AIRBUS 17th DEC TELEX 2 DRAFT IBE6463 CRASH UIO

[Griffone]

FROM : AIRBUS FLIGHT SAFETY DEPARTAMENT TOULOUSE

>
>
>
> ACCIDENT INFORMATION TELEX - ACCIDENT INFORMATION TELEX
>
> SUBJECT: IBERIA FLIGHT IB6463 ACCIDENT IN QUITO, EQUADOR
> OUR REF: IBE6463 AIT Nº2 dated 17 December 2007
> PREVIOUS REF : IBE IB6463 AIT Nº1 dated 12 November 2007
>
> This AIT is an update of AIT IB6463 Nº1 regarding the A340-600 accident during landing
> on runway 35 at Quito, Ecuador, on the 09th of November 2007 at 17:10 local time.
>
> The data which follows has been approved for release by the commission of
> investigation led by the Ecuador Investigation Authorities.
>
> The analysis of available data, including the accident recorders (DFDR & CVR),
> indicates the following sequence of events.
>
> IB6463 was approaching on ILS 35 to Quito airport. Latest reported information to the
> crew during the final approach were:
> - wind 170/06;
> - visibility 3000m;
> - wet runway.
> The Captain was Pilot Flying (PF).
>
> Quito runway 35 altitude is 9198ft. The total runway length is 3120 m. The Landing
> Distance Available (LDA) is 3120 m. The runway is equipped with a PAPI. However this
> runway has an ILS displaced threshold of 510 m (remaining LDA for ILS approach is
> then 2610 m).
>
> The CVR records confirm the crew intent was initially to follow the ILS until sufficient
> visual references were available, then to leave the Glide Slope to visually capture and
> follow the PAPI path and use the full runway for landing.
>
> The approach was performed with both AP1&2 engaged in LOC and GLIDE track
> modes, A/THR engaged in managed speed mode. Till touchdown, A/THR maintained
> the VAPP. For final approach, the aircraft was configured to land (gear down, auto-brake
> set to HIGH, ground spoilers armed, flaps fully extended). Landing weight was 249t,
> Vapp 151 kt. Given the altitude and the tailwind, the True Air Speed was 181 kt and the Ground Speed 189kt.
>
> While AP 1+2 were engaged, the aircraft remained stabilized on the LOC and GLIDE.
> Runway 35 was in sight just prior to minimum, DA(H) being 9850ft(652ft).
>
> AP 1+2 were disconnected at the minimum. The PF applied nose-down stick inputs to
> reach the PAPI flight path. This resulted into an increased rate of descent above
> 1400ft/mn between 450ft and 150ft radio-altitude. The GPWS “SINK RATE” warning was
> triggered at 270ft radio-altitude, it was followed by transient nose-up inputs from the PF.
> As programed, the THS froze at 100ft, mantaining a sightly nose down position.
> The “SINK RATE” warning was triggered again below 50ft AGL.
> The A/THR commanded IDLE power, reducing the pitch up momentum.
>
> The touch-down ocurred at about 200m after the full runway threshold (remaining
> distance was 2920 m).
>
> The landing was extremely hard ( more than 3g vertical acceleration,
about 19ft/sec
> 1100ft/mn), which lead to:
> - Breakage of the lower articulation link of both Main Landing Gear (MLG);
> - Abrupt derotation of both bogie beams;
> - Burst at impact of all 4 MLG front wheels;
> - And damage of the wiring looms of RH an LH boogie proximity sensors that are
> used to detect the GROUND condition hence allowing engine thrust reversers
> deployment.
>
> As a consequence of the 4 MLG front wheels burst, the AUTO BRAKE function was lost.
>
> At touchdown, engine throttles were retarded to idle thus A/THR disengaged, and the
> ground spoilers deployed immediately.
>
> The thrust reversers were selected but did not deploy because the GROUND condition
> monitored by the Engines Control Computers was not fulfilled due to the above
> mentioned sensors loom damage. For the same reason, engines stayed at FLIGHT
> IDLE instead of GROUND IDLE.
>
> Full manual braking was applied 5 seconds after touchdown for the whole rollout. The
> average deceleration achieved during this landing phase was 0.15g.
It was consistent
> with:
> - the wet condition of the runway;
> - the 4 MLG front wheel tyre burst;
> - the non-deployment of the engine thrust reversers.
>
> The runway overrun occurred at 85kt in a right turn sideslip attitude resulting from right
> rudder pedal inputs. The aircraft finally came to a rest at about 200m from the runway
> end. All passengers and crew members were safely evacuated.
>
> At this stage of the investigation, Airbus reminds operators to comply with Standard
> Operating Procedure to achieve stabilized approach conditions. Go-around must be
> initiated if the stabilized conditions are not met at defined altitudes.
> Airbus also reminds, that under certain conditions a G/S or a Glide Path Angle not
> guarantee a stabilized approach.
> The engagement of A/THR is fully recomended for al flight phases, regarding the Pilot
> as the last responsible of its correct operation and use.
>
> Futher update will be provided through the normal communication channel to
> customers.
>
>
> YANNICK MALINGE
> VICE PRESIDENT FLIGHT SAFETY
> AIRBUS
>
>
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>

[Huck]

As programed, the THS froze at 100ft,

What is that?

[Clarence Oveur]

As programed, the THS froze at 100ft,What is that?Trimmable Horizontal Stabiliser. It's Airbus speak for stab trim.

[Griffone]

Merci beaucoup,

My fingers are very fast.

And I not doing any wrong because this telex was never sent, was a Draft.

I think it is important, because Airbus and Iberia are going to blame the pilot, and this aircraft model is not suitable for fields above 5500 feet.

Adieu

[Doors to Automatic]

The thrust reversers were selected but did not deploy because the GROUND condition monitored by the Engines Control Computers was not fulfilled due to the above mentioned sensors loom damage. For the same reason, engines stayed at FLIGHT IDLE instead of GROUND IDLE.


Surely this is a serious design fault? Is there no override function or are the pilots simply expected to become passengers?

[Chris Scott]

This is to provide a simulation of the elevator control forces (as felt by the pilot) during the landing flare on a conventional aeroplane. Prior to that, Normal Law constantly re-trims the "trimable" horizontal stabiliser every time the pilot selects a new pitch angle, the IAS changes, or the wing is reconfigured.

Hope this helps.

[Chris Scott]

Doors to Automatic, you might like to know that the provision of ground idle (as opposed to flight idle) for landing and taxying is a relatively recent thing (25 years). If it was possible to select it in the air, it might compromise the engines.

Similarly, selection of reverse thrust in the air went out with the Spey-powered Trident. [It used to enable an excrutiating rate of descent, I believe.]

I doubt that the certification authorities would allow an override, making it possible for either to be selected in the air. In this case, the aeroplane had every reason to "think" it was still airborne. Just as well the ground-spoilers deployed, or the brakes would have been even less effective...

[Anotherflapoperator]

Perhaps nose gear sensors might have helped. however, if they do blame the pilot, can you remember being taught not to do "Dirty Dives" in primary flight training? Perhaps this example will remind us all of that maxim.

[Huck]

I would humbly submit that landing that type of aircraft in Quito with a 6-knot tailwind will always involve a Dirty Dive.....

(See previous threads for description of PAPI vs. Glideslope there.)

[dudleydick]

think it is important, because Airbus and Iberia are going to blame the pilot, and this aircraft model is not suitable for fields above 5500 feet.

Do not SAA fly this type out of FAJS which is tad higher than 5500ft?

[TyroPicard]

Could someone post the LDR under those conditions?
TP

[wiggy]

Just asking - is 249 tonnes a typical landing weight for the A340-600?

[eagle21]

Well I have never flown such a heavy jet at such elevation, but in this whole matter there is one piece of information that rings bells in my mind:

GS189 so ROD for a 3 degree path = 1000ft/min, this must require a big derotation and lots of anticipation.

It just doesn't sound possible to be stable on this approach at any time if at minimums you decide to land 500 shorter.

What is the required LDA for a WET RWY 35 with 10kts TW at Quito???

Maybe is also time to make this airbus planes a little bit more logical, I mean , spoilers deployed, pilot demanding reverse , tyres burst ( it would help if they had a pressure indiation/sensor), RA reading O, angle of attack constant and speed decreasing, pilot braking to the maximum,

How many more clues does an airbus need to know that it is on the ground???

[barit1]

I think it is important, because Airbus and Iberia are going to blame the pilot, and this aircraft model is not suitable for fields above 5500 feet.

How can Iberia place blame on the pilot, if it's Iberia that's scheduling an unsuitable aircraft into the Quito 9198ft. airfield elevation?

Seems to me there was a disconnect back in Madrid long before the ground proximity detectors became disconnected.

[mustafagander]

Wildly unstable approach, very high density altitude, tail wind, wet runway. It seems to me that the pilot ought to carry at least a teensy bit of blame, wouldn't you say?

[PA38-Pilot]

How many more clues does an airbus need to know that it is on the ground???Probably NOT crashing into the runway would help ;) (sorry, but a 3g "landing" isn't a landing anymore...)

[Chris Scott]

This thread has certainly given opportunity for the Airbus-knockers to get on-song again... One wonders if there might be a covert budget somewhere in Seattle! Ever since Airbus pioneered civil FBW (roll spoilers) and ECAM on the A310, 25 years ago, the wise guys have been taking the Mickey out of Airbus logic.

I also loved eagle21's sharp turn of phrase, though, and there's a lot in what he/she says. No doubt Airbus will be looking at their "aircraft on the ground and staying there" sensing logic, and considering introducing some more 'AND'-gates and 'OR'-gates. There's certainly not a shortage of available sensors. How can a non-VTOL aeroplane maintain 1g (vertical) at a negligible angle of attack (and IAS) if airborne?

Can Boeing aficionados assure us, however, of the infallibility of Boeing's logic in similar scenarios?

This aeroplane was indeed crippled, and the nose-gear weight switches (yes, they are fitted, but used for other systems) are arguably more vulnerable than the main-gear ones.

As for the mysterious Griffone, of dubious intent, he must be gutted that he was the leaker of non-news. But Airbus needs to avoid any accusations of being less than transparent, as in the A340 engine-run accident at Blagnac.

[poorwanderingwun]

Assuming that the fax is a reasonably fair assessment of events It's difficult to see how the guys up front can be totally absolved from this one... with the best will in the world it would appear that this accident began when the approach was commenced... A ppl with a whizz wheel could have calculated the effects of altitude/tail-wind on TAS... then factored for a wet runway... the dive to intercept the PAPIS/VASIS or whetever should have been the final wake-up call, after all this was never going to be a laid back approach... the pulses must have been racing .. what happened after the 'landing' re the unavailablility of some systems can be laid at the door of AI... heavy landing or not, a couple of broken undercarriage pieces should not turn an incident into a catastrophic accident... these won't be the last guys to screw up.

[Bellerophon]

Chris Scott

...Similarly, selection of reverse thrust in the air went out with the Spey-powered Trident...

Hmm....could have sworn I was still using reverse thrust in the air, on a four-engined passenger jet, until about five years ago. ;)


...Ever since Airbus pioneered civil FBW (roll spoilers) and ECAM on the A310, 25 years ago...

FBW (all control surfaces) was in use on (the same) civilian jet aircraft long before 1983.

Can't deny the Airbus heritage though!


Regards

Bellerophon

[eagle21]

PA38-PilotQuote:
How many more clues does an airbus need to know that it is on the ground???

Probably NOT crashing into the runway would help (sorry, but a 3g "landing" isn't a landing anymore...)

Chris ScottHow can a non-VTOL aeroplane maintain 1g (vertical) at a negligible angle of attack (and IAS) if airborne?


More reasons why the plane should assume it is on the ground when combined together.

Chris Scott Ialso loved eagle21's sharp turn of phrase, though, and there's a lot in what he/she says

The thing is the pilots might have made an error, but the way the aicraft is designned did not help to recover this situation.
I am also an airbus pilot and sometimes it worries me that there have been many accidents in the past and there will be in future due what they call lack of understanding of the systems from the pilots side, but this is not always the case.

When people say that the airbus is an easy to fly plane they simly don't know what they are talking about , it is a serious step in aircraft design and we are still adjusting to it.

As an example: http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=20010207-0

As the crew applied TOGA power for a go-around, with both pilots pulling back on their sidesticks, the alpha protection law reduced the elevator nose-up command. Instead of a go- around, the aircraft struck the runway with a vertical speed of approx. 1,200 fpm.

This incident prompted Airbus to develop a modification to its flight control software. It will prevent the airplane's built-in protection against stall from being activated by a high rate of change in angle of attack

[J.O.]

The blather about him posting a confidential message is a waste of time. He is not posting anything confidential. I received the same AIT from the Airbus flight safety department on December 18, 2007. It is exactly as written in the opening posting of this thread.

When you crash an airplane onto the runway at over twice the normal rate of descent and G load, you must expect that stuff is going to break and not work exactly as designed. Blaming the pilot may be the easy thing to do, but it won't change the fact that the decision to send an A340, or any other heavy jet, into Quito in those conditions is an accident waiting to happen. If the stories are true, this operator had other landing incidents at Quito in the days and months leading up to this accident. The fact that they didn't see these events as a reason to rethink the plan is where the investigation should really be focussed.

[PositiveRate876]

What is the required LDA for a WET RWY 35 with 10kts TW at Quito???

I don't fly an A340-600, so I used the book for A340-500 in an overweight landing condition.

