Aer Lingus Viscount accident--off Strumble [Archive]

BSD

26th Dec 2007, 12:05

411A,
Sometimes you talk a lot of sense, but in this case, I think a little too much Christmas cheer adulterated your post.
The Darts I flew had a limitation of not less than 40lbs of torque inflight, which is probably about the 10% power setting that Zebedie refers to.
Notwithstanding that however, I don't see how you can suggest that the aeroplane was operating at an inordinately low thrust setting during it's cruise, such that poor acceleration from low rpm was a problem, which in this case lead to the loss of the aeroplane. The facts that are known don't bear out such a scenario.
Whatever it was that caused this tragic and unexplained tragedy, blaming the poor old Dart is one heck of a long shot. It was an engine deisgned in the 40s that soldiered on for many years of sterling service, and which I hate to admit, I've seen abused way beyond some of it's more serious limitations. Not even the slightest hint of trouble.
Being an Aussie here in the dear old UK, I've noticed that a lot of your posts enjoy a similar underlying theme: you don't like the British. Mind you, there seem to be lots of things you don't like, Delta/United/American/USAF/young pilots/old pilots/ pilots whose common sense and sound judgements cause them to make more use of automation in busy TMAs in 2 crew modern aeroplanes.
Whilst I totally agree with you on some things, the reduction of standards in airline training depts of late for example, I would love you to explain how you think the dear old Dart was responsible in the case of this Viscount.
Allay my concerns about your deep-rooted prejudice against your fellow man, and post something benevolent, and generous of spirit for once. Mentor the young pilots who read these columns, encourage them, rather than belittleing them.
It is Christmas after all.
Happy new year!
BSD.

411A

26th Dec 2007, 12:30

Oh dear, BSD, I do seem to have upset you so.
If so, my sincere apologies...:E
First to ZeBedie's ststement.
Yes, a minimum torque was specified except to close the throttles for landing, and yes that was to reduce excessive lay-shaft wear.
And, yes again, I have 'round about 5000 hours in Dart-powered aeroplanes.
Almost all Command.
Having said this, as a former corporate aviation department manager, I have found some pilots simply didn't RTFB...with generally poor results.
One even tried to select GFP at 50 feet.:uhoh:
This ain't good...at all.:(
And, as for British designs in general, their turbine engines are, without a doubt, the best in the business.
Darts, Conways, RB.211's are the ones I flown, for over twenty thousand hours in total, just with these engines.:}

ZeBedie

26th Dec 2007, 13:28

I have found some pilots simply didn't RTFB...with generally poor results.

Well don't blame the Dart for yankee incompetence then:}

411A

26th Dec 2007, 13:42

Quote:
I have found some pilots simply didn't RTFB...with generally poor results.

Well don't blame the Dart for yankee incompetence then

Ahh, well actually, this particular pilot was Belgian.:}
Yanks knew better.:E

BSD

26th Dec 2007, 13:43

411A,

Not at all, your posts, curmudgeonly at times, are often amusing. Many of them as I've said I agree with.

No need to apologise. I've also seen a few cases where the Dart was abused horrifically by pilots who needed to RTFB, in all cases though the stout lillle beast just carried on.

I would however be interested in how you might develop a scenario in which the Dart was responsible for the loss of this Viscount.

I don't think for a second, that there is any suggestion this crew had failed to RTFB, so the scenario would be best written assuming their complete competence.

Cheers once again.

BSD.

KeMac

29th Dec 2007, 18:00

I believe a book was published about this called "Tragedy at Tuskar Rock'

BSD

3rd Jan 2008, 09:07

Hey, hey, 411A!
Just back from a few days away.
Checked this PPRUNE thread, looking forward to reading your theory of how the RR Dart brought down the Aer Lingus Viscount.
Nothing, or should it be nada in your part of the USA. You've been posting all over the place in the meantime though, so I imagine you are either working on one heck of a theory, or maybe just forgotten.
It is not on to cast aspersions as you have on the engine without attempting to produce a theory to back it up. For credibility it should take account of the known facts.
If that isn't bad enough, you've gone on to launch a swipe at the operating crew, linking them to people whom you have know who made mistakes for whatever reason. Your subliminal suugestion is that if not the engine, then the pilot's poor operation of it may have caused this tragedy.
I think you may be unique in your beliefs. I also think you need to either help us understand how you have come to them, or better still out of respect for all the people whose reputations you have damaged, retract them.
For someone with as much dislike of the poms as you have, I'm really surprised you haven't latched on to some of the other very anti-British theories that exist about this aweful loss.
What say you 411a? How will you defend this rubbish you have posted!
Happy new year!
BSD.

parabellum

3rd Jan 2008, 09:29

Was it an isolated incident or were some models prone to a total electrics failure? I seem to remember an accident in Germany that was attributed to an electrics failure.

DH106

3rd Jan 2008, 12:34

Yes - the 'complete electrical failure' problem, highlighted by the German accident, was caused by the fact that is was possible for the alternators/generators to trip due to some other issue, but the pilots weren't given adequate warning (dim bulb I think due to depleted batteries).
Reseting the trip to re-enable charging required a certain voltage to be available to flip a relay - so once the aircraft's batteries were depleted below that voltage total electrical failure was inevitable. Catch 22.
Unfortunately in this case the Viscount was flying above 8/8 clouds and by the time the pilots realised the situation it was too late. Control was lost whilst descending through the clouds in IMC because of the failure of all the electrically powered instruments.
The fix was obviously to enable resetting the alternators/generators manually without need for electrical power.

I've read the book "Tragedy At Tuskar Rock" - the author assisted in the 2002 review/re-investigation of the 1969 accident. I think the new conclusions come much closer to the truth than the original report.
The new report highlights the seemingly blatent incompatibility between the 40+ witness reports of the aircraft's erratic movements at low level prior to the crash, and the apparent radio transcript before the brief distress message that was received - although they were unable to conclude why such an incompatibility existed. Very intrueging to say the least.
I largely agree with the conclusions of this new report - that some sort of elevator/trim tab failure occured, the crew struggled for some time to keep the aircraft under control through several upsets but were tragically unable to prevent an eventual crash. But I do have some reservations about the details of this theory based on the witness reports of the Viscounts low level flying ("low enough to flatten the grass" by one witness report.)
Anyone else read it and have opinions ?

411A

3rd Jan 2008, 17:41

Your subliminal suugestion is that if not the engine, then the pilot's poor operation of it may have caused this tragedy.

Hmmm, I think your subliminal mind may well be working overtime, BSD, as I suggested nothing about this particualr accident, only about some crews general operating techniques with the Dart.
Read between the lines, old boy.:}

DH106

3rd Jan 2008, 19:35

I agree in that I can't see Dart failures being the primary cause of the Tuskar accident - but the book "Tragedy at Tuskar" notes that the engine fuel system was susceptable to possible interuptions in fuel supply caused by negative G.

BSD

4th Jan 2008, 09:18

411A,

Yes, you are definitely management! Wriggling off the hook by invoking semantics is a true manager's tactic.

Might I quote from your orignal post on this thread, which was about the tragic loss of this Viscount:

"I rather suspect that the Dart engines had a hand in all these accidents."

