WW2 Night Bomber Formations

[meadowbank]

Can anyone provide information (or link thereto) regarding the 'mechanics' of putting together large RAF night-bomber raids?

I've seen film of the silhouettes of other bombers photographed against a backdrop of fires on the ground and am intrigued to know what measures were in place to prevent fratricide caused by falling bombs.

[walter kennedy]

I would have thought that "fratricide caused by falling bombs" was the objective - carpet bombing Saxon cities? :E

[Magic Mushroom]

Meadowbank,

The definitive resource concerning the evolution of Bomber Command tactics during WWII is 'The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, 1939-45' Volumes I-IV. This is the official history of the campaign completed over 15 years by Sir Charles Webster and Dr Noble Frankland.

For a more concise study, I'd recommend 'Bomber Command' by Max Hastings, any of Sir Martin Middlebrook's books on specific periods in the campaign, or 'The Bomber Command War Diaries: an Operational record Book 1939-45' by Middlebrook and Chris Everitt.

In essence the period up to early 1942 was chaotic with both sides limited by an absence of technology and RAF aircraft simply routed to their targets as they wished over a period that could extend for several hours. Faced with the increasing lethality of German defences facilitated by Kammhuber's 'Himmelbett' C2 system of radar guided searchlights and nightfighters, Harris introduced the bomber stream from March 42 which concentrated attacks and sought to overwhelm defences. Augmented by increasing use of EW, the Pathfinder Force and diversionary raids, the bomber stream was maintained throughout the remainder of the War.

Some attempts at vertical deconfliction were attempted but it was largely down to individual crews. Indeed, more experienced crews would regularly change altitudes to confuse Luftwaffe fighter controllers. Generally speaking the Lancasters and Halifax IIIs flew at the highest levels of around 18-22 000 ft with earlier Halifax variants and Stirlings only capable of maintaining much lower altitudes. Later, the Stirlings and older Halifaxes were withdrawn from the main force due to losses whilst a small number of 100 Group Fortresses and Liberators were tasked at higher altitudes for active ECM. meanwhile 'Master Bombers' (sometimes referred to as the Master of Ceremonies (MC)) mostly flying in Mosquitoes and Mustangs would fly at even lower levels over the target, sometimes down to rooftop height and direct and/or correct the aim of the main force as bombs dropped around them!!!!! Sir Leonard Cheshire was an example of one such MC. The one cardinal rule was to avoid flying across or against the bomber stream. Additionally, leaving the bomber stream would deny the protection from German GCI, radar laid AAA and nightfighters afforded by 'Window' (chaff) dropping.

In short then, night bomber crews employed the big sky theory to avoid bombs being dropped from above!!:uhoh:

Which reminds me, if the Land Army and Lumberjill girls can have a commemorative badge, when are the Bomber Command guys going to get a campaign medal?:mad:

Hope the above is of use,

Regards,
MM

[ZH875]

Walter, are you sure that it wasn't little green men with weird radio's controlling the direction that the bombs went in, ensuring they missed friendly aircraft. Apparently 75% of bombing raids on France were not necessary, just blooming good sport.

[LowObservable]

One of Alfred Price's books had a scale drawing of the bomber "stream" with one very small Lancaster at the top of the page and another at the bottom.

[Been Accounting]

I seem to remember a photo of a 37 Sqn aircraft that was hit by a bomb in the rear fuselage. The photo was a demonstation of the strength of the Wellington's structure.

[Been Accounting]

I just found this - but it's not the story I remember!

http://carol_fus.tripod.com/raf_hero_jrobertson.html

[mr fish]

for the mechanics and results(for the raf AND german civilians) you must read 'INFERNO' by keith lowe. released last year and just about the best non technical account of the 'battle of hamburg'. pretty harrowing but a great read all the same!!!

[walter kennedy]

ZH875
Nothing "weird" about a PRC112 - very common piece of kit and simple to use - or mis-use.

[Pontius Navigator]

From a different forum I saw a question about altitudes and pressure settings.

I then contacted a Lanc Nav.

While the heights quoted 18-22 were no doubt ideal it was not always that high.

He remembers bombing as low as 12000ft. Essentially below cloud. It would also confuse if the fighters were trying to intercept the stream but were 10000ft two high.

There is another book I am reading I'll try and see wht he says.

[Magic Mushroom]

PN,

You're absolutely correct, Lancs and Halifax IIIs would often be lower dependent upon met and load up. I was just trying to give a very broad indication.

Regards,
MM

[rolling20]

In Max Hastings Bomber Command when the first 'Thousand Bomber Raid' was briefed on Cologne ,the crews were told that 'no more than two aircraft would collide over the target area', ( as computed by Bomber Command Boffins) some bright spark asked if they knew which two!!
The crews would intially climb for height over base, then meet @ a pre -arranged height and point, always climbing for height. It could take a fully loaded Lanc an hour or more to get to 20,000 feet, by which time they could be over the enemy coast.
Different groups would be assigned heights, according to weight and aircraft type etc.. It was not unkown for aircraft to let bombs go over the sea in order to gain more height.
Over the target it wasnt unusual for aircraft to be 'showered' with incendiaries as there were literally thousands of them being dropped. Cases of aircraft being hit by bombs were not unusual and as we have seen on here, returned home to tell the tale!
Aicraft being hit by exploding bombs were rarer due to the arming fuse not being fully armed on its intial descent. There were often stories of aircraft being bought down by others which had received a direct hit from Flak.
Bomber Command crews believed that 'Scarecrow Flares' were used ( in a kind of Psychological Warfare), that were ment to resemble a fully laden aircraft blowing up! In essence, this is what it was , as there was no evidence of the Germans using such a device.

As a rule the Bomber Stream ment safety , although Nightfighters got into 'the Stream' on occasions. Some pilots such as Micky Martin would fly at low level to the target, gain height to bomb, then back down to low level home.

[Magic Mushroom]

The scarecrow shells rumour originated from the use of upward firing 'Schräge Musik' (Jazz Music) cannons in Luftwaffe nightfighters. These didn't use tracer bullets as attacks were carried out at close range and very few bombers attacked in this method survived.

As a result, crews returning from ops did not report seeing the tracer fire which characterised engagements by Luftwaffe fighters using their forward firing weapons. It was therefore assumed that the explosions were simply pyrotechnic shells fired to give the impression of exploding bombers, or to intimidate aircrew; hence 'Scarecrows'.

German records proved that no such shells were employed and it is now generally accepted that scarecrows were indeed mostly bombers exploding after having been engaged at short range from below. Luftwaffe statistics suggest that over 80% of RAF bombers dispatched during the 1943-44 Berlin campaign were killed by Schräge Musik.

Regards,
MM

[Jetex Jim]

Schräge Musik...I do not believe I had ever heard of the upward firing guns from Luftwaffe until the last few years.

Described in great detail in 'Bomber' by Len Deighton, published 1970 and by FJ Dyson, in the chapter "The Children's Crusade" in Disturbing the Universe, 1979

[Magic Mushroom]

Here's a pic of Schrage Musik cannons on the upper fuselage behind the cockpit of a Ju-88 nightfighter.

http://i151.photobucket.com/albums/s127/Magic_Mushroom_photos/ju88g6a-b.jpg

[MadsDad]

I remember many years ago reading a book about Bomber Command* where it described a briefing for of the first of the mass raids where they were trying to 'compact' the stream, for a shorter time over the target. After the briefing was over there was concern amongst the crews about the dangers of collision with so many aircraft in such a small piece of air and a question was asked about it. The reply was something like "Ah, yes. The boffins have been looking at this and have assured us that, statistically, there should be only one collision. And we have also been informed that that will be between two Tiger Moths, somewhere near Lowestoft".

(* Title and authors name lost long ago to the mists of time).

[Hipper]

I understand the Luftwaffe did actually use flares in order to light up the bombers.

From what I've read the aircrews kept a very good look out for other aircraft, in particular the air gunners and the bomb aimer once his deed was done.

In the book RAF Bomber Stories edited by Martin W Bowman, there are decsriptions of a collision, and two bombs on other aircraft incidents with pictures.

[LowObservable]

My brain is turning to mush. When the subject came up it niggled me that I had read something somewhere. Here it is:

http://www.technologyreview.com/printer_friendly_article.aspx?id=17724

The great Dr Dyson answers all questions. There are two parts to this story, the link to Part II being in the footnote.

[Magic Mushroom]

Hipper,

Luftwaffe He-177, Do-217 and Ju-88 bombers in particular were used to drop flares over the bomber stream. This was a tactic employed to particularly help the Wilde Sau single engined night fighters who lacked radar.

Additionally, the Flak batteries fired false flares to mimic Pathfinder route and target marking although they struggled to accurately replicate several of the colours employed.

Regards,
MM

[mr fish]

i remember a conversation with a rear gunner many years ago , he told me they always tried to fly under the cloud cover as on moonlit nights it was easier for nightfighters to spot them against to cloud backdrop. he also said that sometimes they were so low he could smell the smoke and scorched flesh:eek::eek::eek:

[Fareastdriver]

To get an idea of what one would have to go through in the 8th Air Force try this one in Aviation History and Nostalgia.

Scares me - and I'm fearless!

However, in Bomber Command, flying on ops was a damned sight safer than training for it.

[meadowbank]

Thank you all for the information and references, especially LowObservable for the link, which was particularly interesting. Please continue to add anything on this or related subjects.

[Jetex Jim]

Dyson relates his experience in wartime Operational Research in the chapter The Children’s Crusade, in his book Disturbing the Universe. Much of it is repeated and in more technical detail in the links above.(post #21)

One anecdote from the book is worth repeating.
Following a raid on Frankfurt.- ..As usual, the impact points deduced from flash photographs were plotted on a map of the city with a three-mile circle drawn around the aiming point. The plot was supposed to go to the commander in chief together with our analysis of the raid. Our experts looked glumly at it for a few seconds then gave it back to the sergeant. “Awfully few bombs inside the circle.” someone said. “You’d better change that to a five-mile circle before it goes in.”

At least we can be sure that this kind of institutionalised self-deceit has no part in modern military thinking.

[Chugalug2]

However, in Bomber Command, flying on ops was a damned sight safer than training for it.

I'm sure that I'm not the only one mystified by your statement, Fareastdriver, and would appreciate an explanation of it. AFAIK the BC aircrew losses of plus 55,700 included approx 8000 in training. Fearsome figures indeed, and a lot of it down to CFIT, finger trouble, poor airmanship, sheer lack of experience, no doubt, with the enemy nowhere in sight. But more dangerous than Ops? WADR, I rather doubt it!

[clicker]

Just finished a book on the Nuremburg raid where 95 aircraft were lost. Mainly due to high unforecast winds and German aircraft getting two RV points that were on the bombers route.

Well worth a read if its still available.

Would love to see the plans for raids towards the end of the war when they would condense the bomber stream into a short space of time.

Planning for all the airfields aircraft to join the stream must have taken some working out.

[Hugh Spencer]

Well, I think between you all you have covered every aspect of the night bomber stream. Strict attention was given for the navigators to keep strictly to time otherwise we could have been in trouble. Very little deviation from the planned track was possible and even if you were in trouble you had to keep going. For so many aircraft to be concentrated into so little time over the target involved very tight planning. We didn't have too much trouble with that and the other thing was, all the crew had their eyes 'peeled' all around us all the time and especially when the bombaimer took control.

[om15]

The following three books describe the mechanics of the bombing operation,

RAF Bomber Command in the Second World War - The Hardest Victory by Denis Richards.

The Right of the Line by John Terraine.

Bomber Harris by Henry Probert.

The books by John Nicol do give insight to the people involved, also
" Lancaster Target" by Jack Currie, may not be in print now.

best regards, om15

[Chugalug2]

all the crew had their eyes 'peeled' all around us all the time and especially when the bombaimer took control.
A point made by one of you compatriots in the BBC Battlefields edition 'Bomber' featuring Prof. Richard Holmes, Hugh, to the extent that he found himself doing a full neck-swiveling scan in trains etc! The video can be seen at:
http://www.stage6.com/History---World-War-II/video/1995281/RAF-Bomber-Offensive
As you can see it requires a stage6 download, but is surely worth the effort. Bit off thread I'm afraid, but it gives an excellent overview of the Bomber Campaign. Surely time now for the medal and time for the memorial?

[Robert Cooper]

As I recall from my father most of his bombing was from between 10,000 and 15,000 depending on the target and his slot in the Main Force. Collisions over the target were not uncommon, and the crews in the aircraft in the lower layer did have to accept the fact that bombs were raining down from above. However, after 1943 the Master Bombers made their presence felt and things were a little more organized.

Another good book with prime source material is "The Bomber Offensive" by Anthony Verrier (1968).

Cheers, Bob C

[Pontius Navigator]

. “Awfully few bombs inside the circle.” someone said. “You’d better change that to a five-mile circle before it goes in.”

At least we can be sure that this kind of institutionalised self-deceit has no part in modern military thinking.

I would argue that a 5-mile circle was not spin but merely the use of an appropriate scale for the measurements involved.

Graphical displays have always been distorted, one from another, by the use of different scales.

Once accuracies had come down to 400 yards or so the use of even a 3-mile circle would have looked odd.

[wopag42]

Schräge Musik...I do not believe I had ever heard of the upward firing guns from Luftwaffe until the last few years.

Two questions.
Was the existance of this night fighter technique hidden from Bomber
crews as a matter of policy?
Why wern't belly turrets fitted to Lancs and Halis?

[Pontius Navigator]

Schräge Musik...Two questions.
Was the existance of this night fighter technique hidden from Bomber
crews as a matter of policy?

Why wern't belly turrets fitted to Lancs and Halis?

On your first question, I suspect it was not deliberately held back from the crews. My only reason for saying that is that the crews were not idiots. If one crew knew they would talk to another and so on. If they knew their intrep had been squashed I am sure that questions would have been asked. Pure speculation I admit.

The second is easier to answer.

The obvious reason would be Bomber Harris's refusal to compromise the massive bomb carrying capability for purely defensive armament. We may see this from the different approaches form the USAAF. They planned to fight their way through by day; Harris planned to deliver twice the bomb weight under cloak of darkness.

Another reason would be sheer lack if space. The bomb bay of both Halifax and Lancaster occupied almost the full length of the ventral part of the aircraft. When H2S was added it was sighted to the rear of the bomb bay.

I would imagine both the H2S and a putative ventral turret would have had adverse effects on the CofG. To have both would have required a shortening of the bomb bay and hence a reduction of bomb weight.

[stevef]

Some Lancasters were fitted with ventral turrets (Frazer Nash 64, twin Brownings) but generally the position was utilised for H2S. Garbett & Goulding's Lancaster at War 2 has cutaway and fuselage layout diagrams of this on the inside of both covers.

[wopag42]

I have not known any aircrew who knew of Schräge Musik until after the war. Of course, they did know of " scarecrows "!

Aircrew considerations were always a compromise with bomb load.
Look at the different approach adopted by the Americans, RCAF,
Luftwaffe and the RAF.
We had no need for ventral turrets before 1944, so the bomb load
argument doesn't apply. The H2S modules would have a similar effect
on bomb load but the more effective use of the bombs was more important than the small loss in weight.
When the Luftwaffe identified the Bomber's blind spot and took decisive
action, we could have mitigated this by fitting a ventral turret.
The argument that there was no room doesn't wash , if it was never seriously considered.
There would have been a reduction in bomb load, but so long as the losses were below 6% i.e. 120 to 200 aircrew lost per raid, it was not deemed necessary. The aircrew might have had a different opinion.

[clicker]

Seem to recall from the Nuremberg raid book that only one Canadian bomber group favoured the ventral gun position.

Martin Middlebrook wrote "Two of the 6 Group squadrons had been equipped with Lancasters and others being converted to the type. Some of these Lancasters were the comparatively rare radial-engined Mark II which had a mid-under or ventral gun position; the Canadians were also fitting similar gun positions into the bellies of its other aircraft as fast as they could get the nessessary conversion kits from the US".

Also regarding the Scarecrow he wrote "Bomber Command obviously accepted the Scarecrow story and a report dated April 1944 warned crews of 'the well known use by the enemy of Scarecrow flares and other pyrotechnic displays' The Scarecrows were also freely reported in the British press. It was ironic that the Scarecrow was officially accepted but the real danger of schrage Musik remained unknown for so long. Such are the futunes of war."

[rolling20]

The scarecrow shells rumour originated from the use of upward firing 'Schräge Musik' (Jazz Music) cannons in Luftwaffe nightfighters. These didn't use tracer bullets as attacks were carried out at close range and very few bombers attacked in this method survived

Have to disagree with you there MM. 'Schrage Musik' was used under the bomber and fired into the petrol tanks, where there was no armour plating.
The 'victim' usually burned very slowly at first, but gave the crew enough time in theory to bail out. Many x Luftwaffwe aircrew state they did this to give the crew a chance. The wing would eventually burn off or sometimes explode, but generally by then the aircraft was out of control and hopefully the crew had escaped.
If they took aim in the bomb bay, it would usually be the end for the attacking crew as well.

[EyesFront]

If I can add a recommendation to the books mentioned in this thread, "Most Secret War" by RV Jones is a fascinating account of the technology battle between the Germans and the Allies, particularly when it describes how the technical advantage swung between the two sides throughout the bomber offensive, and the changing tactics by the bomber streams and the defences. I'm not sure if it's in print now, but I could do with a new copy to replace my old dog-eared paperback. Another book in the same vein is "Instruments of Darkness" by Alfred Price. These books really set out the ground rules for electronic warfare as practiced in all subsequent air offensives.

(Edited for typos)

[Kieron Kirk]

Have to agree with EyesFront as to the books "Most Secret War" and "Instruments of Darkness".

[Jetex Jim]

PN

The obvious reason would be Bomber Harris's refusal to compromise the massive bomb carrying capability for purely defensive armament. We may see this from the different approaches form the USAAF. They planned to fight their way through by day; Harris planned to deliver twice the bomb weight under cloak of darkness

In fact Dyson argued for the removal of ALL turret mounted guns, calculations suggested that without the weight of guns, turret mechanisms and with the draggy turrets faired off performance would have been greatly improved. It was believed that the gunners rarely saw their attackers.

A/C such as the JU88, with their draggy VHF radar antennas, plus the weight of electronics had little performance too spare, higher, faster flying Lancs would have been less vulnerable. Moreover in the event of losses the totals of souls lost would have been fewer.

[EyesFront]

Enter the Mosquito...

[Pontius Navigator]

JJ, indeed it would have been so as the Mozzie proved.

Similarly Charlwood's book, No Moon Tonight, recounts one intercept where they dropped the 4000lb cookie for increased manoeuvrability and another, may be the same incident, where the gunners did not fire as the tracer would have revealed their position.

This certainly supports the idea that unarmed might have been better although the lookouts may still have been useful.

Remember a pressurised Wellington reach 42000 feet
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vickers_Wellington

and I found this too:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Victory_Bomber

[Jetex Jim]

Yes too bad a few more Mossies were not made instead of Lancs, isn't it true a Mossie could really carry the same bomb load as a B17?

Another interesting aspect of the Mossie seems to have been it diminished (effective) radar cross section. Did DH develop stealth technology back in 1940?

Seriously though I'd be interested to know how detectable it was compared to say a Beufighter.

[rolling20]

There was a thread on here sometime ago regarding the Mosquito bomb lifting capability and the reasons why they didnt build more.
The basic reason is that the Mosquito was mainly made in small workshops dotted about the country and not concentrated in one huge factory. It was a specliaist wood-working job. Also the demands for the aircraft , once its potential had been revealed was such that supply struggled to keep up!
Also British industry was 'geared up' to build heavies. The changing of production was not a simple task in wartime.

50MPH was the estimated increase a heavy could expect in added speed devoid of armament and gunners. However the Germans used JU88's with Nitrious Oxide to catch Mosquito's , so its probable they would have reacted fairly quickly when faced with a fast unarmed 'Heavy'.

[GOLF_BRAVO_ZULU]

Jetex Jim. Also remember that one of the points of the Mossie was to make use of a cabinet making industry that was, otherwise, making little contribution to the war effort. That industry was finite, though, and was probably working close to its capacity. Additionally, all that balsa wood to sandwich with ply had to run the U-Boot gauntlet from South America and was in competition with other essential war material.

Now, a metal Mosquito would have been interesting and would probably have better utilised skilled airframe (metal) fitters and myriad semi-skilled workers than churning out Stirlings and Halifaxes.

[Jetex Jim]

A Metal Mosquito

Interestingly, pictured in ‘From Bouncing Bombs to Concorde’ a biography of Sir George Edwards is something called the Metal Mossie, Vickers Type 432, Barnes Wallis had a hand in the design and a prototype flew in 1942. To what extent this can be considered an equivalent to the wooden wonder is debatable although Edwards stated in retrospect that he expected it to be abandoned in favour of the wooden version.

A wooden aircraft does seem to hold the promise of a stealth capability, especially against the comparatively low frequencies of the 1940’s German radar. There is a certain irony here, given much of Britain’s later efforts, which seem to indicate, if not an ignorance of radar cross section, at least a cheerful disregard for it. - I think mainly of such slab sided marvels as the Lightning, the TSR2 and the Tornado.

The Edwards book also includes an amusingly captioned photograph of Sir George being interviewed in 1959 for BBC TV by Raymond Baxter. Entitled ‘In the Hot Seat, somehow I think not.

Only a 50 MPH speed improvement, for the removal of turrets? That’s not too shabby when your top speed is only 280mph, and there’d be an increase in altitude, it would be another 20 years before the strategic bomber stopped seeking safety by flying as high as possible.

The Luftwaffe had a few NOX equipped night fighters, and had it come to perhaps they’d have come up with a machine with a bit of endurance as well. But as Dyson puts it, without the gunners, even with losses, the total souls per aircraft lost is reduced. But he maintains that the RAF wouldn’t try, even on a few aircraft, the effect of stripping the turrets out and fairing them off.

Instead the defence systems grew heavier, with Monica, the rearward looking radar, ostensibly to warn of night fighters , but it couldn’t distinguish between them and the rest of the bomber stream, moreover some night fighter were equipped to home on its signals.

[Pontius Navigator]

A wooden aircraft does seem to hold the promise of a stealth capability, especially against the comparatively low frequencies of the 1940’s German radar.

There is a certain irony here, given much of Britain’s later efforts, which seem to indicate, if not an ignorance of radar cross section, at least a cheerful disregard for it. - I think mainly of such slab sided marvels as the Lightning, the TSR2 and the Tornado.

Actually a slab sided aircraft does not necessarily have a high RCS. Most of the incident radiation will reflect away when it strikes a flat plate. What is not stealthy are the rough bits like intakes and slots like undercarriage fairings.

In the 60s RRE was certainly working on RCS reduction. I remembe seeing a Morris Traveller van covered in rubberised horse hair with two arcs in the windscreen for the wipers. This RAM coating was designed to produce an radar invisbile vehicle. It was then covered with small radar reflectors on rods. Presumably to give a moving target without other reflectors.