-255t (Accident A/C 249t)
-No autobrake or reverse credit
-Wet figures
-10kt tailwind
-9200ft elevation

Result: 2638m (which is just off the far end of the pavement)

actual landing distance to a complete stop from a point 50 feet above the landing surface with no margin included. (As done by an Airbus test pilot in Toulouse and without the 'Oh ****" factor)

[Strongresolve]

Is true, I work for a company that operates A320 and I have received the same AIT, but mine have some lines less.

I dont have anything about "The THS froze at 100 ft..." and "The A/THR commanded IDLE pwr..."

This clearly reflects behavior of this plane during a critical phase of the landing and the flare, rather than behavior of the pilots.

Here in Spain, I have listen stories of Iberia A340-600 crew having problems to reduce the rate of descente during the flare in high altitude fields, like Bogotá, touching hard the runway with the side stick in the full back position and with TOGA power.

I also know that Iberia has banned the A340-600 in Quito, and that Iberia´s A340 Crews have no information of what have really happened there. The company only have diseminated a four sheet presentation with almost no technical info, that only explains that the accident has been due to a hard landing. Only with the AIT, I have more information than them.

In response the crews are only landing in Quito with the A340-300 with dry runway, good visibility and headwind. If this conditions are not meet, they are diverting to Guayaquil.

[golfyankeesierra]

actual landing distance to a complete stop from a point 50 feet above the landing surface with no margin included. (As done by an Airbus test pilot in Toulouse and without the 'Oh ****" factor)
But without 5 secs delay in manual braking. 5 secs! Thats a long way when going at 189 kts.

BTW re "dirty dive": it has certainly been SOP for many years at UIO to follow the G/S and once visual aim at PAPI and normal t/d zone. Nothing wrong about that.
In fact it's the only way to get a heavy in there!

There is a youtube video somewhere about a KLM MD-11 approach into UIO.
That gives you an impression.
(Where I am now, you tube is blocked).

[Chris Scott]

Sorry, Bellerophon, you have the advantage on me, and I give up. Which 4-engined passenger jet are you referring to? I think it may have been possible (but forbidden) to select reverse in the air on some 1960s/70s types, but FBW on all surfaces?

Hi, eagle21, I agree the A320 and descendants are not perfect. The sidestick has limitations (e.g., you can easily command some pitch accidentally when you only want roll). With autothrottle, I never did like the non-driven throttle levers, even after 13 years of flying them (although they are brilliant in manual thrust). But the overall package takes a lot of beating.

I hope the Boeing drivers/engineers will not overlook my request for a comparison between B777 and A340/A330 logic in the weight-switches-broken-on-landing scenario.

[J.O.]

BTW re "dirty dive": it has certainly been SOP for many years at UIO to leave the G/S and once visual aim at PAPI. Nothing wrong about that.
In fact it's the only way to get a heavy in there!

Just because it's always been done that way doesn't make it right. Almost every airline in the western world has maintained the "stabilized approach" concept as an integral part of their SOP for some time now, because they recognize the safety implications of dive and drive approaches. To ignore the basic principles of the stabilized approach concept because "it's the only way to get a heavy in there" is to ask for an accident.

[A-3TWENTY]

I`ve been there with the A-330 and with no problems at all, but I recognize this is a runway which requires extreme care.<

I fully understand the position of the Captain regarding to touch in the very begining of the runway since during the last 400,,500 mts the runway is very contaminated with rubber and deposits , and it is not uncommon to feel the antiskid releasing the wheels at speeds as low as 60, 70 kts when the runway is wet which was the case.

175kts -185 kts are common TAs during final...

And circling to runway 17 is not the best things to do with a heavy during daylight...imagine at night...

Poor guy...A lot of headache...

[PA38-Pilot]

Sorry, Bellerophon, you have the advantage on me, and I give up. Which 4-engined passenger jet are you referring to? I think it may have been possible (but forbidden) to select reverse in the air on some 1960s/70s types, but FBW on all surfaces?

Im quite sure he's talking about the pointy one ;)

[NigelOnDraft]

Sorry, Bellerophon, you have the advantage on me, and I give up. Which 4-engined passenger jet are you referring to? I think it may have been possible (but forbidden) to select reverse in the air on some 1960s/70s types, but FBW on all surfaces?The clues are there ;) Airbus "heritage"... until 5 years ago... :oh:

[Chris Scott]

Ah, the pointy one. And the car alarms going off. Halcyon days... Never would have guessed I was in such distinguished (analog) company.

But reverse in the air? :hmm:

[SeenItAll]

It will be very interesting to compare this landing of the IB A346 at UIO at a vertical descent of 19 fps with the descent parameters of the BA B777 at LHR.

Although the reasons for each accident's initiation appear to have been quite different, both aircraft structures seem to have experienced similar physical challenges in dealing with the landing -- fast descent, broken MLG, IB: no significant reverse thrust, BA: no significant thrust at all.

Both likely to be a trove of comparative information about these planes' structural failure modes.

[golfyankeesierra]

@J.O.
Just because it's always been done that way doesn't make it right. Almost every airline in the western world has maintained the "stabilized approach" concept as an integral part of their SOP for some time now, because they recognize the safety implications of dive and drive approaches. To ignore the basic principles of the stabilized approach concept because "it's the only way to get a heavy in there" is to ask for an accident.

The approach I talk about is NOT a dive and drive approach as you call it.
There are 2 glidepath's, one ILS and one visual. The idea is to transfer at the DA (650') to the visual PAPI glideslope and aim at the normal touchdownzone.
And not to make a stukadive to the threshold in order to cross that at 1 ft.
That's what I call a dive approach.

Of course I agree on the concept of stabilized approaches but there are some airports where the reality is a little bit more challenging. So your airline puts you in the sim or on the jumpseat before you fly in there.

And of course UIO is a much more critical operation than your average 3500m sealevel runway but it's not less safe then say Kai Tak used to be.
Didn't hear many pilots object to that approach.

BTW several sinkrate-warnings on (short) final is not stabilized imho.

[golfyankeesierra]

It will be very interesting to compare this landing of the IB A346 at UIO at a vertical descent of 19 fps with the descent parameters of the BA B777 at LHR.
But there are large differences as well; the triple landed at low speed (stall speed? 100kts? any one?) in soft ground, and the Iberia at almost double speed (189kts GS) on concrete and on a considerable upslope.

Anyone remembers the upslope of the beginning of UIO 35?

[Strongresolve]

SEQU

RWY 35 SLOPE +0,4% LDA ILS 2610m LDA PAPI 3120m

ILS SLOPE 3,2º PAPI SLOPE 3,1º

DIFERENCE OF MAXIMUM LANDING WEIGHT A340E ILS VS PAPI (X1000KG)

ILS DRY WIND CALM 200.8 FULL FLAP
ILS WET WIND CALM 179.0 FULL FLAP

PAPI DRY WIND CALM 227.1 FULL FLAP
PAPI WET WIND CALM 206.4 FULL PLAP

PER 5 KNTS TAIL WIND SUBSTRACT APROX -11.0 (DRY AND WET)

A340E MLW IS 190.0 (X 1000 KG.)

[Doors to Automatic]

Surely the logic could be programmed such that if Radio Alt =0 and/or Airspeed < say 120kts allow thrust over-ride.

This would allow an emergency over-ride in the event of an occasional 3g landing (which takes out the sensors) and avoid write-off of aircraft and/or casualties whilst not allowing anything stupid to be done in the air.

Sound reasonable?

[Check Airman]

I entirely agree that the plane could have been "smarter" so that it could sense that it was on the ground (pilot applying brakes, selecting reversers, nosewheel weight etc...), but I wonder if a Boeing would be any smarter? In either event, I'm not trying to start an Airbus/Boeing debate. Remember that with each added level of complexity to the air/ground sensing, there's something else to go wrong.

I wonder what people think of having a reverser override, or air/ground override switch? It would obviously have to be guarded, but I think it may have saved the day (if not the tires) in Quito.

Also I'm not going to dwell on the tailwind too much. Whenever a pilot lands with a tailwind, people are ready to jump down his throat. Yes, a headwind is better, but sometimes the bigger picture dictates that you take the tailwind.

[Check Airman]

Sensible suggestion Doors to Auto, but I see that for good reason, you've chosen a reasonably low speed. Remember that reversers become less effective as you slow down, so that speed would best be a bit higher...but then you loose the protection...:}

[Mad (Flt) Scientist]

Surely the logic could be programmed such that if Radio Alt =0 and/or Airspeed < say 120kts allow thrust over-ride.


And if the radalt fails? That then allows inadvertent TR deployment in-air. (if it's an OR gate).

The existing systems for determining the "on ground" state are intentionally complex in order to minimise the risk of inadvertent in-air deployment, even in the event of (possibly dormant) system failures. The hazard associated with in-air deployment is, for most types, severe. The hazard of failure to deploy on-ground is IN GENERAL small - because normal planning factors have sufficient margin to account for failure (or non-use) of reversers. Therefore the correct risk management approach is to bias the design to address the in-air problem, not the on-ground one.

[Togalk]

I fly this Airplane all the time, it looks like to me, the boys screwed up, plain and simple.

[mustpost]

As SLF just putting in my tuppence-worth. Indeed one notices how approaches have changed over the years - I still remember a TAP 707 into Faro 25 years ago which involved a "dirty dive" and a split arse landing :eek:.
I still wake up at night....

