Canada: Cormorant & Cyclone thread

[dmanton300]

Interesting, I heard a possibly unconnected but equally nebulous "rumour" here on the shop floor in Yeovil not an hour before I saw this post. Whatever, we certainly seem to be approaching an end game of one sort or other for this farce.

[Ian Corrigible]

Government of Canada to continue with Maritime Helicopter Project and begin retiring Sea Kings in 2015 (http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?mthd=tp&crtr.page=1&nid=806659&crtr.tp1D=1)

Today, the Government of Canada and Sikorsky announced that a Principles of Agreement (POA), which will form the basis of formal contract negotiations to put recommendations [from a Hitachi Consulting report] into place, was concluded on December 31, 2013.

Under the terms of the POA, Canada will see delivery of helicopters with operational capability sufficient to begin retirement of Sea Kings in 2015, and a program to enhance those capabilities culminating in a fully capable CH-148 Cyclone Maritime Helicopter in 2018.

Sikorsky has agreed to pay Canada $88.6 million in liquidated damages for non-delivery.

“We regret that we have not executed this program to the satisfaction of the Government of Canada and that no aircraft were delivered in 2013,” said Mick Maurer, President of Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation. “We recognize that we and our sub-contractors must do better.”

I/C

[TorqueOfTheDevil]

we certainly seem to be approaching an end game of one sort or other for this farce.


An endgame which will drag on until 2018, it would now seem!

[heli1]

I wonder who is going to pay for the outstanding Mods needed to ensure the Cyclone meets the spec,like EM protection,power and performance upgrade and or weight reduction and so on....and can Sikorsky actually achieve all this ?

[dmanton300]

I wonder who is going to pay for the outstanding Mods needed to ensure the Cyclone meets the spec,like EM protection,power and performance upgrade and or weight reduction and so on....and can Sikorsky actually achieve all this ?

As the programme is an endless procession of broken promises, missed deliveries and unsuitable aircraft, it seems that Canada's preferred option is to continue extending the lifeline until eventually SOMETHING shows up that is suitable and matches the original specification in every area except delivery schedule. So, a fully compliant fleet by 2018? Only 8-10 years late.

I also note the way Sikorsky have, even this time round, tried to spread the blame amongst other parties, notably the sub contractors! No, the only promises and schedules broken here than Canada needs to worry about are yours Sikorsky, your subcontractor issues are yours, they should be transparent to the vendor, it boggles the mind, it really does.

[SansAnhedral]

2014's decision to stick it out...but still not a single mention of the -92 IDMGB or its status

What have the guys in Fort Worth been up to the past 6 years?

[cdnnighthawk]

Latest commentary on the subject from the Canadian fifth estate:

Chopper announcement disgraceful

January 6, 2014 - 8:56pm MARILLA STEPHENSON (http://thechronicleherald.ca/author/marilla-stephenson-0)

Halifax Chronicle Herald
The Canadian government, completely bereft of the courage to cancel its bungled $5-billion Maritime Helicopter Program with Sikorsky, pulled a Friday Night Special last week.
The mission? Ensure minimal media coverage of the most embarrassing large-scale procurement contract in the government’s history. Notice of the new agreement was sent late Friday at closing time for federal offices. There was no technical briefing, no additional information.
Defence contractors and governments play a high-priced game with these massive taxpayer-funded contracts. Given the stakes and the three-decade history of Canada’s helicopter procurement project, Friday’s news release needed a certain amount of magic.
First, there was the unprecedented grovelling on the part of Sikorsky.
“We recognize that we and our subcontractors must do better,” said Sikorsky president Mick Maurer. “We have completely restructured our approach and added considerable new resources and technical expertise.”
There is little doubt Sikorsky, which built the Sea Kings, can produce excellent helicopters. The gap in the Cyclone contract seems to stem from the fact the Cyclone is being adapted from a commercial aircraft never before used for heavy-duty military use.
A federal auditor general report has previously criticized government officials for describing the contract as an “off the shelf” purchase when, in reality, it was anything but.
Myriad technical problems, some of which I outlined in a Dec. 17 column, have rendered the four developmental Cyclones at 12 Wing Shearwater unfit for Canada’s warships.
The agreement announced Friday is basically a deal to negotiate a new contract for the Cyclone. The aircraft were to have been delivered in 2008 and are now 10 years behind schedule.
The release, raising more questions than it answers, says the government will use helicopters “with operational capability sufficient to begin retirement of Sea Kings in 2015,” with compliant Cyclones first being delivered in 2018.
In short, Sikorsky has been handed 10 extra years to deliver compliant helicopters. There is no information on what helicopter capabilities the Canadian military will have to do without from 2015-18.
Meanwhile, Diane Finley, the minister of public works and government services, says no payments will be made until the compliant helicopters are delivered, and “Sikorsky has committed to deliver the needed helicopter capability at no additional cost to Canada.”
This statement is laughable. Canadian taxpayers have already paid untold millions of dollars — and will pay millions more — to deal with costs related to this project. The navy already paid to modify three Halifax-class frigates to carry the Cyclone, then paid to revert two of them back to Sea King specifications.
They are paying to keep the Sea Kings in the air, and will continue to pay for what is actually a developmental military helicopter, with all of the hiccups and technical glitches and adjustments that come when a country is the first to purchase complicated military hardware.
As for the $88.6 million in penalties the company is to pay, it will be traded for free future maintenance costs, a small portion of a huge maintenance component of the overall contract.
For decades, Canada’s military boasted a sterling reputation as the best submarine hunters in the world, with the Sea Kings increasing the range and protection for our warships.
The bulk of the fleet, based at CFB Halifax, was reinforced with helicopter air detachments from what was then CFB Shearwater. They left Halifax Harbour to undertake missions around the globe, with elite operational levels that were the envy of their allies.
It was Canada that developed what became known as the bear trap haul-down system that enabled a Sea King, attached by a cable to the deck of a destroyer, to land safely in the most challenging North Atlantic weather conditions, even in the black of night.
The Cold War, which included a huge increase in the Russian submarine fleet, has long been over. The operational role of the rugged Sea King, after 50 years of service, continues. But even with upgrades and modernization to the helicopter, advancing technologies have reduced Canada’s sub-hunting status. The days of being No. 1 are long gone, existing only in the nostalgic memories of misty-eyed naval air veterans.
Guided missiles are the more recent weapon of choice, but enemy submarines remain the largest hidden threat to Canada’s warships, even as this country invests $25 billion to upgrade its surface fleet. Meanwhile, the project to replace the Sea Kings has been woefully mismanaged, with political egos and partisan one-upmanship trumping the military’s operational needs.
The 12 Halifax-class frigates, which were developed to be paired with new maritime helicopters, first put to sea in 1992.
The first of the navy’s new warships announced in 2011, intended to replace both the old Iroquois-class destroyers and eventually the frigates, may well arrive at the jetties of CFB Halifax before the military manages to obtain a helicopter capable of flying from the decks of our superb surface fleet.
It’s a disgrace.

[Thomas coupling]

Dmanton300: In answer to your question and having dealt with both countries:
Norway: Rich (second richest on the planet after Saudi).
Canada: STUPID beyond belief (see above).

Next question.....................................

[TorqueOfTheDevil]

TC,

I agree that the latest decision by the Canadians is a little surprising, but in the situation they are currently in, what would you do?

Option 1 - the current plan (NB - this has capability gap written all over it)
Option 2 - upgrade/extend Sea King
Option 3 - Merlin. Expensive and politically embarrassing, but at least it is a proven modern ASW type
Option 4 - Something new. NH-90 anyone??

[dmanton300]

TC,

I agree that the latest decision by the Canadians is a little surprising, but in the situation they are currently in, what would you do?

Option 1 - the current plan (NB - this has capability gap written all over it)
Option 2 - upgrade/extend Sea King
Option 3 - Merlin. Expensive and politically embarrassing, but at least it is a proven modern ASW type
Option 4 - Something new. NH-90 anyone??

Given the horrendous problems and delays so far experienced from existing customers, option 4 seems as riven with risks as option 1!

[Thomas coupling]

TOTD: Given their propensity to be too damn nice all the time, the Canadians are (as ever) being taken for another ride. It's written in their history - they always accept 2nd best because they don't learn. I really really like Les Canadiennes (ooops sorry Canadians), lived there, flew with them - what's not to like.
BUT: They should have cut and run from this long ago. There is still time if 2018 is to be believed. Time to threaten Sikorsky and demand a replacement SAR cab that works (S92) and for massive discount, too. OR sue the living daylights out of them and buy elsewhere.
Clinging to this ridiculous pride thang and purchasing uber sophisticated white vans is ludicrous and appeasing no-one.
Step up to the plate Canada and knee the buggers in the underslung load area :)

[cdnnighthawk]

According to the October 2013 MHP RFI responses to Canada (which was the "secret" search for an alternative to the Cyclone) Canada would have begun receiving new build AW101s (i.e. 600 series naval variants with the AgustaWestland NFH-90 mission system+ installed) in full compliance with the Canadian MHP REQUIREMENTS SPEC, not later than 34 months after contract award (and much earlier if the Indian contract was to end up being cancelled - as it now has - rendering hulls available - and even earlier still if Canada greed to some pre-contract early long lead item avionics procurements). In other words, sometime during 2016 or 2017 at the very latest. That's a fact.

What's not fact is my conjecture..... All of the new milestones related to the latest Cyclone Rescue plan occur after the Canadian 2015 federal election. My view is that the Harper government has made this move solely to kick the Cyclone can down the road so that it does become an election football. We'll see. It appears that the can they have hoped to kick into a deep ditch has just bounced back onto the Canadian political football field much to their chagrin.

[cdnnighthawk]

The Cyclone rescue aftermath is starting to get a bit uglier:

Tories have spent $1.7 billion on troubled Cyclones, making them too big to fail (Navy-Helicopters-Poli) By **>Murray Brewster<**

THE CANADIAN PRESS
Murray Brewster
January 9, 2014
The Globe and Mail


OTTAWA _ More than $1.7 billion has already been spent on the elusive effort to upgrade Canada's helicopter fleet, internal documents show _ a clue as to why the Harper government is sticking with the troubled program.

The eye-popping figure _ about 30 per cent of the overall $5.3-billion budget _ could have meant a far worse political firestorm for the Conservatives than the one that accompanied the ill-fated plan to buy the F-35 stealth fighter.

In the aftermath of an independent report last fall on the beleaguered plan to buy the CH-148 Cyclone choppers as replacements for Canada's aging Sea King fleet, the government acknowledged it was looking at other aircraft _ even going so far as to meet with other manufacturers.

Documents obtained by The Canadian Press under the Access to Information Act show the money went towards ``acquisition progress payments'' and ``in-service support set-up.'' The nearly decade-long program has delivered just four test helicopters that National Defence has refused to formally accept.

The $1.7-billion figure is slightly higher than numbers that were buried deep in federal public accounts records released last fall.

Only about one-third of the total has been spent on aircraft. The bulk has gone towards developing mission systems, training facilities in Nova Scotia and B.C., flight-simulation equipment and support.

The briefing notes, prepared for a committee of deputy ministers, also paint a more detailed picture of the back room tug-of-war and building frustration in the military as missed delivery deadlines continued to pile up.

Cancelling the program was clearly not an option, say critics who accuse the Conservatives of perpetrating a charade with its consultations last fall.

Spending so much money and having virtually nothing to show for it would have caused untold political damage, especially among a frustrated Conservative base still reeling from the ongoing Senate expense scandal.

``It would have been a bigger blow to them, to their base, than the F-35 situation,'' said NDP defence critic Jack Harris.

``I am certain that politics was part of the calculations.''

The Conservative reputation for prudent management of the public purse took a hit in 2012 when the auditor general slammed the F-35 stealth fighter program, even though no money had been spent.

Regardless of whether Ottawa could have recouped some of the costs, cancelling the Cyclones would have triggered an ugly, protracted court battle in the run-up to the 2015 election, said Michael Byers, a political science professor and defence researcher at the University of British Columbia.

``I think this is a big, dark cloud that hangs over the Conservative government,'' said Byers, who has argued publicly for the deal to be scrapped.

