Airservices’ impressive US Class D towers

[Dick Smith]

Most people in the industry know that for the last three years Airservices Australia has been operating US Class D towers in Hawaii, Guam and Saipan.

I was recently asked to accompany a group from Avalon Airport to look at the Airservices operation on the Island of Kauai. The tower is situated at the town of Lihue.

Our small team (including the Avalon Airport Managing Director, David Fox, and the Avalon Airport Manager Tim Anderson) departed Honolulu in the scheduled Hawaiian Air Boeing 717 which in this case was full to the brim – even though this is the off-season.

Honolulu is Class B airspace to 9,000 feet with Class E above. Our aircraft left the top of the Class B airspace at about 20 miles to the north west of Honolulu Airport, and then climbed in Class E. The pilot then elected to fly at 13,000 feet in the Class E airspace rather than climb above FL180 and operate in Class A. Then again, Qantas and Jetstar fly through the Class E from FL180 to 9,000 feet into Honolulu many times a week, so it is a pretty safe airspace. In fact, I understand that no Qantas or Jetstar pilot has complained about operating in Class E airspace at Honolulu.

US pilots and controllers tend to love Class E (see Voices of Reason’s post here (http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=127459)).

It is about 90 miles between the two airports. We descended from 13,000 feet into the Class D, which measures about 4.3 nautical miles in radius up to 2,500 feet AGL. There are a couple of small Class E extensions from this Class D airspace. These extensions cover the instrument approaches.

We visited the tower and I spoke to the manager and the controllers. I also spoke to a number of commercial operators at Lihue and also at Kona on the big island. All the commercial operators (mainly helicopter operators) are aware that the towers are now operated by an Australian company and they say the service is superb.

One helicopter pilot said in 15 years of flying he has never been held outside the Class D. This is in complete contrast to our Class D at a place like Hamilton Island, where the local helicopter operator is consistently held outside the zone, orbiting with passengers in a single engine aircraft over water because one IFR aircraft happens to be approaching in CAVOK conditions.

Now before everyone jumps on me, I fully realise it is not the controllers’ fault in this situation. I have said that our controllers are as good as any in the world. It is obvious that we have archaic procedures for Class D airspace.

Controllers in Lihue simply give traffic information between IFR and VFR. The procedures are very similar to what we use at our secondary airports. Then again, why shouldn’t they be? Our secondary airports were copied in 1986 from the US Class D procedures.

The tower is funded by a ticket tax on airline passengers (which goes to the FAA Trust Fund) and also a fuel tax on Avgas. This means that Avgas in the USA is slightly more expensive than Avgas in Australia. There is no location specific pricing in the USA.

The tower manager told me that this small airport has about 28,000 RPT movements per year. That is about 80 RPT airline movements per day, with everything from 717s and 757s to the occasional DC10. The total passenger count is about 1.5 million, which is similar to the figures Avalon will be achieving in the near future.

Airservices are obviously doing a good job there. The controllers were motivated and positive about their jobs and the airspace they operate.

I asked the controllers about how they would go with the Australian system, where we have Class D with Class C above, with the controller responsible for the Class C to 8,500 feet (as at Albury to 45 miles – i.e. 90 miles across). They all basically thought I’d had a misunderstanding and couldn’t believe that the Australian system could work in such a way.

One controller said:

Sir, we would not do Class C unless we were properly staffed and had proper equipment. That is just the way the system works here.By proper staffing I understand that he meant a correct number of approach controllers and by proper equipment I understand he meant a proper primary and secondary terminal radar unit.

The controllers were all very happy with the dimensions of the Class D airspace. One said that he would not want it any larger. At the present time, with a pair of binoculars they can sight aircraft at 4.3 miles, and this assists in their ability to give a traffic information service that they can rely on.

They have no problems with the Class E airspace above – which goes from 2,600 feet to 18,000 feet. I asked about over-flying VFR traffic. There did not seem to be much. This airport is a bit like Hobart – aircraft over-flying would have to be going somewhere many miles away in the ocean.

Of course there are over 350 Class D towers in the USA. Many of them have quite a high density of over-flying VFR traffic.

There is no transponder requirement in the Class E below 10,000 feet - except within 30 miles of the Honolulu Class B. The tower had a digital bright display of secondary surveillance radar (which went to low levels) from a nearby SSR head. As they controllers were not radar rated they could only use this for guidance – as in our Class D towers in Australia.

It was obvious to all of us that a similar Class D tower, using the Government approved NAS procedures, would improve safety at Avalon. I am personally hoping that Avalon will be upgraded shortly to Class D airspace.

I should mention that when the Lihue Class D tower closes at 10 pm, the Class D airspace becomes Class E, and IFR aircraft still get a full air traffic control service from the Honolulu radar facility.

Note that in Australia, when our Class D towers close, the airspace (including the Class C airspace above which is controlled by the tower) becomes Class G – with no air traffic control separation service provided to any aircraft. That happens to the Class C in Canberra, where it becomes an uncontrolled “black hole” when the tower controllers go home.

Before everyone starts attacking, please think constructively about whether it would be a good idea to upgrade Avalon from Class G to a NAS style Class D. AOPA have been opposed to any upgrade of Avalon Airport because they have been told that it would be Class C, and VFR pilots would be held outside the airspace on many occasions.

[Chris Higgins]

Dick,

This a very thoughtful and well balanced essay on the way that ICAO Airspace classification and integration are supposed to work! I see no reason why staff of Air Services and the various pilot associations in Australia will not read it this way as well.

Your arguments are critically correct in every aspect of Class C usage in the USA.

Sincerely,

Chris

[missy]

Dick,
Honolulu Class B
Do they operate ICAO Clas B without any exemptions or exceptions?

[Hempy]

- as long as it is properly staffed and equipped, and it is adequate for the level of traffic.

And - that the training for airspace users is adequate, timely and wel publicised.

And - that the training for air traffic controllers is the same.

I laughed out loud http://www.g3tsome.com/forums/style_emoticons/default/rofl2.gif, but then I cried :{

[west atc]

Don't know enough about Avalon to know whether a tower is required or not, but I do have one simple question.

Where are Airservices going to get the staff from?

They have enough trouble staffing where services are provided without thinking about more staff.

Dick, I don't disagree with you because as I said, I don't know enough about Avalon, but where Airservices need pressure put on them is to provide enough staff to provide services where ever they are required, be that Avalon or Enroute airspace that is going TIBA regularly because of a lack of staff.

[Dick Smith]

Missy, you ask if the FAA operates its Class B airspace without any exemptions or exceptions to ICAO.
The FAA is very smart. I understand they have filed the greatest number of differences with ICAO recommendations and standards compared to most other countries in the world. This is because the FAA considers that ICAO rules have not been properly “costed” and are basically in place for third world countries. FAA officers have told me about how astonished they are at the cargo cult recommendations that are made at ICAO which completely misallocate safety resources. I understand that there is one significant obligation for an ICAO signatory – that is, to notify ICAO of any differences with their rules and recommended practices. The USA does this all the time.

That is why, in the Cabinet approved NAS document, we did not say that we were going to comply exactly with ICAO recommendations and requirements. We made it clear that it was based on the North American system (not just the USA) and that differences, such as the GAAP/Class D difference, would be notified to ICAO.

If you read the ICAO Class B classification chart rigidly it is clear that VFR must be separated from VFR. This is sort of what we had in Sydney before about 1983. I have regularly flown VFR in the USA Class B, and their “separation” is basically giving traffic to VFR and ensuring that the radar dots don’t merge. If they are about to merge, they give one or the other aircraft a vector if they have not sighted each other.

The reason that general aviation in the USA is booming compared to other countries is because they simply notify a difference with ICAO and get on with ensuring that they have a thriving, viable and safe industry. Good on them.

Direct.no.speed and Hempy, the only airspace change in which I was ever directly involved with the training and education of pilots and air traffic controllers was the original AMATS changes. I have a feeling they went pretty well.

Ever since, those who were against the change have done everything they can to make sure that anyone who actually understands the reason for the change is not involved.

At the time of NAS, Angus Houston called me to a special meeting in Canberra to request that I not be “hands-on” in any way with the introduction of the system. No doubt he had been pressured by others, and we have seen the result.

I have found in the 15 years since the AMATS changes that generally you have one group or another actively opposing the changes – more for reasons of fundamentalism than anything else – and therefore they do everything they can to frustrate a proper training and education program. The whole thing is a stuff-up and they succeed in stopping it working, or getting it reversed.

[kam16]

Dick
I am sure that we have all been there and done this thread in various forms over the years on PPRUNE :ugh:

However my two cents worth....

Correct staffing levels, comprehensive training and Airservices can not be used in the same sentence.

[CaptainMidnight]

Our small team (including the Avalon Airport Managing Director, David Fox, and the Avalon Airport Manager Tim Anderson) And they are happy to pay for (or at least contribute towards) manning the AVV TWR?

Or at the very least, make the UNICOM service there more comprehensive?

[VH-XXX]

Normally Dick, I'd just read a post such as this and tend to agree because it all sounds good.

However, last year I was accompanied by my beautiful partner to the Island of Oahu. We flew on GO Airlines to the Island of Maui. During this short approximate half hour trip our CRJ was buffeted on two seperate occasions due to wake turbulence from passing aircraft.

The resultant aircraft movements were no less than terrifying to say the least. The second occurence saw out aircraft tip approximately 80 degrees. My partner didn't want to fly home again and subsequently I have not been able to get her into a small aircraft more than once in the last year. I'm a pilot with well over 1,000 hours and I thought my life was also coming to an end!

Had this airspace been class C or equivalent, I think this would never have happened.

Thoughts?

[Scurvy.D.Dog]

... around and around and around :zzz:

[mjbow2]

VH-XXX

You sound like a journalist with emotive unsubstantiated drivel like this.


The resultant aircraft movements were no less than terrifying to say the least. The second occurence saw out aircraft tip approximately 80 degrees. My partner didn't want to fly home again and subsequently I have not been able to get her into a small aircraft more than once in the last year. I'm a pilot with well over 1,000 hours and I thought my life was also coming to an end!

So your CRJ left from Honolulu on Ohau which is in fact Class B and landed on Maui, Kahului which is Class C where the airport does not cater for anything over the weight of a Gulstream IV business jet. So we know your death defying wake turbulence did not happen in that Class C which leaves Honolulu Class B as the 'culprit airspace'.

Any garbage to cast doubt. I have said it before that there is a strong resistance to change here in Australia and garbage like this to cast doubt is a commonplace symptom of the level of resistance.

MJ

[VH-XXX]

No wind-up. It did happen. Next time you're in a passenger airliner and you think you're going to die, you'll understand. :bored:

[Dick Smith]

CaptainMidnight, the owners of Avalon Airport will do whatever is required for safety. In this case they are waiting for the Office of Airspace Regulation at the Civil Aviation Safety Authority to tell them what airspace and service is required at Avalon. This is how it should be. Why else would we have a so-called independent Civil Aviation Safety Authority?

If CASA told the airport owners that a UNICOM was necessary in the short term, they would put one in immediately.

I personally believe that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority – which has been responsible for airspace for nearly 6 months now – has totally let down the more than 1 million passengers who go through Avalon every year.

There is a very simple and straightforward establishment and discontinuance formula that is available to see whether Avalon meets the criteria for Class D airspace. For some reason CASA has refused to use this simple study.

I understand that at the present time they are looking at a more complicated study which is going to be done next year. My belief is that this is just a delaying tactic so a decision will never have to be made. Why would you invent a new form of cost benefit study for Class D towers when a proven one – that has been used for many years in Australia and other countries – already exists?

I know Lindsay Fox personally. I admire the man. He is paranoid about safety. He and his management team will make sure that whatever is required by CASA in the interests of safety will go ahead at Avalon.

Remember that Qantas made $1 billion in profit last year. Possibly a small amount of that could go towards manning the tower – even if it was with a qualified UNICOM operator in the short term – to give their fare paying passengers an adequate level of safety.

But don’t hold your breath. Qantas seems to be immensely powerful in Canberra.

