On Yankee Station

[WE Branch Fanatic]

I have recently been reading On Yankee Station by the late Cdr John B Nichols USN (Rtd) and Barret Tillman, published by the Naval Institute Press, about the US Naval air war over Vietnam. I think there are things from this book that are worth mentioning as the lessons apply to current operations in the Middle East, as well as future operations.

The book starts with an introduction to US carrier doctrine of the Vietnam era, including lessons and experiences from Korea and the stand off with Castro's Cuba. They then go straight into the difficult subject of Rules of Engagement, commenting on how much control the political leaders placed upon the military, frequently for fear of harming Soviet or Chinese advisors. Did the USSR or China show such concern for US personnel? For example, they comment that the North Vietnamese fighter airfields were left intact, for fear of harming advisors, and speculate on a possible MiG attack against US ships. Indeed they speculate that the reason such attacks did not occur was so that their airfields were left alone. Likewise they comment on the rules regarding SAM sites, and often AAA, being left untouched until they became active. They comment on how Chinese and sometimes Russian merchantmen offered AAA to US aircraft without fear of retaliation. The strict ROE regarding shipping is discussed, as is the failure to hit the docks at Haiphong. They then go on to discuss how the policy makers in Washington dictated over types of weapons that could or couldn't be used up North, such as napalm or cluster bombs, or even the size of bomb. Even more incredibly, they mention that even things such as the approach to hitting bridges was dictated by Washington.

Morale is briefly discussed, as is the desire by bean counters to stop Combat SAR operations on cost grounds. The book then discusses the surface threats from AAA and SAMs, before discussing the fighter actions against the MiGs. This is an interesting chapter as it discusses the F4 community, with their focus on long range missile engagements, vis a vis the F8 community with Sidewinder and cannon. It mkes the point that ACM is still needed, and that this something that needs constant practice. ECM aspects of the air war are discussed, something of particular interest, before discussing CV based strike operations in general, noting the importance of the skills of the deck crews, and the level of teamwork required in the air. SAR operations are mentioned, particularly with regard the the US Services taking time to develop robust combat SAR capabilities.

Finally, the authors ask "what if", commenting that it is a myth that tactical airpower failed, but was misued. The speculate that Haiphong harbour had been mined at an earlier stage of the war, it would have had a salutory effect on reducing the flow of supplies, going a long way to blunting the Communist war effort. When it was finally mined, the effects were significant. They then argue that an amphibious landing north of the DMZ would have changed the course of the war. They state that the policy of "no wider war" precluded the use of wider, and potentially war winning, naval assets. Personally I cannot help wondering what would have happened, if US submarines had made there presence known in that part of the world, would the merchant vessels have been so keen to take shiploads of war materials to Haiphong? The idea that the war was winnable is a controversial, but fascinating, one.

The book concludes with some recommendations, mostly about the need for ACM practice, the desire for a high/low mix with a low cost pure fighter, and the need for mechanisms for lessons to be learnt. It also includes the following paragraph:

In short, an air force - especially a naval air force - is a fragile weapon. It must be constantly exercised - maintained at a high state of operational readiness with a uniformly high skill level.

I refer to the Royal Navy's own problems regarding carrier aviation, as discussed on the Sea Jet (http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=98152) and Future Carrier (http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=221116) threads.

See the offical USN history of the war in Indochina. (http://www.history.navy.mil/seairland/index.html)

This link (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Oklahoma_City_%28CLG-5%29) relates to an air attack on the USS Oklahoma City. Not much has been written about air attacks on US vessels off of Vietnam, but I believe some did occur.

I think many of these lessons still apply today. Political meddling in military affairs is still a problem.

[Occasional Aviator]

I don't see the problem. The UK has an air defence force that regularly practises ACM, and with the introduction of Typhoon this is only getting better. Likewise the RAF has plenty of carrier experience with exchanges on the EA-6, F-18, AV-8, latterly the F-14 etc, as well as the JFH who (Naval or RAF) do embark when op commitments allow. Surely any sustainable force would be able to cross-pollinate these skills to JSF.

[glad rag]

WE, thanks for that round up, I DON'T now think that I will purchase.

[WE Branch Fanatic]

To be honest, I was surprised by the lack of replies. This was not intended as another carrier thread, but one relating to over restrictive Rules of Engagement and political micro-management. Nor was it intended to be about fighters and ACM, although the need for ACM practice and aircraft guns is the lesson that needs to be remembered.

The idea that the war in Vietnam was winnable seems to fly in the face of the widely held view that it was unwinnable, but it is certainly worth thinking about. Similarly the Rules of Engagement issue. I remember watching the Bosnian conflict for years on TV, and hearing (and I've heard a lot more since) of how the efforts by NATO to use airpower was frustrated by UN officials on many occasions. It was only when the UN was removed from the decision making process that NATO was able to bring the genocide to an end. Operation Deliberate Force showed that air power can be an extremely powerful instrument. Operations over Kosovo were less successful, partly (in my view) because the Serbs did not believe NATO would be serious about mounting a ground invasion.

The role of the US Navy in Vietnam is often forgotten. Apart from carriers launching strikes and the riverine forces, the role of US warships is often overlooked. Yet amphibious operations and naval gunfire support were key parts of US operations. On a number of occasions US warships shot MiGs down. Inevitably they took losses.

Today, US and UK forces are committed to two theatres, one all but land locked, the other totally landlocked. But naval forces contribute to both operations, a fact frequently forgotten. The next theatre will almost certainly not be landlocked, may well have an extensive coastline, and may even have air force or a navy. Yet many assume that all future operations will be in landlocked places, because Afghanistan is. Nichols and Tillman comment on the tendency of planners to assume that the next conflict will be the same as the last.

I think this a good time to include a link to an article from Janes.

Opinion - Asymmetry and other fables (http://www.janes.com/defence/news/jdw/jdw060818_1_n.shtml)

Guerrilla warfare is also hardly new and can be defeated by forcing the guerrillas to fight on unfavourable terms - asymmetrically. The South African Army, for example, used mechanised forces against guerrilla bases in Angola and light mechanised forces to track and defeat those guerrillas who did get across the border.

The reverse side saw South Vietnam conquered by conventional North Vietnamese forces of armour, infantry and artillery that rolled over the South Vietnamese Army without much difficulty. They were able to do so because the south was organised and armed primarily for operations against guerrillas. This is asymmetry at work.

[Evalu8ter]

WEBF,
In the hope of stimulating some debate...

Tillman's book is an excellent book, but skewed to a fighter pilots view of how a campaign should have been fought. For a better strategic overview read US Grant Sharp's book, "Strategy for Defeat".

IMHO the arguements for and against the effect of airpower in VN are finely balanced, and designed to underline the viewpoints of a their protagonists. My conclusions are thus:

1. The USAF was obsessed with the "big one" and only grudgingly accepted the Spad, SLUF et al into the inventory when it became obvious that the OrBat was wrong for SEA (when, if ever, will we come to the same opinion...)

2. Basic rules of war were ignored. "Gradualism" seemed a RANDesque construct that had/has little place in the tenets of war; It is difficult to "send messages" whilst bombing a country, particularly when youe refrain from hitting vital infrastructure (Haiphong, Phuc Yen, SAM sites, Dams etc) for fear of widening the war.

3. The VN war was the first "Long Screwdriver" War. To paraphrase, "War is too important to be left to politically motivated individuals"

4. The desire for all branches of the US military to be seen to be important, wary of losing their slice of the pie.

I would also take issue with the Janes synoposis. The rapid defeat of 1975 was hastened by the restrictions imposed upon US Air Power by a anti-war Congress / Senate who prevented Ford from launching strikes to support the SVN state or by providing the required weaponry (as they had to Israel) to stop the NVN Armour (note that the 1971 use of NVN armour had been repelled by TOW missiles, many fired by AH-1s). The ARVN was organised along unit v unit lines, it was just not very good at it.

[eagle 86]

Quite simply the US (and allied) forces did not lose the war in South Viet Nam. A lack of political will and cr@p rules of engagement allowed the other side to have a distinct advantage. Post Tet '68 the VC and NVA in the South were reeling and a spent force. A lack of positive follow up led to a massive troop build up from the North and the rest is history. Similarly today the allies are too soft and politically unwilling to take extremely difficult steps.
GAGS
E86

[brickhistory]

Fighting an essentially defensive war is a losing proposition to begin with in most instances. Korea being the best counter to that argument, but even then the offensive above the 38th parallel and the subsequent Chinese intervention turned it back into a stalemate.

Vietnam was an effort to stop the North from coming South. A defensive war. Really hard to win that kind as it gives the offense all the advantages.

That said, I agree mostly with evalu8ter's:

1. The USAF was obsessed with the "big one" and only grudgingly accepted the Spad, SLUF et al into the inventory when it became obvious that the OrBat was wrong for SEA (when, if ever, will we come to the same opinion...)

2. Basic rules of war were ignored. "Gradualism" seemed a RANDesque construct that had/has little place in the tenets of war; It is difficult to "send messages" whilst bombing a country, particularly when youe refrain from hitting vital infrastructure (Haiphong, Phuc Yen, SAM sites, Dams etc) for fear of widening the war.

3. The VN war was the first "Long Screwdriver" War. To paraphrase, "War is too important to be left to politically motivated individuals"

4. The desire for all branches of the US military to be seen to be important, wary of losing their slice of the pie.

I would also take issue with the Janes synoposis. The rapid defeat of 1975 was hastened by the restrictions imposed upon US Air Power by a anti-war Congress / Senate who prevented Ford from launching strikes to support the SVN state or by providing the required weaponry (as they had to Israel) to stop the NVN Armour (note that the 1971 use of NVN armour had been repelled by TOW missiles, many fired by AH-1s). The ARVN was organised along unit v unit lines, it was just not very good at it.

Vietnam-era ROE were inordinately restrictive as Washington was worried about the press/world opinion not necessarily at winning militarily. A lack of the appropriate munitions - launching sorties with one 500lb'er to keep sortie counts up, thus unit 'effectiveness,' and the like did nothing to help. By the time Washington did wake up to the military facts, it was too late politically.

ROE in Kosovo were inordinately restrictive, but the politicians couldn't handle the heat if there were dead airmen paraded through Pristina or the like.

Don't slip the dogs if you're not going to go all out.

If you aren't, figure out another way to talk to the other side.

If you are, give the word, then step back.

Desert Storm was about right, in my mind.

[WE Branch Fanatic]

Nichols and Tillman offer the view that political considerations meant that Washington based policy makers prohibited the use of some naval options, such as mining the North Vietnamese ports, greater use of naval gunfire and an amphibious landing North of the DMZ were ruled out.

Perhaps this restraint was justified considering the Cold War situation, however.....

Most of the war supplies for the communists were imported by sea. Therefore if a serious effort (mining, interdiction of ships carrying arms by US warships) has been made to stop this early on in the war, the outcome may have been changed. An amphibious landing North of the DMZ would have given the US/South Vietnam the initiative, cut communist supply routes and brought Hanoi to the negotiating table. I understand that many US Navy and US Marine officers felt frustrated with these options being ruled out.

Conclusion: Sea power (including carrier aviation) may have a strategic effect on the course of a conflict if used correctly. This is frequently ignored by politicians, media commentators etc, but needs to be remembered in a world where something like 90% of nations have coastlines.

[Wiley]

A lack of the appropriate munitions - launching sorties with one 500lb'er to keep sortie counts up, I can attest to (or confim) that comment from conversations (frequently drunken) at the time with the people who were doing it.

Some might recall the US (at huge expense) buying back a large number of iron bombs they'd sold some years earlier to a West German fertilizer company as war surplus, (circa 1965-66? - not certain of the date).

However, in the meantime, inter-service rivalry saw someone vaguely naval in the Pentagon, in an imbecilic effort not to allow the USN's sortie rate to fall behind the USAF's, launching multiple flights of A4s into the most concentrated and sophisticated AAA environment known to man (to that time) with concrete blocks on one wing to balance the single 500 lb bomb each aircraft carried(!)

Read Jack Broughton's very readable 'Thud Ridge' for a USAF perspective on the same subject. (The description of Broughton's wingman's F105D flaming out over Laos in sight of the tanker and his subsequent 'dead stick' approach to the tanker is worth buying the book for alone*.) He mentions exiting through Haiphong Harbour and getting the finger from the crews of merchantmen - merchantment from countries, some of them Western (read France and the UK), that the US (in his words), had saved from the Nazis in WW2.

The micro-management of the war, particularly the restrictions applied to targets in the North, was little short of criminal. Again quoting Broughton (probably inaccurately - it's a long tme since I read the book), he says that the USAF planners cited 100+ targets in the North that had to be hit in the first days of any bombing campaign. Quite late in the war, 109 of this list of targets had yet to be touched.

What quite a few people might not know is that the Ho Chi Minh Trail, whilst certainly important to the North Vietnames war effort, was as much a propaganda myth as a fact. For much of the war, the vast majority of war material that reached the Viet Cong and the NVA in South Vietnam had a very short journey overland after being being unloaded from (neutral) ships in (Siahnouk's neutral) Cambodia, where politics dictated they were untouchable. (Standing by to be reminded of the rephensible American bombing of the border regions of neutral Cambodia.)



(* Reading the wingman's version of events is - understandably, I think - a little unkind to Broughton as the element leader who got him into that particular pickle!!! See '100 Missions North/a Fighter Pilot's Story of the Vietnam War' (ISBN: 0028810120) Kenneth H. Bell )

[Mr C Hinecap]

Conclusion: Sea power (including carrier aviation) may have a strategic effect on the course of a conflict if used correctly. This is frequently ignored by politicians, media commentators etc, but needs to be remembered in a world where something like 90% of nations have coastlines.

Are you confusing the focus on current ops with a belief we have forgotten the RN and what it brings? The globe is, after all, 7/10 water and we certainly owe our previous glories to being a maritime nation.

Oh - sea power getting captured and paraded on TV can have grand strategic effect too :E

[Evalu8ter]

Wiley,
You are correct in your assumption. The USAF drew up, effectively, a JPITL for NVN which had IIRC 93 significant targets. These included POL, ports, LoCs, Dams and other infrastructure. The problem was two fold. Firstly, SAC had no real interest in playing and fought hard to prevent its' assets (not only bombers, but also tankers) being released. More importantly, RAND and Johnson were convinced that slowly knocking out targets, followed by bombing halts to encourage negotiation, the NVN government could be forced to desist ops in the South.

Some targets were just way off the reservation. The port facilities at Haiphong and the railways from China were verboten in case of hitting Russian/Chinese assets, and potentially widening the war. Hitting the dams would probably have starved large areas of the country - Johnson was terrified of world opinion if he did this. Invading NVN would have risked both.

By the time Nixon launched Linebacker, detente was in place and he could hit whatever he liked without the fear of widening the war, and he went after what was left of the target list. The NVN had to negotiate as they'd run out of SAMS and with the ports (finally) mined and the railways interdicted they couldn't replace them.