RAN Seasprites

[Trojan1981]

Don't know if anyone here is interested but the RAN Seasprite program has just recieved one in the back of the head. I can't find news link at the moment but it has definately been cancelled. Total cost: 1 Billoin AUD+
Helos operational: NIL

[ChickenLips]

Here you go Trojan. I went to post similar but a search found your thread(s) ahead of mine :D

http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/Fitzgibbontpl.cfm?CurrentId=7480

[Trojan1981]

Cheers, CL:ok:

[John Eacott]

ABC News (http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/03/05/2180394.htm)

Labor cleans up Seasprite 'mess'

Billion-dollar dud: A Navy Seasprite goes through its paces (www.navy.gov.au)

The Federal Government has cancelled Australia's $1 billion commitment to the Royal Australian Navy's controversial Seasprite helicopter project.

Defence Minister Joel Fitzgibbon made the announcement at a visit to a Newcastle engineering firm this morning.

The $1 billion Seasprite fleet was due to enter service in 2001 but was indefinitely grounded in 2006.

An upgrade of a 1960s airframe with 21st century avionics, the helicopters are unable to be operated reliably in poor visibility conditions and at night.

A statement from the Defence Department said discussions with the contractor would start immediately.

"Today's announcement demonstrates our determination to make tough decisions whenever required for the security of the nation and the safety and capability of our Defence Force," Mr Fitzgibbon said.

"The decision taken by the Rudd Labor Government is one that should have been taken by the Leader of the Opposition, Brendan Nelson, when he had the opportunity last year.

"But his Government decided to put its own political interests ahead of the national interest. Consequently, the responsibility of cleaning up the mess they created falls to us."

Coalition defence spokesman Nick Minchin says Mr Fitzgibbon must explain what it will cost to drop the Seasprite contract, and what legal action the contractor Kaman will take.

[Flyingblind]

About time too, now after having shelved out over A$1 Billion what do we have at the end of the day? are they even our airframes and can we sell them onto any one else?

Or should we mount them around the country as gate guards to remind people of this absolute foly.

:ugh:

[Straight Up Again]

A lot of people said it was a bad idea, and it turned out to be a very bad idea.

I know people who worked on the project, it had a mulitude of problems.

The only good thing about it was that it covered our arses, as we were working on the Seahawk upgrade, which was late and overbudget, but nowhere near as bad as the sprite. I'd hate to think how much bad press we would have had without the Seasprite covering us.

Part of the delays on the Seahawk were caused by the Seasprite, they were supposed to sort out most of the software problems (same kit as was going on the Seahawk), but ended up so far behind that we overtook them.

[0497]

A few weeks ago

The Oz

Axe falls on $1bn choppers

Patrick Walters, National security editor | February 18, 2008

NEARLY a year after it earned a reprieve from the Howard government, the navy's $1 billion Seasprite helicopter is set to be axed as the Defence Department undertakes a comprehensive review of major spending programs.

Senior defence sources have told The Australian that it is certain the ill-fated Seasprite program - which is running more than six years late - will be abandoned.

The navy's surface fleet is expected to be equipped with European MRH-90 machines in place of the Seasprites, which were first ordered in 1997.
The 11 twin-engine SG-2G(A) Super Seasprites, equipped with Penguin anti-ship missiles, were destined to operate from the RAN's Anzac-class frigates, performing a maritime strike and surveillance capability for the surface fleet.

But the project, originally costed at $667 million a decade ago, has been dogged by airworthiness and software engineering glitches, making it the most troublesome of Defence's "legacy" projects, arising from poor procurement decisions made by previous governments.

Last year, former defence minister and now Opposition Leader Brendan Nelson recommended the project be axed, but he was overruled by John Howard and his cabinet, who were worried about the negative political fallout from such a move in the lead-up to the November election.

Senior Liberal Party sources told The Australian last week that had the Coalition been returned to office, the axe would have fallen on the Seasprites.

Nine Seasprites have been provisionally handed over to the navy, but the fleet has been grounded while the software problems and air certification issues are sorted out.

