Qantas A330 Emergency Landing in Learmonth

[peuce]

Thanks 404 Titan.

I was wondering how the pilots got the beast under control if erroneous data was continuing to be fed to the flight control computers.

[captaintunedog777]

Heard the same about the conflicting data. Fantastic job done by the crew involved.:ok:

[4PW's]

Fair enough, no CB's to hand. I'll ask the fellow again. He's a Boeing pilot, after all. It's a bloody good job they're all alive. Well done to the pilot(s). Just read this report: AAIB Bulletin No: 6/2001 Ref: EW/C2000/10/2 Category: 1.1. Seems to me a little knowledge is dangerous, and I have only a little knowledge of Airbus aircraft and systems logic, so perhaps 404 or someone with the good oil might briefly explain how the A/P can simply disengage because of an overspeed, then climb to lose the airspeed excursion. Did I interpret the report on that correctly, and is there a similarity with QF's A330 incident, or was it human induced? Don't get testy, Keg, et al. This is a valid question. Two major events in a short period of time, the near hull loss of a B744 and a jet upset in an A330, are points in the history of any airline to pay attention to.

[Capn Bloggs]

From 4PWs,
"It seems almost certain that circuit breakers were pulled prior to the incident when, in conjunction with Maintenance, the pilots were attempting to address an ECAM."

I'll not quote the source.

Just please tell me this isn't so....

How about we try to verify that what we are posting is not total nonsense before we post? Or at least ask the question "is it possible to pul CBs in the A330" instead of implying the crew were doing so by saying "please tell me this isn't so". :=

[4PW's]

Whatever you say, Captain.

[Teal]

New angle....

Base&squo;s signals may have caused plane&squo;s computer glitch caused Qantas plunge | PerthNow (http://www.news.com.au/perthnow/story/0,21598,24497567-948,00.html)

Ironically, the claims may have come from pprune posts refering to the high-powered VLF transmissions from the Harold E. Holt Naval Communication Station north of Exmouth.

[allthecoolnamesarego]

briefly explain how the A/P can simply disengage because of an overspeed, then climb to lose the airspeed excursion

As the Bus is a FBW aircraft, it is controlled by computers (obviously). The FBW technology means that there are effectively a few layers. Firstly, the control surface deflections are all computer controlled,. The aircraft has auto-trim (put the stick in a position, let it go and the aircraft will hold that attitude). The FBW is almost (simplistically) a dumb autopilot - it sets and hold control surface positions. It also has an ability (a bit smarter than dumb) to realise when things aren't right, and change control surface deflections to 'fix' the problem.

This FBW technology allows the aircraft to have a series of protections, one being an overspeed protection. When an overspeed is detected, the control surfaces are deflected by the flight computers to change the attitude and prevent an overspeed, just as a pilot would...

The autopilot is a layer above the FBW (the smart side of the aircraft). This operates like any autopilot, tracking, height conntrol etc etc.

When something is amiss (ie overspeed) the autopilot will drop out and the the FBW protections will kick in, to fix/control the problem.

So basically, the FBW is a 'basic' control, and the autopilot is a level above.

Hope this makes sense :eek:

[Old Fella]

allthecoolnamesarego. Your statement "When an over-speed is detected, the flight control surfaces are deflected by the flight computers to change the attitude and prevent an over-speed, just as a pilot would" seems to imply that no reduction in thrust is automatically made. As an older F/E I really do not have any in-depth knowledge of the intricacies of FBW aircraft system operations and as you make no mention of what happens to thrust settings in the event of an over-speed I ask, "does the crew have any control of thrust, in a case such as happened with QF72, without reverting to what is known as Direct Law mode"?

[4PW's]

Thanks for the reply, Names, but I don't understand why that'd be so in a Bus. That is probably because I've only ever driven pistons, turbo props and Boeing's.

In such simple airframes, if an overspeed was about to occur or had occurred the idea is to retard the thrust levers with the autothrottle engaged by either manually pulling the levers back to the stop or intervening in the engaged autothrottle mode.

Not to start a competition between manufacturers, but the autopilot is not disconnected to regain airspeed in anything I know of that resembles an airplane.

With all due respect, is that really what the Airbus would do?

[Capn Bloggs]

Thread drift, but for those of you interested in what an Airbus can get up to in an overspeed scenario, read this (http://www.aaib.dft.gov.uk/cms_resources/dft_avsafety_pdf_501275.pdf) (from the Rumours and News thread). Don't cruise directly above an Airbus? :ouch:

[404 Titan]

A380-800 driver

Yeh thanks for that. I realise that in "Direct Law" the pilot is still flying the aircraft through the "Sec's" but wanted to keep my answer simple and explain to peuce that all protections can be overidden by turning the "Prim's" off. You and I know that the airbus is just like any other aircraft in "Direct Law" except we have no feel through the side stick, hense we have to be careful not to over control it.:ok:

[Capn Bloggs]

A380-800
Didn't a 717 do something similar in WA a couple of years ago, stick shaker etc.
Yes it did, but became immediately totally controllable by the crew using the wires pulleys and bellcranks control system as soon as they decided that that was appropriate and the electronics had gone haywire. :D

Haven't you ever oversped a 717?
I have actually. The subtle difference was that it didn't involve a virtually uncommanded rather harsh pullup to FL380, straight through the level of another aircraft, which thankfully was slightly off track (unusual for GPS tracking). Otherwise, there would have been a few hundred dead people splattered over the North Atlantic. :=

Computers are really good until they come to a point that the programmers didn't consider (QF72?) or they respond so unexpectedly that the crew is caught completely unawares (TC-JDN).

[The Mr Fixit]

Firstly the C/Bs in the Avionics Compartments are accessible in Flight, I have actually been in the fwd cargo compartment of an A330 during flight.

Secondly Airbus claim that the all the 'breakers' in the cockpit are just software resets but I dare any driver a320,a330,a340,a380 to reset all you FCCs in flight without upset/incident.

Anytime you mess with a system or practice you know little about or have little used you run the risk of something going wrong. In LAME land that's why we do everything IAW the manual the mind no matter how good is never infallable.

BTW there is 'no blame' for mine on the flight crew for two reasons first I do believe they did ask for assistance (not that we know exactly what that assistance was) and secondly if they did make a mistake (and ffs we are human) they righted it by getting all to the ground safely.

As a side question 'scanners' in the NW picked up the initial 'Pan' then a 'MAYDAY' call, could any flyboys (or girls) enlighten me, I thought MAYDAY was only used if the aircraft was or believed to be out of control and in serious trouble ?

[Capn Bloggs]

I thought MAYDAY was only used if the aircraft was or believed to be out of control and in serious trouble ?
That's probably what the crew thought at the time. :eek:

[peuce]

MAYDAY: When the PIC believes the aircraft, or its occupants, are in grave or imminent danger ... and require immediate assistance.

[The Mr Fixit]

Correct A380 Driver, I don't think any crew would venture down there, I also think they would think twice about resetting any system in flight esp. a flight control system.

Thanks Peuce, that's what I was trying to confirm.

Has anyone actually qualified to time lapse between initial climb and control of a/c ? was it secs ? mins ? an hour ?

[Veruka Salt]

Our fleet management has just published a memo to Airbus crew, containing an extract from the Airbus Operator Information Telex.

It's a detailed account of "what" actually happened, if not "why".

'As the incident is subject to a formal ICAO Annex 13 investigation led by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB), the updated data about the incident included in this OIT have been approved for release by the ATSB.

The A330 aircraft was flying from Singapore to Perth. The aircraft has then been diverted to Learmonth (Australia).

The preliminary analysis of the DFDR, Post Flight Report (PFR) and BITE (Built-In Test Equipment) data allows to establish the following preliminary sequence of events:

The A/C was flying at FL 370 with Autopilot and Auto thrust system engaged without any reported or recorded anomaly, when the IRS 1 Fault has been triggered and the Autopilot automatically disconnected. From this moment, the crew flew manually the aircraft to the end of the flight except for a short duration of few seconds.

From the time the IRS 1 Fault has been triggered, the recorded parameters of the ADR part of ADIRU 1 include erroneous and temporary wrong values in a random manner. These values are spike values and not sustained values. ADIRUs 2 and 3 seemed to have operated normally.

This abnormal behaviour of the ADIRU 1 led to several consequences as follows:

* unjustified stall & overspeed warning
* loss of attitude information on Captain Primary Flight Display (PFD).
* several ECAM system warnings.

About 2 minutes after the initial IRS Fault, the ADIRU spikes generated very high, random and temporary values of the angle of attack leading to:

1/ the flight control laws commanding nose-down aircraft movements (A/C pitch attitude decreased from 2° nose-up to 8° nose-down and vertical load factor changed from 1g to -0,8g.
2/ the Flight Control Primary Computer (FCPC) "F/CTL PRIM 1 PITCH FAULT" ECAM WARNING was triggered

The crew timely response led to recover the A/C trajectory within seconds. During the recovery, the vertical load factor did not exceed 1,6g and the maximum altitude loss was 650 ft.

The DFDR data show that the ADR 1 continued to generate random spikes. A second nose-down aircraft movement was encountered later on, but with less important effects in terms of aircraft trajectory. It also led to generate the "F/CTL PRIM 2 PITCH FAULT" ECAM WARNING. This, combined with the previous "F/CTL PRIM 1 PITCH FAULT" ECAM WARNING led to switch from NORMAL to ALTERNATE law.

The BITE message of the ADIRU 1 does not include failure or maintenance message. However the PFR also includes other system failure messages which have been demonstrated as spurious but generated by the ADIRU 1.

Tests performed on the A/C following the incident did not reveal any abnormal results that would allow explaining the reason for the event.

At this stage of the investigation, the analysis of available data indicates ADIRU 1 abnormal behaviour is likely at the origin of the event.

The type of ADIRU, which is involved, is NORTHROP GRUMMAN (previously LITTON), PN 465020-0303-0316.'



Once again ... well done Kev.

[404 Titan]

The Mr Fixit

The next time you are in the cockpit of and A330 have a look in the QRH regarding the resetting of computers. Resetting the FMGEC’s, PRIM’s/SEC’s x One at a time, and LGCIU’s in flight isn’t a problem as long as you follow the procedures prescribed. I have done all three numerous times since I have been on the bus.

Regarding circuit breakers in the avionics bay, yes there is a hatch in the cockpit but just like “A380-800 driver” our SOP’s prohibit us from going down there in flight. All the Reset Switches in the cockpit are just that Reset Switches. They aren’t Circuit Breakers and aren’t designed to protect the relevant system as a Circuit Breaker would.:ok:

[Capt Kremin]

The reason why only two people "got it right" is that the event has never happened before whereas CAT events are relatively common. Even the two who got it right were speculating at the time.

[kellykelpie]

Regarding PAN or Mayday

I remember in a sim being told by an instructor to give a mayday call if in doubt. I think the exercise was an emergency descent. He said something like "Just give a mayday call. If you are over India, you want to make sure you've got their attention".

So a Mayday call might not necessarily be as a result of the crew believing they "are in grave and imminent danger". It may be that they are using a Mayday to ensure any risk (e.g. traffic) outside of the current situation is kept to a minimum. This is especially the case during a very high workload non-normal when it is not completely apparent what the problem is, how much time there is to deal with it and what the risk of the problem is.

On the airbus, a sim instructor said to "work the colours". If it's LAND ASAP in Red give a Mayday, LAND ASAP in amber give a pan. We were told that if it goes from RED to Amber (e.g. fire goes out) then make sure you downgrade.

Anyway, sounds like the crew did a great job.:)

[NSEU]

Yo Dawg...
It's not the destination, but the journey....

If everyone was right all of the time, no one would learn anything (including humility). :}

[man on the ground]

Regarding PAN or Mayday

I can assure everyone that no one on the ground had ANY problem with a MAYDAY call being made. If there is doubt about the controllability of the aircraft, and especially with the multiple serious injuries, it is a righteous call. The one phrase conveys a whole lot extra meanings that don't need to be restated, thus minimises distracting extra R/T to a busy crew, such as what services are required etc. Call Mayday, with intentions, and we rock n' roll with the full response. From our perspective, it was appropriately and professionally handled by the crew. Nice work guys! :ok:

[ct2k]

Havnt been following the thread, cant be arsed reading 7 pages, but i herad it was the Navy`s LF radar in that aera which threw the a/c systems out of wack. Apparently the same thing happened to a 777 in the same place. Only a rumour though.

[ampclamp]

the story in the news re the vlf station being investigated as being the source quite likely started here on the prune.Its not a radar signal its genuine very low freq ie antenna to the moon at 19.8 khz.

journo's seem to come across a lot of "facts" on this fine rumour mill.

There is another thread on this incident and its(the vlf issue) been discussed at length either here or there cant remember which one.
Personally I dont buy it.Possible but unlikely imho.

[nick2007]

Original media reports stated that the incident occurred about 100 miles (nautical or statute?) north of Canarvon, which puts it about 100 km south of the VLF site.

A little far I would think. Though from memory there is a sign on the road to Exmouth, (just near Learmonth actually, so about 50km south of the site), which reads something along the lines of: "No electrical detonators past this point... due to EMF". :)

[Capt Kremin]

The MAS 777 incident happened at top of climb out of Perth. eg, a long way from where the QF incident occurred.

[Zeke]

TO: A318/A319/A320/A321/A330/A340/A340-500/A340-600 Operators


SUBJECT: A330 in-flight incident


OUR REF: SE 999.0083/08/LB dated 14 Oct 08

CLASSIFICATION: INFORMATION-FLIGHTS OPS

AFFECTED AIRCRAFT: All A330/A340/A340-500/A340-600 in service aircraft

--------------------------------------------------------------

Notice:

This OIT/FOT covers an operational issue.
It is the Operators' responsibility to distribute this OIT/FOT, or the
information contained in this OIT/FOT, to all A330/A340/A340-500/A340- 600
flight crews without delay.

--------------------------------------------------------------

1. PURPOSE

The aim of this OIT is to:

- Update operators on the in-flight incident, which occurred on an A330
aircraft on Oct 07th.
- Advise A330/A340 operators about OEBs issuance and associated MMEL
operational procedure impact.

2. EVENT DESCRIPTION

As the incident is subject to a formal ICAO Annex 13 investigation led by
the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB), the updated data about the
incident included in this OIT have been approved for release by the ATSB.

The A330 aircraft was flying from Singapore to Perth. The aircraft has
then been diverted to Learmonth (Australia).

The preliminary analysis of the DFDR, Post Flight Report (PFR) and BITE
(Built-In Test Equipment) data allows to establish the following
preliminary sequence of events:

The A/C was flying at FL 370 with Autopilot and Auto thrust system engaged
without any reported or recorded anomaly, when the IRS 1 Fault has been
triggered and the Autopilot automatically disconnected.

From this moment, the crew flew manually the aircraft to the end of the
flight except for a short duration of few seconds.

From the time the IRS 1 Fault has been triggered, the recorded
parameters of the ADR part of ADIRU 1 include erroneous and temporary
wrong values in a random manner. These values are spike values and not
sustained values. ADIRUs 2 and 3 seemed to have operated normally.

This abnormal behaviour of the ADIRU 1 led to several consequences as
follows:
- unjustified stall & overspeed warning
- loss of attitude information on Captain Primary Flight Display
(PFD).
- several ECAM system warnings.

About 2 minutes after the initial IRS Fault, the ADIRU spikes generated
very high, random and temporary values of the angle of attack leading to:
1/ the flight control laws commanding nose-down aircraft movements (A/C
pitch attitude decreased from 2° nose-up to 8° nose-down and vertical load
factor changed from 1g to -0,8g.
2/ the Flight Control Primary Computer (FCPC) "F/CTL PRIM 1 PITCH
FAULT" ECAM WARNING was triggered

The crew timely response led to recover the A/C trajectory within
seconds. During the recovery, the vertical load factor did not exceed 1,6g
and the maximum altitude loss was 650 ft.

The DFDR data show that the ADR 1 continued to generate random spikes.

A second nose-down aircraft movement was encountered later on, but with
less important effects in terms of aircraft trajectory. It also led to
generate the "F/CTL PRIM 2 PITCH FAULT" ECAM WARNING. This, combined with
the previous "F/CTL PRIM 1 PITCH FAULT" ECAM WARNING led to switch from
NORMAL to ALTERNATE law.

The BITE message of the ADIRU 1 does not include failure or maintenance
message. However the PFR also includes other system failure messages which
have been demonstrated as spurious but generated by the ADIRU 1.

Tests performed on the A/C following the incident did not reveal any
abnormal results that would allow explaining the reason for the event.

At this stage of the investigation, the analysis of available data
indicates ADIRU 1 abnormal behaviour is likely at the origin of the event.

The type of ADIRU, which is involved, is NORTHROP GRUMMANN (previously
LITTON), PN 465020-0303-0316.

3. OPERATIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS for A330/A340 fitted with NORTHROP
GRUMMANN - LITTON ADIRU

Pending final resolution, Airbus will issue an OEB 74-1 that will
instruct the crew to select OFF the whole ADIRU in case of IR failure,
instead of switching OFF only the IR part.

The aim of the following procedure is to isolate both the IR and ADR when
an IR is detected faulty in order to prevent the ADR from
providing erroneous data to the other aircraft systems.

PROCEDURE:

- If one IR is self detected faulty or if the ATT red flag is displayed on
the Captain or First Officer PFD the supplying IR and ADR must be
disconnected.

NAV IR 1(2)(3) FAULT or ATT flag displayed on CAPT (F/O) PFD
-IR 1(2)(3) pb ______________OFF
-ADR 1(2)(3) pb _____________OFF
IF IR 3 NOT AFFFECTED
-ATT HDG SWTG _______________CAPT (F/O) ON 3
-AIR DATA HDG SWTG __________CAPT (F/O) ON 3

- In case of dispatch under MMEL and an IR failure in flight, either
detected by an IR 1+2 (1+3)(2+3) FAULT or with ATT red flag displayed on
CAPT or F/O PFD, the supplying IR and ADR must be disconnected.

ATT flag displayed on CAPT (F/O) PFD or,
NAV IR 1+2(1+3)(2+3) FAULT
-IR 1(2)(3) pb ____________OFF
-ADR 1(2)(3) pb ___________OFF
SPD BRK____________________DO NOT USE
IF CG AFT 32%:
- T TANK MODE _______FWD

Note: In case of failure of IR 1 and IR 2 failure, the
Inertial and Air Data from ADIRU 3 should be provided on
Captain side.

Note: To isolate an ADIRU, IR mode rotary selector (OFF; NAV; ATT) remains
in the NAV position so that Inertial and Air Data be
disconnected from other systems without de-energizing the ADIRU (NAV mode
may be recovered if IR or ADR unduly selected OFF).

4. MMEL IMPACTS for A330/A340 fitted with NORTHROP GRUMMANN - LITTON ADIRU

In case of dispatch under MMEL 01-34-10-01-A), the associated MMEL
operational procedure is amended as follows:

IR (affected) pb sw____________________ OFF
ADR (associated) pb sw _________________OFF
IR (affected) mode rotary sel___________OFF


- If IR 1 (2) is affected:
ATT HDG sel ____________________ CAPT ON 3 (F/O ON 3)
AIR DATA sel ____________________CAPT ON 3 (F/O ON 3)


This will be reflected in MMEL Temporary Revisions:

TR N°02-34/01Z ISSUE 01 for A330
TR N°02-34/01Z ISSUE 01 for A340

5. FOLLOW-UP PLAN

Airbus is working together with the ATSB and the supplier to identify the
ADIRU failure mode.
Additionally, as the same ADIRU PN standard is fitted on single aisle
family aircraft, Airbus is currently checking if temporary measures are
also required on these aircraft types.

However initial investigation result seems to indicate that single aisle
family aircraft flight control system is more robust against this ADIRU
failure mode.

OEB 74-1 (A330 family) and 88-1 (A340 family) will be issued in the coming
days.

Specific follow-up of this OIT will be provided through OIT revision when
pertinent information related to investigation results is
available

[archangel7]

Why was my post removed??

[archangel7]

can't remember, but I was the first to suggest a comp failure...anyways I’m over it...

[Dynasty Trash Hauler]

"Computers are really good until they come to a point that the programmers didn't consider (QF72?) or they respond so unexpectedly that the crew is caught completely unawares (TC-JDN)."

This can apply to any system, software or hardware.

Rudder hard overs were never meant to occur. DC-10's were never meant to crash following a single fan disk failure. 777's were not meant to glide following fuel icing.

The point is that the bogeyman computer driving the FBW system on the Airbus family of aircraft has never had a failure resulting in a crash. It has however, saved MANY aircraft from crashing that you and I have probably never heard about in situations that conventional aircraft would have been lost.

Enough of the macho "cables and pullies are better" crap.

[ULH Extreme]

DTH, Totally agree with you. But as an Airbus driver i think what Airbus has pumped out sofar is not enough., I would like to see a full printout of the event, as they do normally, so the next time i leap into the air, i'm not guessing what went on in that cockpit.. I'm not knocking the crew and their actions btw.

[Zeke]

Sounds like a crackpot who does not the difference between the Airbus GNADIRU and the 777 ADIRU

[IAW]

derek zoolander: I'm by no means an expert, but I do know a little bit about Air Data Computers and IRUs. I work on aircraft that still have these systems seperated, rather than newer models that have ADIRUs.

Having said that, the accellerometers are part of the "IRU" part of the equation. They provide accel data for each of the three planes of movement, which the IRU then integrates a couple of times to get distance. Combine these three measurements and given a reference point and you can calculate present position.

The reports about this Qantas incident point to erroneous Angle of Attack values provided by ADIRU, which would not be data derived from an accellerometer. Accellerometers don't care and couldn't guess which direction the nose is pointed in relative to airflow, so I think this guy is probably putting 2 + 2 together and getting 5.

Anyway, hope this has been helpful. Nobody get your knickers in a knot if I've got some terminology wrong!

[HotPete]

I ask a simple question. What happened to the triple redundancy we hear so much about?
IF there are three ADIRU boxes and one begins to put out different data to the other two, why isnt it automatically isolated and the output from the other two utilised from then on?
I'd appreciate a comment from an A330/A340 driver.

[404 Titan]

HotPete

It should. That is why there is such interest about this incident. Airbus are just about if not already about to issue a new “OEB” so that crew can be better prepared to deal with this kind of failure until the root cause of this problem is fixed.

[Lookleft]

The similarity between the MAS 777 and this incident is that erroneous data was able to find its way to the flight control computers. The way this occured is different. The ADIRU on the 777 is a Fault Tolerant ADIRU. Boeing decided that they didn't want pilots mucking around with switching from one ADIRU to another so Honeywell put all the bits in the one box. Their were multiple units ( i.e. 6 accelerometers), which would automatically switch in case of a single failure. The idea being that the single ADIRU unit would never have to be removed from the aircraft during its entire service life, (hence the fault tolerant bit). What happened in reality was that Honeywell were getting quite a few of these units sent back to them because of transient failures. They installed a different version of the operating software which allowed for transient failures of an accelerometer for example, to be monitored over 1000 flight hours and if it behaved itself then it would be allowed back into the game.

What happened with the MAS 777 was that a second accelerometer failed, so the OPS bought an accelerometer back into the game that had failed months previously. By failed I mean that they were producing high acceleration values. These high values were now fed to the flight control computer and the autopilot responded accordingly.

From the information released so far about QF72 it seems that the main issue is how the erroneous data was able to get to the flight control computer. My personal opinion is that somewhere some software was modified and this allowed dud data to go to places dud data should not go.

Crikey.com never lets the facts get in the way of a good beat up.

[Capt Kremin]

Thanks for that LL. Very informative post.

[601]

What cannot understand is that one ARIDU out of three can give incorrect data to the Flight Control Primary Computers and these computers act on that info.

What did the software do to the info from the other two (correct) ARIDUs.

Is the software written so that if one of the ARIDUs gives an output that indicates the aircraft is moving into an abnormal flight situation, the three Flight Control Primary Computers will give preference to that info rather than the info from the other two which indicates that the aircraft is operating normally and act accordingly?

[Capt Claret]

One report I've read somewhere, perhaps even on this thread, suggest that the ADIRU was expected to fail power (electrical) dead, not power positive, whereby it send out erroneous signals.

[Max Tow]

From today's Sydney Morning Herald website titled "Passengers Seek Compo"

"QF72 from Singapore to Perth fell 1050 feet in less than a minute on October 7, slamming passengers into the cabin roof and walls."

Watch your VSI's guys, I feel another 40 million claims coming on. Better still, just try to avoid landing altogether.

[Ngineer]

Triple Redundancy?
I ask a simple question. What happened to the triple redundancy we hear so much about?
IF there are three ADIRU boxes and one begins to put out different data to the other two, why isnt it automatically isolated and the output from the other two utilised from then on?


I'm not a bus fan but have heard alot of people asking the same question. I know on older boeing aircraft the Inertial nav sys is seperated, and when single A/P is engaged the computers will happily obey the commands of their respective INU/IRU provided they have not failed significantly to create an A/P disengage. (IE 'A' Autopilot - #1 INS, 'B' Autopilot - #2 INS, 'C' Autopilot - #3 INS). So defects such as porpoising, uncommanded A/P movements etc could occur, and have in the past though uncommon. A/P voting would only occur in multi-engaged system ops (ie - land).
I am assuming that QPA would have been single engaged, thus operating on the command of 1 ADIRU when this occured. Can anyone correct me if I am wrong? I cannot understand why A/P commands would be voted (as people are saying) during single channel engage in cruise, but then again, I am not a bus person.

[Teal]

Mid-morning update from online Age newspaper:


Naval base transmissions may have led to Qantas jet plunge
Brendan Nicholson
November 14, 2008 - 10:46AMCivil Aviation Safety investigators are considering the possibility that transmissions from the top-secret joint US-Australia naval base near Exmouth may have caused a Qantas aircraft to dive suddenly last month, seriously injuring a flight attendant and at least 13 passengers. The base in Western Australia is used by the US Navy to communicate with its nuclear submarine fleet in the Pacific and by the Australian Navy to maintain contact with its fleet of six Collins-class submarines.

Kerryn Macaulay, of the Air Transport Safety Bureau, said yesterday it was considered unlikely that a low frequency transmission from the Harold E. Holt transmitter near Exmouth could have caused the problem but that possibility was still being investigated.

She said it was also possible that an electronic device being used by a passenger might have interfered with the aircraft's computer system.

Ms Macaulay said examination of information from the aircraft's flight data recorder indicated that at the time the aircraft's autopilot was disconnected. This theory from memory was suggested by several posters.

MEDIA RELEASE : 14 November 2008 - ATSB Preliminary Factual Report, In-flight upset, Qantas Airbus A330, 154km west of Learmonth, WA, 7 October 2008 (http://www.atsb.gov.au/newsroom/2008/release/2008_45.aspx)

[Barkly1992]

And many posters said why it wasn't possible.

[compressor stall]

Misleading bloody media again. :mad:

In the text of the media release they state: This [RF interference] is unlikely, especially if the problem is clearly identified during the ADIRU and system testing.

Never mind Bendan Nicholson just run that as the main thrust of the article even though it is an unlikely cause. :ugh:

A good jouno would still be able to engage the public with a relevant article.

Is Brendan one of the 55? :8

[Groaner]

Interesting read:

http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2008/AAIR/pdf/AO2008070_prelim.pdf

The FDR plots near the end (page 39-onwards, although labelled 29) would give you pause.

[Capt Wally]

Just as a point of interest I wonder if the flt crew where whilst attempting to find out what caused the A/P to trip off in the first place (there was 2 mins elapsed time whilst the A/C was 'autopliotless') inadvertently did something to cause the upset without even knowing it? The crew may very well have been doing what most of us would be doing, apart from simply resetting the A/P they might have been trying other ways around the problem before calling base for advice. Such 'fiddling' could have been done at random & this eventually caused the excursion from otherwise level flight. Just a thought & no malice intended towards the flight crew.



CW

[TWOTBAGS]

OOHHHH this is a pearler……

I can just see the headline in the Terrorgraph now.

“Qantas Jet in death plunge”

followed by the subtext………

"narrowly misses outback primary school" (closed in 1984)

“believed to be linked to the Navy transmission of a VLF acknowledgement message to the submarines first diving mate that her breast enlargement surgery had been approved by the navy to enhance her self esteem and hence mission readiness, and to give the yodas in the back something to chuckle about during annual underwater escape training……………”

FFS:E

Going on to prove that qantas management might just be the biggest tits in this country! Only just:}


:ok:

[max autobrakes]

Behind Telstra management!:ok:

[Whiskey Oscar Golf]

Excuse me people if I'm repeating a question put by others, but could an engineering master please answer this. If there are 3 ADIRU's and one, as seems to be the case is giving erroneous data, why isn't this compared to the other two before it's fed into the FMS? Wouldn't that be the redundancy? Why is the data fed directly before being compared?

Sorry if I'm asking a dumb question and if this is what actually occurred are there any MD's or AD's issued by the bus boys?

[Capn Bloggs]

Capt Wally, I'm disappointed at your last post. I'm surprised you'd think a captain of a thing the size of an A330, who was hand-flying at the time, and his SO, would have been "fiddling around" trying to sort out the situation. Look at the timing - after getting the thing back under control at FL370, not more than a couple of minutes elapsed before the **** hit the fan and the bunting started.

[404 Titan]

Whiskey Oscar Golf

Normally there is a voting out process. The current investigation is trying to determine why there wasn’t one in this particular incident.

Capt Wally

In normal law with all protections available the AP will disconnect if :
• High speed protection is active.
• Angle-of-attack protection is active (α prot is reached).
• Pitch attitude exceeds 25° up or 13° down or bank angle exceeds 45°.

[Capt Wally]

"CB" you can be disappointed all ya like with my last post, we are dealing with humans here, not so much the machine which can be made to do certain things time after time, unlike the medium that manipulates it, pilots. What's the size of the A/C got to do with it anyway? Totally irrelevent I'd say. You, me & them (the crew invloved) are NOT immune to 'fiddling' regardless of what training we have had over the years. Like I said there was no malice aimed at the crew, was & still is just my opinion as is everyones elses in here thus far.
Tnxs "404" obviously you have accurate knowledge on the laws of the Airbus. But there would be a zillion things that would cause an A/P to go tits up, some we can only ever find out as they happen, case in question perhaps being just one.

CW

[Jabawocky]

it seems to me that the AOA is the likely culprit, even if the spurious event is measured in milliseconds, the systems react but may not be recorded. Hence the A/P disengagement.

What is interesting is there is not much said about the cause of the bogus AOA data. Its obvious the plane was not at 50 degrees nose up ever in its life, so where did the data come from, a faulty sensor?? Water in a cable?? I do not know where to start here on an airbus but I would be starting at the sensor and working my way back, up every little creek, tributary and gully till I found a fault. The question is in my mind where did the AOA data come from that was so random? The rest of the plane reacted accordingly, as it should.

Then the next issue is why is the comparison and checking not done pre the FMS ....... one bad and two good.....go with the two.....A redundency stratergy issue there.

J:ok:

[Capt Kremin]

One of the major side issues here is the ECAM. The Airbus philosophy is inextricably wrapped around the proper operation of the ECAM system. The constant scrolling of ECAM messages would have made it difficult, if not impossible to accurately diagnose and correct many of the problems this crew encountered. How that plays out will be very interesting to watch. I don't know if the A380 carries a suite of flight manuals on the flight deck, but if it doesn't, maybe it should.
The preliminary report left a few things out that are becoming known to QF guys. When this ADIRU went out it took a lot of unrelated systems out with it. The systems it had remaining when it landed rendered it little better equipped than a C172. Suffice to say that this crew did an outstanding job. They should be recognised appropriately.

[Tidbinbilla]

Somebody is out of his depth on this thread - yet again.;)

[Kev9]

Wally quote...

Just as a point of interest I wonder if the flt crew where whilst attempting to find out what caused the A/P to trip off in the first place (there was 2 mins elapsed time whilst the A/C was 'autopliotless') inadvertently did something to cause the upset without even knowing it? The crew may very well have been doing what most of us would be doing, apart from simply resetting the A/P they might have been trying other ways around the problem before calling base for advice. Such 'fiddling' could have been done at random & this eventually caused the excursion from otherwise level flight. Just a thought & no malice intended towards the flight crew.



CW




Totally correct....

All the control inputs occurred from the sidestick (LHS) with AP1 off.

ADR 1 went U/S then crew selected IR1 off...effect was that AP1 disconnected. And with a warning.
Both crew did not apply the Airbus 'I have control and communication. ECAM actions'.
A clear and concise call alerting both crew that that they are now in an Abnormal or Emergency situation.
Both roles are then clearly identified.


The a/c climbed *** feet above its assigned altitude while both crew not paying attention to the flight path.
And when CM1 looked down, he/she then took immediate action to reset the a/c back to the correct level.

The result of brisk action at that Flight Level...... Read the crap news reports.

The speculations about what could have caused the 'roller coaster ride' are pure 'Red Herrings'.
They are bouncing ideas from wall to wall in an attempt to cover up or blame the ridicules.

Basic failure in SOPs. Will it make it to my next CRM course?
Probably not. Not serious enough.
Will those silly passengers listen to p.a.. I doubt it.
I could be completely wrong.

[Keg]

That's a pretty serious allegation there Kev and it doesn't appear to be supported by comments by the ATSB to this date. Have you got a separate source or are you just hypothesising like the journo's that we tend to bag out for being ignorant and commenting on issues that are still under investigation. :ugh: :rolleyes:

[Kev9]

Keg
'comments by the ATSB..'

What would they be then?

[Keg]

You can try these links.

The first one:

MEDIA RELEASE : 14 October 2008 - Qantas Airbus A330 accident Media Conference (http://www.atsb.gov.au/newsroom/2008/release/2008_43.aspx)

In this one the crew's actions were reported like this:

The crew's timely response led to the recovery of the aircraft trajectory within seconds.

The most recent one:

MEDIA RELEASE : 14 November 2008 - ATSB Preliminary Factual Report, In-flight upset, Qantas Airbus A330, 154km west of Learmonth, WA, 7 October 2008 (http://www.atsb.gov.au/newsroom/2008/release/2008_45.aspx)

In the second report it expands on the issues dealt with by the crew.

while the aircraft was cruising at 37,000 ft, the autopilot disconnected, accompanied by various aircraft system failure indications. While the crew was evaluating the situation, the aircraft abruptly pitched nose-down and descended 650 ft. After returning the aircraft to 37,000 ft, the crew commenced actions to deal with multiple failure messages. Shortly after, the aircraft commenced a second uncommanded pitch-down event and descended about 400 ft. The crew's timely response led to the recovery of the aircraft descent within seconds in relation to both pitch-down events.

Nothing else in the ATSB's statements even goes close to suggesting the type of scenario that you describe.

I can't find anything in there that suggests a situation such as you describe. In the first one

[Capt Kremin]

Kev09 and Captain Wally, may I suggest you read the ATSB reports before you post speculative tripe?

[Capt Wally]

'CK" I think you might like to re-read my post, it was just a thought/opinion, no more no less. I'm sure when the event happened the pilots would have been caught unaware, just like the rest of us would have been, how they reacted only they know.

Obviously 'Kev09" knows a hell of a lot more than I know but if he is correct then some in here need to pull their heads in a little but if he's not then am sure he will say so but as for me? Well I think that just 'cause a report has ATSB on it doesn't mean it's totally correct!
Cover ups & balls ups are common place in ALL sectors of industry! Not saying that's the case here.



CW

[Capt Kremin]

Kev 09 is not correct. He is engaging in pure speculation. Having spoken to one of the crew members involved, I know what is fact and what isn't.

[Kev9]

You guys are spot on.
I am only speculating.
But there is no doubt that the words used by the regulator are very selective.
The idea that I added to this story, with others, is very possible.

At FL370 any movement of the elevator will result in an exacerbated height loss, which ever way the input occurs.

What happened to the old days when an aircraft farked up and the authorities had no choice but to ground every other of its type?

[radaz]

Capt Krem
Kev 09 is not correct. He is engaging in pure speculation. Having spoken to one of the crew members involved, I know what is fact and what isn't.


Excellent Capt K
You the man.... and then are you going to share and tell all.
Your turn.

[Capt Kremin]

The ATSB report broadly confirms what happened. The rest I guess will come out in the final report, but I alluded to it on another post. This crew lost many systems, including but not limited to the Captains instruments, proper heading reference, automatic pressurisation control, FMGEC functions and landing gear indications.
They did an outstanding job.

[maggotdriver]

Autopilot engagement is effectively irrelevant if some of the Normal Law protections are activated due to spurious inputs. There is nothing you can do to the stick to stop the aircraft pitching down no matter what state the autopilot. You can hope that the voting principle kicks in, the spurious signals stop, or get rid of Normal Law (if you know how and have the cojolies!).
The important thing to remember or understand is that with the PRIMs operational there is still effectively a type of autopilot between you and the controls filtering your inputs and adjusting/optimising them before the control surfaces are activated. This is the essence of FBW. Why the spurious signals occurred and why the delay in the self failing of the ADIRU or the voting principle of the three units and the PRIMs I suspect (warning - this is conjecture only) will be the main focus of the future investigation - particularly, considering the millions of commercial flight hours and previous flight testing without problem. Was there a software problem and who owns 'the blame'?

[maggotdriver]

P.S. I waited for the preliminary report before making any statement but it became apparent some were pointing fingers in the wrong direction and I don't like armchair critics that could possibly taint the good job done by the crew as stated by the ATSB. Elevator went to 10.3 degrees down.....I just shaaat myself at the thought of it. When the investigation is complete, I think you'll find, any detractors of the crew (or for that matter QANTAS in this particular case) should offer an apology.:ok:

[Brian Abraham]

Autopilot engagement is effectively irrelevant if some of the Normal Law protections are activated due to spurious inputs. There is nothing you can do to the stick to stop the aircraft pitching down no matter what state the autopilot. You can hope that the voting principle kicks in, the spurious signals stop, or get rid of Normal Law (if you know how and have the cojolies!).
The important thing to remember or understand is that with the PRIMs operational there is still effectively a type of autopilot between you and the controls filtering your inputs and adjusting/optimising them before the control surfaces are activated. This is the essence of FBW. Why the spurious signals occurred and why the delay in the self failing of the ADIRU or the voting principle of the three units and the PRIMs I suspect (warning - this is conjecture only) will be the main focus of the future investigation - particularly, considering the millions of commercial flight hours and previous flight testing without problem. Was there a software problem and who owns 'the blame'?
Dave: Hello, HAL do you read me, HAL?
HAL: Affirmative, Dave, I read you.
Dave: Open the pod bay doors, HAL.
HAL: I'm sorry Dave, I'm afraid I can't do that.
Dave: What's the problem?
HAL: I think you know what the problem is just as well as I do.
Dave: What are you talking about, HAL?
HAL: This mission is too important for me to allow you to jeopardize it.
Dave: I don't know what you're talking about, HAL?
HAL: I know you and Frank were planning to disconnect me, and I'm afraid that's something I cannot allow to happen.

Interviewer: HAL, you have an enormous responsibility on this mission, in many ways perhaps the greatest responsibility of any single mission element. You're the brain, and central nervous system of the ship, and your responsibilities include watching over the men in hibernation. Does this ever cause you any lack of confidence?
HAL: Let me put it this way, Mr. Amor. The 9000 series is the most reliable computer ever made. No 9000 computer has ever made a mistake or distorted information. We are all, by any practical definition of the words, foolproof and incapable of error.

The movie was on last weekend as well.

[Kangaroo Court]

That you can recall that dialogue in such clarity should suggest to people that there is no real danger in raising the retirement age to at least 64!

[Sunfish]

I cannot help but think of what's called a "race" condition in computer hardware, where one device behaves badly either through software or hardware failure, and then screws up the rest of the system by rapid and inappropriate communication over a data bus to the other components - ie: sending gibberish.

These conditions can be caused by minute timing problems (in terms of number of clock cycles, delays etc.) that are very difficult to detect because they only occur when certain things synchronise.

But what would I know?

[PlankBlender]

CASA have issued an urgent AD to handle the fault operationally.

http://www.casa.gov.au/airworth/airwd/ADfiles/over/a330/a330-095.pdf

Seems the manufacturer has some debugging to do..

[LandIT]

I can hardly believe it, but another event....

A Qantas jet was forced to abort its flight on Saturday following problems with its navigation system near a military installation in Western Australia.

Qantas said yesterday that flight QF71, bound for Singapore with 277 passengers, returned to Perth soon after taking off.

A cockpit alert said there was a problem with the plane's navigation system near Carnarvon.

The incident has raised fresh questions about whether electrical interference from signals is to blame.

(snh: January 2, 2009 - 10:22AM)

[Charlie Foxtrot India]

Isn't that where the SETI dish is?

Should we be looking out for monoliths?

[vme]

MEDIA RELEASE

Adjust font size:
http://www.atsb.gov.au/images/DOTARS_fs_off_01.gif http://www.atsb.gov.au/images/DOTARS_fs_on_02.gif http://www.atsb.gov.au/images/DOTARS_fs_off_03.gif http://www.atsb.gov.au/images/DOTARS_fs_off_04.gif

2009/01

Qantas Airbus A330 incident, 480km North West of Perth on 27 December 2008

02 January 2009

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau was advised on 27 December 2008 of an occurrence that day involving a Qantas Airbus A330-300 aircraft while in cruise at FL360 (36,000 ft) enroute from Perth to Singapore.
At about 0829 UTC (1729 Local Time), the autopilot disconnected and the crew received an ECAM message (NAV IR 1 Fault) indicating a problem with ADIRU Number 1. The crew actioned the Airbus Operations Engineering Bulletin (OEB) procedure by selecting the IR 1 push-button to OFF and the ADR 1 push-button to OFF. Both OFF lights illuminated. The crew elected to return to Perth and an uneventful overweight landing was conducted. At the time that the autopilot disconnected, the aircraft was approximately 260 nautical miles (NM) North-West of Perth airport and approximately 350 NM South of Learmonth airport.
It is very early in the investigation and too soon to draw any conclusions as to specific causal factors involved in this incident. As it appears to be a similar event to a previous event involving an A330 aircraft (AO-2008-070 on 7 Oct 2008) it will be included as part of the earlier investigation. The ATSB investigation will explore all aspects of the operation of the aircraft, including examination of recorded data, and any commonalities with past occurrences.
While the investigation is likely to take a number of months, the ATSB has been working with a number of national and international parties on this investigation and plans to release an Interim Factual report by about mid-February 2009.
Should any critical safety issues emerge that require urgent attention, the ATSB will immediately bring such issues to the attention of the relevant authorities who are best placed to take prompt action to address those issues.
ADIRU = Air Data Inertial Reference Unit
ECAM = Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor
IR = Inertial Reference
ADR = Air Data Reference
NAV = Navigation

Media Contact: 1800 020 616

[denabol]

I've picked up three reports on the latest incident.

The first was of pilots calling for a no-go zone around the naval base suspected of jamming the computers in the Sydney Morning Herald.

The second was on Plane Talking, which seemed to rubbish the jamming angle since the flight was much closer to Perth than the base.

The third was in the IT section of The Australian, claiming Qantas suspects military involvement but doesn't back it up with any statement to justify that.

So can I get this clear. How close is close. If the signals can jam a flight 600 kilometers away, why can't they jam them in Perth. Wouldn't there have been lots more jets between the Qantas Airbus and the naval base when the latest incident occurred? Sandilands says thousands of jets have flown closer to the base since it opened but doesn't say when it opened but if it was around the time Holt got taken by a Chinese sub, yeah, right, I guess it would have been thousands.

I get the impression there is a big screw up in the Airbus computers not some sort of weird military interference that is making them go crazy half way across Western Australia.

How close to the base do flights get anyhow?

[topend3]

it would be reasonable to suspect denabol that an aircraft at FL370 could conceivably pick up signals from the base even hundreds of miles away.

[nick2007]

it would be reasonable to suspect denabol that an aircraft at FL370 could conceivably pick up signals from the base even hundreds of miles away.

I'm not sure that I see your point...?

In theory an aircraft, or a car, or a refrigerator, or an escalator, or a pen-knife could 'pick up' signals from the other side of the universe... but
It is the strength of the signal at the receiver (distance from transmitter), and how efficient the receiver is at turning that signal into a current (is the receiver suceptible to interference at that frequency) that determines if the transmitter will have any effect on the electrical systems in the receiver. (Pls correct me if I'm wrong).

Since:
1. the singal strength drops off with the square of the distance from the transmitter (conservatively not accounting for directional variation in signal strength, signal polarisation etc), and
2. the aircraft is not specifically designed to be a flying VLF antenna,
...then I would think that the chances are remote.

[quacker]

I'll believe that the VLF station is causing the problem when you can explain to me how the VLF station is causing problems to aircraft in other parts of the world.
This problem is occurring in aircraft north of the equator. It's just those aircraft havn't had jet upsets like the QF did. The problem as described by AIrbus's OEB is occurring in other parts of the world. Fortunately its still a fairly rare event.

My View the VLF station has absolutely nothing to do with it.

[TheShadow]

.
see here (http://www.iasa.com.au/folders/Safety_Issues/FAA_Inaction/another_Automation_incident.htm)

.
.

[framer]

Shadow, although that link is quite interesting it is nothing to do with this incident.
Most airline pilots would read that report and conclude rather quickly that the crew entered icing conditions without the ice protection on, the auto pilot held it as long as it could then let go. That was followed by the ice-protection being turned on as shown on the FDR. The captain saying that it was too warm for icing doesn't tie in with a freezing level of 12,000ft (they were at 23,000ft) and the severe icing forecast.
So although interesting, it is a waste of time if you are wanting to discuss this topic.
Framer.

[ampclamp]

Its not only reasonable for vlf to be picked up hundreds of k's away its actually needed to do that and penetrate water for sub's.
VLF bends around the globe.Airbuses all over the world could be receiving signals at anytime.Exmouth isnt the only one in operation
Whilst anything is possible I seriously doubt it has anything to do with it.

[UNCTUOUS]

Shadow, although that link is quite interesting it is nothing to do with this incident.
Most airline pilots would read that report and conclude rather quickly that the crew entered icing conditions without the ice protection on, the auto pilot held it as long as it could then let go. That was followed by the ice-protection being turned on as shown on the FDR. The captain saying that it was too warm for icing doesn't tie in with a freezing level of 12,000ft (they were at 23,000ft) and the severe icing forecast.
So although interesting, it is a waste of time if you are wanting to discuss this topic.
Framer.
.
Cannot see any mention of that 717-200 crew actually having failed to switch on pitot-static heaters. Think that they're talking about airframe anti-icing here: ".....the crew felt they did not need to utilize airplane anti-icing because the outside temperature was still too warm to require it."
.

see also this link (http://www.pprune.org/4626400-post16.html) from this thread (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/356585-another-qantas-adiru-mishap.html)

.

[Going Boeing]

(December 30, 2008) -- Airbus today marked the 15th anniversary of its first A330 delivery, which opened a highly successful career for the twin-engine family of medium/long-range widebody jetliners that will continue to serve operators for years to come.

The no. 1 aircraft - an A330-300 version - was provided on 30 December 1993 to Air Inter, which operated it on the airline's high-capacity domestic route network within France. This aircraft subsequently joined the fleet of Brussels Airlines - which continues to use the milestone jetliner on regular service to numerous African destinations, accumulating a total of more than 50,000 flight hours.

There are some 250 A30-300s in service today, with more than 130 firmly-ordered aircraft still to be delivered.

From its original Air Inter routes with an average sector length of no more than 400 nautical miles, the A330-300 has spread its wings around the world, and now serves such long-haul routes as Frankfurt, Germany to Seattle, Washington on the U.S. West Coast - a still-air distance of over 4,400 nautical miles.

A growing proportion of the A330-300 fleet is now employed on extended-distance regional routes, such as those linking Middle East destinations with European capital cities. Similar flight lengths characterise the segments flown between Australia and Asia or from Europe to North America.

A330-300s convey large numbers of leisure travellers to the winter snow and summer sun every year. With the start of deliveries to Air Asia X in October 2008, the A330-300 is now providing low-cost services from Malaysia to China, Australia and other Asian destinations.

The A330-300 also is firmly established as the 300-seat aircraft of choice for operators in China (including Hong Kong), with almost 80 aircraft in service or on order.

Operators who will receive their first A330-300s beginning in 2009 are Etihad, Gulf Air, Oman Air and Saudi Arabian Airlines - as well as Aeroflot, Finnair and Swiss. The first of the new operators will be Singapore Airlines, with deliveries commencing in January.

Overall, more than 1,000 A330s have been ordered in the aircraft's various versions, including the new A330-200F freighter, which was launched by Airbus in January 2007. The A330's versatility also is demonstrated by its evolution as an aerial tanker for the in-flight refuelling of military aircraft and the airlift of troops and cargo.

Source : Airbus

For an aircraft program that is this mature, you wouldn't normally expect to encounter the problems that Qantas (& others) have experienced lately.

[aveng]

vlf signals

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Its not only reasonable for vlf to be picked up hundreds of k's away its actually needed to do that and penetrate water for sub's.
VLF bends around the globe.Airbuses all over the world could be receiving signals at anytime.Exmouth isnt the only one in operation
Whilst anything is possible I seriously doubt it has anything to do with it

Couldn't agree more! VLF are ground waves.

[Pedota]

Here's what today's edition of Air Transport World are reporting . . .

Joint US/Australia naval communications base in Exmouth, Western Australia, is not to blame for two air data inertial reference unit failures on Qantas A330s (ATWOnline, Jan. 6), according to the base manager. Russell Levine told The Sydney Morning Herald that it was "highly, highly unlikely" that radio signals from the base could scramble a commercial aircraft's navigation systems because the two use completely different frequency bands.

Levine said the very low frequency signals from the Harold E. Holt naval base probably are unable to penetrate an aircraft fuselage. "We [also] operate in the kilohertz range and the aviation computers operate in megahertz, so there's a big difference," he said. "If we affected planes like that, we would have a lot more issues," he told the paper. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau is investigating both recent incidents and has not ruled out interference from the communications base.

[LandIT]

To pick up on quacker's line (3rd Jan), not just happening to other Airbus' elsewhere either. Just looked at an article in Flight safety news where the NTSB is assisting the UKAAIB investigate an Easyjet 737-700 non-revenue lease handback test flight plunge of some 10,000ft and exceeding VMO over 100kt, link...
EasyJet Boeing 737 plunge being investigated by AAIB and NTSB (http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2009/01/14/321068/easyjet-boeing-737-plunge-being-investigated-by-aaib-and.html)

[Frink]

I understand our old friend VH-QPA called a PAN on descent into Sydney on Sunday morning. Anyone with the lowdown?

[Capt_SNAFU]

Burning smell in part of the cabin.

[Wod]

Here

200806143 (http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2008/AAIR/aair200806143.aspx)

a lot of hard work, but still no clear understanding.

[TheShadow]

Maybe look at:

The QANTAS Airbus A330 Inflight upsets (http://www.tinyurl.com/bcgb88)

.

Seems like a credible explanation for ADIRU happenings

[Wod]

I'll stick with the ATSB for now.

[blueloo]

I understand military jets such as E6B prowlers and the like have some fairly sophisticated and powerful jamming gear installed (relatively speaking)..... not sure what effect it would have on a commercial jet..... however this is relatively small and when compared to ground based gear somewhat insignificant.

Is it really beyond the realms of possibility that ground based gear appropriately targeted couldnt do this? (Yes pretty remote - but is it possible?)



Anyone with any idea of how military jamming on a jet works?

[VH-UFO]

Something i dont understand is that pax get told to switch off ipods etc on takeoff and landing as they can interfere with aircraft navigation equipment.

So if an Ipod supposedly can do this to an aircraft, im supposed to believe that Harold E Holt communications cannot?

[Keg]

When any airliner takes off, I'd put money on the fact there are still mobile phones, ipods, blackberrys or other 'devices' switched on. Given how few events we have because of those devices and their proximity to the aircraft I find it doubtful that a VLF transmission caused this type of event.

[blueloo]

Keg - only thing is - all those items are extremely low powered (by comparison) and the jets wiring should be moderately well shielded from general interference items such as those.

I know many crews who leave their phones on all the time - the only downside is your phone looks for a station all the time and the battery goes flat quickly.

In fact sit in business class and its amazing how many phones start getting msgs (some punters dont care as their phones beep continuously) at about 1000' on finals.

Also I find it hard to believe any phone or ipod like item will ever cause interference. (Not saying it wont just very unlikely and likely to be some mitigating factor)

Yet a military base may have the ability to.... does this base only transmit VLF? Or is it capable of other transmissions which may cause interference?

[ampclamp]

ipods mobile phones and the like emit much higher wavelength emissions from either their antenna or simply from oscillators within the gizmos.They do so within very close range of everything within that hull.
VLF has (as discussed at great length earlier) an enormous wavelength, ie kilometres, and despite its power output is still hundreds of K's away.To have an efficient antenna and to allow a signal at those wavelengths within a shielded hull to do anything is remote to the extreme imho.

I also tend to think that the turning off of consumer electronics is probably overplayed but why take the risk ?

I'm sure the very clever people who design these things do consider the RF the aircraft will encounter and provide adequate filtering and shielding.

If the vlf signal has anything to do with it, it would be a failure of a filtering cct and or shielding within wiring to or in a component not a design oversight imho.

Not having a shot at anyone here but in the media (including the net)those who dont or wont understand tend to go with conspiracy theories to explain things.

I'm quite sure any military would like their airbuses ie tankers) to not fall from the sky anytime they go within cooee of a vlf station.Its in their interests to solve this issue not hide from it.

[TheShadow]

This post's two links have a lot to offer by way of precedent and explanation for ADIRU misbehavior
.

LINK (http://www.pprune.org/d-g-reporting-points/364940-qf-a330s-electromagnetic-interference.html#post4771416)
.
.

[F24]

Qantas passengers to sue Airbus over plunge terror

Qantas passengers to sue Airbus over plunge terror (http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=CNG.18275bfac3f5852a630f1aaf6fa6b687.2e1&show_article=1)

[Lookleft]

A view from the inside. It is not a good situation when faced with an aircraft gone "rogue"

The untold story of QF72: What happens when 'psycho' automation leaves pilots powerless? (http://www.smh.com.au/good-weekend/the-untold-story-of-qf72-what-happens-when-psycho-automation-leaves-pilots-powerless-20170510-gw26ae.html)

[Another Number]

A view from the inside. It is not a good situation when faced with an aircraft gone "rogue"

The untold story of QF72: What happens when 'psycho' automation leaves pilots powerless? (http://www.smh.com.au/good-weekend/the-untold-story-of-qf72-what-happens-when-psycho-automation-leaves-pilots-powerless-20170510-gw26ae.html)

Was told about this article on one of the online Fairfax group (WAToday), but couldn't get far into it ... the writing makes GT look like a Pulitzer winner! :ugh:

[Rodney Rotorslap]

10 simultaneous failures at the same momentand together too.

[ACMS]

Really? I found the story quite good myself. Glad it was them up there and not me.

Well handled by the crew I thought

You need to get a life

[601]

The reason you have three computers is that is one gives erroneous information the other two can overrule, or so I thought. Obviously airbus engineers think differently.

[CurtainTwitcher]

What happens if two are in error? I am of the understanding that the manufacturer (Northrop-Grumman) admitted that 5 defective ADIRU's came off the production line in sequence, 3 ended up in QF aircraft, with2 defective units ending up in the aircraft involved in the incident (QPA).

[B772]

A good read. Reminded me of the SQ A340 that went berserk near ASP many years ago.

[Keg]

A good read. Reminded me of the SQ A340 that went berserk near ASP many years ago.

Except that was self inflicted when they turned off the hydraulic pumps instead of some fuel pumps to balance fuel!

[4Greens]

When I checked out on a 707 many moons ago the Check pilot said :

All the lights come on and all the warning noises sound; What do you do ?

Answer: Sit on your f******* hands.

The idea being to see what the aircraft is doing and is it on profile before you jump in.

Best advice I ever got !

[The Bullwinkle]

When I checked out on a 707 many moons ago the Check pilot said :

All the lights come on and all the warning noises sound; What do you do ?

Answer: Sit on your f******* hands.

The idea being to see what the aircraft is doing and is it on profile before you jump in.

Best advice I ever got !
That's 'cos it's a Boeing! :ok:

[ACMS]

All good but it would be hard to sit on your hands when you are watching the nose pitch down suddenly...........

[Lookleft]

That's 'cos it's a Boeing!

It happened to a Boeing first, and they had a Honeywell ADIRU. It was a very similar incident where the computers were malfunctioning and the only warning to the crew was the autopilot reacting to bad data. The crew of that aircraft also lost confidence in their machine. It gave them a false windshear warning on final approach for good measure. That was a 777.

The QF Captain's nickname according to the article is "Sully"!

[Captain Nomad]

If I were a current pilot named 'Sully' I think I would be getting pretty nervous about what might happen to me next given the record so far of other pilots named 'Sully'... :ooh: :}

[pithblot]

No fatalities, unlike this one; the Greek government Falcon 900 accident.
A twenty four second nightmare on descent - ten oscillations in pitch (+4.7g to - 3.6 g) followed by a visual approach and 'uneventful' landing. The cabin was destroyed and seven passengers were killed.

The aircraft was returned to service.


Falcon 900B SX-ECH, Sept, 1999

http://skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/681.pdf

[Al E. Vator]

Not a bad article at all, given it needs to make the technical matters simple enough for all readers to comprehend.

Besides the main premise that automation is as yet insufficiently mature to entrust it with as much responsibility as we do, the other is the human side.

Having been around aviation for a while and observed incidents and accidents over the years, I just feel very sorry for those involved. For a start you have the shock of the incident or accident, alarming enough particularly when there are injuries. Then you have the inevitable self-doubt.....'what if I'd done this, could I have done that better'. Then all too often you have the subtle distancing by airline management, it's often so much simpler to say 'pilot error' than to address the core issue. Fortunately Qantas seems intelligent in this regard but airlines in say Asia or the Middle East often simply sack the pilots and pretend the problem is then solved. It isn't and the pilots are destroyed.

Finally we have the smart-Alec judgment by so many of our peers; just look back at the numskuls on this very website so quick to pass judgement with so little information. Surely we as fellow professional aviators would be the greatest source of support but often we are armchair experts using the benefit of hindsight and shock-free thought processes. Although theatrical, this was illustrated in the recent 'Sully' movie where his peers in simulators were able to land safely after an engine flame out but totally pre-briefed and familiar with the farcical exercise they participated in. Without blaming them, it appears that by default they were part of a procedure designed to allocate blame to Sullenberger. I'm sure the movie was inaccurate but the process could not have helped Sullenberger's state of mind at the time.

I forever hear snippy comments from fellow aviators about the pilot of the other famous QF Airbus incident. Bottom line is that in both cases, aircraft behaving inexplicably were returned safely to earth and for that we should pat our colleagues on the back, regardless of the perceived peculiarities of how they did it. There by the grace of god go the rest of us.

Good article, well done to Captain Sullivan and hopefully he and the flight attendant mentioned can now put it behind them and enjoy life. And if the article is correct, hopefully Northrop Grumman will make sure their algorithms are improved in future.

Hope so, I'm about to go fly the same aircraft!

[allthecoolnamesarego]

What is very interesting, is that after the QF32, the A380's were grounded until they could identify the problem.
After the QF72, the airline just kept on flying.......

[t_cas]

Well said Al E.

I also thought the article was good. Journalism for the masses with a great deal of technical aspect needing to be communicated as effectively as possible.

Perhaps the armchair super critics have not been around long enough to have had **** get real. It takes demeanor to remain focused and react effectively in any abnormal or emergency.

I too hope the individuals involved can get on with their lives. The subtleties of post event can affect people in insidious ways. It can take many years to overcome.

[4Greens]

ACMS,

The point is that you are watching for any odd manoeuvre of the aircraft, not messing around with the automatics. This is the whole point.

[JamieMaree]

What is very interesting, is that after the QF32, the A380's were grounded until they could identify the problem.
After the QF72, the airline just kept on flying.......

Not quite accurate.
The A380s kept flying for a few days until they had a handle on what might have caused the catestrophic failure of the engine. Then they were grounded until all engines were cleared or modified for the fault.

[ACMS]

That was my whole point as well. You can't sit back and wait on your hands for something like this pitch down event.......you can for other stable ECAMS but not this one I'd say.

[mrdeux]

I forever hear snippy comments from fellow aviators about the pilot of the other famous QF Airbus incident.

Me too, and I just wish they'd give it away. No matter what they think, he has the runs on the board, and invariably, they don't.

[B772]

Possible not as bad as VH-EAB the Bahrain Bomber that became inverted, entering a spiral dive loosing 19,000 feet and most likely going supersonic. The FDR recorded a +4.57 G and a -0.63 G.

[Fantome]

THE AUSTRALIAN NOV 6 2015

STEVE CREEDY

It was the “Bahrain Bomber” baby and it miraculously slept through one of the most harrowing incidents to affect a Qantas jet despite being wrenched from its mother’s arms and ending up under a pile of debris

In two minutes of terror on a Boeing 707 the plane approached, and possibly even reached, supersonic speeds as it hurtled towards the sea in a 19,000ft dive that took it well beyond the stresses it was supposed to bear.

The story is among a riveting collection of untold or forgotten stories gathered by author and former Qantas director of public affairs Jim Eames in his latest book, The Flying Kangaroo.

Eames, whose department played a role in getting Dustin Hoffman to insist “Qantas never crashes” in the award-winning movie Rain Man, turns up a *number of stories refuting the actor’s claim as well as highlighting how close the airline has come to disaster.

They include insider details of the fiery destruction of a Qantas Super Constellation that crashed on takeoff in Mauritius in 1960 as well as near miss between a Qantas Boeing 747 and a US Air Force CD-5A transport flying at the wrong altitude and with its transponder apparently turned off over Thailand in 1990.

The military plane came so close that its wash forced the *Qantas Jumbo into a 15 degree roll and the crew estimated it was no more than 50ft above them. The close call was made even more poignant by the fact the captain had selected an altimeter setting that was 75ft below that chosen by his first officer and had opted to use his settings for the flight management system

Had the FMS been programmed with the first officer’s settings, the two planes would have collided head-on.

But it is the account of the baby on the City of Canberra as it flew between Bangkok and Bahrain on a pitch-black night in February, 1969, that is one of the strangest stories.

The plane was lightly loaded with just 62 passengers, including Australian nuclear physicist Mark Oilphant, and was being flown by an experienced crew captained by Catalina war veteran Bill Nye. He was accompanied by first officer and former fighter pilot David Howells, second officer Ian Watkins and flight engineer Bob Hodges.

Although the B707’s technical log had a record of discrepancies between two of the plane’s three artificial horizons, it was deemed serviceable to depart Bangkok.

That discrepancy would *almost prove the flight’s undoing after Nye moved to correct what his artificial horizon told him was a 30 degree bank to the right and instead sent the plane tipping to the left as it cruised at 35,000ft.

Nye’s correction made the aircraft roll, become inverted and enter a spiral dive with its engines still running at cruising speed. It plummeted more than 19,000ft, approaching the speed of sound, before the crew managed to level out at 16,800ft. Then it began to porpoise wildly: climbing to 21,500ft and descending to 17,000ft before coming under full control.

The aircraft’s peak speed was measured at 885km/h, close to the speed of sound, but some Qantas experts believed it had actually broken the sound barrier during the dive.

They were also of the opinion the aircraft, which went back into service and was sold to a leasing company in 1977, probably would have broken up had it been fully loaded.

Unsurprisingly, there was chaos inside.

Howell had been resting and was forced to crawl along the floor fighting G-forces to get the cockpit while another senior steward, Ed Kirkland, had found himself pinned to the ceiling for a few *seconds before coming crashing down on Oliphant.

Cabin crew were forced to rip the jammed concertina door separating first and economy classes from its mounting and found themselves confronting a pile of bags, pillows, blankets, broken duty free bottles and other debris stacked against the forward part of the cabin.

Flight attendant Maureen Bushell recalled how everything thing in the cabin had “been just turned upside down’’, although the shocked passengers, many of whom were wearing seatbelts, were calmer than she expected.

A Royal Brunei policeman had hit the ceiling and was injured when he slammed into the seat-rest ashtray and a couple described how they saw their daughter floating about a metre above them.

Another passenger also described hitting the ceiling and “watching all the stuff floating around below’’.

But worst of all was a woman seated towards the back of the plane, desperate to find the baby she had been carrying in her arms.

“After a frantic search, the crew located the infant under a pile of debris at the front of economy,’’ the book says. “It had floated the length of the aircraft and when negative gravity had come off, descended to the floor, to be then covered with cabin trash. Miraculously, it had been fast asleep the whole time and was uninjured.’’

The Bahrain Bomber story, largely forgotten outside Qantas, joins richly told accounts of *colourful characters, political *intrigues and hushed-up operations. Among the latter was an *operation to smuggle out the *future princess Diana from Australia so quietly that even Eames was unaware of it.

It highlights the resourcefulness, ingenuity and sometimes acrimonious internal workings of the national carrier from its beginnings in Queensland through the war years to the merger with Australian Airlines and privatisation in the 1990s (the red tail-blue tail era).

Then there was s humour and a larrikinism that Eames noted would not be tolerated in today’s highly regulated, closely scrutinised environment.

These included the exploits of former RAAF transport pilot Ross Biddulph.

Biddulph’s legend was born flying a DH-84 Dragon from Kainantu to Lae in New Guinea. After realising he’d left his Craven A cigarettes in the back of the plane, Biddulph, desperate for a puff, decided he would set the aircraft on a level cruise and dart through the cabin to retrieve them.

“Apparently Dragons dislike people rapidly appearing behind the centre of gravity because the wretched plane reared up like a Wodehouse salmon and set course for Jupiter,” Biddulph wrote in a letter. “Almost immediately it stalled and, forgetting all about Jupiter, screamed straight down towards Nadzab (a PNG *village).

“Shortly afterwards I arrived in the flight deck area, spreadeagled against the instrument panel like a butterfly and covered in thousands of Craven As.’’

Worse for Biddulph was the fact that Qantas’s chief pilot in the region, Bill Forgan-Smith, was flying a DC-3 1000ft behind and above him.

The author uses archival material and tracked down people who were either part of stories he relates or knew those who were.

He also draws on his own experience in the airline as well as in New Guinea.

He nominates the tough training regimen at Avalon airport prior to the introduction of simulators near Geelong and the “Skippy Squadron’’ servicing Saigon during the Vietnam War as among his favourites.

The flights into Saigon were an extension of a rich heritage of wartime service by Qantas that included World War II, Korea and the 1950s Malayan Emergency

“Skippy Squadron, I always wanted to do that because it had been forgotten even in Qantas, ‘’ Eames told The Australian this week. “And when I started to talk to people like Alan Terrell and Norm Field, those blokes started to tell the stories about taking off from there in the middle of day — heavy, hot. And then I bounced to people like Les Hayward who was looking out the window and some Skyraiders were firing rockets off their wing tips.’’

Eames says the book should be read as a window on the colourful, significant and often humorous exploits of a company that was by no means perfect but carved out for itself a special place in Australian society.

“I wasn’t setting out to make comparisons with today,’’ he said. “That’s why I didn’t go much further than the red tail-blue tail thing because that’s up to somebody else to do in a later version.’’

The Flying Kangaroo, Jim Eames (Allen & Unwin), $29.99.

[Fantome]

#354

What happens if two are in error? I am of the understanding that the manufacturer (Northrop-Grumman) admitted that 5 defective ADIRU's came off the production line in sequence, 3 ended up in QF aircraft, with2 defective units ending up in the aircraft involved in the incident (QPA).

If this comment relates to the trouble with QF72 then it is surprising that the author, Matt O'Sullivan, did not mention it, but quoted Captain Kevin Sullivan as saying about the way the unit was taking good information in and pumping out extreme data , " They don't why it did that. And there is no result."

Incidentally, 'Centaurus' should be along shortly to give his learned views on the excessive reliance on automatics and computer systems.