How very silly of me to think that on this thread, your comments were relevant to the tragedy under discussion.

As for reading between the lines here is what I see: you have tried mischieviously to dent the reputation of the RR Dart, tried when asked to explain, to shift the blame onto the pilots. When asked for clarification, suggested that some pilots, in some 'planes, in some operations, but not this one, weren't very good. Oh, and by the way they weren't Americans.

Sadly, I think your post is tosh, and as you have pointed out, somewhat irrelevant.

DH106's comments are a great deal more relevant, and I agree with him that a failure of the Dart(s) is not likely.

Shall we say an unworthy post from you?

BSD.

airborne_artist

4th Jan 2008, 09:36

My father was the Captain of HMS Hardy, the first UK ship on scene. The ship was on passage from the North. I've got his order book, and a load of press clippings following the accident.

He's now dead, but was contacted about ten years ago by the Admiralty asking for some information following some publicity. The interesting thing he was told at that time is that the ship's log book for the period, which was returned to the Admiralty on completion, has gone missing. No other book is the series is missing, however.

Here's the ship's order book for the day:

http://www.hrmconsultancy.net/images/viscount_600.jpg

411A

4th Jan 2008, 17:55

Shall we say an unworthy post from you?

Not 'we', BSD, but you certainly are entitled to your 'opinion'.:}

How is it not known, just as an example, that perhaps the pilots closed the throttles rapidly, for some unknown reason (aircraft overspeed perhaps) and one or more propellors hung up on the cruise pitch stop, thereby severely overheating one or more engines?
Or, perhaps a propellor third oil line failure.
Many unknowns, it would appear.

DH106

4th Jan 2008, 23:07

Propellors hanging on a pitch stop aren't a Dart problem, but a propellor problem.

411A - It's not known for SURE that the details in your example didn't happen, but it's got to be a pretty shakey investagtive position to assume and engine issue happened and then ask for proof it didn't. No?

llanfairpg

5th Jan 2008, 15:08

Hey Boys
Why dont you start a DART thread, then we talk about melting engines in flight fine!

Georgeablelovehowindia

6th Jan 2008, 22:09

llanfairpg: you wouldn't be talking about a certain ex BEA 'character' who got the sack from Channel Airways for melting four Darts on a Viscount at Southend, would you? Only he tried to do EXACTLY the same thing to me on a Dart Herald years later, on the same runway. I got my hand to the FFP stop withdrawal lever faster than he could open up the throttles, after an abandoned takeoff. Good job aviation is a small world, eh?

Nevertheless, he could tell a many a good story in 'The Flarepath.' This included the time he flunked his Vanguard conversion at BEA when he hoiked all the power off at 50ft ... which was even less of a good idea than on the Viscount! :uhoh:

The Vanguard disaster over Belgium was caused by the rear pressure bulkhead failing. The cabin air rushed into the tailplane, blew the skin off, and caused loss of aerodynamic download. The aircraft nosed over and went into an unrecoverable vertical dive.

mikeintheskies

7th Jan 2008, 12:23

as said above the book "tragedy at tukar rock" by Mike Reynolds.. provides a lot of information about the incident... takes into account all the rumours that circulated at the time... and the ones that still do

383656

28th Feb 2008, 11:13

The Viscount, reg. letters EI-AOM, flight number 712, crashed 1.7 miles east of Tuskar Rock at 1215 A on Sunday 24th March 1968 with the loss of all onboard...61.
An Investigation into the accident was carried out by the AAIU and published in 1970.
A Review of the files associated with the crash was published by the AAIU in 2000.
A Study carried out by an international team of experts was published in 2002.
All these documents are available on the Irish Goverment Department of Transport website.
Happy reading

383656

28th Feb 2008, 11:28

There were two books published relating to the crash and oddly enough both had the same title "Tragedy at Tuskar Rock" . The first was written by Dermot Walsh and published in 1983 the second was written my Mike Reynolds and published in 2004. The first book is based mainly on the 1970 Investigation carried out by the AAIU and the 2nd is supportive of and based on the 2002 International Team Study. Having read both books and the various investigations/reviews and studies I would suggest that some of the conclusions reached in the Study and therefor in the 2nd book should be taken with a grain of salt.

narnia

28th Feb 2008, 14:55

I was flying Aer Lingus Viscount EI-AOM on a training detail about a week before it crashed at Tuskar Rock. We were on a conversion course after basic training and we conducted high speed dives at the ground from 13000' before pulling out sharply with positive G. Additonally we used to do level approaches at Rwy 23 Dublin at 1000' and when the runway disappeared under the nose, the training Captain would close all four engines, and a courageous steep nose-down dive at the runway threshold was necessary to avoid going off the far end, followed by a positive G rotate and landing. I regarded these manoeuvres as highly stressful to the empennage and reported the matter to the last inquiry. I still think it was probably a metal fatigue structural failure of the tailplane or other elements of the empennage that caused the crash.

383656

28th Feb 2008, 15:30

Hi,
Just read your Dad's Night Order Book extract...brings back memories. I was a junior officer on the "Irish Frigate" mentioned on the left hand page...... in fact our ship was a Flower Class Corvette "L.E. Macha". Spent all summer off Tuskar Rock !!!
Best regards.

383656

28th Feb 2008, 16:11

It is hard to understand why neither crew or passengers had donned lifejackets even though EI-AOM was flying in a disabled condition for 30 minutes or so before crashing....that is, if we are to accept the findings of the 2002 International Team Study.

RETDPI

28th Feb 2008, 17:58

Sorry to blunder into this thread late and also far removed from any detailed knowledge of the case in question.
Possibly part of the "military aircraft mid-air" speculation came from, IIRC, the recovery of a nosewheel leg and some bits from what some in the the popular press at the time deemed to be an "RAF Fighter" , during the investigation.
Again ,IIRC, these bits turned out actually to have been from a Meteor which went in many years previously.

llanfairpg

29th Feb 2008, 11:37

Additonally we used to do level approaches at Rwy 23 Dublin at 1000' and when the runway disappeared under the nose, the training Captain would close all four engines, and a courageous steep nose-down dive at the runway threshold was necessary to avoid going off the far end, followed by a positive G rotate and landing.

Cant quite see that any useful purpose is served by this type of training or am I missing something, it would certainly bring some interesting pax comments!

narnia

29th Feb 2008, 16:29

Why do spectacular dives at the ground in a Viscount from just 1000'? I often wondered that myself as a trainee, but I was only 19 at the time and on initial four-engine conversion. I expect it would come in useful if you'd forgotten to descend below 1000' during final approach and, coincidentally, all four engines failed as you passed over the approach lights! I suppose it was to trigger the immediate response necessary for recovery from engine loss at low altitude so as avoid a stall and to effect an emergency landing.

My principal concern about doing unusual dive manoeuvres from 13000' on Oscar Mike a week before the Tuskar Rock crash was the effect on the tail structure of VMO dives with, first, sudden negative G in forcefully attaining at least 45 degree nose down as rapidly as possible to reach VMO (or whatever it was called in 1968), and then the less stressful level out at lower altitude (around 4000' if I recall correctly). I never heard whether the subject of my letter to the Inquiry was considered a possible factor in the accident, especially since the loss of tail elements was always part of the speculation.