The Defence Department has estimated that the Seasprites won't be fully operational until 2010 at the earliest.

In March 2007, the helicopter's manufacturer, US-based Kaman Aviation, warned the Howard government that it would face a lengthy legal battle if it scrapped the program. Kaman said that cancellation would generate an arbitration process that would uphold both the reputation of the Seasprite platform and its manufacturer and expose weaknesses in the Defence Department's equipment procurement system.

Defence Minister Joel Fitzgibbon is examining a range of big defence contracts, including the Howard government's decision to spend $6.5 billion on 24F/A-18 Super Hornet fighters.

Mr Fitzgibbon has ordered a full review of Australia's future air-combat capability in the wake of the Super Hornet buy.

The review, to be completed by the end of April, will examine issues relating to the retirement of the F-111 strike force from 2010 and the planned introduction of the F-35 fighters from 2014. The Super Hornets are due to enter service from 2011 as an interim capability.

Cancelling the Super Hornet contract could cost several hundred million dollars and have an adverse impact on Australia's close ties with Washington, senior defence analysts believe.

[Kitbag]

Wonder whether the UK procurement system will identify lessons and learn from the Australian experience?

Any takers?

[Gainesy]

Sadly, even the most blatant optimist would doubt it.

[wessex19]

when all is said and done, probably the right decision, however, poor old 805 squadron cops the axe again:{
http://www.navy.gov.au/units/805sqn/

[Boldface]

Maybe we could swap them for our MRA4s!!!!:}

[0497]

Reminds me of the British Chinook HC.3 procurement.


Decision leaves navy in parlous state

COMMENT: Patrick Walters | March 06, 2008

FINALLY, Joel Fitzgibbon has bitten the bullet.

A year ago, Brendan Nelson, as defence minister, wanted to cancel the $1 billion Seasprite helicopter program, having been advised that a full operational capability was still years away.

But with an election looming, John Howard's national security committee walked away from his recommendation, anxious about the adverse political fallout.

In the end, the Defence Department simply lost confidence both in the Seasprite platform and the ability of US prime contractor Kaman to eventually deliver a fully "mission capable" aircraft.

This was despite the fact that nine of the 11 helicopters had been handed over to the commonwealth and Kaman's stated confidence that all the technical glitches identified by the customer had been addressed.

The junked Seasprites, which could cost the taxpayer as much as $1.3 billion, are a monumental defence debacle -- arguably the worst in the modern era.

The sorry saga will be studied by generations of defence procurement experts as a classic case of how not to go about a major equipment purchase.

The Seasprite project dates back to the early 1990s, when the navy wanted a helicopter for its planned "Offshore Patrol Combatant", a smaller warship it planned to build in partnership with Malaysia.

When the Malaysians pulled out, Defence should have axed the project, but the Seasprites were then earmarked for the Anzac-class frigates, with a contract finally signed in 1997.

Australia's Defence Department stands indicted for approving an "orphan platform" uniquely designed for our navy with the extraordinarily ambitious aim of incorporating state-of-the-art avionics into a 1960s airframe.

As Nelson once observed, the Seasprite program was like trying to fit an EH Holden into a 2010 motor vehicle. [sic? - shouldn't it be modern computing/avionics into a EH Holden]

While Kaman incurred major problems in fulfilling the original contract, much of the blame must be sheeted home to the Defence Department and its successive decision-making failures in regard to the Seasprites.

Kaman has continued to insist that problems with the Seasprite's avionics and combat systems integration have been solved, but Defence has had serious doubts that it would ever perform fully in line with contract specifications.

Fitzgibbon, as Defence Minister, has had the courage to act, ending two years of procrastination by the Howard government. But his decision leaves the navy's Fleet Air Arm in a parlous state, with the Sea King fleet due to be phased out and the Seasprites abandoned.

The navy's Anzac frigates face a lengthy period without an adequate helicopter-borne maritime strike and surveillance capability.

[ozbiggles]

Of course a more accurate Headline to that story would have been Labor cleans up the mess it started with its buy second hand policy last time it ran the countries defence force.
The other side of course should have shot it in the head a lot earlier too.