[Engine3firehandle]

There a lot of things to remember with high altitude airports and especially the A346.

GS times 5 gives you a very high sinkrate of almost 1000fpm. In my company this is the max allowed anyway (1000fpm).

Next problem is the pitch at touchdown without a tailstrike. If you try to continue on the visual glide and try to dugunder in no time your sink rate is at 1400 fpm. Reducing or breaking the sinkrate is the next problem. if you adjust the pitch to an +2 or more degrees over the normal attitude of your approach attitude. You just lost almost all of your pitch you got for doing a break and also beforehand your thrust was decreasing, because you are leaving the G/S to dugunder and the A/T systems things you got access power and reduces thrust. The autothrust is very slow in the reaction and I wouldn´t have used it in such an enviroment. ( But airbus thinks different about it )

So maybe the thrustsetting was not very high at touchdown and just the weight of the a/c was still pushing.

Do you know your powersetting by heart at 10.000 feet PA and please do not forget the adjustment for the DA ?
The power setting should have been way higher then a normal powersetting at the regular approaches. To ensure a safe touchdown this is an imminent information you got to think about beforehand.

You pull the power at 50 feet, the engine is spooling down faster then normal and your break because of the thin air has to be stronger or earlier. Stronger break means higher tailstrike risk. Powercut too early or too fast means hard landing. Too late means more landing distance.

The time between early or late is maybe a second.

If they did the break as normal, the a/c had to hit the runway hard.

I would like to know, if they have high altitude operation training in the sim missions at Iberia ?

This operation has definetely a very difficult landing and would have made me grey hair during my trip to the destination.

I just checked the data for my current jet and had to find out, that we do not have data for it. It stops at 8000feetPA.

[Engine3firehandle]

togalk,

if you fly the 346 all the time - fly the approach it in the sim.

Afterwards tell me, if the "sink rate" came on or not.

It seems you lost the respect for your aircraft, this is a dangerous thing to do.

By the way, I had been flying the A346, A333, A342 A343 and 333 and I am well aware of the dangers, but I believe it is a very safe aircraft which keeps you far away from the edges from the envelope.

But sometimes you get there also damn close to the boundary and might not be aware about it.

[Chris Scott]

[Sorry for the bad pun.] Quote from Check Airman:
I entirely agree that the plane could have been "smarter" so that it could sense that it was on the ground (pilot applying brakes, selecting reversers, nosewheel weight etc...), but I wonder if a Boeing would be any smarter? In either event, I'm not trying to start an Airbus/Boeing debate. Remember that with each added level of complexity to the air/ground sensing, there's something else to go wrong.
I wonder what people think of having a reverser override, or air/ground override switch? It would obviously have to be guarded, but I think it may have saved the day (if not the tires) in Quito.
[Unquote]

Bring the Boeing/Airbus debate on, I say. Let you operational people (and even us ROFs) call both the megaplane companies to account. But let's leave out rhetoric and stereotyping, please, not to mention cheap jibes. Many of us have earned our crusts flying products from both sides of the pond. We might knock some sense into both of them... Actually, I won't be surprised if there's little difference in their ground/flight sensing, and how it affects this incident.

A guarded and wire-locked ground/flight switch would be difficult to reach and select on a bumpy runway. It took them 5 seconds after touchdown to recognise that autobrake had not kicked in on schedule, and to apply the brakes manually. A switch would take much longer.

In those circumstances, waiting for the IAS to reduce from 150 to 120 kts would use a lot of runway, and, when it became available, its deceleration force would already be lower than at (say) IAS 145. Fan reverse is not very effective anyway (but at least you're not getting forward thrust).

Quote from Mad (Flt) Scientist:
The existing systems for determining the "on ground" state are intentionally complex in order to minimise the risk of inadvertent in-air deployment, even in the event of (possibly dormant) system failures. The hazard associated with in-air deployment is, for most types, severe. The hazard of failure to deploy on-ground is IN GENERAL small - because normal planning factors have sufficient margin to account for failure (or non-use) of reversers.
[Unquote]

True. The three things missing were autobrake, reverser capability, and ground-idle. Ground-spoilers deployed, because the main-wheel spin-up sensors worked (luckily). Can someone remind us why main-wheel spin-up triggers ground spoilers, but is not used to enable reverser selection?

If any relaxation is warranted, perhaps it could involve vertical g and alpha. Once the nose is down, let's assume alpha stabilises at about zero (not like the B707...). In normal flight, wings level, this would inevitably involve a dramatic fall in vertical g from 1 towards 0. [Like the vomit-comet.] This wouldn't happen on the ground. Bumps could be averaged out, and humps do not drop the g that much.

Airbus might also consider using the existing nose-gear weight switches, which I don't think are used for this purpose. But the pilot would initially have to use forward stick to ensure the nose gear remained firmly on the ground, and might this reduce the effectiveness of the (main-gear) brakes on a wet runway?

[aerostatic]

but I wonder if a Boeing would be any smarter?

I know nothing about this airport and do not fly airbus aircraft but since the question has been asked...on the B737 reverse thrust can be engaged with the air/ground sensor in ground mode *or* rad altitude < 10 feet. So in that respect my answer would be yes, smarter. Can't comment on other Boeing types.

However this accident will no doubt be found to have multiple contributing factors. Let's face it the 'error producing conditions' were numerous - high altitude airport, high weight, tailwind, night, wet runway, low visibility, ILS G/S not aligned to normal aiming point. And those are only some of the ones we already know about. Glad I don't fly there.

[old fart]

"Is true, I work for a company that operates A320 and I have received the same AIT, but mine have some lines less.

I dont have anything about "The THS froze at 100 ft..." and "The A/THR commanded IDLE pwr..."


Just wondering why an Airbus operator would delete the above from an AIT?


Cheers.

[Strongresolve]

I know from my friends in Iberia that they train a lot in Quito, but only with tha A340-300, because they dont have a sim of the -600.

The Pilots Union and the Safety Dep. of the company have requested that one of the two sesions of each year will be on a A340-600 sim, but the company response is that another sim of the -600 is very expensive.

One of the Sims of Iberia is compatible with the A340-600, but the conversion and the new software costs 3 Millions of Euro, also expensive in terms of the company.

They prefer to risk another plane in places like Bogotá (SKBO) San Jose (MROC) and Guatemala (MGGT) rather than pay the 3 Million Euros. I think that maybe the cost of the insurance is less, and they will be earning money if the lost another plane.

[RECSAM]

I know very little about the A340, or Iberia operating procedures, or Quito airport. But imho one thing sticks out here: the PAPI seems not to follow the same approach path as the ILS glidepath on this runway. So breaking cloud at DH, previously aiming for a displaced threshold, pilot now looking out and the aircraft is 'high' on approach according to PAPI which are now directing the landing onto the real threshold. Can one be surprised that a heavy landing might follow?

[His dudeness]

Excuse me,

but if these numbers are correct:

RWY 35 SLOPE +0,4% LDA ILS 2610m LDA PAPI 3120m
ILS SLOPE 3,2º PAPI SLOPE 3,1º
DIFERENCE OF MAXIMUM LANDING WEIGHT A340E ILS VS PAPI (X1000KG)
ILS DRY WIND CALM 200.8 FULL FLAP
ILS WET WIND CALM 179.0 FULL FLAP
PAPI DRY WIND CALM 227.1 FULL FLAP
PAPI WET WIND CALM 206.4 FULL PLAP
PER 5 KNTS TAIL WIND SUBSTRACT APROX -11.0 (DRY AND WET)
A340E MLW IS 190.0 (X 1000 KG.)

How could he attempt to land at 249tons ? Or are these wrong?

[CONF iture]

Because those numbers give an interesting comparison between ILS and PAPI perf, but apply to a quite different type.
A 346 can be almost 100 tons heavier than a 340E

[fkair]

Hey guys and girls;

I am entering the discussion late, yet my two cents on this is that Quito it is an hard place to land in good condition with a good app. No matter who you are coming into Quito you will always get all the good alarm about terrain in short final because of the building coming up. I have flown several times there with several different ways of doing and there is no easy way. While wainting in line for take off we would always make jokes of the aircraft approaching and talked that one day one would be off the runway.

My two cents

[pasoundman]

Griffone
The thrust reversers were selected but did not deploy because the GROUND condition monitored by the Engines Control Computers was not fulfilled due to the above mentioned sensors loom damage. For the same reason, engines stayed at FLIGHT IDLE instead of GROUND IDLE.


There seem to be a design oversight here in that a failed sensor (loom) is allowed to prevent a critical system from functioning.

It strikes me as a case of 'fail unsafe'.

[Chris Scott]

Quote from pasoundman:
There seem to be a design oversight here in that a failed sensor (loom) is allowed to prevent a critical system from functioning.
It strikes me as a case of 'fail unsafe'.
[Unquote]

Can I refer you, and other newcomers to this aspect of the debate, to the following posts, which give various opinions: #8, #9, #18-20, #22, #27, #37-40,#45 and #46. It's worth the effort.

Hope this helps... :)

[slatch]

C-17's can put all four engines in reverse idle for tactical descents....If you ever get a chance to experiance it go for it. Some DC-8's can reverse engines 2 and 3 inflight. And of course the Shuttle Simulator Gulfstream does it also.....

[Iceman49]

On the C5 you could also put the inboard reversers out in flight...no one did it, because the possibility they would stay out.

[Strongresolve]

NEW DATA.

I triying to obtain the Iberia Landing Tables of the IBE A340-600 in Quito.
Meanwhile I have the procedure from the Flight Manual to calculate the RLD.
I been using round numbers.

REQUIRED LANDING DISTANCE A340-600 RWY35 QUITO. (No Rev)

WEIGHT 249 Tons.
.................................................DRY........ ................ WET
Sea Level ................................2034,6m.................. 2339,5m
Incr 8% 6 KTS Tail Wind .............2196,0m.................. 2526,6m
Incr 36% 9100´ Quito Alt. ..........2987,5m .................3436,1m
W Rev. Decr 7%Dry/19%Wet ......2792,0m .................2783,2m

As you can see the Iberia Max Landing Weight in Quito with 5Kts, Wet RWY is far beyond 249 Tons (But no so far), as they make the calculations with reversers, and apply a LDA of 3120m.
Also, as you can see is impossible to land this A/C following the ILS App. LDA 2610m.

Following the QRH procedure, the Actual Landing Distances for 249 Tons are:

DRY 1797,0m the procedure has a correction for rev use 1679,4m
WET 2679,6m with the correction for reversers use 2251,7m

Also is not possible to use de ILS LDA for an emergency landing.
I dont know why, but RLD doesnt mach with the ALD applying the 1,67 increase for Req Landing Dist, and the 1,15 incrs for Wet Rwy. They are very similar in Dry Rwy, but differs a lot in Wet Rwy.

Is well clear that if Iberia/Airbus tables and charts doesnt lie, this is a very difficult landing with this kind of A/C. Is just a boundary operation in landing performance, and this is also a boundary operation in final approach performance, meaning the high rate of descente, the high GS, high elevation and altitude of the A/C, A/THR operation, and how this is going to affect the transitions between the Normal and Direct flght Laws of the FBW Control System during the flare.
As someone has said, you cant expect a normal response of this A/C in this situation. Probably Airbus needs to establish new procedures, as flying this aircraft in final approach manually and without A/THR, and planning a Go Around if you have Tail wind and the Rwy is wet.

[ChristiaanJ]

Ah, the pointy one. And the car alarms going off. Halcyon days... Never would have guessed I was in such distinguished (analog) company.
But reverse in the air?Yes, but only on the two inboards, and at little more than flight idle. Enough for over 10,000 ft/min descent rate, though.

[broadreach]

YouTube have quite a number of Quito cockpit videos. This one http://au.youtube.com/watch?v=0zku7Z8VVYY&feature=related (KLM Cockpit Video #1 - Bonaire-Quito) is instructive despite the music and jerky filming; note the height callouts just prior to touchdown.

[MoodyBlue]

This video is absolutely fantastic. Be aware, however, that the approach to Quito that is shown is not the ILS to rwy 35 but the circling to rwy 17. First overhead the field from QIT VOR, then the ILS-letdown, then the LH circling to rwy 17. Fantastic flying.

[ChristiaanJ]

Oh, and re Concorde in-flight reverse.
Whoever wrote the entry for the flying manual must have had a sense of humour....

"Maximum period of use, 4 minutes."

[YRP]

Not to be slow or nothing, but why is that ChristianJ? After 4 minutes, you'd be down at ground level?

[ChristiaanJ]

Not to be slow or nothing, but why is that ChristianJ? After 4 minutes, you'd be down at ground level?You got it in one :)
Upper right corner of the in-flight reverse envelope is 30,000 ft and 370 kts IAS,
so with about 10,000 ft/min, you can do the sums....

[alf5071h]

Many aspects of this accident were discussed here:- http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=299739

However, the following safety issues are reiterated:
An IFR approach should not require a duck under maneuver and should therefore plan to use the displaced (ILS) landing distances. Duck under has additional hazards at high altitude due to higher ground speeds and possible increased pitch inertia.
The chart should warn of the difference in the PAPI location; note that the single PAPI installation may not be of any value to the long bodied A340, which if crews follow the visual guidance may have reduced threshold crossing height.
No stable IFR approach should encounter an EGPWS alert or warning; every alert should be heeded.

[Strongresolve]

The plane has been writen off as hull loss.

The plane had a 30% of damage, and Musini, the Insurance Company wanted to recover it, but Iberia and Airbus has said that the damage is so big, that is better to save all usable elements and avionics that remain intact, and chop in site the rest.

Iberia, as usual, keeps quiet.