GF -072 :Very inexperienced flight crew?

[Invaribly]

Having analysed the CVR on the net i couldent help but notice the vast inexperience of the flight crew.The captain had only been flying for 6 years and had only 82 hrs as captain on the A320.The F/O had only been flying for just over a year , with 608 hrs TT,and had also failed (acheived too many 'D' ratings) some simulator checks.
Was their inexperience a major factor into the crash?Gulf Air Captains officially went on the record and described the co as 'meek','Shy',and 'reserved'.Some questioned his potential ability to speak up if he thought something was not quite right.
Any thoughts?

[A319-131]

Any chance you could post a link to that cvr and others please? Thanks.

[Belgique]

pdf files accessible from:

http://www.bahrainairport.com/gf072factualinformation.htm

[wonderbusdriver]

Sounds more like a major CRM-problem, coupled (as always) with other factors.

There´s never one sole cause (unless it was technical) to this sad sort of event.

[5 APU's captain]

The CRM is a nice thing....
Just what you can do with a guy with 600 hrs?
Even CRM does not help you.

[wonderbusdriver]

The communication problem here has nothing to do with 600hrs or 6000hrs.

CRM is about the crew working together in the most effective way by communicating.

If the FO is trained right in CRM,he´ll speak up long before they run into this sort of situation - even with low hours.

If the CP is trained right in CRM, he´ll listen to his FO and factor the FOs input into further actions - even with low hours in command, moreover especially then .

I´m not laying any blame on the colleagues for anything!

[whats_it_doing_now?]

Just what do you mean by that 5 apu? Interested to know since I am copilot with just over a years experiance and 600 hours jet time. Can't wait to get some more experience then I can be perfect too.

[This message has been edited by whats_it_doing_now? (edited 19 May 2001).]

[Huck]

When I had 600 hours I could accomplish a turn on instruments without crashing.

I don't know the details, but any chance those fellows mistook the flap overspeed aural warning with a stall warning?

[wonderbusdriver]

On the new Airbusses (if all systems are OK), before stalling you automatically go into alpha-floor protection - TO-GA thrust etc..
Should you stall anyway the warning starts screeming "Stall!...".

[scanscanscan]

A voice yellig STALL STALL?
Does this mean? Do it?
Or does it mean do not do it?
Or does it mean something else!
Seems better if it told the pilots what to do, as the pilots have obviously got it wrong so far and they cannot phone a friend.

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We will do the drill according to the amendments to the amendments I er think?

[This message has been edited by scanscanscan (edited 25 May 2001).]

[Diesel8]

The Airbus, in normal law, meaning everything is funtioning, cannot (in theory) be stalled. If these pilots had done nothing else, but pull the sidestick full aft, the aircraft would have applied TOGA thrust once it reached a certain airspeed. The aircraft would have climbed like a banshee looking for a banana and would start reducing the bank angle.

Apparently these aviators did the bad thing of flying a perfectly good aircraft into the ground (water).

[BenThere]

It's a problem that when new equipment becomes reachable in the bidding process, the awarded captain will often be new to the airplane even though probably experienced as a captain. While seniority rules, there is no requirement to season in the right seat before taking command. Is this a safety issue? You bet!

[Boeinguy]

With regard to the comment about low flight time. I understand what the poster means. I was a captain at a regional when they started hiring very low time pilots (under 1,000 hrs). Most (not all) of the new pilots I flew with had never flown into a busy airport or shot an actual instrument approach. I could tell stories, but basically, it was a shocking experience. In short, my new fo's were cfi's that had a few hundred hours doing steep turns.

After a few years, they'd be alright, but they were upgrading to captain in six months. So when this started, you had new captains who hadn't learned the ropes yet flying with very green fo's. You could have two guys up front that had never used a wx radar dodging storms...or dealing with winter ops.

This is not to slam low time guys, but there's a lot of things to learn that can't be taught in a classroom or sim, and many of the new hires I flew with thought they new it all. We've all been new, but I think many of the older guys learned the hard way...flying something like a Navajo on night charter jobs and the like. We also took several years to make captain.

