BALPA say: Anti-terrorist cockpit doors 'dangerous'

[Devils Advocate]

As posted by BALPA (but see also: BBC: Anti-terrorist cockpit doors 'dangerous' (http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/uk/newsid_1629000/1629465.stm)

31 October, 2001 PILOTS UNHAPPY WITH DEADLOCKS ON COCKPIT DOORS: ‘ILL-CONSIDERED, ILL-CONCEIVED AND POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS’

Commenting on the security measures announced by Virgin and BA, the British Air Line Pilots’ Association (BALPA) said that while some suggestions were sensible, the heart of the proposals - putting deadlocks on cockpit doors without considering the impact on operational procedures - was of very serious concern.Said BALPA General Secretary Christopher Darke: ‘British pilots have long believed that locked cockpit doors are not the answer to the threat of hijacking.‘After all, the cockpit doors on the four airliners taken by the terrorists on September 11 were all locked. ‘But having doors that are not only locked but have a deadlock on them that flight crew cannot lock or unlock from their normal operating positions- as BA and Virgin propose - is ill-considered , ill-conceived and potentially dangerous.‘Although deadlocks may play some part in helping to protect the integrity of the flight deck, without serious analysis and trials to validate crew procedures, an instant introduction carries a far higher risk to aviation safety than that posed from hijackers.‘Deadlocks will put passengers in more, not less, danger.’‘On a two person flight crew, if one pilot becomes ill, it will be impossible for the other pilot to get help without leaving the controls of the aircraft. The potential problems cannot be ignored.‘And what if the flight crew become incapacitated together, perhaps through smoke inhalation. Currently the cabin crew are trained to check on the welfare of the pilots from time to time. By timely administration of oxygen, for instance, disaster can be averted. By locking out cabin crew, and indeed pilots who may be travelling as passengers, they are powerless to help.‘You cannot turn the cockpit, which is the nerve centre of a complex environment, into a fortress. The success of a flight relies on a close working relationship between pilots and cabin crew.’BALPA experts are also investigating the effect of deadlocked doors on other safety aspects. In the event of a violent depressurisation, a strengthened door risks causing the cockpit floor to collapse. That is why current doors are fragile. They need to be able to break immediately when a calculated pressure is applied to them.Said Christopher Darke: ‘We will look at these doors very carefully indeed. We cannot understand why the airlines didn’t first have full and frank discussions with pilots, the regulatory authorities, or even among themselves. There is a suspicion that the announcements today are public relations and marketing led. Certainly the proposals haven’t been thought through.’Ian Hibberd, the pilot who chairs BALPA’s security committee and an acknowledged expert in the field said: ‘The International Federation of Air Line Pilot Associations, at its Tokyo conference two weeks ago, opposed the enforced locking of flight deck doors, especially doors that are deadlocked and cannot be opened from where the pilots sit. That is the view of the whole of the world pilot community. ‘The enforced locking of flight deck doors is no substitute for proper and adequate ground security and pre-boarding screening and control. The locking of cockpit doors can in fact reduce the safety both of the crews and of the aircraft by denying access in the case of an accident or incident.‘It’s on the ground that terrorists need to be stopped, and new systems have been developed that are about to be trialled. Once a terrorist gets on an airliner it’s too late. The damage is done. And deadlocked cockpit doors certainly don’t help. They won’t stop the terrorist and they do hinder the crew.’

And, imho, I must agree.

Maybe as part of a total security package these doors have a place – as in, they maybe add yet another level security, but in all honesty (cynically) they're really just a fop to make the customers / pax believe that the airlines are taking the threat seriously - and pays to remember that taking security 'seriously' costs 'serious' money !

Nb. that's the kind of money which neither of the airlines mentioned have in abundance just now (so one might read into that, that this is the minimum they can get away with - whilst being seen to have done something)

And w.r.t. to the video in the door bit..... well I for one do not relish watching Tracy from door 2R getting her throat cut (and then Sharon from 2L, and then..., and then..., and then..., etc, ..... as some terrorist tries to entice us to open the FltDck door.

Also, it’s all very well VS and BA saying that they’re going to fit a ‘second’ door system – whereby providing a second tier of security – aboard their spacious wide body aircraft, but pray tell us just what are the B737 / B757 / A319 / A320 / A321 type operators supposed to do ? ..... and rest assured, any / all of these aircraft could quite easily reek as much havoc as those aircraft involved in Sept 11th !

Perhaps the bottom line is that it’s much better to keep trouble makers off from the start, than to have to try and deal with them later within the confines of the aircraft.

I, for one, am not that impressed.

[Hand Solo]

This whole thing reeks of panic in the marketing departments. This is throwing away 15 years of Flight Crew/Cabin Crew CRM developed after the Kegworth disaster and for what? To install a device which is dangerous obstruction to personnel, a barely surmountable barrier to emergency communications and which will thwart the hijackers right up until the moment one of us chooses to go to the toilet. This is a huge danger to the flying public and to aircrew. Think what will happen next time we have a case of incapacitation. With no means to unlock the door from your seat you'll be required to leave your seat to pull the other guy away from the controls. Now the only pilot at the controls is the one having the seizure. Very safe. Furthermore, what makes these idiots think that you can't force the doors to be opened from the inside anyway? With a knife at someones throat do you think a crew member couldn't be persuaded to ask for the door to be opened? As a final thought, I think its also rather nice of them to let us know that in the event of an incapacitating accident that flight crew are now expendable, as there's now no way to gain access to us as the flames lick round our feet. Thanks a lot!

Personally I hope the general public reading this thread see this panic measure as the danger to their safety that it is. Don't be fooled, let your airlines know that you want real security, not gestures. :mad:

[ 31 October 2001: Message edited by: Hand Solo ]

[flying Dr]

As stated above, i thought that cockpit doors were brittle enough to be broke down by a fire axe in the event of a crash.
I also heard about a flight in which the captain had gone to the toilet and the first officer absolutely desperate had gone too. As soon as he got out the door, he heard the awful thud of the door lock behind him! I hear it wasnt an easy task either to break the door down with the supplied axe. Hence an indestructable door isnt the answer, a strong but destructible may be, and in the time it takes to break it down, the crew could be ready to deal with the hijackers then( im not getting into the firearms debate but a loaded gun waiting for a hijacker as soon as he succeeds in getting through would stop him, especially coupled with cctv warning you when hes going to break through)

2nd argument, pilot suicide , although rare exists and you dont wanted a suicidal pilot locked in the flight deck( or with access to a firearm)
Thats my tuppence worth

[le loup garou]

Completely agree! I dont Know the stats but I'm sure the risk of an incapacitation is far greater even the two pilot case than an attempt to take over the aircraft.
Very dangerous me thinks! Cant wait to have to try to get out in a hurry either. :mad: :mad: :mad:

[Notso Fantastic]

Security of this sort can only be countenanced on a 3 pilot operation.

[RatherBeFlying]

What you want in a cockpit door is delay sufficient for the pax and cabin crew to mob the bad guys.

A single door does leave the cockpit vulnerable to a surprise rush whenever a pilot visits the lav or a cabin crew member brings in a meal.

A double door arrangement blocks the surprise rush. The outer door(s) could protect the front galley. An interlock would allow only one to be open unless on the ground.

[Capt Pit Bull]

Well, does anyone know of a case where an incapacitated pilots random limb thrashings were sufficient to direct the aircraft straight towards a population centre, and the other pilot was not able to intervene, but fortunately the purser managed to dash into the flight deck just in time to prevent the aircraft from spearing into a skyscraper killing thousands?

It staggers me, reading this and other threads, that people don't seem to be able to grasp realities of the new situation that we find ourselves in. On this site, and in the crewroom at work, people seem unable to grasp the simple premise that in order to deny the hijackers the use of the aircraft it will be necessary to (a) have a robust door, (b) lock it and (c) not to open it regardless of the threats or actions carried out against the cabin crew or passengers.

This requires the flight crew to have the courage not to try and 'have a go' but rather to make the tough decision to stay put.

As far as the viewpoint that the solution is to prevent the wrong people getting onto the aircraft, well fine. I suggest that instead of spending time doing simulator drills of emergencies that we simply spend more money making the aircraft more reliable. After all, if an engine never fails I won't need that engine failure practice, will I!

Perhaps Chris Darke should have said "... SOME pilots..."

I do agree that ideally the lock needs to be controllable from your seat, but I say give me a robust door NOW, since we are presently bombing these people, and if it takes a couple more months to get the mod for the electric door lock sorted out, fine. In the mean time just give me a supernumery crew member. God knows there are enough spare flight and cabin crew kicking around!

CPB

[Nigel PAX]

Well the current situation is absurd. Just got back from a flight where the FAs diligently locked the door every time they came out of the flight deck, carefully and obviously stowing the key in the same place in the galley. Any half observent pax in an aisle seat could see where it went. Other than stopping dopey loo-bound pax stumbling into the flight deck, it seemed a bit pointless.

[E cam]

Darke was not speaking for me. The chances of a pilot incapacitation on any one flight are quite small. The chances of an autopilot malfunction on any one flight are very small. The chance of both, at the same time are a risk I don't mind taking in return for this kind of security and some much needed pax confidence. Remotely operated locks can follow; Bin Liner might not wait!

[CrashDive]

I've said it before, and I'll say it again (and again, and again.... ) , but ( imho ) one of the first lines of defence is to stop trouble-makers from getting on-board in the first place, i.e. :

Boarder Guard (http://www.imagingautomation.com/bg.htm)

Boarder Guard and Air Travel (http://www.imagingautomation.com/bgair.htm)

Boarder Guard plus 4000 (http://www.imagingautomation.com/bgplus4000.htm)

e-Manifest (http://www.imagingautomation.com/eman.htm)

I know for a fact that this system can feed loads of info / data to the 'security services', for them to subsequently monitor / track movements / raise alerts;

.....and for those who'd shout "what about my civil rights ?" my reply would be "Well what about the civil right of those men, women, and children who were murdered on the 11th September ?!"

Yes, it'll cost some money - but hey, if it was your child/wife/husband, what price a life ?! ........ please remember this at the next election and / or the next time you fly with an airline who elects for some lesser level of protection for you !

[M.Mouse]

Captain Pit Bull/ E Cam

Unfortunately it has happened and not that long ago either. A co - pilot had a seizure on a 747. The Captain could just control the aircraft (he was dealing with an extreme control input from the unfortunate co - pilot) and was unable to let go of the controls let alone get up and open any door.

This whole idea is flawed not least because it has been hastily introduced with no thought or real consultation.Pilot incapacitation does happen and is but one of the concerns we all have.

I have yet to meet a pilot that doesn't think the same. Locked doors are probably inevitable but lets have procedures that reduce the danger not increase it.

[The Guvnor]

CrashDive is right. The security efforts should be concentrated on stopping the bad guys from getting on board in the first place rather than having to deal with them at FL360.

Airlines can't afford to throw away hundreds of thousands of pounds on Kevlar doors at present and if anything as Chris Darke (and many others say) their downside is greater than their benefits.

That said, as the US Secret Service knows all to well: if you have someone skilled and determined enough then all the physical security measures in the world will not prevent them from carrying out their task.

In the words of PIRA after the Brighton bombing in 1994: "We only have to be luck once. You have to be lucky all the time"

[Zulu]

I posted this earlier...any thoughts?

"...but would a perspex/glass/transparent cockpit door help with many of the security issues being raised at the moment?
If it was one-way-mirrored (silvered), like security windows you see in shops; then:
1) We can see straight into the cabin without having to get out of our seats to look through the peephole
2) We can see that the person knocking at the door is the No.1 with a drink, and not someone else
3) We can see if the cabin crew are "compromised" in the cabin.
4) Pax. can't see in.
Drill a couple of holes at the top and bottom, sorts out the de-pressurisation issues, and voila!
..."

Transparent / Glass cockpit doors? (http://www.pprune.org/cgibin/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic&f=41&t=002359)

[Pandora]

Capt Pitbull,

There was a recent incident of a pilot having a seizure (not the one M Mouse was on about - it was a smaller passenger jet, a 737 I think) who had to be removed to stop inadvertent control input. This incident happened 2 and a half years ago. I also know of an incident where the captain had a heart attack and collapsed with all of his 17 stone of body weight onto the control column. Now as someone who weighs approximately half that, I can't see myself flying one handed while with the other hand pulling him off the control column. I don't know - maybe once we a re all locked in our cockpits we will be told in order to remove the risk of an incapacitated pilot our airlines will remove the control column and rudder pedals. Finally, how many pilots out there can fly an aircraft and pull the captain in the window at the same time?

[SLF]

I think the airlines are missing an important factor here. Prior to 11th September, if I was on a plane being hijacked, my reaction would be one of compliance - I'd expect a diversion somewhere and sit it out. These things used to be highly survivable.

Now, however, anyone or any group attempting to hijack a plane is going to be lynched by the pax. We understand the new rules, and guns/bombs/knives are not going to deter us.

The biggest threat posed by an armoured cockpit door is to prevent pax access to the cockpit which may have been occupied by hijackers.

[MrNosy]

There was an accident with an AN24 in Romania a few years ago where the aircraft made a hard landing and caught fire. All the pax and cabin crew got out but the flight deck crew were apparently incapacitated and died in the fire. Why did'nt they get out? The cockpit door had been locked on departure for security reasons and they had the key.

[Roadtrip]

How many people have been killed as a result of bolted cockpit doors?

Answer: Hardly any


How many people have been killed as result of insecured cockpit doors resulting losing command of the aircraft?

Answer: at least 4 aircraft, 5000 lives, billions of dollars of damage, 100,000 lost airline jobs in the US alone, and countless damage to the civilized world economy.

It's difficult to suffer posts by morons incapable of critical thought.

[John Farley]

Roadtrip

Exactly

[E cam]

BA/Virgin are trying to restore pax confidence.

BALPA appear to be trying to undermine their efforts.

Any fool can see that what the airlines are doing is less that perfect.

I prefer this less than perfect solution to the alternative i.e. unemployment!

[Hand Solo]

Roadtrip:

How many airlines have bolted flight deck doors? Hardly any. The answer to your question should have been 'hardly any yet'. Furthermore its highly likely the doors were secure on all the flights on Sept 11th, as per FAA requirements. That didn't stop them.

The 'morons incapable of critical thought' you dislike are the ones who came up with this hare-brained idea. If you want security you need a second door between the flight deck and the cabin like El-AL use. They've thought about, BA/VS haven't.

E Cam:

I'm sure BA/VS are trying to improve passenger confidence. Lets see how confident they are when both pilots get locked out of the flight deck on the turnaround and the Eng has to drill his way in. Lets see how confident they are when the guys in row 1 (incidentally, which is where some of the hijackers were sitting) see the armour plated door open so the pilots can get out. Especially if the only thing blocking their way is a small hostie and an unsuspecting pilot. Lets see how convinced of this system they are when I have to leave the flight deck and there's a line of six people queuing for the lav right outside my door.

I've discussed this with plenty of non-flying friends and they are in no way fooled by this. We're in no different a situation than we were on September 11th, except this time the hijackers will have to be more opportunistic about when they seize control.

[ 01 November 2001: Message edited by: Hand Solo ]

[Devils Advocate]

Hand Solo - Touché !

You, CD, Guv (and others) are imho quite right, in that that the first line of defence should not be an armoured or locked flight-deck door – this should only be viewed as the very final arbiter in a chain of prevention.... and right now that chain is nothing like strong enough ! i.e. the airlines are promoting it big time, but they're seemingly doing very little at the coalface of the check-in.
E.g. Hands up all those who think that the check-in process, security screening, embarkation process is tough / secure enough ?

Bottom line is that it’s still a ‘relative’ piece of p!ss to board an aircraft with malicious aforethought – and that’s a thought I take with me to work every day, and so should you !

Nb. I’ve literally just heard on the news that OBL has basically just asked Moslems to ‘Rise up against the West’ and you can rest assured that there are thousands of his wacker followers out there who will do just that. Nb. And they don't all look like Afghans.
So please, please, please, ALWAYS assume that one of his scum have made it aboard your aircraft – accordingly, you will then be the last line of defence..... and of course your plan is.... ?! ...... Yep, it’s wake up time fellas, you might be next.

Ps. It might also be said that there’s a seemingly terrific thread waiting in the wings, with regards to the CRM aspects of a locked and armoured door. E.g. In locking the door it might be said that we’ve taken an action which many have endeavoured for years to break down, e.g. the ‘apparent’ divide across the flight-deck door, but here we are now resurrecting it.

So, what now all those CRM / MCC refreshers we have to sit through, i.e. why bother ? as it’s now, more so than ever, a case of them (the cabin crew) or us (as in all of us) - as in damned if you do, and if you don’t !

[Roadtrip]

Hans -
The doors we have are only a makeshift emergency solution until a purpose-built and highly functional engineering design can be adopted. There is no danger of inadvertant locking. It is not a substitute for enhanced/effective screening (we're doing that too) or other security measures, only another sieve in the process. A secure cockpit is not a hinderance to effective crew coordination. Procedural methods ensure secure entry and exit. From you reference about the doors being locked on Sep 11, it's obvious you don't understand the functionality of existing cockpit doors.

In the interim, until proper emergency venting is developed, the risk of rapid D or duel/triple pilot incapitation is microscopic compared with the clear and present risk of losing command of the aircraft and encouraging the impression that the aircraft cockpit continues to be a soft target.

As usual, it seems those with virilent opposition to secure cockpits, falsify assumptions and inflate historically insignificant occurances in an attempt to justify their position.

Whatever the Brit & Euros do, good luck. The UK used to garner alot of American tourist money. Between Foot&Mouth and now this, we need to get the North Atlantic traffic going again, both ways and by all our airlines. If it gets any worse, I'll be one of unemployment statistics too. I know you guys are there are hurting badly as well. We've got get our pax back in their seats, and not paying sub-cost airfares. They've got to be safe AND feel safe.

[ 02 November 2001: Message edited by: Roadtrip ]

[bugg smasher]

There appears to be an attempted BALPA hijack in progress, allow me to raise some of their finer points for enhanced security screening and possible body cavity checks;

“You cannot turn the cockpit, which is the nerve centre of a complex environment, into a fortress.”

Evidently you can, however, easily turn it into a weapon of mass destruction.

“We cannot understand why the airlines didn’t first have full and frank discussions with pilots,…”

I am quite certain the “injured princess” ploy will not find sympathetic ears in the general public at large, nor will it receive much enthusiasm from New York.

“There is a suspicion that the announcements today are public relations and marketing led...”

I wonder who, exactly, are the individuals who fear to be identified as the suspicious ones. Poorly conceived strategic planning my friends, you defeat your own causes by creating sharp divisive camps within the industry, especially at a time like this. Most certainly, something needs to be done, and urgently before the whole industry slides inexorably closer to the abyss in a mire of indecision. As the elected and self-proclaimed leaders of the pilot community are not taking the initiative, someone will have to.

“The International Federation of Air Line Pilot Associations, at its Tokyo conference two weeks ago, opposed the enforced locking of flight deck doors, especially doors that are deadlocked and cannot be opened from where the pilots sit. That is the view of the whole of the world pilot community.”

That appears to be the view of the privileged few who participate in such conferences, you take yourselves rather glibly it seems. Perhaps there are El Al flight deck and cabin crew out there who would care to comment?

“It’s on the ground that terrorists need to be stopped, and new systems have been developed that are about to be trialled. Once a terrorist gets on an airliner it’s too late.”

It is too late for many things. It is not too late, however, to address and defeat the threat that exists at this very moment, passengers’ lives are the stakes with which you presently gamble. “About to be trialled” indicates an uncertain date at some point in the future, and is not, therefore, a decisive option. If the terrorists cannot be stopped with any reasonable certainty on the ground, then we must have a contingency plan for the cockpit.

This document does not in any way represent “the whole of the world pilot community”, the sheer manipulative effrontery of BALPA in presenting it as so is an appalling and disgraceful insult to the profession.

[Roadtrip]

The "whole of the world" doesn't include that little pocket of aviation, the United States. I know we're rather insignificant compared to places like Japan, the UK and Botswana, but I think we deserve recognition anyway. In this little corner of the world, both the public and pilots, by overwhelming majority, want secure cockpit doors and armed pilots for last ditch cockpit defense.

"Whole of the world" indeed. When 5 terrorists waltz into their cockpits and slice their throats and take command, maybe they'll change their minds, just before they, their passengers, and thousands on the ground die. These people are buffoons.

[Redus Baronus]

Whilst secure cockpit doors are an obvious solution, for the majority of the short haul aircraft they are completely useless if the toilet is the wrong side of them. Are we all to be catherterised and have colostomy bags? :( And call me cynical, but what is the point of having check-in and security checks if there are weapons on the aircraft. All the terrorist has to do is wait for the pilot to have a pee, and then they have both access to the cockpit and a weapon. Brilliant - NOT.

[The Guvnor]

It's really simple.

How many times - as part of a single, co-ordinated action - have airliners been used as flying bombs?

Answer: once.

How many times have aircraft suffered from pilot incapcitation, rapid decompression, loss of flight deck windows, birdstrikes/hail smashing cockpit windows?

Answer: loads.

The chances of a September 11 type attack happening again are miniscule. It was a 'spectacular' that would not have the same impact if repeated.

However, by causing the West's airlines to run around like headless chickens spending millions unnecessarily - and by deterring the pax from flying - the bad guys have won.

Don't let them.

[A and C]

What a sad bunch we are logical thinking seems to gone out of the window as we rush headlong towards a security agenda dictated by the tabloid press , yes we do need a cockpit door that will resist attack but we must be able to unlock it from all the crew seats in case we need help from the cabin crew and the cabin crew must be able to enter without help from us if they feel it is nesessary the door is just the first line of defence that we can employ in the event of an atempted hi-jack but not the most important ,however it is the only one that the tabloid press can understand and so seens to have taken on an importance out of all preportion.

BALPA are right to question the door issue after all do we realy we want the press and worst the inmates of the house of commons dictating security policy in the standard knee jerk reaction that we see from these people who just want publicity to futher there political ambitions or do we want security in depth that can only be acheved with a number of interlocking security measures that cannot be explaned in the press or dont have the "quick fix" that is needed for a bit of political self publicity.

[The Guvnor]

I along with all other BA Executive Club members received the following email today, which is really going to make me run out and fly BA ... not! :rolleyes: :eek: :rolleyes:

Dear Mr Robertson,

The additional security measures we have put in place over the last few weeks such as additional passenger and hand baggage searches, banning visits to the flight deck and preventing the carriage of sharp objects are all part of our commitment to ensuring you have a safe and secure flight with British Airways.

On 31 October, we announced the start of a major new security improvement designed to prevent unauthorised access to the flight deck. British Airways has designed a full-length metal plate which will be fitted to the exterior of cockpit doors. We will also be strengthening the door lock and hinges. Installation work has begun and will be completed as soon as possible.

This is the first stage in a continuing programme of security enhancements which compliments security improvements already introduced on the ground, at airports and across the worldwide network. British Airways currently spends 100 million pounds a year on security measures and is fully compliant with all UK Department of Transport, Local Government and the Regions (DTLR) and Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) security regulations.

The airline continues to examine a range of other security initiatives. Consideration is being given to measures such as CCTV on the flight deck and the introduction of electronic passenger blacklisting software.

You can be certain that we will do everything possible to continue to ensure that you have a safe and secure flight with us.

We look forward to welcoming you on-board soon.

Yours sincerely
David Hyde
Director of Safety and Security

[tired]

Let's get something straight - the locked cockpit door policy on British airliners has been mandated by the CAA and is a legal requirement that applies to all British airlines, not just BA and VS. The finer points of practical implementation presumably lie with the airlines themselves, but the policy itself is mandated by the CAA - as the FAA has done in the States.

Secondly, what is all this crap about cabin crew not being able to access the cockpit in case of pilot incapacitation etc etc etc rhubarb, rhubbarb, rhubarb....? I have yet to see a cockpit door that cannot be unlocked from either side and as far as I am aware it is not the intention to start now. If one of the pilots becomes incapacitated, the cabin crew will still be able to get in to help, it will merely take them a few seconds longer. You guys are missing the whole point of this policy - it is not to keep the hijackers out of the flight deck indefinitely, it is to keep them out long enough for a) the pilots to be ready to meet them with the crash axe at the ready b)to enable the cabin crew and the rest of the pax to get there to help. Do you seriously think, after 11 September, that any planeload of pax is going to sit idly by whilst someone attempts to rush the cockpit or break down the door?

I agree wholeheartedly that the place to stop these scum is on the ground, but we all know that no security system in the world is foolproof, (not even El Al's I daresay)and we therefore need a defence in depth - if they penetrate the first line, hopefully the next line will catch them. The locked cockpit door is the last line of defence - hopefully it will never be needed, and it's certainly by no means foolproof, but in the present climate it's a sensible precaution.