Panop

29th Feb 2008, 18:32

RTE Radio have just done a Special on the crash.

See http://www.rte.ie/radio1/investigate/tuskar.html#

The programme can be heard at http://www.rte.ie/radio1/investigate/rams/2008/tuskar1.smil - it takes almost half an hour so give yourself enough time to listen carefully.

DH106

29th Feb 2008, 23:13

I regarded these manoeuvres as highly stressful to the empennage and reported the matter to the last inquiry. I still think it was probably a metal fatigue structural failure of the tailplane or other elements of the empennage that caused the crash.
Capt Fergus Ryan, retd

Narnia - I completely agree that some sort of empennage failure is the most likely cause, but to someone with some aerodynamics knowledge the reported specifics of this accident are a real mystery....

Basically, in classic aircraft such as the Viscount, pitch stability is achieved by having the tailplane produce a downforce i.e. a nose up pitching moment which in stable level flight is balanced by the C.G. being forward of the centre of lift. So any empennage failure (say loss of elevator and/or tailplane) would upset this balance and cause the aircraft pitch sharply nose down. Several accidents have highlighted this:

1) Vanguard G-APEC 1971, near Aarsele, Belgium: Rear pressure bulkhead failed due to corrosion & caused tailplane failure - dived near vertically into the ground.
2) Boeing 707 G-BEBP 1977, Lusaka: Fatigue failure of right tailplane on approach - dived into ground.
3) Viscount SE-FOZ 1977, on approach to Stockholm: severe icing on the leading edge of the tailplane caused the tailplane to stall and near vertical dive into a parking lot.

So - I can't see it being a simple empennage failure or we'd almost certainly just have seen a near vertical dive into the sea off the south Irish coast. I doubt such a failure would be controllable/recoverable even with the height they had at the point of initial upset.
At least one witness reported the nature of the initial upset to be that of a spin/spiral dive. The Viscount then appeared, according to various witnesses, to fly erraticaly at fairly low level - at least once flying low enough to "flatten the grass" according to one witness. Another witness reported seing the faces of the passengers looking out through the windows - so again that must be pretty low level. The obvious speculation here is that the pilots were fighting some sort of controllability issue, but the fact that the aircraft spent some time at very low level but amazingly didn't hit the ground at these points suggests suggests that the aircraft was under some sort of pitch control (perhaps marginal?).

Analysis of the recovered aircraft wreckage suggests a fairly low forward speed (less than 130 knots according to analysis of the engines & prop pitches) but a high vertical descent speed - with possibly one wing lower on impact with the nose being somewhere between level pitch and 45deg nose down. The only condition I can visualize that fits all this is a spin - which makes an interesting comparison to the witness statement regarding the initial upset.

So - to sum up: what failure would give an aircraft marginal control for an extended period and perhaps a tendancy to spin?

383656

1st Mar 2008, 07:00

The following is a reply received from Colin Torkington in 2006 who was one of the three who compiled the 2002 Study.
"You asked whether an aircraft could enter a spin or spiral dive as a result of a near miss and could subsequent loading cause structural fatigue failure. I will do my best to answer.
Any aircraft making a determined pull up or even a rolling manoeuvre to avoid a collision could probably stall, drop a wing and spin or spiral dive. This was considered. The Viscount like most large aircraft, is definitely a non-spin aircraft. There was one case of a Viscount recovering from a spin but with extreme difficulty by an experienced test pilot.
It is indeed quite possible to break an aircraft in an attempted recovery from loss of control following an upset. This often includes a spiral dive and there have been many such cases.
In Australia, we lost three Viscounts with in-flight structural failure ( I was structures Group- Leader in two of the investigations ) The first one involving VH-TVC at Sydney in 1961 is relevant to your question, the others being fire and metal fatigue.
TVC suffered a catastrophic structural failure in attempting to recover from an upset and loss of control in a storm. Most such cases result in wing failure which was not the case with AOM.
If I remember correctly there have also been cases of engine mount and empennage failure.
There is a definite 'NO' to your question about a fatigue failure. Excessive manoeuvre loading beyond the design strength of the aircraft will usually be a single application causing an' overload' failure as against 'fatigue' which normally requires thousands of load cycles.
One difficulty I had with the TVC type of overload failure is that when the aircraft breaks up, it is in a time scale of seconds. AOM flew for approximately 15 minutes after reporting loss of control. The Indonesian Viscount PK-IVS with springtab-flutter- fatigue causal factors flew for around 20 minutes from calling Mayday to crashing.
I have always regretted that the Irish Viscounts were not fitted with Flight Data and Cockpit Voice Recorders as were in the Australian aircraft at that time. Although early simple devices, they would have almost certainly answered all questions of altitude, speed, flutter and loading and narrowed down the causal factors. However.....
Hope this is of some interest to you
regards. Colin Torkington."
The question was asked of Colin because one of the findings in the 1970 Investigation stated " There is evidence which could be construed as indicative of the possible presence of another aircraft or airborne object in the vicinity which, by reason of collision, or by its proximity causing an evasive manoeuvre to be made, or by its wake turbulence, might have been the the initiating cause of an upsetting manoeuvre resulting in the Viscount entering a spin or spiral dive," (Page 20 para 2.2.2.1. 12)

Spotlight

1st Mar 2008, 08:26

Possibly unrelated:

However, a Viscount crashed and killed all on board after take-off from Sydney in the late fifties. Butler Air Transport (BAT). Severe thunderstorms were present.

Strongly suspected by people close to the operation (but not adressed in the subsequent official report), was that the overhead CB and switch panel unlatched and swung down on the hinges, sconning the pilots.

411. Ansett had a check captain who put a Friendship on its roof at Launy Tasmania many moons ago. Pitch Lock on descent, overcooked approach with (late) attempted go-round---or something???

The big wheel was given a spin and he was----------PROMOTED.

BEagle

1st Mar 2008, 09:52

spring tab-flutter- fatigue

This sounds a highly likely cause - perhaps leading to loss of control and a spin?

How was recovery from those steep dives effected? Was pitch trim used in an attempt to assist with heavy control forces?

One wonders whether the pitch circuit, rather than empennage, was subjected to loads beyond those it was designed to cope with?

Repeatedly playing Stukas with a Viscount is unlikely to have been beneficial to aircraft fatigue.

llanfairpg

1st Mar 2008, 13:10

Fergus

Was it AL policy to do this sort of training, or was it just one cavalier training captain playing to the gallery?

What sort of G forces do you estimate were involved in these 'pull ups' and am I right in thinking the Viscount would not have been certified to more than about 2.5 positive?

Were renewals done in the simulator and if not were these sort of manoeuvres repeated on base checks?

Just a spotter

1st Mar 2008, 13:20

Don't forget that less than 12 months before hand, Aer Lingus lost a sister Viscount 803 to EI-AOM (cn 178)

On June 22, 1967, EI-AOF (cn 176) crashed while on a training flight near Ashbourne in North County Dublin (a few kilomometers north of EIDW). The aircraft went into a spin from a low altitude and impacted the ground killing all 3 on board. The accident report blamed corrision around the tail and higlighted issues with the then Aer Lingus maintenance procuedures.

JAS

411A

2nd Mar 2008, 00:15

411. Ansett had a check captain who put a Friendship on its roof at Launy Tasmania many moons ago. Pitch Lock on descent, overcooked approach with (late) attempted go-round---or something???

The big wheel was given a spin and he was----------PROMOTED.

Par for the course, in my experience.

It has always amazed me that some folks want to do with the aeroplane something for which it was not designed...or, to put it another way, how hard is it to actually fly the airplane according to the manufacturers instructions?
From some of the accident statistics...apparently, quite a few.
These few folks are right and truly...silly fools.
Or, if you like, a**holes.

narnia

3rd Mar 2008, 08:59

The two sharp diving training manoeuvres seemed to be part of standard initial conversion. I have no reason to think they were ex curricular, but we never did anything like this again in subsequent training.

The rapid descent from apx 13000' was probably part of a normal decompression exercise, although it certainly involved the non-normal stresses of initial sharp nosedown control column push to at least 45 degrees until maximum operating speed was achieved for descent. The level out would have been less stressful than the initial descent but still more than a normal level out. This exercise definitely took place on AOM days before the crash and I reported that to the second investigation. I have no knowledge of the training details of the others on our conversion course.

As for the sudden dive at the runway from 1000' this was certainly a dramatic manoeuvre with, again, initial heavy and sudden push for nose down after closing throttles to maintain speed control and a final pull up before landing sharper than any normal approach forces. But it would not have involved excessive G anywhere near limit.

DH106

3rd Mar 2008, 09:23

But it would not have involved excessive G anywhere near limit.

Yes, but of course it's possible that the elevators & associated tabs etc. could be pushed closer to their ultimate limits than perhaps evident by the aircraft's overall G loading.... And when you combine that with the issue of whether these components had grossly exceeded their "safe life" as I believe was inferred in the recent "Tradgedy At Tuskar Rock" book (and not mentioned in the 1970 report) then perhaps it was just an "accident waiting to happen".

It does sound like tab flutter is the most likely cause of -AOM's crash. As 383656 points out above - comparison with the PK-IVS crash is very interesting, although the final mode of crash is different with -IVS finally losing an elevator after prolonged tab flutter, the crew losing control and the Viscount diving to the ground.

383656

4th Mar 2008, 07:50

I have been endeavouring to obtain a reasonable explanation as to why nobody on board EI-AOM was wearing a lifejacket even though the a/c was flying in a disabled condition for approx. 30 minutes (according to the 2002 International Team Study)...can you help.

Flightwatch

4th Mar 2008, 08:26

I remember my own base training in the UK on the Viscount 700 in 1967 where the same manoeuver was required on finals. As far as memory serves it was done from 1500' and when the threshold disappeared from view the throttles were closed and full (47 deg?) flap was selected - a setting that could only be achieved when the throttles were closed - they automatically retracted to the penultimate setting if power was applied. The aiming point was the mid point of the runway and a flare started very early. I can only assume that was part of the required test for the 1179. In my case the aircraft then soldiered on for another 3 years before ultimately being scrapped so it appeared to do it no harm.

I subsequently flew the 800 too but was not required to repeat the exercise on the final base check for that model. (We had the use of the BEA simulator for the conversion and most of the airwork was done on that.)

talent

4th Mar 2008, 15:35

Just a spotter,
WAnt to pull you up on your reasons for the crash of EI-AOF June 22, 1967. This was, of course, the Aer Lingus Viscount on a training flight.

"The accident report blamed corrision around the tail and higlighted issues with the then Aer Lingus maintenance procuedures."

According to my source on this crash, Michael O'Toole's excellent book on Irish air crashes, Cleared for Disaster, the probable cause was the possible incapacitation of the training captain, the only qualified pilot aboard, perhaps due to a heart attack, and the inability of the trainees to find the airport in the overcast conditions, and to land the airplane. The main safety recommendation was that a second qualified pilot should always accompany the training captain.

I know corrosion was examined in the Tuskar Rock crash (the subject of this thread) but this has always been an inconclusive investigation.
Talent

talent

4th Mar 2008, 15:46

Panop,
I heard that broadcast on RTE and it all seemed plausible until I heard one of the witnesses say the plane flew so low that he could see the pax through the windows. Hmmm ...

BTW, that radio report was prepared by Phillip Boucher Hayes who caused a major stir when he produced what he thought was a major scoop by declaring on radio that BEA was still flying the Q400 after they had been grounded. It was a piece of very lazy journalism and he obviously never bothered to read the official grounding order which was to ground the aircraft until the undercarriage had been inspected for corrosion. The obvious sequel was, if there was no corrosion, the aircraft could immediately fly again ... but why let the facts get in the way of a good story.

383656

4th Mar 2008, 16:46

In a statement to the AAIU that same person also said that he saw, on the afternoon of the crash, an eighty foot length of aircraft fuselage floating 3 miles S.W. of the Saltee Islands. He was standing in Slade (Height of eye 30ft) at the time, some 11 miles from the object. Sighting such an object with H.E. 30ft and distance 11 miles would be impossible when one takes into account the curvature of the earth. In addition no other witness came forward to corroborate any of his testimony. Finally he also said that he took a photograph of this object with an ordinary family portrait type camera and gave it as a slide to the AAIU.....but the AAIU mislaid it (He said).
Its extraordinary that the ATC officer in Shannon on duty that morning was not believed by the International Team, who published the 2002 Study, yet the evidence of the chap mentioned above was.

Panop

4th Mar 2008, 16:51

One point that was made a lot of in the RTE programme was that in the aircraft's (or someone's) call to London Control the callsign EI-AOM was used rather than the flight number. I am fairly sure that Aer Lingus had only recently then changed from using registrations to flight numbers as callsigns so it is possible that in a moment of confusion or an emergency they reverted to the more familiar callsign.

It was also suggested that the voice in that call was not that of either of the flight deck crew. I have not read as widely on this subject as many of the others here but has the possibility of crew incapacitation and consequent (or even incapacitation subsequent to) loss of control ever been canvassed? This could explain a 'strange' voice and the use of the registration rather than the flight number if another person was working the radio.

Or (and this is a great leap of the imagination, I know), has the possibility of unauthorised entry to the cockpit and some form of piracy been considered, with loss of control resulting?

Either of these suggestions would, at least, explain why r/t was apparently normal up until that final call - which seems to me to rule out some of the other theories put forward.

As I said, I have not studied this incident in the detail that other contributors have so I will not be at all upset if any or all of the above is shown to be totally incorrect or impossible - just my two bob's worth.

talent

4th Mar 2008, 18:16

The various investigations lacked three things which most air accident sleuths would say is almost essential to solving a crash mystery.
1. No FDR
2. No CVR
3. Very little wreckage.

There is a fourth, a surviving cockpit crew member but given there were no survivors whatsoever, I think that crash must forever remain a mystery.

383656

5th Mar 2008, 14:45

Panop

The voices who spoke the two messages," EIAOM with you" and "5000ft descending spinning rapidly" intercepted by London Airways have never been identified. Some very experienced aviators have said that the "EIAOM with you" message actually came from another aircraft which was closing with the Viscount. In the 1970 Investigation 4 witnesses are mentioned as having seen an aircraft "with very red colour on wings and tail". The colour of this aircraft was "not green or white". This Investigation also concludes, on page18 para 2.1.4.10. "that there was such another aircraft in the area is inescapable". The 2002 Study carried out some 30 years after the crash concluded that there was no other aircraft in the vicinity except the Viscount.

13370khz

6th Mar 2008, 14:53

Correct ! For european flights Aer Lingus had used aircraft registration as
radiotelephony callsign until 1967 or perhaps early 1968 when the change
to FNC was made. However, for atlantic flights which were then operated
by "Aerlinte" (remember that fiddle?) the ICAO designator "Shamrock" plus
flight number was/still is used. Capt O'Beirne had been a B720/B707 F/O
until perhaps '66 or '67 and so would have encountered two recent changes in callsign format. Initial contact with London by saying "EIAOM
with you" while not standard RTF phraseology was common and similar
transmissions can be heard today!
Incidentally about 20 years ago Aer Lingus decided to drown the Shamrock and use "Aer Lingus" plus flight number as callsign for
ALL flights. After a few months use and confusion with Gander Radio
and Kennedy Tower the decision was reversed ( it was right at the
time !!! ). Shamrock plus flt number was then adopted for ALL flights.
A few years ago Shamrock plus alpha-numeric callsigns changing one
digit of the flt number were invented. The law of unintended consequences was then consulted!

383656

6th Mar 2008, 15:49

13370khz
During the investigation in 1970 it was never definitively stated or proven that the voice heard was either that of the Captain or Co-Pilot. The only evidence on file is a hand written note to state "voice not Captain O'Beirne".....the above is an extract from the Review of Irish and UK Files published in 2002.

13370khz

6th Mar 2008, 22:36

Hi !

Have a look at 2002 report Vol 11, Tome 2, Annex A, Para. 19

383656

7th Mar 2008, 08:15

13370khz.
From the Review Page 64
"The only physical tape recording of the R/T of the St. Phelim and the ATC unit, located during this review, contains the last transmission of the St. Phelim to London ATC on frequency 131.2 Mhz with the message “descending spinning rapidly” thereon.
The actual tapes of the exchanges between the St. Phelim and the Irish ATC units have not been located by this review.
During the investigation in 1968 it was never definitively stated or proven that the voice heard was either that of the Captain or Co-Pilot. The only
evidence on file is a hand written note to state “voice not Captain O’Beirne” . It was therefore assumed that the voice heard was that of the co-pilot, First Officer Heffernan."

From the Review Page 37 Annex L
“It is our understanding that the voice was not Capt. O’Beirne’s. This was stated by one of his contemporaries. I have no idea who identified F/O Heffernans voice. I intend to have the recording played in Farnborough in the presence of an Aer Lingus pilot who was both his school pal and contemporary in Aer Lingus. "

Ref page 14 of Annex A of Volume 2 Tome 2 it is noted that the former Aer Lingus captain " listened to the distress message of EI-AOM."
Is this entry referring to the "EI-AOM..." or to the "descending spinning..."
message ?.

Do you not think it most unusual that the voices who uttered the two message intercepted by London Airways were not identified within days of the crash.?

DH106

7th Mar 2008, 08:20

Owwch !! No need to shout.
Has the erm.... 'Battle Of The Fonts' commenced.... ? :bored::bored::bored::bored:

(Font now corrected :))

383656

7th Mar 2008, 08:26

My ability with this thing is limited....typed using small font but then these giants appeared....how does one change the font size please ?.
383656
:confused:

All ok again
:O

13370khz

7th Mar 2008, 19:55

No, I dont think it was unusual. The "....descending, spinning message..."
was initially thought to start with "five thousand feet, descending....."
but was subsequently thought to be more likely "twelve thousand......"
That indicates transmission was of poor radio readablilty leading to
difficulty in identifying the voice. Neither do I think it unusual that the
former captain should identify the voice after more than 30 years. He
may not have heard the tape previously?

BTW the 1983 book "Tradegy at Tuskar Rock" was reviewed in Irish Times
by an acknowledged expert soon after publication. Book was discredited.
The second book "Tradegy at Tuskar Rock" was based on the 2000 investigation. Irish Air Letter, No. 328, April 2002 contains an excellent
review of that report and rejects its conclusions. Well worth a read!

Please leave me out of the Fonts War.

383656

10th Mar 2008, 10:17

13370khz
Is the Irish Times review readily available ?. You mentioned Irish Air Letter No. 328 April 2002. As the second book was published in 2003, did No. 328 refer to the Study published in Nov. 2001 and is it available for perusal.

Received IAL No. 328 from editor PM this date

383656

12th Mar 2008, 17:38

13370khz
Ref. IAL 328
If it looks like a duck, waddles like a duck and sounds like a duck it is a duck.
I refer to the 4 witnesses who testified to the 1970 Investigation, that they saw an aeroplane after Mass (Mass over at 10.40) and before dinner (dinner at 11.30-12.00) with very red colour on wings and tail.(times G.M.T.). They also testified that the aeroplane was not green or white. The Investigation also noted that the times of the observations can be taken "as reasonably accurate because it being Sunday the events of Mass ending and the middle of the day dinner being placed on the table are of great regularity throughout the population ".
Other witnesses also testified as hearing a "loud whoosh" and "a loud boom like a jet coming out of a cloud" . Surely what these witnesses observed was a "duck" and not the Dove which arrived on scene at around 14.00. However the three wize men plus one thought differently.

DH106

12th Mar 2008, 19:05

383656
I must have missed something & I'm trying to follow what you're perhaps alluding to. The "red, but not green nor white" aircraft isn't the Viscount nor the Dove, so perhaps a 3rd aircraft...... collision & conspiracy? :confused:

383656

13th Mar 2008, 10:25

DH106.
Thread number 50 posted on the 1st March might explain your query. The 1970 Investigation interviewed witnesses immediately after the crash and came to the conclusion that "there was such another aircraft in the area is inescapable". The Study carried out some 30 years after the crash dismissed this conclusion.

811733

18th Mar 2008, 18:57

The AAIU should not have had sole access to investigating the crash . As soon as it was determined that another aircraft was in the vicinity the Gardai should have been alerted to the possibility of a crime having been committed. The question has to be asked why were'nt they called in, after all 61 died and the second aircraft whose presence was "inescapable" could have been responsible for causing the crash. The 1970 Investigation alludes to this possibility on page 20 under para 2.2.1. " There is evidence which could be construed as indicative of the possible presence of another aircraft or airborne object in the vicinity, which by reason of collision, or by its proximity causing an evasive manoeuvre to be made, or by its wake turbulence, might have been the initiating cause of an upsetting manoeuvre resulting in the Viscount entering a spin or spiral dive"
Is it too late now to have the G.S open the case and attempt to determine the identity ofthis aircraft ?
If a similar accident happened today (God forbid) there is no doubt but that the AAIU would call in the G.S.

383656

19th Mar 2008, 10:30

13370khz or anybody else.

Ref page 14 of Annex A of Volume 2 Tome 2 it is noted that the former Aer Lingus captain " listened to the distress message of EI-AOM."
Is this entry referring to the "EI-AOM..." or to the "5000ft descending spinning..." message or both ?. Is it possible that two different voices were heard ?.

Alan McCormick

19th Mar 2008, 16:45

"The AAIU operates a 7day 24hour call-out service and investigates accidents and incidents specifically,as you say,to prevent reoccurence.We are expressly prohibited from attributing either blame or liability by our legislation.Please note that many occurances do not involve either blame or liability.
Following notification of an accident,an AAIU Inspector is immediately dispatched to the site.AAIU proceedures require that if the Inspector finds any evidence of criminality at an accident/incident site,or during an investigation,then the Gardai or appropriate authority is immediately called in.In the case of the Gardai,they would then take charge of the investigation with the AAIU assisting them as required.Otherwise the investigation is conducted by the AAIU."

383656

22nd Mar 2008, 15:04

Let us remember those who died 40 years ago on board Aer Lingus Viscount St. Phelim
On the 24th of March 1968 Aer Lingus Viscount Saint Phelim, Registration Letters EI-AOM , Flight Number 712 took off from Cork Airport at 10.32 G.M.T. on flight to London. At 11.15 G.M.T. she crashed 1.9 miles east of Tuskar Rock. All 4 crew members and 57 passengers perished. The following are their names:
Katherine Archer, Dennis Arnold, Roger Baeck, Hans Beck, Elizebeth Bryan, Hannah Burke,
Mary Coughlan, Michael Cowhig, William Cox-Ife, Jacques Creyelman, Sheila Dann, Teresa Dann,
Rory Delaney, Pierre Dreyfus , Thomas Dwane, Edmund Faveurs, Karin Gahlin, Sven Gahlin,
Eileen Gallivan, Marion Gallivan, Paula Gallivan, Joseph Ganglehoff, Mary Ganglehoff, Paul Heffernan, Edward Hegarty, Maura Herlihy, Max Hinderer, Eileen Jephson, Maurice Jephson, Theordor Jurgens,
Ann Kelly, Anthony Long, Curt Meyer, Noel Mulcahy, Christopher McCarthy, Jeremiah McCarthy,
Rita McCarthy, Neill McCormick, Dorthy Newey, Richard Nunan, John Nyhan, Barney O’Beirne,
Edward O’Brien, Bridget O’Callaghan, Patrick O’Callaghan, James O’Halloran, Josephine O’Halloran, Nora O’Mahony, Barney O’Rourke, Nellie Quinlan, Paul Schwartz, Ann Shorten, Thomas Shorten,
Ruth Sless, Albert Spleleers, Marcel Vastenavondt, Madeleine Waeckerling, Roland Waeckerling,
Desmond Walls, Rudolf Weiss, Ernest Zimmerman

811733

26th Mar 2008, 12:00

Would the IAC member (past or present) who is mentioned in the 2002 International Study as indicating that the truth could be found "closer to home", please make contact by PM.

Alan McCormick

28th Mar 2008, 08:39

Have you had a satisfactory explanation yet as to the cause of this crash?Last Thursday was the 40th.anniversary of the death of my brother Neill who died in this crash along with all 60 others on board.The official report of June 1970 into the accident had enough witnesses to conclude that the Viscount was involved in a mid-air collision with a manned military aircraft.Two neutral experts had absolutely no hesitation in concluding that fact.But to this day the Air Accident Investigation Unit in Dublin control everything to do with this crash-not even the European Court Of Human Rights or the International Civil Aviation Organization in Montreal can interfere.The AAIU have such a grip because the cover-up lies that protect Aer Lingus,the Irish Air Corps,the Fianna Fail Government and the like from the truth is vital.This is actually a criminal situation.
You should be able to get plenty of information about this crash on the internet if you wish-maybe you might get an idea of what I'm talking about.

DH106

28th Mar 2008, 12:27

The official report of June 1970 into the accident had enough witnesses to conclude that the Viscount was involved in a mid-air collision with a manned military aircraft.

As someone with some knowledge of aerodynamics, I think that the reconstucted dynamics of the final impact together with the physical reconstruction of the recovered wreckage pretty much precludes an actual collision, although the 'near miss / upset' scenario is perhaps still possible.

383656

31st Mar 2008, 09:09

The 2002 Study looked at many scenarios which could have caused the accident to the Viscount except a "near miss"....or did I miss it?

383656

4th Apr 2008, 12:16

The International Team had a difficult job....if they believed the Shannon ATC records then they would have had to conclude that the flight crew diverted from the flight plan and send two ficticious messages....."Level at 17000ft".. and... "By Bannow"... I suppose it would be totally unreal to accept that a passenger aircraft would divert from original flight plan without informing ATC and proceed on a "touristic flight" as mentioned in the Study. It is noted that the solicitor acting for the Operational Controller who was on duty on the 24th of March 1968 at Shannon wrote to Kevin Humphries, Chief Accident Investigator AAIU, on the 22nd January 2002 with the following comment:
"We have been instructed to state that our client rejects the contents of the draft report in so far as it contradicts his own statement and the certified transcripts of the tapes".
The Study concluded that EIAOM when over the Old Parish area interrupted its "climbing and dived into a spin" and appeared to be "attempting to go back to Cork". The Team of experts seemed to have missed that at this time a Herald aircraft was inbound to Cork and would have been flying approx 4000 ft lower then EIAOM.

811733

5th Apr 2008, 12:56

It is suggested that the following scenario is more realistic then that concluded in the 200 Report
The aircraft was not in trouble shortly after take off as concluded by the International Team ...if she was in trouble a mayday signal would have been sent and she would have returned to Cork. A diversion from the flight path was the reason for levelling off at 9000ft and flying along the south coast of Count Waterford before turning in towards Waterford City. That aircraft sighted by Tory Hill so low that the grass was flattened was not the Viscount...it was the same aircraft that witnesses saw over Fethard with red wing tips and tail. What happened over South Wexford is difficult to tell but there is no doubt that there were two aircraft in close proximity in the area. The aircraft which did'nt crash got "home" safely and so far there is no record of it being where it was. But it is suggested that its identity may be ascertained at some date in the future .

383656

6th Apr 2008, 19:35

The Review of Irish and U.K. Files carried out by Kevin Humphries and Graham Liddy of the AAIU and published in August 2000 contains the following:

"Strenuous efforts were made to trace the possibility of a second airborne object without success.

It should be noted that even if the presence of another flying object in the area were proven, there is still no evidence to show that it might have had any connection with the accident to EI-AOM"

Who made these strenuous efforts ?. Was it the team who investigated immediately after the crash or the International Team in 2002?
These "strenuous efforts" are not documented either in the initial 1970 Investigation or in the 2002 Study insofar as they relate to airborne activity from Irish Aiports other than from Cork and Baldonnell. The unsigned Baldonnell log sheet came with the following "health warning" issued by the International Team :
"It is noted that is an operational statement, and so, questionable"
Page 96 Volume 1 : Study Report

411A

7th Apr 2008, 03:28

I suppose it would be totally unreal to accept that a passenger aircraft would divert from original flight plan without informing ATC and proceed on a "touristic flight" as mentioned in the Study.

Not entirely without prescedent.
The mid-air collision between a United Airlines DC-7 and a TWA Constellation over the Grand Canyon in Arizona years ago was attributed to one of the airplanes going on a sight-seeing tour, thus diviating from the flight plan (and ATC approved) route.

Not good policy:(

DH106

7th Apr 2008, 07:25

I suppose it would be totally unreal to accept that a passenger aircraft would divert from original flight plan without informing ATC and proceed on a "touristic flight" as mentioned in the Study.

There were witnesses to the 'initial upset' which pretty much disprove the 'touristic diversion' theory - paraphrasing the witness statements but the Viscount was climbing 'normally' as flights from Cork eastbound usually do when suddenly some upset caused it descend rapdly with a spinning/spiral motion before being recovered at low level...

airborne_artist

7th Apr 2008, 12:08

I've posted one or two bits from my father's files before, but came across a letter he wrote in 1998 to the MoD in response to their questions. My father died four years ago, so I have taken it upon myself to release this letter, which I think could be found under the FOI. I have removed the names referred to, as I happen to know most of them. I don't know if they are still alive, but I thought it best to withhold them at this stage. I doubt if any of them have more information.

Those who subscribe to the missile theory should read the penultimate paragraph.

The letter is here (http://www.hrmconsultancy.net/pprune/viscount.pdf)

corsair

7th Apr 2008, 15:19

This is quite fascinating. It's amazing how this mystery continues to run and run. Airborne artist, your Dad refer to an Irish Air Corps Dakota in his letter. The IAC never had Dakotas, but he was an naval officer not a plane spotter. I assume that refers to the IAC Dove which interestingly had dayglo patches on it's wings and tail. I can't help feeling that this is the aircraft many saw that day when the Viscount went down and confused their timings. This may have led to the idea of the drone or military aircraft colliding with the Viscount. We all know how unreliable witnesses are. We only have to evidence the recent Citation accident to see that.

What always put me off the idea of the mid air with a military aircraft was the fact that it was a Sunday. The IAC in particular didn't operate on a Sunday back then. The only possible IAC aircraft with the performance capability to be in the same place as a Viscount were the Vampire T55's, which incidentally also had dayglo wing tips. It is hard to believe that a cover up exists in the Air Corps in relation to a Vampire flying that day. The IAC was very small indeed and this is a small country. To maintain a cover up of that size would be quite difficult.

One other theory, I read about is even more tenuous. It suggests a Fouga Magister collided with the Viscount. But the Air Corps didn't have Fougas at the time, although Potez who built the Magister were actually building an aircraft factory at Baldonnel at the time. So the suggestion is that a visiting Fouga from France collided with the Viscount. But the complete lack of evidence for a visit by Fouga Magister visitor to Baldonnel snookers that theory too. Although a cover up by the French authorities may be more plausible.

I'm afraid I tend to believe the more prosaic idea that there was a failure which led to a loss of pitch control. Like the Indonesian aircraft, the crew heroically managed to keep it flying for a while but lost the battle in the end.

All this talk of mid-airs distracts from that.

Alan McCormick

7th Apr 2008, 16:14

One of the most extraordinary conclusions reached by the International Team in their 2002 study is that the Viscount "crossing at 9 to 10,000ft.suddenly interrupted its climbing and dived into a spin".This conclusion was reached mainly on the evidence of a new witness who was "standing...near his home in Scart (North Youghal).He saw an aircraft,and identified it as a Viscount".The aircraft was flying at an altitude between FL 90 and FL 100 and would have been approx.13 miles distant from the witness.It is suggested that even with a powerful set of binoculars it would have been impossible to see an aircraft not to mind identify it as a Viscount.The 2002 Study then claimed that after the Viscount spun or spiralled,almost vertically,she flew for 30 minutes without broadcasting a mayday message!!!Rubbish,total rubbish.

(I hereby challenge AAIU incidentally to either endorse this precise part of the 2002 Study or to confirm its total and utter disagreement with these farcical conclusions).

Thank you DH106 for your technical contributions...they are most helpful as my search for the truth continues.My brother Neill died in this crash.

airborne_artist

7th Apr 2008, 17:11

Airborne artist, your Dad refer to an Irish Air Corps Dakota in his letter. The IAC never had Dakotas, but he was an naval officer not a plane spotter. I assume that refers to the IAC Dove

Thank you for pointing that out. You are right - my Dad never was a spotter!

383656

7th Apr 2008, 17:55

Alan McCormick
The authors of the 2000 review pointed out that ;

"had the St. Phelim developed problems immediately after take off, it is unlikely that it would have continued on its way to London but rather would have returned and landed in Cork".

Your point is valid concerning identifying an aircraft 13 miles away. This distance is the equivalent of observing a commercial transatlanic airliner directly overhead flying at twice the normal altitude. At normal altitude, around 30 to 35 thousand ft, an observer would have difficulty knowing that there was an aircraft except for the presence of the contrail.

811733

15th Apr 2008, 06:13

Would the fitting of a FDR in EI-AOM have recorded if the aircraft was over stressed in the course of training a week before the crash ?.
Were any extra maintenance schedules implemented by airlines who carried out such unusual altitude manoeuvres ?.
If an aircraft had to carry out an actual emergency such as those envisaged in the course of training, would the aircraft have to undergo an immediate inspection ?.

viking1948

10th Aug 2008, 11:47

Fascinating thread. I note from the latest book by Mike Reynolds that he seems to think that someday a piece of wreckage will be found washed ashore or on terra firma which will 'solve' this mystery. Who knows what the future will hold?

383656

18th Nov 2008, 09:51

It has come to light that an unauthorised Aer Corps flight took place on the day after the crash. Would the pilot please make contact by PM.

2 sheds

7th Feb 2009, 18:55

In respect of the possible activity of UK-based anti-aircraft units, there are numerous mentions on record, including in the Irish Parliament and from journalists, to the effect that "it was well known in Territorial Army circles that they had had some involvement in this accident".

The UK government has always denied this, but (a) they would, wouldn't they, or (b) such denials might well be quite sincere and just in line with their own records.

Does anyone have contacts who might have definite knowledge in this regard to either confirm the probability of such involvement or alternatively to expose such rumours as mere bullsh!t, bravado or Chinese whispers?

Any info gratefully received - please PM.

2 s

Liffy 1M

8th Feb 2009, 10:03

In respect of the possible activity of UK-based anti-aircraft units, there are numerous mentions on record, including in the Irish Parliament and from journalists, to the effect that "it was well known in Territorial Army circles that they had had some involvement in this accident".

The UK government has always denied this, but (a) they would, wouldn't they, or (b) such denials might well be quite sincere and just in line with their own records.

The problem here, as with conspiracy theories generally, is the inherent impossibility of proving a negative (i.e. that there was no British missile). Whatever evidence is offered to show that there is no basis for such belief can simply be met with the "they would say that, wouldn't they" response. I suspect that, with so much time having elapsed since the events of 1968 and no physical evidence available, this will have to remain an accident for which no definitive cause has been established.

2 sheds

8th Feb 2009, 11:14

Indeed - I would not disagree. But insofar as some people have claimed to have evidence, what I am saying is let's hear it, let's name names and have chapter and verse. After all, a journalist ought to be fairly certain of his facts before publishing as should a member of parliament before making public statements. If they cannot do this or have to admit that they were misled, that would equally be more satisfactory than at present.

It is not just a traditional conspiracy theory - there were these claims, there were witness reports of another aircraft with red wingtips and noises like a sonic boom. The original, formal, accident report said that it was inescapable that there was another aircraft in the area. This was then totally discounted in the 2002 Report by the so-called International Team because they interpreted evidence to suit that conclusion. They made inaccurate interpretations of parts of the communications transcripts and said that other parts must be wrong - just in order to support their claim that all the witnesses saw just the one aircraft, the Viscount. That was either incompetent or a whitewash.

Whitegolf

17th Aug 2009, 23:39

Could the discrepancy between the Shannon ATC tape, the sudden change in situation on handover to London and the proposed (twin spinning) flight scenario put forward in the latest investigation be explained by the wrong tape being put forward by Shannon ATC? I do not know what the verification process for time and date was in the pre-digital age! Now that the tapes are gone, it would be hard to say, but could it have been from an earlier flight! Captain O'Beirne did fly the route before.......Probably one conspiracy theory too far...

2 sheds

18th Aug 2009, 12:04

All things are possible, but there is only a "discrepancy" between the transcript evidence and the "International Team"'s scenario because the IT chose to construct the latter by assuming that all the witnesses were referring to the one aircraft, i.e. the Viscount. This beggars belief when you examine some of the detail given by some witnesses.

It would be an amazing coincidence as the first communication with LATCC was at an appropriate time just after the aircraft had been instructed to contact London Airways. In addition to that factor, the aircraft's VHF comms had one set selected to LATCC frequency, with the other no longer on Shannon frequency.

In order to justify their scenario, the IT had to discredit the evidence of the transcripts with implications of inconsistencies and the direct accusation that the Shannon transcript was plain wrong - though they were unable to justify this. However, on close inspection, it can been seen that their interpretation of the transcript evidence was based on considerable ignorance and lack of understanding of the factors involved - including also a basic error in their logic about the timings in the Shannon transcript.

There might well have been no other aircraft involved, but if one were being uncharitable, one might think that the IT started out to prove this and then twist the evidence to support it in order to put the whole matter to bed once and for all.

2 s

383656

18th Aug 2009, 14:44

On the 24th of March 1968 an Aer Lingus Viscount aircraft crashed off Tuskar Rock. All 61 persons on board perished.
An investigation was immediately initiated and a report was published in 1970. This Report concluded that the presence of a second aircraft in the vicinity on that day was “inescapable” but was not positively identified. This aircraft was described by 4 witnesses as having very red colour on wings and tail. This sighting took place at Fethard around noon (after Mass and before dinner).
On the 25th of March 1968 an RAF Shackleton reported the presence of a Vampire jet aircraft with definite Irish markings in the search area . Irish Vampire jets have red colour on their tails and wings. This Vampire was reported by British Authorities, who were coordinating the search for the missing Viscount at the time, to be hampering the search . The Marine Rescue Coordinating Centre based in Haulbowline made enquiries from the Aer Corps regarding the identity of this Vampire. The IAC reported that there were no Irish military aircraft in the air at that time.
In addition the IAC movement logs published in the 2002 International Study did not record any Vampire jet in the air on the 25th of March. These logs were omitted from the main report until 5 years after its publication and then only after the AAIU were informed of there omissions by myself and Alan McCormick. It took the AAIU 6 months to find them. It is interesting to note that the authors of the 2002 report cast doubt over there veracity. The report refers to the logs thus “ It is noted that this is an operational statement and so, questionable” The report also refers to an alleged statement by a member of the IAC that “the solution should be closer to home”
There is also a most unusual entry in the Review of Irish and UK files carried out by the two most senior members of the AAIU, both retired IAC officers which states “ It should be noted that even if the presence of another flying object in the area were proven, there is still no evidence to show that it might have had any connection the accident to EIAOM”
When I questioned a member of the AAIU recently about the presence of a IAC Vampire on the 25th he admitted immediately and without reference to any documentation that an unauthorised flight of a Vampire Jet took did in fact take place on the 25th. The pilot according to the AAIU was a young cadet.
It should be noted that the 1970 report concluded that the proximity of a second aircraft could have caused the Viscount to make an evasive manoeuvre resulting in a spin or spiral dive.

383656

15th Mar 2010, 21:40

Two books were published titled "Tragedy at Tuskar Rock". The first was written by Dermot Walsh and published in 1983, the second was written by Mike Reynolds and published in 2003. Walshes book was in the main based on the official investigation carried out by The Department of Transport and Power , A.A.P. No. 6. and published in June 1970. Reynolds book was totally supportive of the Study carried out by the international team published in 2001. It is suggested that a forensic examination of this Study would conclude that it cannot stand up to close scrutiny. This Study for example concluded that EIAOM fell 10,000 ft. out of control shortly after leaving Cork and then traveled along the south coast before turning inland over Waterford. No messages were received from the aircraft during this time and there was no evidence that life jackets were donned by either passengers or crew. There are many inconsistencies in this Study which when published went unchallenged. The Irish taxpayer were hoodwinked into paying for a load of rubbish.

2 sheds

17th Mar 2010, 19:37

Reynolds book was totally supportive of the Study carried out by the international team published in 2001 (sic - 2002?).

Well, it would be - as he was employed as an assistant in the production of the report and was named in it as a contributor! However, from the evidence of his own book, it would seem as if he exceeded his brief and meddled in aspects of which he had only a little knowledge and even less understanding, specifically the interpretation of information from the ATC transcripts. What is amazing is that the principal investigators either did not check his work, or accepted it without question, or indeed originated some of that part of the report themselves - the analysis is ill-informed and incompetent.

They try to suggest that there were anomalies in the rate of climb and yet failed to take into account the aerodrome elevation at Cork, the prevailing pressure and the tolerance of timings. They suggest a mystery about the ETA passed by the crew for STU and that it was wrong - and yet a few simple calculations will show that it was precise. They make an elementary error (applying a correction the wrong way!) in addressing the time difference indicted by the Shannon controller. They suggest that the Shannon transcript must be wrong but cannot explain that accusation. They describe the Viscount crew as navigating by using DME at Strumble - there was none. Their chart of the Viscount's track from CRK includes the fundamental error of being plotted in degrees (true) instead of (magnetic).It is suggested that a forensic examination of this Study would conclude that it cannot stand up to close scrutiny.

Too right! In fact, correct analysis of the transcripts only serves to reinforce their mutual accuracy. Therefore, and not surprisingly, they totally contradict the Team's assertion about the early "significant event" and enforced descent. Their alleged scenario that the witnesses were only referring to the Viscount is seen to be nonsense, as is the resultant conclusion that no other aircraft was in the area.

This is not to deduce that another aeroplane or missile was involved in contributing to the accident, but that the Team's logic in totally discounting that possibility is utterly false and based on incompetent analysis.

2 s