CVF

[comet 4b623PW]

80,000 tonnes of steel ordered from Corrus at a value of £65 million pounds for two aircraft carriers. Orders also placed for fibre optic cable and reverse osmosis plant.

Slowly the MoD seems to be making progress.

[Jackonicko]

Bloody disgraceful. They need to be cancelled so that we can pay for the really vital kit that we're struggling to afford.

And cancellation needs to come before serious money is spent.

[27mm]

I'd like to know:
1) Where the raw material for the steel is sourced from
2) Who supplies the fibre optic cables and osmosis plants

China, perhaps, or Russia?

[noregrets]

This'll be interesting - China is snaffling up the world's supply of iron (and concrete) faster than the world's factories can produce it! I wonder how much Corus is going to have to cough to get its hands on the raw materials for all that lovely steel...

[Mr-AEO]

Jacko. Is your view not a trifle short sighted?

[Jackonicko]

If we could afford everything that we need, my view on CVF would be entirely different.

In this climate, it's a niche, luxury capability we can't afford.

I wish things were different.

[Sunk at Narvik]

90% from Corus plants here in the Uk apparently. Dunno where they get their ore from though. Does it matter?

[hulahoop7]

Plenty others see it as a key strategic asset for the next 50 years. Just take a look over on ARRSE to get a more lucid view from those who REALLY are at the teeth end.

As well as risking future security you also become a Brown apologist by calling for these types of cuts to pay for current ops. It is singularly his fault that our troops haven't the correct equipment - not the CVF, Typhoon tranche 3 or FRES project. If this cutting continues to other supposedly irrelevant projects the UK armed forces will be reduced to an ill balanced rump, with no capability outside COIN ops.

We get news every day of Russia and China rearming... of natural resource prices going through the roof as demand exceeds supply. The future contains plenty of risks outside fighting in sand pits. How do our politicians and opposition respond… by promising to pump another 2% of GDP into a hole called NHS or risking the nation’s finances on dodgy mortgages.

I don’t know why I’m bothering. Many have made more insightful and intelligent ripostes to you previous bellicose posts on CVF Jacko, but like a fked parrot you can’t help but splutter the same line over and over again.

[Wader2]

Plenty others see it as a key strategic asset for the next 50 years.

Whilst not disagreeing with your sentiments but 50 years seems rather optimistic for modern warships. Ark Royal from launch in 1955 to paying off in 1979 lasted only half that time.

Victorious managed 1941-1968 or 47 years which was not bad especially for a ship started in 1937.

Hermes on the other hand lasted only 1959 to 1986 before being sold.

Even Invincible 1977-2010 will have only done 33 years.

It looks more likely that we will either sell them on early or the Navy will seek new toys long before the 50 years is up.

[Sunk at Narvik]

Better to compare them with USN carriers. How long will Kitty Hawk have been in service when she retires/gets given to the Indians?

Ark Royal was a wartime build and the quality was pretty poor apparently. Victorious had her career cut short due to fire in a galley (excuse for early retirement) but generally speaking all the post WW2 carriers were just to small to operate modern jets.

Generally speaking, the bigger the hull, the longer she'll last.

[airborne_artist]

Wader2 - the penultimate Ark was launched in 1950, but not commissioned until 1955 - and she was on the stocks for seven years as well. Let's hope the new carriers don't take twelve years ...

[Navaleye]

Hermes/Viraat will be 50 next year and she's still serving well. So much so that she's likely to out live her airgroup!

[Jackonicko]

A f*cked parrot, eh? We're resorting to animal based insults, are we.

Still, at least I'm a parrot who can spell, and add up.

And yours is not an insightful and intelligent riposte, however much you might like it to be.

Unless you're willing to pay substantially higher taxes, in order to give defence a really major increase in its GDP share, then we simply cannot afford everything. I don't personally oppose increased taxation, as I'm not some selfish, libertarian, demi-Thatcherite nonce, but I do recognise that tax increases are not supported by the majority, and so are unlikely to happen.

The equipment programme needs more money, even without the cost of ongoing ops (which are, if we believe the Government, funded separately anyway). So something has got to give.

We are not the USA. We are not Russia. We are a minor power, in the second rank, and as such, while we need solid expeditionary capabilities, we do have to cut our coats according to our cloth. We need, flexible, versatile, agile and cost effective assets - and carriers are none of those things. We haven't NEEDED a carrier since 1982, and we are unlikely to NEED one again (that's not to say that Carriers aren't useful, and aren't nice to have, if you can afford them, and it's not to say that they haven't proved useful, and wouldn't prove useful again) but there are other more important priorities, for kit that is essential, rather than just nice-to-have.

We need tankers, recce and SEAD every time we go on operations, and with QRA activity getting back to Cold War levels, and with a need to sustain a Falklands fighter commitment, I'd venture to suggest that four AD squadrons is nowhere near enough, while our FJ force has been over-stretched (yes, over-stretched, not stretched) for a decade or more.

By binning the CVF and JSF we could afford virtually everything else that we need, and failing a massive injection of cash, binning both programmes seems to me to be the best option.

[Magnersdrinker]

Agree with Jacko on this , do we really need a Carrier, yeah agree nice to have and flex your power around the globe, but with 2 carriers with say 60 JSFs (at a guess) what use is that against a North Korea /China
We have no long range cabability except our subs really.
I think the priorities are a bit wrong IMHO considering defence spending is getting reduced even more,the money needs to go to the right places, for the last 10 years this has not been the case and its unlikely it ever will.

[hulahoop7]

Are you really serious Jacko. Are you saying these 3 things with a straight face?

1. We need, flexible, versatile, agile and cost effective assets - and carriers are none of those things.

2. We haven't NEEDED a carrier since 1982, and we are unlikely to NEED one again.

3. I'd venture to suggest that four AD squadrons is nowhere near enough.

[The Helpful Stacker]

If we could afford everything that we need....

We can afford everything we need. Unfortunately it not a matter of whether we can afford it but where the government would rather spend money in order to secure votes. The sinkhole that is the NHS for instance or buying votes throughout the North East.

£42 billion to prop up a reckless bank then later nationalise it or spend that money equiping the armed forces to do what you expect of it? Which would buy the most votes in a part of the country that cares more for the colour of the rosette than what the person wearing the rosette is saying?

[Door Slider]

Jacko,

I do like the way so you say:


1. We have not needed carriers since 1982


then go onto say:


2. We need to sustain fighters in the Falklands

Remind me, when was the last time fighters were used in combat in the falklands??

[Navaleye]

1. We have not needed carriers since 1982

Tell that to the team on Invincible in GW2 operating day and night sorties of 4 GR7 and 4 FA2s. A balanced strike package. Invincible was contributing to the US carrier effort, but could have operated in support of UK ground forces independently.

[Polikarpov]

By binning the CVF and JSF we could afford virtually everything else that we need, and failing a massive injection of cash, binning both programmes seems to me to be the best option.

That would assume that if CVF and JSF were cut, the money ring-fenced for CVF and JSF and bound up in their various political contracts / agreements would be available for other military spending.

Not a chance - it would disappear into Gordon's general expenditure pot quicker than a scalded whippet, with maybe a paltry percentage remaining for some 'new boots', or something.

If these things were cut, cuts they would be, not reallocation!

[Widger]

Jackonory.........on and on...change the bloomin record.

Your whole issue is...The MOD hasn't got enough money, to give the RAF all the lovely toys it wants so therefore I want a slice of everyone else's cake! If there are not enough SH, Tankers, Transport etc, that's not the RN's fault, it is Typhoon's fault, MRA4's fault, NIMWACS fault, Scampton's fault, the Dead Sparrow's fault, the airbases up the ying yang's fault....try looking at your own NAVAL (yes I can spell!) for a change!

What you are afraid of, is that when CVF is in service with Dave/Rafale/Marinated whatever, where will the requirement for your beloved Typhoon be? OBSOLETE!

That is why you are so narrow minded and blinkered in your vision. You should try and take a leaf out of Magic Mushroom's book and show that you are not talking out of your..................:ok::ok::ok:

[MarkD]

Victorious managed 1941-1968 or 47 years

Is this the new mathematics? It's 27 years the way I was taught (by the Count on Sesame Street, if you must know)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_Victorious_(R38)

[ORAC]

Tell that to the team on Invincible in GW2 operating day and night sorties of 4 GR7 and 4 FA2s. My goodness, I hadn't realised they made such an essential and vital contribution. :ooh:

[artyhug]

Tell that to the team on Invincible in GW2 operating day and night sorties of 4 GR7 and 4 FA2s. A balanced strike package. Invincible was contributing to the US carrier effort, but could have operated in support of UK ground forces independently.

Navaleye, please please tell me that was you stirring.

[Growbag]

I do enjoy the circular fashion of threads on this forum, and I think that this is one that will be about for many years to come.

The requirement for CVF is certainly in the realms of crystal ball-work, however the USN carry out significant operations from their carriers into present theatres (mainly due to their organic tankers) and the ability to project such power without host nation support is the pinnacle of flexible air power. Typhoon will no doubt become a useful asset to the UK's arsenal, with some decent investment to rectify the poor design faults or rather to create a swing role aircraft from a pure AD platform...but it is not suited as a true swing role aircraft and JSF will outshine it in every department (depending on which variant we choose of course!). I agree with some points that if we canned both programmes we could fund an array of present tense assets that are crying out for cash, but when we have the opportunity to gain something which allows global reach and dynamic implementation, then why don't we have a bit of faith in the future. I have been around the military for many years, and have seen some poor procurement choices, but in times of cash shortages I have had direct experience of procuring the BEST equipment, off the shelf (rather than ten times the price from BAE, for example) and it being used as it was designed, and furthering the UK's reputation as being the best at what it does. That gives me hope.:D

[Archimedes]

Widger, your observation about Typhoon's obsolescence must be either

1) A Wah

2) A slightly unfortunate example to use when suggesting that JN is engaging in the art of communication via his rectum

3) Evidence that you are Lewis Page and I can claim my five pounds...

Now I disagree with JN (I will confess to having said in print that if the UK is serious about expeditionary ops it requires CVF), in that if spending on quangos were to be reduced by just 5% and reallocated to defence - which would have no implications for the NHS, education, transport or anything else other than the well-remunerated quango members - we would be able to afford both CVF and Tranche 3 without any difficulty.

Quangos received £24.1 billion in 1997, and the Iron Chancellor promised "a bonfire of the quangos and greater democracy" and a reduction in spending to more sensible levels - before, over the course of the next ten years increasing spending upon these undemocratic and unnecessary bodies by £100 billion.

However, that notwithstanding, the idea that Typhoon will be made obsolete by JCA is, I fear, somewhat far-fetched - particularly if one CVF is in refit/dock and the other several thousand miles away from a crisis and multi-role aircraft are needed fairly smartly.We need both Typhoon and CVF, and arguing about which capability to cut gives comfort only to the Treasury and a variety of barely-accountable governance bodies. And lesser enemies of the realm...

[LateArmLive]

Yes, the GR7s on Vince in Telic........................:mad::mad::mad:

[Jackonicko]

Even if we need JSF, for FCAC, we don't necessarily NEED a carrier. Most of the allies who participate in coalition ops don't bring carriers to the party, and are able to make a worthwhile contribution. Nor are carriers necessary for autonomous ops.

Carriers are an exceptionally expensive way of delivering relatively modest effect, and they are vulnerable, slow to deploy, and require massive and expensive support.

In the real world - the world in which we cannot afford every club for the golf bag - I'd rather rely on the Spams in the distant eventuality that we need carrier air, and instead make sure we have our own autonomous SIGINT, our own, 'bought and paid for' tankers, lots of SH, a proper Canberra replacement, SEAD capability, low collateral damage weapons, sufficient AD aircraft and lots of deployable FJs. As well as proper kit for our troops on the ground, radios that work, appropriate vehicles, etc.

We need every Typhoon we've ordered, and (in any case) very little (if any) money would be saved by cancelling Tranche 3, since most of the cash is spent, and penalty payments would take care of most of the rest. And I suspect that if we were going to flush MRA4 to save money, we should have done it a decade ago.

I'd agree with you that the Reds, and Scampton are indefensible, and that they should probably go, along with Victory and all that historic Portsmouth stuff, at least one of the naval bases, Dartmouth, the Household division, the King's Troop, RHA.

And the RN is responsible for some of the budgetary pressure. The Admirals were told Trident replacement or carriers, and they're pushing for both, when neither are strictly necessary. We could and should have a cheaper deterrent - even if it remains submarine launched. The Moscow criteria is no longer valid, nuclear SLCMs would be more than adequate.

As to the money wasted on Nimwacs - that was spent decades ago - it's like blaming the CVA01 cancellation fees, or the last refit to HMS Rodney.

Whereas there is a great deal of real saving (money that hasn't already been pissed away) to be had if we deep six the CVF and JCA now.

[Magic Mushroom]

Oh FFS children!:ugh:

It is fair to say that carriers have not been essential to any of our ops since 1982. People can bang on about HNS but this has not been a show stopper in practice. However, carriers have been exceptionally useful in many ops and particularly during the Balkans where carrier assets sometimes allowed air to be maintained over B-H when all the Italian bases were red.

Tell that to the team on Invincible in GW2 operating day and night sorties of 4 GR7 and 4 FA2s.

Either that is a big wah Navaleye or you need to get your facts straight. No fixed wing operated off the CVS during GW2. It was used purely in the LPH role for the Cdo Bde insertion on Al Faw via Chinooks and SK4 with Lynx and ASaC support. The FA2s did not fly in the op although RAF GR7s flew CAS/interdiction from a, err, 'friendly' nation.

The use of the CVS in this role is probably a useful microcosm of how we've used our carrier assets since 82. The assets could easily have been disembarked to a shore location and the op staged from there. However, having the CVS was exceptionally useful and prevented a complex and time consuming logs move ashore. In addition, the ability of a carrier to move rapidly (or as rapidly as a boat can:E) from a position elsewhere can mask our intentions better than a move ashore which would have taken several days. A CVF would have been even more useful in this role and would probably have had the capacity to maintain fixed wing ops as well.

...however the USN carry out significant operations from their carriers into present theatres (mainly due to their organic tankers) and the ability to project such power without host nation support is the pinnacle of flexible air power.

Incorrect. The USN's organic carriers do very little other than offer an ability to top up one or 2 assets within a few hundred miles of mother. They are certainly unable to 'project' any meaningfully sized package. Even when the USN had a decent organic tanker in the shape of the KA-3D Whale that capability was limited. As their AAR moved onto the KA-6D, S-3B and now the FA-18E, the organic tanker has slowly become even more limited. Therefore, even USN CVNs rely almost exclusively on land based AAR (as well as ISTAR etc) support from the USAF and RAF. Even in the early days of Afghanistan, US carrier assets regularly employed land based FOBs to turn in another, err, 'friendly' nation.

