Tarom B737 hit a car on the runway at TO

[skytrax]

It happened today in OTP, Bucharest. There were 120 pax on board, going to Sharm el Sheick, charter flight! No casualties. It was fog. Aircraft type 737-300. There was a maintanance car left on the runway.

more info soon

[skytrax]

http://www.realitatea.net/129176_BREAKING-NEWS--Un-avion-a-ratat-decolarea-pentru-ca-a-lovit-o-masina-pe-pista-aeroportului-Henri-Coanda-.html

Here is the news (in romanian) and a photo of the airplane. There was an evacuation after the ac stopped off the runway.

[A4]

Now that really is scarey. How on earth could a car be left on the runway? Don't the count them out and back in - like instruments used in surgery? Imaging taking off in 125/125/125.... and suddenly there is a car! Imagine if it had been at rotation:\

Presumably no surface movement radar at OTP otherwise it would have been picked up.

Fly safe everyone,

Happy New Year,

A4

[dvv]

Imagine it was on landing (http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19841011-0).

[Palyvestre]

Some video here coming from TV

http://www.crash-aerien.com/forum/viewtopic.php?p=27397#27397

[Bedder believeit]

A4: I like your optimism: "no surface radar at OTP otherwise it would have been picked up". We have just recently had installed at the major international airport where I am a tower controller, current generation ground radar, and I can assure you it doesn't always "pick up" vehicles. I'm afraid that runway integrity still very much relies on: a/ the aerodrome (local) controller not forgeting what he/she has cleared on to or off the runway; b/ other tower controllers (eg the Ground controller) not clearing other moving objects on to an active runway without clearance from (a); c/ the crew at the front of the aircraft that is about to use the runway, seeing, or having a fair idea what is on/recently off the runway, d/ operators of ground vehicles, tugs etc to be sufficiently trained and aware of how important runway sterilization is, and finally e/ crews of taxiing aircraft not to do silly things like crossing a runway holding point during a period of runway activity. Of course option (c/) has it's drawbacks during periods of poor visibility, and at night when the view from the cockpit (especially after recent rain) can just be a mass of reflected lights. Any of the events listed above can have an ugly outcome if allowed to slip through, unfortunately ground radar is really just an aid, helpful at times and sometimes pretty useless.
Just my thoughts
Happy New Year to you anyway.

[AltFlaps]

Muppets !!
Hope whoever was responsible got fired ! :mad:

[fox niner]

That is extraordinary footage.

Darn. Could someone roughly translate what the airport official is saying at the end of the video? He seems to be making some official statement.

My Romanian does not go any further than "good day"

[hetfield]

@fox niner

According to a friend of mine who is Romanian the airport official says nothing important. Business as usual

- we have to wait for more details
- no fire
- wait for the outcome a few days

and so on....

[countbat]

F^%$#ing unbelievable. How much traffic do they have on that airport? They should stop party two weeks for New Year Day. That is just one day deal only. What would they do if they had FRA/ORD/NYC etc traffic?

[Oxidant]

Gentlemen, before you start making stupid wild comments, may I suggest you find out the facts?:rolleyes:
Remember this is supposed to be a "professional pilots" network, not for drivel by three year olds. (rant over)

[Spitoon]

Muppets !!
Hope whoever was responsible got fired !
Hey Alt, good safety management approach! I'm more interested in how the airport procedures allowed it to happen - so that they can be fixed. Or what checks were made that the procedures were followed.

But I guess there's no need for that - if they fire the 'person responsible', then there's no way it can happen again.....

[alph2z]

If you look at the video, just before impact you can see the plane rotate up a bit or turn right.

Looks like the former but probably the latter.

Great stuff that no fire occurred :D
.

[JEM60]

Hi, Two One Four. I believe the pilot in question is the great Bob Hoover.

[Ptkay]

Few years ago I landed in Bucharest Otopeni, (as a pax)
and the first thing the struck me, were the dogs,
many of them, strolling around the runway and taxiways.

I was more than happy to leave next day without incident.

I went there two more times, a year later, nothing changed...

I am not surprised with this accident. :(

[Shore Guy]

This technology will help......

http://www.sensis.com/docs/533/

[Airbubba]

I recall a story about some ground technician who badly screwed up the fuelling of an aircraft, so much so that it struggled to return safely to the airfield.

Upon landing the pilot went up to the quaking technician, who by now was expecting a b0ll0cking and the sack, and insisted he come back to fuel the aircraft the next day - on the grounds that he was probably the only guy who wouldn't make the same mistake again.

Hi, Two One Four. I believe the pilot in question is the great Bob Hoover.

It was indeed the great Bob Hoover. His piston powered Shrike Commander was fueled with jet fuel after an airshow at Brown Field in San Diego in 1989. Bob didn't quite make it back to the field, he crash landed on the side of a ravine with no injuries to himself or two pax. He found the lineboy (now called a fuel maintenance technician:)) and had him fuel the P-51 for the last two days of the show.

[PAXboy]

The pax video is both fascinating and shocking to watch. It appears to start just as the t/o roll begins and the impact is 27 seconds later, so the a/c must have been almost at rotation - hence the power of the impact. It is remarkable that there was no fire.

The pax holding the video camera must have been badly bruised as he appeared to be sitting forward and turned through 90 degrees to see out of the window. As he landed up on the floor, it's possible that he did not have his seat belt fully fastened, so that he could sit further forward. A very good lesson there for pax who don't listen to the safety briefing.

[Ozgrade3]

As a former works safety officer at Sydney airport, I;m curious about a few things.

Why was a vehicle left unattended on the runway.

If it was where they were doing the works on the runway, who (from the airport) was in charge of the worksite.

Prior to the runway being handed back, why was no runway inspection done.

The mind just boggles as to how this situation developed.

[N1 Vibes]

AltFlaps,

Muppets !! Hope whoever was responsible got fired !

For the fog? OK then, here goes:

Dear God,

you're fired!

Or did you mean the car driver?

As it says in a good book somewhere "Let the first person who hasn't had a parking ticket, cast the first stone!" Suggest a bit of humility before condemning someone.

Here Endeth the Lesson in Navel Gazing!

N1 Vibes

[skytrax]

There were two guys near the car and they runaway when they heard the noise of the engines. They were doing some work at that time and they said they could only enter the runway with the approval from the ATC.
Obviously there was some miscommunication in between. They said that the car had been twice on the runway on that day in coordination with the ATC.
Luckly, no one was hurt.
I would say that things are pretty safe in Romanian aviation, cos as part as the UE now they had to improve everything in order to comply with the UE standards.
It was a silly mistake (it looks like somebody forgot to pass the information on) that could have been a big disaster.
There are a lot of photos with the plane after the evacuation on this link. Just scroll down, sorry the article is in romanian.
http://www.evz.ro/article.php?artid=335930


PS: Both the flight crew and the cabin crew did a great job I would say. a/c was evacuated in 60 sec.
The visibility was 200m on that day according to the pilot.

[German Sheperd]

Actually looking at the rear axle in those pictures, I think this wasn't a car, but a truck!

Very lucky outcome, thank God no one was hurt.Sends a shiver down my spine.

GS

[makintw]

Nice video, but shouldn't all electronics be switched off? :uhoh:

Same for the SAA wing and truck strike.

[TCAS FAN]

What ever happened to robust Low Visibility Procedures? If you do not have Surface Movement Radar to facilitate them, then just robust procedures to remove the risk to aircraft movements will suffice. I know I've written and operated LVPs without SMR for many years.

It appears that Otopeni did not have the required robust LVPs, and therein probably does not have a Safety Management System to underpin operation of the airport. About time for ICAO & IATA Audit Teams to pay a visit to ascertain the extent of Romanian compliance with the Standards of Annex 14, or a return visits to check on what they missed!

In the mean time what are the operating airlines going to do during low vis' conditions, keep on operating? Assuming that they also operate with an SMS, have any withdrawn flights during LVPs, I suspect not.

If anyone from the Civil Aeronautical Authority, Romania or OTP Airport Operating Authority read this, PM me, I'll share with you all I know about Low Visibility Operations. Additionally any operating airline or company is also welcome to do so.

[The Bartender]

...and again, if the deceleration is of such a nature that it turns a small DV-camera into a flying missile, with the potential to cause more harm than a modest bump on the head, it just might be the least of your problems...

[PJ2]

flying missiles in the event of a sudden deceleration

Not to mention that the first thing many passengers do after sitting down is to take their shoes off and open the paper, as though the aircraft cabin was their living room, (an attitude which is comfirmed when one leaves the aircraft and sees what a state it's been left in). Getting on board with flip-flops is the same thing.

Responsibility for self-protection doesn't begin with the safety briefing and/or reading the safety card. It begins with a little situational awareness for oneself and taking the necessary precautions. Whether airlines encourage such blasé attitudes in an attempt to keep fear low is another thread.

[Helen49]

Sadly similar incidents occur much closer to home but mangers and others who should know better, take the same view as AltFlaps. The result, incident hushed up or disciplinary action taken. The consequence, it will happen again because nobody has the opportunity to learn from the event.

Suggestion, AltFlaps and his/her ilk should be fired!!

H49

[ChristiaanJ]

Shore Guy,
Interesting article, but not too relevant here I would suggest.
That system is primarily aimed at runway incursions, and at getting the info to the aircraft pronto.
In this case we don't know whether Bucharest even has a basic ASDE.
Also the vehicle was stationary which makes it easy to overlook.
Finally, would somebody even be watching an ADSE scope at that moment?

[TheOddOne]

Finally, would somebody even be watching an ADSE scope at that moment?
With a modern system, they wouldn't need to be. The current systems employed at, say, Gatwick automatically detect all targets within the Localizer Sensitive Area. If there develops a closing speed between any of these targets greater than 40kts, an alarm is sounded.

So, a truck 2km from an aircraft accelerating through 40 kts will give a warning to the Tower controller, giving time for a 'stop, stop, stop' or equivalent message to be given.

However, the answer really does lie, as other psoters have said, in a proper Safety Management System, with ATC being a part of that loop.

In the UK, all vehicles entering the runway have a dedicated person on board communicating with ATC ON THE SAME FREQUENCY as the aircraft, so that they will hear the a/c being given lineup and takeoff clearance. I know this doesn't happen in many other countries, including what we'd describe as 'first world'. ATC also employ a 'runway blocker' strip, to inhibit them from giving any runway clearances, takeoff or landing, to any aircraft with any other obstructions on the runway.

Fair play to the engineers for legging it. If they'd tried to move the vehicle, I doubt thet'd have done so in time with the couple of seconds warning they'd have had.

TheOddOne

[TheOddOne]

We have just recently had installed at the major international airport where I am a tower controller, current generation ground radar, and I can assure you it doesn't always "pick up" vehicles.

Bedder believeit,

No, I can't quite. Surely all your vehicles are fitted with transponders so that you're not dependent upon the primary return? Not only will the transponder always give you a target, but you'll also have the callsign of the vehicle on the screen.

TheOddOne

[Spitoon]

No, I can't quite. Surely all your vehicles are fitted with transponders so that you're not dependent upon the primary return? Not only will the transponder always give you a target, but you'll also have the callsign of the vehicle on the screen.
Dream on!!!!

And even when there are such technological wonders there are many technical gremlins that conspire to limit the confidence that one can have in the picture.

And, anyway, if you want to detect incursions onto a runway, you surely are not going to rely on the intruder to be good enough to switch an the tx'der and operate it properly - you need primary for that particular function.

[barit1]

That's fairly simple to solve:

1) Transponder comes ON whenever the motor is started.

2) Transponder can only be switched OFF by a key held in the manager's control.

Thus, short of a battery failure, or intentional fraud, the xpdr should operate any time the vehicle leaves the garage.

[TheOddOne]

you surely are not going to rely on the intruder to be good enough to switch an the tx'der and operate it properly

No, of course not - it should be hard-wired into the vehicle and no user intervention is required. The latest A-SMGCS systems all make provision for this facility. A number of European airports have taken this on board.

The vehicle callsign belongs to the vehicle, not the person driving it, 'Ops 1, Fire 4, Works 3' etc etc. and will be permanently broadcast by the transponder fitted to the vehicle. Vehicles approved for operation on the Manoeuvring Area have their callsign placarded inside the vehicle, just as an aircraft has it's registration placed on the instrument panel.

TheOddOne

[Spitoon]

That's fairly simple to solve:

1) Transponder comes ON whenever the motor is started.

2) Transponder can only be switched OFF by a key held in the manager's control.

Thus, short of a battery failure, or intentional fraud, the xpdr should operate any time the vehicle leaves the garage. True - a solution that should overcome a good many of the potential problems. But, sadly, not all of them. There may well be situations where it will be better to get the driver to switch off the tx'der, but it that is not possible.......

And, of course, there's always the possibility that you will want the tx'der 'squawking' (or whatever) even if the motor is not running. The difficulty is, the more rigid (some might say foolproof) you make the system, the less able it is to cope with non-standard situations. Better that the system allows adaptations - up to a point - and that users have robust procedures and are appropriately trained and skilled to use the equipment etc.

No, of course not - it should be hard-wired into the vehicle and no user intervention is required. The latest A-SMGCS systems all make provision for this facility. A number of European airports have taken this on board.

The vehicle callsign belongs to the vehicle, not the person driving it, 'Ops 1, Fire 4, Works 3' etc etc. and will be permanently broadcast by the transponder fitted to the vehicle. Vehicles approved for operation on the Manoeuvring Area have their callsign placarded inside the vehicle, just as an aircraft has it's registration placed on the instrument panel.
Hard-wired and no user intervention does create an inflexible system again. I think it's more correct to say that current A-SMGCS are able to display targets that are suitably equipped (hard-wiring etc. is not really an A-SMGCS function) - or have I missed your point? You are quite correct that a good number of European airports claim to have implemented level I, and sometimes level II, A-SMGCS but in reality all have some weaknesses (albeit, in some cases, the equipment works as designed but either does not provide the information needed by users or does not do so in a timely enough fashion).

The point about callsigns belonging to the vehicle rather than the driver is a bit of a generalisation. Whilst it is good practise, it's not always the case. It can be particularly problematic when the callsign used relates to the function being undertaken, for example 'Checker' or 'Seagull'. Once again, it is a little inflexible if a vehicle goes u/s or is off the run for maintenance - does that mean that the function that the vehicle is normally used must cease? Just think about hazards associated with the callsign being used by the vehicle driver being different to that shown on the A-SMGCS.... None of these problems are insurmountable but the less flexible the system is, the bigger the headaches dealing with the non-standard or unexpected situations.

One last thought. The idea of the vehicle callsign being 'permanently broadcast' I think assumes that the system is mode S based and that the ID is derived from the 'Flight ID' field of the message - not all A-SMGCS use this data to establish the label ID.

Whilst this represents some significant thread drift - for which I apologise to those who are displeased by it - I think it is highly relevant to any discussion about runway inccidents.

[west lakes]

At the risk of being shouted at!

Whilst the validation required for airfield use will no doubt be a problem

There are a lot of commercially available GPS based tracker systems out there (we're getting them fitted at work) they give real time location of vehicle, can be either user controlled or not and the data output is not dependant on the vehicle - the ident is configured by the recieving system.
Most transport companies use them and a lot of the utilities - worth a thought

[Bedder believeit]

Too(sic) TheOddOne: No, not all of the vehicles that regularly access our runways have transponders, and often, those that do, work/display intermittently. I know it's still in the development stage, however, over 900 aircraft a day using the runways is hardly "development stage". As I see it, electronic and technical advances are only as good as the people operating them. Since widespread TCAS was introduced, have we had a situation in aviation of NO mid airs? Answer "no"; since we had GPWS/EGPWS introduced, have we had a situation of NO CFIT? Answer "no". It seems that technological advances merely help us to keep up with ever increasing traffic levels and complexity. The danger is always just lurking around the corner. I'm not suggesting for one moment that we say "stop!", things will keep on "advancing", but the human part of the chain remains critical. A disadvantage of "relying" too much on technology, is that it's easy to be lulled into complacency. I notice that with our new A/ SMGCS, that with auto tag, it is harder to keep a mental picture of traffic disposition than with our old system, where we needed to tag aircraft up manually. This is fine as long as everything is working 100%, but our achievement rate is well below that. But then the old manual tagging of aircraft/tows etc was time consuming and inefficient! Ce'st la guerre!:)

PS, Re your "blocker strip", that's been around for yonks and I guess will be there for some time to come. Simple, but only useful if used with total consistency. HNY :):)

[punkalouver]

Perhaps this would prevent this type of accident...

http://www.azom.com/news.asp?newsID=7327

[fireflybob]

Probably not possible at a major airport but when I learned to fly in the 1960s an experienced aviator once told me that prior to taking off from a runway in low viz it was a good idea to taxi the length of the runway prior to take off to ensure the runway was clear.

This advice still holds true for minor and/or uncontrolled runways at some aerodromes!

[sleeper]

Sounds great , but.........

- Is never going to happen on big, busy airports.
- It doesn't give any assurance that somebody (or thing) will not enter the runway after you have passed.

[Spitoon]

punkalouver, I have never understood why some people continue to believe that installing radar and other surveillance systems will prevent runway incursions and accidents. At best they are tools that support those involved in airport operations. At the very simplest of levels, as ChristiaanJ pointed out, a pure surveillance system can only be of value if someone who is able to do something to resolve the situation (in the often limited time available) is watching the display at the moment that an error becomes apparent. In practice, the operator with access to such a display is only likely to look at it if he or she is unsure about the location of traffic or to confirm that a clearance is being followed etc. - so when there is nothing to suggest that anything is wrong there is usually no-one looking at the display.

In terms of A-SMGCS, much work is going on into generating alerts to controllers (and, ultimately, to pilots ond vehicle drivers) when an unsafe situation occurs. Unfortunately it is not easy for the equipment to discriminate between situations in which an alert should be generated and a normal, operationally acceptable, and very similar traffic situation. As a result, even the best of these systems still generate a significant number of false alerts - this has the effect of reducing the value of valid alerts. We have similar experience with systems designed to prevent CFIT where both airborne and ground-bases systems have been undermined by the prevalence of false alerts reluting in accidents.

Although there may well be technical 'solutions' to runway incursion/ accident situations, none will, of themselves, prevent incidents and accidents - at best they will improve situational awareness and provide continual monitoring for abnormal situations (something that we humans are not good at). We still need to have well crafted and robust procedures.....that are followed.

[Shiny side down]

One of the many curiosities is that while we have (and must have) an RT license, many ground vehicles seem to be operated by people who have simply been told where the transmit switch is. These same personnel have access to aircraft movement areas, and active runways. If the level of training applied to communications is similar to other operations, exactly how well trained and disciplined are these?
Operating at Glasgow, it is interesting to note the number of people who simply pay lip service to any form of ramp discipline, whether in vehicles or otherwise.
Moving away from UK airports, you see some really interesting events, including being cut up by a vehicle while taxying out (BCN), Being chased along the taxyway by dogs (egypt someplace), aircraft towed at ridiculous speeds (PRG), ops vehicles asked to confirm and read back a clearance such as entering an active runway (back the UK).

I wonder how many near misses occur simply because operating crews did keep a bloody good look out and listen, and caught a problem before it became an incident.

[TheOddOne]

ops vehicles asked to confirm and read back a clearance such as entering an active runway (back the UK).


I presume you mean that the Ops vehicle failed to give a correct readback in the first instance and had to be reminded to do so. Excellent; this shows that the system is at least partly failsafe. If you were in an aircraft at the time, then it's even better, because you had situational awareness regarding the vehicle. I've heard plenty of pilots being required to re-readback clearances until they get it right.

Drivers of vehicles on the Manoeuvring Area at LGW and LHR receive a comprehensive training package in topography and RTF phraseology and are only allowed to drive unaccompanied once they have passed a test and have received a Certificate of Competence. Additionally, those whose priviliges extend to entering the runway receive extra training, testing and Certificate issue. Certificates are only valid for 3 years and are renewed by re-test. The syllabus and the overall scheme is a joint venture between the BAA and NATS and is regularly reviewed. I'm sure similar schemes operate at other UK aerodromes. If you operate from LGW, listen to the professionalism of any of the operatives in 'Checker'.

Unfortunately, the UK CAA have consistently refused to mandate a national regulation of driver RTF competence, leading to a CAA licence, which I think is wrong. Their view seems to be that they are only required to oversee the competence of pilots and Air Traffic Controllers, FISOs and A/G operators. Eurocontrol take the matter seriously but haven't the teeth to make any international regulation. Perhaps this will be remedied by EASA when they get around to Aerodromes. Maybe we should be campaigning to get ICAO to ensure that SARPS include Level 4 English and competence for all drivers on the manoeuvring area worldwide.

TheOddOne

[uncle_maxwell]

Has the use of night vision equipment / infra-red cameras ever been used in military / civil aircraft to detect runway incursions? I think it would provide some advantages over primary / SSR plus it could be combined with a head-up display and should yield good enough results in low visibility. Seems to work in some modern cars, why not aviation?

[ChristiaanJ]

Uncle Maxwell,

Again, you're looking at technological solutions, which take time to implement, cost money, and will be available at only a limited number of locations.
As to night-vision and IR systems, they don't exist on current civil aircraft, and in the case of fog, they do not really penetrate that much further than visible light.

As said here earlier, the real answer is procedures, discipline and training. Where any of those are missing, or fail, no level of technical gadgetry will do the job.

[uncle_maxwell]

ChristiaanJ (http://www.pprune.org/forums/member.php?u=105267),

Agreed on the importance of training & discipline & procedures (just like our grannies told us) but all I am suggesting is that there are technical *aides* (not necessarily solutions) that might potentially *help* in lowering the *probability* of runway/taxiway incursions. Neither do I want to cut out human agency nor should you completely negate the benefit of technology. GPWS and TCAS did lower accident probabilities and it's about more or less rather than all or nothing.

If we relied on the known only and failed to innovate, we would have perfect procedures but still no swept wings, breaks on undercarriage or Mach trimmers - in fact we wouldn't be flying at all. Flight deck would still consist of 4 people, there would be no auto-pilot etc. etc.

Balance between innovation (potential long-term benefit) and training/procedures (short term clearly) should be right!

Do give you a non-aviation example: In chess, machines now play far better than any live human. Would have been unthinkable 20 years ago.

[Boeing Pilot]

http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=20071230-1

[TCAS FAN]

ChristiaanJ

From that provided by Boeing Pilot, agree with you 100%, "procedures, discipline and training" appear to have been seriously lacking in respect of any Safety Management System that should have been put in place by the airport operator and ATC during low visibility conditions.

Due to the apparent failings of both the airport operator and ATC, this could have been Tenerife 2!

[forget]

The current systems employed at, say, Gatwick automatically detect all targets within the Localizer Sensitive Area. If there develops a closing speed between any of these targets greater than 40kts, an alarm is sounded. So, a truck 2km from an aircraft accelerating through 40 kts will give a warning to the Tower controller, giving time for a 'stop, stop, stop' or equivalent message to be given.

Giving time? Therein lies the problem with all current Airport Movement Area Safety Systems (AMASS etc). In fact, the NTSB has been saying for years:

The system the FAA is currently deploying to prevent runway collisions requires a controller to do the following:

1. Determine the nature of the problem.
2. Determine the location of the aircraft.
3. Identify the aircraft involved.
4. Determine what action to take.
5. Issue appropriate warnings or instruction.

A ‘delayed’ controller yelling 'Stop, stop, stop' doesn’t, and never will, cut the mustard.

A ‘solution' to the delays has been proposed ( OK, I’ve proposed a solution as part of THIS (http://www.axis-electronics.com/groundmarker/default.asp) ) where the controller’s VHF frequency is automatically commandeered at the instant of the warning and a strident automated transmission is made - ‘Runway Warning, Runway Warning, Runway Warning’.

Low vis Short finals? Immediate Go Around.
Rolling & Accelerating? Immediate Reject.

Nothing to lose - and a lot to gain.

[Spitoon]

A ‘solution' to the delays has been proposed ( OK, I’ve proposed a solution as part of THIS ) where the controller’s VHF frequency is automatically commandeered at the instant of the warning and a strident automated transmission is made - ‘Runway Warning, Runway Warning, Runway Warning’.
Whilst technical solutions may well provide assistance (and, perhaps, a safety net) in preventing runway incidents the primary preventative tool will remain appropriate training and the use of robust procedures. If I could make it any bolder I would! Not only are the procedures and training relatively cheap but they are suitable for use at any airport and can also be implemented relatively quickly. The use of GroundMarker as proposed is not a particularly useful enhancement to the overall system. The broadcast of a warning only provides part of the picture - a pilot or driver faced with a warning but no other information may not take actions that improve the situation, and that's not taking account of the effect that a 'strident automated transmission' when it is unexpected can have on one's cognitive processes.

When something goes wrong on the runway the person with the most complete 'picture' is usually the controller who is then able to make a judgement as to the most appropriate course of action. The factors that are taken into account when deciding what to do are many and varied, and difficult (if not impossible) to set out in rules to be applied by a technical system. The idea of 'Rolling & Accelerating? Immediate Reject.' is not appropriate in every situation and may well introduce additional hazards. Take, as the most obvious example, a runway incursion involving a vehicle crossing the runway threshold as an aircraft is on its take-off roll (and consequently the vehicle is behind the aircraft), although representing a serious incident creates no immediate hazard to the aircraft. To reject the take-off in this situation is unnecessary and creates additional hazards that present far greater risks than continuing the take-off. Much work was done in the UK on this topic resulting in some useful guidance (see ATSIN 68 for details) (http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/ATS068.pdf).

GroundMarker (like its sibling, CONTRAN) has some merits but, unfortunately, if a comprehensive hazard analysis is done on all operational situations where it may activate (as opposed to just those where it may save the day) it presents additional hazards which cannot be adequately mitigated. As with all such systems, user confidence is important - false alerts broadcast by the system will soon undermine its usefulness. One or two unnecessary go-arounds or rejected take-offs and pilots will no longer trust future alerts and I suspect that the aircraft operators will not be too impressed either. How is good is GroundMarker at the ratio between alerts of actual dangerous situations against other alerts?

Just as an aside, I would suggest gaining that important user confidence in a system is likely to be made more difficult if you use phrases like 'the controller’s VHF frequency is automatically commandeered'.

Of course, the need for such potentially problematic technical solutions would be much reduced if we had and applied proper procedures!

[ChristiaanJ]

Am I wrong, or do I remember several extremely close misses where the aircraft taking off just managed to clear the 'incursion' by a few feet?
A "reject" in each case would have resulted in another Tenerife.

[forget]

Take, as the most obvious example, a runway incursion involving a vehicle crossing the runway threshold as an aircraft is on its take-off roll (and consequently the vehicle is behind the aircraft), although representing a serious incident creates no immediate hazard to the aircraft.

Surface Target Tracking Software would ignore this nil-threat example.

'Rolling & Accelerating? Immediate Reject.' is not appropriate in every situation and may well introduce additional hazards

Which is why the message is 'Runway Warning' and not 'Stop Stop'.

Christian, Unless you can come up with an example I'd say you were wrong. :)

[ChristiaanJ]

Which is why the message is 'Runway Warning' and not 'Stop Stop'.In the few seconds it takes to sort out what's going on and decide on a course of action, between the warning and the impact, the "Runway Warning" alert sounds worse than useless.

[forget]

.......... and decide on a course of action, between the warning and the impact, the "Runway Warning" alert sounds worse than useless.

Fair enough Christian; In true Gallic fashion you've decided that the impact should be the first indication of a problem. :ok:

[ChristiaanJ]

Salut forget,In true Gallic fashion...Don't trust appearances, chief. Just because I live in France, that doesn't mean I'm French....
... you've decided that the impact should be the first indication of a problem.Didn't expect such a fatuous remark from you, actually.
The real problem is that there are usually only a few seconds between the perception of a problem (by ATC, the pilots, or whoever, or whatever system) and the final impact.
A few seconds is usually not enough to resolve the problem.
So I'm back to my original remark "procedures, training and discipline".

[forget]

Salut back Christian, Didn't expect such a fatuous remark from you.

Apologies, tongue in cheek. :oh:

You say, (as does Spitoon) "procedures, training and discipline" are the first defence. No argument - Absolutely agree – 110%.

You also say “The real problem is that there are usually only a few seconds between the perception of a problem (by ATC, the pilots, or whoever, or whatever system) and the final impact. A few seconds is usually not enough to resolve the problem”.

This is where we may differ. Unless someone goes barrelling across an active Stop Bar at 30 knots there is (usually) a lead-in period where a normal situation ‘slowly’ deteriorates to produce a runway crisis.

As an example, let’s start with the Daddy of ‘Em All.

With KLM in position, static on the runway, and Pan Am taxiing towards him the situation was ‘normal’. I know that Pan Am wasn’t where the controller thought he was, but no matter, there was no threat to life or limb - so lets call it ‘normal’.

The instant that KLM started moving this situation changed hugely.
So, think this through. The simplest of target tracking software would have seen one aircraft ‘in position’ but then releasing brakes and accelerating, another aircraft on the runway ahead of the first. Let’s say we now have a choice; we can either trigger generic AMASS (I know it wouldn’t have worked here but let’s pretend for a moment) and have the controller -

1. Determine the nature of the problem.
2. Determine the location of the aircraft.
3. Identify the aircraft involved.
4. Determine what action to take.
5. Issue appropriate warnings or instruction.

or;

Have the ATC VHF automatically transmit ‘Runway Warning - Runway Warning’. As I see it, the warnings could be triggered with the ‘attacker’ at less than twenty knots.

In this case, and with the ideal response of “KLM rejecting” the world would have been a different place – at least for 583 souls.

I’ve looked at many incursion incidents, most recently the several near misses in the US, and there’s no doubt that the scheme could have shown benefits.

I certainly don’t mind being proved wrong (It’s only an idea) so, when you have an hour or so to spare, take a look at a few yourself and let me know what you conclude. As I said, nothing to lose, and a lot to gain.

[DesiPilot]

I agree with Christian, procedure, training and discipline can save the day. In the following incident it was the US Airways 2998 pilots discipline that saved the day. Now the questions is would the software trigger the warning in this case??

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5BvgSS6kBdU

[forget]

Now the questions is would the software trigger the warning in this case?

Oddly enough, I thought of Providence when I was writing about Tenerife. From the older NTSB animations I’ve seen, but not knowing exact locations against time, all I can say is “I think so”.

It depends on just when 1448 busted the active. Where was FedEx at that precise moment?

If 1448 busted the active before FedEx started moving then FedEx (and 1448) would get a Runway Warning as soon as FedEx accelerated to, say, 30 knots.

If 1448 busted after FedEx started moving then 1448 (and FedEx) would get a Runway Warning the instant the Hold Bar was crossed, and before sticking his nose onto the runway.

This latter is, I recognise, a possible ‘problem’ window. Worst case? FedEx may get a Runway Warning pretty close to V1, but then again, 1448 would have hit the brakes hard (I’d like to think) so the worst case is a high speed FedEx reject on a clear runway.

PS. And with Ground Marker 1448 wouldn't have got lost in the first place. ;)

[punkalouver]

Spitoon said
punkalouver, I have never understood why some people continue to believe that installing radar and other surveillance systems will prevent runway incursions and accidents.


Occurrence Summary :

A08O0004: The Air Canada Jazz CL-600-2B19 (registration C-GGJA, flight number 8027) landed on runway 24L at Toronto/LBPIA and exited at D4 taxiway. The aircraft was subsequently cleared to taxi across runway 24R turn right on Charlie and hold short of Bravo taxiway. After crossing 24R the aircraft was observed on the airport surface detection equipment (ASDE) by the tower controller. The aircraft appeared to be in the process of turning right onto C4 taxiway which is a high speed exit off of 24R, while Air Canada 622 (A319-100, registration C-FZUL) had been cleared for take off on runway 24R and had just begun the take off roll. Air Canada 622 was at approximately 40 knots and was instructed to abort the takeoff. Meanwhile Jazz 8027 had already turned around and was proceeding as cleared. Air Canada 662 exited D5 taxiway and returned to the departure end of runway 24R and departed without incident. The latest METAR at the time of the occurrence indicated the visibility was 1/4SM and the RVR for runway 24L was 4000 feet.

Now you understand why.

[Spitoon]

punkalouver, I have never understood why some people continue to believe that installing radar and other surveillance systems will prevent runway incursions and accidents. At best they are tools that support those involved in airport operations. At the very simplest of levels, as ChristiaanJ pointed out, a pure surveillance system can only be of value if someone who is able to do something to resolve the situation (in the often limited time available) is watching the display at the moment that an error becomes apparent. In practice, the operator with access to such a display is only likely to look at it if he or she is unsure about the location of traffic or to confirm that a clearance is being followed etc. - so when there is nothing to suggest that anything is wrong there is usually no-one looking at the display.My, slightly fuller, response goes on to say that reliable surveillance is a tool for (typically) the controller but it will only save the day if it is used. Your example shows that it can assist the controller to remedy an unsafe situation but A-SMGCS level I will not prevent the incident/accident. All credit to the controller for spotting the problem but there are examples where a surface surveillance system was installed but was not being watched (or not being monitored in the right location) as an incursion was taking place.

If I return to my original point, I guess I should have included lighting and signage (although I would consider this to be an integral part of the procedures). It would be interesting to know how much of the risk of surface movement in LVPs was mitigated by the infrastructure/procedures and how much more could have been done. That is not to say that the ASDE is not necessary, or that it did not play a major role in preventing a serious incident or accident - but it is only a part of what is needed to operate safely in LVPs.

If we follow your argument there should never be a loss of separation in the air when there is a radar available because the controller can see what is going on. Sadly there are plenty of instances where the controller might have seen the incident if only he/she was watching that piece of airspace at the moment things started to go awry.

[punkalouver]

If we follow your argument there should never be a loss of separation in the air when there is a radar available because the controller can see what is going on.

My arguement if there ever was one, was to show that there is a debris detection radar in Vancouver which would likely have picked up a truck sitting on the runway. I said "Perhaps this would prevent this type of accident..."
and pasted the link.

For some reason you said "punkalouver, I have never understood why some people continue to believe that installing radar and other surveillance systems will prevent runway incursions and accidents. At best they are tools that support those involved in airport operations."

So I posted an example of a potential accident prevented by ground radar.