[Dick Smith]

VH-XXX,

Wake turbulence, which rolls a CRJ airline aircraft to approximately 80°, would certainly be reported by the pilot.

You would know the date of your flight. Can you give that date to me, and I will make enquiries with the FAA to get you the information on what caused the upset?

I have flown in airlines all around the world and I have never ever been in an airline that has rolled 80°, so I am wondering if you may be exaggerating slightly or possibly the whole story is a furphy so we can keep our present airspace system.

[Dick Smith]

Direct.no.speed, yes I agree that you are supporting change and I do agree with your post – i.e. there has to be proper training for both pilots and air traffic controllers, it has to be timely and it has to be well publicised. I was simply explaining one of the reasons why this didn’t happen.

You have my total support for a properly managed change process. I agree that we haven’t had such a thing for over 10 years.

[Capn Bloggs]

Remember that Qantas made $1 billion in profit last year. Possibly a small amount of that could go towards manning the tower – even if it was with a qualified UNICOM operator in the short term – to give their fare paying passengers an adequate level of safety.

No, the people that cause the hazard, the private operators, can also contribute. Did I read above the US has an avgas levy which contributes to the airspace system? Where's ours? Oh that's right, Dick got rid of it with LSC.

Why should the fare-paying passenger have to fork up when the major threat to them at AVV is a lighty?

Let's face it, a CA/GRS would be more than sufficient if the only aircraft in the sky at AVV were big jets. If any other (higher) standard is required, then the participants that cause that requirement can contribute to the cost. Stop trying to gouge the fare-payers for you own convenience/safety, Dick.

You have my total support for a properly managed change process. I agree that we haven’t had such a thing for over 10 years.

Only because a compliant AsA/CASA/Pollies dutifully followed your commands Dick. Pity they almost cost hundreds of lives before sense prevailed. And as I recall, the major change management stuffup was the intro of NAS 2b by the Dick Smith protagonists, not the rollback.

I too am all for change when it actually provides tangible benefits ie increases safety or costs everybody less.

[Yakka]

Captn Bloggs,

That must be a wind up........however I'll bite.

Do you really believe that the only people that should be using AV are "Big Jets" :ugh:

And

How can you say that the"lightys" are causing the hazard. There may be a hazard, but might it be caused by Jets and lightys occupying the same airspace?? and not just the lightys being present!!

If someone is to pay then it should be the people that benefit from the changes/ increased safety i.e. the fair paying passengers!!!

I am not against the "private operators" also contributing, but fair is fair.

You should really go sit down and have a think about the dribble that you just typed.


Yakka

[bushy]

They usually manage without a tower. It's the airlines that want it. They should pay.

[VH-XXX]

No worries Dick, no wind-up. 20/11/2006, 5:13AM AEST - Photo taken, so perhaps about haf an hour after that. (could be a day earlier or later as my camera date is a day out now, not sure if it was back then) Oahi - Maui.

No complaints with airspace whatsoever and happy for your suggestions to be implemented. 80 degrees, yep, no embelishing of the truth there. The disturbing thing at the time was that it barely seemed to raise an eyebrow of even the hosties. It was suggested that they were used to such events occurring due to the "business" of the airspace between the islands.

I've been on half a dozen trips to and across the US, similarly in OZ and have never experienced such an event.

I should have been concerned when I saw the pilot wearing a baseball cap and chewing gum.

http://users.netconnect.com.au/~njah1/go.jpg

http://users.netconnect.com.au/~njah1/go2.jpg

[OZBUSDRIVER]

Bloggs , you haven't changed. Have you?

Gather round kiddies, the skygod speaks.
Why should the fare-paying passenger have to fork up when the major threat to them at AVV is a lighty?
If it wasn't for fare paying passengers there would not be a need for a control zone!
Get off your high horse Bloggs, ATC is provided for fare paying passenger's safety! The service is for them so they should pay for it!
It is criminal that you guys are relying on dirt road tactics to save a buck for your bosses and then have the gall to blame lightie drivers.

[Capn Bloggs]

If someone is to pay then it should be the people that benefit from the changes/ increased safety i.e. the fair paying passengers!!!


So Yakka the lighty pilot, his passengers, their families don't benefit when they have a midair. Right. They contribute to the decrease in safety, they can help pay for measures that raise safety back up to an acceptable level, just like on the roads.

I'll say it another way. If there were no jets, there would be no need for a tower. If there were no lighties, there would be no need for a tower. Put both in there and there is a need for a tower. So therefore all should pay. Don't gouge the fare paying pax! Of course, life would be simpler if we just had a ticket and avgas tax like the hallowed US of A. But no, we had to have LSC.

It's the airlines that want it.

The airlines don't want it. Dick wants it.

I Like that wheelchair ramp, XXX! :ok:

[werbil]

So Capn Bloggs, are are saying you would be happy to fly into YMML at peak hour with no tower service in IMC in your heavy with wx just above ILS minimums providing there are no lighties allowed? I certainly wouldn't be.

[JackoSchitt]

If the Airservices Act says that Airservices can take on “other commercial revenue” only utilising surplus capacity and given that Airservices runs these towers and bids on sandpit work and India infrastructure and various other overseas projects…

How can these “Impressive Class D Towers” and the Unicom trial etc. be justified if not a day goes by where considerable services inside Australia are not available due staff shortage (Flightwatch VHF, ATC TIBA procedures in upper and lower airspaces)???? :hmm::hmm::hmm:

[SM4 Pirate]

Why gouge anyone? Airservices Australia returned somewhere near $100M (dividends and tax last year) to fed g'mnt (general revenue); make them pay for it; but getting staff is still a different story.

[Walrus 7]

Dick,

If, as you say, Lindsay Fox is so 'paranoid' about safety, why doesn't he fund the tower himself? Don't I remember the Howard government pushing through legislation to allow competition for tower operation? I seem to remember you putting a post on DickSmithFlyer encouraging controllers to form their own companies and take-on Airservices.

Surely, YMAV would be the perfect place for a privately-run D Class tower (with E over the top!). It is true that AOPA objects to a tower at AV because it would inevitably mean C class overhead, but they are unlikely to object to E over a D tower because it would make a good test case that could later be leveraged over other D towers. But I don't speak for AOPA.

Walrus

[Whiskey Oscar Golf]

I think Mr. Smith has a valid point in at least iniating some sort of trial for E, maybe at Avalon. If it doesn't comprimise safety and there are the correct numbers of ATCs to staff it without taking from other areas then why not. At least we would get to see it and people could give informed opinions on suitability and function. We can then argue the pro's and cons with knowledge. How hard would it be to implement a trial and is the education factor going to cause a real problem? If not let's give it a go.

[Dick Smith]

Capn Bloggs, you state:

And as I recall, the major change management stuffup was the intro of NAS 2b by the Dick Smith protagonists, not the rollback. I thought I should remind you of the facts. NAS 2b changed the airspace so that all Class C was adequately manned by air traffic controllers, with a full approach radar facility. This is as per every other modern aviation country in the world.

The introduction of NAS 2b was done totally by Airservices. They were the only people who had the legislative power to do so. They were the only people who had the cartographic skills to re-draw the maps. They were the only people who had the funding to publish the maps and send them out.

A number of months after they introduced the NAS 2b changes, it was pointed out that the change process they used was flawed – namely that they did not do their own safety study. Because of this they were advised to reverse the change. Otherwise the Board members could be held liable for an accident – i.e. total self-interest.

Capn Bloggs, you may ask if the way they did the safety study was flawed, whose responsibility do you think that may be? Would it not be Airservices?

The wind back resulted in air traffic controllers having to provide a Class C service, but without the additional staffing and without proper radar facilities. Minister John Anderson directed that this be corrected – i.e. that where Class C airspace exists over D that Airservices provide full approach radar and the adequate number of radar qualified controllers to man the system.

What did the Airservices management do? So far they have ignored the direction.

Of course, a number of airline pilots insisted that the air traffic controllers take on the additional responsibility without the proper staffing levels and the tools (radar) for the job. Why wouldn’t they? If they can hand the responsibility for separation to someone else, that is a good deal – especially if their airline does not have to pay any extra.

There is no doubt that the people who are exploited in this particular situation are the air traffic controllers responsible for the extra Class C airspace.

Capn Bloggs, do you realise that there are times when one controller in the Albury tower is not only responsible for all of the Class D airspace to 4,500 feet, but also responsible for full separation of IFR and VFR for airspace that is 90 miles across up to 8,500 feet?

We all know that if a collision occurs in any of this airspace, the air traffic controller will be held liable. In other words, the controller has been forced to do a job which controllers in other countries say is impossible without the proper radar and manning levels. However in Australia, because controllers accepted this with good grace in the past, they must accept it forevermore as traffic levels increase.

Capn Bloggs, do you agree that your airline bosses have run a very successful campaign to ensure that the proper approach radar and extra staffing is not provided by Airservices as per the Minister’s directive? This is purely for self-interest from your bosses. They don’t want to pay the cost of the proper service. They know that when the inevitable midair occurs, they won’t be held responsible – it will be the air traffic controller.

So far, despite intense lobbying by Qantas and others, Minister Anderson, Minister Truss, Minister Vaile, and hopefully Minister Albanese will not remove the directive for approach radar to be provided for Class C airspace. This directive will eventually be complied with and air traffic controllers will be properly protected and cease to be exploited in this particular way.

[SM4 Pirate]

and there are the correct numbers of ATCs to staff it:D That is the crux of the problem. Any trial will require extra ATC resources; where are we getting them from?
Does having E solve any problems? My information is that IFR to IFR is not the issue, (As they are regularly captured by the IFR service (DTI) from ML RAS) it's the unknown VFRs that pose the biggest risk to an IFR; how does E make them more visible? Excluding the TCAS visibility assuming Tpndr is needed in class E; well except for when it isn't.:ugh:

[Walrus 7]

SM4 Pirate,

During the introduction of NAS 2b, AOPA conceded that transponders would be mandatory in E class airspace. Support for that was traded for E over D. VFR traffic was royally shafted when the Airservices reneged on E over D but maintained the requirements for transponders in E.

Since that day, Airservices Australia has never been trusted.

Walrus

[Dick Smith]

Walrus 7, you are exactly right in relation to the unique Australian additional transponder requirement. The Airservices people are totally unethical – but karma will get them.

[Vref+5]

I remember reading the Aiservices safety case justifying the rollback. I recall the monthly total of VFR aircraft overflying Albury (above the D) was 5 or 6 per month. Would that few aircrat really jusitfy increasing the airspace from E to C?

I also remember some "interesting" pilot and controller error rates used in the calculations to increase the chance of an IFR/VFR incident. I also spoke to 1 or 2 people from GA who were consulted and they were not impressed with these figures

Anyone else aware of/involved with this safety case?

[Dick Smith]

Walrus 7, regarding the local airport operating the tower, I think I have changed my mind on that. Originally I thought that the limited competition would allow for some reduction in the cost. However after having seen what has happened at Bankstown Airport with the sell-off, I no longer believe this.

I see a situation where if the local airport owner runs the tower it would become like a mini Sydney Airport, ripping off huge profits from aviation and further destroying it.

I happen to like the present Government’s policy – that is, there should be more efficiency gains within Airservices and therefore an implied reduction in unnecessary overheads to reduce the cost of these towers.

Whether Lindsay Fox runs the tower at Avalon or whether it is run by Airservices, the people who pay will be the people who benefit from the extra safety at the airport. As I have said before, with over one million passengers per year it will be something like 50 cents per ticket – not really very much for the obvious safety benefit.

[Walrus 7]

Dick,

The difference with BK is that BAL limited really don't want to operate an airport. They're clearly in it for whatever other development they can get out of it. Linfox do want to operate AV and EN as airports and therefore are unlikely to start charging their customers mega-bucks for tower charges. Having said that, they have increased the movement charges at EN to unreasonable levels from Jan 1 08 to discourage GA. But big operators have alternatives to both AV and EN (ML and MB) so there is some competition there. There is no alternative airport to BK ... expect the BAL-owned Camden. Hence, competition in the SY basin is stifled. I'm not sure the same is true of the ML basin.

Walrus

[vans]

Dick,
You said So far, despite intense lobbying by Qantas and others, Minister Anderson, Minister Truss, Minister Vaile, and hopefully Minister Albanese will not remove the directive for approach radar to be provided for Class C airspace
It is clear from the paragraph below taken from LABOR’S STATEMENT ON AVIATION 2007, Martin Ferguson AM MP, Shadow Minister for Transport, CAMPAIGN 2007, that it is current Labor policy to remove the radar directive issued by the Howard Government to Airservices.
Labor will withdraw the Howard Government’s unnecessary radar direction. That direction issued to Airservices would impose unjustifiable costs on industry and had no safety or business case rationale

[Dick Smith]

vans,

Yes, I had seen that part of Labor’s policy. We have to ask where could have that policy come from? It certainly wouldn’t have come from the air traffic controllers – surely, they wouldn’t want to have Class C airspace without proper manning and without the proper equipment.

It would have, at a guess, come from the airline industry. They have probably used their weight to try to get the directive removed. The airlines lobbied the other three Ministers and got nowhere, it will be interesting to see if they can clearly put profits in front of safety and win with the present Government – I some what doubt it.

[Capn Bloggs]

are are saying you would be happy to fly into YMML at peak hour with no tower service

No I'm not. This discussion is about AVV, not MEL.

[En-Rooter]

Ar$eclown,

I have said it before that there is a strong resistance to change here in Australia and garbage like this to cast doubt is a commonplace symptom of the level of resistance.

Nup, not a level of resistance, quite happy to do the class e bizzo, WITH THE PROPER RESOURCING!

It's 'experts' like you who think they know it all that put a bad taint on this stuff. Do you sit at a radar screen and see the VFR transponder errors and cringe when you can't contact them. The sphincter pucker is not pleasant. The level of 'education' to the GA industry prior to the e airspace trials was a disgrace.

I am not willing to sit on an airliner when I know that the primary means of avoidance is an RA from a TCAS unit. You must be happy with that?

[CaptainMidnight]

The introduction of NAS 2b was done totally by Airservices. Oh no it wasn't. All NAS implementation was driven by the NASIG and not Airservies as you well know. They like the industry were on the receiving end of NASIG directives. Who do you think you are talking to here??

To quote from some RAPAC minutes:Don Mitchell proposed the following motion:

‘The QLD RAPAC Convenor write to Mr. Mike Smith NAS Implementation Group and express concern that previous correspondence has been ignored on the issue of reduced safety by the introduction of NAS. We draw your attention to the following points and require that they be addressed in writing prior to the published implementation date of 27 Nov 03:

1. We perceive a safety issue caused by the deletion of frequency boundary demarcation.

2. Inadequate and insufficient training material of specific reference for instructors and trainers.

3. Timing of distribution of Instructor Pack and difficulty in interpretation of documentation distributed.’
andMINUTES WESTERN AUSTRALIAN RAPAC MEETING 2003/02 26TH NOVEMBER 2003

5.4. NAS

A representative from the NASIG was not present at the meeting. However, members gave the following comments on the NAS model.

• It appears to be the national opinion that the NAS model was “steam rolled” by the Minister contrary to concerns from many operators.

• The model has been implemented to suit small aircraft operators, not medium or heavy aircraft operators.

• TCAS is being used as a primary tool for controlling aircraft.

• Operator concerns have been highlighted in various forums around the country, but to no avail.

• The education package should have been delivered 3 months prior to the changes becoming effective to ensure pilot education was thorough and complete. The package was delivered only in the last couple of weeks. Some pilots are yet to receive the information.

• NAS’s further proposal of removing MBZ’s in the next stages is of serious concern and is objected to strongly by industry.

• Further changes to the airspace should not proceed until ADS-B has been implemented.

• Industry refutes the quoted 70million dollar saving NAS will provide. They believe the savings do not exist and industry has been mislead by the Minister and NASIG.

• NASIG have promoted that the RAPAC forum has been used for consultation with industry. In truth members believe this has not occurred as proper consultation was not administered.

• Pilot knowledge of NAS is minimal. This in itself highlights a problem with the implementation process of the new system. And let us get the history straight: the E over class D Towers was changed back to C because there was no demonstrated benefit for the reduced safety E resulted in. In fact because no clearance is required for VFR in E (and now no transponder requirement for many types) it is even less safe now compared to class C than when the E over D was reversed.

Also the requirement for transponders, radios or NAV fit is not dictated by Airservices and never has been – that is and always has been a CASA responsibility.

Some still seem to have NFI as to what Airservices are responsible for (ATC, Flightwatch, NAVAIDs, AIS and AIP publication) vs. CASA (safety regulator, rulemaker, licensing, airworthiness, airport surveying and airspace regulation.

[Scurvy.D.Dog]

.. a person would have to be deaf, dumb, blind, inept and just plain feckin stupid to believe more efficency can be gained ..... there is nothing more that can be ripped out of towers there should be more efficiency gains within Airservices and therefore an implied reduction in unnecessary overheads to reduce the cost of these towers. .... that sort of fool statement is utter bollocks ! :ugh: :mad: :mad: :mad:
.
... and CM is dead right ..... would you like more history post to show the hypocracy :=

[peuce]

I think you'll find that AIP is also owned by CASA ... even though ASA might do the leg work for them.

[Capn Bloggs]

Dick,

A number of months after they introduced the NAS 2b changes, it was pointed out that the change process they used was flawed – namely that they did not do their own safety study. Because of this they were advised to reverse the change.

Oh, come on! They reversed the change because your fantastic E airspace almost killed hundreds of people in near misses with RPT jets shortly after it was introduced, no other reason.

[vans]

Then Capn Bloggs, given your statement that E airspace is so dangerous in Australia, how do you reconcile the obvious success of this same airspace in North America, where it is ever so larger, goes to much lower levels and does not have a transponder requirement for operations within it? Surely, given your pronunciation that your fantastic E airspace almost killed hundreds of people in near misses with RPT jets shortly after it was introduced, no other reason they would have had many very serious mid-airs in the US by now due entirely to the application of E airspace? And if this were to be the case, why would the FAA have not shut it down long ago!

[vans]

I plead ignorance Mr. OS. You’re a man who obviously has a handle on the figures; perhaps you can tell me exactly how many mid-airs there have been in the US in the last 12 months, (or whatever other time frame you care to nominate), that have been directly attributed to aircraft being flown in E airspace as the cause of the accidents? That is, had the aircraft involved been operating in any other type of airspace, the accident would not have occurred.

[Dick Smith]

Capn Bloggs, I can only quote what the Airservices management said both verbally and in writing in relation to the need to reverse NAS 2b. The ATSB made no recommendation to reverse the NAS 2b changes after the incidents you have referred to.

Here is a diagram of the US airspace system.

http://www.aopa.com.au/airspace6.jpg

As stated by Voices of Reason (see here (http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=127459)) Class E airspace is transited by airline aircraft in North America thousands of times every day in total safety.

Why then do you think that after a few weeks of operation, at an incredibly low traffic density airport such as Launceston, an incident would take place that would be used to reverse this airspace? It sounds suspicious, doesn’t it?

First of all, if you read the ATSB report or talk to the VFR pilot involved, he said there never was the chance of a collision. He had heard the radio call from the Virgin aircraft descending into Launceston, he sighted the aircraft, kept it in sight at all times, and at any time could have changed his course if necessary. He said that this was not necessary, and at no time was there a chance of a midair collision. By the way, this procedure is called “alerted see and avoid.”

This is what you and your fellow airline pilots believe is very safe in the enormous amount of Class G airspace in Australia where airlines operate.

Now let’s look at the airline crew in the Launceston incident. In fact they never saw the light plane. All they knew about the plane came from their TCAS. TCAS requires a transponder to operate. Before NAS 2b, the airspace was Class C and there was no requirement for a transponder in this airspace. If the light plane had been flying through the airspace before the NAS 2b changes, an incident would never have been reported as the airline crew would have had no knowledge of the VFR aircraft’s presence.

So we have a situation where the NAS 2b changes, which introduced a transponder requirement in airspace which previously did not require a transponder, were then used to reverse the airspace.

By the way, if the Class E airspace above Launceston with mandatory transponder was not satisfactory, why do you accept that we have jet airline aircraft operating in Class G airspace at those levels every day at places from Ballina to Proserpine, and from Ayers Rock to Broome, with no transponder requirement at all? That is, they are purely relying on see and avoid if a radio is on the wrong frequency or the volume is turned down.

Surely Capn Bloggs, it is all about resistance to change – i.e. keeping airline aircraft in Class G without a transponder requirement, and resisting any introduction to Class E because we don’t want to change anything or copy the successful allocation of airspace that happens in other leading aviation countries.

[Dick Smith]

CaptainMidnight, oh yes it was. The NAS implementation might have been “driven by the NASIG” to use your words but the actual introduction was done by Airservices and was its legislative responsibility.

Airservices had a full time manager as a member of the NAS Implementation Group. His name was Stephen Angus. He was totally responsible for the liaison between the Implementation Group and Airservices Australia, and it was clearly agreed at all times that Airservices Australia was solely responsible for the implementation of NAS 2b as this was the law of the land. Stephen Angus has now been promoted to General Manager ATC Reversals at Airservices. They obviously thought he did a good job in relation to NAS 2b!

The minutes of the Queensland RAPAC and the Western Australian RAPAC show quite clearly that the members had simply no idea of the advantages of the North American NAS airspace system.

Then again, why would they? Most would never have flown in it, and the education program (which they spent over $1 million on) with a tour around Australia by John and Martha King was pretty well boycotted by professional pilots. After all, many had made up their minds that they did not want any changes to the airspace system that they originally learnt to fly in.

CaptainMidnight, admit it – there has been a constant resistance to any change.

At the present time we still do not use our excellent radar coverage between Hobart and Cairns effectively below 8,500 feet in the enroute environment. Many professional pilots state that they don’t need to use radar in this airspace – they would prefer to talk plane to plane. The problem is that a mountain shrouded in cloud and at night does not talk.

I know many professional pilots do not believe there is a risk that they will have a controlled flight into terrain. The evidence from the Benalla, Mount Hotham and Lockhart River fatal accidents shows that this is not 100% true.

Perhaps Creampuff could come on and tell us who was responsible for the airspace changes of NAS 2b. Was it the NAS Implementation Group (which if I remember correctly was part of the Department) or was it Airservices Australia?

[Dick Smith]

Owen Stanley, most of the midairs in the USA (as in any country) take place below 3,000 feet and often within 5 miles of an airport. I have researched midairs for over 25 years in the USA and I cannot find one involving an air transport aircraft in Class E above Class D.

The midair that is always quoted (the one at Cerritos near Los Angeles) occurred because a VFR aircraft inadvertently climbed into the Class B airspace above. This is exactly what could happen at Hornsby tomorrow – i.e. a 500 foot error in altimeter setting could put a VFR aircraft right on the approach of an airline aircraft in Class C.

In Australia at the present time there is no transponder requirement at Hornsby for VFR aircraft, whereas in the USA within 30 miles of Class B (i.e. the major city airports), since the Cerritos accident there has been.

Don’t kid yourself. Our system is potentially less safe. Do we need to have a Cerritos type accident before we put a transponder veil in? I wonder.

[Dick Smith]

Scurvy.D.Dog, the overheads of everyone at the Airservices building in Canberra are added on to the costs of the tower at Launceston.

Are you telling me that you don’t think these overheads in Canberra can be reduced? If so, I don’t agree with you.

Maybe a little less involvement by the Canberra people in overseas businesses may be a start to reducing high head office overheads.

[Creampuff]

At the time of the 'trial', AA had the formal power to determine that a volume of airspace was a specified class of airspace, and the responsibility to provide services in each class of airspace, subject to obligations with respect to ICAO and safety. CASA had formal power to develop and promulgate safety standards, and secure compliance with them.

