Concorde documentary

[Jolly Tall]

Concorde documentary just finished - not bad, nothing we didn't already know (or think we know), but anyone know why it ran nearly 15 minutes under its scheduled time? Was anything pulled at the 'last minute'?

[BEagle]

By trying to cover so many aspects of the background to the entire Concorde project, as well as focusing on the aftermath effects upon those who either lost members of their families or were directly affected by the accident, I feel that the programme lacked sufficient time to give adequate treatment to the accident itself. There was a good deal of speculation about the rights and wrongs of BA continuing commercial Concorde operation after the accident, but apart from John Hutchinson's clear statements about the potential effect of the missing undercarriage spacer, very little mention was given to the overweight take-off and the No 2 engine shutdown. No mention at all of the recent facts concerning the validity of the FO's licence, nor of the effect of this upon the aircraft's certification.
No - this was rather a lightweight effort by the BBC; John Hutchinson took great pains to avoid direct criticism of the crew and drew all his explanations from the facts presented in the interim reports whereas Christian Paris the Air France pilot saw fit only to accuse John of being 'in love' with the aircraft and contributed nothing but an air of condescension. Without wishing to appear Francophobic, I have to say that it was M Paris who was the emotional and vague commentator and Capt Hutchinson who was the clear analyst.

[ 06 September 2001: Message edited by: BEagle ]

[Evo7]

JT

It ran to schedule according to my TV guide???

Evo

[Jolly Tall]

Evo7,

Indeed - I just checked the BBC web-site for their schedule. Seems my TV guide gave erroneous times from 21:00 to 22:00. But I won't pull the posting or it will kill the entire thread.

[Evo7]

JT

Wouldn't expect you to pull it (although Danny might :) ). Interesting programme worthy of discussion. Just don't know enough personally to add much that hasn't been said here before.

[old-timer]

I respect Johns conclusions & judgement,
he is a well balanced chap who presents
the facts in a human way.

It seems it was a terrible run of
events with an awful result,
deepest respects to all lost in the accident.

[fireflybob]

I found the TV programme rather disappointing. As Beagle has so eruditely pointed out some of the facts which are in the public domain were hardly touched on.

I hope that Captain Hutchinson will publish his own findings at some date in the future.

[Jackonicko]

Anyone got a contact number or E-address for John H?

[twistedenginestarter]

It tantalisingly raised the question of why did the plane crash and then ignored it. Somewhat frustrating.

Has anyone seen any reports of simulations of the flight? Why once it was airborne did it lose control in such a sudden and spectacular fashion?

[hasell]

Its difficult to report and cover everything in the time allowed during the documentary.
Capt. Hutchinson's posistion clearly differs from the M. Paris.

Its a tough call...

I have a question though:
Is it possible to rig up a concorde simulator with the same parameters -as far as we know, to see if this situation was survivable as Capt. Hutchinson seemed to suggest?

[Arkroyal]

Typical modern touchy feely 'human interest' documentary.

High on doom-laden organ music and teary hand-wringing but low on fact.

Frustrating waste of a chance to investigate the causes.

[John Farley]

Arkroyal

My views exactly

Full marks though for a valiant solo effort by John Hutchinson to try and ventilate the issues still hanging around.

[Bally Heck]

For anyone who missed it, John Hutchinson's conclusions were published in the Observer a few weeks back. It may still be on the web.

[CCAero]

I too found the programme rather disappointing. Does anybody REALLY know the cause?

[Feathers McGraw]

Assuming that the return of the CofA means that the investigators are satisfied that they know what happened and how to prevent it, when should we expect the BEA to publish a definitive report?

Anyone know anything?

[Gaza]

The fact that the FO's medical had expired and obviously invalidated the aircrafts CofA has little or no bearing on the crash. If he had suffered a major medical incident at the time when everything was going wrong then it would have been different. The BBC lawyers probably had to ensure that nothing libelous was said ahead of the publication of the offical report. The facts presented by Capt H. are pretty much in the public domain - missing spacer, 1.5 tons of taxi fuel still on-board, unrecorded bags, etc.

CCAero - We will have to wait for the official report before we know the answer to your question.

[ 07 September 2001: Message edited by: Gaza ]

[sgt.culpepper]

Enjoyed the docu . I think it probably held the interest of the viewer throughout, which would be one of the objectives of the producers.Agree with other posts that it did not shed much new light on the causes , but then it's a legal minefield out there for anyone speculating . I thought JH was doing fine until he came up with the proposition about the fire going out ,like ,of it's own accord .What did he mean by this?. Did not come across to me as plausable and did tend to undermine the rest of his case.

[New Bloke]

I think he meant that the fuel was exiting at such a rate that the tank would have emptied itself before long.

[PAXboy]

For the regular viewer - at whom it would have been aimed - I think they did OK.

For those of us that have followed the story and take a closer interest, it was never going to be much more than background.

The one point that I would have liked to have been made is that, no other commercial aircraft has had a fleet grounded, following a single fatal crash. If the point had been put in proper context, it would show that the authorities are reacting differently to Concorde's crash than to any other.

[fen boy]

New Bloke - all the fuel tanks on each side feed into each other - it would have burnt for a long time with a flow of 65 litres per second..

[shortfinals]

John H presented his OPINIONS based on interim reports and his previous experience. But many of the things he said were still conjecture. The stuff about the supermarket trolley behaviour of the left bogey is what lack of a spacer COULD do, not necessarily what happened. A Concorde engineer acquaintance of mine told me that Mike H's scenario is unlikely. And if you look at the tyremarks on the runway (photos are in the report on the web), there's no evidence of shimmy.

