Latest Qf Incident,where Will All This End

[employes perspective]

A Qantas 747 lost power on its descent into Bangkok this afternoon.
A Qantas spokeswoman was unable to say what systems were affected on QF2 from London to Bangkok or for how long the aircraft lost power.
"This incident involved loss of electrical power on a Boeing 747 on descent into Bangkok," said Qantas chief pilot, Captain Chris Manning in a statement. "The back-up system was activated and the aircraft landed safely.
"Qantas reported the incident to Boeing, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau and the Civil Aviation Safety Authority and is also investigating its own thorough investigation. The aircraft is currently being repaired and assessed."
A spokeswoman added: "Because it is under investigation, we are are unable to provide any further information at this stage."


most probably another quality product out of Singapore,hopefully the eel sys was working this time

[Short_Circuit]

Thank goodness the backup power system worked, I guess battery / standby power worked. Would the scab labour, transit authority holders, done a proper test of the backup power on the transit from next week? I think a few hundred pax will thank their lucky stars we are still on the job looking after their interests. :p

[MUNT]

Latest Qf Incident,where Will All This End

...you've got to be kidding :rolleyes:


most probably another quality product out of Singapore,hopefully the eel sys was working this time

...and some people on this forum think jounalists are the devil for jumping to conclusions...

[Short_Circuit]

Sad thing is we all know where it will end.
Most of us have been screaming about the problem
on this forum, but we are shot down by money
grabbing manager and non-professional pilots (PAF).
Safety costs money, professional pilots & engineers cost
money. Pay the price or loose the company in a big event.
..... :ugh::ugh:

[Galley Raider]

I heard it was caused by water from the PC galley flooding down onto the E racks because the large fibreglass drain/water barrier was not re-installed after the last C chk.

The top shelf has 4x GCU's, BPCU's, Etc. All A/C gone!:eek:

Lucky the inverter lives around the corner in a dryer spot.

It could have been the BIG ONE. It's only a matter of time. What do you think?

[socks]

What was the rego and where was the last check done Aus. or OS?

This is not the first time this has happened but fortunately only ever happened on the ground before.

Why has it never been modified?

And what action will be taken this time to prevent future occurrences?

Poor design to start with, naturally loaders are going to step on it occasionally and not realising the importance don't report it.

[Jabawocky]

Galley Raider

You seem to know a bit fairly quickly:hmm:

So s this the next round of Today Tonight specials? Alng with some industrial action stories?

J:ok:

[booskins]

You have to be joking mate. A landing scare in an aircraft that has multiple redundancies built in. That is a joke if ever I heard one. A bigger emergency would be getting out of the crap bars in BKK. More effort would be spent doing that than what the chaps on QF2 had to go through.:ugh:

[Galley Raider]

It was OJM. A friend of mine works at SIT and heard some goss from MW.
Stores sent about a dozen new boxes up to replace anything that got wet.
The PC galley sits between doors L1 & R1 above the MEC. I am not sure when & why the water barrier was removed. Maybe this was the 1st galley flood since the C chk.

I can hear cox now, "It was not a safety issue, just a quality lapse."

I wonder how it feels coming into land with no IFE;). At least the freshly stapled EELs would have been glowing.

[forgetabowdit]

Qantas reported the incident to Boeing, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau and the Civil Aviation Safety Authority and is also investigating its own thorough investigation.

That's a lot of investigating going on before, I assume, the initial thorough investigation has been completed! I wonder what they expect was wrong with their self proclaimed 'thorough investigation'...

Ah, that mob make me laugh...

[UNCTUOUS]

The top shelf has 4x GCU's, BPCU's, Etc. All A/C gone!
.
Assume that's aircon and not "all AC Pwr".

[Taildragger67]

... but I was under the impression that a 744 could happily handle a loss of all cabin power?

My impression was that there is a small set of clockwork flight instruments up front (but you'd need to do a bit of old-fashioned navigation), and the donks would continue to turn...

But I guess you'd still need some elec power to run the fuel pumps...

So what's the story? What systems run off the batteries/inverters etc. and what can run independently?

I'm not trying to be sensationalist, but a comment in the press has been made that this could've been nasty if it'd happened way out over the drink somewhere. Anyone care to give the real story?

[Launch_code_Harry]

You have to be joking mate. A landing scare in an aircraft that has multiple redundancies built in. That is a joke if ever I heard one. A bigger emergency would be getting out of the crap bars in BKK. More effort would be spent doing that than what the chaps on QF2 had to go through.:ugh:You don't think flying 350+ people around on an hours worth of battery power is serious? If the anecdotal evidence presented thus far proves to be accurate this is no trivial matter. I would appear that the so called 'independent' systems actually had a common point of failure and thus there is in fact, NO redundancy.
Are you going to offer an apology?
Hats off to the crew for an extraordinary job. Well done chaps.

[Galley Raider]

By A/C I meant Alternating Current (Not Aircon).
So it lost all AC, and thus DC.
Standby power is a 96lbs Nicad battery feeding a static inverter that puts out 115v for about 1 hour to feed some essentials in the cockpit like VHF1, backup NAV, stby instruments with ILS. A bit like a bug smasher. Engs run ok using their own dedicated generators to power the FADECs. Fuel is gravity fed (i think).

The Self Loading Freight would be sitting in the quiet cabin (no recirc fans) in the dim battery powered emergency lights. PA also works.

It would have got interesting after 1 hour. No VHF, NAV, ILS, or Stby insts (except the magnetic compass).

Not being a pilot I am not sure how dire this would be. Comments please.

[Work-4-It]

it would have been very interesting to see what would have happened if it had of happened in an airbus, with all the flyby wire flight controls.

[Offchocks]

"Not being a pilot I am not sure how dire this would be. Comments please."

If you are IFR you cannot get more dire once the battery goes.

[Syd eng]

Heard that the water had run down onto the Racks and shorted out the GCU's therefore all generators would have been gone including the APU ones. Bet the crew earnt their wages for that period under standby power.

[VH-Cheer Up]

Here's how Steve Creedy and Michael West reported it for the Murdoch family press...

http://www.news.com.au/travel/story/0,26058,23026699-5014090,00.html

[socks and thongs]

So what is the purpose of such a device? To help slow the aeroplane down??


What about an APU, to help speed the aeroplane up?

[Galley Raider]

Sorry mate, No RAT on a 744.
APU GCU (Generator Control Unit) sits next to the other 4 GCU's and is also not waterproof. Even if the APU was running there would be no way to keep its 2 gens online.

Get ready for fleet wide and type wide inspections.

[Jabawocky]

I can see it now........Coupla garbage bags and a tube of Sikaflex!:uhoh:

If it turns out to be a C check done o/s there will be plenty of ammunition, on the other hand if it turns out to be done in Sydney HM before they were put to pasture it will take a lot of sting out of any arguments:hmm:

J

[Dark Knight]

I heard it was caused by water from the PC galley flooding down onto the E racks because the large fibreglass drain/water barrier was not re-installed after the last C chk.


Murphy's Law?

Or didn't some highly qualified maintenance pesonnel not complete and/or inspect the quality of a maintnencance task correctly? (regardless where the maintenance was undertaken)

DK

[chemical alli]

people in glass houses shouldnt throw stones ! ojm was the last chk out of syd while all the h245 guys were being shafted.

[QF MAINT OUTSOURCED]

the APU would of been useless as it will not start in flight,and the fuel pumps run on DC power there supply is not gravity feed,the whole thing would of ended in a disaster if they where more 1 1/2 hr out.

[Jabawocky]

Popcorn anyone?

[Nudlaug]

Fleetwide inspections have kicked in already since yesterday, no 744 was allowed to take off without those inspections done, all dripshields to be inspected, galley above too, EA's are out, AD's probably out soon too, that's just a guess though

[VH-Cheer Up]

So much for limiting SLF to 100mls of fluid or gels each - the galley strikes another blow!

How many other types are similarly vulnerable to an overflow with a missing drip tray? Would this affect 767/777 fleet too?

Does Toulouse have a better solution?

[airtags]

VH Cheer Up:

ZXA, XC & XE (767s) have regular not so little overflows from the forward waste water - one late last year flooding the J class so badly that the J class biz pax through to row 3 having their keep their legs up to avoid the wave of brown stinking sludge (waste water ex sinks not toilet pan although I rekon the toilet may have smelt better).

Tight turnarouds on a busy day 4 leg day so Q just wet vacuumed the cabin, taped the fwd galley and fwd toilet sinks off (pax don't wash their hands anyway I'm told) and sent the plane back out much to the dismay of the entire crew - the left seat was pressured big time by the company with a number of 'managers' turning up at the gate to make the point that it's not that bad.

Thankfully on return to XXX after another set brown waves on rotate & landing, a very thorough person decided to check under the cabin floor including the avionics bay and found traces of moisture. Left seat told attending manager to (words generally meaning) tow it & cancell the flight.

Excellent diagnostic work - shows its not just a case of fixing the reported problem but also using talent, brains and experience to consider the secondary effects/risks.

[Short_Circuit]

Too right, these things are Air Ships and aren’t designed to operate with waves of water (especially brown) flowing over its deck.

It would be wise to refuse such aircraft until problem solved.. You have the ammo now with QF2

[Sub Orbital]

Booskins.
Having trained B744 pilots for many years, including just this scenario, I know how serious this situation is.
Your comments now are appearing pretty stupid.

[funbags]

Booskins,

You have no idea :ugh:
The battery is the final redundancy.

[Short_Circuit]

There is one more final redundancy, a torch and magnetic compass.
I think there might be a prayer after that?:sad:

[Going Boeing]

The aircraft (OJM) was on descent into BKK (late afternoon with fine weather conditions) when the cabin crew reported a major water leak in the first class galley area (turned out to be caused by blocked drains). Shortly after that the engine driven generators dropped offline accompanied by a huge number of related EICAS messages. Power was available only to the Captains PFD, ND and standby Attitude indicator. At the time that this happened, the leading edge flaps had already been deployed due to the 210 knot limit in the STAR for BKK. The crew started working through the checklists for the more important EICAS messages but after realising that they were not going to get the generators back on line the captain elected to get the aircraft on the ground ASAP before they ran out of battery power. Alt gear/flap extension, no anti-skid, no autobrakes, no thrust reverser were some of the issues that they dealt with in a very short timeframe and then landed safely. On the ground, outflow valves had to be manually opened using remaining DC power to depressurise prior to opening the doors. A flap assymetry occured when they tried to retract the flaps (believed to be due to elec control of leading edge flaps).

The directive that is now in force requires QF B744's to have every drain in the P & J class galleys (4 per galley, I believe) checked for blockages and then water is flushed through while the shields above the Main Electric Centre (MEC) are checked for integrity. There are directions as to how any repairs to the shields are to done and reports of every inspection are to be sent to Boeing's Maintenance Watch.

The main question to be answered is why the shields on OJM did not work - ie were they fitted correctly, cracked, etc and where was the last heavy maintenance check done.

[domo]

Well done tech crew you earned your money on that trip, the public would find it hard to believe a blocked sink could cause a hull loss.

Ps cabin crew please dont put coffee in the drains, use the bins

[airsupport]

Yes, full marks to the Tech Crew, great job by all accounts. :ok:

[OliV2]

Sub-Orbital: Is there a work around for this sort of event? Do they train for it in the sims? Had this happened further out and back-up batteries failed/ran dry, does anyone know exactly what the crew would have had? Magnetic compass and hydraulic controls right? Zero coms though, so could not be "guided" in by ATC, is that correct (wonder about mobile phone coverage...)? What powers the fuel pumps - engine, right? Similarly for Hydraulics and L/gear? Reading Going Boeing's post, sounds like the crew were amazing - nice to know such talent is sitting up front (most of the time!). Hope they come out ok from the investigations - paper reporting that the CVR and FDR have been "quarantined" whatever that means.

[Short_Circuit]

Does anyone have BKK approach no in contact list in mobile phone,
guess we should all put it in, 2 major at BKK:ok:

[OliV2]

Wonder what the vodafone call center would do if you rang up and asked to be put through the BKK tower....reckon it might take a while!:confused:

[aveng]

Airbus has its high priority equipment located on seperate shelf forward of the nose wheel well (1x Prim computer 1x Sec computer and MMR1). The general stuff is aft of the wheel well and the gcu's are either side of the wheel well. The galleys are no where near any of the electronics - j class is at door 2. They even have 1 adiru located under the floor panel away from the other two. Much better design. High priority power cb's/feeders are remote from rest in seperate cupboard.

[Fliegenmong]

3...........2..........1........Bobus v Aering !


(Pulls up chair, kindly asks Jabawocky for some popcorn, opens a cold one and waits....)

[another superlame]

Now is this an incident or a near miss ? Gotta love the Flying Kangaroo.
I did hear the RAT wasn't deployed due to an MEL.
Rumour has it if they spent more time fixing planes and less time counting their cash things might be different.

[genex]

Well done by that crew. Bet there was some adrenalin. Great future LOFT training there.

Few years back when I was at Korean, an American 747 classic freighter Captain picked up an a/c at Gimpo that had been loaded in heavy rain and something didn't work with the water shields/seals (or something!) in the E and E. Result, a mini tidal wave as they accelerated. As he approached V1, one by one the 3 INS red lights came n and he lost the lot. Fortunately being "old school" he could fly by standby a/h and magnetic compass and timed turns so got it back. Think the company gave him a round the world First Class ticket etc. Goes to show though that these things can happen (remember Sioux City?) and that sims should be able to replicate it and give us all some exposure.

[Short_Circuit]

Pssst, the only RAT on the 747 is the big white one on the tail.

[Galley Raider]

Also, the Airbus 330/340's have a hydraulic motor generator that run off the green system. There is a green EDP on each eng/wing. If one eng can turn you don't run out of electrons.
If the eng stops (ie. gliding) you can drop the RAT. It will also run the emeg gen.
You only need the batts (2) below 50Kts when the RAT gives out.

Of course, after all that you are down to the magnetic compass, torch and mobile phone (and a prayer).

[Going Boeing]

OliV2
What powers the fuel pumps - engine, right?

Without the electric fuel pumps in the tanks operating, the engine driven fuel pumps would have been sucking fuel from the tanks. It's not a problem on descent but if you were to climb with that situation, you run the risk of cavitation as gas bubbles come out of the fuel in the lower atmospheric pressure.

another superlame, Ram Air Turbines (RATs) are only fitted to twin engined aircraft as four engined aircraft are deemed to have enough redundency to not require one. They didn't take into account flooding of all GCU's.

Speculation about starting the APU for electrical power has a couple of issues:
1. The B744 APU is not certified to start in the air.
2. The APU starter motor would draw a huge current from both the Main and APU batteries and if the start attempt failed then there would be even less battery power available for the essential items to get the aircraft on the ground.

[speedbirdhouse]

Wasn't there another issue very recently with a 744 that had a Singapore C check.

Something to do with freezing drain pipes due to an oversight during Sngapore maintenance resulting in a back up of fluids spilling out of the upper deck galley floor drains...................?

The holes in the swiss cheese seem to be getting so close to lining up that you can see light.

Oh well, never mind we are making lots of money.:yuk:

[OliV2]

Thanks GB - Makes sense. In terms of APU, it can be operated at below 20k and provide bleed air below 15k, but has to be running already.....is that correct? In other words, can not be started mid-flight.

[blackhander]

RATs are hydraulic pumps not elec generators so wouldn't have helped the situation unless the fluid was run through a HMG.

[Dark Knight]

DZ earlier someone said:

I heard it was caused by water from the PC galley flooding down onto the E racks because the large fibreglass drain/water barrier was not re-installed after the last C chk.


Murphy's Law?

Or didn't some highly qualified maintenance personnel not complete and/or inspect the quality of a maintenance task correctly? (regardless of where the maintenance was undertaken)

Lets wait until the inquiry is complete prior to mischievous speculation about poor design and avaricious legal eagles.

Remind me again `how many million problem free flight hours has the Boeing 747 flown?’

DK

Boeing builds a better airplane

[chockchucker]

Beg to differ blackhander, Rats provide both limited elec and hyd pwr. Do some research on the glimli glider (Air Canada 767 I think) to see an example of their value in a twin engine aircraft.

[blackhander]

Must have been the RAT supplying hydraualics to centre HMG

[Desert Diner]

in an aircraft that has multiple redundancies built in.

Now we know there is one less built in redundancy!

[SCHAIRBUS]

The last aircraft out of SYD Heavy was OJI I know I signed it out.
Would have thought all the 400s that went through Sydney would have had another major check by now.
QF 747-400s don't have rats or HMG with 4 IDG your aren't supposed to need them.
Everything should also switch over automatically when power fails flaps/slats would have kept going as they are Hydraulic and pneumatic.;)

[Stick'm up]

:D Well done to the crew! Maybe they too are worth more than 3% :ok:
Shows what experience and decication can do when almost everything else has been taken away
I know what all the punters would have been thinking on TD.

[cjam]

some Ram Air Turbines drive hyd pumps, some drive elec generators.

[soldier of fortune]

it has been confirmed that the drip shield above the e1 shelf rack had a large crack through it. allowing water to drip on to all gcu's and bus power control units-rendering them inop- over 5 pages of eicas msg,s were coming as power was being lost. it has also been confirmed that the fwd galley drain lines were all blocked with -you guessed it coffee. water backing up and flowing under the floor- there was also an estimated 30 mins of battery time -

outstanding flying from the crew:ok::ok::ok::D:D:D

[NSEU]

I'm almost choking on the misinformation on this forum....

One hour of battery time? Try 30 minutes (ref QF Boeing Maintenance Manual)

The Boeing 767 RAT provides hydraulics only and it CAN'T run the Hydraulic Motor Generators to provide electricity (there are check valves in the system which won't allow this). HMG's use so much power, sometimes even the electric demand pumps won't run them. The Gimli Glider must have been getting electrics from another source (pilots have reported that fast windmilling engines sometimes reach the critical 50 or so % N2/N3 required for IDG ops).
Airbusses and 777's, however, may have RAT's which provide both electrics and hydraulics, but don't quote me on that.

Yes, there is suction/gravity feed on a 747-400. This is only available for main tanks 1~4, but enough to get you to the nearest airport.

The type of 744 involved in this incident would still have had a Standby Altimeter and Airspeed Indicator after the batteries had died (the Altimeter needs power for the vibrator to overcome stiction, but I'm sure the crew would be quite able to tap it from time to time). There would be no background lighting for these instruments, but there are plenty of torches on board. There would be no heat for the pitot static system, however. You wouldn't want to fly through rain/cloud at high altitudes.

The biggest problems would be attitude and navigation. There would be no attitude after the IRS's lost their power and the Standby Horizon gyro had run down. (Note: Different aircraft type, but Qantas' 747-400ER have an Integrated Standby Flight Display which has it's own dedicated battery supply which does lasts for hours. ER's are flown on the longer oceanic routes, so this would be plus. Attitude is available from this instrument.

I can quite believe that any company undergoing great change would be more susceptible to this kind of error (people who are about to lose their jobs are not going to be focussing on what they are doing).

Re putting a galley above an equipment centre... There is more than one safeguard.

1) A drain system designed to take water away from faulty galley devices such as coffee makers, water boilers, etc.
2) Sealed floor panels in galley areas
3) Protective drip-trays mounted above the electronic equipment
4) Inbuilt redundancy in electronic devices

All of these would have had to have failed before you lost 4 generators. Incidentally, rumour has it that overseas maintenance people working on QF aircraft were omitting the protective floor barriers in some areas (although I can't say which areas were involved).

As all QF engineers know.. you have to line up all the holes in the swiss cheese before you get a catastrophic failure :hmm:

Incidentally, it's highly embarrassing to hear the faulty information a supposed "Qantas engineer" supplied to the newspapers. I would suggest that he needed re-training... but we all know that the bean counters decimated the training budget :}

Rgds.
NSEU

[DirectAnywhere]

Can any of the Engineers in the room let me know what is left when operating on the Standby power? Obviously the Standby Flight Instruments. Is that it?

None of my books give much info. Obviously a little knowledge is considered a dangerous thing.;)

In the sim everything invariably comes back - within 30 seconds or so - when you do the checklist and you never get to the stage of operating on the standby for lengthy periods.

I would be interested to know what they would have actually had available and what difficulties may have arisen operating on the standby electrics for an extended period.

Cheers.

[mmciau]

Glad the aircraft got onto the ground safely.

It is sincerely hoped that the situation never arises again.

Now, should someone ask the obvious?

Does any other Boeing model have a similar electrical cabinet/close to fluid transmission systems?

And hopefully not the B787 electrical layout as that aircraft will be even more reliant on "electrotechnology systems" integrity.

Mike

[Work-4-It]

I believe its approximately 45 minutes of standby battery power. thats what we learnt on course. I would have to say that QANTAS would have to be the most blessed airline in the world. The tech log shows that the cathay engineers only replaced G.C.U. 2, G.C.U 3 AND B.C.U 1.. i thought that they would of had to replace all G.C.U's, but then a again im only a greaser

[Taildragger67]

Galley Raider,

You're famous (http://www.smh.com.au/news/travel/cause-buzz/2008/01/09/1199554716584.html)!

[Galley Raider]

What can I say........? I was pretty close too. I'm sure more info will come out soon.

Again, Bravo to the crew. You are worth the money.

As soon as this f:mad:ked up current QF management figure out that it is the PEOPLE, like pilots, engineers and hosties who make the airline great, the better.

Sure, self preservation may be a good motivator. But so is dignity,worth and respect.

Eat my shorts. Dik$on, Cock$, Harri$ and Co.

[NSEU]

"Can any of the Engineers in the room let me know what is left when operating on the Standby power? Obviously the Standby Flight Instruments. Is that it?"

Lots! (including straight battery powered stuff) Here's a list I prepared earlier...

_115VAC STANDBY BUS-MAIN_
ADC LEFT POWER (34-12-01)
NAV RADIO RMI (Optional)
NAV RADIO MKR VOR LEFT (34-51-01)
NAV RADIO ADF RIGHT (can also be found on 115AC Bus #1 on some airlines)
NAV RADIO ATC LEFT (34-53-01) Optionally found on 115VAC Main Bus #3
STANDBY IGN ENG 1 (74-31-01)
STANDBY IGN ENG 2 (74-31-02)
STANDBY INSTR LIGHTS (33-11-04)
FLIGHT CONTROL ELEC 1L AC (Also known as FCE Power Supply or PSM. One of four. See Notes)
NAV RADIO MLS-L (Optional)
EFIS CONT LEFT (31-61-01)
UPPER EICAS (31-61-01)
EIU LEFT (31-61-01)
FLIGHT CONTROL ELEC 2L AC (Also known as FCE Power Supply or PSM. One of four. See Notes)
MAWEA POWER A (31-51-01) Modularized Avionics Warning Electronics Assembly power supply A.
FMCS CDU-LEFT (34-61-01)
MAIN AC STBY BUS VOLTAGE (24-34-02)
STANDBY IGN ENG 3 (74-31-03)
STANDBY IGN ENG 4 (74-31-04)
MMR LEFT (MULTI MODE RECEIVER) 34-31-01

_115VAC STANDBY BUS- APU_
PFD-LEFT
ND-LEFT
FMCS FMC-LEFT

_28VDC APU BATTERY BUS_ (Normally supplied with DC power from TRU #3 unless forced to use APU Battery Charger or APU Battery)
ENG START AIR CONT (Provides elec power to Start Switches and Pneumatic Start Valve solenoids. Valves are electrically controlled, but pneumatically driven... They won't open without bleed air). Power for light in Start Switches comes from the #1 DC Bus.
APU DC FUEL PUMP (Required if #2 AFT MAIN BOOST PUMP is not providing pressure. APU switch must be in ON or START and the following CB's must be set: APU PRIME CONTROL (or APU ALT CTRL) and APU START)
APU FIRE WARN HORN (Horn located in RH Body Gear Well)
NACELLE LE ANTI-ICE 1 (30-21-01) Also known as NAI. Provides power to VALVE solenoid). Auto Anti-Ice Systems appear to use Main Bus power however
NACELLE LE ANTI-ICE 2
NACELLE LE ANTI-ICE 3
NACELLE LE ANTI-ICE 4
LOOP A FIRE 1 OVERHEAT 2
LOOP A FIRE 2 OVERHEAT 1
LOOP B FIRE 1 OVERHEAT 2
LOOP B FIRE 2 OVERHEAT 1
LOOP A FIRE 3 OVERHEAT 4
LOOP A FIRE 4 OVERHEAT 3
LOOP A FIRE 3 OVERHEAT 4
LOOP A FIRE 4 OVERHEAT 3
FIRE DET APU LOOP A
FIRE DET APU LOOP B
ENG 1 SPEED SENSOR 1 (77-12-05) Provides power to engine #1 "N2 speed card" Channel 1. N2 > 50%, N2 > 52%, N2>83% data is used for airplane system logic.)
ENG 1 SPEED SENSOR 2 (As above, Channel 2))
ENG 2 SPEED SENSOR 1
ENG 2 SPEED SENSOR 2
ENG 3 SPEED SENSOR 1
ENG 3 SPEED SENSOR 2
ENG 4 SPEED SENSOR 1
ENG 4 SPEED SENSOR 2
EEC CH A RESET/INHIBIT 1 (73-21-15) EEC Hardware reset
EEC CH A RESET/INHIBIT 2
EEC CH A RESET/INHIBIT 3
EEC CH A RESET/INHIBIT 4
CLOCK DISPLAY (Clock digits on Capt's and F/O's Chronometer)


_APU HOT BATTERY BUS_
LEFT OUTFLOW VALVE (Left Pressurization Outflow Valve MANual Power)
RIGHT OUTFLOW VALVE (Right Pressurization Outflow Valve MANual Power)
INLET DOOR (APU)
ANTI ICE VALVE (APU option.)
APU PRIMARY CONT (49-11-01) One of two power sources for APU Controller.
LEFT IRU (DC)
RIGHT IRU (DC)
CENTRE IRU (DC) Times out after 5 minutes if aircraft on battery power only


_28VDC MAIN BATTERY BUS_
HYDRAULICS EDP SUPPLY 1 (29-11-01) Provides power to a motor driven shutoff valve which closes when the respective engine Fire Handle is pulled, stopping hydraulic fluid getting to the engine driven hydraulic pump. Resetting the Fire Handle with Main Battery Bus power available will re-open the shutoff valve. This valve is not opened/closed during normal operations.
HYDRAULICS EDP SUPPLY 2 (as above for EDP/Engine #2)
HYDRAULICS EDP SUPPLY 3
HYDRAULICS EDP SUPPLY 4
OXYGEN VALVE AND INDICATOR (35-11-01) Provides power to pax and crew oxygen bottle pressure transducers to enable EICAS oxygen pressure displays. Also provides power to manual pax oxygen system activation system (Emergency & Theraputic). This CB & the OXY RESET CB is required to reset the Emergency oxygen system after use.
OXYGEN RESET (see above)
STBY ALTIMETER VIB (34-13-01) Vibrator to prevent stiction in Stby Altimeter. Indicator may not move as smoothly without this power, but should not stop it working completely. Not required on aircraft with ISFD-type indicators.
VHF LEFT (23-12-01) Provides power to Left VHF Transceiver and Left Radio Control Panel (VHF/HF control head)
CAPT INTERPHONE Provides power to cockpit speaker, captain's interphone circuits in Audio Management Unit and Captain's audio selector panel.
STBY ATTITUDE INDICATOR (34-24-01) Provides power to gyro and gyro flag (removal when gyro OK), but not ILS information.
STANDBY ILS INDICATOR (23-24-01) Provides power to the ILS processing circuits and flags (removal when signal valid).
AUTO FLIGHT WARN (22-10-04) Function unknown. May provide A/P status (i.e. A/P disconnect) when aircraft loses main bus power (uneducated guess!)
UPPER YAW DAMPER (22-21-01) Provides power to Upper Yaw Damper switch (not switchlights) to turn on Upper Yaw Damper Module (computer). However, Yaw Damper Module requires Flight Control Elec (FCE) power. Will provide FCE distribution schematic at a later date.
FLIGHT CONTROL ELEC 1L DC (27-09-01) Also known as FCE Power Supply or PSM. One of four. See Notes at end of list)
FLIGHT CONT ELEC 2L DC (Also known as FCE Power Supply or PSM. One of four)
STAB TRIM ALT CONT (27-41-01) For Altn Stab Trim switches on thrust quadrant. Alternate stab trim system sends nose up/down signals via up/down limit switches to the STCM's which control hydraulic fluid to the stab trim jackscrew drive motors. Each stab trim mode has different up/down limits. Limit for this trim mode is 11.75degs stab LE down (14.75 units) and 2.75 degrees stab LE up (0.25Units) .
ILS/MLS SWITCH-L (34-34-01) Optional switching for aircraft fitted with microwave landing systems.
ILS ANTENNA SWITCH LEFT (34-31-01) Glideslope and Localiser antenna switching power for Left ILS system. When gear is not down and locked, the glideslope systems use the glideslope "capture" antennae behind the radome. When the gear is down and locked, the glideslope systems use the"track" antennae mounted on the small nosewheel gear doors. Under certain circumstances, the localizer systems share the VOR antennae at the top of the vertical stabilizer. When APProach mode is selected (with certain other qualifications, the localizer systems use the dedicated localizer "track" antennae behind the radome. With no power to the system, the GS and Loc default to the approach mode antennae.
AURAL WARNING LEFT SPEAKER (31-51-01) Dedicated Aural Warning Speaker above captains head. Speaker receives inputs from TCAS, (Enhanced) Ground Proximity System, Weather Radar (Predictive Windshear) and MAWEA (Fire, Warning, Caution, etc)
STICK SHAKER LEFT (27-32-01) Provides power to Stick Shaker on Captain's control column. Requires signal from Left Stall Warning Management Card in MAWEA.
BCU 1 (24-41-01) Electrical Bus Control Unit #1. MUST BE POWERED TO GET POWER ON RESPECTIVE SIDE OF SYNCH BUS. BCU can be powered by a number of different busses. Varitions are also possible depending on age of aircraft, modifications, etc. E.g. 28Vdc GROUND HANDLING BUS or 28Vdc Main BATTERY BUS or APU HOT BATTERY BUS (if battery switch is on) or main AC busses if #1 EXT Power contactor is closed.
GEN DRV DISC 1 (24-11-01) Generator Drive Disconnect. Power is required to disconnect the IDG (and engine N2 rotation)
GEN DRV DISC 2 (24-11-02)
GEN DRV DISC 3 (24-11-03)
GEN DRV DISC 4 (24-11-04)
AGCU 1 (24-22-03) Generator Control Unit for APU Generator (not to be confused with APUC). Controls operation of APU Gen #1 and opens/closes Aux Power Breaker #1 (Co-ordinates operation with BCU #1)
ENG 1 FUEL XFEED VLV (28-22-02) Provides power to XFEED Valve switch on overhead fuel panel (not lights in switch). The switch opens/closes the respective xfeed valve. It also provides power to the logic in the Valve Position Logic Cards in the Fuel System Card Files. The VPLC's send a signal to the VALVE light in the XFEED Valve switch to illuminate/extinguish the light (additional power is required for the bulbs). The VPLC's also send a signal to the EIU's Via FSEIC cards (Fuel System EICAS Interface Cards) for EICAS message logic.
ENG 2 FUEL XFEED VLV (28-22-02) Provides power to XFEED Valve switch on overhead fuel panel (not lights in switch). The switch opens the valve if air/ground & flap logic is satisfied. The switch closes the valve if selected to off. VPLC and FSEIC interface as above.
ENG 3 FUEL XFEED VLV (28-22-02) Ref ENG 2
ENG 4 FUEL XFEED VLV (28-22-02) Same as ENG 1.
FLT DK DOME LIGHTS (33-13-01)
PARK BRAKE (32-44-01) Provides power to park brake motorized valve and power to illuminate the park brake light. Powers Park Brake Valve position relays (which send signals to EIU's for EICAS "PARK BRAKE SET" Memo and "PARK BRAKE VALVE" Status (fault message). Park Brake Lever position signal is also sent to the Brake System Control Unit (as Park Brake will affect antiskid and torque limiting).
FLT DK CAPT IND LTS (33-12-01) Provides power to selected annunciator lights on overhead panel, glareshield, main instrument panel and pedestal (tables requred)
CABIN PRESS MANUAL LEFT (21-31-04) This or CAB PRESS AUTO A can provide power for manual control of the Left Outflow valve DC motor(OUTFLOW VALVE LEFT CB on APU Hot Battery Bus must be set to power the motor)
CABIN PRESS MANUAL RIGHT (21-31-04) Have seen this listed on one airline's Main Hot Battery Bus system. Don't know if this is an error or not. This or CABIN PRESS AUTO B CB can provide power for manual control of the Right Outflow valve DC motor (OUTFLOW VALVE RIGHT CB on APU Hot Battery Bus must be set to power the motor)
FLT DK STORM LIGHTS (33-13-01)
ENG 1 FUEL CONT VLV (76-11-01) Provides power via Fire Handle to Fuel Cutoff Lever to open/close SOSV (Shut Off Servo Valve) in Hydromechanical Unit (CF6). Also provides power to relays and EIU's for shutdown/engine running message logic.
ENG 2 FUEL CONT VLV
ENG 3 FUEL CONT VLV (76-11-03)
ENG 4 FUEL CONT VLV
APU ALT CONT (49-11-01) This or APU PRIME CONT CB provides power to APU Controller and to APUC-controlled "95% relays" (which allow APU bleed air and APU generators to come on line).
PRIMARY TE FLAP CONT DC (27-51-01) Provides power to Flaps Extend/Retract Drive relays. Logic to activate either the extend or retract relay is provided by the Flap Control Units (FCU's). The relays allow CB power to reach the electrically operated (TE) Flap Input Actuator which controls valves on both Inboard and Outboard TE hydraulic-power drives.
E/E COOLING SMOKE OVRD (21-58-03) Supplies power to various relays in the Equipment Cooling system (Cargo Fire E/E Cooling Shutoff relay, Smoke/Overboard Valve relay, Differential Pressure relay and E6/E9 Valve relay).
E/E COOLING PCA (21-58-01) Provides power to the Equipment Cooling control card.


_28VDC MAIN HOT BATTERY BUS_
ENG 1 & 3 B FIRE EXT (26-21-01) Provides power to 1 & 3B squibs via Fire Handles. Also provides power to squib test light when test button pushed on overhead Maintenance Panel.
ENG 1 & 3 A FIRE EXT
ENG 2 & 4 B FIRE EXT
ENG 2 & 4 A FIRE EXT
ENG 1 FUEL S/O VALVE (28-22-01) Provides power to open close Spar Valve. Power is routed through Fire Handle and Fuel Cutoff lever. Also powers relays which send open/closed logic to Fuel System EICAS Interface Cards (FSEIC) for EICAS messages.
ENG 2 FUEL S/O VALVE (As above for engine 2).
ENG 3 FUEL S/O VALVE
ENG 4 FUEL S/O VALVE
FUELING VALVE 2 (28-21-01) Provides some of the power required for refuelling when wing fueling station BAT switch is in BAT position (for when main bus power is not available).
GCU 1 (GENERATOR CONTROL UNIT 1) (24-22-01) 28Vdc backup power for GCU.
GCU 2
GCU 3
GCU 4
EMERG EVAC (25-63-01) Provides power to emergency EVAC lights and horns in the cockpit and cabin. Works on a dead ship (unless the battery is totally flat).
FUELING POWER-HOT BAT (28-21-01) Provides power to refueling system when BAT switch selected on Wing Fueling Panel
ELEX CLOCK (Chronometer timebase for Captain and F/O)
ACARS DC (23-22-01)
FIRE SW UNLOCK (26-11-01) Provides power to the Fire Handles unlock solenoids.
MAIN BAT OVHT PROT (24-31-01) This CB powers the relay circuit which disables (removes power from) the Main Battery Charger if an overheat switch is closed by excessive battery temperatures. Another section of this circuit disables the Main Battery Charger if the Standby Power Switch is selected to BAT.
MAIN BAT VOLTAGE (24-34-03) Provides battery voltage sample for use by BCU's (data is sent to EIU's).
BCU 2 (24-41-02) Electrical Bus Control Unit #2. MUST BE POWERED TO GET POWER ON RESPECTIVE SIDE OF SYNCH BUS. BCU can be powered by a number of different busses. Varitions are also possible depending on age of aircraft, modifications, etc. E.g. 28Vdc GROUND HANDLING BUS or 28Vdc APU BATTERY BUS or MAIN BAT HOT BUS (if battery switch is on) or main AC busses if #2 EXT Power contactor is closed).
FIRE EXT LWR CARGO (26-23-01) Provides power to the Cargo Fire Discharge switch on the overhead panel. When the switch is pushed with either the FWD or AFT switches selected, the power will be routed to the squibs for the extinguishant bottles, blowing the squibs and releasing the contents of the bottle into the selected cargo area.
IRS ON BATTERY (34-21-04) Provides power to the Ground Crew Horn on the nose wheel and the "IRS ON BATT" light on the overhead panel. The light will illuminate if any IRS is on battery power only, the aircraft is on the ground and the Ground Service Bus is de-energized. The ground call horn will also sound under these conditions (or if the pilots call the ground or if the Equipment Cooling system air rises above a certain temperature for 55 seconds on the ground or if low cooling airflow is detected on the ground for the same time period).
TOWING/BAT PWR CONT (Optional Towing Bus power. With Dead Ship AND Stby Power Switch OFF, the towing switch can be selected on to power selected systems used for aircraft towing. Low current drain stuff)

Did I miss anything? :}

Rgds.
NSEU

[B A Lert]

Qantas by all accounts have experienced a near catastrophic incident. The QF2 saga was wall-to-wall on the news tonight but there was not a peep from anyone at Qantas. Perhaps someone was interviewed but the copy was unsatisfactory to air. Why haven't we heard from any of the top team at Qantas, starting from Dixon and Cox? What have management told staff and customers by way of reassurance?


It IS time for wholesale changes at the top - I hope that the new Chairman conducted an appropriate due diligence before he accepted what could be a poisoned chalice.

PS The workers, as usual at Qantas, have done a great job. They should be richly acknowledged for their efforts in bringing home the bacon. :D:D:D:D:D:D:D:D:D.

[NAS1801]

Why haven't we heard from any of the top team at Qantas, starting from Dixon and Cox? Hahahahahaaaaaaaaa yesssssssss!!!! Get cox on Today Tonight again!! The Chasers war is off air at the moment and we need some good comedy!!

[Galley Raider]

NSEU,
You have way too much time on your hands. You must be a supervisor;).

I am glad the question didn't need to be, "what was still working after 45 mins?"

Cox and Co have been quiet. Even the half baked Today Tonight team could not get to them. They must be at spin school...."Now repeat after me: It was not a safety incident, It was a quality lapse."

[capt.cynical]

The "Spin Dr's" :yuk: are still on holiday ??:*

[QFinsider]

As a 400 pilot I am naturally concerned. This is but another lining up of the swiss cheese model that "other" airlines have proven is so true..Now it is us. How long until the world realises the management of Dixon and cohorts know nothing of aviation. Spin will not prevent the big one, I hope the divisiveness of the mismanagement departs before we have an incidenet that cant be spun away..........

To my colleagues well done. That is what Qantas pilots are paid for, the statistically unlikely 1%. They are worth every cent. Bean counters have had too much control for way too long. It is time they were put back to counting and not being allowed to touch anything. They have unfortunately assumed a role far in excess of their actual competence. The increasing number of incidents is testament to how out of touch, Dixon, Borghetti, Cox, Gregg , Jackson et al are. They know nothing nothing of effective leadership, and less of aviation.

This once great airline was built by pilots and engineers. They used their own money and knowledge. current "management" can say what ever they please, they are not pilots, nor engineers and the only engineering that goes on in their ranks is of the financial type.

FOG et al

[flyingtake2]

Lets hope that this is a wake up call for the multimillionaires at the top. They cant run this company like a bank -peoples lives are on the line for stuff ups.

[northcoastal]

Yes it's good to know we still have quality pilots...well done.

I'm thinking that a handheld ICOM & Garmin 296 should be standard in the cockpit...that's redundancy.

[teresa green]

Firstly, well done lads, (or ladies) I'm with you QFinsider, I registed a post no more than a fortnight ago (before this incident) stating exactly what you have posted re having pilot and engineers more involved in the running of the company, and as I said then, these people would not know a APU from a camels A#se (A#@se). Thirdly,and while I am not saying this was the cause but one of the banes of Flight Engineers was the habit of coffee grains being put down drains instead of into the provided bags, it was also a constant complaint from the ground engineers, it was repeatedly done even though the FSD/CSM often requested otherwise. I nominate the next C/C member caught doing it should be made to swim home. Forthly, I am starting to think BKK is QF's nemisis! And lastly knowing QF like I do, the witchhunt will now start. If they can find some poor hapless engineer to pin it on they will, at no stage will they consider the fault could have come from the destruction of one of the best engineering groups in this country all in the name of the mighty $$$. WAKE UP BEFORE IT IS TO LATE, we are dealing in A/C here not bloody jam tin labels!!:ugh:

[Big Enis Burdett]

Pretty sure last C check on OJM was carried out at Avalon in Sept 2007

[Jabawocky]

Hey....aren't you from Smokey & The Bandit;)

Ber...Bur....errr heck I got to go:D

One has to ask the question of management.....are they running Bunnings or Qantas.

One also has to ask, if there is a procedure for coffe grinds....WTF dont they follow them. All procedures are there for a good reason! :ugh: Serve Nescafe Gold in future and ditch the grinds, or use the coffe bags like tea bags.

Hard to believe a 744 is almost brought down for the sake of coffee grinds.:eek:

[speedbirdhouse]

There are standard procedures for the disposal of coffee grinds that involve waste bins and not galley sinks.

Blocked sinks from a flight attendant's point of view are a major inconvenience so no one in their right mind would knowingly block one.

We have a large number of flight attendants recently recruited out of London who may be poorly trained. Perhaps this may be an issue.

The cabin crew base has a reputation for being light on experience as the conditions of employment are poor with resultant high staff turnover.

This situation does sound like a perfect vindication of "Reason's" model.

www.coloradofirecamp.com/swiss-cheese/introduction.htm

Coffee to our premium cabins on our 744s was once of the inventum brand, pillow pack variety.

These were large tea bag style "pillows" of ground coffee that are placed in drip filter type machines.

The problem for Qantas of course is that these machine are expensive AND require maintenance from time to time.

I suspect that the coffee itself is dearer too than what we are now using.

Coffee now is made using cheap plastic 2 liter bodums using small packs of vacuum packed loose ground coffee.

Oh, and it tastes like ****.

There is also in first class an espresso machine but it uses pillow pack style coffee so its unlikely to have been a problem.

Inexperienced or poorly trained cabin crew may have been a factor but one thing is certain.

The pilots did a fantastic job. :D

[Scylla]

Thanks for the pilot compliments. I was unfortunate to be driving another 4-engined(?) jet when we poured the entire contents of the potable water tank into the avionics bay on rotation. Fortunately it was only a BAe146 and we were still VMC so we got a call in to ATC before the last radio died and just poled it round a circuit to land using the good old Mark 1 Eyeball.

Should have taken the hint and gone home - after an aircraft change, we then had an engine failure......

[whatdouknow]

Big Enis, suggests Avalon may be the last place that OJM was C-Checked, can anyone confirm?

[stubby jumbo]

Good Post Speedbird.

Congrats all round to those that got this aircraft safely on the ground.

Everyone has been saying this sort of thing COULD happen-"Reason Model".

Well Guess what -.it F~~~~_'n well just has !!!!:mad:

When are those clowns who "supposedly" run this joint going to wake up from their slumber.:ugh:

[employes perspective]

never i suggest,their bonuses are to large,they spend to much time day dreaming about how they can spend the money,perhaps take your family to Europe for a nice holiday via BKK

[shitthatsbig]

I must agree with you "another superlame". If the managers and lames at qf spent more time concentrating on the job these sort of accidents would not happen.
The quality of work at qf seems to be poor at the best of times, let alone when they have their eye off the ballgame.

Managers; Get on with it and sack all those slackass lame's.

Lame's; Wake up and smell the cheese, "its all over" you will be outsourced very soon.

[mrpaxing]

which makes this near accident an prime example of the swiss chees model. it is waiting to happen again and again. most times a 747/400K/P/J puts the nose down at TOD, water comes out of the fwd galleys and soaks the galley floor and runs off(presumable down into the cargo bays).cabin crew tell the cleaners/engineers. they cleaners clean up(on many occassions they had to come on with , the engineers have a look at a possible blockage(time permitting). next sector the same thing.
the problem is a design fault in the galleys, which puts the ice draws/drainige at the wrong place/area. once the ice melts on longer sector (the a/c is on an angle inflight) and the small drainage is unable to cope with the runoff as it blocks easily. ecxess water accumulates and once the nose goes down it comes forward. on touchdown/reverse thruster/brakes engage all the remaining water comes rushing forward. sometimes it is a lot. this happens almost every other sector.:mad:

[Short_Circuit]

speedbirdhouse you are absolutely correct. cost cutting again has caused a near hull loss.
(after 30 min on stby pwr its back to a torch & stby compass at night in rain etc.)
By removing the coffee pillow packs & tea pot bags to save a dollar or two per flight,
the loose grinds find their way into the drains and Bingo, the plane dark and quiet.

Cutting costs to maintenance is not the only way those at the top are putting peoples
lives at risk. Hopefully this last upset will shake them back to the reality. :ugh:
But I feel we are banging our heads against a brick wall!

[Short_Circuit]

mrpaxing, the galley floors are sealed units with drains in the corners to drain any floor spills, these too block with grinds. So it is still a fact that by not having pillow packs / tea pot bags, drains will block. Yes the ice draw drains are poorly designed by J@mco but incident reports need to done each time this spill happens, thorough cleaning and now, inspections of the E racks for moisture will have to be done!! (get my drift).

[mrpaxing]

double my efforts to LOG /write an incident report"every little drop" from now on.:ok:
but as you knowe transit ports don't give a flying **** about those things:*

[RedTBar]

The problem is or should I say one of the many problems is that the company from the top down has given the order to save money at every chance.

This means that CC dep like every other is looking at everything they can do so they can say"hey we saved X dollars just like you asked Darth"

The result though even when logged by CC is said to be whinging because the visitors don't want to admit that they made a wrong call.

[Reeltime]

How dare anyone criticise Dixon, Gregg etc..it's a little known fact that these 2 gentlemen invented aviation!

What would those dunces in Flight Ops and Engineering know about operating and maintaining aircraft, you need to be an accountant or at least possess an MBA in order to be able to make a knowledgeable comment on this subject.

"A330-300's go further than 200's"

"The 777 is old technology"

We are very lucky to have these two, to prevent QF making the mistakes that all our competitors have made.:D

[Lodown]

Just for a little perspective, there's a lot of blame on here on cost cutting. And with the tiers of personnel in Qantas, this means that there has to be many willing participants in the process, including the "workers".

It appears in this case that two things have come together (and bear in mind I'm only making an assumption based on the postings on pprune): loose procedures in the cabin with a clogged sink and a missing drain thingy/water barrier. Is this a result of cost cutting that coffee grounds are disposed in the sink and the ginger beers leave off the drain thingy?

I would think an important question to ask is where is the drain if it was indeed left off? Usually if there are components left around in a hangar after the aircraft is pushed out, someone will ask why. I can't see an engineer depositing an extra drain to the stores without raising some red flags.

In a classic safety study way, either one of these components to the incident is not a huge concern. Put them both together and they could have destroyed an aircraft and its contents. How many people in the world could have forseen that? Perhaps there will be a greater awareness of the need to follow procedures even down to disposing of coffee grounds.

[another superlame]

I do remember a couple of years ago Uncle Geoff Dixon in one of his pep talks say,
There are 400,000 AME's in China that would love your jobs

[Dick Smith]

In my CJ3 and in my Agusta A109E I have two generators with two separate generator control units mounted in different locations. I also have a separate battery back up unit running an attitude indicator.

Despite these, I always carry a battery operated Garmin 296 GPS – I have one in the glove box in each aircraft. This means that if everything else fails, I have navigation information and also quite acceptable attitude, climb and descent information as well as ground speed. The units operate from dry cells and will keep going for many hours.

Has Qantas ever thought of equipping each aircraft with one of these small portable units? The cost is virtually nothing and in the situation at Bangkok, if the same problem had occurred at night over the Pacific in the LAX – Sydney flight, a small GPS could have saved the lives of everyone. What do others think?

[Short_Circuit]

Lodown,
The barrier is a water tight seal as in a shower recess to stop water leaking through the lining of the floor / walls. It is inspected on larger maintenance periods, I am guessing at a C check, it is not a physical component that is missing. Yes, cutting costs by not using coffee / tea bags is directly attributable to the latest incident. No matter how careful CC are at disposing grinds, some will spill, wet or dry and clog. If they were still enclosed pillow packs there would be no problem. Secondly, many hours are spent during A checks flushing drain lines as routine maintenance. What is the saving now that we have to expend manhours flushing drains because of a few bucks saved in coffee / tea bags???:rolleyes:

Hi Dick, I suggest that cost will be the factor again. One handheld GPS does not weigh much, but to a QF bean counter, one GPS per A/C on every flight in the QF system equals X fuel burn over one year equals unacceptable cost. And of cause you are never going to need one, are you???

[shitthatsbig]

Yep.....The writting was in the wall then and its been all downhill since. Time you all took a look around and realised that the light at the end of the tunnel was a train, and you've been run over.

The end result of all this is reduced qaulity of maintenance and an accident such as the one above.

[blueloo]

Dick - the GPS units sometimes have trouble working through the heated glass windows on the boeings - they do work sometimes on a rear side window, with attached suction cup antenna.

I guess if all power is gone then the windows wont have current ...................

[another superlame]

Lowdown

I know that Cabin crew are not supposed to put coffee grinds down the sinks,but in reality when everyone at the airline is getting screwed equally, things like this are not really cared about.


Not only coffee down the sink, how about blankets down the toilets, it all comes back to poor morale from being screwed so often for so long

[shaftedagain!]

Short Circuit,
I think that the Barrier in question may in fact be the drip shield that is located directly above the Equipment Racks in the MEC. The Bus Power Contol Units and Generator Control Units are located on the top shelf of these racks. This shield is not usually disturbed during a C Check, it is more likely to get damaged during a Major Modification, for example Skybed when the floorboards would have been removed for seat track mods and galley rework.

[Short_Circuit]

^ No that is a "drip shield" (and was found cracked) the blue plastic paint on the galley floor is the barrier. Then there is sealed floor boards before the drip tray.

But you may well be correct they may be disturbed during reconfig or IFE installation.

[employes perspective]

i takes more to fly an aircraft than a radio and instruments,there are also engines and flight controls,that's what makes the aircraft move,move is what it does at 30,000 ft,what would of happened with the last of the available DC gone.
This reminds me of the DC 10 that crashed with the loss of hydraulics power to ALL 3 sys a few years back ,all it took to take the aircraft out was 1 grain of SAND(it was in the #2 eng compressor disc,left over from the day it was cast).
1 SIMPLE GRAIN OF SAND KILLED MANY PEOPLE,WHEN WILL THESE MANAGERS LEARN, SORRY ACCOUNTANTS THAT AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE HAS TO BE DONE RIGHT THE 1ST TIME,SOMETIMES YOU DON'T GET A SECOND CHANCE.

[another superlame]

The good thing about the 747-400 is that it is a mechanical aircraft. If you have fuel in the tanks and the engines keep running then you will have hydraulic power and flight controls. A has been mentioned previously Airbus puts the critical stuff out of harms way. May be Boeing might need to look at that for future designs

[Clipped]

Dixon, may I suggest quality preventative maintenance would have prevented this incident. Very much like your ticker operation - no expense spared there - eh.

[blueloo]

Dixon should have left Cox install that, wonder how long before he would croak then.

[spanner90]

I'm sure everyone who has completed HF training will remember, that if a potential failure path is identified, you should put in place another line of defence. In other words, if the holes in the cheese look like they might line up, put another slice of cheese in.

Ban the beans, bring back the bags, forget the cost, compare to the cost of a hull loss!!:uhoh:

BTW, well done to the professional LAMEs who inspected the 744s in quick time, despite EBA issues.:ok:

[Torqueman]

Originally posted by Dick Smith.

In my CJ3 and in my Agusta A109E I have two generators with two separate generator control units mounted in different locations. I also have a separate battery back up unit running an attitude indicator.

Despite these, I always carry a battery operated Garmin 296 GPS – I have one in the glove box in each aircraft. This means that if everything else fails, I have navigation information and also quite acceptable attitude, climb and descent information as well as ground speed. The units operate from dry cells and will keep going for many hours.

Has Qantas ever thought of equipping each aircraft with one of these small portable units? The cost is virtually nothing and in the situation at Bangkok, if the same problem had occurred at night over the Pacific in the LAX – Sydney flight, a small GPS could have saved the lives of everyone. What do others think?

Dick your comments on this matter have clearly demonstrated your shallow view of this industry and a clear lack of understanding of the importance of suitably resouced and competent engineering staff and facilities.

I hope you never find yourself plumiting through the air with the ground rushing up, while your plane falls apart around you.

Never mind Dick at least you'll be able to track your progress on your battery powered GPS....:ok:

[Nudlaug]

OLIV2, i think noone answered your question regarding the APU, you guessed right, logic prevents the start of a 744 APU in flight. It can be operated and supply electrics and pneumatics up to a certain altitude if it was started on the ground, but it can not start once in air

Cheers

[Mech-prentice]

I can confirm OJM was in Avalon (Hangar 5)around September 2007. I'm pretty sure it was a C-check, though there's a chance it was only an A.

Glad I never went near the MEC on that one...

Off topic, (and directed mostly to SCHAIRBUS) the last plane I remember being in Sydney Heavy was OEE. Or was that the one in there when they announced heavy was shutting in three months?

[OliV2]

Thanks Nudlaug.

Torqueman - a bit harsh there. Maybe you saw something in DS's post that I didn't but surely your response is a bit harsh. His comments relate to his private fleet and his personal methods of dealing with the unknown. Simple question was asked about the idea of hand-held devices on commercials. I don't think this in anyway detracts from the other (very valid) points about the state of operations at QF. Seems a shame to attack someone like that.:(

[ACMS]

DICK: how does your hand held GPS provide you with Att info updated fast enough to fly in IMC with? I'd like to see you try that under the hood.:ok:

Apart from GS and Alt what ATT info does it give you anyway?

It will only tell what has ALREADY happened, and maybe too late.

[Torqueman]

OliV2,

it was meant to be harsh. This kind of quick fix response has become systemic in the industry and management alike.

People are sick to death of hearing people like Dick, who have a reasonable all rounded voice which people are inclined to listen to, comment in such away.

What he has in effect said is lets treat the symptoms or what we see on the surface. People have been screaming at the top of their lungs for some time now about the underlying problems and causes, or the disease if you like that is destroying this once great industry in Australia.

Why don't people like Dick take the time to look at the root of these problems. Would installing a portable GPS in the cockpit of a 747 have stopped the water from getting to the BCU's, would it help the engineer to have been more qualified and better resourced to carry out their inspections. That is the root of the problem.

By the way the APU can't supply electrical power in flight. It can't be started in flight. If it departs with it running it can supply pneumatics to around 15,000'.

Dick to his credit has been a great champion to improving the aviation industry. Airspace and the like. This is all to no avail if the planes continually drop out of it. :D

[B A Lert]

Inexperienced or poorly trained cabin crew may have been a factor

What a load of cr@p! Blocked drains are caused by one thing: LAZINESS. No matter how good the training, nor how vast the experience, laziness in some people cannot be cured. It has nothing to do with poor morale, an arrogant management or any other factor. IF storage is provided for coffee dregs, why isn't it used? My betting is that it's easier and quicker to pour the lot down the drain. That is called laziness.

Just maybe the engineers will see an end to this caper now that the culprits can see what their laziness can (potentially) inflict on the innocent.

[speedbirdhouse]

B A lert, you've stopped taking your medicine again haven't you :=

[mention1]

In a similar vien, I visited a major capitol city Control Tower last year and we were discussing redundancy.

After discussing multiple path electrics and diesel generators the ATC guy said, "...and if all else fails we have a couple of hand held VHF transceivers over there to talk to the aircraft until something is fixed". Sure enought there were two ICOM's hanging by straps on the wall.

It was simple, inexpensive and so very easy to use. I think Dick's idea is a good one!

[Jabawocky]

Mention1

A bugsmasher driver like me might struggle in IMC on just a 296, but I can assure you that all of you lot on here that are airline drivers would probably save the day if you only had a 296 left in your panel and in IMC......sure the update rate is a fraction slower for the synthetic instruments but I bet you would survive!

Not suggesting anyone should regularly fly that way of course!

J:ok:

PS.....Speedbirdhouse, not sure of BA LERT's medication requirements, but he does have a point.

[speedbirdhouse]

No one would Knowingly block a sink by poring coffee dregs down the sink.

[another superlame]

They might not intend to block a drain but they have been asked many many times not to do it.They see the results of it everyday if they pour it down the drain. It is just laziness

[northcoastal]

"People are sick to death of hearing people like Dick, who have a reasonable all rounded voice which people are inclined to listen to, comment in such away."

I think that you think you speak for all...you don't. I am willing to listen to anyone with useful opinions on saving lives...including Dick.

Yes there are obviously root causes...but the point was that regardless of root causes, all civil aircraft should have COM & NAV ability that is totally redundant. Handhelds are totally redundant and I believe with a suction cup antenna, in the hands of a skilled crew, could be used to save the day.

Or maybe Boeing & Airbus etc should build a totally seperate,hand-held, low-power battery backup system. Perhaps the ability to plug EFBs into auxiliary GPS antennas? Then again if the power goes on an Airbus, I'm not sure how the fly-by-wire system would go.

[B A Lert]

No one would Knowingly block a sink by poring coffee dregs down the sink.

Yes. it is true that cabin crew may not knowingly block the sink but they do knowingly pour the dregs down the sink/drain. All lazy actions have consequences. This should be a wake-up call for all lazy FA's.

[chemical alli]

the system is redundant ,loss of gcu,s stanby inverter powers capts screen fmc ,vhf1 capts cp,is this not redundant ? i think maybe that there is more of a problem yet to be investigated.with one gcu dropping all others offline,
as for carrying handheld stuff where do you stop?
yes battery pwr lasts about an hour but the donks keep turning.

[Sunfish]

I seem to recall other Pprune threads that indicated that Qantas CC numbers have been pared to the bone, thereby increasing their workload, morale is low and experience levels are low as a result of turnover.

So whats to stop an inexperienced, overworked, tired and stressed CC from washing out a coffee maker in the sink like he/she does at home? The coffee grounds goes down the sink at home, so why not on an aircraft?

Swiss cheese holes that lined up this time appear to include:

1. Cracked water deflector. (Should it have been found during last check? Who checked? What was their training and experience level? And what was their state of mind and the size of their workload?).

2. Loose coffee grounds instead of bags. (Bean counters)

3. Grounds down drain (Who chucked them? What was their training and experience level? And what was their state of mind and the size of their workload?).)

4. Blocked drain. (Boeing design)

The Swiss cheese holes that might have existed but didn't......

5. Min spec'd Aircraft with limited redundancy (Boeing has a stack of options on how you configure the aircraft, (ie: Dual this and triple that) there is a lot of safety gear that is optional, depending where you want to fly the aircraft )

6. Crew already having to deal with another problem, perhaps maintenance related.

7. Stressed, tired, badly paid and inexperienced pilots at the controls.


......And all of a sudden the crew overloads trying to sort out the aircraft and...........!


My guess is that Qantas will now crucify the LAME who last signed off on that drip shield, plus the cabin crew who poured the coffee.

Cheers to the crew! Boos and catcalls to management!

[cart_elevator]

Ok BA_Lert and Super Lame

Have you ever tried to clean out a bodem on an aircraft? We are told to pour it in a the bin ... the bins always leak, but we do it anyway. Then we have to wash the pot and the plunger (bother have coffee grains stuck to them). That has to be done with a hot water tap - a sink is under every tap. If we didnt use plunger coffee/tea there would be no problem. It isnt laziness - its just the equipment/ product we have to use.

Plunger coffee usually isnt a problem in the area of the aircraft that went sour into BKK - we have an espresso machine that uses sealed pods in the doors 1 galley, we rarely (if ever) use plunger coffee there.

If you have another way to clean out a plunger coffee jug (which isnt related to laziness) please let us know! We used to pour it down the loo to stop blocking drains (and because of the constantly leaking bins). But we arent allowed to do that anymore.

We do our job as best we can with the crap equipment we are given, and the galleys that are never maintained. Nobody intentionally pours coffee grounds down a drain, it is inevitable - we are the cleaners, the bodums dont magically clean themselves at the end of every sector (they are only changed by catering in Australia)

So before you point the finger at 'lazy crew' try and see it from another person's point of view -----> the people who actually do it ! And point the finger at those who make us do it, rather than those who have to.

:mad:

[spacesage]

I am not employed by the airlines nor have I ever worked in the aviation industry.

I have been watching this forum for a month or so and this is the first time I have been moved to respond.

This incident strikes me as being a terrible stroke of bad luck. Aircraft have been hit by lightning more times than this has happened. Just because some people had a hand in it, doesnt mean they are the cause. Corrective actions should be taken, but it should be taken for what it is, very, very, bad luck.

Flying to wherever regardless of wx or anything is still the safest part of my day. And that is a credit to the discipline of all parts of the aviation industry. Notably it is largely self discipline, based entirely on the each persons personal integrity.

[chemical alli]

alot of jumping to conclusions.
1.was it coffe blocking sink i doubt it
2.could have been a leaking water filter
3.why so quick to shoot the cc
4.dripshield installed ?or cracked
5.nmultiple failure,

[Short_Circuit]

cart elevator & chemical alli,
You mention espresso machine in P/C galley, how often are they serviceable, 25% don't work and QF do not have spares, so the plunger comes out and the loose grinds. You must wash the plunger each use or pax will complain about the grinds.

1. coffee that blocked the sink? ----------- more than likely, usually is.
2. could have been a leaking water filter - --filters usually block not leak.
3. why so quick to shoot the CC ----------- we are not
4. drip shield installed? or cracked --------- cracked
5. multiple failure -------------------------- most defiantly

fatigue, cheap products, rushed maintenance, holes in cheese lining up - you bet it is, caused by cost cutting ..... absolutley... :cool:

[Jabawocky]

Shorts circuit.......bad choice of words, reminds me of an airline not hear anymore:ooh:

absolutley... :cool:

[teresa green]

The Australian 10/01/08. Mr. John Borghetti angrily reacts to suggestions that QF are putting safety before profit. Well bu@#er me! How could I have got it so wrong? Lets see now: lets start with the cabin crew. No longer a job for life with promotion, no, we will give you a two year contract, no incentives, and don't lets forget the import of overseas C/C who are well intentioned, but whose english could let them down under severe stress, why should they give a tinkers curse, about the company, and cetainly no loyalty, = unhappy cabin crew = unnessary stress = safety factors. Then lets go onto the Engineers. Without a doubt one of the best aviation engineering groups that ever existed. Any airline would jump at the chance to employ a Qantas trained engineer. The current boards answer: to divide and conquer. Put off QF trained apprentices, outsource work to other companies, pension off some of the best engineering brains in the company (quickly snatched up by other airlines) and the blokes and girls they have managed to hang onto, not pay them what they are worth. Arthur Baird would hang his head in disgust. Onto to drivers: why might you ask for the first time in the companys history, are the pilots leaving? Never been heard of before. Their training appears up to scratch, perhaps its morale that is getting them down. Sure the money is better o'seas in some places, but those with kids and parents getting on, don't really want to leave these shores (as us poor bu$#ers in 89 had to) you only have to read the posts on prune and q to know they are very concerned about safety and the future. QFs luck cannot hold out forever, some how pressure has to applied, to get this board to lift its act, or I am very fearful for the future:ugh::ugh:

[NSEU]

"By the way the APU can't supply electrical power in flight. "

Actually, some 744's can. There was a modification made to the BCU's which allowed APU generators to come online if ALL 4 engine generators went offline. However, I haven't been able to find out if QF has this type. However, the APU wasn't already running... so it wouldn't have helped anyway. The APU gens probably wouldn't have come online anyway with the BCU's underwater.

Rgds.
NSEU

[sydney s/h]

Word has it that they had another incident up in SFO.... flaps not retracting and did a high speed landing into SFO as the flight came down from YVR.

And apparently a baggage loader caught alight when they were loading the thing with a fuel truck connected!

[Short_Circuit]

sydney s/h it wasn't OJH by chance?

[ACMS]

JABAWOCKEY: I say again.......how does a handheld GPS unit of any description provide the flight crew with real time up to the second ATTITUDE information????????????????

ie Roll and Pitch.

IT DOESN'T...........

I challenge anyone to try and fly straight and level in cloud using just a handheld GPS unit.

They don't have a GYRO of ANY TYPE fitted.

I'm not saying it wouldn't be useful for other information, it's just that DICK said he could get ATTITUDE info from it..............WRONG

[life_sentence_as_AME]

my handheld garmin does tell me if it is being held level or not when looking at the electric compass

[soldier of fortune]

-life sentence as an ame-

nice name i know were your comming from -things are grim but keep your chin up -you will be trained- :ok:

[ACMS]

There is a LONG LONG way between using it on the ground in a quite unmoving enviroment to using it in a bucking Aircraft at night in cloud.

I suggest you take it for a spin in an aircraft into cloud and see how you go.

A HANDHELD GPS, OF ANY TYPE, IS NOT DESIGNED TO GIVE ATTITUDE INFORMATION to enable the pilot to fly in cloud.

With all due respect my friend I suggest you stick to fixing the aircraft and we will fly em......ok?

[life_sentence_as_AME]

but if i get trained i will have to change my prune name... i just cant win :}

[The Bungeyed Bandit]

Here's one for thought. how would you like to be flying over the South Pole in the middle of the night and have this happen.

Well this same aircraft (VH-OJM) was the very same aircraft that did the new years eve antarctic charter only 8 days prior to this latest QF2 Bangkok incident!!!

Low visual awareness, standby compass with low accuracy (because of location) and 4 -5 hours flight to nearest airport.

Now that would really be testing the capability of the aircraft and it's crew.

[NSEU]

Maybe his GPS comes with a spirit level? :}

ok ok.. let's give the poor lad a break. Don't be too hard on him... A few years ago, an experienced 747-400 crew took off thinking that their GPS's would re-align their IRU's for them in flight (they tried a quick alignment at the threshold for a heading discrepancy, but pushed the TOGA switches before the IRU's had resumed normal ops).

Rgds
NSEU

[ACMS]

Yeah I mean if a non-pilot says this then I can forgive him.

But the great DICK himself said it.......................tut tut.

then again maybe ol Dick has the new wiz bang handheld GPS that comes with it's own Laser gyro installed:ok:

[kalavo]

There's a number of people attacking Dick regarding his comments, go back and have a reread, because it seems you don't remember from one sentence to the next. He said that he has a secondary attitude indicator that has a battery backup and that he carries a Garmin 296.

Now there are a number of different secondary attitude indicators, but there's certainly self contained attitude indicators with internal backup battery that continue running when "the ship's battery has gone and everything else is up **** creek" available on the market. Hell it was mentioned similar models are available on the 400ER and without Dick being back on the forums to reply, I think we could give him the benefit of the doubt on what he meant even if it didn't read clearly.

So with that and a Garmin 296, I'd say you have enough navigation and attitude information to get to the nearest base. I can't see the 296 being approved for sole means navigation or even primary means, but hell I'd take the option of a 296 and a standby attitude indicator over a black cockpit.

There also seems to be a hell of a lot of anger in this forum which I think is misdirected passion for wanting to improve things - pay rises are nice (and I'll happily take one tomorrow), but quite often a job you can be proud of means so much more.

You guys have stumbled across a failure mode which could result in a hull loss, and a lot of suggestions on which bits of swiss cheese to change. Where I work we would get our arses kicked if we left that situation untouched. There is a change management process, and peer review to make sure we're not going from bad to worse, but anyone who left something so significant without doing anything about it, would more than likely be asked not to come Monday.

Now, if management isn't taking these problems as seriously as they should be, then that is an issue CASA should be addressing and you have means of contacting the regulator to ensure that happens.

If CASA is sufficiently ineffective to help you in your cause, then I'd suggest its time to start taking it up with your local politician. There's more than enough of you Australia wide to make a heck of a lot of noise and get some action. Inaction on your part because "I can't change it" is just laziness.

[ACMS]

Let me quote uncle Dick

Despite these, I always carry a battery operated Garmin 296 GPS – I have one in the glove box in each aircraft. This means that if everything else fails, I have navigation information and also quite acceptable attitude, climb and descent information as well as ground speed. The units operate from dry cells and will keep going for many hours.

Now I'm not a rocket scientist or an English teacher but...........

Mr Smith says "despite these ( referring to the stuff above ) if all else fails.........I have quite acceptable ATTITUDE information ...........blah blah blah"

WRONG

[kalavo]

*sigh* I asked you to read everything again

In my CJ3 and in my Agusta A109E I have two generators with two separate generator control units mounted in different locations. I also have a separate battery back up unit running an attitude indicator.

Despite these, I always carry a battery operated Garmin 296 GPS – I have one in the glove box in each aircraft. This means that if everything else fails, I have navigation information and also quite acceptable attitude, climb and descent information as well as ground speed. The units operate from dry cells and will keep going for many hours.

But yes, CASA's english test will help clear up confusion on pprune when they enforce it on everyone.

[ACMS]

yeah but..............

1/ he says he has multiple generators

2/ a second Att indicator

3/ THEN he says "despite these" ( see above )

I always carry a Garmin 296 GPS..................This means that if.........

Anyway I guess he means if all else fails he has the ATT indicator AND the GPS.....................

he should have written a bit more clearly for those like me :ok:

[Jabawocky]

ACMS

I usually like your posts, but mate get off your high horse for a second.:= Obviously in this instance you have little knowlege of the unit in question. Yes the update rate is not as fast as my solid state EFIS, you are correct there....however it is sufficient enough to save your arse should all the good easy to use TSO'd gear went u/s on you.

If that was all you had left, plus an AI and Altimeter, normal old clocks, and the F/O grabbed the 296 and chucked it out the window saying this won't help........YOU would probably kill him with your crash axe!

The thing would save your arse....probably not with me flying it, but your highly skilled ATPL brains would make do. In fact I reckon I might have a crack at flying on it under the hood sometime soon. Might just surprise myself. Will take along a current Qantas check and trainer to make sure i do it safely and without cheating. If I remember I will let you know how it goes.

J

Thread drift off........:oh:

[kalavo]

he should have written a bit more clearly for those like me :ok:

Absolutely! :)

It's as clear as a CASA exam question... where the technically correct answer is most appropriate, though you have to read eight separate sections of the Regs to arrive at that answer. :)

Flaming it for the Level 4 English is just flaming for the sake of flaming though. Not that there's anything wrong with that - spelling and grammar are the only way you have of showing your intellect on the Internet, and as pilots we tend to expect high standards of ourselves as well as others.

Back to the topic though, his point appears to be is all this system intergration leaving us open to rare failure modes that take out all critical systems because the all suffer from the same design flaw? If so, isn't the cheap and effective solution a portable GPS capable of providing reasonably accurate navigation information far superior to a clock and compass.

The chances of you having a common fault on the same piece of equipment at the same time is relatively high compared to having the same fault on two completely separate and independant systems....

Operating 4 engines in N+1 or even N+2 / 2N isn't actually that great if they all share a common fuel source. That's why we have multiple tanks and demand the refuellers test for water, etc.

As we've seen with this incident, operating 4 GCUs isn't much to write home about if they all share the same environment, and hence subject to environmental issues like water under the floor, fire, etc.

Operating a 747 with 3x IRS, multiple screens, standby signal generators... and a Garmin 296, well the Garmin isn't going to save you from a loss of RAIM due to lack of visible satellites that's the job of the VOR, DME, INS... but it may just save you from a loss of electrics.

[Mooney Driver]

The Garmin "Virtual 6-pack' really DOES work, I've practised flying VOR and GPS approaches using it ALONE; it is hard work and I wouldn't want to try recovery from unusual attitudes with it, but, IT DOES WORK.

Those of you not familiar with the capabilities of modern, general aviation, portable GPS units might wish to read the following excerpt from "Aviation Consumer" magazine.
**************

Garmin 196
We reviewed Garmin’s GPSmap 196 in the September 2002 issue of Aviation Consumer, reporting briefly on the panel page feature. This page is easily accessible by toggling through the moving map page or numerical page with the page key. After dispensing with the disclaimer, the full screen is occupied by the five basic flight instruments described above. In addition, there are numerical repeaters for speed and altitude and values for ETE and distance to active waypoint. That means that on a single page, the 196 provides all the data necessary to remain upright and navigate to an airport or waypoint.

The 196’s position-in-space is derived entirely from three-dimensional GPS, including WAAS, which it’s equipped to receive. Altitudes are GPS altitudes which are heights above the GPS mathematical spheroid, not MSL nor precisely AGL altitudes. The 196’s displayed altitude usually jives with MSL altitude within a few hundred feet but descending on this data alone without other information could be fatal. Unless you’re having a terrible day, a partial-panel emergency will leave you without gyros but with working airspeed, altimeter and VSI instruments.

Speaking of airspeed, the 196’s is GPS-derived groundspeed, not indicated airspeed. The obvious shortcoming here is that in a tailwind, the 196’s speed will be higher than indicated and it will be lower than indicated in a headwind. For heading, the 196 uses GPS magnetic groundtrack, not true or magnetic heading.

Although it has no pitch indication other than trends in speed and vertical speed, the 196 does have a simulated turn coordinator, from which bank angle can be surmised, since the aircraft can’t turn unless it’s banked. The turn coordinator has no slip/skid ball; in a wings-level slip, it behaves exactly like a real turn coordinator, showing wings level. It does not, however, respond to initial yaw, as a turn coordinator does.

Garmin has clearly applied sophisticated software and rapid updating to get this display to work right and it does work right. You’d expect some jerkiness in the indications and although there’s a bit of that, the needle indications are surprisingly fluid and well damped. Start a bank to the left and the HSI dutifully begins winding around and the turn coordinator airplane banks left. Rolling out produces crisp enough response to hit headings—ground tracks—within 10 degrees. The acid test of these things is to fly them, either in the clouds or with outside references blocked. We did the latter by constructing a cardboard hood that restricted the pilot’s view to nothing but the 196 panel page, repeating a test Garmin showed us last summer. We wanted to see if a pilot could remain upright and find an airport and land, using only the 196.

He can and did. Our test pilot easily flew assigned headings, climbed and descended to specified altitudes and held straight and level. Because of slight display lag, the ride isn’t glass smooth. We noted a slight continuous wing rocking—a 5-degree bank either side of wings level. But headings and altitudes were easily maintained. The 196 has GPS approaches in its databases but even without using these, we were easily able to navigate to the runway centerline at Sky Acres, New York, descend and land in what we set as a 500-foot overcast and 1/2 -mile visibility. We repeated this exercise to another nearby airport, Stormville, New York, with the same results.

Pushing our luck further, we tried recovering from unusual attitudes in various pitch and bank-angle combinations. Our subject pilot—who had never laid eyes on a 196 before this experiment—recovered effectively if somewhat uncertainly. Recoveries take longer than they do with conventional instruments and there appears to be a tendency to overbank past wings level during the recovery, again due to display lag. But even with the overbanking, all of the recoveries eventually damped out to wings-level. In a real-world partial-panel event, the Garmin could keep you alive, in our view, provided it doesn’t lose power or satellite lock. If you want to navigate to an airport or fly an approach, you’ll need to be eyes-closed proficient with the navigator. The workload of flying and navigating while also puzzling out the receiver’s higher functions is simply too great. A better plan would be to find an exit to VFR weather.

[Motorola]

Quote:

"No one would Knowingly block a sink by poring coffee dregs down the sink."

Is that like the flight attendant that knowingly stuffed a blanket down a 744 toilet?

[VH-Cheer Up]

Quote:
In my CJ3 and in my Agusta A109E I have two generators with two separate generator control units mounted in different locations. I also have a separate battery back up unit running an attitude indicator.

Despite these, I always carry a battery operated Garmin 296 GPS – I have one in the glove box in each aircraft. This means that if everything else fails, I have navigation information and also quite acceptable attitude, climb and descent information as well as ground speed. The units operate from dry cells and will keep going for many hours.

Maybe he meant altitude, not attitude. A one-letter typo could have spawned a whole load of venomous posts!

Regarding whether Dick's Garmin has a spirit level attached, look up Bob Hoover, Shrike and Orange Juice to see why that wouldn't help! (e.g. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TUVWHUR5OEI)

[Jabawocky]

Mooney Driver..........Thank You:D

ACMS.....if I was in your shoes, you would emand an apology no dout, i will settle for.......thanks for the enlightening debate:ouch:

Seriously, all dummy spitting aside, Dick raised a very practical point, just a pity all those who take any opportunity to publically dispute his thoughts do so without prejudice.

In this case he has a valid question.......I can tell you a well respected GA guy on here has been in the situation of a 296 scenario pending......and his coment was it would have done the job. Not a daily commute, but a bacon saver!

J

Ohhh yeah....thread drift was off......bad boy J:=

[601]

Anyone of you blokes used a Garmin 296. have a look at page 39 of the Pilots Guide and you will see what is close to a limited panel plus navigation. In limited panel flying you did not have a AH but derived attitude information from ASI, turn needle and VSI, all of which are presented here. All the info is there. It may be derived from a completely different source by some clever electronics and software, but it is there.

Dick was correct when he stated he could get attitude information from the Garmin.

[AN2 Driver]

These things here are not portable, nor are they TSO'd but they basically have all it takes as a backup, provided a separate power source for them is available. GPS, AHARS, the works. Would make a great back up but no chance to put one of these on a certified aircraft. I wish those guys would take the plunge and certify them. Something with the functionality like this would be a great help in case, clearly tough, they need lots of installation.

http://www.bluemountainavionics.com/products.html

I've seen one of these installed in an experimental, works very nice indeed.

[PJ2]

kalavo;
Where I work we would get our arses kicked if we left that situation untouched. There is a change management process, and peer review to make sure we're not going from bad to worse, but anyone who left something so significant without doing anything about it, would more than likely be asked not to come Monday.

[said with mock sarcasm....], Clearly you're not in the airline business then... Such reviews might come up with changes that cost money, you know. :ugh:

Now, if management isn't taking these problems as seriously as they should be, then that is an issue CASA should be addressing and you have means of contacting the regulator to ensure that happens.

Unfortunately, easier said than done given resource levels at some regulating authorities. Internal safety management is what "SMS" is all about, so airlines under SMS are "self-regulating" with a drop-in audit by the regulator to see if the books and documentation are ok.

In the race to the bottom to control cost and increase shareholder profit, any deviance that can be normalized without result will be explored and with today's management mentality which doesn't know it's in the aviation business, likely taken.

The anger you readily recognized on this thread is a bunch of guys/gals who know aviation and who know this pattern and it's effects upon flight safety viscerally and not just the effects on pocketbooks industrially.

As someone else posted, a job-well-done in aviation which is both actually comprehended and perhaps even grudgingly respected by management goes a lot farther to maintaining a safe and profitable operation than any number in the bank accounts does. Numbers in the bank account sometimes even follow such mild apprehensions of the value of employees' skills and experience. Short-term thinking may work in pushing stock of department stores etc, but it doesn't work in airlines - it is the wrong metric because the technique's shelf-life is as short as the next accident.

The anger you see here boils from the one cauldron aviators know only too well and is seen in elementary posters in all flying schools...that;

Aviation in itself is not inherently dangerous. But to an even greater degree than the sea, it is terribly unforgiving of any carelessness, incapacity or neglect.

— Captain A. G. Lamplugh, British Aviation Insurance Group, London. Circa early 1930's.


The story unfolding on this and the other thread in the R&N section is that airline employees the world over are seeing the same thing: the race to the bottom in cutting costs, the unbridled power of the shareholder to control management decisions despite the business they're investing in, and the resulting pressure to maximize profit at all cost. One way or another, airline managements will come to learn the lessons which taught you the processes you describe in your post - that they would get their arses kicked if they permitted such processes to compromise the integrity of the work at hand. Sadly for airlines, such processes are increasingly unwelcome at corporate safety meetings. Unfortunately for aviation and the airline business, the people who are good at kicking employees and suppliers for being the expensive liabilities they are while cutting notches in their cost-control rifle-stock, are invited to return Monday morning and those who take, and otherwise suggest the side of caution (which always equals increased costs), are increasingly unwelcome or at best, tolerated as boardroom anachronisms. In other words, the exact opposite of what you describe often takes place - nobody wants to hear about mistakes.

Intelligent, informed, comprehending cost control can be done safely. It takes experience, expertise, good data and a sense of aviation to do so wisely. It also takes listening to employees which today is about the last thing a management experiences as employees the world over have turned so strongly against management that there is virtually no communication. You cannot beat down wages to eight bucks an hour, make pilots pay for training, or dump employees' futures off in court bankruptcies forever. The effects of poorly-implemented LCCs are now being seen, first with employees but sooner or later, likely in the accident rate.

Airline employees know these truths. That is the anger you are seeing expressed on this and other threads - perhaps mildly misdirected at times and not perfectly grammatical, but real nonetheless.

The key to resolving these fundamental issues lies in two areas - the separation of hegemonies from realities and the return to governance by aviators or those who know aviation and not mere MBAs who couldn't describe an aileron from a coffee-maker but who know the price of both and the wages of the guy installing them, both of which are automatically too much.

Managements' seeming incapacity to comprehend why employees are angry means we can expect that despite the new year's optimism in re the numbers, the accident rate will rise over the coming years. And, no one will know why because there is absolutely no courage to look inside this business and why commercial priorities are pushing out the fundamentals. The last one to do so was Virgil Moshansky of Canada and he has expressed great concerns over SMS, or the "de-regulation of safety".

The employees of airlines around the world who are at the pointy end and in the engine compartments are the canaries in the mine. Their cautions, sometimes forcefully put and perhaps pushed out in all directions because they know that the friend as well as the enemy of aviation is profit, are being set aside by those who know nothing about aviation and who don't know that they don't know.

There is so much more to this than any one post or even thread can delineate...

[Sunfish]

Not sure if a garmin 296 would work in a Boeing cockpit because your windscreen heating is a conductive film that may give a Faraday cage effect, giving you a poor signal. Anyone care to try?

Last count, I have about six GPS (boat, plane,car) they seem to multiply like coat hangars. The 296 works for me, but I'm only a VFR driver.

My latest Yacht autopilot has a rate gyro in it (about the size of a postage stamp - Kynetix), so I guess a hand held Garmin unit that could provide attitude information is not beyond the bounds of possibility.

[Capt Kremin]

PJ2, excellent post.:D:D

[SkyScanner]

Has Qantas ever thought of equipping each aircraft with one of these small portable units? The cost is virtually nothing and in the situation at Bangkok, if the same problem had occurred at night over the Pacific in the LAX – Sydney flight, a small GPS could have saved the lives of everyone. What do others think?

Dick, the probability of 1 AC Bus dropping off is 1 in a million. The probability of 2 dropping off is a million squared. According to CASA, the probability of them all droping off is 3 in recorded aviation history. You cannot plan for every contingency, sometimes its just not your day...

[Galley Raider]

I just heard an interesting story. It may even be true.

Soon after OJM lost power into BKK, QF grounded the fleet until all drip trays were inspected. OJD was inspected in SIN and sents home by the local line stn lame. In SYD it was inspected again due to duplicate paperwork. In SYD it was found to have 5 cracks in the drip shield.:{

I wonder if the line station guys are into "safety before schedule" too?

[PJ2]

Skyscanner;

You cannot plan for every contingency, sometimes its just not your day...

Absolutely a truism in aviation. Like all those who fly for an airline posting here, I've had those kinds of days with thankfully very few serious events. It is a testimony to systems already in place that there is, in the millions of departures every month around the world, so little by way of serious occurence. What is increasingy under-appreciated is, such performance of complex systems does not occur naturally as part of the enterprise.

Likely you know this, but the whole idea is mitigation and preparation, not eradication of risk. Though it is observed, sometimes jokingly, it is trivially obvious that if nothing operated, it would be perfectly safe.

The idea is to take advantage of all input and have both a system and a culture in place which accepts all input, (the "what", not the "who"), is capable of sorting out the wheat (risk) from the chaff (unfounded fears) and creating a process to deflect/handle risk. That's what kicking tin, (an investigative process which only prevents the second accident), is all about and that's what data programs, (a preventative process whereby risk in downloaded flight data is examined daily, hopefully preventing the first accident), under SMS are supposed to do.

The issue comes when either nobody takes such data seriously, nobody wants to talk about it or nobody wants to fund it out of their budget and instead wants to look good in front of the meeting by keeping costs "under control". The career lifespan of someone who spends and comes up with increasing budgets these days, is short. Nobody wants to bell this cat so commercial, not safety decisions drive the daily operation until someone puts their foot down, usually a crew dealing with a mess of an airplane or other ops circumstances. We've often said that the best ally in the cockpit is the park brake followed by the word, "no". If anyone says the pressure to press on isn't there, they haven't sat in on one of these disputes where operations and dispatch are pushing and the crew is slowing it down. Most of the time it resolves itself intelligently and frankly that is the nature of the beast - there is always and forever a necessary tension between operations and safety - the balance obtains in well-run organizations. It is when, in ignorance or willingness to please others for atta-boys and look good to those higher in the food-chain for one's next promotion, that the balance is tossed out in favour of pure cost-control. These are real organizational bureaucratic dynamics, present all the time but most of the time dealt with in a healthy, quiet manner to good outcomes.

The one-in-ten-million chance that the N1 rotor disc on the center engine of a DC10 who's flying parts lined up with the junctions of all three hydraulic systems illustrates the valid point you are also making - **** happens and most crews deal with it quietly, professionally and there's never a peep out of the media or even management. That's airline work.

But daily operational safety, - good decision-making and a system which withstands and accepts the occasional "no" from crews requires an enormous infrastructure which is difficult to both demonstrate the need for, (because, frankly, we're so good at the safety game and "nothing" happens most of the time), and therefore tough to sustain under the present circumstances which is why it is slowly being dismantled through a thousand tiny cuts.

The results aren't here yet - they're coming, unless it is realized what course is being taken.

The notion of the MCPL, 200hr Pilot Wonders from "PilotTemps.com", (ficticious address!) is merely a variation on a theme, where it is acceptable to non-aviation types especially those under pressure to produce, that button-pushers who have memorized the SOPs to a "T" can be safely placed in airliner cockpits with minimal training and no experience.

As I say, one thread is not sufficient to fully explore the issue being touched upon by so many here and elsewhere.

[Launch_code_Harry]

PJ2 great posts

============================================================ =

Dick, the probability of 1 AC Bus dropping off is 1 in a million. The probability of 2 dropping off is a million squared. According to CASA, the probability of them all droping off is 3 in recorded aviation history
But was the risk of the loss of 4 generators actually 1 in 1,000,000 ^4 as you imply? This would be true if the systems where truly independent, but as this is a new failure mode it would appear to render that assumption incorrect. In fact, the 1 in 1,000,000 number that you quote is now totally meaningless. The risk in now what chance of 1) water leakage 2) failure of the water shield to the MEC?

[NSEU]

There are several layers of protection in place. Not just one or two. I had a look at the area above the MEC racks 2 days ago.
1)There is the drip shield directly above the racks
2) there are fiberglass honeycomb floor panels with rubber seals around the edges.
3) Didn't get the chance to look on top, but there will be a plastic waterproof barrier on top of the floor panels in galley areas (thick black adhesive plastic if I remember correctly).
4) There are a number of drains/filters at various levels (coffee maker compartments, benchtop and floor).

Rgds.
NSEU

[SkyScanner]

PJ2 and Harry, I don't disagree with anything you said. As with everything in aviation we learn from our mistakes/ accidents/ incidents etc. The original question from Dick Smith questioned whether a hand held GPS should be considered for this scenario... My response was just trying to provide a realistic view given the fact that QF and Boeing DO NOT plan for this situation.. Furthermore, the likelihood of this happening again still remains 3 in a giga-billion..

[Dick Smith]

It is extraordinary stuff. I have been watching the posts attacking me in relation to my suggestion that a Garmin 296 GPS be carried on Qantas flights – just as I do. Following are some of the comments.

Dick your comments on this matter have clearly demonstrated your shallow view of this industry and a clear lack of understanding of the importance of suitably resourced and competent engineering staff and facilities. Torqueman, I do have a clear understanding of this, but as the incident occurred there is obviously a problem, and if the incident had occurred over the Pacific at night, I believe the Garmin unit, held near a side window, would have allowed the aircraft to get to a suitable airfield.

DICK: how does your hand held GPS provide you with Att info updated fast enough to fly in IMC with? I'd like to see you try that under the hood. ACMS, in fact I have, and as shown in an article posted after your comment, it is possible to fly under the hood using the Garmin unit with only GPS inputs, even in a small aircraft. In a larger aircraft with greater inertia it could possibly be even more satisfactory. It would be very simple for Qantas to test this.

Here is a page from the manual:

http://www.dicksmithflyer.com.au/artman/uploads/garmin_296_1.jpg

ACMS also says:

Apart from GS and Alt what ATT info does it give you anyway? As stated by others (and as stated in my original post) it gives “quite acceptable attitude, climb and descent information as well as groundspeed.”

People are sick to death of hearing people like Dick, who have a reasonable all rounded voice which people are inclined to listen to, comment in such away. In fact, my comment is “reasonable.” As you would have seen by later posts, the unit is designed for just such a situation as the Qantas crew could have found itself in – i.e. an emergency last resort back up when everything else fails when in IMC.

As I have stated previously, my tests under the hood show that even a helicopter can be flown with this basic information.

If there is a problem with the windscreens of the 747, a simple remote antenna with suction cup could be carried and the antenna could be mounted on the side windscreen of the cockpit. I understand that a Garmin GPS works perfectly well in any airline aircraft with the suction cup antenna mounted on one of the side passenger windows.

ACMS, you kept harping on the following point:

A HANDHELD GPS, OF ANY TYPE, IS NOT DESIGNED TO GIVE ATTITUDE INFORMATION to enable the pilot to fly in cloud.

With all due respect my friend I suggest you stick to fixing the aircraft and we will fly em......ok? By the sound of it you are a pilot and one of the few pilots with a closed mind. There are a number of handheld units, including the Garmin 296, which are specifically designed to give information that will allow a pilot to fly in cloud in an emergency – the very situation we are referring to. That is exactly why this special page is provided on the Garmin unit. I will repeat – for flying in cloud in an emergency.

From now on when I fly Qantas – and I do often as I still consider it one of the best airlines in the world – I will take my Garmin 296 GPS with me. If ever we have a similar problem I will be able to have it sent to the flight deck!

It is obvious why we can’t upgrade to Class E airspace in the terminal area with such incredible resistance to lateral thinking.

By the way, with all the criticism we have of Qantas (and some of the criticism is well due) at least when problems occur they get publicity in our country. I understand that in some Middle East countries, when there are problems with the airline the media would not actually be game to publicise this – they might end up in prison.

[OliV2]

Nice one Dick :ok: Tall poppy syndrome mate.....sure you have come across it before! All the best.

[mmurray]

"Dick, the probability of 1 AC Bus dropping off is 1 in a million. The probability of 2 dropping off is a million squared. According to CASA, the probability of them all droping off is 3 in recorded aviation history. You cannot plan for every contingency, sometimes its just not your day..."

I don't know anything about flying or repairing aeroplanes but I do know about statistics. If I understand correctly what I am reading the generator control units are close together so failure via water is not an independent event for each one. For non-independent events you don't multiply probabilities. From what happened in this case I would suspect the probability of all four failing via water is the same as the probability of one failing. So it is not one in a giga-billions it is one in a million.

Mind you I never understand how people get failure numbers like one in a million. Do they mean that or do they just mean it is a rare event? Or maybe they are basing it on experience of how long these planes have flown without incident? In the latter case they are assuming the aging of the planes has no effect. News today is suggesting there are more cracks in water shields.

Thanks for all your posts -- makes interesting reading for a lurking passenger.

Michael

[Dick Smith]

I believe a most important question has not been answered. If the Qantas Bangkok incident had occurred a few hours before (when the aircraft was over the Himalayas) what would the most likely scenario have been?

Or if the incident had occurred on the Qantas flight from Australia to South Africa (or from Australia to South America) at night in the remote southern latitudes, what would have happened?

Surely professional pilots who fly for Qantas must have some idea on how the crew could get out of this problem – or would it be a definite loss of the aircraft and all the passengers?

[Nepotisim]

Oh for goodness sake.

Will everyone stop with the what ifs!:ugh:

It happened 15 mins out of BKK. There was enough battery power.Thats it.

Now, what if.................

[funbags]

Some of you guys astound me. Dick Smith has probably forgotten more about aviation than you people (including me) will ever know. As a current Boeing Pilot (on 3 different types all up in my career), what he has to say about a handheld GPS makes perfect sense.

And Nepotism, without the "what ifs", it makes it hard for the rest of us to actually think what we would have done in the same situation, or especially if it worsened. If the problem had occurred (say over the Pacific, or the Himalayas as Dick suggested), I would hate to think of the potential ramifications, especially at night or in IMC. What Dick brings up is definitely food for thought.

[Short_Circuit]

^ and as one CC explained the rush of water from the ice draw happens on TOD and brakes on during landing not in CLB or CRZ.

[OliV2]

Fair call nepotism - I know where you are coming from....BUT....I originally asked the "what if" question purely out of interest. Simply want to know if there is a checklist or any examples of it happening a long way out, and if so, what the outcome was. Would be interested to hear what a 744 pilot or sim trainer had to say on how they think the situation could be dealt with (assuming no personal GPS on board!!). Might be slightly morbid to think this, but it is a pretty amazing event. It reminds be of the Air Transit 236 A330 and the amazing outcome in that situation (obviously a totally different cause, result etc....). A totally unpredictable and unlikely event. Anyway, perhaps the answers are in the post already, but would love to here someone take a guess on how they might handle it! The guys who got QF2 down safely on Monday are perfect examples of why there is a fascination in these sitautions for many of us.....they dealt with an extraordinary situation on the fly (excuse the pun) and got out it ok thanks to their skill, intelligence and adaptability - exactly the skills that got us out of the trees all those millenia ago. Superb! :D

[Clipped]

PJ2 - inspiring posts.

Unfortunately it is akin to venting ones spleen.

In this day and age, this downward spiral of standards, unique to our industry, is being borne by the majority of decent employees who are confronted with finding a balance within their function.

When, how will management types realise that this balance must be achieved, to serve their employees and the flying public.

[Hardworker]

An interesting point, 8 days ago VH-OJM did the polar flights south, imagine if that had happened then, no standby compass available - useless in the polar regions, no nav aids, not HF let hope the crew toilet was available from the static inverter because they would have need it!

[PJ2]

Clipped;

If any of this opens just one manager's eyes who lurks here, it will have done some good so hopefully it's not spleen venting. It's not intended as such anyway.

When? Management will discover this only when the costs are too high.

That statement means airline managements have consciously made the decision to be "safe enough but not as safe as before", just so that costs go down. That means starving safety programs or providing them with absolutely minimal (meaningless box-tick) resources just so they can pass an IOSA audit.

Anyone who wishes to examine the dynamics of this kind of organizational behaviour for themselves can read "The Challenger Launch Decision" by Diane Vaughan, or "Organization at the Limit", edited by Farjoun and Starbuck and Starbuck's article, "Fine-tuning the Odds Until Something Breaks". The term, "normalization of deviance" which is the process of lowering standards until they are "normal" and deviance from previous standards is no longer visible but the standard is lower, was coined by Vaughan in her book.

Nobody wants an accident. Although completely true, that is the illusion such normalization is accepted under. But both statistically and historically, with such an approach the risk goes up. Because very few organizations are actually, really, looking at their flight data, (because either the experts have left out of frustration or, under SMS, operations people have no time and don't understand the information anyway), they do not have any idea of where they stand in terms of risks and trends. So standards are being lowered but in actuality little monitoring of the effects of such changes is going on. That is what is meant by being able to do cost-control safely - if one monitors carefully, one can cut safely. But cost-control mantras cut a wide swath and the first to go or at least lose support are the safety people and programs.

[kuldalai]

This is extract from QF Media Release..... "Qantas Statement on QF2

Latest News
Sydney, 09 January 2008

........ Mr Borghetti said the incident was triggered by water entering the generator control unit, which caused loss of power. The aircraft had automatically reverted to standby power.

"The aircraft was subjected to stringent inspections and testing in Bangkok before being cleared to fly," he said..................

............ "As a precaution, Qantas has inspected its entire B747-400 fleet and all of these aircraft have been cleared to fly."

Today Friday ABC Radio News disclosed that six (6) other QF x 747's were found to have cracked drip trays . Presumably the other six problem trays were found during the checks, but simply not mentioned in the media release; just covered generally by the statement " ..... Qantas has inspected its entire B747-400 fleet and all of these aircraft have been cleared to fly." ?

[NSEU]

Mr Borghetti is a manager. He has no idea what goes on inside the MEC of a 744. He's probably using 4th or 5th hand information watered down (pun not intended).

Gotta laugh.. he was flying on a 744 recently.. and his (and all the other Business/First Class pax) electric chair power failed (no recline/restow operation). A random relay failure, but nevertheless a portent of things to come.

re the drip trays.. It's amazing what you can find when you know where to look. If a worldwide 744 airline Airworthness Directive is not raised, I'd be mighty surprised. If QF has them, all the other airlines do, too.

Rgds.
NSEU

[Jabawocky]

If a worldwide 744 airline Airworthness Directive is not raised, I'd be mighty surprised. If QF has them, all the other airlines do, too.


Maybe nobody else has tried the granular coffee test yet?:E

J

[alph2z]

Is there a battery or battery-bus controller/disconnector ??

Could the batteries have been thrown offline ??

How far would the battery controller, if it exists, be from the generator controllers ??

If so I wonder how close they were to also losing the battery bus.

Any ideas on how the battery relay-control units works.

Thanks
.

[Going Boeing]

An interesting point, 8 days ago VH-OJM did the polar flights south, imagine if that had happened then, no standby compass available - useless in the polar regions, no nav aids, not HF let hope the crew toilet was available from the static inverter because they would have need it!

The nature of the water ingress into the MEC (ie blocked drains (esp ice container) in P class galley) would mean that it would become more of a problem late in the flight and with nose down attitude. The polar flights do have descents over the ice continent but, luckily in this case, the amount of water was not sufficient to flow out of the galley pan. QF has been lucky.

[bushy]

If what I read here is a correct picture of what has happened, then I think Qantas maintenance is worse than GA maintenance. I have been reading about water overflows that are common, and considered normal, and were allowed to continue until a very serious "incident " occurred.
And all this comes soon after reports of ground crews filling oxygen systems with nitrogen. Here also it seems this was not one isolated mistake. Reports indicate that despite colour coding and different fittings that were designed to make this impossible, someone persisted doing it wrong to the exteme, and the fittings were changed so that the error was possible.
Unbelieveable.
I think Ansett was shut down for less.

[Clipped]

Ahh .. The Regulator and regulation, again.

Heard the usual from Peter Gibson, matey.

[Brian Abraham]

If what I read here is a correct picture of what has happened, then I think Qantas maintenance is worse than GA maintenance. I have been reading about water overflows that are common, and considered normal, and were allowed to continue until a very serious "incident " occurred.
And all this comes soon after reports of ground crews filling oxygen systems with nitrogen. Here also it seems this was not one isolated mistake. Reports indicate that despite colour coding and different fittings that were designed to make this impossible, someone persisted doing it wrong to the exteme, and the fittings were changed so that the error was possible.
Unbelieveable.
I think Ansett was shut down for less.

Service Difficulty Report 510004977 B747-438

Floor beam upper chord had approximately 181 open fastener holes located between BS480 and BS980. Seat track flanges in the same location had approximately 3,455 open fastener holes.

I guess this means the seats were not restrained so lucky passengers never got to test their crashworthiness. Has Qantas, as an organisation, reached the stage where it's an accident looking for a place to happen. In asking that I would put poor morale (said somewhere else the most rampant corporate disease in America... killer of motivation, productivity and enjoyment in the workplace) caused by management practices (and the drive to cut costs) as the main driver.

[HotDog]

Is there a battery or battery-bus controller/disconnector ??

Could the batteries have been thrown offline ??

How far would the battery controller, if it exists, be from the generator controllers ??

If so I wonder how close they were to also losing the battery bus.

Any ideas on how the battery relay-control units works.


The main Battery circuit is relatively simple and none of it's wiring or components are located in the vicinity of the Generator Control units. The Hot Battery bus is hard wired to the battery throught the Battery and Hot Battery bus circuit breakers. If the airplane power fails, the Essential DC bus drops to zero causing the Battery bus transfer relay to drop out. The normally closed contacts of this relay supply voltage to the Battery Relay and if the Battery Switch is in the ON position, the relay is energized, connecting the Battery bus to the Battery. The Battery bus is thus powered until the battery goes flat.

[NSEU]

If what I read here is a correct picture of what has happened, then I think Qantas maintenance is worse than GA maintenance. I have been reading about water overflows that are common, and considered normal, and were allowed to continue until a very serious "incident " occurred.

Thanks for your comments... Please pass these on to QF Management.

Unfortunately, "maintenance systems" in their entirety don't always reflect the level of skill/dedication of its engineers. If effective maintenance time is less than an hour (typical of a lot of transits), there is not much a pair of engineers assigned to an airplane can do in this time... especially if one is monitoring refuelling. There are routine checks to be done, as well as non-routine Cabin and Tech Log items to attend to. Only a year or two ago, there were four or more engineers assigned to a 747 transiting an Australian port. Now there seems to be two (and in some cases one of these might not even be a licensed maintenance engineer). I can only imagine what goes on at ports outside Australia (on QF aircraft).

Is this the norm for most airlines these days?... Possibly. Maybe worse... with baggage handlers arriving and departing aircraft.

Management keep asking the engineers "How can we compete with budget overseas airlines if you don't moderate your wage demands and let us outsource maintenance". So when overseas airlines start using trained monkeys to service and fly their aircraft... should QF jump on the bandwagon? As someone recently said in the engineering fraternity "We used to be "old world", then we changed to "new world" (for the sake of efficiency)... and after the wheels fell off that... then we became "third world" :}

Don't the public love cheap flights... until something goes wrong ;)

Rgds.
NSEU

[QFinsider]

I knew PJ2 had been studying the normalisation of deviance as experienced by NASA. Firstly Challenger, then the foam shedding the ultimately claimed Columbia. In the high risk space environment, non operational people had eroded the control of operational personnel.

It is and continues to happen at Q. Look at our organisational flow chart..See where the head of engineering and Flight operations sit?? The bean counters are levels above Flight operations. The department that runs the flying is "A department" of many. The CP another department head.
CAO 82 is very clear, this should not be allowed to persist. It doesn't in GA yet is tolerated in Qantas.....CASA permits the normalisation of deviance in operational control..It is why so many decisions that impact adversely on the flying operations are challenged. If the WX is bad at destination, why do the company call an aircraft on the sat phone and say we want you to go to place Y. It is an operational decision!! PIC is PIC however the more pilots are dicated by commercial concerns the more the normalisation is allowed to persist. Who amongst us on the a short haul contract has gone to work sick because the financial penalty mean it costs us money..Yet CAO 48 is very clear..(i am guilty) Commercial is important, but operational decisions are for operational personnel. Not commercial...Who in Qantas has noticed the "non technical markers of performance labelled "commercial awareness" That has no bearing on flying an aircraft safely...It is this acceptance of transfer away from operational personnel that COULD generate the big one...

[HotDog]

NSEU

So when overseas airlines start using trained monkeys to service and fly their aircraft... should QF jump on the bandwagon?

Rather unfortunate choice of words mate, I think I'll report you to the ICC!:rolleyes: Seriously though I spent 33 years flying for an overseas airline with an excellent record of safety (no excursions to the golf course) on aircraft serviced and overhauled by your "Monkeys" to the highest of standards. There is life outside QF you know.:rolleyes:

[NSEU]

Hey, I didn't say they had yet (literally) started training monkeys! (and I do mean ANIMALS)

The point I was making was.. Should QF stoop to the lowest common denominator just to keep on an equal footing with competitors?

Sorry if that caused offence... It certainly wasn't intended.

Jeez... the guys on this forum really are a sensitive (but sweet bunch) :\

Cheers,
NSEU (former engineer... now, trained monkey)

[ACMS]

DICK: ok then...........I was not aware of ANY GPS that replicated a normal panel with that sort of display.
I still can't see how it's refresh rate would be fast enough for you to fly in light turbulance IMC day or night?

I guess it's worth a try though.

Trust you to have deep pockets for the latest gizmos.

[blueloo]

Personally, i think a GPS on the flight deck is a good idea - not necessarily because of electrical failure, but because chances are it has better info available than on some of QFs antiquated basic FMC non GPS jets.

[HotDog]

Ok NSEU, peace. You didn't really offend me, I'm far too old and thick skinned for that.:ok:

(HotDog-ex LAME-ex Flight Engineer; now retired p!ss head.):E

[Roadrunner]

Forgive me if this has been mentioned, as I have only read about 7 pages of this thread.

I have often wondered why major airlines don't use the expertise at their disposal to come up with a concise, definitive, explanation of exactly what a crew have at their disposal in the event that they end up on basic standby power.
Of course I am talking about more than the basic list given in the systems manual. I have noted over the years how the sections seem to be getting less and less as they amend them.
I used to fly a Boeing in the Middle East and no one really knew for sure if it had the battery mod connecting the APU battery to the main batteries thus giving 90 mins on SBY instead of the normal 30.
I asked if there were any electrics required to run the normal flap/gear extension as I was concerned we might end up at an airfield with depleted batteries after a major electrical fault. It wasn't easy to get an answer and in the end I think the ginger beers said they thought there probably was a need for some electrics for the normal flap extension. The systems section for the 75/767 is now even more basic than it used to be when I first came onto the type.

My point is, why isn't all this stuff worked out for us by the companies and Boeing/ Airbus etc so that we have it all at our fingertips.
Even if there is only a slight chance of such an event, I think a little prescience would go a long way.

If we could get this happening then maybe we should arc up about proper full face Oxygen masks in the cockpit as well. The thought of major smoke in the cockpit with the silly little goggles we now have is of concern to me.

Good luck. :ok:

[employes perspective]

Qantas flies into stormy weather

By Peter Gosnell
January 11, 2008 08:22am

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AFTER the turbulence of 2007, Australia's national airline has emerged this side of the New Year certain of little more than the precarious state of its reputation and the prodigious size of its profits.

In its wake is a vapour trail of incidents and events that has those believing in Qantas' status as an Australian corporate icon reaching for the oxygen.
To sum up, the Flying Kangaroo endured a failed takeover bid, the departure of its chairwoman in the aftermath, prolonged industrial disputation and soaring fuel costs which have been passed onto consumers through so-called fuel levies.
It has also copped a plea over a price-fixing scandal and agreed to pay $60 million in fines to the US Justice Department. Then there was an executive health scare which may yet mean boss Geoff Dixon steps down before his July 2009 departure date and most recently near disaster, when an electrical fault on a flight from London to Bangkok this week put the airline's legendary safety record to its gravest test yet.
Despite the bumpy ride, Qantas has maintained its grip on 65per cent of the domestic market thanks to the success of its budget carrier Jetstar.
It has plans to spend $35billion over the next decade replacing its ageing fleet, with orders in place for the giant A380 airbus and the Boeing 787 Dreamliners.
Big plans, and with a forecast full-year profit of $1.44 billion certain to send the bonuses of the airline's senior executives into the stratosphere, the firm will have all the borrowing capacity it needs to put its plans into action.
And while Qantas engineers might rightly believe they're entitled to a portion of this burgeoning financial growth, Qantas management has so far given barely an inch in its recent war with its engineers.
Yesterday the Australian Licensed Aircraft Engineers' Association (ALAEA) - which is seeking a 5 per cent annual wage increase for its 1700 members - deferred for a second time to refuse overtime. Enterprise bargaining agreement negotiations are continuing.
But can Qantas maintain its reputation in the wake of the poisonous disputes, the odious publicity, rising fuel costs, perceptions of declining service standards and most importantly last Monday's incident?
Reports yesterday suggested QF2 had experienced electrical faults before departing London, a claim Qantas denied.
"The flight departed normally ... we have no reports of any technical or other issues," a Qantas spokesman said.
The wisdom of admitting to having no knowledge aside, the incident has plenty in the industry worried, not least the plane's manufacturer.
"We're not entirely sure about what happened on that particular flight and we've got a high-level investigation into the incident," Boeing Australia spokesman Ken Morton said.
"The fact that this happened at all is highly unusual and we need to better understand the facts of the case."
It's a sentiment echoed by pilots. So far the power failure has been attributed to water leaking through a cracked drip pan under first class. The water got into the electrical system and caused a short circuit.
The pilots switched to emergency battery power which lasts for at least 30 minutes.
Fortunately the plane was about halfway through its descent into Bangkok and was on the ground 15 minutes later.
But a pilot who asked not to be identified said the critical elements in a power failure of this kind were where you were and whether it was night or day.
"In Europe or Asia there's plenty of places you can go but in the middle of the Pacific where the nearest place is three hours away, you'll probably have to stick it in the water," the pilot said.
Mr Morton was unable to say just what Boeing recommended to its customers in terms of maintenance inspections for the drip trays, although he confirmed Boeing did provide extensive recommendations in relation to maintenance.
"There are some areas of the plane that command more attention than others," he said.
"A lot of components are maintained on condition that they don't have a finite life which means if they are not broken they don't have to be replaced," Mr Morton said.
Qantas has one maintenance division based in Sydney comprising employees but outsources maintenance at its Avalon base outside Melbourne.
A spokesman was unable to say when the plane was last inspected or where.
Depending on where the fault lies will have a big bearing on whether Qantas' reputation finishes the year with fewer blemishes than when it started. Not that is necessarily so important any more. As it showed in 2007, a few stains didn't undermine Qantas' incredibly profitable bottom line.

[employes perspective]

Shares may face more than a near miss



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January 09, 2008

HOW near was the miss? Just another "incident" - or enough to rattle a rampaging Qantas share price?
Qantas had clamped down the information shutters last night -- and to be fair, no one knew what the problem was -- yet "the incident" will throw into stark relief, again, that critical nexus between costs, profits and safety.
The Boeing 747 flying into Bangkok on Monday from London to Sydney had a highly improbable electrical failure and had to resort to the back-up system -- a battery.
This battery, according to pilots and an aviation engineer contacted by The Australian, lasts for about 30 minutes and provides a cockpit light, a radio and the captain's instruments.
The speculation now is twofold: how did four independent electrical systems (four generators on four engines) fail simultaneously? And what would have happened had the failure occurred over an ocean in the dark?
As the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, the Australian Transport Safety Board , Boeing, the Thai authorities and Qantas were investigating last night, no one had any answers.
Neither could Qantas provide confirmation on the age of the aircraft. It's a 747-400 and could be anywhere from five to 25 years old.
This matters. If it is a fair vintage, the "incident" will bring controversy, perhaps even dent the stock price. Qantas has one of the oldest fleets in the developed world at roughly 11 years, while management focus on eliminating costs has brought terrific internal debate on the trade-off between profits and safety.
Three years ago, David Forsyth, the airline's former executive general manager of engineering and maintenance, presented to the executive committee on the challenges of maintenance and the sustainability of the cost-cutting program.
Forsyth left shortly afterwards, said to be dissatisfied with the company's approach and spending on maintenance.
The debate has raged, and so it should, as Geoff Dixon and his team drive billion-dollar profits with their comparatively old fleet. Almost anyone trying to get a ticket overseas knows the yields and load factors are running full-tilt at Qantas, and at most of its competitors.
Besides the age of the fleet is the array of aircraft types and configurations, which make maintenance a difficult job. Bombardiers, 737s, two types of 767s, three types of 747s and the incoming 787s are all in the fleet.
Perhaps the greatest concern in last year's private equity tilt at Qantas was the one least featured in the press. Amid all the debate on price and the role of the board, valid issues all, was the matter of cost savings.
The Macquarie-Allco-TPG consortium plan was to run up debt to drive financial performance and cut costs. The issue of safety was mostly ignored in the public debate, although the chances of an increase in "incidents" may well have risen under a more aggressive management.
There comes a point, however, in aviation when safety can really damage the bottom line. Were Qantas to crash, the premium for safety would be wiped out with devastating consequences for the stock price.
For Qantas, the only positive in the incident is that it may redirect attention from the latest fuel surcharge. Given that management had been telling the market how well the company was hedged for 2008, it's a cheeky outcome indeed that, according to analysts, the latest hike should plonk another $130million on the bottom line.

[employes perspective]

i am really starting to fear for the flying public now,incident after incident,power outages,oxy sys filled with nitrogen,eels held together with staples,checks not done as there meant to ,inspections down in a fraction of the time allocated (re Singapore checks) and the list goes on,and all this in such a short space of time since Syd Heavy was shut down.
What the hell is CASA up to,when will someone there be held accountable :mad::mad::mad:

[U.K. SUBS.]

EP, did you not know the real intent of CASA?.

campaign against safe aviation

Maybe we (as maintenance and flight crew, as we are ultimately legally responsible) should take heed of who lobbys what in Canberra more closely. Just a thought.

Apologies to all for thread drift.

[PJ2]

employees perspective;

Thanks for the posted article.

From the article, the author (unnamed) writes:
There comes a point, however, in aviation when safety can really damage the bottom line. Were Qantas to crash, the premium for safety would be wiped out with devastating consequences for the stock price.


Such are the ethics of airline managments and shareholders today that the only comment ever offered regarding their concerns over safety is, "There comes a point, however, in aviation when safety can really damage the bottom line".

The corporate concern is not for the passengers and crew, not for the professional ethics that each of their pilots and flight attendants holds dear regarding the safety of their passengers, but... "the bottom line".

Wow. It doesn't get much more succinct than that.

What on earth has this industry come to?

[ferris]

PJ2 I think the author, in speaking to that particular audience (shareholders), is trying to reach them via a vehicle they understand. You are so right, but when in Rome.....

[PJ2]

ferris;

Thanks... - in which case I hope it works.

I think the message is too vague and soft for shareholders to see or hear, however. Only someone who knew what they were investing in, aviation, would sense what was really being said.

For most, a message that cites a possible shareholder risk, such as complete loss of the shareprice, or worse, a possibly-fatal accident and all the financial and governance outcomes which follow because safety priorities were not accorded as high a corporate priority as they should be, should raise the hair on the back of their necks sufficiently so that they at least take more than a casual look at their investment and ask some questions of management. I realize that it's far more complex and involved than that and that I am not a financial expert nor am I knowledgable of such things - I only am aware of some of the effects of same on the airline business...

[HotDog]

U.K. SUBS.

campaign against safe avaition

Me thinks you need to post another edit.:E

[blueloo]

The only way the focus will change is if someone is held accountable. We all know the pilots and engineers on the day will be the scapegoat, but the people who should be held criminally accountable are the board of directors AND the shareholders.

The reason why I include shareholders (primarily institutional as opposed to the small family investor), is because they endorse these directors, and the continue to endorse their decision making with large, ridiculous increases in remuneration.

As to how prosecution of shareholders/enforcement would occur, I have no idea.

It cannot be sustainable, to have the CEO/directors of the company, just pass the buck when something goes wrong.

[PJ2]

We have such a law in Canada already. It's formal name is "Bill C-45 (http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?pub=bill&doc=C-45&parl=37&ses=2&language=E)" but it is widely known as the Westray Bill and was commented on in Parliament thus:

"Mr. Speaker, the passage of Bill C-45 represents the final step in the House in making significant reforms to the criminal law as it applies to all organizations. The bill has its origins in the terrible tragedy of the Westray mine explosion. All parties in the House co-operated in ensuring that the bill received high priority."

Paul Macklin,
Liberal MP and Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada on introducing Third Reading of Bill C-45 on October 27, 2003.

From the United Steelworkers web page:

"Westray was a coal mine in Pictou County, Nova Scotia that exploded on May 9, 1992 killing all 26 miners who were working underground at the time.

"The resulting public inquiry delivered a damning report of management greed and government incompetence. In all, Judge Richard made over 80 findings and 74 recommendations. Most notable is recommendation #73:
"The Government of Canada, through the Department of Justice, should institute a study of the accountability of corporate executives and directors for the wrongful or negligent acts of the corporation and should introduce in the Parliament of Canada such amendments to legislation as are necessary to ensure that corporate executives and directors are held properly accountable for workplace safety."

From the Act's Summary page, (link above):
This enactment amends the Criminal Code to


(a) establish rules for attributing to organizations, including corporations, criminal liability for the acts of their representatives;

(b) establish a legal duty for all persons directing work to take reasonable steps to ensure the safety of workers and the public;

(c) set out factors for courts to consider when sentencing an organization; and

(d) provide optional conditions of probation that a court may impose on an organization.

[Clipped]

Management 101 - Divert attention, reassign blame.

[bushy]

That is the difference between technical /scientific people and managers/executives.
In the past it was considered ok to just "sack the wrongdoers" and pretend the problem was fixed. (the blame game.) Some still want to continue this. That is half doing the job. (shifting blame)
I once went to a breakfast meeting where Professor James Reason spoke at length about these things. (the only time I got a free feed from CASA) Professor Reason emphatically made the point that the blame game was usually a diversion from the real purpose of preventing such things from happening again.
Sure you have to find who did it wrong (if they did) but sacking them will not usually solve the problem. You have to then find out why, and the trail may lead to many places. They all must be fixed.
An example is the airliner that crashed and killed many people because the cargo door was not properly closed. The person who closed the door could not read english. And the door instructions were in english.

[gaunty]

bushy

The inimitable Professor could only shake his head at this one:

and then there is accident at a WA mine construction site;
“He got wedged there and the other worker could not get to the controls to take the boom down to release him,” Mr ***** said.

“His head hit the top of the building and pushed him over the controls so the other worker could not get to the controls.”

Mr ***** said that there was an override switch on the ground but that the three men on the ground, who he said were from ****** and did not speak English, were not able to operate the switch.

Happened very recently but reflects the pressure on resources, self generated or not we do not yet know, but the lesson is obvious. The deeper the cuts and the shorter the short cuts the closer we all come to this in this new world of corporate arrogance and corporate greed.

QF001 and this recent very very close shave makes 2 strikes, both for different reasons but the same root cause.

I have to travel to the US and other parts at the end of the month to facilitate the purchase of another corporate jet. Trouble is, to get into the haven of one I am now a little no, a lot apprehensive about travelling airlines. Good 'ol United here I come, unless I go the other way on British.

The egg cant be unscrambled but the sale of our National carriers into the hands of corporate brigands was never a rational nor sane idea.

[airtags]

On the back of last year's incident where blocked drains resulted in "moisture" being found in the avionics bay aboard ZXC, and given recent events one would rekon that there would be a sense of caution about sending out an a/c knowing that its drains were blocked....

well not so at Q today - where the ever reliable 767 RR powered ZXG complete with taped off galley sinks and instructions that the drains are blocked (just like XC last year) was sent off the starting blocks for another day of domestic legs.

Initial diagnostics late yesterday apparently determined that the a/c would require at least 12 hours off line to rectify the drain blockage and therefore........ it would just have to wait while pax endured a soggy mess upfront.

Spare a thought for the maintence crew tomorrow that have wade through the stinking putrid waste water and lets hope that any wayward 'moisture' doesnt find its way into anything important in the meantime.

dilgence again dies in the debate for dollars - seems like the LAMEs didnt need to take action on defects - Q is taking the do it yourself path!

[kellykelpie]

Globalisation works on all levels. MPLs, indonesian airlines about to start in Oz and less and less money being spent on safety can only indicate a globalisation of safety culture. Australia was once a stand out but we are on the skids.

[cobber_digger_buddy]

Bushy,
that is the difference between technical /scientific people and managers/executives.

I think what you mean to say , is I believe "that is the difference is between people who have integrity and people who do not. "


but ultimately you are correct, also in my experience australian Management/executives/middle manager bean counters are a wholly untrustworthy and about as solid as a peking duck pancake , their teamwork and resilience is appallingly bad and their empathy for their "team" extends to what the team can do for them.

pretty poor.

[Lodown]

I've got a similar, but slightly different take on the matter. I don't know how the process works at Qantas, but usually the VP's/directors/managers send the strategy and support down to the employees who make the work happen and it's the employees' role to do the work and pass updates back up the line. (I know, it's not perfect.) Even during cost cutting however, this process should continue to function. Something in this process is missing and Qantas should be extremely concerned to identify and rectify the situation asap.

First, where is the communication breaking down on changing from enclosed to loose coffee grounds? Who made the decision to use loose coffee grounds and what advice did he/she receive? Was the advice from a suitably qualified person? Was that advice received, and if so was it ignored and why?

Second, it is apparent that loose coffee grounds have been causing problems for some time. Being charitable and suggesting that the decision was taken by someone not totally familiar with the situation, who then was responsible for ensuring the appropriate decision makers were made aware of the problem and could then take appropriate action after implementation? What is being done to mitigate flight with blocked sinks now?

Third, who or what organization has been signing off or ignoring cracked drip pans? Were senior management aware of this and what action did they take to rectify or mitigate the situation? Were the supervisors who are supposed to see the big picture aware of the correlation between cracked drip pans and clogged sinks because it sounds like a few LAME's should have known the possible consequences? Were the concerns travelling back up the line? And what is being done now to fix the problem?

Finally, as others have suggested, what role did CASA play or not play in this and what are they doing now to avoid similar occurences in the future? Did anyone in Qantas who may have been in a position to realize the possible consequences of cracked drip pans and blocked sinks ever contact or try to inform someone in CASA? If not, why not? And how much action and resources is CASA currently employing to thoroughly research the incident?

Where's Richard Feynman? There should be a thorough open and independent investigation of this incident carried out either by CASA (with appropriate government funding) or a reputable third party. The investigation shouldn't be directed at castigating the Qantas management, but tasked with determining where the breakdowns in communications are occurring and checking into the fitness of the appointed supervisors to responsibly listen to advice from employees and make appropriate decisions. If there is no investigation, or simply an internal Qantas investigation, then I would expect business to operate as usual and it will only be a matter of time before another serious incident occurs. I would think a responsible and informed shareholder would not only welcome, but call for an independent investigation.

[speedbirdhouse]

Lowdown,

one of dixon's actions of late was to "compartmentalize" Qantas into five separate divisions, each one responsible for maintaining/containing their own profits/costs.

What we see now is one department competing against another with regard to the apportionment of cost with no one really concerned about how things affect the whole business just their department or KPIs.

The decision to use loose coffee no doubt saves the cabin services department money but probably results in an increase in engineering costs AND delays due to an increase in incidents of blocked drains.

Yes, the dregs shouldn't end up in the sink but despite peoples best intentions they obviously do.

This sort of thing is occurring all over the company.

There isn't a holistic approach to anything anymore only concerns for ones own department or worse, KPIs.

The other problem is to do with communication or the lack of it due to the fact that our management structure has been layered with non airline people.

Speak to anyone operational and they will tell you the same. We all invariably report to people who have no idea what it is that we do, how we do it or why.

For them the airline industry is just a concept. Take cabin crew as an example. We report to and are managed by people from banks, call centres, the scout movement, casinos, CES etc.

Can you imagine how frustrating that is? I've been to my managers with operational issues only to get black stares of incomprehension or pithy replies just to get me to go away.

End result, people no longer bother or worse, care.

This airline is fundamentally sick but hell we are making lots of money and that really is ALL that matters to those running it :yuk:

[GE90115BL2]

NSEU: Mate I'm not stupid :ok: Of course you'd need to have enough fuel to descend to 10,000'. Most of the time mid-Pacific you'll have 70 to 80 tonnes of the stuff, enough to fly to the nearest suitable airfield at 10,000' I chose 10,000' so you could depressurize the ship BEFORE you lost ALL power to the valves. And yes this would only work in daytime VMC.

So, answer my original question: Couldn't you just turn off the battery to conserve power AFTER you've 1/ descended 2/ depressurized 3/Advised ATC and 4/ worked out Navigation .

This must be better than pulling god knows how many cb's powering god knows what.

[QFinsider]

The student of the corporation would be well placed to study Q. It is a classic example where operational disconnect and executive management with no operational experience are driving a company into the ground.

Executive management requires a thorough understanding of the operation. Who at executive level posesses that experience? If they do not posess it do they canvass it from the operational experts, be they cabin, pilots, engineering, ramp, check in etc.
In a highly labour oriented business these people are key ASSETS. They are not COST. Ask an experienced cabin crew how to organise the aircraft interior and schedule meals/service they will tell you. Ask engineers how to fix aircraft and what needs to be watched, they will tell you. Ask the performance engineers about the 3 important bits, range, payload and pax-they will tell you. Ask pilots about operating an aircraft, weather etc they will tell you! Ask check in staff about busy times, staff numbers etc they will tell you. More than likely you will reduce cost!

Qantas executive ask nothing! Not only do they not posess the knowledge, they do not seek it. Or if they seek it, they seek it from the yes men. If Dixon was worth $6m, he would not coccoon himself in P class he would talk. His individual illsuited personality and what it engenders and the illsuited people it promotes underscores the problem.

Business segmentation pits normally "objective" focused teams against each other. I cannot get the aircraft to LA if they loaders don't do their job, the engineers don't sign it out, the cabin crew aren't onboard and ready to serve the passengers, the check in staff haven't processed, the fuel isn't loaded etc...A very people intensive business.
Now engineering can duck shove a cost to commercial and the manager generates a $ for himself. The cost borne out in the annual reports meansures nothing of downline disruption, damaged perceptions or OVERALL LONG TERM COST. This does not interest Dixon, nor Gregg nor Jackson, Gosgrove, Cross et al. It is not a tangible cost to the accountant and deserves little attetion. If it can't be measured it isnt important. If they collectively understood the business, they would intuitively know how we are perceived is at the heart of the bottom line.

The end result is clever media, outsourced everything and slick marketing (which is Dixon) substance is little. Substance and tangibility are key in convincing people to fly your aircraft over water to whereever and arrive in one piece. The perception can be manipulated for a time, but for how long?

With an aging fleet, poor route structures, declining market shares, dispatch relaibilities falling, numerous product failures and poor aircraft choices, we see manifest evidence that the executive does not listen nor seek any differing opinion, they know best. The canaries are chirping in the mine, but the company isn't listening. Us canaries be us cabin, engineering or pilot crew will chirp here. The public is getting wind of just how much spin and little substance is Q executive. This latest near miss is a chirp from the mine...

Dixon can't twirl a spanner, Jackson couldn't open a door, Borghetti can't land off an ILS. It is much easier to dismiss their lack of knowledge by fostering a culture where operational people are malaigned and intimidated, particularly if we challenge the process of decisions.


Gordon Bethune could, both twirl spanners and fly 757/767. He encouraged feedback, he was honest and turned around a company that was left with the stain of its Dixon. I hope this occurs before some of the bean counter induced "cost redution" inposes a cost on real operational people that is too big for us all to sustain.

[NSEU]

Third, who or what organization has been signing off or ignoring cracked drip pans? Were senior management aware of this and what action did they take to rectify or mitigate the situation? Were the supervisors who are supposed to see the big picture aware of the correlation between cracked drip pans and clogged sinks because it sounds like a few LAME's should have known the possible consequences?

Unfortunately, managers want maintenance in Australia to head the way it is going in Europe, with engineers trained for specific tasks only, with a much lower percentage of LAME's overall. LAME's and long time AME's, more likely, have had greater experience, better training and therefore have a better understanding of the airplane and how small abnormalities lead to much larger ones. A person trained in one task is not even going to know if something outside his field is abnormal or not.

As someone mentioned in another thread on this incident.. hindsight provides 20/20 vision. As for all inspections, the depth and frequency varies (depending on the importance). Did the engineers know that the drip trays played such an important role in this particular area before this incident?
For info: The drip trays above the equipment racks in some areas clears the floor cabin floor paneling by only a few inches and requires good, even lighting and inspection mirrors. The only way to truly have a good look at the tray is to remove the floor panels and whatever is on top of them (in some cases, this would be a monumental task). The fact that the drip trays were broken is amazing it itself. How do you break something which is barely accessible? Did someone tread on one the last time the floor panelling was removed and was the pre-panel installation check overlooked or not done thoroughly enough? Or did they simply crack with age? (are they made of the correct material for the job?).

Some detractors are starting to say that Qantas is the "lucky airline" because these incidents have not led to any pax deaths in generations of flying. Seems to me that they are they unlucky to have had chains of events which have led to such bizzare incidents.

QF managers want engineers to follow a "safety before schedule" policy... but would the average engineer (prior to this event) have had the b*lls to delay an aircraft for hours/days simply because the carpet in the forward galley area seemed a little damp (by the time they got to the aircraft)?

[QFinsider]

NSEU

I agree operational staff are maligned and intimidated.
Yes men appear to prosper and dissenters sidelined.
That happened with QF1 and the flaps 25 idle reverse rubbish too..

Engineering and pilots are the custodian of the airline. Our signatures are on the paperwork, we fixed the doomed part/aircraft or we piloted it. Qantas was built on operational excellence, by pilots and engineers.

We ought all be much more vigilant slick media spin is no sustitute.

FOG

[Willi B]

There are two sets of contributors to this thread - those whose every utterance on any PPRunNe thread reflects the focus of their hatred and loathing of QF management; and those who seek to make a reasoned, thoughtful and objective contribution to the discussion. What a pity the former outnumber the latter.

[speeeedy]

There is a simple choice in relation to aircraft maintenance:

a) Expensive newer aeroplanes allows cheap maintenance.

b) Cheaper older aeroplanes requires expensive maintenance.

They are both valid options, and both safe, QF in the past has proven this because generally they have always used option b) with success, hence the deserved reputation for engineering excellence.

The current Brain Surgeons in QF Management are trying to invent a third option:

Cheap old Aeroplanes AND cheap maintenance - this will spell disaster and people at the QF coal face have been seeing it, and warning against it for quite a few years now.

[MTOW]

one of dixon's actions of late was to "compartmentalize" Qantas into five separate divisions, each one responsible for maintaining/containing their own profits/costs.A bit like the crew on 'A' Deck of RMS Titanic reporting that their deckchairs are all perfectly aligned, even on an increasingly steeply sloping deck?

It reminds me very much of my airline (not QF).

Interesting post (#172) on the thread on the main board on this same topic asking what part maximum use of automation might have played in the outcome of this incident had it occurred in some other airline that demands this practice.

[ms disengaged]

An assembled group of 500 Qantas staff at the Sydney Conservatorium Of Music for a "Roadshow" where senior management spell out the company's plans and seek [??:}] to inspire the troops..............

Only to hear John Borghetti rant and rave that, and I quote " I don't care about any EBAs, if I hear anyone say anything negative about qantas i'll sack them."

------------------

Willi B,

at least there is no doubt why QF management are so routinely hated, eh?

[NSEU]

So, answer my original question: Couldn't you just turn off the battery to conserve power AFTER you've 1/ descended 2/ depressurized 3/Advised ATC and 4/ worked out Navigation .

Again apologising for my ignorance, GE90... Wasn't sure of your qualifications ;)

I'll have to hand this question over to the aerodynamicists... As previously asked.. Can the 747-400 fly without any Yaw Damper whatsover? (Does it simply make the flight uncomfortable for the passengers in E Zone or perhaps waste a little fuel... or will it make the aircraft wobble about until it shakes itself to death :} After a brief study of the wiring schematics, it looks like at least one of the YD systems will be operating using Standby Power (with half the rudder authority than two systems.. and much less if you switch off one of the two functioning IRU's).

"worked out Navigation"

Not for the faint hearted, either... following a great circle route using a wobbly magnetic compass

[GE90115BL2]

NSEU: yes the 400 would fly ok at lower altitudes without the yaw damper.
Navigation may be a problem depending on where you were and the cloud cover.

BUT..........that aside.

Answer my question. Could you turn off the battery to save power?

remember this is a last ditch effort to conserve remaining power for landing.

[Spanner Turner]

Answer my question. Could you turn off the battery to save power?

remember this is a last ditch effort to conserve remaining power for landing



It worked for Jim Lovell, Jack Swigert and Fred Haise on Apollo 13 !

:ok:

[captaindejavu]

QFInsider,

I think you should send a copy of that MOST erudite, intelligent and superbly-crafted post of yours (#203) to each secretary of upper management in QF and have them sit their respective boss down, tie them to the chair and READ IT to them! That's the only way they'll hear your most brilliant 'take' on the situation that is before all of us. But I'm not naive enough to expect them to do anything else but yawn, then immediately get back to smiling at their latest personal bank statement.

In one awesome post you've very accurately summarised the peril we face. :D:D

Well said, sir. I hope one day I can buy you several beers up the track.

[bushy]

Do cabin crew have MEL's?
After reading about aircraft departing with sinks "taped off" so they don't use them due to blocked drains, I have to wonder about the effect of the "on time departure" performance measurement, and how this affected this incident.
It also surprises me that there are no air driven backup instruments. Maybe Boeing should talk to Piper. The PA31 can get home and lower its gear without electric power.

[WALLEY2]

Captaindejavu,

I was just printing QFinsider's post to send to our management and airport section heads for discussion, as it with clarity and precision identifies a corporate syndrome which must be avoided in the aviation business.

I do not know wether QF is or is not in this position, however the syndrome is plausable and dangerous and company senoir management and Boards should be on their guard.

QFinsider very well done.

[Spaghetti Monster]

Out of interest - when you've got FADEC engines, will the thrust levers and/or fuel control switches still do anything when there's no electric power?

[captaindejavu]

bushy,

No MELs of their own. Any cabin condition entries that impact the operation have an MEL but are included in the master Tech Log, after transcription from (and being referenced to) the Cabin Condition Log. (e.g. blocked sink, locked-off toilet, galley chiller inop, GWDU failure, O2 bottle used; seats recline u/s, etc). MELs are applied by the Ginger Beers/Flight Crew for applicable items.

[PJ2]

captaindejavu;

Fully agree with all you said in re QFInsider's comments. I know another airline that these comments should be sent to - same procedure for reading it to them - they don't believe flight data so maybe this will work.

[NSEU]

Answer my question. Could you turn off the battery to save power?

remember this is a last ditch effort to conserve remaining power for landing.

Of course... Yes. The only busses remaining active would be the APU Hot Battery and the Main Hot Battery. With these busses, you would still have some things available and to a limited extent and more importangly, running continuously in the background.. e.g. the IRU's. You would then have to make a decision to turn these off (losing ND Map position information permanently) to save power.

Note that the outflow valves (in Manual) would need the Battery Switch to be ON for control, but at 10,000', you could set them open and forget them.
If you left the battery on for descent to control the outflow valves, you would waste a lot of power however (with everything else running on Battery/Standby power). Maybe if you turned off Standby Power and left the battery switch on (only), this would be a compromise. On the other hand, you might decide to put your faith in the mechanical underpressure/overpressure control devices (positive/negative pressure relief valves).

Engine fire extinguishing is available on the Hot Battery Bus, but detection requires the Battery Switch to be on. You may need the Battery Switch to be ON to configure your Equipment Cooling to Override (maybe in this scenario, differential pressure, at least during descent, may assist the drying process of the waterlogged components).

In the cabin, the emergency lights would be on but power will be coming from individual battery packs, not the main batteries. You could manually select these off, if you thought you might need them later on for evacuation on landing.

Other things to consider in the cabin:

Cabin temp might be troublesome.

There will be no PA with the Battery Switch off. Hopefully good person to person communication between the pilots, cabin crew and passengers will reduce the panic. I'm sure the fact that the engines would still be running would put many minds at ease :}

Hope this helps.
Cheers.
NSEU

[NSEU]

Out of interest - when you've got FADEC engines, will the thrust levers and/or fuel control switches still do anything when there's no electric power?

FADEC engines have their own mini alternators powered by the spinning of the engines (in fact, these are used under normal circumstances). The EEC's/ECU's then supply power to the thrust lever "potentiometers" (more technically "Rotary Variable Differential Tranformers").
Fuel Control switch relays relax to the RUN position with loss of power. This means that without power (on the 747-400), you won't be able to switch them OFF.. at least not until ground power has been established after landing. Later aircraft types, such as 777's and 737NG's, have a separate rechargeable battery source for switching off the engines (I think it was mandatory in new aircraft design after a certain date due to the problems it has caused previously)

The EEC's/ECU's may run in a semi-degraded, but non life-threatening, mode however, because of lack of anti-icing for the engine sensors and lack of Air Data from the aircraft (especially with Battery/Standby Power turned off completely).

Hope this helps.

Rgds.
Q>

[Brian Abraham]

Some one may wish to pass this onto the good Mr Dixon as well

http://www.casa.gov.au/fsa/2007/dec/18-25.pdf

An extract

CEO legal responsibilities for safety
For a CEO of a business that operates through an AOC – that is, an airline or charter business – the legal obligations for managing safety are up front in Section 28BE of the Civil Aviation Act 1988. It’s probably worth repeating the detail here: Section 28BE Duty to Exercise care and diligence
(1) The holder of an AOC must at all times take all reasonable steps to ensure that every activity covered by the AOC, and everything done in connection with such an activity, is done with a reasonable degree of care and diligence.
(2) If the holder is a body having legal personality, each of its directors must also take steps specified in subsection (1).
There are some useful observations to make. Firstly, the issue of duty of care is quite clear, and places the ultimate responsibility for safety with the operator. Secondly, it is the ‘holder’ of an AOC who carries that responsibility. The vast majority of AOCs are held by legal entities (a company), so CASA places the practical responsibility on the office holders or ‘key personnel’ of the company as listed in S28 (3) of the Act.
The CEO is at the top of the list of those key personnel, so although day-to-day responsibility may be delegated to other officers, should a serious safety issue develop, CASA ’s main port of call will be to the CEO. The third point to note is that the scope of that duty of care is very broad. ‘Every activity covered by the AOC’ and ‘everything done in connection with such an activity’ includes everything from flying the aircraft and maintaining it to loading, training, dangerous goods management and so on.
Subsection (2) highlights the responsibility that each director of a company operating under an AOC carries with respect to safety. A CEO will, in most cases, also be a director of the company; however CASA could consider it necessary to approach non-executive directors to resolve a safety issue.
Although Section 28BE highlights the duty of care regarding safety for companies (and their CEOs) holding an AOC, CEOs of companies operating under other certificates issued by CASA under the Civil Aviation Act, such as a maintenance organisation or an airport, in reality have the same duty of care. Risks associated with flying operations are more obvious, so the Act gives appropriate focus to AOC holders.
However, as we know from experience, some accidents can result from a multitude of factors, including ones associated with maintenance or airport design and operations; hence, CEOs of these types of aviation businesses could be held accountable for safety outcomes under common law.

There is a practical reason for a CEO to be involved in safety
Not many years ago, safety problems in larger organisations were seen by many as purely technical problems that involved pilots, engineers and so on. It was quite common for safety managers to operate exclusively in the technical parts of a business and for discussions on how to fix safety issues to be conducted amongst only the technical people.
There was probably an element of ‘turf protection’ behind this practice, but it was largely driven by the simple fact that the vast majority of bad safety outcomes involved technical people of some sort.
Although analysis over the years has highlighted the dominance of human factors involving technical people in accidents, it is clear that organisational factors in many cases play a major part.
Organisational factors are clearly the responsibility of management in the broadest sense, not necessarily just technical management such as a chief pilot.
Indeed, in some cases technical managers such as a chief pilot could use the support of the business owner/CEO to see the system problems and identify system fixes.
Someone once said ‘If you think the cost of safety is high, just wait till you’ve had an accident!’ It is a sobering fact that of the three fatal accidents involving Australian airlines (all small regionals) since 1990, none are still in business.

Question: Is Qantas an accident looking for a place to happen - Or headed in that direction?

[HAWK21M]

Im Surprised All 5 Gens supply was Knocked out.
Lucky they were not very far from land & Good old Battery/Static Inverter functioned.
regds
MEL

[HotDog]

Im Surprised All 5 Gens supply was Knocked out.


So am I, especially since only four generators are available airborne.:suspect:

[mmurray]

Im Surprised All 5 Gens supply was Knocked out.

Somewhere on the first two pages somebody said the four generator control units for the four generators were close together and all got hit by the water from the galley. If that is correct then the supposed fourfold redundancy of having a separate generator associated with each engine is not really redundancy as if you knock out one generator control unit with water you are likely to get the other three as well.

I noticed in Dick Smith's post he said that on his plane the two generator control units are in different physical locations.

Michael

[HotDog]

Somewhere on the first two pages somebody said the four generator control units for the four generators were close together and all got hit by the water from the galley

Not so. Generator Control Units 1 & 2 plus Bus Power Control Unit 1, are situated on E1 shelf. Generator Control Units 3 & 4 plus Bus Power Control Unit 2, are on shelf E3 at the opposite end of the rack, quite a long distance apart and I find it difficult to comprehend that all of them were flooded.

[mmurray]

Not so. Generator Control Units 1 & 2 plus Bus Power Control Unit 1, are situated on E1 shelf. Generator Control Units 3 & 4 plus Bus Power Control Unit 2, are on shelf E3 at the opposite end of the rack, quite a long distance apart and I find it difficult to comprehend that all of them were flooded.

OK that makes more sense from a design point of view. But as you say it makes it pretty surprising if water got them all.

Thanks - Michael

[Dick Smith]

Why hasn’t anyone answered my very important post regarding what would have happened if this incident had taken place when the aircraft was in the remote ocean area at night? I’m fascinated that no one will touch this in any way. No, I’m not trying to beat anything up. Possibly there will be a simple explanation that the aircraft could have easily tracked to the nearest airport and landed safely. If that is not the explanation, surely we should know.

Surely there is someone reading this thread who is qualified to answer this very important question. I would have thought it is also important for the Qantas management and Board to know the truth – i.e. was there no real problem if this happened in a remote area at night, or could the aircraft and passengers have been lost?

Please, could someone address this important issue?

[employes perspective]

it would have been lost DICK

[Spaghetti Monster]

I would have thought it is also important for the Qantas management and Board to know the truth

You'd think so, Dick, but sadly they don't seem too interested in the truth when it's unpalatable.

Except when it can be spun into something positive -e.g. "These staples in this wiring loom don't show that our maintenance practices are bad. They actually show how good our maintenance practices are. After all, we found the staples, didn't we?"

[stubby jumbo]

Dick,

'though not addressing your very pertinent point directly.. This piece from a SMH journo (Paul Sheahan 14/01/08)..... with a lot of credibility says it all really !!!!

Again, applying the REASON MODEL.........Management is your first thick slice of Cheddar !!!


"The Qantas staff, and Qantas itself, simply cannot meet the demand being created by a global mileage mountain that is growing faster than the airlines themselves. Squeezing the frequent flyer program was one of the ways Qantas made a profit of $1.5 billion last year. Squeezing the staff, like sacking a flight crew for taking some chocolates off a plane, or being willing to absorb a strike rather than give engineers a salary increase of more than 3 per cent a year, has enabled senior management to earn hefty performance bonuses.

Qantas is now a caste system, with a yawning income disparity between rich and poor. Had last year's private equity takeover been successful, the top tier of management would have made $60 million from the deal while the rest of the staff made nothing. This grotesquery reflects the modern marketplace, where large investors are fixated on quarterly earnings."

[breakfastburitto]

Here's a link to the whole article (http://www.smh.com.au/news/opinion/frequent-flyer-points-a-big-con/2008/01/13/1200159272317.html)

[another superlame]

It is not even 2 weeks since the OJM incident and already it is nearly forgotten. The spin doctors have made it go away.
And management barely said 2 words about the whole thing. It just proves my theory that if they don't mention it, it goes away.
Now about that EBA

[Andu]

Dick, go to the main board and check out the thread on the same subject. Your question has been addressed at length there (some would say ad nauseum, with a plethora of budding Biggles/Hop Harrigans telling us how they would have played "Tim the Test Pilot" after assessing the situation with steely eyed accuracy, and then heroicly dragged the Old Girl safely back to base after descending into VMC conditions (which somehow they knew would be there), pulling a multitude of circuit breakers and then hand flying her in for 'n' jours on limited panel whilst navigating with their (analog, I presume) wrist watches.

All have extensive experience on Play Station 2 or MS Flight Simulator, where their monitor screen has not once fallen off their desk as they perform these acts of derring do.

Regarding the QF spin doctors: I'm interested how the story has changed from the drip tray not being re-fitted after the servicing to it being split.

[mmmbop]

Dick,

One of the facts being overlooked is that this incident only happened on descent with enough nose down attitude to get the water needed to travel forward to reach the GCUs. As a result the chances of it happening mid Pacific are VERY slim.

If by some chance in a godzillion this had happened over the Pacific (EXTREME turbulence for eg) basic control could to be maintained, however the lack of a standby AH would make orientation in IMC or at night a difficult task. Extreme workload on the Tech crew, but definitely not insurmountable (given a good bit of luck!)

M

ps and b4 somebody states the bleedingly obvious that if we were in extreme turb we wouldnt be able to maintain control of a/c without an AH, my point is that(without trying to say the words exactly) in straight & level cruise this ISNT going to happen

[Dick Smith]

Is there a chance that water didn’t get to all of the generator control units and some other problem – possibly regarding human factors – caused the complete loss of power? If this is so, surely it should be communicated quickly so a similar situation doesn’t happen again.

I have stated before on this site that whenever I hear of a problem I always say to myself “When can I do that?” It is only by learning of others’ problems that we can hope to not repeat the situation.

[maggot]

Is there a chance that water didn’t get to all of the generator control units and some other problem – possibly regarding human factors – caused the complete loss of power?what exactly are you suggesting here dick?? that the flight crew disconnected the remaining gen drives?? if that is what you are suggesting, you could be a little more 'up front' about it. Also, where did you get that idea from??

[Short_Circuit]

Why hasn’t anyone answered my very important post regarding what would have happened if this incident had taken place when the aircraft was in the remote ocean area at night?

Dick, You are a pilot, how would you go all engines running just fine, cruising fl390, pitch black, stby AH toppling, no moon, a few clouds below?

I suggest you find a glass of water 3/4 full draw a line around the level of the water and keep the water on the line.

or else, plonk!

[blueloo]

Dick I doubt they would be intentionally disconnecting Gen drives on descent.....not sure what the 744 bus logic is, but maybe they were led to cycling the bus tie breakers in an attempt to reset the logic - in an attempt to regain instrumentation, as opposed to intentionally remove or fiddle with it.

As for standby power, the switching should be fully automatic - no need to manually select it, unless another checklist has told you to select "BAT" as opposed to AUTO. (I assume the selector is similar to 767)

There has to be a case to install ISFDs here - across all fleets. Independant battery powered ISFD which last a couple of hours, providing vastly easier to interpret information, and allowing Capt /F/o to fly without parallex error.

(or is it IFSD....)

[capt.cynical]

10. Memo Qantas: safety and spin aren't the same thing
Ben Sandilands writes:





Let’s challenge the Qantas spin about how safety conscious the airline is in the aftermath of QF2’s power failure on approach to Bangkok a week ago.

The same jet performed a scenic flight over Antarctica on New Year’s eve.

If the problem had occurred on that flight the naval ships and Japanese whalers might be reaching its last known position about now.

Qantas admits the problem was related to water from a leaking galley seeping into and shorting the normal electrical distribution system, forcing the jet onto a backup battery system.

And all the world now knows that Qantas hasn’t been keeping water from overflowing in its cabins for some time, given the information ‘flooding in’ from passengers.

If it is going to continue to dispatch jets with taped up sinks or wet carpets why isn’t it formulating a safety check list for pilots to refer to in the event of another power failure?

The crew of QF2 acted instinctively. Their cockpit screens were crammed with warnings generated by the power failure. Instead of thumbing through the manuals to trouble shoot a crisis no Boeing 747 crew is on record of having to deal with they just took a shot for the runway.

The Qantas Antarctica flight was cleared to descend to a lower level to ensure a better view during its 12 or so hours away. It imitated the descent QF2 was making when the water sloshed forward in its first class cabin, shortly before lights out but fortuitously close to Bangkok.

The water blamed for this incident which points to shoddy maintenance and possibly more could have sunk to the same sweet spot that shorted QF2 just as readily over the ice cap.

Consider this. Once the back up battery and invertor fails, about an hour after the main supply goes down, there is no radio communication and very little flight instrumentation.

There is no electrically assisted fuel transfers to configure the load in its tanks for optimum efficiency and this jet is at times at least four hours from Australia during which some fuel transfers would be expected to take place.

There is no capacity to restart the engines of a 747 in flight with no electrical power if fuel starvation occurs. But if the jet does make it back to Australia the lack of electrical power means a fast flaps up landing almost certainly with the wheels up as well.

It means a crash.

The spin concerning this incident is unacceptable. If the responsible minister Anthony Albanese is being told by his minders in Transport and officials in CASA that everything is just fine he needs to decide whether to dismiss them before or after the Royal Commission.


Comment on this article


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[NSEU]

The GCU's control the BTB's and GCB's, but the BCU's (Bus Control Units) have control over which power sources actually go on-line. The #1 BCU is essentially the master, with the #2 BCU acting more as a slave rather than a backup. Sounds like it was the #1 BCU which stopped the show (as mentioned, this was one of the units replaced after the incident).

There were no dark and mysterious human factors at work here (other than in the original cause of the problem).

If it's not already written in the manuals, IMHO, it would be better to manually select the Standby Power Switch to Battery instead of leaving it in AUTO, especially if the GCU's are not able to supply a constant/reliable source of AC to the busses. Constant tripping and setting of relays is going to cause extra problems.

Rgds.

[NSEU]

almost certainly with the wheels up as well.

Seems to be a common misconception....

The normal gear extension on 747's is mechanical + hydraulic. Definitely no gear up landing.

There are steel cables running from the gear lever to the wheel well. Moving these operates hydraulic valves for normal gear extension.

Rgds.
NSEU.

[NSEU]

There is no electrically assisted fuel transfers to configure the load in its tanks for optimum efficiency and this jet is at times at least four hours from Australia during which some fuel transfers would be expected to take place.

Does it really matter?(other than for CG purposes) From any given initial configuration, there will always be fuel available from the wing tanks to feed all four engines (certainly sufficient for four hours of flight). The crossfeed valves are open for most of the flight, so if the outboard tanks starve, one would assume that the inboard tanks would continue to supply fuel to the outboard engines.

(EDIT): Looking at the wiring diagrams, the main crossfeed valves (1~4) are battery operated. It would be up to the crew to decide whether on not they wanted to mess around with the valves prior to running the batteries flat, but I really don't think they need to open/close them.

[jbsharpe]

mmmbop:
If by some chance in a godzillion this had happened over the Pacific (EXTREME turbulence for eg) basic control could to be maintained, however the lack of a standby AH would make orientation in IMC or at night a difficult task. Extreme workload on the Tech crew, but definitely not insurmountable (given a good bit of luck!)

Non-pilot speaking, but could a routine change in altitude (ATC instruction) have caused this? How about responding to a TCAS RA?? Obviously if that had happened, you would be having a very bad day!

I remind you all, non-pilot speaking! Be gentle..

JBS

[Brian Abraham]

The normal gear extension on 747's is mechanical + hydraulic. Definitely no gear up landing.

I thought the uplocks were electrically operated. Hence no electricity, no gear.

[Keg]

jbsharpe, most TCAS RAs require an attitude change of no more than a couple of degrees. It's be a very, very close call were a RA require a change from level flight (couple of degrees up) to something approaching five degrees down.

A cruise descent to a lower altitude isn't generally done at idle thrust and so the attitude is much higher than a normal descent.

[Short_Circuit]

I thought the uplocks were electrically operated. Hence no electricity, no gear.
Elect up locks are the BACKUP SYSTEM if the cabling system fails.
So, if the primary fails and power has failed the alt extend system will not work.
Sounds the wrong way around but that is the way it is.

[Mech-prentice]

Short_Circuit's right. The gear alternate extension system uses an electric actuator to release each uplock.

[NSEU]

Non-pilot speaking, but could a routine change in altitude (ATC instruction) have caused this?

If memory serves me correctly, the wetter parts of the galley aren't directly over the electronic equipment centre. The descent into Bangkok caused the water to flow forward. Any sort of nose down pitch might have caused this to happen.

Cheers.
NSEU

[ruffrider747]

It is very important to listen to what Qantas management is not saying rather than what they are saying

[ruffrider747]

There is so much distrust at QF I am scared for my safety like never before. This thread is a wonderful opportunity for like minded people to unite and express their opinions. I know the QF culture and I am scared that the yes people and the bean counters will ultimately destroy what is Qantas if this global greed and the race to the bottom is not stopped. They are blind to this growing swiss cheese event. They even today publish spin their blindness is frightening. Our engineers and pilots are what keeps Qantas safe not the spin that management keeps trotting out. Listen to what Qantas is not saying about this incident. QF2 would have been a catastrophe had this occured over the ocean in the middle of the night.
If your loved ones were on that fligth how would you feel. Qantas needs to have a long hard look at itself. Unfortunately the culture within Qantas is about pretending everything is rosey. Rose coloured glasses head in nthe sand mentality. Yes I can see all the swiss chesse lining up I just hope no ones loved ones are on the plane thet seems to very shortly be plunging to the ground. This may sound dramatic but pilots engineers and Cabin Crew the people that work on planes are worried. It's alright for those in their ivory towers they do not understand the realities and safety implications of flying

[HotDog]

Yes, they are not saying if the Loss of all Generators checklist was activated. However, with 15 minutes on finals prior to landing it was probably the best decision to continue on standby power, supplied by the battery. Since the 1&2 GCUs, No1 BPCU and the 3&4 GCUs & No.2 BPCU are widely seperated at oppsite ends of the top shelf of the E rack, it is unlikely that power could not have been restored to at least two generators, providing the SSB (split system breaker) remained open. Therefore the hypothesis of impending disaster of a similar failure over the Pacific, may not necessarily be a valid observation.

[amos2]

Interesting post Ruffrider 747 (phew)..or whatever you call yourself!

Done this before have we?...perhaps by another name?

What do you think...that we came down in the last shower?

Ten posts and you have all this concern??

Get honest or go away! :yuk: