managers responsible for delivering the info on each carrier to airline management on a monthly basis...in a non-punitive manner, in keeping with the spirit of these efforts. That removes the intercompany squabbles between pilots and management. But it does nothing to enhance safety, except provide information. No pro-active "self-correction" in place. A truly "enlightened" management may actually do something.

Ensuring that something gets done has to come from the FAA exercising its oversight duties. I'm sure they're quite happy with this type of chaos as they can place the blame for failures on inter-company squabbling, not lax oversight.

PJ2
6th Dec 2008, 04:32
tbavprof;
Self-regulation worked well in the financial services industry, didn't it?
I've posted elsewhere on PPRuNe on that very topic.

What executive(s) of financial institutions is/are in jail or even under suspicion over the recent financial collapse? Nobody. They're lined up at the Christmas bonus trough and will be lining up again at the "performance bonus" trough.

What we are seeing, although the term is now being disputed by those interested in promoting SMS for reasons other than flight safety, is the "deregulation of flight safety", under the heading of "neoliberal" economic principles (google the term) - the privatization of everything under the sun and the accountability of no one in management or the executive, (because even under SMS, no executive is going to be found "accountable" - it will be the crew who is criminally charged and historical safety data whose collection is mandated under SMS will be used against that crew) - just watch what's coming.

We are going to see the rapidly-descending graph line representing all fatal accidents from 1950 to the present, begin to rise over the next decade because of these foolish and risky industrial and legal decisions, and the executives and politicians who started this process are going to walk while blame for accidents once again returns to the cockpit so that the crew, if they survive at all, will be criminally prosecuted instead of executives who chose to ignore SMS because, when no one is watching, they could.

I have seen this happen already in a serious incident when the aircraft was simply re-dispatched and the downloaded flight safety program data ignored. Our protestations were similarly ignored.

SMS will work only if it has strong oversight by the regulator and not just of the audit process - otherwise, "profit", shareholder value and shareprice, especially these days, rules all behaviours and corporate decision-making. It is no more complicated than that. With safety programs dumped, the airline returns itself to a happy state of being able to live, and claim to be living, in willful ignorance of what their airplanes and crews are doing on a daily basis. That in itself is, in my view, criminal but that's why I'm not a lawyer.

Bill Voss is completely right in his comments but is fighting a tremendous tide against spending and/or supporting those departments within private corporations, the Flight Safety Departments and the Safety Reporting System, that aren't "profit centers", to use the business term.

As this kind of thinking takes hold throughout the industry, until the stupidity and recklessness of this response is realized, it will be increasingly up to commanders to exercise their legal authority to mind the store even more carefully and where necessary aggressively defend their operation against commercial priorities and pressures. The commander is always in charge, but the airline must make money so that everyone has a job. That said, commanders must know when they must set the park brake to achieve that which is required for safe flight. I've done it and it works very effectively because no department wants the blame for a delay.

That kind of exercising of command authority, to be effective and respected, must be extremely rare. Further, it has to be reasonable and it has to be by the book. Most airline ops are non-events and accomplished without untoward delay.

But when the shxt hits the fan and it's all coming apart and tough decisions must be made, they must be made from the cockpit because everyone else is eventually leaving their comfortable desk and is going home to a warm bed while you're still on the ramp dealing with a technical or de-icing or?... procedure before departing.

There is only one person who is going to end up in the oak chair answering questions from the prosecution if something goes south and you are one of the survivors, and it won't be an airline executive. Sadly, there are very few justices around anymore with the courage, patience and prescience of a Virgil Moshansky.

Crusty Ol Cap'n
6th Dec 2008, 12:19
Safety costs money! Modern management will not 'waste' money on safety unless it is mandated. The shareholder comes first!

Oilhead
6th Dec 2008, 12:41
Safety culture is not at all just about investment of money. There is an enormous personal investment required.