I'm with John Farley on this one (see other Concorde thread). Crucifying the French crew is no way to go, and almost certainly unjustifiable. Put yourself in the seat and imagine what it would have been like. It's in that area that I particularly part company with John H's general drift.

I think the French verdict was right. John H is in love with the aeroplane, and that (plus his passion for doing things right as he sees it) overrides everything else for him. He knows what verdict he'd like to see.

We know that the tyre explosion started it all, and now that we know a lot more about the sequence of events which followed it's tempting to believe we know it all.

Sure, I have a lot of questions I would like to see answered yet, but none of the scenarios that I can see as possible would make me criticise Marty and his crew. This time I'm waiting for the full report before I make up my mind.

And do we think that the new AD, when carried out, will make Concorde safe?

At the moment I believe it will, but I am prepared to have that view challenged.

[aidybennett]

I thought they did a fair job on the programme. They obviously can't get over technical in a programme like that. Captain Hutchinson seemed to make a lot of good points. The idea of the fire going out seemed a bit unlikely, but then, he's a Concorde pilot and I'm not, so what do I know? A Concorde FO explained to me last year that they have a 'Velocity Zero-Rate-Of-Climb' Basically, Concordes delta wing produces more and more drag the slower it flies but doesn't stall, the limit is bhow much power there is available to counter the drag, hence all the noise, fuel burn etc on final approach with the nose high. I think he said that in the configeration they were in the VZROC was aroun 350 kts. If Captain Martin had rotated early beause they'd been dragged off the side of the runway by the undercarriage fault, and they then couldn't retract the gear (I understand the hydraulics for raising the undercarriage is off the left-hand engines, both of which were shut down) they obviously couldn't achieve a positive climb on two engines.
But with regard to the documentry, that kind of explaination is a bit two envolved for the general public, so apart from possibly a bit too much pathos (and please don't please don't mis-understand me, it was tragic and I have the greatist respect for the crew, passangers and people killed on the ground) I think it did a fair job.

[brockenspectre]

I thought the programme was well presented and well offered to the general public. The lack of attention to MTOW and RTOW and the breaches of both on July 25 did not (unless my attention waned) get any airing what so ever. The focus on the impact on people's lives is fine, I thought everyone concerned presented very well. The Air France guy whose name I dont' recall was a little supercilious but what I liked was his aim to ensure we understood Capt Marty to be an excellent pilot.

That Concorde should re-fly with kevlar-lined fuel tanks is excellent. That Pirelli should make new non-burstable tyres is wonderful. That all those souls should have been lost because someone didn't clear the runway...remember..the cause was a piece of titanium on runway ripping tyre and hitting fuel tank..is not acceptable. At no point in the programme did the issue of runway sweeping enter the debate...even as a passing comment surely this should have been addressed. I am glad the Suffolk Yoof Orchestra weren't involved but, excuse me, this was meant to be a programme about Concorde crash and has been timed to be broadcast just as the Goddess of the Skies (well indulge me, she is the most amazing aircraft the world has seen in passenger transportation) is due to be relicensed...

I am delighted to have had the chance to see some beautiful footage of Concorde in the air, above cloud, but I am dissatisfied that the "medja" have chosen not to pursue a serious analysis of the accident but merely to follow up on the "ground effect".

I just hope that CDG has improved on its runway sweeping policies!!

:)

[skua]

Jacko
you can probably get through to John Hutch via GAPAN. See http://www.gapan.org for details.

Skua

[Speedbird252]

Arkroyal and the legendary John Farley call it correct.

The programme was utter rubbish. I tuned in expecting a 50 minute, BBC style short but effective documetary that outlined the aircrafts History, the events leading up to the accident and all that has currently been done since, with BA and AF to get her back where she should be - on revenue flights. The programme from the very start was backed with sad and tragic sounding music, with the kind of still photography you would associate with a murder hunt. An insight to the backgounds of the people, friends and families involved was the backbone of the programme, with a star perfomance by a waitress at the hotel where the aircraft came down. All of us have major condolences for every one involved in this tragic event. The poor people of Borrusia Munchen-Gladbach, the aircraft crew, and the four people who died at the hotel. But, to call the programme "The History of Concorde" defies belief. I guess if you make a real bad programme, about a well touchy subject, youve got to call it something interesting to get the public to watch it.

Thank god for John Hutchinson. The French didnt like what he said much - we arent out to annoy people, but if you are just relaying factual accounts as John was, it wouldnt be right to shoot the messenger, would it......?

Too much drama, not enough fact.

Regards, Ppruners

Speedy.

:mad:

[PETERJ]

Yup it was a sad programme all right and I think it would have hit a spot in most non-technical viewers. Apart from the loss of life there was also the loss of a beatiful machine and possibly confidence in sharp end technology.
The spacer/shimmy theory is the first I have heard of it but I recall a sory that the French President Chirac was sitting in a stationary plane at CDG at the time and Concorde was heading in the general direction of the presidential plane at one point during the take off run...Shimmy ?.

Incidentally I understand that Captain Marty PIC Concorde made an attempt to windsail across the Atlantic in his younger
days and a documentary of this appeared on UK TV.

[Covenant]

shortfinals

And do we think that the new AD, when carried out, will make Concorde safe?

Don't ever let the general public hear you say that! :)

Forgive me it was unintentional, but use of the word "safe" in that context is very problematic. It means different things to different people. To an engineer like myself, saftey is a quantifiable parameter, like any other. To most people in the street it is an absolute: something is either safe or it's not safe. If it's not safe, then they want to know why the hell they should fly in it and, if someone's been hurt or killed, how much compensation they can get from someone because it wasn't designed right!

Are you implying that it wasn't safe before the AD? Are you implying that it is 100% safe after? These are the sorts of questions and demands that the guy in the street has.

I think Concorde always was a "safe" aircraft; and I use that in the sense that there is a high safety factor - so to speak. With the mods, it is now safer, which can only be a good thing!

I think there is a very high probability that under exactly the same circumstances, the AD would prevent exactly the same accident from happening again. But then, what is the probability that exactly the same circumstances will transpire again?

Still, if the money spent on the mods gives Joe Public (or even the CAA) a warm and fuzzy feeling about flying the old bird again, then I'm happy. Long may she continue to grace our skies.

[ 07 September 2001: Message edited by: Covenant ]

[BEagle]

Jackonicko - e-mail me direct and I will forward your e-mail to John H asking him to reply to you.
John Farley - your statement in this thread is, in my humble opinion, absolutely correct.

[Jackonicko]

BEagle,

Wilco!

All,
I don't want to get into criticising Captain Marty for his handling of the emergency after crossing the main road (I had earlier (on another strand) questioned whether others felt that they'd have turned for Le Bourget earlier, and perhaps traded a small but steady rate of climb for more airspeed, and even whether the final turn was too slow and too tight) - especially after John Farley and Covenant have expressed their belief that he was doing an excellent job in handling the aeroplane. Who am I, a humble (?) PPL, to question....

But even if we don't question the Captain's handling or judgement in that final phase of the flight, that doesn't mean we should either blame or absolve the crew of blame entirely - and I think we should continue to ask questions about the human and CRM factors involved.

Shortfinals:
You say that "Crucifying the French crew is no way to go, and almost certainly unjustifiable. Put yourself in the seat and imagine what it would have been like."

I would hope that any professional pilot putting himself in Captain Marty's seat wouldn't have deliberately and knowingly taxied out and taken off overweight, and would have acted differently on learning of the change in wind direction, since that increased the discrepancy between ATOW and RTOW to an unacceptable extent.

I would hope that any flight engineer putting himself in the French FE's seat would similarly have not shut down the No.2 engine at that stage of the flight.

I would hope that no FE would shut down an engine without a direct command to do so from the Captain or handling pilot.

I would hope (though with less vigour and much less confidence!) that any Captain would have made some reassuring or explanatory remark in response to his FO's repeated shouts of 'airspeed!'.

"none of the scenarios that I can see as possible would make me criticise Marty and his crew."

What would you have done when you realised that ATOW was above MTOW, even before you taxied, and perhaps even above max structural for taxying, then?

What would you have done when you realised that ATOW was way above RTOW when you reached the threshold then?

If you'd have done the same as they did, then there's no reason for criticism, but if (as I suspect) you'd have done your job according to the rules and regs, then there are grounds for asking questions at least, even if they imply a degree of possible or potential criticism.

Personally, I'd question the risk perception of a pilot who attempted to surf-board across the Atlantic. I can't see that as indicating anything other than enormous self confidence, courage and probably skill, strength and intellectual toughness too - but (on the flip side) might also suggest a fairly cavalier attitude to conventional perceptions of risk and procedure. That said, of course, there are individuals who can exhibit entirely different characteristics in different areas of their lives, and a careful, methodical plodder on the flight deck may be a devil-may-care exhibitionist and dare-devil on the water, in bed, or on the racetrack, or whatever, but may never let one set of characteristics intrude into another area of his life. Captain Marty may well have been such a man.

[one four sick]

What Concorde programme can call itself complete without an iterview with Chris Orlebar? The man who flew Concorde, wrote the Concorde Story and is now preparing a sequel - not to be missed.
The programme was disjointed in it's direction, a mishmash of fact and fiction. Shame.

[Seat 32F]

Jackonicko

Having only very limited aviation experience I am hesitant to raise this question again in an aviation professionals' forum, but you've touched upon a subject that I am curious to explore: ie how risk assessments are made on the flight deck.

When I asked a question about this following last year's SQ009 accident it appeared that there is no formal risk assessment process for weighing up the combined effect of the myriad factors that could effect the safety of a flight, but that a go / no-go decision relied mostly on the Captain's (and sometimes FO's) instincts.

Formal risk assessment is a practice that seems to me could benefit the whole aviation industry, but from what I was told, it doesn't appear to take place. In an industry that strives to project itself as safety-conscious, and with the enormous financial implications that accrue from a serious accident, I find it somewhat incredible that such systems are not in place.

Has anyone else considered this aspect? It seems to me that if such a process had been applied, the three or four factors regarding weight, windspeed, maintenance of the runway etc., may well have resulted in a risk index that would have said to all involved 'this flight should not go ahead until 'x' has happened'.

[Al Weaver]

Risk management decisions are not new to aviation safety and are commonly employed in manufacturer recommendations regarding retrofits and/or maintenance.

The fundamental basis of risk management is the understanding of average risk assumed in the design and operation of the product vs. what additional risk may added on top of the average for a specific flight.

In hindsight, factors of differences exist for individual flights and it is the risk management objective to limit these differences. However the biggest risk contributor has always been the "unknown" risk of problems not yet identified (hidden) which significantly contribute to the average assumed risk. With this in mind typical risk limitations are applied to the individual known contributions depending on their individual severity quotient (incident, or accident, or catastrophe etc.).

In summary, for the known risks there may have been nothing wrong in continuing the flight, assuming the risks were within expected variation levels.

[Seat 32F]

That's fine but as I see it, what you have outlined only looks at various factors in isolation of others.

Accidents tend to happen not just as a single failure in design or decision, but because two or more things have gone wrong in a sequence of events.

So I am talking about risk assessment where the combinations of known limitations and factors (that in themselves may be acceptable) are examined to see whether there is any factor that, when interacting with one or more other factors, takes the overall risk factor above an acceptable level.

Of course there will always be the 'unknown' risks, but if you have a sufficient margin of comfort with all the others, then you are better able to deal with a sudden emergency than when you are right up against the limit of safety and then something unforeseen occurs ...

[ 08 September 2001: Message edited by: Seat 32F ]

[basil fawlty]

I did not see the programme, so therefore cannot comment on it directly, but having read most of this thread there are a couple of things that I would like to add.
In circumstances such as this, it is often all too easy and convenient to place at least some, if not all, of the blame on to the flightcrew. These guys are dead and therefore cannot defend themselves, and can be libled and slandered with no recourse.
Okay, so what if the first officers medical certificate was lapsed, illegal yes, unprofessional yes, but did it contribute to the events in any way? No. Also, unless every crewmember, passenger, bag, cargo panier and galley cart is individually weighed then there will be an error in actual TOW. Using average assumed weights will yield an approximate TOW only. There will also be errors due to inaccuracies in the fuel quantity indicating system. I'd be very surprised if there was not at least a 1% error between estimated and actual TOW's on most big jet flights. Perf charts are factored to take account of all this, and again, 1.5 tonnes overweight did not contribute to what happened, so why bring it up??? We already know the chain of events; FOD, high energy tyre failure, fuel tank puncture etc. etc.
Lastly, this talk of missing shims. JH is a nice guy (met him a couple of times), and no doubt a skilled and experienced aviator, but it seems he just said too much here. In my experience (as a flight engineer and ex spanner basher!) most pilots are just not qualified to make such comments, their only technical knowledge coming from ATPL textbooks. Most would not know what a shim was, let alone what it was for!

[Magnus Picus]

It is fair to say that the one of the conclusions of the producers of this documentary was to question the morality of the key decision makers in British Airways.

Whereas British Airways saw the S.O.P. of Air France as an ingredient towards this terrible tragedy, it was distinctly disrespectful to ever murmur such accusations so close to the event. I felt the program made a strong case to once again call to task the sour/disrespectful/poorly informed/arrogant directors of BA. Will the senior heirarchy within British Airways EVER learn? The bullying attitude has eroded a once polished brand into an embarrasing outfit to work for.

I wish all those who operate Concorde, a quiet time for the next few years....but could you choose someone different to speak on your behalf other than your current Chief? What an ;) rse

[Al Weaver]

Quote from above

"So I am talking about risk assessment where the combinations of known limitations and factors (that in themselves may be acceptable) are
examined to see whether there is any factor that, when interacting with one or more other factors, takes the overall risk factor above an
acceptable level.

Of course there will always be the 'unknown' risks, but if you have a sufficient margin of comfort with all the others, then you are better able to
deal with a sudden emergency than when you are right up against the limit of safety and then something unforeseen occurs ..."

The design regulation JAR 25.1309 and its advisory material do call for assessing the combinations of risks and of course the subsequent limitations to flight in the maintenance and operating manuals do take this into account. My risk management comments had more to do with continued airworthiness and the expected variations among the contributing causes.

I don't believe that there is a lack of process.

[Egg Mayo]

This post may be slightly inappropriate for this particular thread. If it is, I'll edit if required, but here goes.

The programme touched upon the fact BA fitted the "deflector" across the main under carriage wheels, whereas Air France apparently did not. However, towards the end of the programme, we were shown an Air France Concorde with the "deflector" fitted. [The registration of the aircraft was F-BVFB]

Can anyone clarify? Or have I mis-interpreted the facts/evidence as they were presented on the programme?

Digressing, the for the "quality" of the programme, it did attempt to cater for two camps; on one hand, the intelligent, science, technology minded viewer and on the other, Joe Average.

[ 08 September 2001: Message edited by: Egg Mayo ]

[Georgeablelovehowindia]

Egg Mayo: All Concordes have the spray deflector fitted. However, after a tyre burst incident, BA modified it so that in such an event, it couldn't fly off and cause damage. Air France allegedly didn't carry out this mod.

[twistedenginestarter]

Reading the transcript of the crash the crew seemed to behave utterly impeccably.

It would appear the plane just became unflyable as the flames burned away the control surfaces.

[Jackonicko]

Basil and twisted,

Please see the previous threads before telling us all how impeccably the crew behaved, and how the weight was of no consequence.

Whether or not the excessive weight (way more than a tonne once they were dealing with the tailwind) may have been a factor is a question that's been hotly disputed by those with greater expertise than I, but most agree that the crew's failure to ensure that they met the legalities of MTOW and RTOW represented a fairly major breach of good practise, and marked a significant failure to exercise their professional responsibilities. They knowingly taxied out and took off above the maximum structural weight (let alone RTOW) and then failed to recalculate RTOW in the event of the wind changing from a headwind to an eight knot tailwind. This is much worse than the misapplication of formulae used to calculate baggage weights. Moreover, the FE's independent decision to shut down an engine is also worthy of comment and question, if not outright condemnation.

I would be the first to decry the regrettable (and unfortunately common) practise of blaming dead aircrew for an accident - but would be equally vociferous if mistakes or poor practise were to be covered up in the name of 'maintaining reputations' or not upsetting grieving families.

NO-ONE IS CONDEMNING CAPTAIN MARTY OR HIS CREW - though some of us are asking questions about some of their actions. Mistakes and poor decision making may be inevitable in extreme circumstances, and are not a matter for gloating or condemnation, but may be a matter for consideration and deliberation, and certainly for questions and analysis. And do you think a man with the obvious character of Marty (see some moving posts on previous threads by people who knew him) would not want others to benefeit from an analysis of all the factors in this terrible tragedy?

And while it's legitimate to accuse anyone who asks about Marty's handling of the emergency after take off (speed, height control, turn rate, timing of the turn) of speculation, it is also speculation to suggest that "the plane just became unflyable as the flames burned away the control surfaces." There is no hard evidence to support this hypothesis, I'm afraid. And I thought that a plane was a carpentry tool?

BTW, Basil, mate, before you start condemning ATPL's as being "just not qualified to make such comments, their only technical knowledge coming from ATPL textbooks" may I point out that you leave yourself open to provoking equally infantile and over-generalistic comments about 'illiterate' engineers. Is libel really such a hard one to spell? :D

[TwoTun]

Fen Boy;
you said:
<New Bloke - all the fuel tanks on each side feed into each other - it would have burnt for a long time with a flow of 65 litres per second.. >

Once Tank 5 emptied itself through the hole, the crew could have stopped fuel from any other tank feeding into Tank 5. The controls are on the FE's panel, and would have been a simple thing to do.

I also seem to remember that the leak rate was calculated to be somewhere in the region of 100 litres per second, or about 10 tonnes per minute.
:)

[Vfrpilotpb]

Would the slightly odd fact of Cptn Martys lack of full medical cert, have had any implications on the Air France insurance cover, and is that why they seem to have made a very quick( for accident type settlements that is) settlement for all of the pax? And could that be why they have instigated legal proceedings in the hope of some recovery from some third party A/C operator?

[WOK]

AAAaaaarghh - MAGNUS PICUS:

I appreciate your sentiments, but let me make this clear to everyone who may suffer the same misapprehension:-

JOHN H. IS RETIRED AND NOTHING TO DO WITH THE CONC FLEET!

Yes I did intend to shout...

[Flap 5]

I have also seen the program and I don't recall anyone criticizing the crew, accept at one point where John Hucthinson stated that he would be interested to know why the FE shut down the no.2 engine. I thought that his contribution to the program and to the investigation was excellent and the fact that he is now retired has no bearing on his knowledge of Concorde.

The AF pilot was overly protective of AF, obviously concerned at the legal ramifications of AF being found negiligent in any way. This is a cynical attitude after so many people died in such an appalling accident.

The fact that the F/O's medical had expired is a red herring and only applies to the legality of the flight crew.

John Hutchinson did mention the fact that the aircraft was overweight due to the excess taxi fuel, baggage and the tailwind. Does that make him 'in love' with the aircraft? (only a Frenchman could say that)!

[ 09 September 2001: Message edited by: Flap 5 ]

[Magnus Picus]

WOK - I wasn't referring to JH. It was MB I spoke of.

[basil fawlty]

Jackonicko,
You obviously have absolutely no idea about acting as a professional flightcrew member, especially in an abnormal/emergency situation. What should have been done in your (theoretical) opinion will probably make most of the real professional aviators reading it laugh out loud at your naivity. Yes, the flight was not perfect, but thats the real world mate, and the points you raise HAD ABSOLUTELY NO EFFECT ON THE EVENTUAL (SAD) OUTCOME.
If you would care to re-read my last post you will see that I said IN MY EXPERIENCE many pilots technical knowledge is not of a level to make such comments. I stand by that statement regardless of whatever anyone else says. Could your average ATPL change a brakepack for example? or even know where to start? You are trying to lecture a well qualified individual here, and sorry "mate" but it just makes you look sad.....

[twistedenginestarter]

Jackonicko

You are being very adamant about this thing but I'm struggling to pick up the substance of your argument.

Go over to 747Focal's thread on Tech Log and read the official (albeit French) report.

The crew did just what I would expect. The No 2 engine had to be switched off. The captain called for fire drill. There was no argument. Maybe the Flight Engineer made the decision but it was exactly what the captain was going to call for anyway.

The plane was maintaining height and 200 kts for quite a while. Then it crashed. So far I have to agree with the report - physical damage caused the control system(s) to start to fail. It didn't need much given the extreme nature of the situation.

Now tell me what the crew did wrong.

If this is all true then the documentary was correct to paint the picture it did.

The moment the DC10 rubbing strip fell onto the runway, the fate of all those people was sealed.

The documentary just looked out how the final drama was played out. There was little else to add.

[Seat 32F]

The moment the DC10 rubbing strip fell onto the runway, the fate of all those people was sealed.

So if the runway had been swept before Concorde's departure, the accident would not have happened. Which leads me to ask:

1 - what is the normal frequency of take off / landings before runways are swept.

2 - would the runway normally be swept anyway in advance of a Concorde take off / landing given its known vulnerability of tyre damage.

[Jackonicko]

Basil

1) Most of the questions I have raised were also raised by current, practising ATPLs or heavy jet military pilots. Pilots, mark you, not flight engineers, and most of these questions involve an element of judgement as to CRM, the responsibilities of the aircraft captain, and the handling of large commercial aircraft.

2) My 'naive' comments are clearly a product of my training (RAFGSA, RAFVR (UAS), BAFC, etc.). Strangely all of those organisations stressed the need to slavishly adhere to legal maxima and minima and dictated that in emergency, one should stick to established procedure, and not to 'make it up as you go along'.

3) To state that taking off several tonnes overweight, (perhaps with an out-of-limits c of g) careering off the runway thanks to the missing spacer, rotating early (for whatever reason) and having the FE shut down an engine when it was still producing thrust had no effect on the eventual outcome makes you look foolish, not me. As does your apparent contempt for the technical knowledge and abilities of your fellow industry professionals, and your arrogance "I stand by that statement regardless of whatever anyone else says." Mate.


Twisted,

From your profile, I don't know if I'm arguing with a fellow aviator or not, but if your line is that the accident report is right, end of story, then your confidence in it is an example to many highly qualified and experienced pilots.

Naturally I have read the report (in all three versions) and must say that the disparity between structural MTOW, ATOW and RTOW which it reveals is quite breathtaking, as was the manner in which the crew took over the planning from the despatcher when he started being 'troublesome' about the weight. Suffice it to say that many professionals are uneasy about the way in which elements in the chain which clearly had some influence on the disaster were either ignored or dismissed. I suggest that you read the last two Concorde accident threads (one started by me, then one by BEagle) and examine the profiles of those commenting on these factors. Perhaps you'd explain why the factors raised are irrelevant, rather than enjoining us to believe and accept the official report uncritically.

Why do you choose to believe the BEA report over the report prepared by AF Concorde aircrew for the French magistrate, by the way?

I happen to accept that the tyre burst probably was caused by FOD (the magistrates report does not, quoting evidence showing that the tyre had already burst by the time it ran over the strip) and even that the strip came from the Continental DC10 (again, many do not accept this as the origin of the strip).

Moreover, one must question whether a 37 cycle tyre (no BA Concorde tyre does this many landings) would have burst had it not been subject to the stress of an overweight take off (perhaps even a succession of overweight take offs) 'scrubbing' sideways thanks to the missing spacer? Or even whether a Dunlop tyre would have shed debris large enough to cause this kind of result on the tank?

One must also ask whether the hydraulic/hydrostatic shock which caused the tank to explode outwards was a function of its having been filled past its maximum capacity? A slightly emptier tank may have absorbed the shock of the tyre hitting its underside, whereas the fuel in the 'full to bursting' tank had 'nowhere to go'.

Concorde has survived tyre bursts and massive fuel leaks before, however, and what was different in this accident was that there was an ignition source and that the aircraft failed to gain and maintain sufficient airspeed to stay in the air long enough to reach Le Bourget. Hence the relevance of the engine shutdown, and the question of airspeed/altitude and the final turn.

Ask yourself the question. Had it been within its legal, certificated weight limits, and had the crew opted to take off into wind, and had the tyres been newer, and had the fuel tank been emptier, and had the aircraft's undercarriage been serviceable (and thus had the aircraft accelerated more normally) and had the FE not shut down the engine, and had the Captain reached a higher airspeed, and had he turned for Le Bourget even as he crossed the road, would the aircraft still have departed and killed everyone on board?

And they call it a single-cause accident.

Barking! :D

[Al Weaver]

Quote

"
So if the runway had been swept before Concorde's departure, the accident would not have happened. Which leads me to ask:

1 - what is the normal frequency of take off / landings before runways are swept.

2 - would the runway normally be swept anyway in advance of a Concorde take off / landing given its known vulnerability of tyre damage."

The above seems to be focused on the initiating events. This is normally reserved to lawyers attempting to assign blame among multiple imperfections they care little about understanding.

There are hundreds of initiating events that occur each day in commercial flights yet almost none result in a catastrophic result such as a crash. This is because the design of the product has considered that these events will occur, even with multiple interactions, and that some consequences will result. The design intent was to minimize the number of likely interactions and to mitigate or apply barriers such that the consequential result will not be catastrophic to the passengers. It was therefore assumed that planes using runways would leave parts behind occasionally. If you have ever walked in the grass beside a runway, you would find enough parts to build an aircraft someday.

It was also assumed that some of these parts would cause cut tyres and even flat tyres. After all this data has been documented and recorded on all types of aircraft for years. However, the frequency of a blown tyre causing a fuel tank rupture is extremely rare indeed, no doubt due to the robustness of the fuel tank structure to the more hazardous (size number and release speed of) uncontained engine fragment.

Then after the aircraft was certified under these assumptions, new data became available which raised issues ,not about the initiating event (debris on the runway), but the consequential assumptions of energetic tyre ruptures that could/would puncture fuel tank skins. Some of these lessons were recognized and reinforcing and better understanding of these lessons has now been brought home with the recertification of the aircraft after the unexpected catastrophic accident. What is now being dealt with is a key part of the accident causal chain that will be most practical to interrupt.

Anybody who thinks that the can eliminate the initiating part of the causal chain is kidding themselves.

[Seat 32F]

lomapaseo

Thankyou. I apologise for asking naive questions, and no I am not a lawyer. But regardless of everything else, surely if it was known that Concorde was especially susceptible to the consequences of tyre damage then would it not have been a rudimentary precaution to ensure that the chances of this happening were minimised by the expedient of a runway sweep before each departure? Or is this a 'let's assume we'll get away with it this time' scenario?

[BEagle]

So, basil, 'the flight was not perfect but that's the real world' eh? Are you saying then, that in your 'real world', lip service is paid to performance calculations and that questioning CRM standards is, for some reason, not acceptable? Commercial pressures encouraging flight crews to take short cuts to which airlines turn a blind eye can never be acceptable. Does that sort of thing go on in your airline? If so, please tell us for whom you fly so that we can choose a safer carrier?
The company culture which led to what must be now be well documented errors must seriously be in question; perhaps Concorde's fire would never have happened if the aircraft hadn't been put at risk before the take-off roll was even begun.

Accident inquiries seek the truth these days, they do not apportion blame. Some very searching questions have been posed on this thread - but there has also, regrettably, been considerable nonsense posted by others.

[shortfinals]

One of the early factors in the BA decision to keep flying after the accident was the fact that it had reinforced the water deflector and AF had not.

So isn't it interesting that one of the requirements in the new airworthiness directive for recertification states that the water deflectors are NOT to be reinforced. Reinforcing the deflector, apparently, may make it marginally less likely to become a missile, but renders it a much more dangerous missile if it separates.

So if BA's first justification for mounting it's high horse is now judged to be a faulty premise, I wonder what else has yet to be revealed?

Of course, like some of the other factors which have been mentioned in this thread, the water deflector was, in the first interim report, ruled out as a cause or a factor in this accident. But the CAA and DGAC both know that it has punctured the wing at least once before and presumably want to minimise any effects if it happens again. Incidentally, the water deflectors have to be remodelled anyway because the new Michelin (not Pirelli) tyres have slightly different dimensions.

I must admit that, for all John H's good intentions and his evident pride in BA's Concorde operating standards (and incidentally, I believe BA's standards ARE high), I think he has probably done the company's image more harm than good in this programme.

I agree, Orlebar ought to have been given a say as well. His style would have contrasted with John H's and produced a more balanced result.

[Jackonicko]

Iom

To be strictly accurate, the tank was not punctured by tyre debris, it was burst from within by hydraulic/hydrostatic shock. The tyre debris hit the underside of the tank, and set up a shock wave inside the tank, which 'bounced back' and caused a rupture. This rupture from within 'blew out' a much larger piece of tank than a penetrative hole might have caused. This is why it is interesting to ask whether a less full tank have burst in the same way?

[D Beaver]

There is an excellent article on the Concorde accident and the issues surrounding it in the August/September issue of the Smithsonian Air & Space magazine. A summary of the article and a sample of the magnificent photography can be seen at http://www.airspacemag.com/asm/mag/latest.html.

More interestingly, on the same site, is the text of the passenger's report to the NTSB about the 1979 Dulles incident http://www.airspacemag.com/ASM/mag/supp/AS01/Concorda nce.html (http://www.airspacemag.com/ASM/mag/supp/AS01/Concordance.html). The difficulty that the passenger had in getting the cabin crew to appreciate the situation makes for scary reading.

[ 10 September 2001: Message edited by: D Beaver ]

[fen boy]

As I understand it one of the main reasons for the removal of the cable from the water deflector is that, in the unlikely event, that the new tyres do burst then they will shed smaller parts in a different spread than the old tyres did. Hence the manufacturers changed view on the deflector.

[basil fawlty]

Jackonicko, (copy BEagle!)

You seem to think that everything in commercial aviation is clear cut in black and white, but in reality there are many grey areas. Yes, of course we all strive for perfection and precision as professional crews (via the use of SOP's, operating limits etc.), but, sometimes, through no fault of our own, the chain of events and the "system" we have to operate in means that this is not quite attained from time to time. This is what safety margins are for....to ensure a SAFE operation under REAL WORLD CONDITIONS.
Where exactly did I state that the a/c was "several tonnes" overweight?? Bit of a journalistic exaggeration there. IF the a/c was 1.5 tonnes overweight, then I believe that this is only 0.8% of MTOW and 0.9% of RTOW. The rotation speed is typically around 160 kts, so even a 5 kt tailwind component will add a relatively short extra distance to the TO run, given the high acceleration rate of the Concorde aircraft.
Both of these factors are absorbed easily into the available performance margins. This is NOT a desirable scenario, but the a/c got airborne OK. The problems that caused the crash were totally seperate.
I have discussed the dreadful event with friends who have flown Concorde in service at BA, and they agree with my comments.
It is very easy to say the crew should have done this, or the crew shouldn't have done that, blah blah blah. I think that the crew played a fair hand with the cards that they were dealt, and you, mate, are in no position to offer respectable criticism.
Finally with reference to the technical knowledge of ATPL's, I can speak only as I find...Some good, some less so. It is adequate for the day to day normal operation but abnormal/emergency situations?? When our a/c have gone tech away from base the best thing that the pilots can do is go and sip coffee in the terminal cafeteria!! When certain pilots (especially on TV progs) start waxing lyrical about such and such part was wrong/missing/needed changing etc. then they are out of their depth. Sorry, but thats a FACT.

[Jackonicko]

Well over the maximum legal structural weight. Even more over the RTOW for that day's conditions (estimated at 6 tonnes). Fuel tanks over-filled to bursting. Faulty undercarriage maintenance. A 37-cycle tyre pushed beyond its limits? An engine shut down at the wrong time, with catastrophic results. Unanswered questions all over the place. Great unease expressed by AF Concorde aircrew with the BEA report. But you ('cos you know so much more than these mere pilots) know better. It would be funny, were your attitude not so dangerous.

[basil fawlty]

Jackonicko,
It seems to me that it is YOU that THINKS he knows better than everyone else. As I stated previously, my opinions are broadly concurred with by BA Concorde pilots. What qualification do you have to argue against their knowledge and experience?
It seems to me that if I told you my favourite colour was blue, you would try and lecture me that it was not!!
The REAL skill in COMMERCIAL aviation is not purely passing exams and flight tests. It is turning in a consistently SAFE operation despite all of the factors that would cause otherwise.
I will state one more time....
There were mistakes made, the flight was not perfect, BUT the aircraft ultimately crashed for one reason only; because IT WAS SEVERELY ON FIRE.

[Jackonicko]

I listen to what those with relevant experience tell me. Unless and until your wife and all your family bombard me with suggestions that your favourite colour is red, and until I see that you have a red car and wear red shirts and a red hat, I wouldn't dream of questioning your colour choice.

I only wish that some-one could allay my fears and concerns over all of the factors which have been mentioned in this and other threads. I don't prtend to know better than anyone - my role is to weigh and evaluate what evidence others bring to the party.

I would take your opinion much more seriously had you not attempted to undermine the credibility of other experts by casting generalised aspersions at their technical competence, and had you not expressed such contempt and disregard for rules, regulations and procedures. Flying should never be an intuitive game.

Finally, you are factually incorrect. The aircraft did not crash because it was on fire. It crashed because the crew lost control (which may or may not have been as a result of control problems caused by the fire). The aircraft crashed because drag exceeded lift.

[cosmo kramer]

Jackonicko:
Finally, you are factually incorrect...
...The aircraft crashed because drag exceeded lift.

I think you are mixing things up now, Jackonicko. You might want to study basic aerodynamic before telling other people how incorrect they are. "Drag exceeded lift", is nonsense. Drag exceeded THRUST.

[Northern Lights]

basil, did your Concorde friends agree that 160 kts was a typical rotate speed?

John Farley, from another thread:


aircraft at MTOW (185,070 kg) at LHR, on an ISA day with zero wind:

V1: 164 kts
VR: 193 kts
V2: 215 kts


I showed these to a Concorde pilot I had dinner with recently, who agreed with JF's figures.

I was also told that there is a maximum tyre groundspeed limit of 217 kts, and that a 5 kt tailwind might not extend the take off length very much, but it had to be taken into account to avoid the tyres being overspeeded whilst still on the runway.

[Jackonicko]

Cosmo

Many thanks!

Many apologies!

Quite correct!

But being on fire alone was not the cause.

[basil fawlty]

Northern Lights,
Typo error on my part. yes, rotation speed at MTOW 193 kts. I stand corrected.

[basil fawlty]

Jackonicko,

ONE LAST TIME......
I DO NOT DISREGARD ANY PROCEDURES/LIMITATIONS/RULES. How dare you imply that I do. (I hold flight engineer, maintenance engineer and commercial pilots licences). I am simply saying that there is more to it than that, going by the book is very important, but it is just one facet of the job. If you were any sort of "professional" aviator you would realise what I'm on about. What I'm talking about here is called airmanship, and is, to a degree intuitive. This comes only with experience, and it seems you have little of that with regards to airline flying.

[SPIT]

Is JACKONICO a WIND UP MERCHANT or what??? :rolleyes:

[BEagle]

Probably time to put this thread to bed now. The Concorde accident revealed many other areas of concern regarding its operation by Air France; without doubt it ultimately crashed after departing controlled flight, but the causal factors were not restricted to alleged FOD alone, it would seem.

Others have suggested that commercial operators push the envelope of safety; if that is true, it is outrageous. Whilst commercial pressures exist, as we well know, the Captain, not a FE, not a maintenance worker and not a company bean counter, is the person who is ultimately responsible for the safe conduct of any flight. The Company might be considered to be part of the crew in the CRM process which exists to give the Captain the best advice and assistance in HIS/HER decision making - but it is NOT sitting in the driving seat.

Poor marketing might kill an airline; however, poor operations will certainly kill people.

[ 15 September 2001: Message edited by: BEagle ]

[Jackonicko]

Basil,

Apologies. I'd interpreted you as saying that intuition was more important than procedure. You had seemed rather dismissive of the breaches of rules and regs by the Concorde crew that day, and seemed unwilling to condemn such lapses. Thank you for clarifying your position, which I now take to be that procedures and regulations are vital, compulsory and non-negotiable, but which may be interpreted with the benefeit of experience and intuition. I now assume that you wouldn't condone taking off overweight, but don't feel that it was all that relevant in this instance. If that's a useful summary of your position, then we agree, and I apologise for misunderstanding you.

(Edited to add that I'm an amatuer aviator, but, I hope, one with a professional attitude to airmanship!)

[ 16 September 2001: Message edited by: Jackonicko ]

[Bluemax2]

Could the tragic events last Tuesday be the saviour of Concorde as the rich and famous wont have to travel with the riff raff and therefore far less chance of this happening on a CONCORDE???