GMDS
28th Oct 2008, 05:15
Although I consent with some voices on our mailgroup that say writing to management is useless, there are a few bravehearts who still do, and do it well, I have to admit. One answer by ED however cries for a little analysis. Maybe he doesn’t read this, but I bet one of the management cronies, i.e. Mr M5,5, will translate.
The statement that a business class seat is either less effective or somehow less "safe" a rest location is not justified by industry data. Many of our competitors have this same policy.
This is a infantile argument: “I hit him because he hit me as well”. Emirates is therefore openly admitting to lowering its standards to the lowest common denominator. Not very like a self proclaimed industry leader.
When we had 18 F-Class seats the use of two for crew rest amounted to slightly over 10% of the available capacity in that cabin. With the reduction to 8 seats across the fleets, that figure leaps to 25%. Clearly, removing a quarter of the revenue capacity of one of the places where most of our high yield is generated is not workable
Lets see: With the new policy EK is regaining 25% of F-Class and losing 5% of C-Class yield – a clear win situation. The passengers gain some 30% of more seat space in F and only one C pax (as opposed to a F before) has a comfort penalty with a snoring crew member next to him – a clear win situation. The working crew have to put up with a narrower seat that reclines only to 165° and has to bear a full C service as opposed to on demand and more privacy in F as before. A clear lose situation. So much to the hollow statement “…nor with any intent to demean our crews respect…”. Giving all others and taking away from one is a clear lack of respect.
We intend to monitor the use of J-class seats and reports from crew on any fatigue issues that are resulting there from via the FRMS processes. As we have demonstrated with the MRU layover recently, we do take action if the risks begin to outweigh the benefits
This means simply that on fatigue issues, finally safety issues, Emirates goes on with field research. Even if the whole professional pilots world knows ahead of a new policy that it will have an impact on safety, EK implements it and has the toothless FRMS to observe if this reveals true. To their credit it has to be said that they reverse an unsafe situation. Nevertheless this field research had been going on with paying passengers and their own working crews! Again not really a sign of an industry leader. In the aftermath a change, like MRU or HOU, is an admittance that operations were not as safe as they ought to have been. Any one accountable for this? Why can management never learn from their mistakes? Would they have backed a crew in an accident that, like too many others, would be traced back to fatigue and would they take part of the blame because of their policy?
I guess everyone knows the answer. Accountability, just like for investment bankers, is not for managers.
The statement that a business class seat is either less effective or somehow less "safe" a rest location is not justified by industry data. Many of our competitors have this same policy.
This is a infantile argument: “I hit him because he hit me as well”. Emirates is therefore openly admitting to lowering its standards to the lowest common denominator. Not very like a self proclaimed industry leader.
When we had 18 F-Class seats the use of two for crew rest amounted to slightly over 10% of the available capacity in that cabin. With the reduction to 8 seats across the fleets, that figure leaps to 25%. Clearly, removing a quarter of the revenue capacity of one of the places where most of our high yield is generated is not workable
Lets see: With the new policy EK is regaining 25% of F-Class and losing 5% of C-Class yield – a clear win situation. The passengers gain some 30% of more seat space in F and only one C pax (as opposed to a F before) has a comfort penalty with a snoring crew member next to him – a clear win situation. The working crew have to put up with a narrower seat that reclines only to 165° and has to bear a full C service as opposed to on demand and more privacy in F as before. A clear lose situation. So much to the hollow statement “…nor with any intent to demean our crews respect…”. Giving all others and taking away from one is a clear lack of respect.
We intend to monitor the use of J-class seats and reports from crew on any fatigue issues that are resulting there from via the FRMS processes. As we have demonstrated with the MRU layover recently, we do take action if the risks begin to outweigh the benefits
This means simply that on fatigue issues, finally safety issues, Emirates goes on with field research. Even if the whole professional pilots world knows ahead of a new policy that it will have an impact on safety, EK implements it and has the toothless FRMS to observe if this reveals true. To their credit it has to be said that they reverse an unsafe situation. Nevertheless this field research had been going on with paying passengers and their own working crews! Again not really a sign of an industry leader. In the aftermath a change, like MRU or HOU, is an admittance that operations were not as safe as they ought to have been. Any one accountable for this? Why can management never learn from their mistakes? Would they have backed a crew in an accident that, like too many others, would be traced back to fatigue and would they take part of the blame because of their policy?
I guess everyone knows the answer. Accountability, just like for investment bankers, is not for managers.