None of these VOLUNTARY programs will work without mutual trust and respect between the parties; associations and managements, and indeed the regulatory authority. Many companies say they have an SMS on property, but they pay it lip service; a true "just culture" is in part founded on mutual trust and respect, and in part involves non-punitive safety programs, unless of course the intentional disregard for safety clauses apply.

It is hopeless if one division of a company wants you to come forward and tell it all, while another one is sitting waiting to clobber you.

lomapaseo
6th Dec 2008, 14:05
So here we are wringing our hands and slapping our foreheads about this situation, yet in spite of the headlines the real issues haven't surfaced.

If this is about non-punitive voluntary disclosures then the FAA should stay out of it since they have to uphold an implied responsibility to the public in open.

If this is about identifying causal factors and solutions is it then not entirely in the realm of the safety office for the airlines and the people who share lessons between airlines?


I'll admit that it can be somewhat subjective in judging "intentional disregard for safety clauses" but if this judgement is made at the initial airline safety office and sticks 90% of the time, why can't this program work?

I presume that it did work for some time (I've seen the results) but what now has derailed it?

I don't like white wash words like "lack of trust" for an explanation because that implies somebody is hiding behind weasel words and we need to get this out in the open or the public is going to lose confidence pretty damn quick since it's all over the news.

zalt
6th Dec 2008, 16:29
lomapaseo Good point. We do need to know more. AA and Delta have different unions so is it really the same root cause?

But it is clear that having no reporting scheme means poor safety culture and thus no SMS is possible in these operators.

Yet again the US demonstrates that they are way behind their neighbours and the rest of the world and the FAA are seen to be a sham of a regulator incapable of facilitating the advancement of safety.

Meanwhile management and unions should hang their heads in shame for letting down both the travelling public and themselves.

Airbubba
6th Dec 2008, 17:34
Yet again the US demonstrates that they are way behind their neighbours and the rest of the world and the FAA are seen to be a sham of a regulator incapable of facilitating the advancement of safety.

Well, as always we lead, the rest of the world follows. CRM, grooved runways, locked cockpit doors, blood and alcohol testing, AQP training etc., etc., etc.

Hey, Canada made a helluva robot arm for the space shuttle.:)

zalt
6th Dec 2008, 17:42
That would be because of disfunctional crew comms, runway overuns, lax security screening, drunks and druggies, 2 digit IQs etc., etc., etc.;):)

Seriously: Are you proud of this ASAP situation??

At least other carriers AND mechanics and cabin crew at Delta & AA haave made agreements with their managment
http://www.faa.gov/safety/programs_initiatives/aircraft_aviation/asap/media/asap_participants.pdf

Intruder
6th Dec 2008, 21:10
Modern management will not 'waste' money on safety unless it is mandated. The shareholder comes first!
You are SO wrong! These days the [mis]managers come first! :(

None
7th Dec 2008, 02:54
Not long ago I listened to the Senior pilot at our company speak about this.

As background, I happen to know this guy from my 727 days, and I think very highly of him...except on this one subject.

He stated that he had an obligation to our passengers to ensure that our crews are operating correctly. For that reason, even though ASAP was the source for highlighting an event that did not comply with our SOPs, he felt that the crew should be pulled off the line and retrained.

I do not believe this is within the boundaries established by the ASAP Advisory Circular put out by the FAA.

Had the ASAP program not been in existence, more than likely this event would never have been brought to the attention of anyone in our company. In other words, without ASAP, it didn't happen, and no analysis or mishap prevention measures can be initiated to prevent a recurrence.

My opinion is that confidentiality is a must with any mishap prevention program.

PJ2
7th Dec 2008, 05:37
My views on these issues are well known on this forum by now. I fully support such safety programs as ASAP and FOQA, which are about trend analysis, not pursuing individual crews.

However, any agreement between management and the pilots' association must include a process by which serious and intentional incidents and deviations from SOPs can be dealt with. In short, the association must buy into all aspects of the safety program if it is to succeed.

The agreement must include a process that can identify and assist the airline when a serious, individual incident requires further enquiry. Sometimes that circumstance unfolds well because the crew itself, self-reports and is held harmless in favour of continuing the broader goals of the safety program - almost always, these circumstances and the individuals are known by most and management deals with the issue quietly and internally to the benefit of all. If you don't know or believe that, your finger's not on the pulse.

Again however, if we have intentional, serious deviations from SOPs, a good FOQA or ASAP agreement will have incorporated procedures and processes by which an individual pilot may be approached and his/her circumstances handled so as to mitigate then reverse any untoward operational issues. For some FOQA Programs, it's a "2 strikes" approach - if a captain is found to have two serious operational issues within a six month period, for example, that captain is interviewed and the reasons determined. Sometimes its the usual stuff like economic, personal or medical circumstances - Rarely is it a true "rogue".

The agreement with management then provides that such pilot is removed from the roster and provided with training, or medical assistance or whatever is needed to return that pilot, in healthy state, to the line. It is the pilots' association which takes responsibility for the crew member and who advises the airline that so-and-so member will be "off the line" for the "next two weeks - do not call".

That kind of agreement works. It is in place at a major carrier.

That is indeed, what true flight safety and pilot assistance programs are about when and if circumstances get that far.

That these programs have fallen apart speaks to both management and association failure to place flight safety ahead of other, less important issues. That those issues have not yet been elucidated speaks, I think, to the nature of the disagreement.

Believe me, I do understand how such issues can unfold. An airline trying to do due diligence and ensure that it is operating in accordance with FAA requirements but also trying to be fair to pilots who may be caught in circumstances involving all parties, is in a difficult spot these days when money, politics, and public impressions especially after recent issues regarding the FAA, are all impinging upon how management and the pilots association respond to these naturally-intrusive safety programs.

tbavprof
7th Dec 2008, 10:23
Yet again the US demonstrates that they are way behind their neighbours and the rest of the world and the FAA are seen to be a sham of a regulator incapable of facilitating the advancement of safety.

What we are seeing, although the term is now being disputed by those interested in promoting SMS for reasons other than flight safety, is the "deregulation of flight safety", under the heading of "neoliberal" economic principles (google the term) - the privatization of everything under the sun and the accountability of no one in management or the executive, ... - just watch what's coming.

PJ2, You mean like this news out of Singapore? (http://www.orientaviation.com/section.php?currenyIssue=I20081024121038-9N26e&currentSection=businessroundup&currentArticle=A20081027111041-8teJ7&)

The privatised group, with a working title of Newco, will replace the Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore (CAAS) as the airport’s owner and manager. The government announced the decision in October and said Newco would control the Changi Airport group and a new civil aviation authority. The authority will be responsible for the development and administration of national aviation policy, regulatory issues and air traffic management. “The whole idea of transferring ownership to Temasek is to have a clearer separation of the role of policymaker, regulator and the operators,” said Senior Minister of State for Transport, Lim Hwee Hua.
A CAAS deputy director general for operations, Lee Seow Hiang, will be Newco’s chief executive and Lee Hsien Yang, the brother of Singapore’s prime minister, Lee Hsien Loong, will chair the authority.

boofhead
7th Dec 2008, 16:50
The ASAP program does not protect the pilot in all cases. If the airline learns of the incident or error from independent sources they have the right to start a punitive response. If the error involved willful disregard of rules or procedures, or negligence, there is no bar to the airline firing the pilot. Only genuine mistakes are meant to be covered. Some believe that it is a "get out of jail free" program and that is not what it is.
However it is a great tool and definitely improves safety.
I run a safety program and the majority of what I do does not cost the company a penny. It is a change in attitude more than throwing money at a problem. I don't have ASAP but I apply the principles of it and so far the reporting system has been thriving. We have incidents, but we learn.

Roadtrip
8th Dec 2008, 00:26
It's about absolute control. Airline managers in the US, are, on the whole, have astonishingly bad leadership skills. They have come out of the schools of accounting and see everything in terms of dollars, not realizing that you need to LEAD a company, not drive it. The other part of that most executives in the US really don't care about the industry they're in, or the end result, but only how many tens of millions of dollars they can soak out of it as fast as possible. The traitors that drove the banking industry in the US off the cliff, while they pocketed literally hundreds of millions of dollars in bonuses and compensation are proof of this. These guys are not incompetent. Far from it. They knew exactly what they were doing.

PJ2
8th Dec 2008, 04:37
Roadtrip;

It's about absolute control. Airline managers in the US, are, on the whole, have astonishingly bad leadership skills. They have come out of the schools of accounting and see everything in terms of dollars, not realizing that you need to LEAD a company, not drive it. The other part of that most executives in the US really don't care about the industry they're in, or the end result, but only how many tens of millions of dollars they can soak out of it as fast as possible. The traitors that drove the banking industry in the US off the cliff, while they pocketed literally hundreds of millions of dollars in bonuses and compensation are proof of this. These guys are not incompetent. Far from it. They knew exactly what they were doing.
Well, it's very sad but that post deserves quoting in full because it is absolutely 100% correct. We at FDA have been pushing rope for a decade and nobody wants anything to do with it, hates it and ignores it every chance they get. It's a box tick because they don't really know the business they're in. No executive I have ever met and I've met all of them here, understands the principles of flight safety and how such programs work to protect the very thing they care for most and which is priority #1 - shareholder value. They're comfortably numb.

lomapaseo;
If this is about identifying causal factors and solutions is it then not entirely in the realm of the safety office for the airlines and the people who share lessons between airlines?
What would you think of a flight safety department that is run by, financed by and reports directly to, the VP of Flt Ops? What flight safety information do you think is going to get past the palace guards to the CEO, (assuming s/he cares to know in the first place)?

Nick NOTOC
8th Dec 2008, 06:29
Interesting topic! It's good to see such a proffessional response, however it would be better to have response from management rather then pilots, after all managers don't get hurt in an accident pilots do.
Over the last 20 years I have seen safety develop in a good direction, but lately it seems that the basic priciples are being re-discussed. New managers, new mistakes and again we must re train our management.
Safety culture is like any culture the collective achievement of a group of individuals that characterises freedom form injury or risk. like so many cultures it's the persons at the top that can influence culture (albeit only in a negative way)
My experience is that a 100% confidential system is the only working system!

Shell Management
8th Dec 2008, 11:56
boofhead - You are right that ASAP is not and should not be a get out of jail card. But without it the FAA can still take certificate action for unintended actions and genuine mistakes. The continuing FAA attitude is very unproductive and unfair and totally against best practice.

tbavprof - you are 100% wrong. What is happening in Singapore is seperating the activity (running an airport) from the regulator. This is a GOOD thing as it makes the regulator independent.

Nick NOTOC and Roadtrip - I agree US aviation managers often show poor leadership - which results in a poor culture.

Nick NOTOC - the need to rely totally on a confidential reporting system is really a sign of a bad culture - it is simply a work around. They are fine if they are designed to cope with just a small percentage of reports.

PJ2 - The structure you suggest is what all airlines should have but too many Directors of Ops fear being made to look bad rather than welcoming the benefit. It is also the way to foster open rather than confidential reporting.

There is a very good and popular article on SMS and going beyond the system to get a culture of safety here:
SKYbrary - Popular pages (http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Special:Popularpages)

lomapaseo
8th Dec 2008, 13:12
I see that we have garnered some important opinions about how a safety culture should work, BTDT. But still no clear sign of why a working ASAP program is no longer working at these major airlines.

I begining to suspect that the problem is not in it's origination but in the user. So what and how is this obvious diminishing in safety going to be fixed?

PJ2
8th Dec 2008, 17:24
Shell Management;
The structure you suggest is what all airlines should have but too many Directors of Ops fear being made to look bad rather than welcoming the benefit. It is also the way to foster open rather than confidential reporting.
Having the Flight Safety Department controlled by and reporting to the VP of Flight Operations only works if the Flight Operations VP and his/her organization wants to know about flight safety issues. At present, they seem satisfied with the operation, we haven't had any accidents and therefore have no need for a flight safety program that may impede commercial priorities. :ugh:

We collect all kinds of FOQA data but do nothing with it - nothing that is effective anyway. We even have to wrangle an invitation to training and standards meetings because we're often "forgotten".

I can tell you from personal experience that getting a FOQA Program going without the support and buy-in of Flt Operations or the CEO, (even getting the CEO's awareness, let alone buy-in, is a significant problem here) is simply a complete waste of time, human and technical resources and the organization's money. We have been beating our heads against the office refrigerator for ten years and it's a lost cause.

So, no, I don't think that "reporting to Flt Ops" is a good idea if they don't want to know. I think the CEO needs to know how close his/her airline came to an accident, (we can show at least a dozen "events") so he can comprehend the notion that the airline business is about more than marketing. Then, just maybe, he might kick some ass down below and get his people onside because right now it doesn't "hurt" for people to ignore the data.

If there is a healthy, knowing safety culture which has an appropriate level of intervention as per previous discussion and a good agreement with the association, (and we have an excellent one that is respected by both sides) where flight safety has both independance from operations and the ability, with teeth, to intervene where the data indicates, (I fully realize the problems in this requirement but expect that a healthy safety culture is one that doesn't ground every 767 no matter where it is around the world with a 5kt flap overspeed!, etc, etc), then a working relationship with Flt Ops which respects and asserts the requirements of both departments so that commercial and safety interests are intelligently balanced through the use of data and not just opinion or politics, can work effectively for the organization.

Anyway, enough. I guess we're going to learn the hard way.

dhc2widow
8th Dec 2008, 17:34
In 1977, the Washington based Institute for Policy Studies launched the Government Accountability Project (GAP) in an effort to support individuals who come forward, risking their jobs and careers, by challenging wrongdoings for the benefit of public safety. The following is an excerpt from “The Whistleblower’s Survival Guide: Courage Without Martyrdom”, first printed in 1997. “Structurally, corporate voluntary disclosure programs are vulnerable to the now-familiar conflict of interest inherent when an institution is responsible for disclosing its own misconduct. To illustrate, the investigations often are conducted by attorneys whose professional duty is to the client corporation – rather than to the public. The same attorney who interviews whistleblowers and serves as a liaison between the corporation and the government during a voluntary disclosure may later act as counsel for the defense in the event of enforcement action.

As a result, voluntary disclosure programs have failed to serve as an effective substitute for external oversight, and too often serve as a shield for liability.”

and

“The GAP has identified six basic principles that we believe are needed for any meaningful system of whistleblower protection and corporate and government accountability. Whistleblowers must:

1. Have a legal right to protection against discrimination for challenging illegality or violations of the public trust through lawful disclosures, without having to obtain advance permission, as well as the same protection for refusing to violate the law;
2. Have access to courts in which the decisionmakers have judicial independence from the political process, and be entitled to a jury trial;
3. Have remedies that hold individual harassers personally liable and subject to discipline, so that an employer or supervisor has something to lose by retaliating;
4. Gain access to legal shields for following government or professional codes of ethics;
5. Have the ability to go on the attack against lawlessness by restoring citizen standing to challenge fraud and enforce the law; and
6. Restore substantive and procedural due process rights for all violations of constitutional rights, even when the government asserts a conflict with national security.”
Have any of these principles been incorporated into the ASAP?

Also curious, what labour associations are available to non-airline pilots? (I know the answer for Canada)

Are there any countries that have a mandatory Professional Pilots Association for all working pilots, and if so, how is that working?


P.S. dch2 widow...interesting name...I hope it doesn't mean what I think it means ... yes, I'm afraid it does.

Shell Management
8th Dec 2008, 20:24
P2 - I may not have been clear - I was advocating an independent safety director reporting to the CEO with the budget and resources required NOT safety officers subordinate to directors of ops and maintenance.

dhc2widow - your GAP example relates to reporting of misconduct. That is not what ASAP or any of theother equivalent schemes are aimed at. If it is a case of misconduct then most national aviation authorities have a means of such reporting. However as you are aware, reporting to TCCA, for example, does not always results in a comprehensive investigation or enforcement if required. But that is a failure in regulation not reporting.

PJ2
8th Dec 2008, 23:32
Shell Management;

Ah, ok, thanks for the clarification. The key is, the CEO "knows", so there is no denial possible and those down below get an earful if they don't do the right thing when things that are done wrong are reported directly to the accountable executive. Our safety people are under Flt Ops so the CEO only knows what's been sanitized through the bureaucracy and no department is going to report on itself.

I'm not fed up or at the end of my wits - that's inappropriate for safety people who are at times, accustomed to such treatment but I am deeply frustrated because it IS after all, my company's health. Thanks for the feedback.

Mark in CA
16th Dec 2008, 17:31
Japan Air Lines seems to be moving in the opposite direction, not only encouraging voluntary, non-recriminating pilot error reporting and continuous black-box data analysis, but they're also showing in-flight videos to passengers that illustrate how the airline is learning form its mistakes.

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/16/business/16box.html

Intruder
16th Dec 2008, 18:11
I was advocating an independent safety director reporting to the CEO with the budget and resources required NOT safety officers subordinate to directors of ops and maintenance.
They exist in many airlines and military air organizations. Still they are only as effective as the CEO/CO/Commander allows them to be. In my military and airline experience, operations still "wins" the arguments most of the time, because the CEO wants the airplanes moving.

Our current "Safety Director" is a do-nothing.

Shell Management
22nd Dec 2008, 11:01
Only back in October NTSB Board Member Robert Sumwalt said the following to the Regional Airlines Association's Presidents Council Luncheon:

Following a fatal regional airline accident a few years ago, the Safety Board issued safety recommendations calling for air carriers to implement Aviation Safety Action Programs (ASAP) and Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA). Almost two years after those safety recommendations were issued, I did some research to see how many carries had implemented them.

ASAP programs encourage employees to report safety concerns in a non-punitive environment, which allows the air carrier to act on the information before an accident or incident occurs. I found virtually no difference between regional and major carrier in implementation of ASAP. 93 percent of 14 major carriers in my survey had ASAP programs, whereas 91 percent of the 21 regional carriers had these programs. I applaud major and regional carriers alike in their efforts to implement ASAP.

Now:

NTSB weighs in on US carrier suspension of voluntary reporting

US safety officials are publicly expressing their concern over the suspension of voluntary safety reporting programmes by four of the country's airlines.

The Aviation Safety Action Programme (ASAP) has officially been suspended at Delta Air Lines and its wholly-owned regional Comair, American Airlines and US Airways.

An Aviation Safety Action Programme (ASAP) is an agreement between an airline labour group, FAA and carrier management that generally frees employees from penalties when they report incidents or safety concerns.

[The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) today said: "These programmes identify and correct safety issues before they cause accidents."

NTSB believes the information provided by ASAP is used in developing methods to improve safety, and "their elimination could put aviation safety at risk".

In 2007 the board said it issued a recommendation to FAA strongly encouraging ASAP adoption among US regional carriers.

Delta pilots suspended the carrier's ASAP programme in December 2006. Both American and US Airways pilots allowed their progammes to lapse this year.

American pilots suspended ASAP after determining a proposal offered by management in the renewal process would put the carrier's pilots at greater risk for discipline.

US Airways this month terminated the carrier's 10-year ASAP programme after pilots failed to expand immunity to events not previously covered under the agreement.

Recently Delta's branch of the Air Line Pilots Association (APLA) said it hoped to reach an agreement with management regarding ASAP soon.

NTSB, meanwhile, "strongly urges all parties to do what is needed to reinstate proactive safety programmes and keep existing programmes viable and fully functioning," says board Chairman Mark Rosenker.
Source: Air Transport Intelligence news

timbob
22nd Dec 2008, 13:10
At play is the longterm competition between the management safety organization (Vice-President of Safety, XYZ Airlines) and the pilot union's traditional role as safety watchdog. At some airlines, it becomes apparent to the line pilots that neither talk to each other very much, each publish periodic safety booklets and letters that appear to have no coordination in content or emphasis. Given the choice, most would probably favor full disclosure in the interest of safety, but the competition between the two elements for moral preeminence (management vs pilot association) can be a distraction. (Note to Both; publishing some joint blather in the Flight Operations Manual is viewed with suspicion by most flight crews as nice words with no specific meaning. Pilots strongly prefer independant reporting to third party for confidentiality.) "Do I confess here, or at the church across the street?"

None
30th Dec 2008, 16:28
Can an air carrier pass an IOSA audit without an ASAP-type of program?

IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA) (http://www.iata.org/ps/certification/iosa/)


[Safety] Programme Elements
ORG 3.3.10 The Operator shall have a process for the investigation of aircraft accidents and
incidents, to include reporting of events in accordance with requirements of the State. (GM)
ORG 3.3.11 The Operator shall have a process for identifying and investigating irregularities or other
non-routine operational occurrences that might be precursors to an aircraft accident or incident.
(GM)
ORG 3.3.12 The Operator shall have an operational reporting system that:
i) encourages and facilitates feedback from personnel to identify deficiencies, expose
hazards and raise safety concerns;
ii) includes analysis and management action to address operational deficiencies, hazards
and concerns identified through the reporting system. (GM)
ORG 3.3.13 The Operator shall have a flight data analysis programme that is non-punitive and
contains adequate safeguards to protect data sources. The programme shall include either:
i) a systematic download and analysis of electronically recorded aircraft flight data or
ii) a systematic acquisition, correlation and analysis of flight information derived from a
combination of some or all of the following sources:
a) aircraft FDR readouts;
b) confidential flight and cabin crew operational safety reports;
c) flight and cabin crew interviews;
IOSA Standards Manual
Part One
ORG 6 ISM Ed 2 Rev 1, April 2007
d) quality assurance findings;
e) flight and cabin crew evaluation reports;
f) aircraft engineering and maintenance reports. (GM)
(Note: this is a Parallel Conformity Option effective until 31 December 2009.)
ORG 3.3.14 The Operator should have a programme for the systematic acquisition and analysis of
data from observations of flight crew performance during normal line operations. (GM)
ORG 3.3.15 The Operator should have a confidential human factors reporting system. (GM)
ORG 3.3.16 The Operator should have a database to ensure effective management of data derived
from the flight safety programme.

AirRabbit
30th Dec 2008, 22:12
The ASAP program, as I understand it, accepts voluntary reports of facts that may have led (or if allowed to continue, might lead) to an unsafe circumstance or it reports something that was or is not in compliance with existing rules, regulations, policies, or procedures. Filing such a report insulates the reporters from any further action being taken against the one doing the reporting and others involved. But I also understand that if it is found that the facts of the circumstance lead to a conclusion that the claimed “error” involves criminal activity, substance abuse, the use of controlled substances, alcohol, or intentional falsifications, an enforcement action may be pursued whether or not an ASAP report has been filed. I also understand that if an ASAP report is filed, and the unsafe practice was found to exist through some alternative investigation NOT USING the information provided by the offending party(ies), where there is sufficient evidence found through another means that would have justified processing a corrective action, including an enforcement action, that corrective or enforcement action may be taken.

I also understand that if an accident or incident occurs, and no ASAP report has been filed, whatever is found can be used in any potential corrective or enforcement action. Noticeably, however, the fact is the voluntary reporting program was designed to highlight and, hopefully, correct the situation before an accident, incident, or another rule violation occurs. Without such information, there is little hope that the circumstance that might lead to such an outcome will ever be known. Believing that a rule requiring the reporting of such violation of rules, practices, or procedures will lead to their being reported is simply naive. If the “offenders” would be subjected to punitive or embarrassing actions if they reported the incident, wouldn’t the motivation be largely to hide the evidence, stay quiet, and hope that no one found out … thereby hopefully avoiding any kind of punitive or embarrassing actions being taken?

In this case I agree with Sturgell … the best course of action is to urge the airlines and the labor unions to resolve their differences. The name of the operation should be PREVENT … not PUNISH. I think there are adequate caveats with the existing program to take necessary punitive or corrective action when someone criminally jeopardizes safety – and I think that operating an aircraft while impaired is at least as bad as operating a motor vehicle under the same circumstances. This industry is currently enjoying one of the safest times in its history. For one, I think that the ASAP program can claim at least some part of that safety record. I would hate to see it removed because of “in-fighting.” I may be all wrong, but I would think that companies would much prefer to re-train a handful of crewmembers … and that labor organizations would rather see their members re-trained … than to have the continuing viability of the operation jeopardized by an accident.

llondel
2nd Jan 2009, 03:49
I think the other aspect of all of this is that the lawyers, having saturated the medical profession, have turned to aviation, so that any admission of a mistake could be the one that invites a lawsuit (costing time, money and giving bad PR). Some management types have obviously decided that the best way to safeguard the company is to act on reports by 'retraining' crew or firing them, showing by their actions that it was individuals at fault and not the company should it come to court.

Ultimately it's going to cost them more - how much does a hull loss with fatalities cost a company if it turns out later that similar incidents had occurred previously but avoided the fatal outcome? Some time in the next few years it'll happen, and the fatal event would have been avoidable if only there had been a sensible mechanism for reporting the first.

Unfortunately there isn't really a good method of anonymous reporting because for many incidents enough detail is needed that the flight in question can be identified.

dhc2widow
29th Jan 2009, 16:19
Updated: January 29th, 2009 09:46 AM GMT-05:00
Home > Top News
NTSB Pleased With Delta's Decision to Reinstate ASAP
NTSB

WASHINGTON, D.C. -- The National Transportation Safety Board is pleased that Delta Air Lines has reinstated its Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP).

Under ASAP, pilots, mechanics, and dispatchers receive immunity from disciplinary action when they voluntarily report any safety-related incidents.

"ASAP is a major component to aviation safety," says NTSB Acting Chairman Mark V. Rosenker. "We are hopeful that other carriers, who have recently suspended their ASAP will also see the importance and value of these programs and quickly reinstate them."

The Safety Board believes that proactive safety programs, which encourage voluntary disclosure of safety issues, are critical to ensuring aviation safety and identifying problems before they lead to accidents.

The memorandum of understanding signed between the carrier, the Air Line Pilots Association and the Federal Aviation Administration will identify and correct safety issues, and prevent accidents.

AMTonline (http://www.amtonline.com/article/article.jsp?siteSection=1&id=7302)

kappa
28th Mar 2009, 01:28
Yesterday American Airlines announced that their pilots had agreed to again participate in an ASAP program. Previously the U.S. Airways and Delta programs had been reinstated.

manrow
28th Mar 2009, 08:15
Is this another sign that these days the FAA is no longer proactive?

Roadtrip
9th Apr 2009, 00:14
The FAA is a joke. When they proposed new rest rules for long haul flying, they quickly retracted them when their defacto bosses in the airline executive boards rooms gave them "guidance."

Defined rest periods required for domestic reserve pilots, but international reserve pilots are available 24 hours a day. And the beat goes on.