Ryanair in the grass at EMA

[jackharr]

I always used to say that there were those who had already been off the paved surface and those who hadn't done it yet. I stopped flying ten years ago while I was ahead. I suppose it might have been skill but more likely it was just plain good fortune.

Jack

[d71146]

I have a feeling that this is going to start something.

[Nick NOTOC]

It appears that to continue and take-off after having been off the paved surface was the reason for FR to sack the poor guy. After all he could just have returned, off-load the pax, call ops and Mx, have the AC inspected and have FR shout at you for being stupid to taxi onto the grass. But thanks to the great non-punitive system that would have been all.
No the poor guy ignored all this good airmanship and decided to continue.
I just wonder how FR makes sure that a pilot feel safe enough to return and not get the shouts etc. when some unintentional mishap occures?
What training and or culture is present to make this pilot loose all his good skills to not do such a thing. Or what selection/ training does FR provide regarding decision making?
Whatever the answert sacking the poor guy does not give the impression of a non-punitive or just culture within FR.

[niknak]

Nick

I have no personal knowledge of this case, but consider the following:

If the Captain had discontinued take off and returned to stand, yes the customers would have been delayed, yes there would have been knock on effects and yes, he would have got shouted at. No doubt he would have been subject to internal inquiries and possibly re training, not pleasant, but he probably would have kept his job.

But, apparently he didn't do any of the above.
He carried on not knowing if the aircraft had been damaged or if he'd damaged anything on the ground which could have been a hazard to a subsequent landing or departing aircraft, and that is at the least extremely unprofessional and at the worst unforgivable.

As a seasoned traveller with FRA, every other low cost airline and many other who aren't, I wouldn't have found it acceptable to be the on the next aircraft to land or take off not knowing the potential hazard left behind by this chap, and no other member of the travelling public should have to tolerate it either.

[GlueBall]

The larger issue is: How can a crew allow themselves to become so distracted and taxi off the pavement in a small jet as such...?

Obviously neither crewmember was paying sufficient attention during taxi. :ooh:

[Nick NOTOC]

Hi Niknak

The fact that the crew should have done XXX is not the end of an investigation, but rather the start of one.

Obviously there are many escapes possible from an incident or an accident therefore we need to manage the risks involved, understanding these risks comes from knowing all factors involved. Without understanding there is not going to be much managing.

True the crew should not have done this, but I doubt that they would now claim that they will do it again, so they have learned. The question is have FR? They still have no idea why this qualified (by FR) crew made such a F... up. With their attitude they never will know and some day they will be too late.

[niknak]

Fair point Nick,

there obviously will be a UK AIB investigation into this, when they make their findings the press will pick up on it and FRA will make their usual excuses, most of which will make my points, i.e the Captain didn't do what he should have done and they did the only thing they could have done, i.e. sack him.

Because I know what goes on at the sharp end, it doesn't make me feel any better that he lost his job, but if it comes to a technicality, O'Leary's "yes men" are absolutely correct, the Captain didn't do what he should have done.

Sadly, however you look at it, FRA are right.

[206Fan]

The larger issue is: How can a crew allow themselves to become so distracted and taxi off the pavement in a small jet as such...?

Obviously neither crewmember was paying sufficient attention during taxi.

Unless he had a female FO on board that was highly distracting for him:E

[rubik101]

The distraction was much more likely to be the rather questionable procedure of getting the Captain to review the Take-Off briefing during taxying. This entails a check of the Flap setting, the N1, the speeds and the initial SID, among other items, all of which have to be read directly from the FMC. My contention has been that this review of the briefing should be carried out by the FO but for some inexplicable reason it has fallen on deaf ears.
I now do the review when stationary, waiting for the tug etc. to clear the aircraft. If I do this on a line check, I will no doubt be criticised for non-compliance with SOPs.
It might have had something to do with the wind!

[Nick NOTOC]

Hi niknak,

I think we have to agree to disagree then.

My view is that punitive action is not indicated here as the crew (at least I asume so) did not on purpose break the rules. Their actions therefore are te result of many factors, some of them are their responsibility and many are FR's responsibility.
A study I recently read (ERAA) indicated that wilfull misconduct (gross negligence) is only present in 0,6% of all incidents, and creates only 0,2% of all risk. Punishing crew will cause less ASR's to be written (ATC Netherlands) and therefore have a far greater negative influence on safety. So one must be very carefull not to let emotions rule. After all no damage was present, no passengers were hurt so only opinions were formed.

Nick

[niknak]

Nick,

again a fair point, nothing did happen, but if it had?

sadly, we live in a world full of litigation and if something had come about as a result of this incident, well... who knows??

Probably out of court settlements and no publicity, which benefits no one.

[Time Traveller]

Careful - do we know the crew knew they had gone into the grass before taking off?

Maybe it was reported to them after departure from a groove in the grass.

[leftseatview]

i agree with Rubic
reviewing the Take-Off brfg on the roll, can and does lead to a loss of situational awareness.
After a complete brfg has been carried out at the gate before pushback,it makes sense only to review any changes.
a lot of the stuff on this so called final take ff brfg some airline SOPs require, are part of the before take off cheklist(on the buses atleast)
Other stuff like fuel state, a/c wt etc need to be moniterd on a continuos basis in all flt phases,which forms part of enhanced situational awareness.
SOPs cant replace true airmanship

[Airbubba]

The distraction was much more likely to be the rather questionable procedure of getting the Captain to review the Take-Off briefing during taxying. This entails a check of the Flap setting, the N1, the speeds and the initial SID, among other items, all of which have to be read directly from the FMC. My contention has been that this review of the briefing should be carried out by the FO but for some inexplicable reason it has fallen on deaf ears.


This full takeoff brief should be done in the chocks in my opinion. You need two (or three) sets of eyes outside while you are taxiing, not someone buried on a screen down low reading off numbers and power settings. Almost everything but the flaps should be set prior to blockout and they will be double checked on a before takeoff checklist at most carriers. The old excuse for waiting until the last minute before takeoff for the brief was to get it on the 30 minute CVR tape. New CVR's hold a lot more data, I'm more interested in preventing the crash than documenting it (I realize others lean in the opposite direction). You can always give a quick verbal review of the brief and scan the configuration just before takeoff. There are a lot more runway incursions and excursions than flaps up takeoffs these days, taxiing is a very critical phase of flight in these times of busy airports.

[qwertyuiop]

Having watched the speed the FR crews taxi, I'm surprised this doesn't happen more often.

[captplaystation]

5 Required. . look at the FMC and check flap setting required ( or was it point at it ?)
5 Selected. . reach across and grab flap handle and check handle is in 5 detent
Green light. . look at (point at ? ) green light , and verify that flap position required is indicated
Of course this probably happened before this latest anally retentitive procedure, but I'm guessing it might happen again due to it.
All it takes is a narrow taxi-way ( Altenberg anyone ?) and an Aircraft a little "out of trim" on the ground (as some are) or a little crosswind, and woops there it goes again.
Maybe we should check these pretty green lights on the overhead too whilst taxying, just to be doubly sure. . . ?

[Sunfish]

If the facts of the matter as gleaned from posts here are correct, then this is a classic example of the well known decision making in a "double bind" corporate culture problem, which by coincidence was discussed a year or more ago.

http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=198385&highlight=double+bind

[wince]

Nick NOTOC

what selection/ training does FR provide regarding decision making?

there is nothing in the selection stage regarding decision making.

No doubt we will get another memo from the chief pilot followed by a ¨dummies guide to flying¨ SOP change that will probably not solve the problem that both captplaystation and rubik101 pointed out: to much reiteration and distractions rather than flying/taxing the bloody aeroplane :ugh:

[Nick NOTOC]

Hi Wince and Nikak,


Oh dear! No proper training then, next question would be: why is that?
Let's do a bit of analyzing here........ Commercial pressure, insufficient training/selection, unclear and poor working conditions, fairly good pay and career progress.

Low level circle at Cork, Loadsheet error/tailstrike, loss of control, take-off after taxi mishap...etc....A commercial very successfull airline all focussed on profit/ cost control

What is the common denominator here?

Maybe something must be done to prevent FR becomming a very sad example in some future CRM course.

[Old Fella]

If any of the critics who have accused RyanAir management of using inappropriate pressure on their crews, to the point of having them afraid to bring safety issues to light, those critics and indeed the crews being bullied should all have the balls to go to the appropriate Aviation Authority with EVIDENCE.

[woodpecker]

go to the appropriate Aviation Authority with EVIDENCE.

Did just that after infirmed adults /children seated in the emergency rows. Cabin crew/flight crew not interested so e-mailed to the Irish Authority.

Their response was that they had no problems/issues with Ryanair's training and operating procedures.

Total waste of time and effort!

[rubik101]

Notwithstanding the issue of 'training' in RYR, which to my mind is as thorough and comprehensive as any other airline I have worked for, my beef is with the SOPs.
For those of you who might be thinking that the full pre-departure briefing is given during taxi, please read my previous post carefully. It is a 'review' of the brief that occurs once we prepare for the Before Take Off Checks. Having said that, it is almost as long as the full brief!
This review is too long, including mention of the Bleeds, N1, speeds, flap setting, trim setting, the SID with any turns, SID stop height, squawk and details of any engine out procedure. This long winded review is a bad check in a bad time frame.
RYR are rightly concerned with preventing rejected take-offs due to 'Configuration Warnings' and believe that this review is the solution. Sadly, it involves head in time at a critical phase and should be abandoned completely, in my view. At the very least, it should be carried out by the FO and need only include the Flap setting, as has been mentioned.
I suggested this change some time ago and was told it was under review. The outcome is a poster in the crew-rooms showing us how to do the Flap check, as described by Captplaystation. Sadly the whole interminable briefing review is still in existence and likely to remain so. Maybe a few more taxiway excursions will focus their collective minds.

[johnriketes]

Not only FR puts in some impressive taxi speeds. I have watched EY in disbelief at their taxi speeds on also. Even more worrying when it is possible the Captain my have their eyes on the FMS, instead of the correct procedure of all eyes outside.

[Nick NOTOC]

Please bear in mind that training is only a part of the issue, culture, commercial pressure, are equally importand to consider. As in many airlines today training is becomming a tickbox exercise and because of all the required (JAR-FCL) items there is hardly any time to actually learn.
Who of you while preparing for a sim-ride are flying a bit more hands-on, and or raw data?
Does this not mean that we are now training on the AC to prepare for a sim-ride?
Airlines such as FR are complying with the legal requirements, but how good is the quality of their training actually?

[Right Way Up]

Johnriketes,
Who is EY?

[the_hawk]

EY=ETD=Etihad

[Right Way Up]

the hawk,
Thanks for that.

[J.O.]

If the full takeoff briefing has already taken place, then a review of the gotchas should be sufficient. That would include:


Confirmation of runway (think Comair at LEX & good T/O speeds)
SID / initial routing
Stop height / cleared altitude
Engine out routing
Any changes to original brief.None of this should require going heads down by the PF.

[MU3001A]

In which case add, head out from a** to the list!

[johnriketes]

Sorry I meant EZ..y. Another low cost high speed type operation.

[Right Way Up]

John,
I though that may be who you meant. Are you aware that EZY has flight data monitoring and anyone taxxing excessively both straightline and turning corners would be picked up by it. There may be the odd transgressor but its not what I would call an airline wide epidemic as you may see it.

[A4]

For Info...... taxi speed is a monitored parameter in the FLIDRAS system at EZY. Exceed 30 knots for more than 5 seconds and it flags. Taxiing at 25-30 knots is not inherently dangerous provided common sense and airmanship are applied, in fact there are places where taxing at those speeds is desirable (25L at BCN, 01L/19R at AMS). Taxiing is a critical stage of "flight" and should be carried out accordingly to the prevalent conditions/traffic situation.

EZY use a "PEDS" review during taxi (Performance, Emergency turn, Departure SID i.e. SFD8M not a full review and finally STOP altitude/Level). This is performed by the PF (FO can taxi the Bus) and takes approximately 10 seconds requiring no "heads down".

A4

RWU... we were typing in sync.....

[rubik101]

RYR taxy speeds which trigger OFDM/FLIDRAS (yes, even RYR have it installed, monitored and used as designed) are 30 kts in a straight line and 15 in a turn, rate of 3 degrees per sec or more.
While most use these numbers as a target, encouraged by our esteemed trainers, others taxy considerably more slowly that this.
With one of the largest fleets in the world and such a high utilization I imagine the time saved on taxying at these speeds is quite considerable.
What limits on taxy speeds do you have?

[Fireboy]

Bmi A321 managed to find its way onto a patch of grass at Heathrow last night around 23:00, no pax, positioning for maintenance.

[mill island]

Why is it that FR SOPs seem to be detailed to the point of distraction? Is it perhaps so that when one makes an error simply trying to keep the blue side up, the Company can point to the obvious disregard for SOPs rather than explore the circumstances that led to the error? Does it not seem worthy of question that perhaps the rapid turnaround ethos with half the flight crew involved with fuelling supervision is the real reaosn why heads down taxying out is an SOP requirement? And does the alleged growing list of former FR Commanders now gainfully employed elsewhere after participating in the non-punitive investigative process not suggest that "Just Culture" in Ryanair is perhaps, "Just" what they want it to mean when it suits?:confused:

[captplaystation]

In a word . . Yes.
That's the short answer, the long one is that somewhere further up the food chain they are acutely aware of the risk exposure they have operating 160 airframes with a Noah's Ark mix of experience/nationalities, so they try to
A- Cover their own asses, and
B- Try to write a procedure to cover every eventuality known to man.
As well , as you rightly suggested, to be sure that if you cock up , there will be a rule to use for crucifixion purposes.
In their defence, past history would seem to suggest that most who have recognised, stopped the chain before it gets too silly, and admitted to cock-ups, have been treated reasonably fairly ( unless the co was out to get them anyway and just waiting for THE day.)

[llondel]

Bmi A321 managed to find its way onto a patch of grass at Heathrow last night around 23:00, no pax, positioning for maintenance.

Don't they know you need a turboprop to properly cut the grass? :}

More seriously, I assume that with hard ground, the scenic diversions are more just an embarrassment than when it's soft and the wheels sink in. Or is it advisable to stop and check the tyres for FOD after such an excursion?

[captplaystation]

You couldn't be sure if you had ran over something sharp, like the taxiway lights you just squashed, also a danger of ingesting FOD, or in extreme cases clipping a marker board or suchlike with the flaps or whatever.
For sure you will be found out at some stage, with most companies I believe in this case it ISN'T better to be hung for a sheep as a lamb, as the safety implications and therefore fallout will be of a very different magnitude.

[JW411]

I remember quite a few years ago one of our aircraft (not Ryanair) cut a corner on taxiing and put a mainwheel in the grass.

The captain (rather foolishly, in my opinion) got it out again using a hell of a lot of power. The main wheels were changed and one of them was found to have a large crack starting on the wheel rim.

Wheels and tyres should ALWAYS be checked after such an event.

[MMORE]

Do you think the rate of incident is rising a bit too much in Ryan ?

[captplaystation]

Don't think it is out of phase with 150 or more aircraft, just that people LOVE it when it happens. . . .the "told you so" syndrome. . . well up to a point.

[-8AS]

To clear up one error in this thread, the Captain was not fired. After an investigation, he was demoted to first officer.

[Faire d'income]

In fairness this is not the time this has ever happened with an Irish airline but the other event didn't lead to a demotion. One would imagine it would be traumatic having to demote oneself.

[birrddog]

in '99 I was on a flight from Standstead to Knock on Ryan Air, flight was delayed, wet runway at night, and felt an interesting sensation that aircraft did a tail slide as the bus driver opened the throttles as we were turning onto the active, continuing acceleration for the t/o roll.

Would be curious if anyone here experienced/did that?

[08KaQAjQ]

This incident not good that it happened and that they didnt return.
Think couple of years ago a dutch major airline b737 landed a bit long and ended up with nosewheel in grass. They used reverse to get out of that without success!

[Roy Bouchier]

As long retired ancient aviator, I wonder if the proliferation of SOPs is related to the often relatively low experience of many of the crew? To overcome this, there have to be detailed instructions to act as a guide.
For many years I would conclude my T/O briefing with "and what have we forgotten today, gentlemen?" Seemed to work OK!
And of course the captain should have been punished for not returning to the ramp to have the aircraft checked whatever the reason for the excursion.
And commonsense should override SOPs at all times.

[Nick NOTOC]

Quote: And of course the captain should have been punished for not returning to the ramp to have the aircraft checked whatever the reason for the excursion.


I can see that you have retired a long time, since then safety has evolved and it has been proved that punishment is not the way forward. Understanding the "why" something happened is more importand then creating a fear of punishment, fear of risk comes from understanding, understanding comes from open investigation.

[Roy Bouchier]

Well I agree punished was not the right word! But continuing without bothering to check to see if any damage had been done certainly calls for action.

[JW411]

I have been in aviation for more than 50 years. I was always taught, and I have always taught my students in turn, that if you drop a bollock in aviation then you should immediately own up to said bollock and so prevent, hopefully, one of your fellow aviators from dropping the same bollock.

This chap went off the prepared surface and put a mainwheel in the grass. He managed to get the aircraft out again and then went flying.

That is where most of us would have a problem with his decision-making process. He should, of course, have either sat tight in the grass or taxiied back in for a check of the offending gear.

So, I am forced to ask a couple of questions. Did he actually know that he had put a couple of wheels over the edge? Maybe, not?

If it was known on the flight deck that they had put a set of tyres over the edge, did the F/O also go along with the decision to go flying without a gear inspection being carried out first?

[Oh that's super!]

I guess the questions are:

... why the captain felt inclined not to report it (e.g. was he worried about the punishment he might receive if he reported it, or did he have a goal fixation of 'getting the flight under way' etc etc?);

... if the first officer raised objection to not reporting it, and if not, why not;

... why the wheel ended up off the hard surface.


I believe the first and second question are potentially just as important as the third, if not more so.

[captplaystation]

Contrary to what -8AS said, I was told that he was indeed fired, and that his attitude at the Disciplinary may not have acted in his favour, but I stress that this is repeated third hand.
At the same time I am hoping this is NOT true, as he is a very good bloke, and a good operator to boot.

[kick the tires]

not that good if he did indeed put a wheel over and knowingly took-off afterwards!

[RAT 5]

Lots of mud slinging & red herrings as usual. JW411 & Super have at last asked some salient questions. Could we please have some more facts from thems in the know. Was it dark or daylight? What was the vis? Was it raining? (it is often hard to see the lines in night rain, if the are no greens.) Which part of EMA's grass was damaged; i.e. exiting the apron or turning at the hold? What was the vis; were all lights working etc. etc. Were they on time or late or missing a slot? Are there any mitigating circumstances?

Was this an incident waiting to happen; i.e has EMA an inherrent problem? Has anyone else nearly done the same? Did they know about it and therefore willing disregard it? Did the crew even discuss it?

Is there anything the rest of us can learn to stop us doing the same thing.

Let's recover some of the 'professional' in the prune rumour forum.

[HundredPercentPlease]

Careful - do we know the crew knew they had gone into the grass before taking off?

There is no way you would miss this excursion.

It happened at A, a 90° taxiway at the end of 27, just where A joins 27 (so way past the CAT1 hp). There is a perfectly good lead on / lead off line to keep you out of trouble, but the FR turned hard right to get the last couple of feet of TORA (27 is off to your left). Wheels 3 and 4 both came off the right of the taxiway and back on to the edge of the runway, leaving 2 big trenches that look about half a wheel radius deep.

[A4]

Hmm. I've noticed quite a few FR's do this "extreme" line up technique at STN.... and I've seen some come very close to doing exactly the same as the EMA aircraft whilst lining up on 23 at STN from "S" (the 45° lead on). Now, I'm all for not using up runway (runway behind you being one of the three most useless things in aviation) but is it really necessary on a 3000m runway i.e. STN and EMA? Not to mention the stresses on the main gear and tyre scrubbing.

Common sense :confused:

A4

[easyme]

They do the same in Luton and I have never understood why.
They backtrack half-way and then turn around. They get very close to the edge of the runway whilst at the end of the runway there is much more space to turn your aircraft around.
Also, what performane figures to they use for this?

[fireflybob]

Also, what performane figures to they use for this?

The correct ones! Company policy is to plan for an intersection departure so anything extra is a bonus.

Performance A calculations (should) assume a line up allowance depending on the geography of the line up maneuver.

The yellow lead off lines are, I believe, there to assist runway vacating rather than lining up.

[A4]

LTN is a different case. So are you saying, FFB, that perf is calculated from the intersection but they still backtrack a couple of hundred metres, do a 180°, and then depart? Why? Why not calculate full length and taxi an extra 20 seconds, do your 180° in the turning circle provided and then depart. Or leave your intersection performance but still use FULL length - LTN isn't the longest of runways (and very unforgiving if you go off the end of 26 :\ ).

The only reason possible is to save time (seconds) - so why back track at all if you've got valid perf from the intersection - what is the objective here :confused::confused:

A4

[fireflybob]

A4 - I cannot answer that question - you would have to ask the individuals concerned!

[Mr Angry from Purley]

FFB
Am glad to see it wasn't you !:\

[crewcostundercontrol]

Thought it would be funny to have all THREE Ryanair in the mud threads on one page.:E

[stator vane]

glad we don't have the classics, they'd probably have us open the doors on the floor at 4 miles out on the approach and check the red stripes are lined up on the gear as well!!!

[HundredPercentPlease]

Photos:

http://www.picattic.com/files/yxacc5fxe2vbfry7jc8v.jpg

http://www.picattic.com/files/p4r7pz1xpdf1vj8ac7lg.jpg

[Robert Campbell]

Have Ryanair thought of switching to Tundra Tires? :)

[gadpilot]

could not agree with you more rubik. i've seen sop's change so many times in my company that it makes your head spin. sop's are put in place to ensure a degree of standardization enabling unfamiliar crews to operate in "synergy". as we all know however, every day and location presents it's unique challenges and if you're unable to use your god given common sense then sooner or later you're going to get your wings clipped or in this case your feet stuck in the mud. sop's are a tool and not the holy grail. knowing when and how to apply them is the challenge. when sop's are finally proven to be without fault then we'll have pilotless aircraft. don't see that on the horizon though. whatever your views are in this case you've got to feel for this guy. who knows the particulars of his day and what his pressures were. he made a bad decision finally but what led to that in the first place? you've got to explore the companies culture i think.

[Mister Slot]

gadpilot - how refreshing to see balanced, intelligent and experienced comment.

Like so many, I had all but given up on pprune because of the proliferation of uninformed and juvenile posts.

Perhaps I'll pop back a bit more often to see if you and others can restore some experienced and polite debate!!