[Trojan1981]

The Liberal Govt ordered the Seasprites in 1997. I am not a staunch supporter of either party, but this is a Howard/Liberal created mess.

[GreenKnight121]

And a big part of the mess was the repeated revisions of the airworthiness certification standards each time Kaman came close to passing them.

That is a big part of why Kaman will (in my opinion) win a large settlement in court... the Liberal government was trying hard to prevent ever having to accept the Seasprite, and now Labor will get the blame for having to pay the settlement.

[Brian Abraham]

The Liberal Govt ordered the Seasprites in 1997. I am not a staunch supporter of either party, but this is a Howard/Liberal created mess

Not strickly true. They were originally a Labor initiative under Keating that were meant for a new class of Patrol Boat to be built with Malaysia who backed out of the boat project - and left the Seasprites without a platform. The negotiations for the Seasprites continued and the Howard government, who came to power in 1996, signed the contract in 1997. The only question is, without a platform why did Keating continue negotiations and the contract go ahead under Howard with the change in government?

[Turkeyslapper]

Surely the blame for all this does not lie with either political party but with the people that selected the aircraft .....The Navy! And no I am not fan of either side of politics.

I am not too familiar with the procurement process but...

Surely it was the Navy who wrote the requirements, ran the competition and then selected (or recommended) the S2G(A) (S@G(A). The people who fund these projects rely on the supposed subject matter experts when giving approval...or am I missing something?

[Wiley]

Turkeyslapper (love the 'handle', by the way, but am unwilling to say what picture it brings to mind), while I don't doubt the Navy should wear some of the blame for not stating their case more forcefully than they appear to have done on this case, (and quite a few years ago), I think you'll find a few replies from people more in the know than I am saying that your comment laying the whole blame on the Navy isn't really accurate.

And that's been the nub of the problem in the procurement process for major projects in 'Phallus in Blunderland' (Russell Hill to the uniniated) for many years now.

The people who make these decisions involving billions of dollars all too often aren't the military men but instead, politicians and/or civilian 'experts' from DoD (or people who happen to wear a uniform but have never left Russell Hill in their military careers) who can override the operational military men.

[Brian Abraham]

From (bolding mine)http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2002/06/16/1023864378971.html

By Mark Forbes
June 17 2002
"We should never have bought them in the first place," said Aldo Borgu, an adviser to former defence ministers John Moore and Peter Reith and now a director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. The plan to build a unique helicopter was unrealistic and poorly executed, and was designed for a proposed Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV) to be built jointly with Malaysia. The patrol vessel never got off the ground.

"Once the OPV didn't go ahead, the rationale for buying a smaller helicopter disappeared," Mr Borgu said.

The patrol vessel project was a favourite of the Keating government, proposed by major ALP donor Transfield (now Tenix). The Defence Force hierarchy was always wary of a project it believed was driven by a desire for export dollars, and its fears increased after the Coalition's election in March, 1996.

Put simply, said one senior official, the boat was "neither fish nor fowl", too big for a conventional patrol boat, too small to combat a frigate. To expand its range and firepower it needed a helicopter, but the vessel was too small to carry the Seahawks already planned for the Anzac frigates.

Tenders were called for a small, state-of-the-art helicopter. The former chief of navy, Don Chalmers, confirmed that the Seasprites were acquired for the patrol vessels, OPV, although it was also planned to place some on the Anzacs. Despite this, Defence and the government failed to formally link the Seasprite and patrol vessel projects.

In Senate estimates hearings this month, Air Vice-Marshal Ray Conroy attempted to fudge over when the patrol vessel project was dropped. "That was effectively abandoned in February, 1998, when Malaysia selected a German tender over the one submitted by the Australian company," he said.

At that point, the argument for buying the Seasprite instead of more of the larger Seahawk collapsed, Air Vice-Marshal Conroy admitted. But he said the argument was hypothetical as the Seasprite contract was signed earlier, in June, 1997.

In fact, Malaysia announced the patrol vessel decision in October, 1997, but earlier that year in March the Howard cabinet was told the deal would not go ahead and the vessel was unsuitable for the Australian Navy.

At a cabinet meeting in Pakenham on March 11, former defence minister Ian McLachlan presented a call from the then Defence Force chief, General John Baker, to suspend the patrol vessel proposal.

"I don't want to embarrass anybody, but we felt the thing was heading south," Mr McLachlan said this week.

"As well, we were in a position of having to buy some vessels that were not appropriate for replacing either the Fremantle patrol boats or warships and we didn't want to do that.

"All the information I could glean was the Malaysians were cooling off on the whole deal. It was a big order but got smaller as the months went on and we thought it might never come to pass and it didn't."

Government sources confirmed that the cabinet had effectively decided to suspend the patrol vessel project, but no decision was announced after strenuous objections by Foreign Affairs Minister Alexander Downer and fears that an announcement would be portrayed as scuttling Transfield's Malaysian tender.

"There was a problem with not connecting the helicopter purchase to the OPV purchase," Mr Borgu said. "When cabinet decided to kill off the OPV nobody thought about the Seasprites. It's adding an additional helicopter platform to the ADF unnecessarily as the Anzacs could take the Seahawks."

A senior member of the Seasprite project agrees the deal should have been scrapped. "It's smarter to get 27 Seahawks rather than 16 Seahawks and 11 Seasprites," he said.

Mr McLachlan said he has no recollection of the Defence Force ever telling him of the pivotal link between the patrol vessel project and the Seasprites.

One of Defence's most senior officials at the time also did not "recall a lot of discussion about cancelling the Seasprite when the OPV hit the fence. I don't think it was looked at carefully and that's perhaps where we made a mistake."

Despite the belief that the patrol vessel the Seasprites were designed for would never be built, Defence - never keen to reject already-committed funds - went ahead and signed the $660 million helicopter contract with Kaman.

That contract contained the seeds of today's fiasco, Defence insiders admit. Ever ambitious, Defence wanted to build a high-tech helicopter at a bargain price. The number of helicopters ordered had shrunk to fit under the price cap and it was determined to go for an option that would cut costs further, rebuilding surplus US navy helicopters up to 40 years old.

Mr McLachlan said: "I do remember a long series of discussions about the problem that now appears to have arisen, and that is: if you buy something with old frames, will everybody say they are old aircraft?"

The second-hand helicopter purchase has been pilloried, but those involved in the project are adamant the issue is overblown. A team of 10 has supervised the selection of helicopters from their shrink-wrapped storage in the Arizona desert and overseen the removal of corrosion from the frames.

Expecting Kaman to install a new, sophisticated weapons and avionics system into these "old birds" is where the project came to grief, insiders said.

Too much was expected of Kaman in too short a time. The Seasprite deal was Kaman's biggest ever and the company was no big-time defence player. Founded by eccentric inventor Charlie Kaman, who also designed the Ovation electric guitar, it has made more in recent years from musical instrument sales than aerospace. "The Commonwealth has signed up to an unachievable contract at an unachievable price," said one senior member of the project team. "The whole thing was set up for failure."

It was unfair to blame Kaman, said one official who played a key role in the contract. "Defence has to realise you can't lay all the risk and blame on this little company," he said.

The official said the contract had no damages clauses because liquidated damages on a deal this size would put Kaman out of business.

The head of the Defence Materiel Organisation, Mick Roche, has said the contract is "not the sort of contract we would wish to draw up these days". In a speech to a Defence seminar earlier this year he said Defence's project management should have ensured effective penalty clauses and prevented a key software contractor walking away, resulting in seven helicopters being delivered without a mission-control system.

Installing this sophisticated control system had been subcontracted to US firm Litton, a major military company that dwarfed Kaman. Soon after accepting the contract, Litton won a much bigger US deal and moved many key staff from the Seasprite project.

In 1999 Litton decided to walk away from the complex task, and under its contract won a settlement that cost Kaman $32 million. Australian firm CSC has now been contracted for the task, but the project is already more than three years' late.

Defence is trying to redraft Kaman's contract, despite having already paid out $960 million of the $1 billion budget. Last month Mr Roche told a Senate hearing the government was examining suing Kaman for breach of contract and could possibly recover that money, but then "we will not end up with the helicopters and will have to start again, that is the dilemma we are in".

Another dilemma remains for the navy. Even if it does receive working helicopters, the boats they were designed for do not exist. Putting the Seasprites on the existing Anzac frigates makes less sense. The Seasprites carry an anti-surface missile, the Penguin, originally intended to cover for the patrol vessel's lack of such a weapon, but the Anzacs already carry the Harpoon anti-surface missile.

A former defence official said the Seasprites created profound logistics and maintenance problems for the navy, with it having five different helicopters for five different uses. Air force chief Angus Houston has overall responsibility for air capability but pointedly refused to endorse the Seasprite purchase when interviewed. Asked if the Seahawk would have been a better choice with the patrol vessel off the scene and if the Seasprite was one helicopter too many for the military, Air Marshal Houston replied: "I'd prefer not to make a judgment on that, you can draw your own conclusions. I think we do have too many helicopter types."

"You can't dispute it's the wrong helicopter," Mr Borgu said. "There are obvious question marks over the Penguin anti-ship missile as opposed to the Harpoon, and the anti-sub capability isn't as good as the Seahawks. We should have got the Seahawks. On balance the ADF would have been better off."

[MaxAOB]

We told them to buy the Superlynx!! Some crews were already trained and experienced with the RN, proven airframe operated widely around the world - the kaman always was going to be a disaster! Maybe they will see sense and buy the Wildcat!!!!!! Wonder what the Kiwis' will do now?

Could be the saviour of the Wildcat programme?

[henry crun]

The RNZAF CAS is reported as saying that they would be interested in the composite main rotor blades, some parts of the airframes, and some engine parts.

[ARINC661]

In 1997 Westlands were finishing off Merlin Mk1 and knew exactly what was involved with an integrated tactical system. It is possible that the Super Lynx price was higher than Seasprite as a result. This reinforces that risk has to be part of a selection criteria, cheapest is not always best.

[0497]

It's not a question of what helicopter could've been better, it's that the project should never have existed once the OPV was cancelled.

Seahawk was already deployed on warships but the request for a new helicopter went ahead anyway.

[Samuel]

The RNZN Seasprites [actually operated and maintained by 6 Sqn RNZAF], are not comparable to the Australian model cancelled. Ours were purchased SH-2G at the same time as Australia, but with different avionics, and the New Zealand aircraft were new-build airframes, not rebuilt American SH-2Fs. The first RNZAF SH-2G was delivered in mid-2001, the last was delivered February 2003.

[ExEngMk3]

All 5 RNZN Seasprites are operational and have accumulated several thousands of flying hours. As we have no fanadago super integrated mission system, auto pilot etc we can it always get in the air. Just goes to prove the old adage, 'Keep it simple stupid'.

[XV277]

My mind isn't what it used to be, but wasn't there some joint procurement psrocess with the RNZN, who jumped the gun and ordered the S-2, thus more or less forcing the RAN to order them? Or was that something else?

[wessex19]

I think it was the other way around

[Samuel]

.....NZ signed a contract with Kaman Aerospace in June 1997, the same month as the Aussie deal was put to paper.

The big difference is that the RNZN Seasprites have already entered service in the RNZN. They were purchased on the basis of how many were needed, and not how many can they could get for the money.They were also not a hung with unproven and state-of-tomorrow equipment but a previously tested model that was already operating successfully in the United States.


New Zealand looked ahead to a useful operational life for the planes of 25 years. For this, new rather than 40 year old refurbished air frames, were preferred. And this provided certainty in build scheduling and costs.They cost more than the antique air frames [some more than 40 years-old] chosen by the Aussies. About $3 million additional for each one, but in the end it was a more prudent way to go, and they've been in service for five years!

God only knows what the Aussie deal will cost by the time Kaman sues them.

[Flyingblind]

Hmmmm.....as a previous poster has shown, A. Downers grubbie prints are all over this deal.

Serious questions are required to be asked of him.

[BombsGone]

Flying blind. I can understand Downer pushing for the OPV on foreign policy grounds but its a long bow to blame him for the Sea Sprites problems.

[John Eacott]

Kaman press release:

Kaman Corp. (Nasdaq: KAMN) reported today that its subsidiary, Kaman Aerospace International Corporation (Kaman), has reached an agreement with the Commonwealth of Australia that establishes mutually agreed terms for conclusion of the SH-2G(A) Super Seasprite program.

Under the terms of the Agreement, ownership of the 11 SH-2G(A) Super Seasprite helicopters will be transferred to Kaman along with spare parts and associated equipment. The transfer is subject to US government approval and the Commonwealth will carry out that process, which could take several months. Thereafter, Kaman will seek to sell the aircraft to another customer or customers and will share the proceeds of each sale with the Commonwealth under a pre-established formula. Kaman has agreed that at least $37 million (US) of such payments will be made to the Commonwealth regardless of sales, with at least $25 million (US) to be paid by March 2011, and $6 million (US) each in years 2012 and 2013. Under the agreement, Kaman will forego payment on approximately $35 million (US) in net unbilled receivables in exchange for the helicopters, spare parts and equipment, which will be recorded as inventory. The value of this inventory is expected to exceed the amount of the net unbilled receivables and the guaranteed payments.

In commenting on the agreement, Neal J. Keating, chairman, president and chief executive officer of Kaman Corporation, said, "We appreciate the Australian government's willingness to work with us to develop a mutually satisfactory path to conclude their Super Seasprite program. We are also pleased to have the opportunity to sell these highly capable aircraft to another customer."

The Kaman Super Seasprite is currently serving with the governments of Egypt, New Zealand and Poland. The aircraft also served with distinction as a front-line U.S. Navy helicopter, where its reliability and durability were well respected.

Kaman Corp. conducts business in the aerospace and industrial distribution markets.

Interesting to see who would buy them, and what kit will be removed before the sale/hand-over :rolleyes:

It's our money, Bruce :mad:

[Octane]

Can I just get this story straight? just read thru the post but still half asleep......

The Australian government (read taxpayers) has spent 1.3 billion dollars on new helicopters based on 40 year old airframes, they don't work, are 7 years late and would need more money to be operational by 2011. So that would make them 10 years overdue. Due to the nature of the deal done with Kaman, DoD doesn't even have the option of disposing of them as they see fit, after 1.3 billion?! Is this the same project contract where the suppliers for years have a team of specialists in Australia on full pay idle because the aircraft are not operational?

So in effect, someone has found a way to turn 1.3 billion into nothing and still have liabilities! (they should have bought gold at 1990's prices). Where has the money gone? i.e. has Kaman made profit (therefore adding shareholder value) on a huge contract supplying nothing of use?!
In the meantime the Kiwi's ordered helicopters with new airframes and have been in service since 2002?!

Please tell me I've got it wrong, it's just a bad dream..........

Octane

[Turkeyslapper]

What is going to happen to all those Penguin missiles the RAN bought years ago for the Sea Sprite? They can surely use these on the Seahawk....surely?

[0497]

What is going to happen to all those Penguin missiles the RAN bought years ago for the Sea Sprite? They can surely use these on the Seahawk....surely?

They bought the ammo before they had the weapon/s? That's like buying a ship-borne helicopter when you don't have the ship.

PS: the USN do use Penguins on Seahawks ie. possible off the shelf modification.

[ZK-NSJ]

the kiwis originally got some old bangers to tide them thru till the new builds arrived, they first ordered 4 then an additional one was ordered a couple of years later, (given that they only have 2 frigates), the only serious problem they had was when an aussie exchange pilot slammed one into the deck and it had to be sent back to kaman for repairs, the kiwis only went for that aircraft because the aussies did,

[ExEngMk3]

We have had 2 damaged, one by the Aussie Testpilot during First Of Class Flight Trials and one during a ground resonance incident when ground running on board.

We will have 5 aviation capable ships once all the OPVs are in service, so 5 aircraft will be more than fully utilised!