Near Miss @ YSSY ? virigin and cathay ?

[ules]

saw a highlight of this just a moment ago, any news on this ?
they showed footage of a virgin blue and cathay pacific.
near miss just over south sydney if i can recall!!

[Wings Of Fury]

It might have happened back in April? sounds like an RA from the news report, 10 seconds was mentioned before calculated impact.

[B A Lert]

Ch 7 Sydney reported the findings of the ATSB report to be found here:

www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2007/AAIR/aair200701982.aspx

[Here to Help]

According to the Channel 7 report, the Virgin Blue aircraft got to "within striking distance" of the Cathay aircraft.

[TCFOR]

"According to the Channel 7 report, the Virgin Blue aircraft got to "within striking distance" of the Cathay aircraft."

Bloody Unions..........

[Jabawocky]

Must have been VB's Military version hey!:ugh:

F/O: Guns or Missiles

Capt: Its full of A scaler's....go the Missiles:E

J:ok:

3.5km and 600feet......to the media, its lucky they did not swap paint!:rolleyes:

[Capt Wally]

...............jaba............I had to laugh, very funny:):):)..............how sad are we, we see this potential incident/accident as a 'money' induced funny........still humor is needed in this sometimes crazy world :)

Capt wally:)

[Pomypilot]

Mmmm check this out!?
PP:eek:

Tuesday December 18, 07:54 PM
Air controller error sparked near-miss

A distracted air traffic controller's data error led to a near-miss between two aircraft south-west of Sydney airport, an incident report has found.
The lapse affected a Boeing 737-8FE from Melbourne that was descending to Sydney airport on April 4 and an Airbus A330-342X departing for Hong Kong.

In a report released on Tuesday, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) said the two aircraft came within 1.9 nautical miles (3.52km) of each other and were just 600 feet (182.88m) apart.
Air safety standards require aircraft to be separated by three nautical miles (5.56km) and 1,000 feet (304.8m).
The report found the air traffic controller responsible for the planes had just come on duty and was distracted and changing the personal settings on his Air Situation Display (ASD) console.
He entered an incorrect radar data tag showing the cleared flight level for one of the aircraft.
"The displayed cleared flight level (CFL) differed from the level assigned to the B737 by the controller," the report said.
"That assigned level was being used for separation by another air traffic controller."
The error was spotted just before an alert on the console was activated and controllers took action to avert a collision.
The situation was further complicated by bad weather, which had forced changes in flight paths.
"The investigation concluded that this data entry error occurred within two minutes of the air traffic controller assuming responsibility for the control position," the report said.
"The reconfiguration of the in-use console by the controller during that time increased the risk of the controller being distracted from the traffic separation task."
The report found that adjusting personal settings on the ASD consoles was not part of official handover procedures.
It was not an "isolated occurrence" for controllers to adjust the settings while directing aircraft, the report said.
Airservices Australia is reviewing the handover procedures in the wake of the incident.

[Aussie]

Funny how these things pop up, months after the incident occurs

[Sunfish]

Is this incident a function of too few ATC's or stress or both?

ONE fatal accident will wipe out AsA's entire "savings" for 100 years!

[SM4 Pirate]

interesting the controller purported to be at fault - yet the controllers have been asking for just shy of 10 years for the TAAATS ASD settings to have a pre-set function so this type of distraction can be eliminated. The technology to reset settings on a console is easily done; it was one of the original 'features' of TAAATS; but some shinny bum decided that the $200K would be better used elsewhere; Over ten years using the new gear, that's $20K a year. Originally proposed was a card reader that knew exactly what you liked alternatively you could have punched in you employee code; 1 second tops.

Having said that; I've always "hovered" after a handover, especially when there is stuff going on. I bet we will soon be 'required' to monitor for X minutes after a handover. Just like the supervisors are required to monitor the handovers; yeah right!

On another issue we aren't paid for handover time anymore if it happens at the end of a shift.

The sooner we get "mode S altitude" select the better; why is it taking so long?

Also folks it's 3NM or 1000Ft not "and".

[Capt Wally]

.....well picked up "SM4 Pirate":)

ATC do a damn fine job under duress at times. We are dealing with humans here, not machines where there is a good chance something can be done correctly every time, not so with the human mind. Hence plenty spent on repetative training.