``We saw some of this exposed during the scandal over the F-35, and the Sea King replacement is another story that speaks very loudly to the problems this government has managing multibillion-dollar military procurements.''

Byers said the government is rolling the dice on an unproven, developmental aircraft when it could have had an established maritime helicopter by 2018 _ the latest deadline set by Sikorsky, the Cyclone's manufacturer.

The Cyclones are meant to replace Canada's 50-year-old CH-124 Sea Kings. Conservatives often criticized Jean Chretien's Liberal government for cancelling the original program in 1993, to the tune of $478 million in penalties.

The Department of Public Works waited until after the close of business Friday _ ``take-out-the-garbage day'' in political communications circles _ to announce it would renegotiate the Cyclone contract, a clear sign to many the government was anxious to mitigate the political damage.

The government was sensitive to the bad optics even before last Friday's announcement. A briefing dated Dec. 13, 2012, noted that officials had leaned on Sikorsky to paint their ongoing meetings as ``discussions,'' not ``negotiations.''

Ottawa's relationship with the aircraft maker has been increasingly strained, especially after former defence minister Peter MacKay characterized the Cyclone program as the ``worst procurement in the history of Canada.''

The flight decks of a number of Canadian warships _ notably HMCS Regina _ were reconfigured to accommodate the Cyclones, only to be switched back because of the delays. Internal documents show National Defence wanted the contractor to foot the $700,000 bill for the modifications, a demand overruled by Public Works.

There was also table-thumping about who would pay for the fuel in the already-delivered test helicopters.

Eventually, National Defence decided to bill Sikorsky and tack on an extra $250 per fill-up ``to recover the direct personnel and equipment costs associated with the refuelling process and administrative overhead costs for accounting and invoicing.'' The Aug. 28, 2012, briefing insisted that the government wasn't making any money off the deal.

The government has set a deadline of the end of March to negotiate the new contract with the U.S.-based manufacturer and promises no further cheques will be cut until fully completed helicopters are delivered.

Flight training began in October on four Cyclones already at the military air base in Shearwater, N.S., said Public Works spokesman Pierre-Alain Bujold.

The air force is prepared to take ownership of up to eight test helicopters before the Cyclones are declared capable, Bujold said in an email.

That appears to be a concession; the government has said it would not formally accept the aircraft until Sikorsky had delivered a helicopter that's up to snuff.

The government's statement last Friday said it expected the Cyclones to be fully operational by 2018 and that the Sea Kings would begin retiring next year.

National Defence has not explained whether Canada would be short of helicopters during the time between the retirement of the Sea Kings and the arrival of the Cyclones.

[Thomas coupling]

What a (political) mess! TOO BIG to fail is on the money.
So with 50yr old Sea Kings disintegrating due to age - as we speak and supposedly being "retired" next year (:uhoh::uhoh::uhoh:) what will they do without a Maritime Force until (at the earliest) 2018???
Are the 15 year old H92's (sorry "new") still going to be FBW?
Are the Canadian government talking to other 101 owners about running and maintenance costs?
Where are the public in all this?:rolleyes:

[dmanton300]

What a (political) mess hopefully G to fail is on .
So with 50yr old Sea Kings dmore gutegrating due to age - as we speak and supposedly being "retired" next year (:uhoh::uhoh::uh what will they do without a Maritime Force until (at the earliest) 2018???
(/quote)

Probably the same as we've done without an MPA capability for four years. . . Sweep it under the carpet, claim everything's fine and sing kumbaya around a campfire.
(quote)
Are the 15 year old H92's (sorry "new") still going to be FBW?(/quote)

I doubt even Sikorsky know!
(quote) Are the Canadian government talking to other 101 owners about running and maintenance costs?(/quote)

Why would they need to? They don't have to go far to get that information. Or do you mean are they talking to other operators who DIDN'T make a monumental balls up of the support contracts and provisions, to see just how much more it costs when you DO make a balls up?
(quote)
Where are the public in all this?:rolleyes:
hopefully nowhere near any decision making. The only thing more guaranteed to make a bad situation worse is asking the uneducated public easily swayed by biased reporting and spin what they want. The politicians are doing a fine job of hashing it up, ddon't get the public involved for pity's sake!

[Ian Corrigible]

That's a fact.
Well...that AW claimed it would be able to meet such a schedule is a fact, but I wouldn't go much further than that, especially since the solution proposed in response to the RFI (note, 'I' not 'P') would involve integration of the NFH90's mission suite into the 101. Without seeking to excuse in any way Sikorsky's repeated schedule slippages, naval mission suite integration is notoriously problematic, leading to delays not just on the CH-148 and NFH90 (as pointed out by dmanton300), but also on the MH-60R...and the SH-2G(A)...and the Merlin...

The temptation to think that switching [back] to 101s can't be worse than continuing with the 92 is an understandable one, though it has led to some bizarre claims in recent weeks, such as the suggestion made in the National Post (http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2014/01/08/michael-byers-canada-could-have-obtained-world-class-helicopters-at-bargain-prices-but-the-conservatives-werent-interested/) that acquisition of the ex-Indian VIP aircraft would have provided Canada with "what is widely regarded as the best maritime helicopter in the world...deemed fully compliant with Canada’s requirements"! :eek:

What a (political) mess! TOO BIG to fail is on the money.
+1

So with 50yr old Sea Kings disintegrating due to age - as we speak and supposedly being "retired" next year
Retirement of the CH-124s is only scheduled to begin in 2015. Given how the CH-124's ELE has been repeatedly pushed back as the result of previous CH-148 delays, we can probably expect the Sea Kings to hover around for a couple of years beyond that initial date.