Only a 50 MPH speed improvement, for the removal of turrets? That’s not too shabby when your top speed is only 280mph, and there’d be an increase in altitude, it would be another 20 years before the strategic bomber stopped seeking safety by flying as high as possible.

In level flight of course. We did 250 knots quite comfortably at 1500 feet once. In Charlwood's book, No Moon Tonight, they did 400 mph in a dive evading a fighter.

Monica, the rearward looking radar, ostensibly to warn of night fighters , but it couldn’t distinguish between them and the rest of the bomber stream

This was also a problem with Red Steer in the V-force when in a high level stream. The difference though was that the following bombers would be relatively static with the interceptors slipping in behind and overtaking.

[Jetex Jim]

Night fighters were equipped with the "NaxosZ" unit which could home in on the "H2S Home Sweet Home" radar set used in Allied bombers.


By effectivly equipping every bomber with active beacons, (Monica and H2S) even aircraft too small to carry full AI sets - the 109 and 190, - which would otherwise have been restricted to a daytime role - were induced to participate in the night time battle.

See :
http://www.radarworld.org/germany4.html (http://www.radarworld.org/germany4.html)

and elsewhere...

[Mike7777777]

The air war over Germany was tidal, 1939 to Big Week 1944 daytime offensives by the Allies were impossible to maintain, the early Schweinfurt raids being an example. But Feb 1944 onwards the balance shifted, night raid losses increased and P47/P51 superiority reduced daytime losses.

A "what-if" scenerio is that the Western Allies put 90% available resource into building Lancasters from 1943 onwards for area attacks at night. Does this finish the German war machine? Probably. 2 x Hamburg raids every week is an enormous onslaught. But the end result is the same, Red Army tanks roll into Berlin. Is a Lanc-only bomber force a likely scenario? No (IMHO), no British politician would have removed further resource from other areas to support Harris, benefit of hindsight etc.

A Mossie-only bomber force is even more unlikely, the decision making process at the time was that bigger and more heavily armed = better. Odd thing hindsight, the American's problems at Omaha probably disappear with cab-ranked P47s overhead; likewise Arnhem, Panzers in the woods? Send in 5 Group. No more woods, no more Panzers.

[Jetex Jim]

A "what-if" scenerio is that the Western Allies put 90% available resource into building Lancasters

A more interesting What If might entail different priorities and different tactics, and arguably no greater production efforts.

The free down load available at
http://www.radarworld.org/books.html (http://www.radarworld.org/books.html)
The Radar War

Though rather offensively teutonic in places, it gives a fascinating, chronologically ordered, round by round account detailing each radar move and counter move.

Window/chaff was deployed for the first time in the July 1943 raids against Hamburg raid, Because of the use of chaff, our losses were relativly low and there was little effective night fighter activity. .

On this raid bombing accuracy was unprecedentedly high.In about half an hour it is estimated that 550-600 bomb loads fell into an area measuring only 2 miles by 1 mile

But within a few months the Germans had the ability to distinguish between moving aircraft and free falling chaff, and shortly after that the ability to factor in the effect of the wind speed on chaff, this increased again the defence systems ability to discriminate Window from aircraft.

Window, was near enough a one shot and with the exception of the Dresden raid, the bomber force never again hit as hard or with such low losses.

While Germany seems to have countered each British electronic innovation, quickly and effectively, the RAF policy seems to have been to indiscriminately bolt on more kit. Admittedly the Monica system was removed when it was discovered that the Luftwaffe had a receiver capable of receiving its transmissions, but this was not until mid 44. Given how quickly the Germans countered Window, and produced effective jammers for GEE and Oboe -and these effects were clearly seen operationally - it might seem naïve to suppose that they were not, rigorously examining and analysing all kinds of the the RAFs radar kit, after all they were shooting enough of it down.

The ability to add the Me 109 and Fw 190 to the defending forces, which was facilitated by installing relatively simple kit in these single seaters (that were available in great quantity), should not be overlooked.

The RAF flew at night but massively advertised its presence through its mapping radars, warning radars and possibly also IFF.

A strategy where the bomb carriers went in ‘quiet’ and dropped visually against accurately laid down markers couldhave lead to fewer losses. And in faster, lighter aircraft (without those gun turrets) would have been easy to investigate.

In fact towards the end raids were launched with massive airborne infrastructures of jamming, precision-guided dedicated target marker aircraft and airborne bombing leaders. And yet, each bomber carried its own advertising. Having bought the kit, nobody was able to go to war without it.

[Mike7777777]

The Radar War! An interesting read, thanks, although it's almost a script from Monty Python in places, the Bismarck "advancing" towards the Bay of Biscay etc.

I don't think there's any doubt that the Germans fought the latter part of WW2 with under-developed weapons from the 1950s (V2, Type XXI, Me262), the Allies generally fought the European war with well-developed weapons from the 1930s. The Allies won because they had more of everything and they could manufacture more of everything.

So, with hindsight, no Stirlings, no Halifaxes, no B17s, no Liberators, but 2000 Lancasters twice weekly from the middle of 1943 onwards, starting with the Ruhr, not many Luftwaffe nightfighters equipped with Schräge Musik until late 1943. But following the "what-if" scenario through, if Germany capitulates in 1943/early 1944, what is to stop the Red Army reaching Calais?

Harris's biggest mistake was his obsession with Berlin, he never had the resources to win that air battle.

[larssnowpharter]

It might have been interesting also if greater effort/focus had been placed on Spec 3/42 which resulted in the Vickers Windsor which, even as a prototype had some pretty decent altitude/speed/bomb load characteristics.

[forget]

From Mosquito by Bill Sweetman. ISBN 0 7106 0131 X. Worth buying for Rikyu Watanabe’s beautiful drawings alone. :ok::ok:

It has been argued that Bomber Command could have done far more damage to Germany, with far less loss of life among its own crews and far less wastage of wartime production capacity, had it embraced the concept of the fast unarmed bomber earlier. Certainly, the Command’s post-war policy reflected this experience, with its jet bombers being designed around advanced H2S and electronic countermeasures and relying on speed and altitude for defence.

It takes fairly simple arithmetic to calculate that the Mosquito in its ultimate form could deliver more weapons over the same distance than the typical heavy bomber, when the two aircraft were compared on the basis of crew man-hours, total engine hours and fuel consumption; also, that the average Mosquito could be expected to deliver far more bombs during its far longer life expectancy, and its crew could expect to survive a far longer tour of operations. The only serious weakness of this argument is that the relative invulnerability of the Mosquito was itself indirectly brought about by Bomber Command’s own policies. Because the RAF concentrated on producing the four-engined heavy bombers, the Luftwaffe’s main task was to destroy these; Germany’s aircraft-production chief Erhard Much accordingly opposed production of the Heinkel He 219 night-fighter, which was faster than the Mosquito, in favour of the slower Ju 88G, which was adequate to deal with the heavy bombers and could be built more cheaply than the He 219. The practical difficulties of a shift to the unarmed bomber philosophy would have been enormous at any stage (including the need to train crews to the high standards demanded for the Mosquito) and would have given the Luftwaffe time to re-equip with the He 219, undoubtedly increasing Mosquito losses.

[Brian Abraham]

forget, does make you wonder how things could pan out. The He 219 had an auspicious combat debut. On the night of 11-12 June 1943, Werner Streib flew the V9 and shot down five bombers. In the next ten days the three Heinkels He 219A-0 pre-production aircraft would shoot down a total of 20 RAF aircraft, including six of the previously "untouchable" de Havilland Mosquito.

Edited to add and one 219 shooting down six bombers in the space of twelve minutes.

[Jetex Jim]

Yes it looks as though the Owl might have given the Mossies a few more worries, especially the 219A-6, dedicated Mossie swatter version.
He 219A-6 was a conversion from the He 219A-2/R1, powered by 2 × Daimler-Benz 603L, rated at 1,750 hp each, and fitted with nitrous-oxide. This version had no Shräge Musik, and no armor, to increase performance. It entered service in August 1944.

It looks as though about 250 Uhu’s were made, with tricycle gear and ejector seats, they could have been 1950s technology. These were classic AI equipped nightfighters with a relatively short ranged radar, needs must then that they operated in close concert with ground controllers and were part of a system that had, compared to the numbers in the bomber stream, a low saturation level.

Hence the deployment and success Wilde Sau - Wiki has this on the subject.


The Wilde Sau force scored their most notable success during the bombing of Peenemunde on August 17, 1943. Mosquito bombers had dropped target marker flares over Berlin and most of the night fighter force was sent there. When it was realized what was really happening, most of these planes were too far away and too slow to intercept the raid. However the much faster Fw 190’s being flown by the Wilde Sau forces were able to easily catch them, and about 30 planes entered the stream and shot down 29 of the 40 bombers lost that raid

[Mike7777777]

Regarding Uhus; a more valid measurement of the effectiveness of the Uhu vs the Mossie as a bomber destroyer is: if 500 heavily laden Heinkel 111s flew in loose connection from Germany to the UK, how many would be should down by an experienced Mossie nightfighter crew?

But perhaps the real question should be: why didn't the Luftwaffe take the air war to Bomber Command? Infiltrate a few JU88s into the stream back to the UK and lurk over the airfields; tired bomber crews, aircraft low on fuel, airfield landing lights etc.

[Jetex Jim]

Mike

why didn't the Luftwaffe take the air war to Bomber Command? Infiltrate a few JU88s into the stream back to the UK and lurk over the airfields; tired bomber crews, aircraft low on fuel, airfield landing lights etc.
Maybe they didn't think it was a good idea.
Why go all the way to England to be shot at by nightfighters when all the targets they could handle came to them, and they got to take a shot before the bombs were dropped.

[Mike7777777]

I can find three accounts of Luftwaffe intruder ops against the RAF and the USAAF, two regarded as successful:

http://www.baermann.biz/pauke/index.php?itemid=145

More Operation Gisella: http://www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/mar45.html 3rd March 1945

Why not do this in 1943? Risk of German technology falling onto Allied hands perhaps?

[Prangster]

My old mans log (2.3 tours) 49 7 90 and 156 squadron showed 2 entries one in 1941 the other May 45 where his Welly bomber and Lanc escaped with the skin of their teeth when bombs dropped on and all around them. The Welly had one 4lb incendiary bounce off and the Lanc dodged a shower of medium bombs that passed by ahead, astern and by both wingtips. He retired after that saying 68 trips was enough. Don Benett agreed!

[henry crun]

Nachtjagd by Theo Boiten has this to say about German intruder ops.

The Germans carried out intruder operations in the second half of 1940. They monitored Bomber Command’s daytime radio testing to get prior warning of a night raid, they then planned to operate in three waves.
First to shoot down aircraft as they took off, second to intercept over the North Sea outbound and inbound, and third over the bases as the bombers returned.
They quickly discoved that that it was more profitable to operate only over Bomber Command’s bases when aircraft returned with nav lights on to a lit airfield.


These early sorties were not very successful, during the last five months of 1940 they only shot down eight aircraft, but lost eleven aircraft on operations and another ten to other causes.
This, and increasing number of radar equipped Beaufighters, forced a change in tactics to patrolling over the North Sea, and this was more successful.

However, intruder ops over UK were resumed in 1941 and they extended their area of operations to central England..
Between January to October they claimed 125 RAF aircraft destroyed for their own loss of 55.
The continuing losses, bombing, and strafing forced the RAF to end night flying training in East Anglia, Yorkshire, and Lincolnshire.

It all came to an end in October 1941 when Hitler ordered General Kammhuber to halt all operations over the UK and North Sea.

He gave his reasons as “One cannot expect any results by the Fernnachrjagd.
If the Fernnachrjagd really would have been successful the British would have copied it a long time ago, as they imitate anything that works well”.

Hitler also stated on this occasion “The German citizen, whose house has been destroyed by a British bomber pilot, would rather see the British flyer shot down by a German night fighter in such a way that he can see this British machine lying next to his burning house”.
Hitler also did not believe in the effectiveness of the intruder ops because there had been no noticeable decline in Bomber Command raids on targets in the Reich.

[ICT_SLB]

Henry wrote: "They monitored Bomber Command’s daytime radio testing to get prior warning of a night raid"

When I was an apprentice at BAC, one of our drafties, Dave Booth, had been a wireless operator on Pathfinders. He told us that the wierdest piece of kit he tried was a system that puffed out pink smoke in response to a morse key. The idea being it would give a point to form up on without the tell tale radio traffic.

[Mike7777777]

Thanks Henry, a book I shall have to acquire.

Hitler had a good understanding of land warfare in the European context, but air and sea warfare was beyond him.

[GOLF_BRAVO_ZULU]

It didn't stop him from interfering, though; Gott seid dank!

[Effluent Man]

Totally agree re: Most Secret War. R.V.Jones has a writing style that is most unusual in as much as he makes the subject an entertainment as well as giving a rare insight into a whole range of projects that he was involved with.One of my favourite books of all time.

[Effluent Man]

I investigated this raid many years ago and was able to locate the wrecks of 2 B24s.Me410s followed the bomber stream back across the North Sea.It seems that the B24s had departed unusually late in the day and were consequently returning at dusk.As they crossed the Suffolk coast just north of Southwold they were attacked. It appears that they had put on lights prior to landing.One particular B24 came down at a place called Henstead about 5miles south west of Lowestoft.Certainly until the late 1960's there were two radial engines lieing in a shallow pond nearby.I think these were recovered and taken to the museum at Flixton near Bungay.A deeper pond in the corner of a nearby field contained a large quantity of wreckage.I still have a Bakelite earpiece microphone from a headset that I picked up in the field in 1967.At the time several farmworkers living nearby described what they had seen 23 years previously.Another B24 crashed close to the Lowestoft-Beccles railway line at Worlingham.