The acuracy of GPS these days being used for primary lateral nav is amazing & the controllers need to be even more vigilant, poor buggers I take my hat off to all of them.
Just as a slight thread drift here. I was transiting the Tasman recently when an opposite direction B767 travelling to the land of the long white cloud was dead in line on our reciprical track & I mean dead!!.............He could have slipt my Transponder aerial right down the middle it seemed that spot on ! That being the case am amazed that there aren't more transgressions in separation standards, & that's not from any fault of the guys we trust!.
We trust you guys, (ATC) keep the puppet strings tight & we'll dance for you every time !:)

Capt Wally:-):)

[En-Rooter]

Is this incident a function of too few ATC's or stress or both?

Haven't read the report, but HO/TO is a routine part of the job, not due to staff shortages or stress :ok:

[40years]

Having read the report, but without the full benefit of replays, etc IMHO ATSB may have missed the target. It seems to be a case of assigning a level verbally and entering a different CFL. This happens more frequently than it should and is a case that warrants more research than it gets. The HO-TO is a red herring, but perhaps it's easier to make recommendations on that than to look at the deeper problem.
Again from the report, the resolution of the incident appears to have been initiated by the controller as part of his scan, co-incident with STCA and (maybe?) before TCAS.

[WELLCONCERNED]

If the separation minima applicable was 3NM or 1000 feet, it would appear that the incident took place within the jurisdiction of the Sydney Terminal Control Unit.

The controllers there are the biggest bunch of lazy, overpaid, prima donnas in the world - and believe me, I have seen some prima donna controllers around the world.

When TAAATS was implemented way back when, every controller in Australia was happy to go with the HMI that was proposed [and as amended based on operational trials etc] - but NO, not Sydney controllers. The HMI wasn't good enough for them - they had to have a special system partition built so that they could use the equipment the way they thought it should be used.

There is NO excuse for 'adjusting' the HMI layout individually in a highly specialised environment like a TCU. Adjust the seat height - adjust the volume - but DON'T ajust the primary functionality and display characteristics - there should be absolutely no need.

It would be like a 747 driver changing the display settings on the 'dashboard' because he/she doesn't like what the manufacturer installed.

The controller concerned should be severely caned, and management at SY TCU should be hung out to dry for allowing such prima donna behaviours!!!!!

[RATpin]

Chn 7! you can't be serious!

[ReverseFlight]

within 19 kilometres of each otherSome air prox !

[Spotlight]

Fly jets do you Reverse?

[bingo doubt]

10 miles at 16 miles/min closure..... We'll leave the math to those that think it wasn't close

[Sub Orbital]

Just tell me why, in this day and age, we are navigating using GPS updated FMS data so we are almost guaranteed to be flying right over the top of each other. Why? Because technology can do it. It is a mindless, senseless use of technology. If we were really looking at aircraft safety, lateral as well as vertical separation would make a whole lot of sense. In years gone by, prior to TCAS, mid air's were avoided simply because aircraft were never exactly on track. I fly 1 or 2 miles right of track but ATC hate it. Doesn't suit their system apparently. It used to be that they were there to assist pilots but is seems these days that we are there for their benefit. I've lost count of the number of times I get asked when I'll be returning to track. I won't be. For goodness sake, make the airway 10 miles wide and within that, leave us alone! Having had a serious wake turbulence encounter I encourage all to do the same. One less hole in the Swiss cheese.

[craigieburn]

Sub, if you want to know why ATC are constantly at you to get back on track, look no further than the Benalla incident. There, a controller was admonished for failing to notify the pilot that he was flying a course just a couple of miles off track!

[amberale]

I understand we get shagged if we don't advise pilots when they are off track.
I also don't understand why the long international and transcontinental routes aren't offset by a mile in opposite directions.
Most domestic routes are racetrack pattern and alleviates this problem.
Modern nav and seperation standards should be able to cope.
Flex tracks make this an anachronism but how many aircraft fly them?

AA

[Sub Orbital]

You've missed the plot entirely.
I'm talking about CRUISE altitudes.

[Sub Orbital]

for goodness sake, how wide are these airways.
These days, you would assume it's 1mm given GPS capability.
Like I said, why aren't the airways 25 nm wide (don't tell me OZ is such a small place that we need airways 1mm wide - spare me)
Anywhere +/- 20 nm should be considered "on track".
And then we could divert "within the airway" without an ATC clearance.
Wouldn't need to get the ATC approval to divert due weather which quite frankly, we are going to do anyway "as my responsibility for the safety of the aircraft".
Would save us a lot of hassle.

Maybe we should all turn off CPDLC.

[Sub Orbital]

direct.no.speed
You have missed the plot as well.
I have no argument with you or your colleges.
You do a great job within the constraints you are given.
Like us.
My comments are directed to the mindless bureaucrats who make these senseless decisions.
Go back to my original post.

[Baileys]

Nobody could possible disagree that ASA is filled with mindless bureaucrats. Have a look at the 2 pages worth of jobs ads on their website - almost all of them fill the above criteria. So many committee's and meetings yet rarely does a good decision get made.

[sunnySA]

Back to the original occurrence
http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/24379/aair200701982_001.pdf
Did I read anything in the report about Mode S Enhanced Surveillance? Thought not...

[Nil defects]

Sub, I am with you all the way.

I fly 1nm right of track whilst oceanic and get pinged by ATC for non-conformance when crossing the continent.

Even in busy US or European airspace, most fly 1 mile right of track. No one else in the world has a problem with it. In fact it is encouraged in the interests of safety. The Chinese assign 1, 2 0r 3 nm right of track upon entry into their airspace. I think that is an excellent use of the technology we have on board and lowers or mitigates the risk if someone, pilot or controller, does make an error.

In the old days, airways were 10nm wide, ie 5nm either side of centre. We used to be able to maneurvre within it without getting clearances. When did that change and how wide is an airway these days?

Offsets obviously upset the ATC software. That's where the problem is!

(...and I have also considered selecting the ADS off!!)

[Blockla]

Talk about thread drift....

What you all seem to be missing is why offsets may complicate things. Lateral separation (not opposite direction) is based upon 1NM separation, it is always obviously larger than that, but when you factor out all the tolerances the minimum distance between two aircraft could be 1NM. Putting yourself off a track (within an airway) by 'up to 5NM' could be the last of the tolerances where you no longer have the 1NM separation...

RE talking about 'at cruising levels' at what point do you go back "on track", when descending/before gently to a waypoint, harsh turn and get back on ASAP??? Many routes in a busy terminal environment may have as little as .5NM tolerance with the minimum radar separation to the next track (ie tracks 3.5NM apart), or SID STAR cross over point where level changes occur, helping yourself to a 1NM offset (or less) is going to get the ATC a nice discussion with their manager and possibly you a please explain?

Airways still exist in some locations but in the modern world tracks are the norm. Flex tracks and User preferred etc are becoming more utilised, so this should help eliminate the constant directly on top of each other scenario, but as logic dictates what is good for one will be good for the next...

With ADS-B, ADS-C, CPDLC etc being off track causes problems, your machine is constantly updating the ATC system with 'off track advice' or non-compliance with the clearance advice.

I work in an environment where we have no tracks, yet the amount of times I see aircraft directly on top of each other is too numerous to count, each shift. Offsetting does very little IMHO to improve safety in many environments.

[haughtney1]

Totally Sub and Nil, I always "advise" ATC in OZ when on a track or not, that I will be deviating 1 or 2 miles right of track for an indefinite period, seems to tick their boxes and gives me a slightly warmer feeling:}

Blockla, your comments re offsetting mayby accurate in Europe, particularly over the UK, Germany, and in the various Mas sectors..but go a bit further south and east/west...and it certainly does.

[Captain Nomad]

I fly 1 or 2 miles right of track but ATC hate it. Doesn't suit their system apparently.

and:
In the old days, airways were 10nm wide, ie 5nm either side of centre. We used to be able to maneurvre within it without getting clearances. When did that change and how wide is an airway these days?


I agree in concept with the safety benefits of track offsets. However, without getting into the debate about how logical these requirement may be, the Jepps do have this to say on the matter (ATC pg 508 sec 5.6):

5.6.1 "In controlled airspace, separation standards are based on the pilot maintaining track as closely as possible at all times. Corrective action must be taken to regain track as soon as any deviation is observed"

5.6.2 d. "where track guidance is provided by an RNAV system - an indicated cross-track deviation of +/-2 NM or more"

and the sub note at the end of it all: "The values given above must not be interpreted as definining a sector within which the pilot is permitted to navigate." Which is followed by:

5.7.1 "In controlled airspace, any deviation from track requires prior clearance from ATC, except in emergency. The values given in paragraphs 5.6 and 5.11 must not be interpreted as tolerances within which deviations from track without clearance are permitted."

The current rules don't condone uncleared pilot initiated lateral offsets in CTA.

[bekolblockage]

From a procedures point of view, I'm more interested in the bit about;

The displayed cleared flight level (CFL) differed from the level assigned to the B737 by the controller," the report said.
"That assigned level was being used for separation by another air traffic controller."


I'm trying to imagine the scenario they are describing here.

Are they saying different controllers were separating traffic on the basis of the CFL in the label not the AFL??

Sounds like it was only a matter of time before it went wrong. :confused:

[max1]

Bekolblockage. Not sure what you are getting at?

In a very basic nutshell.
The Cleared Flight Level (CFL) is the level the aircraft is cleared to climb or descend to. For the controller not having jurisdiction, they will base their separation with their other aircraft on this (in most cases).
It is usual practice that when an aircraft is within a certain distance to your airspace the controller who will give you the aircraft cannot change the CFL without first checking with you. I see an aircraft approaching cleared to climb to FL130, the other controller cannot assign a higher level without checking with me first. I can assign FL140 on descent.
Is AFL Actual Flight Level? If so , on a quick think about it , I can't see any situation where I would separate on AFL? I would base separation on what the pilot is cleared to do, not what he is doing right now. How could I ever have separation assurance on aircraft nose to nose, if I didn't know what the climbing aircraft was going to stop off at.

Not being privy to this incident, it seems as if the receiving controller was separating based on a CFL that had been incorrectly entered. One aircraft was climbing/descending to a higher/lower level than thought. When that aircraft busted the CFL (not the pilots fault BTW) the incident happened.

[man on the ground]

Wellconcerned but ill-informed:
The HMI wasn't good enough for them - they had to have a special system partition built so that they could use the equipment the way they thought it should be used.

Complete nonsense. Each TCU, SY, ML, BN, AD, PH and CS have a separate system "partition" - not because they all want to do things differently, but because it it is the basic system design. Nothing more than that. And for the record, SY had about the smoothest transition of all the ATC groups.

[Captain Dart]

I fly in Africa. I fly in Asia. I fly in India and the Middle East. I have flown in Alaska, and dealt with 'Heathrow Director' and 'SOCAL (Southern California) Approach'. I deal with the boys and girls on 'Hong Kong Radar' during typhoon season.

In none of these places have I ever been 'chipped' for 1 mile offsets twelve kilometres above the earth's surface, had argy-bargy over 'readback requirements' before entering an active runway (non-Aussie FO just saying what we say everywhere else), been required to give other inane readbacks (weather deviation), or seen two successive go-rounds due to spacing foul ups; except in: AUSTRALIA! And, of course, this thread is about one of our aircraft head-to-head with Virgin in Australian airspace.

Like the isolated Galapagos Islands, Australia has evolved its own species; in this case an ATC system which seems to have a firm grasp of the non-essentials. As an Aussie myself, sometimes it's embarrassing operating into the place with British, European or North American crew as cockpit mates; other times it's just plain excruciating.

[max1]

Captain Dart,
I work here and understand, to a certain extent , what you are getting at.
My particular favourite is a change of QNH on the ATIS. I make an All Stations broadcast. There are multiple changes, including the QNH.
My understanding is that I then have to make a directed transmission to any aircraft I have previously given the QNH to. Sometimes it is like pulling teeth to get the pilot to read back the QNH.
I know that the pilot knows the new QNH, however I HAVE A REQUIREMENT to get a readback. It is anal but that is what I am required to do. You can't argue simple common sense with the powers that be. They WILL make an issue of it.
Captain, no use arguing with the poor mumpty on the headset, they probably agree with you. Welcome to the Galapagos, tie up the Beagle over there.