It is unfortunate that at the time, neither AA nor CASA had the corporate integrity to resist those who brought political pressure to bear on the organisations to acquiesce in the running of a trial that was illegal. (It was illegal - that was admitted at subsequent Senate Committee hearings.)

We could drag up all those old threads, Dick.

[Blockla]

...In fact they never saw the light plane. All they knew about the plane came from their TCAS. TCAS requires a transponder to operate. Before NAS 2b, the airspace was Class C and there was no requirement for a transponder in this airspace. If the light plane had been flying through the airspace before the NAS 2b changes, an incident would never have been reported as the airline crew would have had no knowledge of the VFR aircraft’s presence. Guilding the Lilly a little there Dick, The VFR would in fact as is the case today been cleared by the Tower to cross the Class C step; thus the Virgin B737 would have received a 'separation service' from the tower; hence the reason why it would have not resulted in an incident.

My undertsanding of the VFR in that particular incident was 'off track' and the Virgin passed down the wrong side; not exactly full 'alerted see and avoid'; cause it wasn' reciprocated; ie the VFR knew of the B737 but the other player knew naught; hence possibly the [over] 'reaction'. Trust is earned not assumed.

[Dick Smith]

Creampuff, surely you are mixed up here. We are not talking about a trial – possibly you are referring to the Class G trial. We are actually referring to the introduction of the NAS 2b change. Can you give us an answer about that one?

Blockla, I’m not gilding the lily. A VFR aircraft could have flown across that airspace inadvertently (it happens) without a clearance and the airline crew would have been none the wiser.

I think you are getting “alerted see and avoid” mixed up with “radio arranged separation” – i.e. where aircraft talk to each other. In VMC, “alerted see and avoid” is where one or the other aircraft has traffic information, sees the other aircraft and keeps clear of it. It is a pretty safe option.

[Creampuff]

Yes, I was confusing the 'G' trial with the 2b … hmmmm …. 'adventure'. My apologies. I don't have enough insight into how that was implemented to work out who was pulling all the strings.

I will say this: any light aircraft pilot who says:there never was the chance of a collision. [ I ] heard the radio call from the Virgin aircraft descending into Launceston, [ I ] sighted the aircraft, kept it in sight at all times, and at any time could have changed [my] course if necessary. [T]his was not necessary, and at no time was there a chance of a midair collision.is in my view, and with respect, over-estimating their and their aircraft's capabilities.

Your point about the aircraft in the YSBK LOE northbound, and its broader application in principle, is, in my view, a valid one.

[Creampuff]

Quote from the report:The pilot of the Tobago reported that he had selected the aircraft’s navigation, strobe and landing lights ‘ON’. He subsequently saw the 737 and he believed that it would pass safely to his right. The pilot reported that he flashed the Tobago’s landing lights at the 737 several times, but become[sic] concerned when the 737 appeared to turn to the right across the nose of the Tobago. The Tobago pilot reported that he observed the 737 climbing above him ‘appearing to come from starboard to port’. However, he said that, as the 737 was ascending in front of the Tobago and at his 11 o’clock position, there was no need to consider whether there should be an alteration of course or a decision to descend. A review of track and heading information from the 737’s flight data recorder (FDR) did not reveal any indication of a tracking change, although there was a minor heading change of 4 degrees. The wind at 8,500 ft recorded on the 737’s FDR was about 266 degrees M at 43 kts. Appendix A shows the track of the 737 obtained from the FDR. The ATSB also examined the data recorded on the GPS carried on the Tobago, however, by the time the ATSB requested access to the GPS, the data for the incident flight had been overwritten by data from a subsequent flight. The Tobago pilot subsequently advised ATSB investigators that he was aware that the appearance of cross-tracking was probably an illusion which resulted from the strong wind.[Bolding added; footnote 8 omitted]

So the lighty pilot 'believed' something about the 737's track that turned out to be wrong. The near miss was therefore the result of good luck, not the result of good judgment of collision risk and 'see and avoid'. Thank heavens he didn't decide to change course - he would have turned in the wrong direction.

[CaptainMidnight]

The NAS implementation might have been “driven by the NASIG” to use your words but the actual introduction was done by Airservices and was its legislative responsibility.The airspace was declared and the charts were published by Airservices, but they and Defence, CASA and the industry were directed what to implement by the NASIG. We all know that and the industry forum minutes support it - you're not fooling anyone here.

There were also many claims at the time the NASIG were in regular contact with you and that you were pulling the strings and vetting the work - was that so?

The NASIG also stated on many occasions that the time for consultation was over, and what was being introduced was at the (then) government's directive. Those sound familiar words?

The reversal of the E over D occurred because Airservices belatedly but correctly decided that the characteristic should have first been subject to a thorough safety and CBA before implementation, and that instead reliance on claims of a "proven" system in the U.S. was not sufficient to bypass this assessment for suitability of the characteristic in Australia.

Why do we have to keep going over old ground -

[SM4 Pirate]

A VFR aircraft could have flown across that airspace inadvertently (it happens) without a clearance and the airline crew would have been none the wiser.
Puuuurrrrrlease Dick, I have stated often that I think reform is needed, but, sometimes you use any old story to fit your facts (this ultimately hurts your position); the same argument that you just made can be regularly applied to any non-transponder capable (or one that has it off) aircraft in the present E or any class D airspace or any class C airspace, oh yes or any class A airspace. There is plenty of kit out there that can quite legitimately go inside Class E airspace without a transponder right now; despite the transponder requirements.

As for the AOPA mob accepting the transponder argument and needing pay-back (or something like that) surely you folks jest. Flying in a modern world without a transponder is sheer lunacy (if you're able to have one), maybe I need another terry towelling hat?:}

[SM4 Pirate]

and that instead reliance on claims of a "proven" system in the U.S. was not sufficient to bypass this assessment for suitability of the characteristic in Australia.Was it true that the differences were so substantially different in the transition process that to rely on the already built argument wasn't valid; ie yes it was still a 747, one with two engines, no pressure kit and missing a little bit of the wing.

[Spodman]

see a situation where if the local airport owner runs the tower it would become like a mini Sydney Airport, ripping off huge profits from aviation and further destroying it. Maybe they could build two towers at YMAV with clearances prefixed by a reverse auction. That should keep the costs down.

[Scurvy.D.Dog]

His Nib’sWhy then do you think that after a few weeks of operation, at an incredibly low traffic density airport such as Launceston, http://www.airservicesaustralia.com/reports/movements/finlytd06_07.pdf
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Readers will note (for Fin year 06/07):-
1. the ‘total’ movements - LT (20,322) and AV (9,406)
2. moves between 7 and 136 tonnes – LT (9,744) and AV (7,204) :hmm:
.
Also note the Later figure when compared with other regional D and D/C TWR/APP airports!
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... you really need someone other than your typist to do some research for you!!an incident would take place that would be used to reverse this airspace? it was not the only ‘incident’!! …. Remember one of the others, you called ATC negligent, and another you called the VB B737 crew negligent! It sounds suspicious, doesn’t it? .. you need help Dick!First of all, if you read the ATSB report or talk to the VFR pilot involved, he said there never was the chance of a collision. http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2003/AAIR/pdf/aair200305235_001.pdf He had heard the radio call from the Virgin aircraft descending into Launceston, he sighted the aircraft, kept it in sight at all times, and at any time could have changed his course if necessary. .. from the ATSB reportAs the pilot of the Tobago was tracking via the 007 VOR radial he considered that there would be sufficient lateral spacing with the 737 on the 009 VOR radial at the point where they were likely to pass each other .. 2 degrees at that distance (tracking via VOR) is virtually the same position! …. It goes on He subsequently saw the 737 and he believed that it would pass safely to his right. .. and The Tobago pilot reported that he observed the 737 climbing above him ‘appearing to come from starboard to port’. However, he said that, as the 737 was ascending in front of the Tobago and at his 11 o’clock position, the 73 in the end actually passed him on the left … good thing there was vertical segregation (via TCAS RA) there was no need to consider whether there should be an alteration of course or a decision to descend.… ****!
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His Nib’s then asserts He said that this was not necessary, and at no time was there a chance of a midair collision. …. they missed because the 737 was climbing due TCAS RA …. *&^$% By the way, this procedure is called “alerted see and avoid.” . .. THE FECKIN 737 CREW NEVER SAW HIM! …. HOW IS THAT SEE and avoid … and all the while the TOBA pilot thought 2 degress VOR and visual aquisition i.e.
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’oh he will pass me out to the right …… errmmm perhaps he won’t ….. oh gee he is now left 11 ’clock’
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…. THAT IS SEE and MISJUDGE SAFE DISTANCE TO AVOID … obviously because a TCAS RA was REQUIRED BY THE 737 CREW to avoid the collision!
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. and all the while the ATC was sitting there blissfully unaware of the whole thing unfolding because it was your Class E rather than C as it was before your E and is again now CLASS C!!
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… stop seeking to misrepresent what it is to SEE and AVOID!! Before NAS 2b, the airspace was Class C and there was no requirement for a transponder in this airspace. was the Tobago equipped with a TXPDR before AusNAS 2b???? … irrespective, in C the TOBA would have been subject to a clearance, and safely separated from the B737 by ATCIf the light plane had been flying through the airspace before the NAS 2b changes, an incident would never have been reported as the airline crew would have had no knowledge of the VFR aircraft’s presence. how many VCA’s result in TCAS RA’s or collisions?By the way, if the Class E airspace above Launceston with mandatory transponder was not satisfactory, why do you accept that we have jet airline aircraft operating in Class G airspace at those levels every day at places from Ballina to Proserpine, and from Ayers Rock to Broome, with no transponder requirement at all? … because political interference has delayed the regulatory gazetting of Part 71 that would determine the appropriate service in those locations …… I ask you again … why was Part 71 not gazetted??? ... because that is your answer to why B737's and A320's are hooting through 'dirt road airspace in and out of places like Ballina!!! .... who is responsible for that travesty?? That is, they are purely relying on see and avoid if a radio is on the wrong frequency or the volume is turned down. UNALERTED see and hope to avoid …. Perhaps many of the lighties have TXPDR’s … wonder how many have accurate mode C though … and offcourse the ones that do not have one … well lets read on for that scenario in your beloved US of A! Scurvy.D.Dog, the overheads of everyone at the Airservices building in Canberra are added on to the costs of the tower at Launceston. the rent for the building (we the people, use to own) cost us a fortune in rent …. Why have it?? … not sure, there seems to be no one around in Operations Support or Procedures Design or any other section really!Are you telling me that you don’t think these overheads in Canberra can be reduced? If so, I don’t agree with you. .. to be frank, I do not give a stuff what you agree with …. I will say though there is a lot of money being spend on a small number of people who IMHO are nothing more than paid wrecking balls!! Maybe a little less involvement by the Canberra people in overseas businesses may be a start to reducing high head office overheads. no argument there!
.
.. other than that last statement, Mate … you’ve got nothing!!!!
.
Here is a flavour of your beloved US of A airspace outcomes:-
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From the NTSB (US) Database:-
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/query.asp
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Leave the default fields, then enter ‘midair collision’ in the word string box
.
This will provide 6 Pages of Midair collisions data for the past 5 years
.
Some samples for readers:-
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VFR/VFR Midair collision – Fatal - US Class D ‘Contract Tower’ i.e. same rules as OZ GAAP … this is what Dick wants instead of our ‘proactive’ ICAO D at OZ regionals that are servicing high capacity RPT
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?id=SEA05FA158A&rpt=fa
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IFR/VFR Midair collision Class E Hawker800
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?id=LAX06FA277A&rpt=fa
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A few relevant quotes:- 1.10.3 Previous Near Mid Air Collisions in the Reno Area
1.10.3.1 ATC Reports
The RNO TRACON personnel indicated that it is not uncommon for arriving and departing air traffic to obtain a TCAS warning from transponder-equipped gliders operating in the area. The facility keeps track of any Resolution Advisories (RA - as noted previously in this report, the TCAS-II systems provide collision avoidance advisories on the vertical plane; climb/descend instructions) that pilots receive from their TCAS equipment, as many of the pilots must deviate from an air traffic control clearance to comply with the RA. The TCAS RAs are only retained for 30-day-intervals, and the last 30 days worth of reports were provided to the NTSB (4 total). They all included airplanes conducting operations under 14 CFR Part 121. TRACON personnel also reported that they receive numerous VFR transponder codes and/or reports from transport category airplanes indicating that gliders are operating over the final approach course for RNO. In addition, the controllers can sometimes see primary radar returns from a suspected glider, but are not able to ascertain its altitude and if it is a glider.
A number of the RNO TRACON personnel indicated that they were not surprised that a midair collision had occurred between a transport category airplane and a glider, and that it was just a matter of time before it happened. .. and Review of the ASRS database revealed that, since 1988, there were 56 reports of NMACs between air carrier/corporate jet traffic and gliders. Of the 56 reports, 8 focused on the airspace around
RNO. .. and In April 1991, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) issued a research report on the Limitations to the See-and-Avoid Principle. The ATSB reprinted the report in November 2004. In that report the ATSB referenced studies conducted throughout the aviation industry (both civilian and military) and cited reports issued by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The research report indicated that there were numerous limitations to the see-and-avoid principle, including those of the human visual system, the demands of cockpit tasks, and various physical and environmental conditions. These limitations combine to make see-and-avoid an uncertain method of traffic separation. Though it was acknowledged that the see-and-avoid principle undoubtedly prevented many collisions, the concept was a flawed and unreliable method of collision avoidance.
The report also indicated that there was considerable data available that was against the reliance on see-and-avoid. Although see-and-avoid was often effective at low closing speeds, it usually failed to avert collisions at higher speeds. It was estimated that see-and-avoid prevents 97 percent of possible collisions at closing speeds of between 101 and 199 knots but only 47 percent when the closing speed is greater than 400 knots. In addition, the human visual system is better at detecting moving targets than stationary targets, yet in most cases, an aircraft on a collision .. and A FAA study concluded that although see-and-avoid was usually effective, the residual collision risk was unacceptable. … yet Dick wants us to become less safe i.e. use E instead of D or C when the FAA have already identified the need to change their system! :ugh: yer goose :=
.
…. thinking TXPDR’s and ADS-B The FAA, having recognized the limitations of the concept, has turned to other methods such as TCAS to ensure traffic separation. The ATSB concluded in its report that because of its many limitations, the see-and-avoid concept should not be expected to fulfill a significant role in future air traffic systems.
.
This does not mean TCAS can be the primary means of separation where acceptable options exist i.e. Class D or C (subject to frequency loading and resourcing) …. AH HAH ……anyone see where his Nib’s want’s us to go with all this in Oz?!
.
…. given his involvement CAA, CASA, AOPA, ARG, and the infamous ‘Task force’ ….. and his often stated (as recently as yesterday) and long standing drive to reduce ATS costs (via his mates in the now sacked former Fed Gov’t) …. Well, his input over the last 15+ years has arguably left us (ATS) at a point of system breakdown! … to quote you Dick It sounds suspicious, doesn’t it?
.
Some other sample data from the last five years in the US Class E
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MIL/VFR Midair collision – Fatal - Class E
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?id=CHI05FA055A&rpt=fa
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VFR/VFR Midair collision – Fatal - Class E
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?id=NYC06FA025B&rpt=fa
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VFR/VFR Midair collision – Fatal – Class E
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?id=NYC04FA185B&rpt=fa
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VFR/VFR Midair collision – Fatal – Class E
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?id=SEA04FA083B&rpt=fa
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VFR/VFR Midair collision – Fatal – Class E Possible Inst training
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?id=MIA03FA007A&rpt=fa
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VFR/VFR Midair collision – Fatal – Class E ATPL & TCAD
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?id=LAX04FA095A&rpt=fa
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VFR/VFR Midair collision – Fatal – Class E VFR Flight following
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?id=MIA03FA124A&rpt=fa
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… and few samples of the ‘vanishingly small’ risk in G
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VFR/VFR Midair collision – Class G CTAF - One aircraft no-radio
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?id=DFW05LA134A&rpt=fa
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VFR/VFR Midair collision – Fatal - Class G CTAF – Both aircraft no radio
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?id=ANC04FA016A&rpt=fa
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IFR/VFR Midair collision – Fatal – Class G
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?id=MIA04FA043A&rpt=fa
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VFR/VFR Midair collision – Fatal – Class G
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?id=LAX04FA301B&rpt=fa
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… and another worthy of mention from 93’
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IFR/VFR Midair collision – Fatal – Class G CTAF AC690B
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?id=CHI93FA302A&rpt=fa
.
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.. now lets look at a couple of US NMAC’s involving RPT in the last couple of decades shall we:-
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IFR/VFR Near midair collision – Class A AND Class G DO228
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?id=CHI89IA144&rpt=fa ..and
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20001213X28764&key=1
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… explain the two overlapping classes of airspace Dick ….. cause we have already told you about this situation that uniquely exists in the US!
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…and surprise surprise your favourite Alaskan Tower and those pesky US Class D (DTI only to IFR/VFR) rules again …
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IFR/VFR Near midair collision – US Class D Alaska Airlines B734
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?id=ANC94IA075A&rpt=fa
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… this is what you REALLY want Dick??? … nah .. even you could not be that mental ….. this is nothing really to do with improving our system is it?
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Profile …. Profile …. Profile!!!! ;)

