CASA and the Travelling Public

[WELLCONCERNED]

The Civil Aviation Safety Authority has just announced a re-commitment to the principle of protecting fare- and fee-paying passengers as their highest priority. It might be argued that this is simply a re-statement of previous policies, or a re-packaging of previous efforts – but CASA is to be commended, nonetheless, for leaving the travelling public in no doubt that their safety is paramount.

Like many such statements, and to use a few hackneyed clichés, the ‘proof will be in the pudding’ and ‘actions will need to speak louder than words’ if this new direction is to be believed.

One area where CASA must make a difference is in a more disciplined approach to regulating the Air Navigation Service Providers in Australia. For too long we have seen a situation where the default airspace and air traffic management regime has been driven by the current capabilities and capacities - or lack thereof - of the various air traffic control system[s].

In various debates and discussion in this very forum, there have been countless references to the inability of the various systems and mechanisms in both Airservices Australia and Defence Air Traffic Services to provide safety services to passenger carrying aircraft that are taken for granted in many other countries.

Controllers – civil and military alike - regularly state that they are only too willing to provide the services – if only their equipment or facilities were adequate, or appropriate training and resources made available. Pilots similarly argue that they are perfectly happy to operate within new paradigms – if only the training and resources were properly allocated.

Of course this is a simplification of sometimes very complex arguments and debates – but it is nonetheless indicative of a corporate culture of ‘we would if we could” instead of “we must so we will”.

The role of the regulator is clear. If the regulator is truly committed to focusing its safety attention on the travelling public, then it must direct the service providers to provide services in accordance with this policy – and direct them to provide the facilities, capabilities, and resources necessary to meet the policy directives.

At the moment, the tail is wagging the dog – its time that the regulator assumes its rightful role as the safety [watch]dog – not the subservient tail.

[Creampuff]

Not likely WC.

The regulator has decided to repeat history. Question on notice number 2667 and the Minister's answer:Civil Aviation Safety Authority: Air Safety Environment

(Question No. 2667)

Senator O’Brien asked the Minister representing the Minister for Transport and Regional Services, upon notice, on 10 November 2006:

(1) Is the Minister aware of the finding in the report of the Seaview Royal Commission that ‘no doubt the benevolent treatment of industry and the apparent willingness to overlook quite serious breaches was given impetus by industry being declared the partner of the Civil Aviation Authority’.

(2) Is the Minister concerned that the 2005-06 annual report of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA), the successor to the Civil Aviation Authority:

(a) declares that CASA wants to be ‘the valued partner with the aviation community industry in providing Australia with a world-class air safety environment, which has public trust and confidence’; and

(b) proposes that CASA delegate more activities to industry ‘which will enable qualified industry participants to partner with CASA to ensure safety’.

Senator Johnston—The Minister for Transport and Regional Services has provided the following answer to the honourable senator’s question:

(1) Yes.

(2) No.

[WELLCONCERNED]

That's a pity, Creampuff.

It's a sad situation when you have airports [such as Avalon - or even some WA airports] operating large passenger aircraft without a control service, but smaller airports, such as Albury, serving much smaller passenger aircraft with a full control service.

It's a sad situation when you have passenger carrying aircraft operating into remote locations, without adequate communications, or without a control service, simply because it's 'too expensive', or 'not practical' to provide a service.

It's a sad situation when you have many respondents on this forum bemoaning the fact that they would have been happy to provide control services - if only the equipment was better, or the coverage was better, or the training had been provided, and so on.

I am not pushing any particular agenda [certainly not NAS, or the Benalla debate, etc] - but it does seem sad that we allow the debates to be driven by the lack of capability - rather than have a strong regulator say "you MUST provide the service as a condition of your certification".

This is the way they [supposedly] regulate airlines - why can't they do it for service providers.

Can you imagine if Qantas turned around to CASA and said "well, we know TCAS is good - but we couldn't possibly fit it to our aircraft here - it would be too expensive, or impractical". CASA would not tolerate it. The travelling public would not tolerate it.

It's time the regulator got serious with ANSPs.

[WELLCONCERNED]

Now there’s a funny thing.

CASA gets a bad press headline because the timing of one of its “big day out” random ramp check audits gets blown three days in advance, and everyone is hopping up and down about incompetence, or lack of commitment to a true safety oversight regime. CASA says ‘not to worry” – they can still do effective audits, even if the targets have been forewarned, and can ensure the safety of the system.

On the other hand, I see dozens of entries on this very forum, by concerned controllers, stating that they are so understaffed, that even after working as much overtime as they can ‘reasonably’ be expected to do, it is still not possible to fully staff positions. And they are tired, stressed, and ‘fed-up’.

This is not ‘three days notice’ to CASA – its more like three years notice to CASA that Airservices Australia is not able to meet the expectations of the Australian aviation community.

CASA may respond that they have no role in the issue of the provision of services – they are only interested in safety. But surely the information that has been put in the public domain about overtime, staff shortages, rostering pressures, and commercial imperatives would prompt even the slowest gazelle in the herd at CASA to suspect that there may be a significant safety time bomb ticking at Airservices Australia (and probably at Defence as well).

CASA does random ramp checks (well, almost random!) on aircraft operators and pilots – why aren’t they doing random audits of the service providers? Why aren’t they enforcing their own safety regulations? Why aren’t they putting Airservices on notice that their operating certificate will be withdrawn if they can’t provide an effective and safe operating environment for the travelling public?

Surely some of the many controllers out there who regularly contribute to this forum will have a view.

[ForkTailedDrKiller]

"The Civil Aviation Safety Authority has just announced a re-commitment to the principle of protecting fare- and fee-paying passengers as their highest priority."

and their previous "highest priority" was .............. ?

Dr:cool:

[Creampuff]

From the Proof Committee Hansard of the 22 May 2007 hearing of the STANDING COMMITTEE ON RURAL AND REGIONAL AFFAIRS AND TRANSPORT, page 21 (copy here: http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commttee/S10251.pdf)

Senator O’BRIEN—Did the industry receive prior notice of this ['big day out' surveillance] event?

Mr Murray [CASA Group General Manager, Air Transport Operations Group] —No. The principals of each of the airlines received between half an hour and an hour’s notice on Friday morning, and that was intentional.

Senator O’BRIEN—When did CASA staff first learn of it?

Mr Murray—The managers were aware that it was happening on a particular day with about—and this is approximate—10 days notice. Conceptually, the senior management group in CASA were aware of the plan a month prior. Individual staff members found out about the specifics, I believe, on the Wednesday prior to the Friday, and we are talking about last week.

Senator O’BRIEN—Would that explain how industry ground crew knew about the BDO three days beforehand?

Mr Murray—I doubt very much if they would have known three days before, although we fully expected, as a management group, that the moment the information went out to inspectors, it would be widely known. I believe it went to the field offices on the Wednesday. There is an old saying in aviation that there is no such thing as a secret. Obviously, if we tell every inspector in the field, then at that point there is no such thing as a secret. Having said that and having worked for an airline, in practice, with two days notice, what would you do? You would not stack the crews or suddenly change procedures if you were breaking procedures as a matter of norm. So I am not particularly concerned if information leaked out unofficially a couple of days before.'If we tell every inspector in the field, then at that point there is no such thing as a secret. … So I am not particularly concerned if information leaked out unofficially a couple of days before.'

What a telling and sad indictment on the integrity of the organisation and the attitude of its management.

[WELLCONCERNED]

Thanks for the cut and paste, CP. I'm not great at the technology. I agree with you - it is a sad and telling indictment. My point is that if they are this loose in relation to airlines, and other air operators, and they've had 50+ years to learn the trade, how can we believe that they pay anything more than lip service to 'regulating' the service providers.

FTDK - you take the words right from my mouth - what WAS their priority if it wasn't looking after the travelling public.

[Creampuff]

Mr Murray appeared not to comprehend the patent inconsistency in his position.

If nothing can be hidden by the airlines even if they are given two days notice of surveillance, and if the information was inevitably going to leak a couple of days in advance anyway, what exactly was the point of going through the façade of giving the principals only half an hour to an hours notice? If there's 'no such thing as a secret in aviation', then surely the principals would have been in on the secret, long before the 'surprise' knock on the door or phone call.

Of course, no one in Aussie aviation would keep 2 sets of records - one to show the regulator during surveillance, and the real set that gets hidden as soon as the 'secret' leaks. Of course not. If that happened, we'd have to set up a regulator with enough corporate integrity to conduct surveillance without leaking.

[WELLCONCERNED]

Well said, CP.

Of course, CASA has shown that even a 'thorough' audit process 'fails' to show up problems - and even if it does they are less than willing to act upon the information - UNTIL it is too late (I think you know which accidents I am referring to).

I know I keep harping on about this - but it appears that the best place to hide your safety failings from CASA is right out in the open! Airservices staff are saying - and have been for the last several years - that they are tired, short-staffed, under-trained, over-stressed - and the regulator does not impose any remedial actions on them - nor threaten their operating certificate.

If it was an airline, you can bet CASA would (try to) impose sanctions.

And it's not just Airservices. Defence staff - particularly their controllers - are worked even harder, with little recourse to action.

The UK regulator imposes very strict performance requirements on NATS - not just in the areas of safety, but also other service areas, including staffing, on-time performance, and so on. Why won't CASA do that here?