Before all you carrier dudes start screaming 'biased crab', let me offer some balance. The Falklands is often used by both sides to justify/question carriers. Those for mention the use of carriers in the initial war whilst those against point out the fact we now have MPA. However, look at it from the Argies perspective. MPA is arguably our CoG down there. So what happens if they do an 'Op MIKADO' and manage to stick 2 x C-130 (or an 'airliner full of 'relatives on a pilgrimage to the Argie war graves' that are actually SF) onto the runway? Without a runway they could reinforce via surface means, clear the runway and set up shop again. Without a carrier we could do very little about it. However, with CVF en route they'd know we could still come down and kick them out. That's undoubtedly an unlikely scenario today, but will it be over the next 30-50 years? Most importantly, it illustrates the point that everyone should be recognising namely:

LAND BASED AND MARITIME AIR POWER IS COMPLEMENTARY FFS!!!!!!!

In summary, land based and maritime air power each have their pros and cons. I don't think carriers are essential and those who describe CVF as being the 'cornerstone' of UK defence for the next 50 years are imho exaggerating. Is it ‘highly desirable’ enough a capability to push through? Personally, I think so and I think CVF/JCA will offer an exceptionally versatile and flexible capability that we need and should be funded.

My worry however is that the RN have prostituted their future on CVF and the SSBNs and that the latter in particular will compromise their wider conventional capabilities.

Now, everyone stop arguing or they’ll be no pudding for any of you…

Regards,
MM

[Not_a_boffin]

Well put MM.One point worth adding re the bombers. I doubt very much that the Admirals were told "Trident or Carriers not both" as Jacko suggests. The deterrent is a Joint National asset, NOT a naval one. The fact that it is predominantly dark blue merely reflects the chosen delivery method. It most certainly doesn't do much for RN force structure (I can't think of more than three or so units contingent on the deterrent and not all of them are dark blue) and having to support that force from the naval budget does the RN no favours at all.People have debated the future deterrent to death, but if you're going to use an unmanned delivery system, then cruise is too limited in range and vulnerable. Given Ivans recent behaviour, you'd think a ballistic system was worth hanging on to just in case.Having had the naval budget decimated by Trident in the 80s, one might have thought "the Admirals" would have been keen to avoid a repeat......

[Wader2]

MarkD, you are right, brain fade or dyscalculia.

Navaleye, I agree the Viraat is still going strong but it should be self-evident that the Royal Navy did not operate it for 50 years!

Ditto Sunk at Narvik, you are of course right the that world's largest Navy is operating incredibly old ships, just the Royal Navy does not have such a track record with ironclads.

Also, given the number of flat tops they are able to afford the maintenance down time. With old vessels where we have two or three off we really only have the capability and resources to operate one.
We have been throwing modern destroyers away before the paint has dried. We dispensed with a complete submarine arm in short order. It wholly optimistic that political will to maintain 2 CVF over 50 years will endure.

A_A, dont tell me about the Ark. Watched the Queen Mum drive passed our house after she was launched. Not only was she on the slips for so long but they kept redesigning her. Workers would leave work Friday, on mOnday they would make their way back on board, up ladders, down companionways, descend into the bowels and arrive at a solid bulkhead where Friday there had been a hatch way.

Recently, an ex-Ark PO told me how he opened one hatch to find the compartment flooded. It was flooded for 5 decks down. All comparments below the water line were all shut down and damage control had to give permission every time someone needed to go below.

50 years, great idea and I would love to see it happen but I doubt it. I certainly hope they outlast me.

[Wader2]

The equipment programme needs more money, even without the cost of ongoing ops (which are, if we believe the Government, funded separately anyway).

I believe separate funding for current ops is questionable. If X-Desert Boots are needed then we save on Y-Combat boots therefore current ops spending will only be funded to X-Y. Scale this up and we have a large chunk on non-discretionary expenditure from the Defence budget. :(

I am sure Archimedes can confirm or deny that statement.

[PPRuNeUser0211]

Wader, do we actually save y on combat boots? I mean, obviously they're not being worn out at the same rate, but everyone still has a pair of them, even with dessies?

[Navaleye]

Either that is a big wah Navaleye or you need to get your facts straight. No fixed wing operated off the CVS during GW2. It was used purely in the LPH role for the Cdo Bde insertion on Al Faw via Chinooks and SK4 with Lynx and ASaC support. The FA2s did not fly in the op although RAF GR7s flew CAS/interdiction from a, err, 'friendly' nation.

If I may quote directly from Commander David Swain, Wings, HMS Invincible at the time.

"The requirement was a day and night mission over Iraq every 24 hours, with Invincible contributing to each mission four FA2s for force protection and four GR7s for interdiction. However, the desire to maximise the UK contribution to the coalition effort, as well as the degree of training and integration required, resulted in more than double that rate of flying."

[Not_a_boffin]

Navaleye. Are you sure you're not confusing Deny Flight/Southern Watch with Telic? IIRC Ark was the CVS out there at the time, hootching with Wokkas and ASaC.

[Boldface]

Navaleye,

That was Op BOLTON in about 98-99, NOT GW2! In GW2 CVS operated only rotary assets and didn't even deploy with the Harriers.

[artyhug]

Now, now. Lets not let the truth ruin a good story of how indispensible SHar was...

Oh no hang on a minute, it couldn't even manage RS15 to cover QRA(I) north at the time when we all deployed...

:=

[Navaleye]

The tail end of Operation Bolton, but Ops over Iraq none the less.

From the same source.

On 25th January, Invincible was teaming north through the Strait of Hormuz escorted by Coventry. Shortly thereafter both FA2s and GR7s flew their first night sorties over Iraq, helping enforce Southern Watch alongside aircraft from Nimitz and George Washington...

...Each Anglo-US "package" consisted of up to 30 aircraft."

[Magic Mushroom]

So not GW2 then!:rolleyes:

[artyhug]

Yes but Navaleye your whole point was that this was an example of our carriers being needed post 1982.

So

a. Your example was inaccurate.
b. They weren't needed, just as the GR1/4, F3, GR7 and Jaguar (for Northern Watch) contributions weren't needed. I'll not say the same for the ISTAR and tanker contributions.
c. Your impression that even in Op BOLTON/RESINATE the aircraft from CVS operated as an independant integrated balanced package shows how little you understand about COMAO Ops.

By all means defend CVF, I've yet to be wholeheartedly convinced one way or another, but try to use fact rather than dits to support your argument and please admit when you've got it woefully wrong.

[Dan D'air]

Hmmm, Mixed emotions on all of this, but for my two-penneth I have to say that £100Bn to buy-off North-East Labour voters would have bought a heck of a lot of kit, for a long time.

[Navaleye]

My point is/was this. HMG thought they were needed and were sent. In the end they did a useful job in showing coalition resolve, not to mention good training. Sending even a small carrier has a political impact as well. Uncle Sam is aware that large airbases cannot move and make easy targets for IRBMs, which they were. That's why the carrier is the weapon of choice in these situations. In the case of HMG it is a joint asset. A power projection tool for all services. If you don't like the navy having it, maybe we should give it to the army? :uhoh:

[The Helpful Stacker]

Uncle Sam is aware that large airbases cannot move and make easy targets for IRBMs, which they were.

They may not be able to move but as anyone who has actually been to the hot sandy place will tell you, airbases out there are generally bloody huge and the aircraft on them very well dispersed making the threat posed by an elderly IRBM chucked from a ner-do-well gulf state pretty minimal.

Of course the threat posed by a few C-802s against one big floating airfield in a relatively small piece of oggin may be slightly higher.

[glad rag]

A power projection tool for all services. If you don't like the navy having it, maybe we should give it to the army? :uhoh:

And maybe it's about time HMG realised that this country is no longer a world power and should reconsider the "gunboat" part of Gunboat Diplomacy.

[GPMG]

If we don't have any carriers with effective air arms, just who is going to protect HMS Ocean etc with air cover? Or the troops on board? And give air support if they were to attempt any beach landings, carry out operations on land etc etc?

And don't say it will never happen cause you have plan for the battles that you may expect to fight in 10-30 years time. Who says that we will be in America pocket in 5 years time? Can they prove it 100%?

This kind of short sightedness lead the yanks to remove guns from fighters in the 60's which was a big mistake. Of course we would never make that mistake would we??

[GOLF_BRAVO_ZULU]

I'd agree with you that the Reds, and Scampton are indefensible, and that they should probably go, along with Victory and all that historic Portsmouth stuff, at least one of the naval bases, Dartmouth, the Household division, the King's Troop, RHA.


Good to see a total grasp of Service pride, morale and its force multiplication value, inspirition of recruits and "education" of the Masses. Remind us which outfit you served with?

Regarding getting rid of a Naval Base, you may well get your wish in the next 5 years. Remember, though, that the assumption is that the Navy will continue to shrink to an unknown implosion point. The size of a Fleet is dictated by the means of supporting it, both in and out of Fleet Time. If events in the future, such as resurgent big nasty buggers or World shortages of raw materials, food and water require an increased Naval capability, we are going to find it very hard and expensive to expand or build new Bases. Dockyards and capacity are a whole new matter.

Expeditionary warfare, like it or not, is Government policy. A lot of chaps with big rings round their sleeves and batons on their shoulders, and many experts without them, seem to think Carriers are a key asset for that form of warfare.

For what it's worth, I also have doubts about Government policy and worries about how CVF and JSF are going to skew Naval finances and force balance. We need for the protection of UK assets and interests 30+ DD/FFs, 8+ SSNs, an amphibious capability and a balanced force of MCMVs and OPVs. Maybe that's the plan; take the Navy to implosion point and force us into a federal EU force structure to plug the gaping gaps.

[Jackonicko]

GBZ,

In an ideal world, I'd keep all of the heritage and display stuff, but when the frontline is stretched to breaking, and we're getting rid of PR9, Jaguar, and Sea Harrier, when we've slashed the Nimrod MR force, when there aren't enough SH, and when there's a threat to the full Typhoon buy, to two of the existing GR4 squadrons, then no, none of the nice peripheral stuff should be kept.


GPMG,

We can't afford everything, and though I'd like us to be prepared for eventuality - that's a non-starter, and it's not what the defence assumptions plan for.

But if we do need to do something without the USA, and without our European allies, I guarantee that we'll need tankers, recce, SEAD, and all of the other stuff that we're sacrificing to pay for the CVFs, whereas there's no guarantee at all that we'll NEED carrier air.

[Growbag]

Get rid of the Tornado force too then, rather than desperately try to keep them relevant, keep Typhoon purely AD rather than try and turn it into something it isn't, get rid of the harrier force, as when it comes out of afghanistan it won't be of any use and they can't man it fully, the F3's can go too, as they don't really know how to do AD properly (AMRAAM), and then buy JSF to fill in the gaps. We don't need CVF, but we need to have something that actually does what it is designed for, rather than these poor legacy examples we have now.

[Widger]

I apologise for my earlier vitriol but Jackonory's rhetoric is getting about as tiresome as WEBF going on about the SHAR. Thank you MM for bringing some informed sense to this debate. I echo the comments about the CVS (and lets not forget the French with their carrier as well (Think it was Foch at the time)) utility in the Adriatic and I know that General "Bear" was equally grateful on several occasions to have a mobile asset that did not require tankers, while the whole of Italy was socked in!

We are likely to have many conflicts in the future over resources. British Antarctic Territory is an area rich in resource but is also claimed by other countries too. The gloves are on at the moment due to international agreements on Antarctica, but when they come off, it is going to be those nations with Airfields (fixed and mobile) and ports close to Antarctica that will have the upper hand. So that means Chile, Argentina, UK, Australia and New Zealand plus anyone with a Carrier group.

[Jackonicko]

Allow me to repeat the top and tail the Magic one’s argument:

“It is fair to say that carriers have not been essential to any of our ops since 1982. People can bang on about HNS but this has not been a show stopper in practice. However, carriers have been exceptionally useful in many ops and particularly during the Balkans where carrier assets sometimes allowed air to be maintained over B-H when all the Italian bases were red.”

“In summary, land based and maritime air power each have their pros and cons. I don't think carriers are essential and those who describe CVF as being the 'cornerstone' of UK defence for the next 50 years are imho exaggerating. Is it ‘highly desirable’ enough a capability to push through? Personally, I think so and I think CVF/JCA will offer an exceptionally versatile and flexible capability that we need and should be funded.”

Where MM and I disagree is as to whether CVF/JCA is useful enough to justify spending on it at a time when that’ puts capabilities that really are essential (not just nice to have) at risk.

He thinks that it is, whereas I’d rather spend the money on tankers, a NimR replacement, a PR9 replacement, robust SEAD, more recce, etc. And the carriers and JSF would pay for a great deal of kit

And if you think that’s as tedious as WEBF banging on about SHar, or if you think that makes me a ‘f*cked parrot’, I’d suggest that you take the plank (of inevitable, repetitive, blinkered, dark blue, pro-carrier prejudice) out of your own eye, Widger.

These are difficult, dark times, and we need to challenge our assumptions and be prepared to slaughter a number of sacred cows or risk complete collapse. I’ve tried to react to the new budgetary realities since the end of the Cold War, and we have to realize that while we might personally support the increased taxation that would allow Cold War levels of spending, (or taking the money from areas which we don’t view as a priority) the general public don’t agree, and so it’s not going to happen. And that’s why, very reluctantly and sadly, I no longer automatically support the ‘nice to haves’ that divert money away from core capabilities that we need.

I hope that we can keep the Reds, the QCS, the horses and breastplates and busbies, Victory, Dartmouth et al, but can’t seriously argue that we should spend money on them and watch core capabilities being sacrificed. And I have moved from being a dyed in the wool believer in carriers (as I always used to be, in the glory days of Cold War spending levels - especially after visiting USS America and USS Forrestal and watching them in action).

[GPMG]

of inevitable, repetitive, blinkered, dark blue, pro-carrier prejudice)

Os opposed to the 'anti RN, sun shines out of the RAF's bum attitude' that your showing Jacko?

[anotherthing]

Jackonicko - apart from the fact that tourists enjoy the spectacle, I don't know how you can even think of comparing HMS Victory and the Red Arrows.

HMS Victory - Still a commissioned warship (yes, I know in name only) had her Keel laid on the 23rd July 1759 and continued to serve the Royal Navy (her final guise was as home to the naval school of telegraphy) until 1904.

Obviously there is a cost for maintainance, but she is a static display... one that attracts over 350,000 visitors per year.

Regardless of your service, I defy anyone to think that HMS Victory should be sold off etc, in much the same way that The Red Arrows should remain because of what they bring to the UK.

Museums and other armed forces attractions are a relatively low cost, yet invaluable marketing tool for the forces. Only someone myopic and small minded could fail to see their worth, even in todays harsh financial climate.

[hulahoop7]

It's your arrogance and sensationalism that annoys Jacko. Calling CVF a 'Bloody Disgrace' is simply bellicose rubbish, because while you are clearly never going to except it as a worthy asset, there are plenty who can see its benefits.

As an example: “Typhoon and those who support it are directly responsible for Private XXx death, because if it hadn’t been purchased we could have provided adequate armour”. .....Now is that statement helpful? Or is it sensationalist claptrap?

[PPRuNeUser0211]

Growbag, I'm trying to figure out whether your post is a waaah or not.... on the off chance that it isn't however, having gotten rid of the GR4 & the Harrier, & made the Typhoon revert to AD, who do you suggest moves mud between now and the time when JSF is actually ready for ops (circe 2018 at a guess?)

Also, how exactly does the F3 not know how to do AD properly? Seeing as how it's an ASRAAM/AMRAAM/JTIDS equipped jet?

[Jackonicko]

Jackonicko - apart from the fact that tourists enjoy the spectacle, I don't know how you can even think of comparing HMS Victory and the Red Arrows.

Easy. Both are non-essential, non-core items being paid for from the over-stretched Defence Budget, when real, urgently needed capabilities are being sacrificed because they can't be afforded.

I happen to think that both are worth preserving, but that if I'm right, and if there is such a case, then they should be paid for by the Department for Culture (or whatever it's called this week), or perhaps even by industry/corporate sponsorship. And if that meant that Victory would survive, and that the Reds wouldn't, then that wouldn't be a disaster, in my view. It's all about priorities. Neither is a defence priority (though the Reds might rank slightly higher in defence terms, for their training value and potential war role), but in heritage terms, Victory is infinitely more valuable than the Reds, and is (in those terms) a much higher priority.

How much more key capability has to be sacrificed before Victory and the Reds are deemed unaffordable, or is Victory to be the very last ship to go, and are the Reds to be the very last flying unit in the RAF?


Hulahoop,

When we're losing core capabilities that we need every single time we go on ops, then anything that diverts money away from what's NEEDED to pay for something that merely 'might be useful' is a bloody disgrace.

I'm sorry if that grinds your gears.

And the fact that plenty of people think it has benefits is immaterial. Plenty of people can be badly wrong, as is apparent every time the subject of disbanding the RAF comes up!

[GOLF_BRAVO_ZULU]

When we're losing core capabilities that we need every single time we go on ops, then anything that diverts money away from what's NEEDED to pay for something that merely 'might be useful' is a bloody disgrace.

One can have the sharpest and shiniest kit on the planet but if the bloke/blokess driving it isn't inspired to fight, it may as well be a PKM in the back of a Landcruiser. The World constantly seeing that your peers are consistently the best in the World is such an inspiration. Tangible links with the courage and victories of your Service "ancestors" are another. You can put a cost to these alleged fripperies but not a value; and when the link's been broken it will never be reforged. Granted, the memory of these things may last a generation or so and still be inspirational but after that, what?

What used to inspire your fighting spirit when you were In? Surely not the pure and noble cause of preservation or creation of World freedom and democracy?

[anotherthing]

Jackonicko,


The reasons behind your arguments are laudable - I am sure no one on here can deny that more money needs to find its way into essential kit.

However, can you not see how narrow minded and short term your solutions are?

So if you have your way, you will bin CVF and a few other projects because to paraphrase you 'at this moment in time they are not needed'.

So what happens 10 or 15 years down the line when those very assets are needed? We will then start to hear the complaints and cries of lack of suitable equipment for the task in hand, just as you are doing now (and quite rightly, you are not alone in this aspect).

The solution is not to cancel projects - the solution is to get more money and employ smarter procurement methods.

This may seem pie in the sky - and given the Government's track record, it quite possibly is, but the short term outlook that you display in your arguments is the same short term outlook and lack of foresight from years ago that has got the Armed Forces in the mess they are in now.

Cancelling sensible future projects would send an entirely wrong message to the Government - it implies that the Armed Forces are happy to bend over and take whatever this government wants to throw at them.

[Jackonicko]

"The solution is not to cancel projects - the solution is to get more money and employ smarter procurement methods." That would be the best solution, yes. It would be my preferred solution. But it's not going to happen. More money to defence will not happen unless and until it's too late, and when we're fighting for our lives. That's why Drayson went motor-racing, I suspect.

Smarter procurement would also be laudable, but the very concept has been hijacked by risk-averse engineers who think that the term equates to sloughing off all support and upgrade activity to a single monolithic and monopolistic supplier.

This doesn't just seem like pie in the sky.

In the real world, budgets will continue to dwindle, and fighting for increases that will never come will prevent the radical restructuring that is required to maintain the best possible overall capability.

You have two choices. The first is to sacrifice real world warfighting capabilities, force structure and force levels and to rob the current equipment budgets in order to pay for glamorous, high profile, big ticket prestige programmes.

Some of those are essential, and some are merely nice to have, but should be judged unaffordable.

The forces have to be equipped using the money allocated by the democratically elected government. You and I might wish to see higher spending. We might even recognise that that would require higher taxation. But it ain't going to happen.

And the question: "On what are we going to spend this limited and inadequate budget" requires an analysis of priorities and needs, and then needs to be answered with a list of what we need to spend money on. Insisting that we need more money will be fruitless, and will merely ensure that the cuts made are decided on the basis of political and not military requirements, influenced by whichever service chiefs manage to shout loudest.

They won't give us a full set of clubs. While we're arguing that we need the full set to be funded, they're selling off clubs without reference to the player as to which he needs, and are buying new clubs based on what the sports shop and the caddy are shouting about, rather than on the basis of what the player needs to play a normal round. We'll end up with a few rusty irons (7, 8 and 9) and a couple of high tech carbon fibre drivers, with no mid-range clubs, no putter, no tees and no balls!

GBZ,

I have every sympathy with the need for traditions and heritage, and find it all personally inspiring. I don't want our armed forces to become a tradition-blind force along the lines of the Canadian model.

But the money isn't there, however much you and I would like it to be, and there must come a time when tough choices have to be made. How small does the RAF frontline have to be before you'd make the choice between the Reds and a frontline squadron? I think that we're past that point, and I seriously doubt whether the two high profile medal winners today were inspired by the efforts of the Reds.

Nor do I think that the queue of recruits for the Royal Navy would evaporate if HMS Victory was sold off to become an exhibit in some Disney theme park, and certainly not if its upkeep was paid for from heritage and culture funds, rather than from the defence budget.

[GOLF_BRAVO_ZULU]

You missed an important question: what fired your personal and Unit fighting spirit when you were in? Freedom and democracy for all?

[Jackonicko]

I was only 'in' as a VR on a UAS, for three brief and carefree years.

So my opinion is irrelevant.

What fired my desire to join the RAF was a desire to fly military aeroplanes, and to be part of (and even do well in) an organisation that I'd always admired and respected (having grown up in it), and which I hoped I'd be good enough to be a part of. Health issues intervened, and who's to say that I would not have been chopped along the way anyway? I was more inspired by seeing operational aeroplanes doing their job than I was by watching the Reds or historic flight Spits and Hurricanes, and though I always found HMS Victory fascinating, awe inspiring and not a little humbling, visiting her did not tempt me to toddle off to the RN careers office. Had it done so, I'd suggest that my reasons for joining would not have been sensible, and I would not have made a good candidate.

I'm more mindful of history and tradition than most, but I don't believe that it's more important than frontline capability, and I do believe that it can be maintained, nurtured and fostered without spending millions on the reds, or by slowly building an exact replica of the Victory from new timber!

But as I say, my thoughts on it are irrelevant.

I did, however, ask someone who shares my thoughts about the need to prioritise scarce funding to where it's most needed and best deployed, and who shares my views on carriers and the Reds.

Since he served as aircrew from '42, and finally retired in '78, and since his 'fighting spirit' saw him through several wars - including the big one - I'd venture to suggest that his credentials are impeccable.

Freedom, the fight against tyranny, and a desire to fly motivated him to join, stretching himself and progressing in a top-class organisation, as well as serving his country and his service kept him in after that.

He's a big fan of the Reds, but does not see how they can be justified when real frontline capabilities are being cut to the bone. He does not believe that a single penny of the defence budget should be diverted to the BoBMF or the Victory, which should be supported from heritage/culture funding.

[Bismark]

Just what do the Reds bring to the party? I can't really think of anything apart from people to airshows and pride in their airships breasts. What training do they provide? And what war role? It can hardly be said that they bring in export orders as we are not exactly a great exporter of indigenous UK FW a/c - do we have any such aircraft apart from the Nimrod and the VC10 tanker? The Hawk line appears to have dried up.


And why no mention of BBMF and Cranwell? There's another £12M+ per year each.

Re CVF, SEAD etc, the fact is that in comparison to the US we have virtually nothing to bring to the party in these areas, so perhaps we should spend our money on the capabilities that we do dominate in....MCMV, small ship attack helos, SF, Defence Diplomacy (the latter only covered by the RN, neither the Army or RAF do this). I am struggling to think of RAF and Army niche capabilities that the US do not have. However, what all of our capabilities bring, and this is where CVF is important, is political purchasing power and overt support to our allies in periods of tension/day1-3 effect.


The reason that the Harrier Force is in such dire straits is that the senior RAF have lost interest in it and will not invest money in solving the training dilemma. Now if the RN were to pull out of it I suspect we would see a change of priority, surprise, surprise.

I am not anti-RAF but they and their supporters tend to protest a little too much.

[artyhug]

I'm sorry Bismarck I can't let that go past without at least a small comment.

a. The Hawk line has dried up has it? Please define dried up as I assume the aircraft currently being built for domestic use in the RAF and Export to the IAF do not count?

b. Oh yes the IAF, now I may have been dreaming but I have a distinct memory of being in India on what was almost solely a Defence Diplomacy Exercise in 2006 and then again at home in 2007. Spooky... Oh and hang on I could have sworn that in the tour before that I taught a succession of junior IAF fast jet pilots. Nah, I must be imagining it because as you say

Defence Diplomacy (the latter only covered by the RN, neither the Army or RAF do this).

c. And why no mention of BBMF and Cranwell? There's another £12M+ per year each.


Again I must have been reading something else because I could swear The BBMF was included in the whole historic/recruitment vs current capability argument.

So Cranwell, well I assume by that statement you are happy to shut Sandhurst and Dartmouth too and outsource officer training to Tesco?

d. The reason that the Harrier Force is in such dire straits is that the senior RAF have lost interest in it and will not invest money in solving the training dilemma. Now if the RN were to pull out of it I suspect we would see a change of priority, surprise, surprise.


What? I'm simply flabbergasted...

e. No you know what I can't be bothered. You are clearly not interested in digesting opinion or indeed researching evidence. No instead you and a number of other blinkered CVF fans do the RN no favours in trying to convey to the doubters why they feel CVF is essential.

I sincerely, desperately hope you are not a serving member of HM Forces with such a woeful lack of service knowledge and yet such a keen desire to demonstrate your ignorance.

RANT OFF.

Damn that feels better I'm off for a long night in a dutch bar.

[Si Clik]

Jacko,

If it would do any good I could invite you to the Joint Services Command and Staff College where we regularly join in tri-service informed debate on all things defence and foreign policy related. As a student on the said course of 320 'high quality' officers of all three services I can tell you that your viewpoint does not reflect the long term views of the majority Army and Air Force students. If you were to attend our fiesty debates you would understand the need for a balanced view of the Armed Forces of the future that is suited not only to the current conflicts but those of the future where the security of our country, in economic as well as military terms will depend on our ability to counter threats well away from our nation without a reliance on host nation support. With the increasing dangers of global warming and sea-level rise our interests and ability to protect them will be additionally challenged and a reliance on fixed based operations will be a serious weakness.

Success on current operations is not directly linked to the spending decisions of the government on projects to be delivered in 5-10 years time, but on coherent strategic outcomes and operational plans which focus on a comprehensive approach with other government departments and nations. As has been continiously stated by the governments of both the UK and the US our NATO partners must assist in delivering these by providing combat troops and support in the more difficult areas of the country (these we cannot supply since we do not have big enough armed forces).

Current defence policy as laid out in SDR and the susbsequent New Chapter remains the best way to deal with the broad thrust of future threats beyond those in Afghnanistan and Iraq laid out coherently in the DCDC future trends paper. http://www.dcdc-strategictrends.org.uk/Current operations have different challenges more to do with politics than procurement policy, and the successlful application of UORs shows the flexibility that can be applied when required.

Money is always tight in defence and prioritisation is a difficult task that is currently demanding much from our management team. Some would accuse us of mismanagement but with an oil price that has risen by some 30-40% in the last year who should be surprised that previous plans have required revision.

Personally I don't think you will ever be persuaded that our decisions on force structures fit with your air centric ideology, but, as I have this year, try to look beyond your own experience and bias to the broader needs of this country to guarantee its future security.

Si

[Occasional Aviator]

Bismarck,

What is this 'training dilemma' of which you talk? Is it the difficulty of maintaining a ludicrously small cadre of RN fast-jet pilots using entirely the same training system as teh RAF but without anywhere to send them if they don't quite cut it as single-seat and no career prospects above Commander?

My solution - the RN gets 2 CVF, the RAF flies and maintains all the jets. best value for defence all round.

[Sunk at Narvik]

OA

Thats an interesting suggestion and would probabl;y work if we were not all somewhat imperfect human beings. The problem with it being that in times of conflict the RN and RAF drive off in two different directions, each according to its doctrines. I could cite historic examples if required.

Perhaps a better solution would be for the FAA to man three squadrons for each carrier, with the RAF providing the wartime "surge" if required? This would leave the RN in command of the fighters needed to defend itself with the RAF chipping in for anything beyond fleet defence.

[Magic Mushroom]

:ugh::ugh::ugh::ugh::ugh::ugh::ugh::ugh::ugh::ugh::ugh::ugh: :ugh::ugh:

[Jackonicko]

The combination of carriers and JSF together represent a massive investment (even ignoring the massive support that a CBG requires) - but one which will give us the ability to deploy only a relatively modest air wing at relatively modest speed and huge expense.

It will only be affordable via a most unlikely hike in defence spending, or by dramatic cuts to other, less exciting but more useful capability areas.

As such, spending on carriers unbalances our forces, and makes them less useful.

Call me cynical (and though I'd kill to be exposed to the informed debate that goes on there), but it doesn't surprise me that the distinguished students at Shrivenham largely support the policy that they'll be expected to implement in their subsequent careers, and it certainly doesn't surprise me that there isn't too much intra-service bickering and argument (on a single service basis, criticising another service's pet programme, and especially one to which our political masters are so firmly committed).

I've never heard a senior officer publicly criticise PFIs - the best anyone's managed having been a vaguely apologetic, mildly regretful, even slightly embarrassed admission that "in other circumstances...."

Nor does the record of half stars and one stars standing up against the way in which 'Smart' has been distorted and twisted to cover a risk averse shuffling off of all support to a monopolistic and monolithic BAE in a succession of DA mods and DA upgrades and an orgy of availability based support contracting. The most distinguished exception to the rule of craven collaboration soon found himself losing his job as the head of his IPT......

So the fact (?) that Army and Air Force students at the Joint Services Command and Staff College are in agreement as to the usefulness and need for carriers does not entirely surprise me.....

[Archimedes]

JN, in fairness to the inmates, you'd be surprised...

Si Clik (who I fear I will have bored more than once...) uses the word 'feisty' to describe the debate, and believe me it always is. There isn't an almost sheep-like acceptance of things just for the sake of it, far from it.

I have seen RN officers who begin the course as dyed-in-the-wool 'bin Typhoon, more JCA, consider disbanding the RAF, no CVF would mean the end of civilisation as we know it' advocates turn into vocal proponents for the full Tranche 3 Typhoon buy, and previously sceptical RAF officers warm to the notion of a CVF purchase, even if they will dispute/banter frequently with their RN colleagues about whether or not there should be any 800-series squadrons flying the JCA.

Indeed, I have even heard an Army officer say ' RAF pilots are worth every penny of their flying pay, and it'd be a disgrace to chop Typhoon.' And he was sober and in full possession of his mental faculties when he said it, too! :eek:

[Jackonicko]

I'll await my invite from Sy Click with baited breath, then......
:}

[Caspian237]

Excuse my lack of knowledge here but are there any estimates of the running costs of two CFV (after initial build and purchase of air compliment) compared with the cost of three Illustrious class carriers?

Are we suggesting that once the three mini carriers and the GR9's become too old to be used, then there should be no replacements? Would this not weaken the capability the RN's expensive new amphibious units?

[Occasional Aviator]

Sunk at Narvik,

I was actually just trolling. However:

Our JOINT doctrine places carrier-based air under the joint force air commander. The joint force maritime commander then bids for the assets required for fleet defence - which could be from the carrier, or could be from elsewhere - for example, if we needed the stealthy JSF to fly a 'day one' mission, they could all fly off and do that, whicle the fleet might be defended by rear-based Typhoon, or F-18 flying off a US carrier. In terms of how much of the force is allocated to what role, that is naturally the joint commander's call on the day, but you may be interested to note that SRO(C) is working on the assumption that four JSF per carrier are nominally assigned to AD, with all the rest available for land attack. How would that stack up with your three RN squadrons per carrier?

Actually, despite the impression you may have gained from my previous post, I really think we need to get away from the short-sighted ownership issues. Jets on a carrier are not the fleet's toys to use for defending the fleet; they are the joint commander's assets and are used like any other element of air power - they just happen to be on a floating airfield. And no, I'm not overlooking the specialist skills, training, practise and mindset needed to operate an effective carrier air group - ship, aircraft, C2 etc. To an extent, all these arguments apply to an expeditionary air wing too. In capability terms, that is what a carrier is.

Despite what you may think of Jacko, not everything he says is wrong. Carriers ARE an expensive way to project a modest amount of air power at fast walking pace. However, that's not an argument against them - helicopters are an expensive and inefficient way of moving not very much payload not very far not very fast - but we still need them because we want to have the capability to put soldiers and kit in and out of places where there aren't runways. A similar argument could apply to carriers - it is about what kind of country we want to be. However, we must think clearly about what it is we want to achieve - if it's all about Land Attack (as many in the RN are outwardly portraying it), then you can get expeditionary in many other ways too - in Afghanistan and Iraq, more than half the ordnance dropped was by aircraft that took off from US soil - and hardly in a politically sympathetic atmosphere in the case of Iraq.

I haven't really come down on one side or the other - and yes, Jacko, the debates are pretty feisty. However, having come to it with an open mind, the only person who seems consistently balanced on this is Magic Mushroom - and actually the most blinkered and prejudiced views seem to be on the pro-carrier side. Anyone questioning carriers (and all requirements should come under scrutiny) seems to be dismissed as not understanding or abused if they come back for a second go.

I am also mightily fed up of the RAF being portrayed as the author of all the RN's ills. We are NOT briefing aginst CVF, nor are we scheming to undermine it. Yes, thirty-five years ago there may have been an issue over where Diego Garcia was on the map, but having read what Dennis Healey (who made the decison) has to say on the subject, there was a lot more to it than that - in fact at one point he indicated that one of the things that swung it was that the RN were unwilling even to engage in debate - "we need two carriers and that's it." Ring any bells?

And while I'm ranting, the other issue I'd like people to have more balance about is Typhoon. Now, like it or not, it will be the cornerstone of our future air power. Nevertheless, the RAF is not insisting on 232 aircraft at any cost. we all know this number is too high - but we do need Trance 3, not for the airframes but for the capability it gives us. Anyone who thinks we could save any money at all by cancelling Trance 3 needs to find out more about the programme and how we, the Brits, locked everyone in to it, and then take a look at what money is where in the EP and explain how it would actually help - as most of it has already been spent and is is separated by several clear years from the main spend on CVF, Astute, FRES etc. And talking of capability, why are people still chuntering on about lashing up an AD aircraft for CAS? Typhoon was ALWAYS going to be swing role. I can remember going to a presentation at BAe Warton before the Berlin Wall came down and discussing how EFA (remember that) was going to replace the RAF's Buccaneers and Jaguars, as well as what was then the F2.

That's all for now, but I'd be delighted to hear other opinions!

[Evalu8ter]

"This would leave the RN in command of the fighters needed to defend itself with the RAF chipping in for anything beyond fleet defence."

S-a-N, Be very careful with statements like that. You just feed the "self-licking lollipop" school of thought, and make it look like all the RN is interested in is ownership of toys. The purpose of the CVF is eloquently described by OA; it is a joint force asset, with it's TAG normally chopped to the JFACC. The TAG might just as easily, if it is BH/AH heavy, be under the control of COMATG or the JFLCC.

"Chipping In" is just not a good enough reason for CVF; it must be able to PROJECT power, not just defend itself. Anyway, I thought the RN was claiming all sort of wondrous AD capabilities for the T45, so nearly all the TAG could be used for offensive action....

[Jackonicko]

I wouldn't want anyone not to question Typhoon (especially Tranche 3), as no sacred cow should be viewed as being sacrosanct in these difficult times, and any means of saving money should be assessed on its merits.

Unless we do so, we'll have a bizarre force mix, of the Brass's favoured toys (CVF, Typhoon, FRES) and the odd bits and pieces that win support on nostalgic grounds, or because they are well known to the Public (The Reds, Dartmouth, the Kings Troop RHA), while the Canberra PR9 and Nimrod R1 (for example) will go unreplaced.

In fact, any informed debate would VERY quickly conclude that Typhoon is:

a) Needed, both for UK AD and as a flexible, deployable, cost effective A-G platform (It's clear that with a modest resurgence in Russian air activity, four AD squadrons is barely enough for UK AD, and three extra squadrons to support expeditionary requirements, etc, is hardly controversial, surely?). Even with seven frontline Typhoon squadrons, we'd have fewer Typhoon units than those they're supposed to replace.
b) Largely paid for already, with cancellation penalties making cancellation financially unattractive

as OA says.

The only point I'd take issue with is the claim that "we all know" that 232 is 'too many'. 232 is meant to sustain a fleet of 137 through to the planned OSD (a bloody long way away when the figure was dreamed up, and likely to slip to the right, quite rightly, with no rapid development in the threat). 137 aircraft was supposed to support seven frontline squadrons, with 15 aircraft each, (plus an in-use reserve each), four aircraft in the Falklands, an OCU with 24 jets (plus two in-use reserves), and an OEU with four jets.

Seven frontline Typhoon squadrons, to replace three Jag and five Tornado F3 units (and some of the dwindling GR4 fleet) does not seem to me to be in any way excessive.

[Cypherus]

No real need to get all excited about this small hiccup in the steady politically induced decline of the UK armed forces, there are many long months to go yet of evaluation and testing, oh and then the committee stage were intelligent individuals will prognosticate for days on subjects thinly connected to cabbage and it’s medicinal effects on the average Royal Navy enlisted mans dietary requirements all followed by a round of jolly House discussions after which they will Cancel the whole idea and put themselves up for re-election.

So no matter who or what is too blame or how many millions of your money they manage to waste in the process the UK will never have a pair of carriers for anyone to consider putting our non existent aircraft on.

[Widger]

And if you think that’s as tedious as WEBF banging on about SHar, or if you think that makes me a ‘f*cked parrot’, I’d suggest that you take the plank (of inevitable, repetitive, blinkered, dark blue, pro-carrier prejudice) out of your own eye, Widger.

Jackonory,

I think you owe me an apology. You seem to have credited someone else's rant (if you think that makes me a ‘f*cked parrot’,) to me. You might like to check previous posts.

[Jackonicko]

I do apologise, Mr W.

I see that the "F*cked Parrot" post has been removed in toto. I apologise for attributing it to you - truth is I can't remember who said it, and your graceful apology for your 'earlier vitriol' led me to assume - without checking.

Sincere apologies.

I couldn't actually see any vitriol in anything you'd posted (if you think that your post at the bottom of page 1 was vitriolic, you need to eat more red meat) and I assumed that you'd removed the post (though I now see that it wasn't yours to remove!), though comparing me to WEBF "banging on about SHar" in your 'apology' was, if anything, worse than the parrot remark!

[Occasional Aviator]

Jacko,

whilst I see where you're coming from, current plans (and therefore funding) does not see us operating anything like 137 Typhoon - in fact, the fast-jet force in toto is looking at less than 100 FE@R. So, although you may feel that we should have more, I would politely remind you of your earlier point that we can't have all the toys we fancy.

Why is that important on a thread about CVF? Well, those numbers include JSF, and how you look at this little conundrum significantly affects whether carriers are really the answer for UK defence in the round.

If we were to assume that we do manage to keep one of the two CVs at sea all the time, then we have to think very hard about whether we tie a really substantial portion of the UK's air power securely to those decks, or whether we're a bit more flexible about it. This is what caused my (admittedly long) knee-jerk about SaN's intimation that the carrier air should be under fleet command. There is a real dilemma here: to be effective, the ships have to be used to working with aircraft and the aircrew used to operating off ships (although the latter is slightly less of a problem) - but to get the most out of the small FJ force we will have there is no way that we can keep jets on the carriers just for training, or while they steam to the scene of a crisis at fast walking pace.

Also, from an admittedly parochial single-service perspective, the seats in those cockpits are far more valuable to the RAF than they are the RN, as that is where the core seed-corn of our warfighters and future commanders come from, whereas I have yet to be convinced that either single list RN pilots have a realistic career beyond commander, or that general-list officers will be able to devote enough of their career to flying to be effective in a complex platform like JSF. Added to which the current practice and future plan is that RN pilots will do exactly the same training and operate in exactly the same way as their RAF counterparts (stand fast Dartmouth) and I don't see where the value of trying to maintain this unsustainably small cadre lies. Sea-mindedness comes from operating at sea, not wearing gold on your shoulder - I'm sure no-one would suggest that the Naval Strike Wing is any less adept at doing CAS in Afghanistan than the RAF, so why would it be any different the other way round?

[Jackonicko]

It's too often 'one rule for one, a different rule for the other.'

This extends to the very justification for carriers.

All sorts of capabilities (and even overall force levels) are predicated on the basis (enshrined in the defence assumptions) that we will never mount a major operation without allies or as part of a coalition.

I don't like it, but I do wonder whether we have either the money, the national will, or the political b*llocks to assume anything else.

Officially, that's why we don't need the kind of air force we had when we participated in Granby (31 frontline fast jet squadrons, including 39/1 PRU, compared to just 13 today!). In shrinking to meet the requirements of this new reality the RAF's frontline has contracted more dramatically, in a shorter time, than the Royal Navy (measured by frontline surface fleet ships) did, and yet faces further shrinkage to pay for these carriers.

And yet the CVF adherents argue for their cause based on the idea that we may one day 'go it alone' in some major operation, and insist that we are supposed to fund such a remote eventuality (something for which there has been no essential NEED since '82), while cutting the core capabilities that we need every single time we go on ops, whether with an ally, coalition or alone.

Why should the RN alone not have to cut its coat according to the cloth outlined in the defence assumptions? Especially when what it proposes will cost so much that it will dramatically distort force levels and force structure across the remainder of the board.

And make no mistake, the money about to be spent on carriers and JSF could fund a dramatic increase in those workaday capabilities and equipment areas that we need and use all the time - SH, tankers, Nimrod R replacement, PR9 replacement, FJ squadrons etc. Funding these instead would increase our useable combat power (and thus our influence) and reduce overstretch.

But no, we're a maritime island nation, the heirs to Raleigh, Drake, Nelson and the rest, and so we need a blue water navy that can boldly go and project power across the globe, independent of any allies, even if paying for it bankrupts us, and means that we can't afford the capabilities that we actually need and use all the time. Unlike Germany, Japan, Canada, Australia we need strike carriers, and apparently they are worth any sacrifice elsewhere in the defence budget.

In an ideal world, I'd want the kind of forces that would allow us to do exactly that, and to be able to do another Suez (without relying on France and Israel), with half a dozen carriers, fleets of bombers, and the ability to drop paras in brigade strength, all the while with a nuclear deterrent consisting of SLBMs, cruise missiles, and a stand off air launched weapon. But such an ambition is as unrealistic as the delusion that we can or should afford CV(F). That's simply no longer the world that Britain inhabits.

[Jackonicko]

OA,

How many FE@readiness would the 137 aircraft Typhoon force give us, bearing in mind that 28 are immediately discounted by being assigned to the OCU and OEU?

If we only have 100, then how many do we tie to the carrier?

It sounds to me as though a mix of Typhoon and FCAC JSF (none of them tied to a carrier) will give us the most cost effective, flexible and useful force mix.

[Not_a_boffin]

In shrinking to meet the requirements of this new reality the RAF's frontline has contracted more dramatically, in a shorter time, than the Royal Navy (measured by frontline surface fleet ships) did, and yet faces further shrinkage to pay for these carriers.

Sorry Jacko - can't let that one lie. You can't call "surface ships" like with like for the FJ community. In 1990, the RN had over 40 FF/DD - it is likely to be under half that shortly (it's already only 25). In addition there were 14 SSN and four SSK (now 8 and none respectively) and the RN had to look after the deterrent (which really doesn't add much to the non-bomber FE@R) and as I've mentioned before, ought to be funded centrally.

I won't go into the impact on RFA (see 3 basin in Portsmouth for what has been withdrawn) or the FAA. Suffice to say I believe the RN still has a lower manpower establishment than the RAF, so the pain has undoubtedly been shared and not just "to pay for the carriers". I would suggest that the pain has been imposed to pay for the best part of a decade operating well above the DP assumptions yet without the necessary funding from the Treasury. There are a number of procurement f8ck-ups that are contributing to this, many of them a direct result of the centre blithely shuffling the budget to "pay for" the ongoing underfunding.

CVF is not about going it alone - it's about giving "some" independence from HNS. I have suggested before that someone turning off the fuel dump pumps or locking the bomb dump is more likely than losing a carrier.

JCA, Typhoon, CVF and all the other clubs are complementary capabilities. Now - on with agreeing to disagree........

[Violet Club]

Pruners

It's not CVF or Type 45. It's not Typhoon or MRA4. It's not FRES or Watchkeeper.

At a time when there is clearly not enough money to go around, and there will very soon be even less, there is one insane, monumental waste of resources that towers over all else.

Trident.

Eliminate the pointless rent-a-nuke independent-I-don’t-think-so-deterrent and you will free up enough money and resources to fix everything.

It’s not the carriers, it’s not Typhoon, it’s not even JSF…it’s the nukes.

The single greatest thing the UK the could do to restore its place in the world would be to give it all up tomorrow.

If that has you all freaking out then fine – put some warheads on a Storm Shadow, or buy into ASMP-A. But dump Trident. Dump the missiles. Dump the boats. Dump the bases. Dump the W76s with the M&S labels stuck on to them. Dump it all.

Do it now.

VC

[Evalu8ter]

Violet Club,
Given your handle I wasn't expecting that reply!

Your arguement has much merit; nuclear tipped TLAM-N from SSN, S-Shadow from Land or Sea Based air are both plausible options. A few small problems though.

1. SSBNs, like carriers, are political viagra at the top table (ie UN). Few politicians like giving up any form of power..

2. IIRC the Trident boat replacement is as much to do with maintaining Submarine production in this country as it is with maintaining the deterrent. If new SSBNs were not built, there would be a huge gap between SSN classes. We could just build more, more useful, SSNs though..

3. TLAM-N / S-Shadow might be vulnerable to a sophisticated IADS in the future; a potential enemy would have to invest mega-bucks for Ballistic Missile defence.

4. The boats are home-ported in Scotland....

[Jackonicko]

Violet Club,

I have heard no compelling evidence against a cheaper deterrent - Rust's flight demonstrated (if proof were needed) that Moscow's impenetrable air defences and ABM defences were largely imaginary - and I can conceive of no realistic scenario in which a cheaper deterrent, based on SLCM and ALCM (Storm Shadow based if need be) would not be adequate, and would not be more genuinely AUTONOMOUS and INDEPENDENT. That ought to give all of those who dream of the UK going it alone a really major hard-on, and if we put some of it on ships and subs, the cockers-P merchants will be happy.

Not a Boffin,

I apologise for using a statistic which you don't like. I don't know how else to express the fact that since the end of the Cold War, the RAF's frontline combat strength has fallen to something closer to one third of its former size, while the RN is still more than half its former size.

As to the RN being smaller than the RAF in personnel terms, I should think so too. We're living in the age of air power! ;) :p :}

And thus far, HNS has not been the stumbling block that the carrier adherents want to believe, and if it ever is, then the op is probably politically unsustainable anyway!

[WE Branch Fanatic]

Well, excuse me for being tedious :{ :{, but I think links to the Sea Jet (http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=98152) and Future Carrier (http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=221116) threads would be appropriate. I was going to post news of the steel order on the latter.

And thus far, HNS has not been the stumbling block that the carrier adherents want to believe, and if it ever is, then the op is probably politically unsustainable anyway!

Now what was the reason the USAF F111s had to take such a long route and refuel so many times for the strikes against Libya in 1986? Unlike the aircraft from the Sixth Fleet carriers.

Perhaps agreeing to disagree would be a good idea, however, you may find this (http://navy-matters.beedall.com/decline.htm) interesting, even though it is only up to 2000.

We actually had 49 frigates/destroyers in 1990, now we have 25. Other types of units have been similarly cut. Part of this is the change from being primarily an ASW force to an expeditionary force, which is why carriers are so important.

Violet Club/Evalu8tor

The US binned all their nuclear Tomahawks, so we would have to develop a new warhead from scratch. Do you really think that would save money? Likewise an air launched cruise missile - not to mention the issue of whether or not the RAF would need dedicated aircraft (and support infrastructure). Even if it was just a tactical type weapon as the WE177 replacement was intended to be it might be a very expensive way of saving money. What aircraft did you have in mind by the way?

Some have suggested a SSN/SSBN hybrid, with a few missile tubes, that can use the tubes for TLAM, UUVs etc when not undertaking the deterrent role.

[Jackonicko]

Absolutely not a dedicated platform - the problem with the Trident replacement options was that it was assumed that we'd need some huge fleet of dedicated Airbus types and two brand new airfields.

All you need is a small, relatively simple physics package that could form the basis of a warhead for cruise missiles, a Storm Shadow derivative, and even a free fall bomb. Remember, the aim is independent NATIONALLY owned, autonomous deterrence - not wiping Moscow off the map using a weapon which ties us into US decision making and targeting.

[sense1]

Jacko,

I agree with many of your sentiments and I can see where you are coming from when you talk about the carriers not being what we should be spending our limited defence £s on with other pressing priorities out there (SH, R1 replacement, FJ sqns etc etc).

The CVF is undoubtedly a fantastic capability and one we should ideally have but as you suggest it may be a luxury that we could do without as it would mean HM Forces could then afford more of the basics; ie what I have mentioned above.

However, that is where IMHO your argument against CVF falls apart....

Its like this mate - if the carriers are cancelled, tomorrow or in 6 years time, HM Forces sure aint getting a nice big check for £3.5 billion for more of what we need. OH NO, that money will be FUC**NG GONE!

So lets just happily and gratefully accept our two (hopefully!) new big shiny carriers and be grateful for them and use em as best we can rather than get nothing at all....?! What do you reckon?!

Sense1

[Jackonicko]

It's certainly true that there is not much percentage in cancelling the carriers except as part of a proper review of commitments and the capabilities required to meet those commitments.

[Magic Mushroom]

Now what was the reason the USAF F111s had to take such a long route and refuel so many times for the strikes against Libya in 1986? Unlike the aircraft from the Sixth Fleet carriers.

WEBF,
Incorrect. HNS was not an issue during El Dorado Canyon because the HN authorised use of its air bases. Overflight was denied by France but, regardless of routing, land based aircraft still reached their targets, provided the primary Combat Support assets (AWACS, RJ, KC-135, KC-10) for the op, and provided the primary BDA (SR-71). You could argue about the efficiencies of refuelling such extended range ops but land base provided similar numbers of aircraft over the targets as 3 CBGs did.

As ever, land and maritime is complimentary and each has advantages over the other. So stop willy waving.

Meanwhile...

I concur with VC’s views on replacing the SSBNs completely. In reality the primary drivers for replacing Trident are to maintain our place at the UNSC P5 and to retain parity with France.

Ballistic missiles are undoubtedly the most survivable method of maintaining a nuclear deterrent at a time when proliferation is snowballing. However, I think a credible deterrent could be maintained by far cheaper methods from extant platforms (SSN/DDG/manned air). WEBF again misses the point in that the UK has developed its own warheads for the current bomber fleet so his cost argument is irrelevant.

I'd also suggest that we are heading for one god almighty political problem with our SSBNs. Scotland will sadly be independent within 15 years imho and certainly within the lifetime of any Trident replacement (if not our current bombers!). An independent Scotland will then make Faslane unviable and have promised as much. So what do we do? Fork out yet more cash for support facilities in England? This is one example where HNS will be an enormous factor.

In a perfect world I'd like to see us retain an SSBN fleet. But I agree totally with VC that they cannot be justified in the future for the cost and Scottish independence aspects alone. Retain nukes definitely. But stick them on nuclear armed sub-surface, surface or air launched cruise missiles which could be developed (potentially jointly with France) far more cheaply. Those same platforms could then be employed far more flexibly on other conventional tasks when required.

Although a moot point because of the defence threats when Trident was procured (note that I believe that buying our current SSBN capability was justified), imagine how much more flexible the UK military would be today if, instead we'd have placed our nuclear deterrent on SSNs or a sqn or 2 of B-1Bs? A much larger more flexible RN, an RAF who had maintained a manned bomber force with all the advantages offered by such assets over Afghanistan today.

If we must keep SSBNs, a large proportion of the costs should come from the Treasury NOT the Defence Budget to properly acknowledge the political agenda. Failure to do so will imho be the end of the RN and a significant impediment to the other 2 services fighting efficiency.

Regards,
MM

[Occasional Aviator]

Just quickly:

Jacko - FE@R is the old AE (in broad terms) - so, you did get my point - with less than 100 FJ FE@R (I'm not going to go into defence planning assumptions on unclas means), and this small number INCLUDING JSF, the impact of tying jets to ships is enormous.

MM (and others) - actually I don't buy the argument about nukes and UNSC. Somehow I feel it will be difficult for the UN to word their press release: "The UK was today thrown off the Security Council for COMPLYING WITH our own non-proliferation treaty. It is replaced by North Korea, who now have their own nuclear weapons. France, who has broken the treaty by replacing their strategic deterrent, will, of course remain a member of the permanent 5......."

Thoughts?

[Magic Mushroom]

MM (and others) - actually I don't buy the argument about nukes and UNSC. Somehow I feel it will be difficult for the UN to word their press release: "The UK was today thrown off the Security Council for COMPLYING WITH our own non-proliferation treaty. France, who has broken the treaty by replacing their strategic deterrent, will, of course remain a member of the permanent 5......."

OA,

I'm not sure I understand your argument old chap (although I am a thick git). My belief is that retaining nukes is seen by HMG as one way of retaining political influence on the international stage, and therefore a seat on the P5.

Regards,
MM

[Occasional Aviator]

I take your point - it may be me being thick.

Your belief is that it is seen by HMG as retaining influence and therefore a seat on the P5. I probably agree with you that they see it that way, but I think they're wrong!

It's always a pleasure doing business with you!

[Magic Mushroom]

Your belief is that it is seen by HMG as retaining influence and therefore a seat on the P5. I probably agree with you that they see it that way, but I think they're wrong!

Concur. I think it is a bit of a hangover from when the nuclear club was more exclusive and an independant UK deterrent bought us influence with the US. I suspect the main driver is that HMG wish to retain approximate military parity with France. Some may argue that this is also a factor with CVF.

Anyway, I'm off for a pint before the storm arrives!!!:ok:

Regards,
MM

[Evalu8ter]

I think the arguement is coming round, again, to the impossibility of having single-role, niche, systems in the modern fiscal climate. Just imagine how useful an RAF detachment of B1s from our base at Diego Garcia would be right now?

The irony is, this "one platform, many roles" mantra actually plays strongly in the arguement for CVF. There are the obvious roles of CAS, OCA, DCA and SEAD, but also, with some imagination, Strike (nuclear armed S-S / Free Fall), LitM, SF Support, NEO, disaster relief etc etc.

So, sorted! Bin the T boats (or do as the USN has done and convert them to SSGN/SF roles), buy the carriers (and a flexible airgroup - not just F35) and ask the US if we can buy some s/h Bones, or get involved now in the future bomber programme. If that cost us some Typhoons, so be it, but an air platform with stategic reach (and nuke-capable in extremis) would give the RAF a proper strategic role again.

[Occasional Aviator]

yep, that would be my 'ideal world' solution too... Although see earlier about how we couldn't pay for anything by buying fewer Typhoon!

Just a few posts ago Jacko was berated for suggesting that cancelling CVF might realise savings - and we haven't even signed a contract for that yet! When will people realise that the Typhoon money is spent, gone, finished! It's like going on about SHAR......

[Not_a_boffin]

Jacko

It wasn't the statistic, just the idea that RN frontline strength is only measured in surface ships. Dark blue work in more than one environment mate ! :E And as it's the information age (or so we are constantly told) we should all be outnumbered by programmers....oh hang on a minute, we are!

I don't for one minute think that the RAF, Army or RN should be cut any further - a quick look over how the force structure has fallen even in the last eight years is salutary and god knows the new tankers and relief for the K-force are badly needed. However, when all the services are cut further, remember it is not for the carrier (or Astute, Typhoon, A400M, Astor or FRES) it is because the charlatans in 10 & 11 (aided and abetted by some awful PUS) have deliberately made the forces operate way beyond their funded means. If you really wanted to get some money back in the budget, try binning DII!(£6Bn and rising).

[Jackonicko]

It wasn't the statistic, just the idea that RN frontline strength is only measured in surface ships.

It's a crude indicator. Believe it or not, RAF frontline strength is not measured in FJ squadrons either!

I don't for one minute think that the RAF, Army or RN should be cut any further.

No sensible person does. But however hard you jam your fingers in your ears and shout "Lah Lah Lah", that is exactly what is going to happen - especially if we have to find the cash to pay for two CVF (£6 Bn or so) and JSF (At least as much again, and currently estimated at £10 Bn).

CVF may have some multi-role versatility, but it remains a slow and very costly way of deploying very modest packets of "CAS, OCA, DCA and SEAD".

Cancel both and there is at least £15 Bn of unspent money potentially available for all of the other stuff that we need.

Typhoon Tranche 3 won't free up anything like that sort of money. There may be scope for saving money by cancelling air systems - I don't know what proportion of Nimrod MRA4 cost has been spent or irrevocably allocated, and perhaps FOAS/FCAC might free up some money if cancelled.

[Bismark]

Jacko,

You and I will never agree (we are both equally biased) but I find it intriguing that you never seem to include the "cost " of supporting deployed air forces. What does it cost (in terms of strat and tac air transport, shipping etc) to deploy 36 multi-role jets for, say, 20 days high intensity warfighting? Particulalry if they have to move DOBs before the fighting starts. And have we ever done so? Regrettably I am too far removed from the Service to know these things.

[Evalu8ter]

Jacko,
Carriers may be slow and costly but are possibly the only force projector available. HNS for Sierra Leone was a bit lacking for tactical FJs and RW wasn't it? Don't underestimate the "force for good" bit about NEOs and Disaster relief - CVF would provide a superb asset and do much for the UK's standing. In addition, a 36 ac wing of JSF is quite a considerable amount of "punch" if required, and a lot easier to maintain on a boat than in a dusty airfield. As Bismark suggests, at least the CBG takes all it needs with them and is not reliant on an already over-stretched AT fleet for resupply.

OA, I'm very well aware that most of the Typhoon money is spent. In addition, European sensitivities would preclude us from trying to barter for less. My take is, get T3 for all the flash toys then flog a load of T1/T2 jets to recoup some capital costs, and save on whole life costs for a couple of Sqns.

Then try and get back into the bomber business properly...

[Jackonicko]

HNS for Sierra Leone?

Yes you'd have needed a boat for the helicopters to operate from.

And there was no HNS for FJs, of course.

Apart from the Squadron of Jags (sorry) sitting on the Azores all ready to fly into Dakar, which could have got there first.....?

Instead, they waited for the carrier and its Harriers which were then limited to 1,000-lb bombs (too indiscriminate to use), and whose inability to strafe meant that their most effective weapon was "Noise!"

A carrier is a good (if expensive and slow) way of deploying a wing of 36 JSF, and of supporting and sustaining a paltry number of sorties for the five days required......

[Occasional Aviator]

evalu8or,

Apologies. I would love the RAF to get back into the bomber business properly. However, re Sierra Leone and HNS, as well as the Jags, don't forget that when the RN got there after turning left at Gib (lucky they were so close!), there were already Chinooks in theatre, having flown from the UK for the Op.

[Bismark]

A carrier is a good (if expensive and slow) way of deploying a wing of 36 JSF, and of supporting and sustaining a paltry number of sorties for the five days required......

Jacko,

I am not sure it is that expensive and slow....how long does it take to build up a DOB to full operating capacity and be able to generate sorties at the same rate as the CVF? Chance are that the CVF will already be in theatre (or within 500 miles say) and well before any approval for HNS is given for a 36 a/c DOB.

I am not saying either is better, but CVF will give the government a day 1 capability, at a high sortie generation rate regardless of HNS, whereas it could take weeks to build up to a 36 a/c DOB especially if strat/tac air is also supporting a land force build up at the same time. CVF gives the government options, whilst the politics continues, and clearly TB/GB understood/understand that.

[Not_a_boffin]

Jacko. Back to agreeing to disagree hopefully. Intrigued to discover where the extra £2.2Bn carrier cost came from though?

[Widger]

If CVF and JCA is too expensive, then lets buy Rafale instead. Commonality of air type and platform with the French and conventional capability as well. Oh, but then the light blue won't get the toy they want to replace GR9 will they!

To those people who talk about using JCA more flexibly by having them ashore rather than on "the boat", you clearly do not have any clue about what it takes to get current "day and night" and "operational" on a carrier. You cannot just hop on for a few days, fly a few circuits and pop off again. It takes a long to get a whole squadron current and more importantly maintain that currency. That it is why it is such an effective platform, because not many nations of the world can do it.

Also, comparing CVS with CVF when talking about how useful these platforms are, is like comparing an HS125 with a Tristar. They may have two wings and carry passengers but they are totally different.

If CVF had been around in 82, then there would have been no loss of Sheffield or loss of life in Bluff Cove, Sierra Leone would have been a breeze, Deny Flight in Bosnia would have had a massive boost and as to the last 2 Gulf Crises..........They are not like for like, the CVS is compromised on deck size etc and it is a testament to the UK that we have managed to make do with these ships for so long in such a diverse role.

Comments like saying cancel CVF, cancel Typhoon etc are extremely niave. No-one will see the money...it will disappear into the NHS or end up paying for legal aid for illegal immigrants.

Typhhon is needed, CVF is needed, more SH are needed, a decent tanker is needed, MASC is needed, a conventional ship launched FJ is needed (Dave C or Rafale), a Nimrod replacement is needed..etc etc.....they are all needed and Jacko, if you spent more of your energy and obvious intelligence fighting for all these things rather than trying to cherry pick, maybe, just maybe, your lobbying might make a difference.

[Sunk at Narvik]

Ev

I'm not up to speed on the projected split of F35's between the FAA and RAF, or if all F35's will be lumped into one "Joint force" as present? However I'd suggest that not having dedicated squadrons under RN command would be a serious error.

Set aside controversy over carriers for one moment and imagine an infantry battalion. No one in their right mind would suggest that an infantry battalions weapons be under the command of a seperate organisation (even within the army) to that of the battalions CO.

Back to carriers. A carriers defensive and offensive weapons are its aircraft. We can probably imagine a set of circs in which some "joint" organisation prioritised F35 deployment elsewhere leaving the carriers weaponless. It is of course very rare in wartime to not need air superiority, therefore any pull back of carrier based aircraft is bound to lead to losses in any "secondary" theatre, so any such decision would be prompted by extraordinary circumstances of national threat (1940 springs to mind and the controversy over withholding RAF squadrons in the UK during the invasion of France). The obvious conclusion then is that we don't have enough aircraft, not that we don't need carriers.

My ideal world solution to this obvious problem would be to bin F35 and concentrate upon Typhoon. Withdrawal from the F35 program would save around £8bn (if memory serves) out of the £12bn CVF/F35 package. Build the carriers as CTOL (accepting incremental increase in costs of construction & manning) and build Tranche 3 and 4 (yes, we'd need more Typhoons, not less) as carrier capable. Even with additional costs for CTOL and an extra few squadrons of Typhoon, the MoD would still save several £bn over current plans.

"awaiting incoming" as they say :uhoh:

[Sunk at Narvik]

Violet

"put some warheads on a Storm Shadow, or buy into ASMP-A. But dump Trident. Dump the missiles. Dump the boats. Dump the bases."

Very tempting, but it always smacks of too many years of peace.

When the UK needs its deterent it will be because all else has failed. Either we face a nuclear threat to these islands or we have been defeated in a conventional war and are about to be invaded. In this second scenario all the platforms capable of launching a cruise based nuke will either be wrecks on the ocean floor or crumpled wreckage littering a battlefield somewhere.

Whilst I believe the RAF should get back into strategic bombing, with nukes as an option, the ultimate deterent continues to be SSBN's until another technological revolution overtakes and replaces them.

[LowObservable]

Sunk,
Again, it depends on what you think the "independent deterrent" is for. In the old world - an old world that might reconstitute itself someday - it was to deter against a calculated nuclear strike from the Soviet Union, one that was calibrated to be (in the eyes of a US president) not worth Atlanta or Portland.
That was why both the French and the Brits found it essential in the 1960s to consider a hedge against limited ABM developments (France's supersonic low-level CMs and the UK's Chevaline) which would have done little against a Soviet or US attack but would have rendered their independent ballistic missile forces useless.
So, where might a nuclear strike come from? And would it have an effective counterforce element? If not, Storm Shadows, Typhoons and tankers would survive. So VC (godless Communist and cat molester that he may be) could be right.
As for the need to maintain the nuclear submarine industrial base... it seems that, they way things are going, the UK is well on the way to dismantling its independent combat aircraft development infrastructure and becoming a subsidiary of Fort Worth. So which is more valuable? World it not make more sense to join forces on SSNs with the US? (While, perhaps, sounding them out on the future role of advanced non-nukes?)
The overall problem, increasingly, is that (a) CVF/JCA looks as if it is going to starve a lot of other efforts to death; and (b) in that light, is it important enough, or good enough? If we can't fix (a) then we have to answer (b).

[sense1]

But however hard you jam your fingers in your ears and shout "Lah Lah Lah",

and

Cancel both and there is at least £15 Bn of unspent money potentially available for all of the other stuff that we need.

You are the one putting your fingers in your ears and shouting "Lah Lah Lah" because if you think that the result of the CVF and JCA programmes being canceled is £15 Bn for HM forces then you are, IMHO, sadly mistaken - as I said to you in post #85.

[Jackonicko]

It will be £15 Bn from a very small pot, however, and will not be separately funded. The Government won't take the £15 Bn away from the defence budget, so that all, most or at least some of the money will be available for other things.

[Occasional Aviator]

Widger/SaN

Unless you raise your view about air power above the tactical "think what a worked-up Sqn of JSF on a carrier could do" type of comment, you are not going to do CVF any favours. Yes, it takes work to get ship and aircraft to combat ready - but ALL the assets here are the joint commander's. If he (or she) judges that the jets are more use ashore (as may well be the case with a low number of FJ FE@R) then so be it. If the carrier has to be "weaponless" then that's because the weapons are needed elsewhere. Carriers may give the best chance of early intervention, but they'll never match the sortie rate from Tarmac and are not invulnerable. Having carriers should give us flexibility; tying jets to ships or RN command takes that away (and is contrary to our joint doctrine).

[Magic Mushroom]

Bismark,

…CVF will give the government a day 1 capability, at a high sortie generation rate regardless of HNS…

Maybe, maybe not. It depends on the scenario. Given that the UK will only ever have one CVF at sea, it could be argued that there is a fair chance it may not be at the right place at the right time. We certainly won’t have the luxury of the USN in being able to maintain carriers spread around the world. Obviously that can sometimes work to our advantage, as in the Falklands War where the inexorable transit south of the Task Force gradually ratcheted up the pressure on Galtieri and his hoods.

Also, HNS/overflight also applies to maritime aviation at times. In the Afghan ops, carrier assets from both the US and France have used land FOBs on a regular basis and still require overflight rights from specific nations.

…whereas it could take weeks to build up to a 36 a/c DOB especially if strat/tac air is also supporting a land force build up at the same time.

RAF E-3Ds flew their first missions over Afghanistan from a ME nation within 36 hrs of the order to deploy from the UK. Other RAF ISTAR and tanker assets were doing likewise. RAF Tornado F3s were flying DCA over Saudi within a similar timescale in Aug 90 as were USAF F-15Cs.

…What does it cost (in terms of strat and tac air transport, shipping etc) to deploy 36 multi-role jets for, say, 20 days high intensity warfighting?

Similar logistics are applicable for carrier assets. You still have to be resupplied with weapons and fuel. RFA can do some of this but not all. Often a single C-130 or C-17 delivering our pre-packed Fly Away Packs can be sufficient to get a det operational and flying it’s first missions. Multi engined and rotary types can often self deploy all the elements required for austere ops. We’re pretty good at getting set up and going quickly from a bare base these days. Swings and roundabouts.

Particulalry if they have to move DOBs before the fighting starts. And have we ever done so?

Yes.

…I am too far removed from the Service to know these things.

Agreed.:hmm:

Widger,

If CVF had been around in 82, then there would have been no loss of Sheffield or loss of life in Bluff Cove...

Agreed.

Sierra Leone would have been a breeze, Deny Flight in Bosnia would have had a massive boost and as to the last 2 Gulf Crises..........

Err, why would Sierra Leone have been a breeze with CVF other than we could have done it from a single hull rather than requiring a CVS and Ocean? In fact, while we’re at it, one of the most useful aspects of CVF would have been its ability to host a modest Joint HQ structure. Unfortunately, we’ve chopped the ops room requirement!!!:ugh:

As far as the Balkans go, I flew through the entirety of the Croatia, B-H, Albanian and Kosovo campaigns and there were very few times when there was not at least 2 carriers in the Adriatic. These would be a combination of USN and French conventional carriers, USN LPDs and RN CVS. Very occasionally the Spanish or Italians would also pitch up with one of their STOVL carriers. During major ops or periods of tension it was common to have up to 5 carriers including 2 US CVNs off Jugoslavia or Albania.

Yes they helped ease the workload on the land based assets. Yes they helped when the whole of Italy went red (equally I can remember several occasions when the Adriatic went red and F-14s, FA-18s, EA-6Bs and SUEs were spread all over Italy). But they didn’t introduce a stellar change in how the ops evolved. (To be honest, we would dread the arrival of a USN CVN due to their tendency to become the largest threat to flight safety in the Northern Hemisphere…ooops, sorry, irrelevant thread creep!).

The same argument goes for GW1 and its sequel.

SaN,

I'm not up to speed on the projected split of F35's between the FAA and RAF, or if all F35's will be lumped into one "Joint force" as present? However I'd suggest that not having dedicated squadrons under RN command would be a serious error.

As has already been intimated, a CAG will normally be allocated to the Air Component Commander who answers to the Joint Commander. The ACC would most likely be a coalition AF guy, but could equally be a naval (or indeed Army:eek:) aviator. (Incidentally, I am a strong proponent of retaining an independent organic naval and army aviation.)

So once again chaps we return to the age old argument: land based and maritime air are complimentary.

:ugh::ugh::ugh::ugh::ugh::ugh::ugh:

Regards,
MM

[Widger]

MM please stop :ugh::ugh::ugh::ugh:
You will hurt yourself.

[Jackonicko]

Complimentary yes.

Both affordable? Perhaps not.

And if not, equally useful and versatile?

I'd say not.

Prioritisation is hard.

[percontator]

Widger raised an interesting point in his post #102 about the choice of the STOVL F35B for JCA.
What is the rationale behind this choice? Is it:
1) Cost of Training
The cost/difficulty of training for conventional (as opposed to STOVL) carrier ops is disproportionately high given that the majority of JCA will be flown by the shore based RAF and as Widger says:
To those people who talk about using JCA more flexibly by having them ashore rather than on "the boat", you clearly do not have any clue about what it takes to get current "day and night" and "operational" on a carrier. You cannot just hop on for a few days, fly a few circuits and pop off again. It takes a long to get a whole squadron current and more importantly maintain that currency.2)Benefits of Stealth
Neither Rafale nor navalised Typhoon are stealthy although F35C is.
3)Historical
JCA is the Harrier replacement and as Harrier is STOVL so JCA must be also. However the RAF is no longer operating out of Gutersloh with 3rd Shock Army menacingly close.
4)Aspirational
F35B is the latest American toy in the shop and we've just got to have it.
5)None of the Above

[Occasional Aviator]

perconator,

for Option 5 could it be:

a. The US marines need a STOVL platform and if the UK joins them it is politically more difficult to cancel.

b. By having a short-range aircraft without much bombload it doesn't draw attention to how TLAM is not really 'strategic'?

(just kidding)

Also "the shore-based RAF"... have you missed the formation of the JFH and the planning for JCA? RAF and RN Harrier units are interchangeable at sea and on land and are planned to continue to be so with JSF.

But seriously:

Command States: I really think we need to get this right. A couple of posters have talked about things like having JSF "under RN command". Let's examine this.

We were supposed to have realised in WW2 that the three services do not fight three separate wars. Tactical aircraft will (almost always) be under OPERATIONAL command of the JFACC, regardless of which service operates them or exercises full command. This means two things:

1. IT DOES NOT MATTER, IN OPERATIONAL TERMS, WHETHER JSF (or any other carrier based-type) IS OPERATED BY THE RN OR THE RAF. No, really. I have a view on this, but it's based on what is best value for defence in terms of generating op capability, as opposed to the really important question of how the force elements are employed.

2. Our aim should be to deliver military power when and where it is needed, in the most effective and efficient way. To me, that means we cannot tie up a significant portion of our fast-jet force as dedicated assets to be sailed around on a carrier when the real fight might be elsewhere. I'm not ignoring the real issues about work-up, currency, etc, but unless we have an appetite to make step-ashore work (as SRO(C) advocates) then carriers become a less and less attractive way of projecting air power in an age when we are unlikely to have lots of jets.

[Backwards PLT]

Perc

I think the reason for F35B is mostly because it doesnt need a catapult, and that apparently saves quite a bit of cash. The fact that it completely cripples capability compared to the C is, of course, not really relevant. Also, to be honest talking to various people I can't help but feel there is a bit of number 3 there as well.

Having said that, I still think that F35B is better than Rafale or (god forbid) navalised Typhoon. The stealth just adds another capability to the UK armed forces. Just so long as the target is susceptible to 2 x 1000lb and not too far away! The C would be soooooo much better and apparently its not too late to change!

[Widger]

To me, that means we cannot tie up a significant portion of our fast-jet force as dedicated assets to be sailed around on a carrier when the real fight might be elsewhere.


MM now I understand your frustration! :ugh::ugh::ugh::ugh::ugh::ugh:

I suppose that is just like the E3 force "flying around the world", couldn't possibly be doing anything useful! (Sarcasm!)

[Sunk at Narvik]

OA,

Interesting couple of issues there.

If we are talking about an individual theatre then I'd have little issue with a Joint Force commander having overall operational command. The problem arises when naval assets are needed elsewhere. The thing about ships is they can move around the place and its often the case that the MoD will need to move ships around from one theatre to another to respond to events, or shift emphasis. If the JF Commander has deployed all his F35's ashore, where will the navy pick up extra F35's from?

Secondly, there are "real fights" and secondary theatres. Where F35's are needed for the "real" fight who is going to tell the secondary guy he can't have any air cover? Putting F35's ashore emasculates the RN- its like emptying a battleships magazines because the shells are needed elsewhere. Our £2bn worth of carrier becomes a useless liability.

The only sane answer to all this Treasury driven nonsense is to procure more aircraft- not enter a fantasy world in which- like cheap martial arts movies, the bad guys patiently line up to attack the good guy one after another.

Bin F35B, adapt Typhoon for CTOL and buy more of them, consider buying F35C in a decade or so as a "nice to have" for first day strike. In the meantime talk of ditching carriers to meet Treasury driven and wholley artificial monetary constraints (this isn't the 70's the UK is now the 5th wealthiest country in the world, no longer the "sick man of Europe" ) simply sets people who care about UK defence at each others throats and does Gordon Browns dirty work for him. The answer is a realistic defence settlement, not squabbling amongst ourselves.

[orca]

It is absolutely crucial who exercises command and control of JCA.

The RN generically has neither the people or the kit to Command and Control FJ assets at either the operational or tactical level. To do so would require a DTIO and JFACHQ type set-up, afloat.

FJ assets need to be commanded and controlled by a CAOC working for an ACC. CVF should hopefully provide a very flexible platform from which to operate an array of the ACC's assets, but that is all it is.

Some land-based proponents need to just relax a little bit and accept that no-one is trying to steal aeroplanes and lock them in the hangar aboard CVF. Some maritime proponents need to accept that the CVF will never compete with a full-up airfield for scale and support.

In short, there will be occasions where an ACC will want his assets to be flying from a boat, and others when he won't. The key is that the RN cannot give anyone a career path that ends up as an ACC, and doesn't possess the kit to host a light-blue/ coalition ACC and his staff afloat.

[hulahoop7]

Isn't the current predicament with JFH, and the lack of jets for the carrier mainly down to a lack of an alternative? i.e. its the same with the helicopters. We have legacy assets which aren't up to the job, so we are having to push the load on to the small number of types that do. The Harriers are being overworked true, but they have certainly demonstrated their worth and the utility of STOVL. We obviously need to get both FAA squadrons up and flying, but the real answer to the current problem is to get Typhoon moving earth as soon as possible.

[Not_a_boffin]

Getting Typhoon to Kandy is one thing, but it doesn't solve the valid points that Orca makes about the way the RN/FAA is currently set up and the seeming lack of progress in getting ready to do large-scale ops vs the current handful of jets on a CVS.There is no reason why CVF could not host a CAOC - at least for a smaller theatre. The vast majority of the infrastructure (comms, accommodation, intel & planning space etc) is already there aboard ship. The thing that is missing is trained bodies to man it (no reason why they shouldn't be light blue), which ties into a wider FAA malaise where with no higher career path (although there used to be) - it's difficult to get much beyond a squadron command or Wings before banging out.

[Transall]

adapt Typhoon for CTOL

Hello, Sunk at Narvik.

Do you actually believe in that possibility?
I gather that the Sea Typhoon proposals were based on "todays' computers being able to predict ship's movements and communicating with the aircraft whose fly-by-wire controls could ensure a soft landing".
I fear for repeated wave-offs until fuel runs out, damaged aircraft or genuine ramp-strikes.

Best regards, Transall.

[Sunk at Narvik]

Trans

Its been discussed a lot and I recall seeing a proposal (sketches) here on pprune a while back.

I'd be interested to see an elemental cost breakdown of the current aircraft- ie what % of cost is taken up by the airframe, engines, software, weapons systems etc. Doubt that'll ever be in the public domain however.

I'm not convinced by the fancy computer guiding the aircraft down in a howling force 8 though. I'd put the money into raising the cockpit, strengthening the fuselage, beefing up the landing gear and making whatever adjustments to the flaps deemed neccesary. As a laymen I'm taking out of my arse of course, but I'd hazard a guess those are the cheaper componants.

I see the F35B is still having budget and delay issues. I'm not entirely convinced the MoD has got the right deal over software "sovereignty" either. We have an unhappy history of taking the Yanks on their word. So the "capability holiday" stretches ever further into the future. Its almost a re-run of "no war for ten years".. and we all know what happened next.

[Jackonicko]

"The answer is a realistic defence settlement, not squabbling amongst ourselves." And how are you going to ensure that, then? Do you think that this Government (or indeed any Cameron-led Government) would increase spending sufficiently that CVF+JSF would not be a distortion, and would not suck money away from other priorities.

Alistair Darling has just announced an increase of £900 m on equipment next year.

There isn't going to be a 'realistic defence settlement' any time soon, so priorities need to be set. Gold plated 'nice to have' capabilities like CVF have no place in the current over-stretched Defence budget.

"The only sane answer to all this Treasury driven nonsense is to procure more aircraft."

The only sane answer is to procure more of EVERYTHING. More aircraft, more frigates and destroyers, more kit for the cabbage eaters. But sanity is not going to appear.

[Not_a_boffin]

Jacko.

I can absolutely guarantee you that there is no gold-plating on CVF. There are elements in the ship that could be described as "tin-plated"........

[LowObservable]

If we really dig into things, one major reason for F-35B versus C was that the UK's experience bought it a much more important role in the program than its production offtake - under 5 per cent of planned output at best - would have done.

Another was that the UK was convinced (by things like the fly-by-wire Harrier demo) that a STOVL jet could be truly "amphibious" without the expensive, crew-time-dominating and airframe-life-eating recurrent training associated with cat-and-trap operations.

But there is a huge load-and-range cost associated with the B, as well as continuing risk; and Bs won't have the same range, fighter performance or weapons flexibility as a Typhoon. If the only way to deploy the jet is with CVF, that's not relevant; but if it's a situation where jets could be land-based regionally with tanker support, it is.

So the issue's this: in a given situation, do I respond with Typhoons and tankers to a regional base 500 miles from the ground combat area, or a CVF standing 100 miles offshore? (I can buy a whole lot of C-17s and tankers for the price of a carrier.) What do I need to defend my base in each case? There are no generic, simple answers.

[percontator]

Thanks OA, BPLT and LO for your replies.
In retrospect, perhaps I should have asked why STOVL for JCA. If STOVL is the right answer then F35B is the only game in town.

It would seem that if the RAF and the RN were choosing in isolation from one another STOVL would not be chosen. Those navies with carriers large enough to operate them choose CTOL aircraft e.g. USN, MN and (once Gorshkov is converted) the Indian Navy. No other airforce (except USMC for its air capable assault ships) which has expressed an interest in JSF is opting for the F35B. So a major reason for choosing STOVL seems to be the "jointness" of the requirement.

LO identifies two very credible reasons for the choice. The first is both historical and commercial so must be right. The second is one I was alluding to in 1) in my previous post but put more succinctly
Another was that the UK was convinced (by things like the fly-by-wire Harrier demo) that a STOVL jet could be truly "amphibious" without the expensive, crew-time-dominating and airframe-life-eating recurrent training associated with cat-and-trap operations.By following some quite sensible reasoning the UK appears to have found itself in a somewhat uncomfortable position. In F35B it is tied into an aircraft programme where it has little if any control over technical or commercial matters (in particular, cost). The aircraft itself suffers from a number of operational drawbacks compared to conventional FJs. The programme is very risky as weight growth has already led to a fundamental redesign of the structure and not many aircraft grow lighter through their service lives. Finally questions with regard to "sovereignty" are still outstanding.

Is STOVL the right choice for JCA?

[hulahoop7]

Keeping pilots CTOL current is no mean task. You’d have no chance of keeping a mixed RAF FAA force, and UK doesn’t want to pay for a huge dedicated air wing. French pilots rely on the US to keep their skills up. Cat/ trap costs, and it requires a lot of man power to keep it running. STOL set ups like the Russians and Indians will use are incredibly inefficient on deck space, sortie rates and also impose weight restrictions. One could say they go for that option because of a lack of an adequate alternative?

The US is rich enough to build carriers that have 4 cats, and the space for simultaneous landings and take off. No other country has built a carrier that big. Even PA2 won’t be up to that. Without it sortie rates plummet.

Weight issues aside, the B might be short legged compared to the C, but doesn’t look too bad when compared with contemporary jets. A huge proportion (over 90% I think) of the world’s human footprint is within 200miles of the oceans.

I understand that the UK strategy matches that of the USMC. Fight from your CV initially and then follow the forces inland to keep sortie rates high. The B can rough strip, which is very useful – as demonstrated by the Harrier in Stan. Keeps response times down and utimately the number of bombs dropped high.

While dispersal is less of a requirement since the end of the cold war, it certainly got the Israelis interested in the B. who to say it won't be useful to the UK again with the lifespan of the project.

The B might be limited to 2*1000lb internally but could carry more externally. This is the max for the current Harriers and smaller weapons appear to be growing in popularity. I understand that the B could carry 1 stormshadow.

If the B does meet its targets, I do think it is a good flexible fit for what the UK requires. It’ll do everything that the UK requires, and will compliment Typhoon well.

[Occasional Aviator]

Thanks to those who responded to my late-night, and possibly poorly-worded posts.

Sunk at Narvik et al -

I think we're wildly agreeing here. The solution is to have more aircraft. However, in the meantime, don't forget that aircraft can and do move between theatres just as ships do. And I'm talking about the Joint Commander, not the Joint Force Commander, making the call in those cases - so I'm not proposing anything, merely describing how our current system works. I would also expect expect carrier-based air (regardless of which Service flies it) to spend a lot of its time embarked. However, the argument that you can't ever leave a carrier "without its weapons", even if they're needed elsewhere only undermines the argument for having carriers; that's probably why SRO(C) pushes the 'step-ashore' capability.

And I am in favour of carriers - but I want to make sure UK defence gets the most out of them and the aircraft that fly from them - and as I don't think we're buying enough hulls or enough jets, I am just asking people to be flexible in how we use them. The jets are there to project air power, not to make the carrier work (Widger!). Actually I believe the carriers are (largely) there to project air power, but that's a fairly philospohical point.

Orca -

Before you start making bald statements about the RN not being able to command air assets, I'd take a look at the doctrine book. Neither the RAF nor the RN should be commanding force elements on operations - Joint Force Component Commanders should. Don't confuse these with services, and if the day were to come when our focus was a major maritime action with minimal air threat, then I would be the first one suggesting that the carrier air should be OPCON the MCC.

[Widger]

OA,

Just so you do not get me wrong, I completely understand that the CVF is about Strike and projecting Air Power. My point is, that there are unique and perishable skills about operating from a ship at sea. Hopping on for a week or so, does not an operationally capable force make. If the CVF is to be able to project power effectively, then a significant proportion of JFH will need to spend time on the boat. The two current campaigns have skewed somewhat, Defence focus. The UK will not be in Iraq forever (Afghanistan maybe). There will be other problems. You only have to look at recent Russian intentions in the Arctic over resources,, and the reaction of Canada etc, to see the future. As the Oil/Gas/Steel/etc runs out, resources are going to be a much more important issue. Yes, the best place to operate in Iraqistan at the moment is ashore, but you have to get there first. Who knows where we will be in 10 years from now. We may be in the South Atlantic, protecting the Falklands again. More likely, we will be off antarctica, protecting UK mineral companies and fishing vessels from aggression. (Think Cod Wars). Yes Stanley is there, but a CVF could stay on station, poised for weeks, not hours. Yes, come a big fight, you would need land based air power to resolve the issue, much as you need troops on the ground. But, in the build up to a conflict, maritime based air power, can loiter, out of sight, striking when required, with the back up form land based air also when required.

The RN generically has neither the people or the kit to Command and Control FJ assets at either the operational or tactical level. To do so would require a DTIO and JFACHQ type set-up, afloat.

Well....that comment does not even deserve a reply:ugh::ugh::ugh:

CVF is coming, once here the UK will have a fantastic asset that can be used for both operational and diplomatic purposes, projecting power all around the world, providing support for our friends and "speaking softly" to those who would do us or our interests harm. To suggest that it should be scrapped just because it does not fit the current crisis, does not mean it will not have significant utility in the future.

[althenick]

Just to put in my 2 bobs worth...

I'm all for the carriers but I also find myself slightly warming to Jacko's argument against them albeit for different reasons.

If we really are going to get Dave B then would we not be better with an LHD design rather than a carrier? CVF seems to serve one purpose only though I think with a little imagination they could do more - hospital ship springs to mind. An LHD would surle be a more flexible asset with respect to deployment of air and land assets.

As for the "who should own the FJ assets p1ssing contest" Everyone's missed the point

PEOPLE MATTER!

If the light blue got hold of the FJ's they'd never see any time on a carrier. The RN would have no control over it, I suspect it would nearly always be deployed elsewhere. And ultimately the RAF would always give a No to any request. Why? - simple! If you ask RAF personell to go to sea for months on end then your soon going to have a retention problem, Start filling those gaps with other personell then you will have a recruitment problem. Every crab I have ever met (and there have been many) have said no to the sea option. I think the status quo (jointery) is still the best solution.

BTW I have just looked at the rn website. Nearly one in ten personell in the RN are in the FAA!

[Magic Mushroom]

The RN generically has neither the people or the kit to Command and Control FJ assets at either the operational or tactical level. To do so would require a DTIO and JFACHQ type set-up, afloat.

Well....that comment does not even deserve a reply

Widger,

I think it's an entirely accurate statement. The RN have only just started to look at establishing an N2 branch and have barely looked at the enormous J2/J6 issues surrounding exploiting the exceptional capabilities of F-35.

The aircraft will be able to contribute enormously to ISTAR in it's own right but only if the EW, threat and other data bases and J2 systems are there to support and maintain ops. Those will all need appropriate J6 which the RN have very little experience in.

Luckily there is a very capable SO1 at Fleet looking at these issues, but he is the first to acknowledge that they are significant weaknesses. Fleet are leaning heavily on RAF expertise in this area and envisage RAF personnel forming a major part of the CVF J2/6 manning at least initially. As ever, there are no funds to properly establish an N2 branch.

Likewise, FAA retention and career structure issues means that very little dark blue fast jet experience stays beyond the rank of Cdr and this also degrades the RN's ability to exercise appropriate C2 over RN assets. The outlook is not much better when several RN star ranks have stated that 'we don't care who flies the aircraft, as long as we get CVF'.

No particular hit on the RN but it is most certainly a true statement that right now, the RN lack the ability to support a medium sized Air Group of advanced fast jets.

CVF will be a Joint asset and will need Joint manning. RAF personnel will therefore go to sea and I have attended several Joint courses where the guys with the most sea time over a set period have been Harrier air or ground crews.

Regards,
MM

[Widger]

MM,

I bow to your obvious insight on these matters!

Cap doffed! just stop :ugh::ugh::ugh:

[Occasional Aviator]

Widger,

re your reply to my reply - again, we seem to be violently agreeing. I am not talking about "hopping on for a week or so". It is just that my unit of measure of air power naturally tends to be squadrons of jets, rather than carriers with jets on them. And in almost every post I have made on this subject, I have qualified my remarks by saying that I do appreciate that there is a great deal involved in getting a CAG effective. Sorry if I misunderstood your earlier :ugh: when I suggested that jets should not be automatically tied to a carrier (in the same post that I said I would expect them to be embarked most of the time). I think we are on the same side.

Also, for clarity,

The RN generically has neither the people or the kit to Command and Control FJ assets at either the operational or tactical level.

was posted by orca, not me. I found it naive and told him so in as many words in my last post.


Allthenick,

You're absolutely right that people are missing the point over who should own the assets - and I think you included. You said:

If the light blue got hold of the FJ's they'd never see any time on a carrier. The RN would have no control over it, I suspect it would nearly always be deployed elsewhere. And ultimately the RAF would always give a No to any request. Why? - simple! If you ask RAF personell to go to sea for months on end then your soon going to have a retention problem, Start filling those gaps with other personell then you will have a recruitment problem. Every crab I have ever met (and there have been many) have said no to the sea option. I think the status quo (jointery) is still the best solution.

Please read my comments to orca - your comment merely shows that you don't understand our current doctrine. When it comes to ops, IT DOES NOT MATTER WHICH SERVICE OPERATES THE ASSETS. That is the status quo (jointery) to which you refer. The RN does not request Harriers from the RAF, PJHQ directs force elements to an operation.

As for going to sea, RAF personnel have done it and I don't see them running out of the doors. If you want to have an idea of how offensive I find your assertion, think how you'd feel if I said that Naval Strike Wing shouldn't be used in Afghanistan because they joined up to go to sea so will all leave if you based them on land. We're servicemen - we go where we're told and if the way we operate changes a few people might bump their gums but after a few years, no-one really remembers any different. Yes, people matter, and, yes, we DID have a problem in certain parts of the RAF getting to grips with what being expeditionary really means, but we are way past that now and still working on it.

[althenick]

As for going to sea, RAF personnel have done it and I don't see them running out of the doors. If you want to have an idea of how offensive I find your assertion, think how you'd feel if I said that Naval Strike Wing shouldn't be used in Afghanistan because they joined up to go to sea so will all leave if you based them on land. We're servicemen - we go where we're told and if the way we operate changes a few people might bump their gums but after a few years, no-one really remembers any different. Yes, people matter, and, yes, we DID have a problem in certain parts of the RAF getting to grips with what being expeditionary really means, but we are way past that now and still working on it.

O_A

http://www.e-goat.co.uk/forums/showthread.php?t=15992


I posted the above on e-goat barely 4 days ago and although a MORI poll it aint - I was none the less quite stunned by the result. Over 38 of the 55 who voted dont want to serve at sea. I was expecting maybe 20% at the most.

I know it doesnt completely vindicate what I have said but the bottom line is this - I joined the Navy to go to sea. Most Crabs dont want to go to sea and if this persists then there will be problems. It happened from 1921 to 1937, No one ever learns. As for NSW - I would be interested to hear what they think. Maybe i'll post similar on Rum Ration.

[Modern Elmo]

Given that the UK will only ever have one CVF at sea, it could be argued that there is a fair chance it may not be at the right place at the right time.

Only one or two carriers implies the syndrome attributed to the RN in WWI post Jutland battle: must keep the dreadnoughts "in being," therefore can't risk 'em in risky offensive ops!

Therefore, right place at the right time = out of harm's way.

[GreenKnight121]

No other airforce (except USMC for its air capable assault ships) which has expressed an interest in JSF is opting for the F35B. So a major reason for choosing STOVL seems to be the "jointness" of the requirement.


Italy, Spain. They choose to replace their AV-8B+ Harriers with F-35Bs, with Italy going with F-35As & Typhoon for their land-based needs, and Spain currently committed to Typhoon for their Air Force (but there is talk of possible joint purchasing arrangements).

[Mad (Flt) Scientist]

.... the syndrome attributed to the RN in WWI post Jutland battle: must keep the dreadnoughts "in being," therefore can't risk 'em in risky offensive ops!

I would love to hear a justification for this statement; it was the German High Seas Fleet that spent the rest of the Great War safely bottled up in harbour until finally, when tasked to sortie in October 1918, the crews mutinied, at least partially in response to what they saw as a suicide mission. I think you'll find that the Grand Fleet did not spend the same period of time hiding in Scapa Floe.

Hardly central to a discussion of the aerial component of a 21st century aircraft carrier, I know.

[Sunk at Narvik]

Mad Scientist,

It is pertinent to the carrier discussion though, what I think off as the kriegsmarine scenario- a small fleet of reletively good units but to few in number to be risked. With just two carriers, will the UK govt ever risk them in operations other than those dedicated to national wartime emergiencies?

A couple of examples- Hermes in the Red Sea during the 67 Arab Isreali war- too small but too valuable (See "Vanguard to Trident" by Eric Grove) to deploy, so despite investment in the carrier fleet, it was of little or no use.

Turkish invasion of Cyprus- why no UK operation to deter? (hint, only Ark Royal left)

Ark Royal to the Gulf in 90-91- to valuable to risk in the NAG so "supported" the coalition from the Med.

Two carriers is the absolute minimum but still constrains effective use in "wars of choice". To use military force to effectively support diplomacy requires the will to take risks. The only answer is a larger force of carriers which can sustain extended deployments and provide a buffer against attrition. Lets hope that after the two CV's are delivered, the UK Govt replaces Ocean and Ark Royal with two F35B capable "LHD's" similar to the Australian/Spanish designs.

[dunc0936]

Two carriers is the absolute minimum but still constrains effective use in "wars of choice". To use military force to effectively support diplomacy requires the will to take risks. The only answer is a larger force of carriers which can sustain extended deployments and provide a buffer against attrition. Lets hope that after the two CV's are delivered, the UK Govt replaces Ocean and Ark Royal with two F35B capable "LHD's" similar to the Australian/Spanish designs.

I did article on Arrse about future requirements, and I said we should have the 2 CVF's, and as you say replace Ark Royal and Lusty with two upto date CVS's or as you say LHD's that can handle Harrier/F35's this way we would have potientially 4 carriers not two,


Duncan

[Not_a_boffin]

SAN

I stand to be corrected, but would have thought that the resaon Ark did not go to the NAG during Granby was more to do with deconflicting her CAG from the clouds of coalition aircraft expected to be there at the time. IIRC at the time, 800/801 were still FRS1 units and therefore effectively capable only of WVR engagements. While I'm sure the ability to CAP the tupperwares with RN assets might have been valuable, and a CVS would be easier to handle than USS Midway which eventually ended up there, I suspect the decision not to send her was mainly based on co-ordination difficulties and a lack of compelling contribution rather than threat alone. Just think of the difficulties the USN encountered trying to access / operate with the ATO. Would a dozen SHAR1 have made a positive contribution or merely complicated matters?

[Obi Wan Russell]

Turkish invasion of Cyprus- why no UK operation to deter? (hint, only Ark Royal left)

For the record Ark Royal was ordered to prepare for possible deployment to Cyprus in 74, but was stood down when the Turkish government gave assurances that the sovreignty of British bases on the island would be respected. Hermes in the Red Sea in 67? Exactly how were we involved in that war anyway?

I'm also pretty sure the RN is keeping any plans to replace Ocean and Ark Royal quiet at the moment whist CVF is being ordered. Ocean is being refitted to keep her going until 2022 and could probably be extended further if required. Similarly Ark could be extended if need be so that any replacement program does not clash with the CVF program. 2 CVFs +2 LHDs (in all probability what will be ordered) will give us enough platforms for any forsseable operations. For the last couple of decades we have had more aviation 'platforms' than officially stated. 3 CVS, 1 LPH and Argus,= 5 flat tops. Almost back to 60s levels...:ok:

[Widger]

Obu Wan,

Don't forget, Albion, Bulwark, Largs Bay, Lyme Bay, Cardigan Bay and Mount's Bay.

[Modern Elmo]

I would love to hear a justification for this statement; it was the German High Seas Fleet that spent the rest of the Great War safely bottled up in harbour until finally, when tasked to sortie in October 1918,


The Battle of Jutland (German: Skagerrakschlacht (Battle of the Skagerrak); Danish: Søslaget ved Jylland / Søslaget om Skagerrak) was the largest naval battle of World War I and the only full-scale clash of battleships in that war. It is also, by certain criteria, the largest naval battle in history. It was fought on 31 May – 1 June 1916, in the North Sea near Jutland, the northward-pointing peninsular mainland of Denmark.

First Ostend Raid
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First Ostend Raid
Part of North Sea Operations, First World War
Brilliant
Wreckage of HMS Brilliant at Ostend
Date 23–24 April 1918
Location Ostend, Belgium
Result German defences drove off British attackers.
…


North Sea 1914-1918
1st Heligoland Bight – Live Bait Squadron – Dogger Bank – Jutland – 2nd Heligoland Bight – Zeebrugge – 1st Ostend – 2nd Ostend

The First Ostend Raid (part of Operation ZO) was the first of two attacks by the Royal Navy on the German-held port of Ostend during the late spring of 1918 during the First World War. Ostend was attacked in conjunction with the neighbouring harbour of Zeebrugge on 23 April in order to block the vital strategic port of Bruges, situated six miles (10 km) inland and ideally sited to conduct raiding operations on the British coastline and shipping lanes. Bruges and its satellite ports were a vital part of the German plans in the battle of the Atlantic because Bruges was in close proximity to the troopship lanes across the English Channel and allowed much quicker access to the Western Approaches for the U-boat fleet than their bases in Germany.

The plan of attack was for the British raiding force to sink two obsolete cruisers in the canal mouth at Ostend and three at Zeebrugge, thus preventing raiding ships leaving Bruges. The Ostend canal was the smaller and narrower of the two channels giving access to Bruges and so was considered a secondary target behind the Zeebrugge Raid. Consequently fewer resources were provided to the force assaulting Ostend. While the attack at Zeebrugge garnered some limited success, the assault on Ostend was a complete failure. The German marines who defended the port had taken careful preparations and drove the British assault ships astray, forcing the abortion of the operation at the final stage.

Three weeks after the failure of the operation, a second attack was launched which proved more successful in sinking a blockship at the entrance to the canal but ultimately did not close off Bruges completely. Further plans to attack Ostend came to nothing during the summer of 1918 and the threat from Bruges would not be finally stopped until the last days of the war when the town was liberated by Allied land forces.




Did the RN have enough naval gunfire in support of the Eastend and Zeebruge raids?

[Sunk at Narvik]

Boffo,

Your knowledge is greater than mine, so I'm ready to stand corrected, however I recall reading that Arks non deployment was due to considerations of risk to the ship itself- although I accept that her small airgroup and its contribution would be a factor.

Another argument either way for larger carriers and more of them?

[Not_a_boffin]

Never presume regarding knowledge!

I'd settle for the two with a proper TAG, not the half-@rsed arrangement. If we ever get an Ocean replacement (forget Ark) it'll be the back end of the twenties.......

[ORAC]

Torygraph: Royal Navy warships may form part of EU fleet

Royal Navy vessels could take part in a new “European Union fleet” being planned by France. The French proposal would see a British aircraft carrier placed at the heart of a new EU naval group.

The prospect of such close co-operation between two navies whose clashes include the Battle of Trafalgar is likely to outrage eurosceptics and is already said to have caused concern among British admirals.

The plan for an EU naval force is being put forward by Nicholas Sarkozy, the French president. Gordon Brown and Mr Sarkozy are said to have discussed the plan earlier this year, and French officials have described the talks between London and Paris as “well advanced.”

Mr Sarkozy will take over the rotating presidency of the EU next month and plans to use the role to push for greater European defence co-operation. The French leader sees the EU project as France’s reward for rejoining NATO’s military structures.

Aides to Herve Morin, the French defence minister, this week briefed journalists in Paris that France will use the EU presidency to propose a “European carrier group”, which would ensure that the union always has at least one carrier at sea. The German Defence Ministry in Berlin has also confirmed that Germany is open to participating in the joint force and is awaiting more details from Mr Sarkozy.

Britain and France are the only EU powers with aircraft carriers, and agreement between London and Paris would be the key to any shared naval force.

Greater EU co-operation over carriers could solve at least one problem for the MoD. Some naval analysts say that current UK defence spending plans mean that the Navy will not have enough destroyers and other support ships to properly support and protect the new generation of carriers now being built. Under Mr Sarkozy’s plan, other EU nations could help provide such vessels.

Britain’s multibillion pound plan to buy two new aircraft carriers has been hit by delays and budget troubles. France is also building a single new carrier. There is extensive Anglo-French industrial co-operation on the massive construction project, and there has been speculation that the two countries could save money by sharing a carrier.

The Ministry of Defence said there was no question of Britain and Paris sharing a carrier. “There are no plans for the UK and French navies to share carriers,” the MoD said in a statement. But the ministry did not rule out more co-operation between the Royal Navy and its French counterpart. The MoD said: “However, the UK and French Navies continue to work closely together and co-operate on carrier operations, and will continue to do so in the future.”

The Conservatives plan to press defence ministers about the French proposal in a Commons debate on Thursday. Gerald Howarth, the Tory defence spokesman, said: “We need to know if this is an attempt by the Government to ingratiate itself with EU allies and in so doing sell the Royal Navy down the river.”

[The Helpful Stacker]

Surely unless the British carriers come fitted with cats and arrestor wires the scope for French and British naval forces to work closely together ends at sailing alongside each other?

A simplistic view I know but there is little chance of the French being able to cross-deck aircraft etc with the current design for the RN CVF's.:confused:

[Not_a_boffin]

Gash article anyway. I wonder how our Spanish & Italian colleagues feel when told they don't have carriers?

As for extensive UK / Fr industrial co-operation, don't hold your breath. There are areas where equipment can be bought as a job lot, but as M Sarkozy has helpfully put off a decision on PA2 until 2012, the anticipated savings are unlikely to be realised.