[Creampuff]

I received a PM addressed to ‘Clinton’, in which ‘Dick Smith’ asked for information about my statement about the admission of the illegality the ‘G’ trial.

From pages 6 & 7 of the Hansard of the Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee hearing of 1 May 2000, copy here: http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commttee/s967.pdf Senator O’BRIEN— … There are a couple of questions that I have stemming from points that you made. If I understood you correctly, it has now been clearly established that it is Airservices and not CASA who have the responsibility of designing and implementing new air space arrangements. Is that correct?

Mr Smith [Chief Operating Officer, Airservices Australia]—No, Senator. The responsibility is Airservices. CASA have the responsibility to assess the safety.

Senator O’BRIEN—Airservices, not CASA, have that responsibility?

Mr Smith—Yes, correct.

Senator O’BRIEN—And that is consistent with the advice that Airservices had some time ago during the G class air space trial.

Mr Smith—I am not sure what advice you are referring to.

Senator O’BRIEN—It was the advice that we received from Mr Pollard on 1 December last year regarding that situation in estimates on 1 December. I do not have a page reference. In any case, we have cleared that up. [b]It has therefore been established that CASA had no legal basis to run the G class trial, but it went ahead and did that because Airservices was busy with the TAAAT system implementation. Is that correct?

Mr Smith—Airservices had, at that time, taken a decision that to try and run an air space reform program, or to initiate such a program, whilst introducing such a large and complex system was not in the best interests of the industry.[bolding added]

The dissembling and obfuscating responses in the earlier 1 December 1999 hearing had put the writing on the wall (see pages 91 onwards): http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commttee/s2803.pdf

As I said on this forum in earlier threads: CASA (driven by different Mr Smiths) did the equivalent of planting road signs it had no authority to plant. CASA purported to exercise powers it did not have.

[Scurvy.D.Dog]

.... hmmmmm :suspect:
.
Hey Clinton :} ... refresh my poor ol' memory for me .... who was the chairman of the CASA back then? .... or was it AOPA?? :E

[Creampuff]

Please, my friends me Bill.

I think the Chairman of CASA at the time was none other than Richard Harold Smith.

[Scurvy.D.Dog]

".. dispatch, .. we are enroute http://www.augk18.dsl.pipex.com/Smileys/brancard.gif from Terry Hills"
.
.
.... meanwhile back on the Cybersea's
.
.... sound of klaxon's ..http://www.augk18.dsl.pipex.com/Smileys/blackcat2.gif
.
“ ….. clear the bridge http://www.augk18.dsl.pipex.com/Smileys/shipcaptain.gif …… prepare to dive”

[Hempy]

http://members.shaw.ca/wenpigsfly/smileys/tumbleweed.gif

[Dick Smith]

Scurvy, the US has an average of about 15 midairs per year and Australia has an average of one. Considering that the US has about 15 times the amount of traffic in approximately the same land area, it shows that the US system is indeed pretty effective when you consider that the experts say the chance of a collision goes up by the square of the traffic density.

You can close your mind as much as you want to anything that happens anywhere else.

The US controllers insist that if they are going to provide a Class C service – as you provide above Launceston – they need to be provided with correct staffing levels and a full approach radar, including primary and secondary surveillance.

I know you say you can do it without the extra staffing and without the extra equipment. You can in the short term – but why you would want to is beyond me considering that the Government policy is to follow the North American NAS which requires the proper staffing levels and equipment.

I’m sure everyone admires your charitable devotion to aviation. However your bosses are just as ruthless as Qantas bosses. If I were you, I would ask for the correct equipment – i.e. approach radar.

Creampuff, as a legal man you would know that just because an opposition senator stated that CASA had no legal basis to run a trial that this is not necessarily true. I can assure you that everything done at the time complied with the law.

By the way, the Class G trial was to use the radar effectively for the first time between Canberra and Ballina. That is, handing the airspace to air traffic controllers who had a radar screen, rather than the FSOs who were in a room and were not allowed to use radar.

After an effective campaign by those against the change – where the radar was used to “create” incidents – BASI recommended that the trial be stopped. Yes, I kid you not, the airspace was handed back to the FSOs without any radar, so they couldn’t see any incidents!

I did have the final win. I worked behind the scenes and eventually, about three years later, the airspace was handed to the air traffic controllers, and that is as it is now.

Any thinking person was amazed about the resistance to change which clearly resulted in lower safety.

Of course, Airservices Australia was undermining the demonstration – for some unknown reason they would not provide any traffic information (even to IFR) in the demonstration airspace. As stated above, I worked behind the scenes. Quietly and without any hullabaloo, Airservices eventually provided a traffic information service using radar as they do today.

I had a total victory at the time. You can go on as much as you like, however that is a fact. At least I now know that air traffic controllers are running that airspace and providing a traffic information service to IFR using radar where it is available.

I’m now working on moving that airspace up to Class E, where ATCs will actually provide a separation service to IFR and a traffic information service on VFR – a big improvement in safety. Of course, there will be a strongly orchestrated campaign of creating “incidents” in the Class E to try to stop the change – but eventually I am confident that it will come in. Twelve months after it is in, everyone will be very comfortable with it and say, “Why didn’t we do this 20 years ago?”

Scurvy, I have been talking to the light aircraft pilot who was involved in the Launceston incident. He confirms that the ATSB investigation was totally inaccurate and almost impossible to believe. He said that it became apparent after a while during the investigation that their whole aim was to reverse the North American NAS airspace – which they did.

If a VFR aircraft flew through that airspace at that position today, you would not know it. You cannot see that far – even with binoculars. However if you were properly provided with an approach radar (as per the Minister’s directive) the dedicated approach controller would obtain a primary return and at least be able to give traffic on the aircraft that was there without a clearance.

[Scurvy.D.Dog]

I know you say you can do it without the extra staffing and without the extra equipment. .... I have NEVER said that!! ..... in fact I have been saying the exact opposite for a along time!!
.
.... more staff and more equipment does not change the difference arguments between US NAS arc and OZ!!

[Creampuff]

Dick

The Senator was merely summarising the effect of evidence given at committee hearings, including by Bernie Smith, Bill Pollard, and various senior officers from various agencies. There was also the small matter of advice from the Australian Government Solicitor, referred to in the 1 December 1999 hearing …..

The Chief Operating Officer of Airservices said Airservices was, at that time of the G 'trial', busy doing something else. So if Airservices wasn't running the trial, who was?

You tell me: Who outside Airservices had power at that time to, for example, decide that a 'trial' would occur in a particular parcel of 'G' airspace, and to decide what kind of services would or should be provided to aircraft in 'G' airspace. What was the source of their power?

I’m not interested in motherhood statements: I want to know the person's name and the section of the act or the regulation number granting power on that person to do that. I can give you precisely that in respect of Airservices' powers at the time. But Airservices were busy doing something else during the G 'trial': implementing TAAATS (unless Bernie Smith lied to the committee)

I think you'll find that then, as now, ATC'ers have an order of priority in which services are to be provided. Service to IFR aircraft in G was not and is not high in the order.

When are IFR aircraft in G more likely to need the service? Precisely when the adjacent controlled airspace is busy - bad WX, peak traffic periods etc.

If you have been talking to the lighty pilot involved in the Launceston incident, please ask him, and report verbatim on this forum the answer to, this question: Which of the things reported as 'facts' by the ATSB are inaccurate or incomplete, and in what respects?

[No Further Requirements]

I have been talking to the light aircraft pilot who was involved in the Launceston incident. He confirms that the ATSB investigation was totally inaccurate and almost impossible to believe. He said that it became apparent after a while during the investigation that their whole aim was to reverse the North American NAS airspace – which they did.


So the guy lied? That's a big call that the ATSB has produced an inaccurate report. Where is the pilot's response to the report? A whispered whinge to Dick Smith is not the sign of a burned man. If my name had been supposedly been made mud by an incorrect report, I would be fighting tooth and nail to restore it.

Cheers,

NFR.

[En-Rooter]

round and round and round we go! Where this'll lead no-one knows!

Glad to see he's not wearing you chaps down! Keep up the good work :ok:

[Ex FSO GRIFFO]

Hey 'Scurvy',

Ch yr pm's........

Well DUN!:ok:

[Dick Smith]

SM4 Pirate, you ask if there were substantial differences in the way we put in Class E above D in Australia compared to the USA, and whether these differences were so substantial that they would lower safety in a similar way to building a 747 with only two engines, no pressure kit and missing a little bit of the wing.

There were some differences, but not differences that would make a measurable decrease in safety.

For example, in the Class E airspace above Class D in Australia we had to additional mandatory requirements compared with the USA. Firstly, we had a mandatory transponder requirement for all aircraft in Class E airspace. In the United States there is no such general requirement below 10,000 feet.

We also had a mandatory requirement for radio for VFR aircraft operating in Class E airspace – so VFR aircraft could listen to IFR aircraft position reports and obtain an alerted see and avoid system. This is exactly what happened at Launceston. In the United States there is no requirement for VFR aircraft to have radio in Class E, there is no way for the VFR pilot to know what the enroute IFR ATC frequency is, and there is no recommendation that a VFR pilot should monitor the tower frequency when over-flying Class D in Class E. And of course there is lots of Class E in the USA without radar. (See here (http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=127459)).

In effect, the only differences were some additional so-called safety features.

Why then do you think we ended up with different results to those in the USA, and why do you think there are few complaints here when the same airline aircraft descend in Class G airspace without any transponder requirement at all?

[Scurvy.D.Dog]

If a VFR aircraft flew through that airspace at that position today, you would not know it. You cannot see that far – even with binoculars. ..... bzzzzz wrong .... LT is one of the only D regionals with PRIM and SSR Radar to surface ..... that was as a direct involvement of Senator Barnett after the LT (Class E) incident referred to! However if you were properly provided with an approach radar (as per the Minister’s directive) the dedicated approach controller would obtain a primary return and at least be able to give traffic on the aircraft that was there without a clearance. ... I say again, where is the data on non-TXPDR VCA's that supports your attempts to make the cost of regional terminal C prohibitive? ... cause OZ procedural C (without PRIM radar) is demonstrably safe!!!

[vans]

But obviously not so dangerous that the FAA or anyone else for that matter, considers it necessary to change their E airspace, let alone abolish it. And Qantas is happy to fly in it, yet they don’t want it in Australia with the added safety mitigators mentioned above???

[SM4 Pirate]

Vans, Suggest you look at plans from Europe and ICAO re future Airspace design; no such thing as E is included in the future; more along C or ICAO G only lines. Known and involved or unknown and no help and not in the way of someone who want to be known.

but not differences that would make a measurable decrease in safety. But demonstrably less safe than what 'used to' exist; reduction in safety without CBA or safety work; that was unacceptable under the terms available to ASA; they just took a while to own up to it. This is all old ground; why beat this dead horse again?

Lets work out a way of doing it better; smarter.

The USA controllers "claim" you can't do this and that without this and that; well we and many others prove you can, it's the same argument you are using in reverse; claims that OZ ATCs can't do this or that because they are change resistant. I suggest that if you prove why it's a good idea, not just shout at us that you are right, we are more likely to get on your train, instead of saying that train driver is a lunatic:}

I 100% am for change, but I want it for the better, improved safety, improved participation, less paranoia, and less rhetoric.

Put this against the background of the current skipper. He has moved on his 2nd's faster than anyone else ever has and the problems are worse than ever; doesn't like the bad news or can't play with anyone that won't play his rules.

We see controllers leaving; 3 in a week in ML alone, Recruits deliberately failing to escape the 'bond' being applied; more TIBA than ever; training managers saying you don't need ATCs to teach trainees you need educators, The flightwatch debacle, the reduction of TWR hours by NOTAM, OS recruits saying the system is crap, fatigue management program in the toilet, Certified agreement due for negotiations, money up to triple elsewhere in the world, constant arguments about increments, shaving hours from minimum staffing, amendments to base rosters without consultation, AWA (only) supervision despite staff saying they didn't want them, moves to the SDE despite the board endorsed plan re numbers needed being ignored, SMS in name only not by nature, personal aggression at every turn to dissenters; oh yeah and then we are called change resistant conservatives; and we need to get away from being 'rules driven and more focused on outcomes'.

Dick if you have any influence at the Board level, and I'm sure you do :} They have to seriously consider the question, despite the skippers charms and verbal appeals, is he steering the ship in the right direction or are we seconds from the waterfall whilst the next round of cucumber sandwiches are being served?

[peuce]

SM4 Pirate,

:D

[dodgybrothers]

From a drivers point of view. I had 1 hours worth of TIBA in class A ML-PH recently and it was not comfortable. I also had TIBA SY-ML recently and it was downright scary. I, for one moment, do not blame the controllers but bungling from the top end.

The travelling public on one of the world's busiest air routes dererve better than see and avoid and I am astonished that the media hasn't picked up on this.

ASA, wake up.

[Dick Smith]

Scurvy, you state:

LT is one of the only D regionals with PRIM and SSR Radar to surface Why then isn’t the radar used in an effective way?

In relation to the Secondary Surveillance Radar, the aircraft are forced by law to be on your tower frequency, and I understand that you and the other tower controllers are not rated to use radar.

If the airspace followed the North American system – and as far as I know the system in every other modern aviation country in the world – the radar covered airspace is controlled by air traffic controllers who are in the Centre or TRACON and are radar rated. It sounds sensible, doesn’t it? It has the advantage that when the tower closes down at night (or due to staffing problems) the Centre would keep providing a full radar separation service to the lowest level of radar coverage.

The fact that the tower “owns” the airspace to 8,500 feet (or is it 12,500 feet?) is a hangover from the old pre-radar days. It is a bit like the FSOs keeping their airspace for many years after radar was introduced – and therefore unintentionally lowering safety.

To anyone with an open mind who is reading this, in other modern aviation countries Class D airspace changes to Class E when the tower closes and a full separation service is still provided to IFR aircraft from the Centre. In Australia, airline pilots are forced to change off the radar frequency to a “calling in the blind” CTAF frequency – even when in good radar coverage.

It is all about resistance to change – i.e. “This is the way we used to operate it in the 1950s – no one must ever change it.”

Scurvy, by the way, there won’t be much data on non-transponder VCAs in non-radar Class C airspace as no one would know the aircraft was there! Surely you must understand this. In many cases the only way you would know the aircraft was there would be because of a collision.

[Dick Smith]

SM4 Pirate, I do know a couple of members of the Airservices Board, and I have spoken to them about the problems regarding staffing levels. Unfortunately this has had no influence on the decisions of the Airservices Management.

One Board member even said to me, “Dick, they take no notice of me.” What an extraordinary statement. It sounds as if we need some Board members who have a bit of spine, doesn’t it?

Another interesting point is that for the last three years I have tried to arrange a meeting with the Chairman of Airservices to no avail. Imagine that! He knows that I have been publicly critical of Airservices, and rather than meeting with me to find out the validity of this criticism and to get me on side, he won’t even allow a meeting.

Here is a challenge. Has anyone who posts on this site actually ever met the Chairman of Airservices?

By the way, regarding the safety of Class C, I agree that it would be safer than Class E if you could just look at that airspace in isolation. However the way we operate the Class C above D in Australia is to use the already often overloaded single controller of the Class D to provide the extra service in the Class C.

All of the studies that Airservices have performed in looking at Class C airspace have not looked at the reduction in safety that obviously results when the controller has to do both types of airspace.
As I have mentioned before, controllers in other countries – who are just as professional – have said that they would never agree to providing a Class C service without adequate staffing levels and without the adequate tools – i.e. an approach radar.

I know we have done the Class C in the past without an accident. It is a bit like the argument that was used when I was involved in the decision to move to two pilot operations for aircraft of up to 30 passengers. The argument used by some of the airline owners was that we had operated these aircraft single pilot in the past and so it would be OK for the future – despite what happened internationally. Fortunately we made the decision to upgrade and follow what was happening internationally, and all of our airlines now have two pilots. If they were properly trained as a two pilot crew we would probably not have accidents like the one at Lockhart River.
Let’s look at a place like Albury. There are times when the controller is flat out trying to keep aircraft apart in the circuit area, and a VFR aircraft calls up at 6,500 feet twenty miles away.

This is where I believe (from what I have been told) is where the extra overloading of the controller could cause a resultant accident in the Class D airspace. This has never been looked at in any Airservices safety study for obvious reasons – they don’t want to put in the proper staffing levels and radar for Class C because it will reduce their profits.

[CaptainMidnight]

However the way we operate the Class C above D in Australia is to use the already often overloaded single controller of the Class D In seven years on this board I've never seen a single post from an ATC working in any of these Towers saying he/she is "often overloaded" or uncomfortable with working the class C airspace above.

If either situation existed, I'm very sure they'd be vocal here and their union would be active on the subject.

That tells all of us - except it seems you - that those with the real knowledge and expertise on the subject matter - ATCs - know what they are doing and are happy with the airspace.

In fact I dare say they were relieved when class C was sensibly reinstated.

[ER_BN]

Worth a second display!!

"We see controllers leaving; 3 in a week in ML alone, Recruits deliberately failing to escape the 'bond' being applied; more TIBA than ever; training managers saying you don't need ATCs to teach trainees you need educators, The flightwatch debacle, the reduction of TWR hours by NOTAM, OS recruits saying the system is crap, fatigue management program in the toilet, Certified agreement due for negotiations, money up to triple elsewhere in the world, constant arguments about increments, shaving hours from minimum staffing, amendments to base rosters without consultation, AWA (only) supervision despite staff saying they didn't want them, moves to the SDE despite the board endorsed plan re numbers needed being ignored, SMS in name only not by nature, personal aggression at every turn to dissenters; oh yeah and then we are called change resistant conservatives; and we need to get away from being 'rules driven and more focused on outcomes'.

Yes folks..and now TFN is blaming "previous administrations" for all his problems. Like a little kid...can't take responsibility for all his actions.

Gee...this guy make Bernie S and Andrew F top class managers!!

Anyone know what they are doing at the moment. The board might need their phone numbers...

[concernaviat]

The Airservices Chairman's term is up at the end of January 08, so hopefully the new Minister will send him packing and appoint someone who doesn't have Mark Vaile's hand up his backside

[Scurvy.D.Dog]

Griffo
.
NO!
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Make some room in your PM's :ok:

[peuce]

Dick Smith said:

"The fact that the tower “owns” the airspace to 8,500 feet (or is it 12,500 feet?) is a hangover from the old pre-radar days. It is a bit like the FSOs keeping their airspace for many years after radar was introduced – and therefore unintentionally lowering safety."

Unfortunately, just more generalized rhetoric, Dick.

How did "FSOs keeping their airspace" ... "...lower safety"?

Firstly, as if they had any say in any decision to keep airspace. Airspace classification was well and truly others' responsibility. If it was deemed OCTA, FSOs looked after it. If it was deemed Controlled Airspace, ATCs looked after it.

Secondly, the availability of tools to perform ones duties was also in the hands of others ... specifically, at the time, you. You have stated previously on this forum that you failed in getting radar made available to FSOs.

Don't turn your lost opportunity to increase safety into someone else's fault.... sound's like your complaint about the ASA Board, doesn't it?

[Dick Smith]

CaptainMidnight, I have spoken to controllers (admittedly a small number) who work in Class D towers and are not happy with the present system – i.e. the Class C above D. They have said that they are not game to say this publicly because they would be lynched by the small but vocal group who has a very different view.

My suggestion is that you have a look at some of the incidents that occur in Class D – things like aircraft being cleared for take off at Alice Springs and the pilot coming back and saying, “Ahh, isn’t that a vehicle on the runway?”

None of these incidents are ever looked at in relation to whether the controller made the error because of workload in separating aircraft in the Class C airspace above – without even radar.

As I have mentioned previously, the serious incident at Hamilton Island took place when the controller was holding aircraft outside the zone. What was not looked at is how much the pressure of doing this (i.e. knowing they were holding people in a single engine aircraft orbiting over water) added to the situation which allowed the error regarding the IFR airline aircraft to take place.

It is interesting that when I have explained to US controllers how the Australian system works (with a single controller operating not only the Class D airspace to 4,500 feet but also the Class C to 8,500 feet and up to 90 miles across) they say I must be mistaken. They cannot believe that such a situation can exist and that controllers would accept Class C without radar.

Of course we will only need one accident in Class D airspace to move to follow international practice. That is, where Class E airspace is above the Class D (meaning that controllers can concentrate on the airspace close to the aerodrome) or where approach radar is provided with adequate staffing levels.

[Dick Smith]

Peuce, it was not so much that I “failed in getting radar made available to FSOs” but the fact that it would have been ridiculous. We would have ended up with a totally duplicated system with two different unions, and aircraft in all of the low level radar airspace would not have been provided with a separation service – as FSOs are not trained to “control” aircraft.

Are you then going to suggest that I should have got the FSOs a rating so they could “control” aircraft but still be called FSOs?

The fact that FSOs keeping their airspace lowered safety is self-explanatory. That is, for two decades the low level airspace which was covered effectively by radar between Melbourne and Cairns was operated by officers who were in a different room and did not have a radar screen. It is pretty obvious that this system lowered safety.

At least we now have that airspace covered by air traffic controllers who actually have a radar screen in front of them.

Now we have to move forward and actually provide a proper air traffic control service in the airspace covered by radar. Then we will really be doing something for aviation safety in this country.

Isn’t it amazing that with over 25 years of resistance to change, we are still only slowly moving forward? I understand that Airservices are planning to do a “trial” of low level Class E airspace at Ballina. Don’t hold your breath though. As I have said, 6 months after it comes in I bet you will find that airline pilots think it is fantastic, wouldn’t want to go back, and find that they are not unduly delayed.

[peuce]

Sorry Dick, I'm not going to let you get away with this one ...

You said:
"Are you then going to suggest that I should have got the FSOs a rating so they could “control” aircraft but still be called FSOs?"

I did not suggest this. I did not suggest anything. I only asked you to validate your statement. I'm pretty sick of throw away lines.

You said:
"The fact that FSOs keeping their airspace lowered safety is self-explanatory. That is, for two decades the low level airspace which was covered effectively by radar between Melbourne and Cairns was operated by officers who were in a different room and did not have a radar screen. It is pretty obvious that this system lowered safety."


How did FSOs "keep" their airspace?
What is the data on which you base your statement that "safety was lowered"? Lowered from what?


I'll save you some time in trying to read between my lines.

Safety was never lowered by CAA retaining FSOs to manage Uncontrolled Airspace.

I think what you meant (correct me if I've got it wrong) is that safety was not improved ... because the airspace was not given to the Controllers who had Radar.

The success and efficiency of that eventual move could also be debated ... at another time.

[TCFOR]

Yes Yes Yes, but in the interests of honest amusement; Dick, did you follow up with the FAA on the bloke in the wheeelchair who got the free aero's in Hawaii? I can't wait for that one...;)

[Ex FSO GRIFFO]

'Holy **** BATMAN' = Gee Dick = Just W H E R E do I start???

FSO's with RADAR??

We did actually try for that one, ...BUT.....the ability for FSO's to give the 'Directed Traffic Information Service' was not really in doubt - we would much have preferred to have the facility so that we could then give MEANINGFUL DTI - instead of simply relying on pilots to report positions 'ON TIME' @ a Location!!

Some pilots were not entirely 'honest' , as you can well imagine......
e.g. I said I would be there at time ...36...so, at time 36 I made the call...your honour!!!

Services were then provided with a VERY CLEAR CUT BOUNDARY - CTA / OCTA!!

Easy!!!!

Let the ATC's actually control those acft in CTA, and....wait for it......I know its gunna hurt to hear it......but.....then those 'pesky' FSO's could actually provide the Directed Traffic Info to those OTHER acft which were actually flying O C T A, and on ANOTHER FREQ so that there would be NO CONGESTION!!!

You see, we all know that FSO's were never actually employed to 'CONTROL' acft, just to provide the filling in the 'gaps' of info to the then MAJORITY OF AIRCRAFT - FOKKERS, PIPERS, CESSNAS, BEECH QUEENAIRS, and the like - who were then the MAJOR OCTA RPT & CHARTER OPERATORS.....operating into the majority of OZ airspace........you know, away from the "J" curve??? Excuse me, I'm shouting now......

Now, we have mostly high-flyers (Turbos) doing the same work. (IN CTA...UNTIL they DESCEND.....) So the times, they are a'changin'.......

Now, I realise full well we ain't goin' back - but - when you realise what we HAD vs what we've GOT....welll....I have to ask ya....WAS IT WORTH IT???

Considering that the $$$'s go back to the GOVT Consolidated revenue to finance whatever..... BUT NOT TO IMPROVE the present 'SYSTEM' ...or lack thereof????

All to save a few bucks at the coalface.....:=:=

And, not forgetting, then, as is now, very little of that magic RADAR away from the "J" curve = the rest of OZ!!!!:}:}

[Howabout]

Oh, Ex FSO GRIFFO, if only you knew how much I remember and lament the passing of FS. A wonderful organisation dismantled by a zealot (would the term 'fundamentalist' apply?). Many were the days in the north that I recall an absolutely professional and friendly service. I was only a kid, but my uncle flew charter, and I used to go along for the ride. I had a lot of contact in the Top End with the FS guys through my uncle. Sure, it cost the Commonwealth a few bucks, but when you are over the East Alligator River in a C172 that starts sneezing, FS always knew where you were. On the other hand, maybe I'm so far out of date that a flight note would replace the: assistance, advice, monitoring, traffic information, hazard alerts, get your clearance into controlled airspace and generally make you feel that someone was listening out for you that actually gave a rat's.

[Dick Smith]

Howabout, I too liked the Flight Service system and I have stated this many times. The problem is that it wasn’t the Commonwealth paying for it, it was our industry. This was a decision made by the Labor Government before my involvement.

It was also obvious that the airline industry was going to force those who benefited from Flight Service to pay for it. It seemed sensible to train the FSOs as ATCs – for the ones who wanted this additional training – and then change the system so it is basically operated by ATCs.

It did mean quite a number of people losing their jobs. I was aware of that and did not like it in any way – but surely this was better than destroying a whole industry where three or four times as many people could lose their jobs. I know a number of FSOs who trained to be ATCs and worked through to retirement earning additional money along the way.

Direct.no.speed, you do not seem to understand what I am trying to explain and why in other countries Class D airspace is small. It is small in dimensions so the controller can concentrate on the traffic that is most likely to collide – i.e. on the runway and close to the airport. If you then give that same controller airspace responsibilities that are 20, 30, or 40 miles away, and capture lots more traffic, the result is obvious – less concentration on the traffic that is close.

Show me an airport in the world that is similar to Albury – where one controller in the tower controls Class C airspace to 8,500 feet that is 90 miles across. You will find there is no such place in the world – other than Australia – because it results in a lowering of safety.

It is beyond me why controllers in Aussie Class D towers would want this extra responsibility when Government policy says they do not need to have it, and there is no additional income for Airservices – and therefore for the controllers.

[GaryGnu]

Dick,

Some of the points you have are valid, BUT, none of them have to do with the Airspace Classification. Your arguments revolve around the way the airspace is allocated between controllers. Whether it was Class E or C makes little difference. In fact there might even be an argument that Class E presents a higher workload for controllers, but I'll leave that to others.

Why does the airspace above the Control Zone have to be Class E in order for it to be controlled by a "TRACON" type unit. Would not it be just as effectively be operated as Class C outside of Tower hours (i.e when its dark and therefore no VFR traffic)?

I will give you a tip, if you want to gain the support of the professional pilots in this country (not just the AOPA brigade) advocate airspace changes that move up the ICAO scale, not down. Yes that does suggest a Towered Control Zone at Avalon of any Class would get support if it is introduced properly and according to transperent processes.

Give up on introducing Class E in lieu of Class C over any control zone (D or C). It will simply not get the support of the industry. You saw what happened after NAS 2b.

I have a few questions for you:

The Dimensions you suggest for the US style Class D control zones would not contain a typical instrument approach profile (10nm/3000ft). Do you propose that we cover the residual of the approach with Class E, creating a mish mash of airspace classes in a small area? This was already suggested at Albury but thankfully sane heads prevailed and alternate solutions were sought.

In relation to the low level Class E airspace procedures to non-controlled terminal areas. I refer to your often stated vsion that an RPT aircraft will be able to state to the controller "Cancel IFR, procedding VFR" and then land at the non-controlled aerodrome. Would any operator holding an AOC issued under CAO 82.5 be able to do so? I refer to CAO 82.5 Section 7. Feel free to correct any misunderstanding I may have of the US system, or indeed your vision of it.

[Dick Smith]

GaryGnu, you don’t seem to understand. The only reason we have an airspace system is because of VFR traffic. Otherwise everything would be Class A like Heathrow.

The key to maximum safety is allocating the resources effectively. If all you do is to move up the ICAO scale and do not do any “balancing” you will simply increase costs and drive GA out of business – which is happening.

If you had read Unsafe Skies (see here (http://www.dicksmithflyer.com.au/the_book.php)) you would understand that we originally had two types of airspace. One was controlled, where we controlled everything, and one uncontrolled where we didn’t give any control service at all. Modern countries such as the USA have seven classifications of airspace – so the resources are allocated more effectively and higher safety is the result.

Imagine if in our road system we simply had dirt roads and toll ways. Surely it is obvious to you that more lives would be lost. The fact is that we spend money on roads as the risk increases in a stepped way. That is the best way to save the most lives in airspace management.

The link airspace above Class D towers has a measurably lower collision risk than that of the airspace close to the aerodrome at locations like Ayers Rock or Avalon. Surely it is sensible to move the resources to where the increased risk is.

The Class C service over Albury (which used to be the equivalent of Class B) is a definite over-allocation of the airspace categories. Surely it is better to have the controllers concentrating on the airspace close to the tower where the collision risk is higher, and have more of these controllers and more towers.

In the past we would go from uncontrolled airspace with absolutely nothing, to basically Class B airspace with everything. It meant that you had ridiculous situations such as a tower being built at Gove, and never being used. Even then the powers in the old Flight Standards Department knew this was a complete misallocation of resources.

Gary, if you always insist that the only changes that can ever be made result in moving up the ICAO scale and increasing restrictions and costs, we will never be able to have an airspace system which allocates resources correctly.

Direct.no.speed, you seem to be doing everything you can to justify our 1950s system. You could put more controllers in the system to adequately man the Class C above Albury, but I’d far prefer to have more Class D towers. That is because I’m told that the risk of collision goes up something like 100 times between the link airspace above 5,000 feet and the terminal airspace below. In that case, I would rather have a lot more Class D towers with a single controller in them, rather than half as many operating Class D with Class C above.

The reason I would prefer this is that I have been told by experts all around the world that it is the way to get the maximum safety. Not only do I believe them but it fits the commonsense test – it seems logical.

We don’t even have a Class D tower at Avalon, Ayers Rock or Broome, when other countries (such as the United States or Canada) would have one. Yes, the towers in the United States and Canada only “control” a small amount of airspace, and they do have Class E airspace above. However they have more towers than we do per head of population, so that seems sensible.

[peuce]

Dick,

GaryGnu makes an interesting point, which you appear to have ignored:

"I will give you a tip, if you want to gain the support of the professional pilots in this country ......"

Reading between the lines ... who is paying the bulk of Airservices' costs?
Answer: The Airlines

Any change is going to need their support. Why would Airservices take the side of pilots using the system for free (or for a minimal cost)?

What's in it for the Airlines if airspace is changed (down) to your configuration? Unnecessary grief and a greater workload for their pilots.

The bottom line is that the Business will provide what its main Customers want... whatever that is ... and it's probably dealt with behind closed doors.

Your only way to get what you want is to either:
(a) Convince Airservices' customers that what Dick Smith wants is what they need
(b) Remove the Business/Customer nexus

[Scurvy.D.Dog]

Dick,
.
Your arguments contradict themselves .... and a lot of it is just plain crap!
.
I will expand tommorrow (once I have had some sleep after the last 4 days of rubbish :* :mad: :* :mad: :ugh:)

[Dick Smith]

Peuce, why won’t you address the main point that I am making? That is, that I accept that Class C airspace with proper staffing levels and radar is clearly safer than Class E. However Class C airspace that is operated as an “add on” to a lone Class D controller who is already overloaded clearly doesn’t add to safety.

Are you suggesting that in Australia a controller at a place like Albury can adequately control all the traffic in the circuit area and on the runway, while also adequately separate IFR and VFR up to 45 miles away – without radar and using some type of procedural means? Does this consist of a crayon and a ruler on a map?

I’ll say it again. Class C airspace is clearly safer than Class E if you have the adequate tools and staffing levels. If you run Class C at no cost to Airservices, by adding this extra workload to controller of the Class D below, you end up reducing safety in the Class D airspace where an accident is 100 times more likely to happen.

It is interesting how no one will comment on this. It hasn’t come from me – it has come from professional controllers from Australia and around the world. Even if you don’t agree with this, please at least address it.

I mentioned previously that when I was in the USA, controllers that operate Class D to 2,500 feet claimed that to put Class C above without radar and without extra controllers would clearly reduce safety. Why do they have such a different opinion? Why wouldn’t they want to have Class C above? Why wouldn’t the pilots in these countries want to have Class C above being controlled by the one controller who is doing the Class D below?

The answer is simple. Commonsense alone – let alone professional judgment – shows that such an airspace is an accident waiting to happen. No, the accident won’t be in the Class C airspace above, it will be in the Class D airspace. This is because the controller has diverted attention from aircraft close to the runway in order to separate an IFR and VFR aircraft that might be 40 miles away, can’t possibly be seen, and because there is no radar there is no real idea of where the VFR aircraft is.

I still find it amazing that Australian air traffic controllers would not insist on the Minister’s directive going ahead – i.e. that an approach radar system be provided where Class C airspace exists.

[peuce]

Dick,

Firstly, I am under no obligation to address your issues, just as you regularly ignore other posters' issues.

Secondly, My point was that airspace classification and management is no longer under your, or any other individual pilot's control. It is under the control of the Business's major Customer ... the Airlines. Stamp your feet all you like, but these airspace decisions will ultimately be made behind closed doors.

Thirdly, in the spirit of Christmas, I'll have a go at answering your question on a single Controller providing 2 different services.


What happens overseas has NO relevance here ... fullstop
What has relevance is the considered opinions of those providing the service in Australia, under our conditions, using our equipment, using our standards, rules and procedures
If the Controllers (I'm not one) have a problem with the situation, I am sure they will raise a safety issue and have it dealt with through the Company ... or their Union, in need. There is no one better placed to decide if there is an issue ... or not.
There's nothing to be gained by the Controllers "hiding" any systemic problems


Seems pretty simple to me.

[Walrus 7]

I think the underlying objection to E over D has nothing to do with safety in the D class. IFR pilots don't want to pass through E class on descent into the D. If the space above is C then they don't need to worry about "see and avoid" on the way down.

Arguments about safety in the C class are valid and glaringly obvious, but they won't win because they don't address the concerns above.

Walrus

[CaptainMidnight]

lone Class D controller who is already overloaded

The only thing worse than an armchair pilot pontificating is someone doing the same who hasn't been a pilot in the first place.

Same for neverbeen ATCs I suspect?

[Scurvy.D.Dog]

... poligies' for the delay in reply
.
Dick Smith said on the 18th December 2007, 10:00
LT is one of the only D regionals with PRIM and SSR Radar to surface
Why then isn’t the radar used in an effective way?
.
It is! … I have explained a bit about this to you …. and am happy to delve further i.e. we are ‘currently’ limited to using the display for SA, in other words confirmation of the procedural plan and execution. Now it is fact that we can actually move traffic more efficiently using procedural standards (close in), regional D controllers will confirm this, and we have been for years trying to have rules introduced that enable us to use the tool even more effectively. Suffice to say, many of the action items drawn from many Tower Manager conferences on this subject have been followed up by the TM experts, and little beyond that. The onsite experts have done their bit, as for the follow on ….. well I will not attempt to defend the indefensible!! …perhaps you might ask CB management who was following up, and where they are now!In relation to the Secondary Surveillance Radar, the aircraft are forced by law to be on your tower frequency, and I understand that you and the other tower controllers are not rated to use radar. I personally have held radar ratings, do I currently? no, WHY? … again ask why field controllers have been denied said ratings, and why the data path/s to regional towers has not been certified for said use, also whilst you are about it, ask why the latest upgrades to TSAD (with some TAAATS functionality) has not been rolled out (last I heard it was suppose to happen about 2 years ago)If the airspace followed the North American system – and as far as I know the system in every other modern aviation country in the world – the radar covered airspace is controlled by air traffic controllers who are in the Centre or TRACON and are radar rated. It sounds sensible, doesn’t it? …. Yup …. At least double the number of ATC positions to do the same TMA areas currently done by regional tower/app combined It has the advantage that when the tower closes down at night (or due to staffing problems) the Centre would keep providing a full radar separation service to the lowest level of radar coverage. …. Staffing problems :hmm: …. Staffing enroute sectors as it is is apparently too hard …. and you want remote (centre) radar TMA’s at regionals as well????
.
….. at night, IMHO it would be smarter (read efficient) to have the tower/app assume low level enroute (below FL250) … enabling the wide area enroute controllers the ability to concentrate on the vast areas of enroute above FL250 … in fact, it could be argued that FL150 and below should stay with the TWR/APP unit 24/7 with additional staff (APP) during heavy traffic daylight hours!The fact that the tower “owns” the airspace to 8,500 feet (or is it 12,500 feet?) A085! is a hangover from the old pre-radar days. …. Pre-radar has nothing to do with it! It is a bit like the FSOs keeping their airspace for many years after radar was introduced – and therefore unintentionally lowering safety. …. Or reducing services to IFR and VFR outside the surveillance veil (G) and arguably increasing loading on the ATC sectors above?!To anyone with an open mind who is reading this, in other modern aviation countries Class D airspace changes to Class E when the tower closes and a full separation service is still provided to IFR aircraft from the Centre. In Australia, airline pilots are forced to change off the radar frequency to a “calling in the blind” CTAF frequency – even when in good radar coverage. … I say again, who is gunna provide the ‘surveillance' (cost), the class E service (cost and resources) and how is that justifiable when D or better could be provided for the same or less cost (factoring IFR delays with remote E)???It is all about resistance to change – i.e. “This is the way we used to operate it in the 1950s – no one must ever change it.” … resistance to change? Or resistance to changing an entrenched position despite reasoned argument? …… pot calling kettle, pot calling kettle … over Scurvy, by the way, there won’t be much data on non-transponder VCAs in non-radar Class C airspace as no one would know the aircraft was there! unless they saw them or TCAS went ballistic!!!!? Surely you must understand this. In many cases the only way you would know the aircraft was there would be because of a collision. ….. and the data on said OZ VCA collisons/NMAC’s is????? :hmm:

[rosscoe]

Hi Dick

It's about time for you to show us your evidence of this:

Dick Smith
"
This is in complete contrast to our Class D at a place like Hamilton Island, where the local helicopter operator is consistently held outside the zone, orbiting with passengers in a single engine aircraft over water because one IFR aircraft happens to be approaching in CAVOK conditions.
"

You keep saying this but have never provided any evidence to justify the statement so now I'm calling you on it.

Most people here would know who I am and where I work so yes I do have a vested interest in this.

But as per usual you making statements without any evidence to back it up. So come on show us some evidence of your statement.

Of the 30 plus helicopter movements today at Hamilton Island not one was held and if there was approaching IFR traffic they were sequenced as appropriate with traffic information. Several of which were the IFR traffic to follow the helicopters. It was not CAVOK with some IFR doing IAL's and some on visual approaches and diverting around large CB's.

Actually in the last 4 days I can not think of any time anyone, being fixed wing or helicopter, was held "outside the zone doing orbits" and not one of those days was CAVOK.

Even if they were held outside the zone doing orbits over water what difference is that to doing orbits over water watching whales on the way to the barrier reef in a single engine helicopter or 500' over water at Heart Reef doing orbits so that the paying passengers can take happy snaps.

[werbil]

I can confirm that I have not heard any aircraft being denied access to the YBHM zone in recent times - it has been a long time since I have heard a "remain outside controlled airspace" call from YBHM tower. One controller (who I have not heard for many, many months) was notorious for this call. The actual restrictions depend on the controller - if we have the traffic picture we can usually guess the clearance depending on whose voice we hear.

However, given the cloud base today (around 1000' to 1500') I would be very surprised if any VFR aircraft in the zone maintained the required distance from cloud for their whole flight. Even in float planes we like height when flying over rough water, bumming along at 500' under a 1500' cloud base is just poor airmanship IMHO. If SVFR clearances were requested I suspect that at least some of these aircraft would have had to hold outside the zone.

The last time I received the "clearance not available, remain outside controlled airspace" call was when a MLJ was about to fly through the zone. I ended up in the same G airspace that the MLJ had to cross as it entered the zone. :ugh:

I don't think any local VFR pilot has any real issues with the way access to the zone is handled at the moment. :ok: The two tower closures during the day create some confusion. The busiest time of the day for movements is after the tower closes at the end of the day when everyone is returning home.

[SM4 Pirate]

The two tower closures during the day create some confusion. The busiest time of the day for movements is after the tower closes at the end of the day when everyone is returning home.Suggest you lobby ASA and CASA to change the hours, use the RAPAC system. I could go for a gig up there if they needed to up staffing by one:}

[werbil]

SM4Pirate,

The tower hours change when the airline schedules change - which is at least twice a year as daylight savings begins and ends in the southern states. If a jet is running late the tower still closes and the jet operates CTAF procedures.:ugh:

The local GA pilots are quite happy to operate to CTAF procedures. As Chimbu Chuckles states in the affordable safety thread the tower is there for the RPT jet services. If they want the coverage they will have to (a) lobby for it and (b) pay for it.

W

PS One of the local controllers is leaving for a busier tower in the reasonably near future :{ (always good to have a beer with) so there may be an opportunity for a gig up here anyway.:ok:

[peuce]

Maybe I'm thick ....

The Tower hours are based around the RPT schedule ... because it's (apparently) unsafe to have them operate without a Tower.

However, if they arrive after the last ferry off the island, it's suddenly safe to operate without a Tower ..:confused: