FAA to get Airbus to update de-pressurisation procedures?

[newswatcher]

Reuters reports on last year's AA Miami incident.

"Responding to the death of a flight attendant who was sucked out of a parked jet last year, U.S. safety regulators said on Wednesday they want to make sure pilots flying Airbus Industrie A300-600 series planes are better informed about cabin pressure operations.

The National Transportation Safety Board, in a letter to the Federal Aviation Administration, said it wanted the FAA to require that Airbus update its flight manual on proper procedures for operating the pressurization system.

According to the letter released on Wednesday, investigators want to make sure the crew knows that the plane will not automatically depressurize after landing if the pressurization system is being operated manually.

Last November an American Airlines flight carrying 133 passengers and crew made an emergency landing at Miami International Airport after experiencing a pressurization problem minutes into a flight to Port Au Prince, Haiti.

The crew switched to manual operation of the pressurization system and the plane landed safely. However, when a flight attendant opened the left front door during the emergency evacuation, he was sucked out of the aircraft and killed.


Although the investigation is ongoing, preliminary findings revealed that air pressure inside the cabin caused the door to burst open, the safety board said.

The captain began, but did not complete the checklist on manual pressurization "because of other priorities," investigators said.

But the safety board found neither the Airbus A300-600 manual nor American Airlines one for that plane state that the plane will not automatically depressurize after landing if the pressurization system is being operated manually."

[AhhhVC813]

It must say somewhere in the procedures for using manual control of the pressurisation; "During Final Approach - MAN V/S CTL........FULL UP" which opens the outflow valves and depressurises the aircraft. and also a caution to check the diff is zero before opening the doors.
If it doesn't then it is an Airbus procedural thing, if it does then what else should they do????

[newswatcher]

Apparently, because the pilot interrupted the Cabin Pressurisation Manual Control Checklist, the de-pressurisation did not take place after landing. It was not clear from either of the manuals that an incomplete checklist would have this result.

In fact, the investigation found that de-pressurisation would still have taken substantially longer than specified, because of blockages affecting both outflow valves, by insulation blankets.

The NTSB safety recommendation may be found at:

http://www.ntsb.gov/recs/letters/2001/A01_16_22.pdf




[This message has been edited by newswatcher (edited 10 May 2001).]

[SKYDRIFTER]

CURIOUS -

It would appear that the FAA is protecting the questionable maintenance standards or the FAA Approved check list standards, as opposed to looking at the factual cause.

The maintenance practices and the checklist procedures, being FAA approved, obviously need the attention. Breaking a checklist is sometimes necessary, but only with a compelling reason. Certainly, the crew had that, with the fire warnings going off.

Agreed that the description of the event didn't make a difference with the blankets choking the outflow valves.

In the meantime, there remains the issue of the check list interruption with apparently a false warning or an actual fire in conjunction with the event.

This smacks of something major being covered-up. Perhaps the infamous 'Tombstone Agency' has graduated to the extreme that not even a body count will make a difference. In the Alaska 261 case, that also seems to be the case.

Three things become automatically suspect:

1. Who in their right mind would expect the airplane to AUTOMATICALLY depressurize with the system switched to the MANUAL mode - duh!

2. With the pressurization gauge staring them in the face, how can the FAA state that the crew was unaware? Bewildered by the events, for sure.

3. Not even the MANUAL pressurization was working, so why did the crew presume automatic operation of any kind?

Add to the events, the fact that the door slide not only failed to inflate, but fell to the ground. How many mistakes does the FAA permit?

Chaos, being the scenario, I'm highly sympathetic to the human factors in the actual scene, but the FAA making excuses based on the manufacturer's procedures is ludicrous. The FAA bought them, what's the problem in that picture. MANUAL vs. AUTOMATIC is pretty redundant.

With the Federal Law being changed to relieve the FAA of its historic safety liability, the flying public is left to pay the price. Check that one out.

With safety legitimately in question at American, the TWA buyout was insane, in the first place. The LA Times previously quoted the FAA as rating American as "...the carrier with the worst safety record."

With TWA-800 in the background, the FAA did it up big, particularly with no evaluation on the safety aspect of the buyout.

Note the NTSB handholding with the FAA in the report. The fox is locked in the henhouse.

But, remember that American IS a Texas corporation.


[This message has been edited by SKYDRIFTER (edited 10 May 2001).]

[Wino]

Skydrifter

In this case you don't know anything about the A300-605R and you are waaaay off base.

There are 2 outflow valves with 3 motors driving each of them. Airbus manuals (not just the company AA ones) stated that the Ram Air switch would operate any time it was depressed leading to a rapid depressurization, hence the "Caution do not use above 1 PSI warning". 1 motor drives the auto side, 1 motor drives the manual side and 1 motor drives the valve full closed for ditching.

The way it was diagramed was that the ditching motor (which closes the valves) could open them in such a case.

Such was not the case however, and control of the valve had changed many line numbers before American got their aicraft.

Almost no one was aware that Ram air button wouldn't work in manual, especially because the ditching button will!

What is even more shocking is that the crew was able to open the door of a pressurized aircraft! I thought that there were certification standards to prevent that. I guess I was wrong.


Cheers
Wino

[SKYDRIFTER]

WINO -

Please be clear, I'm not faulting the crew. That scenario was more chaos than any crew could reasonably be expected to handle.

What I question is the typical idiotic FAA politics in covering for the carrier which they certified and then didn't monitor, despite all indications of major problems, punctuated by previous fatalities and an internal designation (depending on the LA Times account) that American was "...the carrier with the worst safety record."

Pressurization problems aside, what was the story with the fire warning, backed up by a flight attendant verbal report? That's a lot of impending disaster on an aircraft just released from maintenance.

In any event, the pressurization gauge should have displayed the problem. Again, I'm not faulting the crew, but rather the FAA's implied position (supported by the NTSB) that the crew couldn't have ascertained the pressurization reality.

Beyond the basic problem happening on an aircraft just released from maintenance, let's add the emphasis factor of the slide-pack which not only failed, but fell to the ground when the door opened. That's not a new problem to American on the Airbus, as indicated by the previous evacuation mess in Puerto Rico. The FAA didn't miss that one, either. The NTSB hammered the FAA on that one as being indicative of ongoing negligent FAA oversight.

We agree as to the pressurization normally preventing the doors from opening. However, there is obviously a changeover pressure range where door opening is possible.

If the FAA was the least bit concerned as to safety, they should be moving to change procedures to ensure a depressurized state is verified, before sounding an evacuation. Once again, they go to the corporate profit protection mode.

[Wino]

My understanding (and I just fly the plane, I wasn't their nor am I privy to true inside information) is that there were several PSI still on the aircraft when the door was opened by the cabin attendant. The Attendant was blown out 40 feet away from the aircraft or something absurd like that.

That means that A pax could open the door of an A300 in flight at something less than 8 psi but way more than depressurized. Again, my understanding was that anything greater than .125 PSI and you should not be able to open the door. Now this has been proven to not be true. Apparently there was another incident of opening the door on the Jetway with the aircraft still pressurized.

The pressure guages on the A300-605R are predominantly on the ECAM display. On the ground the display defaults to various modes depending on flap position and whether engines are running or not. NOT 1 OF THOSE MODES SHOWS THE PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM. Calling the pressurization page is a manual function that then degrades the logic of the system while it is manually called.

If there is an emergency and pressurization is detected as a problem during that emergency the Pressurization page will be called, but only AFTER more serious pages are displayed (EG. Fire).

Its another case of the Engineers trying to out think the situation. ECAM is wonderful when everything works according to the prethought out scripts. Get off the scripts and things sometimes get quite interesting...

Cheers
Wino

[SKYDRIFTER]

Wino-

The aircraft doesn't have an independent cabin altitude / PSID guage; independent of the ECAM? The ECAM is the only source of cabin altitude / PSID data?

[15/15 flex]

I do believe he said "predominantly". The 310 (and the 300-600 I believe) has an independent, old-fashioned dial to indicate differential pressure, and cabin altitude. As well as the ECAM.

[SKYDRIFTER]

15-15 -

Yes, the NTSB describes the raw-data gauge in the report to Garvey. It's a certification requirement. Any pilot would typically look to the gauge. The over-pressure ear pain reports should have taken them there.

No doubt the addition of the confusing fire indications understandably distracted them. Any of us would have had our hands full; errors were inevitable. It was significantly more complex than the NTSB report described.

My complaint is against the FAA with their extended history of facilitating fatal accidents, never making any respctable attempt to change anything, with corporate profit enhancement clearly at the root of their inaction. There was too much warning. It's system wide.

The Southwest FAA Region is particularly bad about singing whatever (insider) corporate tune is demanded. It's not just historic, it's current news.

The Northwest-Mountain FAA region does the same. The commonality of the method is scary as hell - no coincidence.

Even after the Fine Air accident, nothing significant has changed in Florida. If it had, the MIA FAA office would have been all over American and the pilots.

After the Fine Air crash, the MIA office took a royal beating. Now, they are almost disinterested, with another fatal accident and more bad maintenance on their watch. They can't even remember the maintenance breakdown in the ValuJet 592 crash.

Jane Garvey has been made aware of it all. There is precious little suggestion that she genuinely cares. If Nick Lacey hadn't pointed the finger at her in the LA Times report, he'd probably still be there.

It is particularly disturbing to see the NTSB word-smithing such reports to further facilitate the same death-dealing effort of the FAA.

[RRAAMJET]

Skydrifter - you've obviously got something against AA, your post reeks of it. Did they not hire you?

I am a personal friend of the FO in the incident; I challenge you to do a better job in your high and mighty throne when the s**t hits the fan. You're the loudest monday-morning quarterback I've heard.

Actually, being a veteran of 2 Airforces, 4 airlines ( 2 of them European ), I have to say that AA has some of the highest standards I've seen. The FAA report you refer to is the one when AA's management had complained publicly about the FAA's inspections - the result was politics.

You've gone on and on about the AA/TWA takeover in other posts and how the FAA should stop it on safety grounds. Exactly what personal experience are you basing this opinion on?

Now go away and do some math : fatalities/seat mile. Where does AA fit in?
We had no fatalities between 79 and 95, and were the 2nd largest airline for that time.
If I felt it wasn't safe here, I'd be the first to let the world know. You're way off base.

[SKYDRIFTER]

RRAMJET -

Basically, I have nothing against American. I'd like to see more independently done in the safety regime, but....

My quarrel is with the FAA. Too many people such as myself have illustrated criminal corruption on their part to no avail. It just continues.

If you go to the change in the law which conveniently lifts the FAA's obligation to attend to safety, you'll see that it's no small matter. Quit rationalizing and count the gravestones.

Profits, glorious profits - YES!!! Flying is disproportionately safe; something has to be done. Profits are at stake. If people don't want to die in flaming crashes or to the tune of screaming children and tearing metal, let them ride the train. Profits are sacred!

If it's your position that ANY human life is expendable in the mathematics of staticians; you're sick!

If you think I'm being unfair about this post think 'rubber jungle.' There's a more potent case to be made in this accident -hint, hint.

When the FAA and the NTSB get back into the safety business and abandon the politics of justifying profits over human life, I'm with you.

For the NTSB to have made the case they did, we must assume that it's unreasonable to expect pilots to realize that a disengaged auotpilot will no longer intercept the glideslope and localizer, because that's an automatic function and the manual fails to specifically state that it will no longer do so in the MANUAL mode.

The NTSB tries to justify the incident by stating, "The operating manual does not state that the airplane will not automatically depressurize after landing if the pressurization system is operated in the MANUAL mode." Duh! Automatic; Manual, get it???

If that kind of rationalization is acceptable to you, please start believing management when they tell you that you are not entitled to a pay raise. You've got to have that much Koolaid in your veins.

Unless the airlines are hiring drugged street people as pilots, accepting the NTSB explanation is patently ludicrous. For the backbone agency for safety to take a position such as that is simply inexcusable.

[MPower]

Maybe one of you guys could help me with this question.
How long will that airplane hold pressure if the engines, apu are shutdown?

[SKYDRIFTER]

PRESSURE HOLDING -

The time of pressure holding is purely a function of various leaks, some designed, some not. Naturally, it also depends on the amount of pressure existing at the time the pressurization sources are shut down.

In theory, being realistic, 20 - 30 minutes without external or internal measures.

[Wino]

A DK leakdown check is a test that is performed after a C/D check. THe Plane is pressurized to max dif. then the air is turned off and the aircraft is sealed tight as it can be and then allowed to stabilize at sea level. It checks the integrity of the cabin. You would be astonished at how leaky an aircraft actually is. Much of it is by design. The lavs have their own little outflows, the galleys, the e/e bays etc.

Certifications requires it to take a minimum of 90 seconds from 8 PSI to 0 PSI. 3-5 minutes is the norm in the 25 Post C Check test flights that I personally did at my last carrier, and I never saw 10 minutes.


Cheers
Wino


PS. AA is my 7th airline as well, including 3 European ones. It is by FAR the safest operation going. And skydrifter, you may hate the FAA, but try out the british CAA sometime. The FAA has them beat as well.

[This message has been edited by Wino (edited 11 May 2001).]