Do foreign carriers have rules like the US regarding pilot pairing (as it relates to avoiding the pairing of two low time pilots)?

[411A]

Boeinguy---
Interesting question. I have worked for several large foreign state carriers over the years. One had the requirement that a new Captain had to be paired with an experienced F/O, but most could not have cared less. Not good.

[5 APU's captain]

what_is_doing_now?
Just read the Boeinguy story.
Iam fully agree with.
(I am not saying that somebody with 600 hrs is a bad pilot, just to understand the situation is critical not the CRM is reqiured only).

[countrybusdriver]

We all talk about experience, but why and how did he get himself that high and fast in the first place. The cardinal sin I feel they/he made was the disconnecting of the autopilot to make a non presision approach. The a/c has everything there to help you and they used none of them.

Madness. Lets just hope others have learnt from this.

[Ellion]

I think the point of CRM is being over emphasised.
I do agree that an experienced (eg 1500hrs+on type)First Officer would have ensured that this type of accident does not occur, however the continued practice of some companies releasing people to line as Captains when they are clearly incapable of doing so , or just have not yet aquired the necessary experience dumbfounds me.

I will not travel on an airline that I suspect carry out this practice. The public need to be informed of it and managment that allows this practce to continue need to be held criminally liable.

[Flap 5]

The instrument presentation to the pilot in the A320 is so good that it is easier to fly a visual approach in an A320 than in your simplest light aircraft.

If you keep the 'bird' (flight path vector) above the horizon the aircraft will always be climbing. Put it on the horizon and you will be level. Under the computer's normal law the flight path will always be constant however much you push or pull the thrust levers. It couldn't be simpler.

These were professional pilots. It should have never happened.

[Semper paratus]

Flap5.

Maybe they were looking somewhere else than on the instruments? I doubt they would have done the maneuvers they did if they had looked at the instruments (especially the pitching down after hearing the flaps-overspeed warning).

GF072 has been discussed on several other threads and I find the theory on "Somatogravic Illusions - the False Pitch-up Illusion" very interesting and plausible.

You can find here:

http://www.pprune.org/ubb/NonCGI/Forum1/HTML/013394.html

[Roadrunner]

The simple fact is, very low time F/O’s can be left way out of the loop when things start to get away from the norm (fit hits the Shan). We have all seen how fast that can happen. It’s called inexperience. We need to think back to our 300th hour and appreciate how raw we really were. The very fact that in a recent accident the F/O had no input to the controls, even in the last seconds before impact, says a heck of a lot.

I believe it is asking for problems when a company allows a pilot to occupy a crew seat of a slippery jet or high performance turbo-prop with such low time. The trouble is that the companies (bean counters) rely on their misguided belief that the Captain will be able to do it all on his/her own on the day. Two pilot a/c are so designed for very good reasons, such as, the handling of abnormal situations and various levels of incapacitation etc.

Companies need to ask themselves a simple question. Is this crew combination capable of handling a heavy-duty emergency with a high probability of coming out on top? If not, they shouldn’t roster the said crew. Two experienced pilots will best assure this.
Some of the problem may stem from the fact that senior salaries are able to be kept higher if the junior salaries are kept lower, hence the possible acceptance by Flight Ops departments of very low time F/O’s or S/O’s. Cheap labor. And you thought only Nike did that.

Many countries do not posses much of a GA industry. Low time guys need to get a start somewhere. I believe companies should establish agreements, so that their low time F/O’s are able to gain experience on less demanding a/c before returning to crew high performance types. RBA have done so in the past.

Pilots should be accepted with due regard to ability and not, as is sometimes the case, based on who they know. This is a problem particularly in Asia.
I have a good friend who works for a flying school set up by a large Asian carrier. He confirms that some of the students are connected, rather than possessing even average ability. Then of course, pressure is brought to bear to get them through and the weak link story we are all familiar with begins.

It’s commonsense really. Until airlines get serious about the low time F/O situation, senseless loss of life will continue to occur. This situation can improve if some overseeing authority forces the companies to make change, otherwise the bean counters will prevail.

These problems are endemic in aviation in many regions around the world.

The travelling public deserves more. I guess it will take successful litigation by some victim’s relatives, before the relentless drive for greater profit, gives way to the necessity to show adequate care and responsibility to the travelling public.

[This message has been edited by Roadrunner (edited 21 May 2001).]

[This message has been edited by Roadrunner (edited 21 May 2001).]

[M14P]

Roadrunner - you raise some interesting points but I am not sure that just because an FO is inexperienced a de facto single crew operation should occur.

As a captain of a TWO CREW aircraft every effort should be made to stay within the standard operating procedures for your type. In the case of GF072 it was clear that this did not happen. Although there was no intervention from the FO it was the Captain who flew the aircraft into the sea.

I feel that it is very shortsighted to blame inexperience outright for this accident when there were clearly other human factors n play.

[Invaribly]

Such as?

[M14P]

I didn't really want to go any further here but:

1) The personality type that will not 'throw away' an approach no matter how bad (there's a bit of that in all of us)

2) Poor handling skills

3) Somatogravic and possibly 'black hole' effects

4) Cockpit gradient issues which may have lead to an unwillingness to contribute

The list goes on and there are lessons for EVERYONE to learn, no matter what seat or aircraft type.

[exeng]

M14P

Nice call.


Regards
Exeng

[scanscanscan]

Better call by Invaribly

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We will do the drill according to the amendments to the amendments I er think?

[Rogan Josh]

M14P

Nice reply to Roadrunner...all points raised are good, but it was the captain who flew it into the sea. Inexperienced pairings is at it,s worst when the job market is bouyant, with the experienced people moving on all the time.........like right now!!

[Roadrunner]

M14P

I’m only suggesting that in dire situations which require a far bit of fancy footwork, as against a more straight forward abnormal, that veeery low time F/O’s can be left far behind. Not for a moment am I suggesting that we all fly around the sky on an average day single pilot whilst accompanied by a low time F/O.

IMHO the GF 072 tragedy would not have occurred had there been an experienced F/O present that was prepared to speak up and finally take over when it was apparent that things were getting totally out of hand and far from normal procedures. A reasonably experienced F/O, I'm sure, would never have tolerated the departure from SOP’s that took place.

It’s obvious the Captain is to blame for the departure from SOP’s. He was definitely to blame for physically flying into the sea, as he was the PF. It is a sad indictment that the captain, even for a moment, believed he could get the machine stabilized anywhere near the ground, let alone 500ft HAT. They arrived at the descent point for the VOR at 317knots (from memory) with about 6 miles to the THOLD. To continue down was crazy. I repeat two pilot a/c require two pilots to operate and that the second pilot is there to counter just such a departure from SOP’s. That did not happen.

Yes, of course accidents occur due to many links in the infamous chain, no doubt there. It was not my intention to suggest that the very low time F/O was the ONLY contributing factor.

I was using this example to get on my soapbox and bleat about what I see as the abysmal situation re very low time people in the RHS of large, passenger carrying a/c worldwide. Airlines have made big savings with modern two pilot a/c. It is a shame they feel they need to further cut costs at the expense of experience in the RHS.

I believe that the innocent fare paying public, deserve far more from the airlines and from the pilots.

[TE RANGI]

Roadrunner:

Two excellent posts. I couldn't agree more with you. Let's face it: Very (extremely) low time hires are becoming a plague in this industry. And in fast expanding carriers low time F/Os eventually become low time Capts.

Those who say that it's not taking a toll in incidents/accidents better wake up from their dreams. Just check out last years' accidents worldwide and see how many times the same scenario is repeated: Capt with low time on type paired with a green inexperienced F/O.

I feel proper regs on this issue are long overdue. Without them it's up to the individual carrier to establish the rules so that a competent crew is dispatched for every flight. Those very same carriers that hired the low time pilots.

PS: Could anyone please provide the FARs governing this issue in the US?

[M14P]

I agree that low experience pairings are undesirable but the 'dire situation' in this case could have been predicted by a properly trained 200 hour cadet as the aircraft passed 12 nm above 300 kt and above 3000 feet.

There are always more reasons than simply 'inexperienced FO'. Training and emphasis on situational and energy awareness as well as aircraft/automatic systems. If the captain had been slightly more experienced he may have never flown the aircraft in such a way thereby eliminating the need for intervention from the FO.

In summary, yes the GF072 flight crew were inexperienced; however, did their inexperience DIRECTLY cause to the accident? No.

Remember the old adage: 'A superior pilot uses his superior judgement to avoid a situation where he may need his superior skill' - Never truer than here (?) I guess that you develop judgement through experience and experience is built on good training.

[This message has been edited by M14P (edited 22 May 2001).]

[scanscanscan]

Please correct me if I am wrong but the rumour was..... there was also another "qualified Gulf Air trained and current national 320 pilot in the observers seat.
Thus as in the Trident Stains there were more qualified on type company trained pilots on the flight deck than legally required and both aircraft got into horrible and uncorrected, then fatal situations.
So could it be Gulf Airs Training and checking department is at the same stage of development as the British in 1972 i.e. Is it 28years out of date?
IMHO.. To prove that this is not the case British Airways trainers who learned and changed their simulator sessions after the facts of Stains emerged should certainly now do a full indepth and detailed report on Gulf Air training and checking personnel and the techniques that they today employ.
Particularly wise thought is required as to how these old and out of date techniques impact and adversely effect human factors and the high stress they may cause to Gulf Air pilots.


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We will do the drill according to the amendments to the amendments I er think?

[BmPilot21]

I started as an F/O on the 737 with 250 hrs. This is common for cadets who have come through the rigorous sponsorship scheme which the airline runs. Yes, I was inexperienced, and BUT I WAS NEVER AFRAID TO SPEAK UP IF A CAPTAIN DEPARTED FROM SOP'S TO A DANGEROUS LEVEL. Even with 250hrs, I would NOT have let a captain fly an a/c into the ground. Monitoring the a/c is the primary task of the PNF, and he should not have been distracted from this.

Surely it is the F/O's (and Captain's)PERSONALITY not inexperience that contributed to this. Even if an F/O has 2000 hrs, he may still be afraid to speak up due to a meek personality / domineering Captain.

Certain Captain's attitude (as shown on this thread), is that inexperienced F/O's are useless. This leads to Captains becoming obviously insulted if an F/O questions something he has done, and so he may not feel like questioning him again. It is the CAPTAIN who sets the atmosphere on the flight deck.

5 APU's Captain and Boeinguy - what kind of atmosphere do you create - is it one where an inexperienced F/O feels he can question you if he's not happy? I hope so.

I agree there is no substitute for experience, however, in my company the Command rating is regarded as one of the toughest around, and only competent (and experienced - 4000hrs min., or around 6 yrs) become Captains.

Experience doesn't always equal safety - it depends on the individual - if he allows himself to become slack wih age - not following SOPs etc., then this is as bad as being inexperienced.

Low time pilots are not dangerous in themselves, if they are good, follow SOPs and fly with a good Captain. However, I agree that if this isn't the case, then the inexperience will compund any other faults in the individuals - a gash inexperienced F/O is worse than an experienced gash F/O!

[Invaribly]

BM pilot21 it is interesting to see that you described a potentially hazardous F/O as one who has a 'meek personality' ,because after the gulf air crash several captains were asked to describe the F/O regarding his general psychology and they themselves use the phrase 'meek personality' - interesting.

[yodason45]

whats_it_doing_now

You must be the answer to the CRM assessors dream. 600 Hrs and perfect _ NOT!

[Ontheairwaves]

hey ScanScanScan
if you don't know whether the plane is stalling or whether to stall it if it is giving you an aural warning then one wonders what you are doing at all in the airplane???
Sure basic IR training will show you what your plane is doing.....trust your instruments....
As for pairing low time pilots.....yeah i do think it is a recipe for disaster....in
United we try to make sure that a new Captain is flying with a senior Co-Pilot and vice versa...
The old saying goes that if it takes an accident for you to realise there's a problem then you ARE already part of that problem......
Too bad there is more blood spilt before someone realises that there is a problem!!!

[tarjet fixated]

I remember when i was junior,new on type and relatively low time on one of the many sequenced approaches to the usual busy airport: i was used to lower the gear at about 7-6 miles on the ILS and everything had always gone well and according to the manual...this one day we had about 20kts tail wind (but i thought "what's 20kts at 3000'?It surely makes no difference.").
At about 9-10 miles the Capt. told me "I would lower the gear..." but i arrogantly said that i would do it at 6-7 miles as usual not to spoil my smooth and nicely flown approach so he let me do it my way....well i got to my ref speed just before touch down with the throttles at idle all the way and nowadays i know the effect of just 20kts blowing on your tail during the approach.
This is just a normal and apparently insignificant everyday story but that day i learnt an important lesson for the rest of my career...but this is thanks to an experienced and confident captain who knew to what limits i could stretch my errors and he let me do it so that i could see for myself.
Low time pairings hardly enjoy this professional growth me thinks.

[Mapshift]

From the inside, but no secret, there was a personal conflict between this Capt, and the f.o. had been ongoing throught the block of trips, hence perhaps the hesitance on part of the f.o. to interject, and was probably just as disoriented as the capt..the f.o. was known to be assertive and contributory on the flight deck, but the apparent conflict between the two, might have caused him to "shut down"

[scanscanscan]

Ontheairwaves.
Thats correct, if you dont know what is going on, you should not be there.
Why and how you may ask did you get there? Who allowed you to fast track and bent the rules to get you there? Who failed to protect you? Who guards the GF guards?
But if you are there, and at 300 feet on a black night and in it up to your neck, (maybe you personaly have not "yet" been exposed to a humbling and overwhelming situation) where it is all turning to poo in your hands, then IMHO a very positive input is required to help you and not confuse you further.
You have already recorded your progress in the recorders and you have experienced your former pride destroyed in minutes, you are very stressed and worried about the consequences of all this.
You now need help at least to stay alive to be fired.
If this is not forthcomeing from the fo or the fo in the jumpseat, what then?
I feel the aircraft warning generated needs at this point, to be, as a last resort, instructional and effectively strong enough to break through the frozen thought paths of the overwhelmed pilots and instruct/guide them to safety, NOT airspeed, flaps, stall, go figure it all out guys, the clock is ticking,gotcha its all to late, bang, you and 142 others are history, goodbye, you were the weakest link!

Your comment regarding being part of the problem is also very true and rumour is some management changes have been made and outside guidence hired as a result of all these deaths.
However knee jerk reactions to accidents such as this by senior airline execs and governments who have zero operational experiance often introduce and produce a far WORSE system than existed in the first place, and the spin off from these hasty fixes damages lots of innocent people.
I was a pilot for 36years, and was with Gulf Air 26 years until terminated May 2000.
I failed the United "Staynine" Psyco testing in 1966, but was comforted to find in the 1980's United needed a lot of Crm retraining as they now decided some of the right stuff was now some of the wrong stuff as they had a number of cockpit incidents.I believe the Staynine was used by most US carriers in the 1960's and I refused the cheat the Staynine service then available for $500.00 offered, in fact I am not sure if that is even how it is spelt and today care even less, however it really was a stoper with the majors if you had failed it then.

IMHO the main important point is United and Bea Trident accidents produced a series of positive and for the good changes, and it is my earnest wish these should now occur at Gulf Air and be properly introduced by British Airways or United Airlines teams.
Dream on did I hear you say?

[Jennifer Lopez]

bmpilot21, You wrote: "BUT I WAS NEVER AFRAID TO SPEAK UP IF A CAPTAIN DEPARTED FROM SOP'S TO A DANGEROUS LEVEL. Even with 250hrs" How a hell did you know when he reached a DANGEROUS LEVEL, with 250 hours??

Most likely you were still in row 30, hangin on for your life... Let me guess, you must be Dutch or a Brit?

[This message has been edited by Jennifer Lopez (edited 25 May 2001).]

[Capt Claret]

BmPilot21,

perhaps I'm reading more into your post than you intended, however, I found your comment re, "slack with age" was a bit too general.

There are plenty of slack young pilots out there.

------------------
bottums up !

[BmPilot21]

Capt. Claret : I didn't mean to imply that pilots necessarily become slack with age. I've flown with several guys who have been in the seat for 30 years and are still as diligent, standard, and profesional as you could wish. You are right, people can become slack with any experience. My only point is that experience doesn't GUARANTEE safety. This is especially true IF they become slack or non-standard etc.

'Jennifer Lopez' - yes, I'm British and proud of our selection process and very high standards that prevail in our pilot culture. This is what allows us to safely have 250hr. pilots in the RHS. It is down to excellent training, SOP's and safety culture. No, we're not perfect, but the fact that we openly admit this is what leads to safety.
You have a valid point to an extent, however:
1. I know that if a guy overbanks and descends towards the ground on a missed approach that he's reached a dangerous level!! I'm inexperienced, not stupid.

2. Sometimes I'm not sure about something, and generally I will question what the Captain is doing. I endeavour to do it in a way that doesn't undermine his authority, and I hope that he will take it in the spirit that it is meant - I am inexperienced and am interested in why he is doing it that way, and he should not take it as a slight or that I'm questioning his authority. There is a good chance he is right, or has a very valid reason for doing it that way. By asking I will either learn something new, or will be correcting a mistake he has genuinly made - either way surely this is ok?

I generally think I cope very well with the jet, but yes it still 'bites' occasionaly, and I learn from it. That's why there are two crew members to pick each other up on their mistakes.

[wonderbusdriver]

Perfect attitude.
CRM at its best.
Well put.

Keep it up!

[Idle Power]

Jennifer Lopez,

If you knew anything about human factors you would know that departing from SOPS is recognised as a rule-based error and can therefore be committed by inexperienced and experienced pilot's alike. However, provided the basic training in procedures is rigorous, the likelyhood of rule-based errors is almost eradicated, regardless of experience levels. Therefore, BMPilot21's post is a valid one.

[Belgique]

Somatogravic Illusions -

The false pitch-down illusion

http://www.ozemail.com.au/%7Eaupa/PDF_files/SDF.pdf

http://www.gretmar.com/webdoctor/dnt.html

http://wwwsam.brooks.af.mil/af/files/fsguide/HTML/Chapter_04.html

http://whittsflying.com/Pagea7Hood%20flying%20and%20illusions.htm

http://tsb.gc.ca/eng/reports/air/1996/ea96c0002.html

http://john.berkeley.edu/Projects/linearAccelTxt.html

http://www.vnh.org/FSManual/03/05Vestibular.html

http://www.avmed.org.nz/http://www.najaco.com/Books/Indestructible%20Pilot/Book/Medical/Medical.htm

http://www.tsb.gc.ca/ENG/reports/air/1997/a97c0236/ea97c0236.html

http://john.berkeley.edu/Projects/SGIllusion.html

http://www.pprune.org/ubb/NonCGI/Forum1/HTML/009550-16.html

[MissChief]

A close study of Gulf Air's A320 SOP's can explain a lot about the prevailing culture at this myopic and xenophobic company. As an example, in any flight, as PF, the First Officer first gets to handle the Thrust Levers at the Thrust Reduction Altitude, i.e 1500 ft. agl. No engine starts, no taxiing, no application of power on take-off.
Imagine the image of left-seat autonomy that this generates in the mind of the FO. Gulf Air remain in the Dark Ages as regards C.R.M also, and I personally attribute this to the insecurity concerning possible superiority of expatriate pilots that prevails amongst many of the Gulf nationals, and particularly within the management ranks.

(Was the same at Qatar Airways until recently...infusion of expat management is moving things forward now)

[scanscanscan]

MissChief..
IMHO ...The Gulf Air standard throttle handling and other operational points you raise are inherited from when BA trained GF pilots on the VC10 and the Tristars in 1974/6

Also interesting in the light of GF072 crash.
On non and precision approaches the BA monitored approach system was (where the Fo flew the approach and the Captain monitored) also taught to GF by these same BA trainers, but in Gulf Airs wisdom the monitored approach system had been THROWN OUT and the 072 Captain was now trained and required to fly approaches in IMC.

The BA monitored approach inmho goes a long way to minimising this Somatogrovic illusion problem and thanks to Belgique for the web refs.
The Tsb report,para 1-18-2 says a lot and combined with the above gets you an accident.

In defence of Gulf Air they were interested (in their own way)in CRM prior to 072 and a memo asking for any pilot interested to teach crm on his 6days off a month and possibly to other airlines got few replies.

In my experiance gulf national pilots do not feel inferior and are not inferior to expat pilots, we all strove together to be safe operators.
National trainers constantly demonstrate their superior knowledge on checks, and a wise expat accommodates.
An exercise in stress management that teaches all concerned patience and pays the mortgage.

National trainers were I am sure as schocked as we all were at the 072 flight path,and that it was allowed to happen by a national crew which they had checked and trained.

However nobody should forget the 767 at Narobi with 200 plus soles on board.
This was nearly a crash and another case of flight path and speed deviations being recorded and this time by a totally expat two man crew.
These aircraft donot discriminate and are not politically correct.

Change a system or change a management or ignore a manufacturers recomendation it does not always result in improvements.

[This message has been edited by scanscanscan (edited 26 May 2001).]

[This message has been edited by scanscanscan (edited 26 May 2001).]

[This message has been edited by scanscanscan (edited 26 May 2001).]

[calltheball]

Jennifer Lopez,
I've never been hit by a bus, but I know that being hit by one would hurt! Incidentally, I am led to believe being hit by a bus is equally painful to a non British/Dutch person.
If you stick to the green cross code/SOPS! then you have a framework for crossing the road/operating an aircraft that will apply equally as well to a 5 year old/200hr inexperienced FO....

Kindest regards,
Calltheball (British/Dutch and allowed to cross the road on my own)

[Skye Pilot]

BmPilot21,
I agree with you that well trained low time first officers are capable of performing successfully (and do, having just returned from a multi-day duty with a very new copilot who made my few days a breeze due to his competence). I would not, though, get too excited about the so called fantastic training provided by your country and company, although i'm sure it was very good, I think you'll find that the training you speak of can be found world wide. What is important is the individuals approach and execution of his/her training and profession, as you have aptly mentioned.
I believe that the root cause of this accident lays with the companies command selection procedures and has less to do with the experience level of the first officer.

[avoidsharpturn]

-Roadrunner;"Pilots should be accepted with due regard to ability and not, as is sometimes the case, based on who they know. This is a problem particularly in Asia."

Sad to say,but you even don´t have to go to asia to encounter this kind of pilot hirings.Take a look around in europe, I know a national flag carrier there where we see the same scenario....

rgds, avoidsharpturn

[scanscanscan]

As the Somatogravic Illusion is said to affect all the flight deck crew and basically cause them to become antifuncional in the correct control of the aircraft flight path, could this illusion be the cause of the lack of total crew reaction in both the Stains Trident and the GF 072 pitch and rock and roll gyrations?

------------------
We will do the drill according to the amendments to the amendments I er think?