Are the 15 year old H92's (sorry "new") still going to be FBW?
Yes

Where are the public in all this?
Bent over with their trews around their ankles, inured to all that is going on by all the other recent procurement disasters (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/305560-canada-cormorant-cyclone-thread-11.html#post8100355). :(

I/C

[TorqueOfTheDevil]

what will they do without a Maritime Force until (at the earliest) 2018???Looks like they are following the UK example of capability holidays. In fact maybe we should collaborate...we have the helicopters and they have the MPA. Retirement of the CH-124s is only scheduled to begin in 2015Indeed. But assuming they only have just enough aircraft at the moment to meet their commitments (please correct me if 12 Wing has a huge pool of under-used Sea Kings and aircrew/groundcrew loafing around at Shearwater or Patricia Bay, but I didn't notice it when I visited a couple of years back!), then even a gradual drawdown will leave them exposed as soon as the Cyclone slips even a small amount. Now we all know that could never happen...:oh:

[cdnnighthawk]

I found the following response on a Canadian site responding to similar queries regarding the GE CT7-8C engine that many had believed had been proposed by Sikorsky for the Cyclone. I can vouch that the attached is an accurate account of the situation.

The FAA type certificate for the alternative Cyclone engine (to replace the current CT7-8A1) ondicates that it (the CT7-8A7) is still grossly underpowered and will not meet, by a large margin, the minimum OEI and cruise speed requirements specified in the 2004 MH contract. I suspect that these are just a few of the perforamance issues that Hitachi recommended be cast aside in order to rescue the Sikorsky Cyclone.

The fact is that Sikorsky never proposed the CT7-8C engine for MHP.

The confusion about Cyclone engines undoubtedly began when GEAE and Sikorsky made a joint press announcement at the Paris Air Show in 2003 stating that the triple turbine GE CT7-8C 3000+shp engine had been selected to power the H-92 (military variant of the yet-to-be-fielded S-92).

However, in 2004 Sikorsky proposed the GE CT7-8A (2500 shp) engine for MHP.

After contract award, it became apparent to Canada that the CT7-8A engine did not meet the minimum MH performance requirements and Sikorsky and GE subsequently agreed to modifications that resulted in the currently fitted CT7-8A1 engine (in the "interim" MH).

As time went on, it became apparent to Canada that Sikorsky had grossly understated the weight of its proposed MH (the Cyclone) and it was clear that more powerful engines such as the 3000+shp CT7-8C would be required in order to meet Canada's minimum one-engine-inoperative (OEI) performance requirements. Unfortunately, by then, President Obama and Defense Secretary Gates had mutually agreed to cancel the AW101 VH-71 program and, along with it, the development program for the super-charged CT7-8C engine that Sikorsky desperately needed for the Cyclone.

In response, Sikorsky and GEAE (at the latter's expense) agreed to a development program to squeeze every ounce of power from the existing CT7 twin turbine engine. GE eventually achieved off-aircraft FAA certification for a fully tweaked CT7 engine in late 2011 (the CT7-8A6 & CT7-8A7 -- the latter specifically designed for the orphan Cyclone fleet). Despite GE's valiant efforts, the CT7-8A7 was certified well short of the Cyclone's OEI power requirements.

The latter explains (but only partially) why HITACHI (in close consultation with Sikorsky) has recommended to PWGSC that Canada step back from its basic MH safety of flight requirements and agree to something less.

[Ian Corrigible]

United Tech sees end to Canada helicopter dispute
The Associated Press May. 20, 2014 (http://www.sacbee.com/2014/05/20/6418915/united-tech-sees-end-to-canada.html)
A long and costly dispute over helicopters between UTC and Canada is nearing an end, the conglomerate's CEO said Tuesday.

Delivery of 28 helicopters was scheduled to begin in 2012. But Sikorsky and Canadian officials clashed over production, support and other issues.

Negotiations are almost complete and United Technologies has agreed to a "phased delivery" of the helicopters, CEO Louis Chenevert told investor analysts Tuesday. Details of the program, known as Canadian Maritime Helicopters, will be available in about 30 days.

"This project is moving along," he said. "I want to make it the last time we talk about CMH ever."

2012? More like 2008 (http://www.sikorsky.com/About+Sikorsky/News/Press+Details?pressvcmid=c892a96c2e289110VgnVCM1000001382000 aRCRD). :suspect:

I/C

[SansAnhedral]

"I want to make it the last time we talk about CMH ever."

http://www.colorado4x4.org/vbb/images/smilies/co4x4/laughing.gif

Oh I am sure.

[Aussierob]

Let the run dry argument begin... again.


Sea King replacements: $5.7B Cyclone maritime helicopters lack key safety requirement - Politics - CBC News (http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/sea-king-replacements-5-7b-cyclone-maritime-helicopters-lack-key-safety-requirement-1.2684036)

[espresso drinker]

Okay, I'll kick it off again, as it's always my favorite subject. Surely the 'extremely remote' becomes less remote (i.e. more likely) when, if the aircraft ever sees active service in a war zone, nasty people are firing all sorts of projectile s**t at it?!? Are they going to cover the MGB with ballistic protection? Or does it withstand being hit with a 7.62 round? A 0.50 round? I don't know, but we're not talking a civil machine taking grease monkeys back and forth to a rig with 'just' mechanical problems and the weather to worry about.

[cdnnighthawk]

The CBC corrected the story you referred to with the following ~ it appears that Sikorsky has been awarded another CAD $2.3 Billion for its sterling performance to date::yuk:

Clarifications



Earlier versions of this story placed the values of the Cyclone helicopter contract between the Canadian government and Sikorsky at $5.7 billion. In fact, the total budget is $7.6 billion - $5.7 billion for in-service support, including the amendments to the contract, and $1.9 billion for the acquisition of the helicopters.

Jun 23, 2014 11:50 AM ET

[tottigol]

I thought Canadian officials were elected eh?

[sandiego89]

At the risk of rehashing the run dry debate, what is the "record" for longest run dry time? Asking about real world examples- not bench testing. IIRC the S-92 tragedy took @11 minutes to unfold. Any real 101 examples or others? We have 30-minute requirments that the manufactures have been certified to and they say they can meet. I do recognize that loss of all oil is an immediate emergency, and no-one would push on casually- just trying to hear some real world examples of the system working as advertised.

[SansAnhedral]

The actual Sikorsky-run loss of lube test failure took 11 minutes on the S92.

This Bell 412 (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/422788-bell-412-transmission-oil-leak-offshore.html#post5841717l) lasted at least 16 minutes in a real emergency, this one (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/422788-bell-412-transmission-oil-leak-offshore.html#post5854113) apparently lasted at least 12, and this one (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/396677-30-min-dry-run-capabilities.html#post5333410) 18, however none to failure.

[cdnnighthawk]

I have seen the Sikorsky S-92 gear box test report for the run-dry test conducted in 2002 and, to my recollection, the gear box suffered a catastrophic internal failure very shortly after the 10 minute point. I am not aware of any subsequent S-92 run-dry test except for the one conducted in 2003 using a cooler bypass feature (not run-dry) which culminated in the FAA decision to grant certification under the "extremely remote" provision.

I have heard many stories of short run-dry flights on pressurized transmissions (I have one myself) but the time from first indication of an oil loss to a successful landing or ditching has been quite brief in all cases that I'm aware of.

If a helicopter MGB is certified by a Technical Airworthiness Authority to run-dry for any length of time, it is not merely an "OEM claim"; it has actually passed the test under stringent conditions with follow-on strip down inspections witnessed by the TAA.

The EH101 was the first helicopter to pass the onerous FAA/JAA run-dry test (in 1993). A production version of the EH101's Advanced Technology Transmission was flown on a rig with loads simulating a max gross weight aircraft for a full thirty minutes after all oil (except residual oil that remained in the bearings) had drained from the box plus an additional 2 minutes of flight for approach and landing.

In 2013, the AW189 passed an identical run-dry test but demonstrated 50 minutes plus 2 minutes for approach and landing. In both cases, the strip inspections revealed some heat damage but nothing that might lead to a catastrophic internal failure.

[Ian Corrigible]

it appears that Sikorsky has been awarded another CAD $2.3 Billion for its sterling performance to date
Some interesting math here: Ottawa (http://www.rcaf-arc.forces.gc.ca/en/article-template-standard.page?doc=government-of-canada-signs-contracts-with-sikorsky-for-maritime-helicopter-project-for-rcaf/hwltfwc7) attributes the 78% increase in the ISS contract (from C$3.2 Bn to C$5.7 Bn) to an extension of "the term by an additional 10 years [to 2038] at rates based on those competed in 2004."

However, the original C$3.2 Bn ISS contract was to provide support for the first 20 years of service through 2028 (http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/305560-canada-cormorant-cyclone-thread-8.html#post7489461), based on the full fleet of 28 aircraft being delivered by 2011. Given that it's now 2014, with the CH-148 still not yet in service, this means that Sikorsky will effectively get C$3.2 Bn for the first 14 years of support (even though the full fleet of 28 aircraft won't be in service until, who knows, 2018?), and another C$2.5 Bn for the next 10 years of support).

Not such a great deal. Methinks someone in the Government is trying to whitewash a poorly negotiated outcome. Why not hold Sikorsky to the original ISS contract from the actual achievement of EIS, and then add-on another 10-years (i.e. to 2044/45)?

I/C

[cdnnighthawk]

In the period since the first contract was signed in 2004, there have been two amendments to the ISS contract that brought it up to $3.4 billion from the original $3.2 billion. The new deal raises the ISS contract value to $5.7 billion (i.e. a $2.3 billion increase).

With that new math, I nevertheless agree that there is definitely the appearance of a whitewash especially when one considers that there has been nothing "in service" to support yet; delivery and acceptance of the first interim Block 1 aircraft is now not scheduled until June 2015 and, reading between the lines, Sikorsky will then presumably begin to start providing some limited ISS during the limited OT&E that can conducted with the interim capability.

With delivery of the first "full capability" (a reduced capability compared to the 2004 contract) aircraft now targeted for June 2018, that is when the full ISS is supposed to kick in.

So, in my view, the revised ISS deal is either a reward for Sikorsky's non-performance to date, or a carrot for Sikorsky so that it would not abandon what UTC has very publicly branded a money-losing contract.

And we were all told back in 2003 that this was to be a "lowest cost compliant off-the-shelf" procurement... if you check the news releases from 2004 you will find that the Cyclone was the lowest cost of the two contenders, had been determined to be 100% compliant with the Canadian performance and equipment requirements, required only minimal development to be navalized and that Sikorsky had demonstrated that it could easily deliver the product by 2008.:ugh:

[cdnnighthawk]

Sikorsky is apparently extremely pleased with the new deal they have made with Canada. What is very odd about the following article is the DND comment in the last two paras. The original contract required all of the "enhanced" capabilities that are mentioned including overlayed sensor and navigation/tactical data on large MFDs in the cockpit and cabin, including digital moving map displays, etc as "basic" requirements. So it seems a bit outrageous to claim ten years later that that these are enhancements. Sounds like Canada's DND may be grasping at straws to justify what is now being viewed by some knowledgeable outsiders as a bad deal for Canada.


From DEFENSE NEWS

Canada, Sikorsky Amend Cyclone Support Terms
Jul. 4, 2014
By DAVID PUGLIESE

VICTORIA, BRITISH COLUMBIA — Sikorsky hopes to recoup some of the financial losses from the troubled Canadian maritime helicopter program through a contract amendment that assures it more money to maintain the new fleet.
Additional amendments, approved by the Canadian government, also provide for some of the stated requirements for the Cyclone helicopters to be dropped.
But Canadian procurement and military officials maintain that the June 18 deal is still good for the Royal Canadian Air Force and will produce a state-of-the art maritime helicopter.
Sikorsky, which was to have delivered all 28 Cyclones by 2011, has now agreed to provide helicopters starting in 2015. Those helicopters, however, will have reduced capabilities and will need to be upgraded between 2018 and 2021.
The amended contract will see the cost of in-service support for the fleet increase from CAN $3.2 billion (US $3 billion) to $5.7 billion. That contract will run until 2038.
Sikorsky spokesman Paul Jackson said the in-service support deal represents a “win-win-win situation” for the company and Canada. He noted that the cost for the support contract is based on the original 2004 pricing rates submitted by Sikorsky. Not only is that beneficial to Canada, but it provides certainty in support costs for an extended period, he added.
“The extension also provides Sikorsky the opportunity to offset some of the recently announced losses as it provides the Canadian defense forces with world-class support for the world’s most capable maritime helicopter,” Jackson said.
Sikorsky did not provide financial data on how much of the losses the new deal would allow it to recoup.
Sikorsky has yet to deliver any Cyclones to Canada under the original contract that has resulted in $88.6 million in damages to Canada for late delivery.
Sikorsky’s parent company, United Technologies, noted a loss of US $56 million in 2011 and another of US $157 million in 2012, both related to the Cyclone project.
Canada is the first customer for the Cyclone.
Sikorsky originally signed the contract in 2004 to build the Cyclones, a maritime variant of its S-92. But problems with the project surfaced shortly after work began in 2005-2006.
In a report on the status of the Cyclone project released in October 2010, Canada’s then-Auditor General Sheila Fraser pointed out that the Department of National Defence (DND) failed to assess the risks involved with what was a developmental aircraft.
The in-service support contract includes the construction of a new training facility equipped with simulators, associated logistical support and long-term maintenance, and ongoing support of the maritime helicopters.
Since Sikorsky owns the intellectual property for the helicopter, maintenance work can be done only by the company, said Pierre-Alain Bujold, spokesman for Public Works, the government department that handles procurement.
The new deal also contains other breaks for Sikorsky. It will not have to produce helicopters with a 30-minute run-dry capability. That capability means the aircraft must continue flying for that time even if it loses engine oil in flight.
A self-starting system for the helicopter in extreme cold conditions has been dropped, as well as a system to automatically deploy life rafts in emergency situations.
Tina Crouse, a DND spokeswoman, said Sikorsky has made modifications to the gear box of the Cyclone to safeguard against a total loss of lubrication. “This has been accepted by the [Air Force] as there is no impact to overall operational capabilities and will not risk crew safety,” she added.
The Air Force also noted that life rafts can be manually deployed and that the aircraft can be started in extreme cold conditions using an outside power source.
Under the new agreement, the Air Force says it will receive capability enhancements to give Cyclone crews better situational awareness and ensure the helicopter can effectively communicate with other aircraft and personnel on the ground.
Crouse said the capability improvements include new tactical displays that will allow for simultaneous displaying of sensor data and the tactical situation; a “moving map” which improves the presentation of geospatial information and map orientation; and radar video control in which radar information can be controlled at more than one crew station.

[SansAnhedral]

The new deal also contains other breaks for Sikorsky. It will not have to produce helicopters with a 30-minute run-dry capability. That capability means the aircraft must continue flying for that time even if it loses engine oil in flight.

Tina Crouse, a DND spokeswoman, said Sikorsky has made modifications to the gear box of the Cyclone to safeguard against a total loss of lubrication. “This has been accepted by the [Air Force] as there is no impact to overall operational capabilities and will not risk crew safety,” she added.

And so rings the death knell for the IDMGB on the S92. I had wondered what happened to that effort over the course of the last 5 years.

It would appear the revised bypass system, new 6 stud filter housing, reverse flow filter, and oil port routing changes sufficed for the MoD. That, or they realized they were never going to get a truly redesigned box.

[dmanton300]

So just to recap. . .Sikorsky have secured MORE money to deliver LESS helicopter 10 years later than required? They have effectively made Canada their bitch haven't they? Way to go Sikorsky! (I mean, credit where it's due and all that!)

Suddenly Chinook HC.3 seems like a small hiccup!

[Stinger10]

This has been Sik. M. O. for the past decade. Low ball bid, promise no cost to the customer for capability development, win the contract; than start the re-negotiations for what the customer THOUGHT they bought....:D

Never fear Canadian brethren. My crystal ball says the US Presidential Helicopter (VXX) win....errr... (sole bidder award) by Sik. will ultimately lead to the US government paying for development of an "enhanced" MGB for national security reasons. (notice: "enhanced" doesn't imply that anything is necessarily wrong with the original MGB, and a bunch of S-92 customers won't demand a replacement MGB) In fact Sik. will likely offer it as a high priced option on the S-92 in the future.......

Yes. I realize that the New VXX contract was FFP, but that was only for the initial 6 EMD aircraft. The remaining helicopters will have to have a follow-on contract be "negotiated" and signed before the fleet is actually delivered. Perfect opportunity to insert the "enhanced" MGB option. This is the same tactic the OEM on Tanker will use after taking a loss on the initial 17 KC-46's when it comes time to actually deliver the remaining +100 aircraft.

YEP. Acquisition is definitely fixed. Just ask them...... :ok:

We've ALL seen this movie before.

[SansAnhedral]

Never fear Canadian brethren. My crystal ball says the US Presidential Helicopter (VXX) win....errr... (sole bidder award) by Sik. will ultimately lead to the US government paying for development of an "enhanced" MGB for national security reasons. (notice: "enhanced" doesn't imply that anything is necessarily wrong with the original MGB, and a bunch of S-92 customers won't demand a replacement MGB) In fact Sik. will likely offer it as a high priced option on the S-92 in the future.......

I think this was what was precisely what they were counting on in 2005, but then they surprisingly lost VXX round 1. I have always suspected the 5th blade hub was a part of that plan for the 92 at the same time.

Though in this case, VXX-II mandates no substantial airframe or dynamic system alterations to the platform, so even NAVAIR has somehow convinced themselves the 4 bladed S92A is up to snuff.

[dangermouse]

Howls of laughter no doubt in Yeovil and Cascina, tinged with genuine feelings of sorrow for the Fine Canadian chaps and chappesses (and also I guess future POTUS) who will be lumbered with this lemon!!

'world’s most capable maritime helicopter'... my :mad:!!!

DM

[Stinger10]

It only mandates "as is" for the EMD (6) aircraft. They can negotiate any changes they want for the production contract.

I bet the "enhanced" MGB and likely 5 blade hub will be ready in time for the follow-on negotiations........

[SansAnhedral]

They can negotiate any changes they want for the production contract.

Well there you have it!

So the US taxpayer will undoubtedly end up funding the "new VXX" MGB which will makes it way out to the S92A and H92/CH148 fleet eventually, even though its been in work for the better part of a decade.

[Stinger10]

The new deal also contains other breaks for Sikorsky. It will not have to produce helicopters with a 30-minute run-dry capability. That capability means the aircraft must continue flying for that time even if it loses engine oil in flight.


If it's been "in work" for the better part of a decade by Sik. why has it not been developed or fielded? 10 years is a long time for an "enhanced" MGB to be "in work"?

Answer IS: SIK wanted someone to pay for something SIK had already promised to provide to Canada. Someone besides themselves that is.

[cdnnighthawk]

The entire affair should be very embarrassing for Canadians but I very much doubt that it will be.

[heli1]

Embarrassing will be nothing compared with the backlash if/when one is ditched at sea following a mgb failure and no auto life raft deployment ,or maybe an engine failure at mauw when they find it won't maintain flight on one engine !
Even worse when the Canadian public find out that none of the above would be permitted in the oil and gas industry.

[cdnnighthawk]

I agree with you. The embarrassment of it all is merely a present thing. The potential regrets to come from this decision all are future matters that, if they come to pass as you portend, will prove to be far more difficult to swallow than the current victory for Sikorsky has turned out to be.

[espresso drinker]

It's all been deathly quiet on the Cyclone for 6 months in Rotorheads and nothing (that I've seen anyway) in the industry media either. Any news if and when you'll be getting these aircraft???

[espresso drinker]

Cyclone Helicopters to Reach Full Operating Capability In 2025: DND (excerpt) (http://www.defense-aerospace.com/article-view/release/176794/canada%E2%80%99s-ch_148-helicopters-not-fully-capable-before-2025.html)

The country's air force is now projecting it will be 2025 before its long-suffering CH-148 Cyclone helicopter fleet is fully up to speed with all of the aircraft, pilots and ground crew needed for deployments — both at home and overseas.

The date for what's known in the military as Full Operational Capability (FOC) will be almost 21 years after Paul Martin's Liberal government signed a contract with U.S. defence giant Sikorsky Aircraft to deliver 28 state-of-the-art maritime helicopters.

It will also be seven years after the last of the vintage CH-124 Sea King choppers is scheduled to retire after flying for over five decades.

"It is really a case study in how not to acquire something," said George Petrolekas, a retired colonel and senior military adviser. "It's a long saga that has to do with choices made by various governments across the political spectrum."

[JohnDixson]

Has anyone talked to the Canadian aviators who have been flying the machine?

[Viper 7]

Unless I miss my guess, they have been given clear instructions to not discuss the Cyclone project in any venue - particularly online.


;)

[TorqueOfTheDevil]

Oh dear...

Air force grounds Cyclone military helicopter fleet after problem during descent in Halifax | The Chronicle Herald (http://thechronicleherald.ca/metro/1457762-air-force-grounds-cyclone-military-helicopter-fleet-after-problem-during-descent-in-ha)

[[email protected]]

Doesn't seem like a full UFCM but that appears to be the way they are treating it.

Sounds more like the sort of thing a dodgy gyro could produce.

[Cyclic Hotline]

Gyro? When was the last time you saw a gyro in a modern helicopter? 🤓

[IFMU]

I haven't seen one without a gyro. Granted the modern gyros use lasers rather than spinning hunks of iron.

[LAXX5]

Nothing to do with gyros. Flight control computer issue.

[[email protected]]

Gyro? When was the last time you saw a gyro in a modern helicopter? ��

Nothing to do with gyros. Flight control computer issue.

And do the sensors that feed into the fight control computer include gyros (of any flavour:)) by any chance?

[ukv1145]

And do the sensors that feed into the fight control computer include gyros (of any flavour:)) by any chance?

Only 12 of them 😃😃

[SARBlade]

Just curious but is the flight control and AFCS systems in the Cyclone the same as the civilian variant?

[IFMU]

Nope. The Cyclone is FBW while the S92 is not.

[LAXX5]

FCCs on the Cyclone are manufactured by a different company then the ones on the S-92.

[Cyclic Hotline]

Air force worried about keeping new maritime helicopters' weapons systems operationalDND searching for outside consultant to 'define' options for the future of the Cyclone fleetAir force worried about keeping new maritime helicopters' weapons systems operational | CBC News (https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/cyclone-helicopter-canadian-forces-1.7079088)

https://i.cbc.ca/1.3769214.1474310444!/fileImage/httpImage/image.jpg_gen/derivatives/square_140/murray-brewster.jpgMurray Brewster (https://www.cbc.ca/news/author/murray-brewster-1.3769227) · CBC News · Posted: Jan 10, 2024 5:00 AM AST | Last Updated: January 10

https://i.cbc.ca/1.7079151.1704913492!/fileImage/httpImage/image.jpg_gen/derivatives/16x9_780/helicopter-crash-2020623.jpg
A CH-148 Cyclone helicopter from 12 Wing Shearwater, home of 423 Maritime Helicopter Squadron, flies near the base in Eastern Passage, N.S. on Tuesday, June 23, 2020. (Andrew Vaughan/The Canadian Press)

The air force is worried about keeping the aging weapons systems aboard its CH-148 Cyclones operational into the future, according to leaked documents obtained by CBC News.

It's an understatement to say that the $5.8 billion maritime helicopters project is a work-in-progress for the Department of National Defence (DND) and the aircraft's U.S. manufacturer, Sikorsky.

It will soon be 20 years since a previous Liberal government ordered the aircraft to replace its fleet of CH-128 Sea Kings, 1960s-era workhorses which saw decades of service flying off the decks of Canadian warships.

But even after two decades and billions of dollars spent, not all of the 28 Cyclone helicopters the federal government originally ordered have been delivered.

And DND doesn't consider the Cyclones delivered so far to have reached their final "operating capability" — an important designation that indicates the military is satisfied it got what it paid for.

Late Tuesday, the defence department acknowledged in a media statement that it's searching for an outside consultant to "define potential options" for the fleet.

Military procurement chief wants defence firms to stop overpromising, underdelivering (https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/defence-procurement-contracts-1.6815577)


Families sue U.S. manufacturer over helicopter crash that killed 6 Canadian military members (https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/victims-families-sue-american-manufacturer-cyclone-helicopter-crash-greece-1.6911194)


Design flaw blamed for cracks in tails of military's Cyclone helicopters (https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nova-scotia/national-defence-determines-cause-cracks-cyclone-helicopters-1.6335495)

Retired colonel Larry McWha — an aviation expert who commanded 423 Squadron when it flew CH-124 Sea Kings — said maintaining and upgrading the Cyclone's weapons system will be a huge, costly challenge because Canada is the only country flying the CH-148, a militarized version of the Sikorsky S-92.

Components will become harder to find and may even have to be specially manufactured, said McWha, who has followed the Cyclone program from the beginning.

The leaked documents — a Sept. 23, 2023 PowerPoint presentation and a spreadsheet that details technical concerns cited by air bases and air force wings across the country — show that 12 Wing in Shearwater, N.S., where many of the Cyclones are based, questioned the "sustainability of the CH-148 Weapon System" in the medium and long-term.
WATCH | Weapons systems for maritime helicopters may soon be outdated:
https://thumbnails.cbc.ca/maven_legacy/thumbnails/479/454/MURPHY_2_MPX.jpg?crop=1.777xh:h;*,*&downsize=510px:*510wAir force worried 'new' helicopter's weapons systems will be obsolete
1 day ago
Duration2:45

A leaked internal report warns the Canadian Armed Forces Cyclone helicopters have weapons systems that are becoming obsolete, even as the military waits for delivery of the final two helicopters from the manufacturer — almost 20 years after they were initially procured.The documents, which were verified by CBC News, were presented to senior military leaders last fall.

"Operational Relevance is in question as critical systems such as secure SECURE COMMUNICATION / TACTICAL DATA LINK / PRIMARY WEAPON are set to expire without replacement pathways," says the spreadsheet.

In a written statement, DND said the air force is aware of the concerns.An optimistic timeline"The replacement of secure comms, tactical datalink and weapons (an upgraded torpedo) are all being actively pursued and funding is being sought to complete all the upgrades," said the statement.

Air force planners still don't anticipate getting the replacement systems installed and run through the initial testing phase until 2031. The department said stopgap measures are being considered.

"However, investigations are ongoing to identify and implement limited interim capabilities for both the torpedo and secure comms by 2025 in order to reduce the operational impact," the DND statement said. "Investigation of a limited interim tactical data system is also ongoing."

When the Cyclones were first ordered in 2004, the Liberal government of then-prime minister Paul Martin predicted that the helicopter would be in service by 2010-2011 at the latest.

That proved to be a wildly optimistic timeline, as neither DND nor the manufacturer anticipated the technical complications that came with converting a civilian chopper to military use.Sunk costsBy 2013, the Conservative government of then-prime minister Stephen Harper (which also hired an outside consultant) was looking at scrapping the Cyclone project altogether as costs and delays mounted.

But the government — which had already spent $1.7 billion on the project by that point and had received just four test helicopters — opted to stick with the program.

Under the terms of a revised contract with Sikorsky, signed almost a decade ago, the air force would start to receive 28 "fully capable" CH-148 Cyclone helicopters in 2018.

In its statement, DND acknowledged that the helicopters have not reached their full capability and likely won't be fully operational by the stated 2025 deadline.

"Given current personnel and resource constraints, it is unlikely 12 Wing and the RCAF will achieve FOC [Full Operating Capability] by 2025," the statement read.A scarcity of personnel, partsThe air force blames shortages of skilled personnel — a problem that plagues the military across the board. It says it can't assign enough skilled people to the airbase in Shearwater to bring the fleet up to standard.

"An additional reason for the delay involves disruptions in the global supply chain that are creating delays across most industries," said the DND statement.

"As such, there has been a delay in the delivery of the 27th and 28th aircraft as Sikorsky waits for parts. The delivery of the 27th aircraft is expected in the first part of 2024 and in [second quarter] 2025 for the 28th and final aircraft."
https://i.cbc.ca/1.6714563.1701881979!/fileImage/httpImage/image.jpg_gen/derivatives/original_780/ch-148-cyclone.jpg

A Royal Canadian navy CH-148 Cyclone helicopter deploys flares in a training exercise in November 2022. (Royal Canadian Navy/Twitter)

McWha said it's significant that the department is acknowledging the impact of the parts shortage.

"Sustainability of the Cyclone fleet has been a problem and will only get worse," he said.

"If the manufacturer cannot get delivery of the parts necessary to deliver a contracted product to the customer, one can only imagine the difficulty that the customer must have in getting replacement parts to support products that have already been delivered."An 'orphan' systemThe problem, said McWha, relates to the fact that the Cyclone is what the military calls an "orphan weapon system" — no other countries are flying it and it draws on a small pool of replacement parts.

The communications and combat system the air force is now struggling to replace may have been state-of-the-art in 2004, he said, but it was also unique to the helicopter.

"Even if it is possible to find a supplier willing to produce replacement parts or repair failed components for such a small fleet, the cost of doing so will inevitably be very high," said McWha.

"This was entirely foreseeable back in 2004."

ANALYSIS (https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/cyclone-chopper-helicopter-crash-fly-by-wire-1.5616809)
The Cyclone chopper crash probe could lead the military to some uncomfortable conclusions (https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/cyclone-chopper-helicopter-crash-fly-by-wire-1.5616809)


VIDEO (https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/cyclone-sea-kings-helicopter-procurement-history-1.5607028)
Fatal Cyclone crash just the latest tragedy in tortured saga of Canada's military helicopters (https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/cyclone-sea-kings-helicopter-procurement-history-1.5607028)


A final $2.1M spent on maintenance for Canada's aging Sea Kings (https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/sea-kings-maintained-1.4796714)

Unless the government throws lots of money at them, he added, the "manufacturers have no incentive to retain the technicians and engineering to service or support a tiny obsolescent fleet that is no longer on their production line."

Dave Perry, a defence analyst and president of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, said it's interesting the defence department has chosen to get outside advice.

He added that, given all the problems with the Cyclone project to date, he's wondering whether federal officials are considering replacing the Cyclone with something less troublesome.

"There's been some Canadian allies recently that have done essentially exactly that, moved to cut their losses on some helicopters which were underperforming and look at alternatives. I don't know whether or not we're quite at that situation," said Perry, whose organization has hosted conferences that occasionally have been sponsored by defence contractors.