Stanley Runway

[John Purdey]

There is a letter in yesterday's Daily Telegraph by a gallant and highly experienced Royal Marine officer, suggesting that not a single bomb dropped by the Vulcans actually hit the runway target at Stanley in 1982. Can anyone with real knowlege comment on this ? JP

[forget]

I read the letter. It was badly worded. He said he'd seen the runway immediately after liberation and no 'repairs' were evident.

http://i21.photobucket.com/albums/b270/cumpas/STANLEY.jpg

[Mike Oxmels]

http://www.raf.mod.uk/falklands/images/bb1bombdamage.jpg

Looks like a nice DH to me. I have never heard anybody else dispute the fact.

[hobie]

ITN did an interview only last week with a couple of the guys that flew that mission ..... they were standing beside a repaired section of the runway to illustrate the most direct hit ..... it was certainly a $$$$$ $$$$$$ $$$ hole .... :p

[toddbabe]

Hitting the runway was only a minor part of what that mission was all about! the overall aim of keeping the mirages and skyhawks at home in Argentina was achieved and it also displayed our ability to hit their mainland bases if needed.
Blackbuck was a huge success without actually doing a lot of physical damage.

[forget]

Here's the letter -


The effects of bombing Stanley runway

Sir - I must balance some well-honed RAF myths with facts ("Bombing Argentines with all the lights on 'just wasn't cricket' ", report, April 30).

Bombed or not the Stanley runway was never long enough to accept fast jets. Until the last night of the war Stanley runway was used continually by enemy Hercules aircraft and often by their Pucara ground attack aircraft.

The Argentine Air Force did not move its mainland-based aircraft further north "so they couldn't take part in the fighting": further north is closer to Ascension Island, whence the Vulcan bombers operated.

Throughout the war those of us on the ground and at sea continued to suffer the consequences of fast jets operating out of Rio Gallegos, a mere 304 nautical miles from Falkland Sound. I have been to Rio Gallegos: it has a very long runway indeed and would have taken considerably more than a couple of inaccurate Vulcan bombing raids to have closed it.

Immediately after the Argentine surrender, I and a Falkland Islander drove the length and breadth of the Stanley runway looking for signs of damage and repair. There were none and the concrete was in as good condition as when I had been responsible for its security in 1978 and 1979.

My friend and I marvelled, not for the first time, at the inventiveness of the Argentine engineers. Certainly the RAF's bombing operations against Stanley airport were strategically useful but of little tactical value to us actually in the Falklands.

War is not cricket. Perhaps the RAF of 1982 had not heard Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher's dictum: "The essence of war is violence, and moderation in war is imbecility."

Lt Col Ewen Southby-Tailyour, Ermington, Devon

[splitbrain]

I did my one and only stint in the Falklands in 1983. less than a year after the war had ended. The concrete runway had been covered with an interlocking covering - AM2 matting I think it was called.
One of the 'sights' to see at Stanley was the edge of the bomb crater that could be clearly seen at the side of the runway sticking out from the AM2. We were told that the bomb hadn't denied the Argentinians the use of the runway as they had managed to operate down the side of it.

[wokkameister]

Was it Stanley runway he was looking at? I mean...Gibraltar/Spain....all very similar.

[forget]

Hmmm. :confused: Lt Col Ewen Southby-Tailyour, Ermington, Devon.

Retired Lt.Colonel Southby-Tailyour (OBE) served with the British Royal Marines for thirty two years. Currently Ewen works as an amphibious consultant for international companies and defence organisations and skippers naval explorations to the Arctic. Ewen is also the acclaimed Editor of Jane's Amphibious and Special Forces.

[Sven Sixtoo]

Ewen Southby-Taylor was, IIRC (and I am doing this without checking so if you know different I won't challenge) a RM Major when he led a sailing exped round the Falklands in late 70's. As a result he was a most imprtant adviser to the Cmd staff for Op CORPORATE.

The Stanley runway could not operate fast jets?

Errr - After we patched it we operated Phantoms off it for at least 3 years late 82 till MPA opened. We had to stop every so often to repatch it.
4500 feet was long enough. The remaining ends - 2 and a bit 000 - would not have been.

Sven

[izod tester]

I arrived at Stanley in early July 1982 and left in November. There was certainly a large crater in the runway then which took the Royal Engineers considerable effort to fill before they covered the whole runway with AM2 matting. Certainly, the Argentinians operated Pucaras and C130 from Stanley even after the runway had been bombed. However, the Aer Macchis which were parked at the Eastern end of the runway did not operate after the bombing, nor was the runway adequate to operate either Mirage or Super Etendard which allowed the Harriers (of both RN and RAF variety) more freedom of operation and reduced the risk to the Fleet from the Etendard born Exocet. Rio Galagos may have had a long runway, but that 390 miles - each way - certainly had an effect on the operating radius of the Argentinian Attack aircraft looking for Hermes and Invincible.

The problem with the Royal Marine Lt Col is that he is unable to give due credit to the efforts of the RAF in support of the RN led but nevertheless, Joint, operation which recovered the Falklands. I do not wish to denigrate the contributions of the Royal Navy, the Royal Marines or the Army. It may have been the case that the operation could have succeeded without any RAF contribution. No one knows or will ever know. The fact is that the RAF provided support in a number of areas. RAF aircrew were prepared to put their lives on the line and large numbers of RAF ground crew worked long and hard to support the operation.

He may have doubts about the effectiveness of the RAF contribution. Fortunately, I have met other Royal Marines who have a much better appreciation of RAF operations and realize that the RAF and the Royal Marines are not in competiton but provide different capabilities in support of Joint Operations.

[forget]

PS. Should anyone wish to discuss this with yer man, you'll find him here.

Thursday 31st May 2007
Falklands Lecture
Commencing: 11.00am - 1.00pm
Place: National Maritime Museum, Greenwich
Lecture by Commodore Michael Clapp and Lieutenant-Colonel Ewen Southby-Tailyour.

Beachcombing by Lieutenant- Colonel Ewen Southby-Tailyour: Beachcombing is the expression used for covert beach intelligence undertaken by people like me when 'on holiday' and which is then forwarded to DI4 - undertaken, seemingly by an innocent 'tourist' without obvious equipment for, say, measuring the stability of sand surface or underwater gradients. In 1978, Ewen Southby-Tailour was an officer commanding a small Royal Marines detachment in the Falkland Islands. On his own initiative he sailed around and extensively chartered the waters and compiled a notebook filled with data on harbours, inlets and landing spots. Even today it is still the most comprehensive sailing guide to the area. After the Argentine forces invaded, the British Forces asked for his book but he refused unless assigned as ‘staff officer without portfolio.’ :eek: ( Isn't that 'aiding the bad guys'?) He was made the navigation adviser to the command as well as commander of the Task Force Landing Craft Squadron.

Major Ewen Southby-Tailour joined the Royal Marines in 1960, served in 42, 43 and 45 (twice) Cdos and numerous UK, US and French ships as a Landing Craft Officer. He was seconded to the Sultan of Muscat's Armed Forces from 1966-68 as a Company Commander and was awarded the Sultan's Bravery Medal for operations during the Dhofar War. He commanded naval party 8901 in the Falklands 1978-79 - (surveyed beaches for own use) then returned in 1982 as the Amphibious and Navigational Adviser and as CO of the specially formed Task Force Landing Craft Squadron. He invented, formed then commanded for 4 years 539 Assault Squadron Royal Marines before retiring in 1992 when he became an author of military biographies and built yachts for high-latitude exploring and surveying.
Tickets: £7.50/£5.50

[John Purdey]

I regret that i shall not be able to be present for the presentation on 31st May, but i very much hope that one or more of the contributers here will be there to tackle him! Meanwhile, many thanks for putting the record straight. What made him fire off like this, one wonders.

[Pontius Navigator]

Forget,

I was sitting immediately behind him when he was called to take the telephone call that he was required.

Quite correct, he wrote he surveyed and wrote the Falklands Pilot. Mind you, if you were stuck down in Stanley for weeks on end on rotation and you like sailing, what better way to fill your time. Much better than actually soldiering :)

[LFFC]

What made him [Lt Col Ewen Southby-Tailyour] fire off like this, one wonders.

I fear that in this current atmosphere of "severe financial constraint" the level of inter-service rivalry has reached new heights of bitterness.

[Zoom]

Can someone interpret this sentence from his letter:

'The Argentine Air Force did not move its mainland-based aircraft further north "so they couldn't take part in the fighting": further north is closer to Ascension Island, whence the Vulcan bombers operated.'

Further north on the mainland is Brazil, isn't it?

[Pontius Navigator]

Zoom,

I could be read as:

'The Argentine Air Force did not move its mainland-based aircraft further north

ie they stayed South

"so they couldn't take part in the fighting":[/quote}

and not safe in the north.

[quote] further north is closer to Ascension Island, whence the Vulcan bombers operated

which would have been the case if they wanted to protect BA?

[exMudmover]

Ewen Southby-Tailyour presents a very one-sided and partisan view of RAF operations in the Falklands War. RAF Harriers also made determined efforts put the Stanley runway out of action, but their efforts were largely frustrated by the general incompetence of their RN superiors, who were ignorant of the requirements of Ground Attack operations, Tactical Air Recce and Intelligence dissemination. The full story of this is contained in RAF Harrier Ground Attack Falklands, published shortly.

[scroggs]

The good Lt Col is incorrect. The runway was indeed penetrated by one bomb, at the mid-point of the runway on its southern side. I was on the second RAF C130 to land there, a day or two after the fighting ceased, and we spent some considerable time inspecting the damage. Even after the runway was repaired and the AM2 laid, that crater continued to cause problems which were never really sorted.

Scroggs

[beamer]

We are getting old Scroggs !

[soddim]

The Lt Col like many of us retired folk is obviously relying on a memory that is itself increasingly unreliable. In any case, even if the Vulcan raids did little but upset the Argies a bit it was still a contribution to the war effort. In fact, they did considerably more than that because after the raid the Argies had to defend BA from air attack. They also were precluded from doing what we did so soon after we occupied Stanley - that is operating fast jets off the airfield. Had they done so the losses to our forces would have been disasterous.

[Melchett01]

Bombed or not the Stanley runway was never long enough to accept fast jets.

As experienced as the good Lt Col is, I am assuming he didn't spot the Aermacchi MB-339s sitting at the end of the runway when he did his grand tour. Or does he not consider them to be fast jets or did he just ignore them as being an inconvenient fact to his argument?

With 09/27 coming in at about 918m the MB-339s could certainly have used themm, requiring only 620m/480m for take-off/landing at sea level. And assuming the Arentinians had managed to install a RHAG, then I'm guessing if they could fly their Super Etendard off a carrier they could have flown them from Stanley. Similarly, the Skyhawk, with its take-off run at 23,000lb - almost max gross weight - being only in the region of 830m could also have used Stanley. This would surely suggest, contrary to the Col's suggestion, that the runway at Stanley could have been used by the Argentinian FJs - with or without a RHAG depending on the ac type and wpns fit / fuel load etc. As such, the fact that the RAF managed to get a Vulcan payload over the runway and that there were no further FJ sorties from Stanley after the Black Buck raid suggests that the Col is incorrect.

If I were being generous, I could put the Col's comments down to the passage of time. However, I could probably equally argue that this is typical of the sort of comments about the RAF we have come to expect from certain quarters of our Armed Forces who seem keen to denigrate our achievements whenever possible.

[The Helpful Stacker]

Perhaps the Lt Col is just lashing out, still feeling a little sore after some of members of his beloved corps had a holiday in Iran?;)

[John Purdey]

Meanwhile, will someone with personal and direct experience of the state of the runway at the end of hostlities, please put an appropriate letter in the Daily Telegraph Otherwise this fabrication will take on a life of its own. JP

[Union Jack]

If I were being generous, I could put the Col's comments down to the passage of time. However, I could probably equally argue that this is typical of the sort of comments about the RAF we have come to expect from certain quarters of our Armed Forces who seem keen to denigrate our achievements whenever possible.

More than a little ungenerous I suggest, not to say offside. I appreciate that perhaps due to "the passage of time" you, and others, may well either have forgotten or be unaware that Ewen S-T was the man who tried so desperately to convince the Welsh Guards on board the SIR GALAHAD that, however tired or however unwilling they were to move ashore at Bluff Cove, they must do so before the cloud cover lifted and the Argentinian Skyhawks arrived.

They could have done so, they did not do so - with the tragic results that could so readily have been avoided if only they had heeded his advice.

So be generous, very generous, to a brave man who was there and who tried so hard to do the right thing when the Argentinian bombs were still falling - and had to watch it all happen exactly as he had predicted.

Jack

[John Purdey]

Jack. Of course, you are quite right, and i think I said in my original post, this is a distinguished and gallant officer. But that does not explain what he claimed in his letter to the Telegraph. Let us please get the facts straight, do you not agree? JP

[Melchett01]

Union Jack,

I am not for one second disputing the good Colonel's bravery or the role that he played during the war. But I do dispute his statement, as published in the national press about the use of Stanley's runway and the usefullness of the RAF's contribution to the overall effort. He clearly states that the runway could not take FJs, and yet the photographic evidence cleary proves him to be wrong.

That the MB-339s never got airborne, must in some part be due to the Black Buck raids, but unfortunately without asking the cdr of the 339 detachment, we will never know for sure. I'm sure if the Black Buck raids hadn't been mounted, then people such as Lt Col Ewen Southby-Tailyour would have been clamouring to demand to know why the RAF hadn't done any more to help out.

It is unfortunately becoming more and more common for people with little or no understanding of the RAF and how it operates to criticize us, and it is about time we stood up for ourselves. Unfortunately, when we do, then the same people that are all too ready to denigrate our efforts suddenly get offended. It seems the RAF is in a lose-lose situation these days. So don't be surprised if having been backed into a corner we come out fighting and "correct" a few misconceptions.

[Pontius Navigator]

I have not read Alf Price's book: http://www.biblio.com/books/80196742.html

AIR WAR SOUTH ATLANTIC by Ethell, Jeffrey & Price, Dr. Alfred

It was written in 1984 and is based, using his usual technique, on interviews with primary sources, ie the pilots. Ethell covered the Argentine and Alf covered the British.

It might be both relevant and fascinating as it minimises the 'passage of time'.

[RileyDove]

The MB339's would have been extremely limited with no radar in what role they could have carried out from Stanley. Certainly the Vulcan raid was dramatic but of limited military value . It was however of a greater psychological value to the British as it forced an already tired and demoralised Argentine Army realise that they were against odds they couldn't counter.
It's interesting to speculate on what the Argentinians could have based there but obviously the Lear Jet flight into Stanley just prior to the war had produced a report which steared them away from fast jet operation.
Tactically it was the right decision for the Argentians as the Skyhawk and Super Etendard would have been distinctly a prime target for Harrier /Sea Harrier attack with BL755 sat at Stanley.

[foldingwings]

I have met the guy, had dinner with him at BRNC about ten years ago. A thoroughly charming and delightful character and an experienced adventurer to boot. Excellent dinner companion. However, he has a pathological aversion to the RAF!

[Archimedes]

The MB339s put in an attack Argonaut on 21 May. Pilot was awarded the Argentine equivalent of the CGC. Caused slight damage, including putting a hole through the radar (which is reported to have worked much better than before afterwards...)

AIUI, the strip at Stanley wasn't long enough to allow them to operate with their preferred anti-shipping weapon (500lb bombs) so they had to use 30mm cannon (podded) and Zunis, but they certainly flew. They were used at Goose Green, one being downed by a Blowpipe - apparently something that had an adverse effect on Argentine morale at the time. They withdrew about a week before the war.

In the grand scheme of things (and as I've said elsewhere, this was a scheme about which Admirals Lewin, Leach, Fieldhouse and Woodward were far more enthusiastic than the then-CAS), the ability of CAS aircraft to operate from Stanley was not the point. The point was to try to keep the Argentines' air superiority aircraft on the defensive/drive them out of range while making the junta worry about whether or not the British PM, who they'd realised was just slightly more bellicose than they'd thought would then turn the bombers onto the mainland.

The fact that they failed to appreciate that this was hugely unlikely was neither here nor there - they seem to have perceived that there was a risk and the moral effect of which air power theorists (and Bernard Montgomery) talk about came into play. Just as the RN (not the RAF) had hoped.

[AR1]

Lt Cdr 'Sharkey' Ward made similar accusations in his book 'Sea Harrier Over the Falklands - A Maverick at war. Non the less an entertaining read. Slightly lost credibility when describing post conflict 'Cravatted RAF Hercules Pilots from Brize-Norton' [sic] looking for red ink entrys to thier logbooks. (Or whatever colour ink you use on active service)

Never ceases to amaze me the level of back-biting that arises from such excursions. The RN, certainly of that era, appear to be crab haters, who blamed anyone in light blue for the demise of the carrier fleet, the British Empire and possibly the Boer war. It follows that the Jet boys always get the TV coverage, fact of life - get over it.

I am personally of the opinion that the Black Buck raids were of limited military value, but they made great headlines and were a great boost to the morale of people sat at various stations (RAF & RN) in the UK, watching the news unfold daily, with anxiety.

[wokkameister]

[QUOTE]
The RN, certainly of that era, appear to be crab haters,

What do you mean, that era. With it's two car ferries, three trawlers and a handful of pedallo's, a large element of the RN would knife the RAF in the back at the drop of a hat.
They would very much like to carve up the RAF between themselves and the AAC. Pity they can't mount patrols off the coast of Iraq by sea.
Apologies to the small element not in this category who are consumnate professionals.

[Robert Cooper]

Scroggs, you are right.

The good Lt. Col. must be having a "senior moment' or total memory failure. I remember the runway crater too and was in the Ops room when that tow line was planned. Remember the result too.

Bob C

[BEagle]

The bearded bull$hitter also broke radio silence trying to talk to the Vulcan as it was inbound on its first attack on Stanley airport......

His book has absorbent pages - so it has one use, at least. But only one.

[timex]

The bearded bull$hitter also broke radio silence trying to talk to the Vulcan as it was inbound on its first attack on Stanley airport......
His book has absorbent pages - so it has one use, at least. But only one.


Why would he want to speak to the Vulcan?

Why did he even know it was inbound?

Where's the BS Beags?



Shaun

[timex]

The RN, certainly of that era, appear to be crab haters,

What do you mean, that era. With it's two car ferries, three trawlers and a handful of pedallo's, a large element of the RN would knife the RAF in the back at the drop of a hat.

They would very much like to carve up the RAF between themselves and the AAC. Pity they can't mount patrols off the coast of Iraq by sea.


WM lets not forget that the RN at the time was just managing to get back onto its feet having seen its carrier fleet decimated by the Govt. The RAF had persuaded the previous Govt's that the Navy wasn't needed anymore because Air Power could strike anywhere in the World (V Force). This meant the loss of ALL future Carriers and quite a few Naval Bases throughout the World...so bitter, probably.


Shaun

[BEagle]

"Why would he want to speak to the Vulcan?"

Heaven knows why he broke OPSEC in that way. He was tasked to provide AD cover to the Vulcan raid, not to compromise it.

"Why did he even know it was inbound?"

All Britisn action was, of course, coordinated. The Vulcan attack was notified to the Task Force for operational reasons, fairly obviously.

"Where's the BS Beags?"

Read his book (don't buy it though) - and you'll find out.

[timex]

He was tasked to provide AD cover to the Vulcan raid

Why would a Landing Craft guy provide AD cover?


Read his book (don't buy it though) - and you'll find out.


Is that because it contradicts your own opinions? Unlike some I've actually met him, and although contentious that doesn't make him a"bearded tosser". I will read his book ,as I shall also read the Vulcan book that is inbound.


Shaun

[spekesoftly]

Why would a Landing Craft guy provide AD cover?
I think BEags was referring to the SHAR pilot mentioned in post #32

[timex]

I think BEags was referring to the SHAR pilot mentioned in post #32

Crikey that was a bit of a leap..........from E S-T to SW.


Shaun

[Squirrel 41]

timex,

I think that BEagle was referring to Sharkey Ward's call to the Vulcan as it was inbound in radio silence on BLACK BUCK 1 from his Sea Harrier - it was the FRS1s what were providing AD, not Lt Col Ewen S-T's LCUs...

More generally, I recall readimg somewhere that the Argies were about to / had trialled RHAG at Stanley, which, as already noted would have allowed it to take an A-4 det, and (possibly) Mirage III/V/Daggers, which could have materially changed the force composition over the islands.

Brave men all - very impressive.

S41

[BEagle]

Ah - the penny drops...We are talking at cross purposes - I was NOT referring to the courageous Lt Col Ewen Southby-Tailyour, but to someone else.....

A very great tragedy that Lt Col Ewen S-T's efforts to persuade the Welsh Guards to come ashore from Sir Galahad were not heeded by those responsible.

[airborne_artist]

In today's Telegraph:


Sir - Ewen Southby-Tailyour (Letters, May 5) is wrong in his description of the damage to the Stanley runway.

As Commander, Royal Engineers, I was responsible for its repair immediately after the surrender. There was one large crater caused by a 1,000lb bomb from the RAF Vulcan raid, and four smaller craters resulting from earlier Harrier attacks. (The Argentines had also created dummy craters to confuse our aerial reconnaissance.) Repairing the large crater and the large area of runway took about two weeks and 1,000 square metres of captured Argentine runway matting.

Lt Col Southby-Tailyour is, however, correct in stating that Argentine aircraft were able to continue to use the runway, despite the bombing raids, by temporarily backfilling the craters. This, perhaps, is why his "recce" did not spot the true extent of the damage.

Maj Gen G.W. Field (retd), Sedlescombe, East Sussex

[JFZ90]

Potentially a bit off topic, but I found Sharkys book interesting in that when you digest his opinions/experience he makes a pretty good case for effective AD being critical to success, and in particular the key role of a capable radar equipped agile fighter to that end.

Whilst he moans about the RAF, he is therefore unwittingly outlining how important things like "air superiority" are, and reading between the lines if Typhoon was a naval asset / carrier capable its pretty clear he'd be its No.1 fan.

[G SXTY]

". . . I smoothly applied power and climbed to 20,000 feet to await the arrival of the Vulcan. Dimming my cockpit lighting almost to extinction, I could see that the cloud cover over the islands was extensive. That was a pity, as I was hoping to be able to see the flash of shells and bombs exploding.

Twenty minutes or so later I heard the V-bomber boys check in. They were on a discreet frequency and so I welcomed them with ‘Morning!’ No reply came, so I didn’t persist. . .”

From ‘Sea Harrier Over the Falklands’, by Commander ‘Sharkey’ Ward.

[The Ugly Fend Off]

I think we all know that the truth always seems to become somewhat embroidered in these post-war books. I'm sure the truth is in all of them somewhere; B20, The One That Got Away, Sea Harrier Over The Falklands etc.

The key is surely to read broadly enough to ensure that you are not misled by a single persons, well inteneded I'm sure, but somewhat colourful account of what they recall.

[Nige321]

There's another letter in todays Telegraph...:uhoh:
Sir - Everyone seems to be missing the point when discussing the Vulcan mission to the Falklands.
It was a cynical attempt by the Air Staff to demonstrate that the RAF had a role in operations at a time when the Royal Navy, Royal Marines and Army were fighting the war successfully without the assistance of that service, other than a few seconded aircrew with the aircraft carriers. The lack of fixed-wing airborne early-warning and anti-submarine capability in the Task Force at the time was of much more significance.
Under-funding and under-equipping of the Fleet Air Arm have progressed today to a potentially disastrous level. Meanwhile, money has been lavished on the entirely redundant Air Force toy the Eurofighter, at the behest of the self-seeking occupants of the Ministry of Defence.
Lt Col B.M. Burton (retd), Little Barningham, Norfolk

So the Herc supply drops, the RAF Harriers, the surviving Chinook etc. were of no importance at all...

N:ugh:

[JFZ90]

Its a bit bizarre isn't it.

Not much is made of the fact that the first SHAR air-to-air vistory of the Falklands was by an RAF Flt Lt.

These type of views are so ingrained though, as though they really believe them, that it makes you wonder. It may be that when the senior ranks in the services are forced into making decisions and trade offs about what they invest in, I suspect its all too easy for them to say "well we would have had capability X, if it wasn't for the Y service wanting capability Z - not our fault, certainly not any reflection on the trade offs made within our own service etc....cough etc.". when briefing their own service on why they themselves have failed to get something delivered/prioritised.

Looks like this sort of cr*p is swallowed by the lower ranks hook line and sinker. I suggest any under funding of the FAA has more to do with Navy priorities (i.e. no. of grey ships = most important) than anything else.

[Roadster280]

JFZ90 - I disagree with your statement:

"Looks like this sort of cr*p is swallowed by the lower ranks hook line and sinker."

As an ex-SNCO, I guess I qualify as a "lower rank", although the comparative adjective depends on the position of the speaker. Assuming the position of "lower ranks", I find that my experience gives the lie to your statement.

No.1 objective is to defend the nation. That means sufficient ships and aircraft to deter in the first place, then patrol the coastline, ASW defences to protect supply lines, and a whacking great army should all else fail, and end up fighting on the beaches.

No.2 objective is to defend national interests overseas. That requires sufficient assets to sustain expeditionary warfare, meaning capital ships (aircraft carrier(s), LPDs etc), task group defence (submarines, frigates, destroyers), air cover (of whatever form), AT, SH, CAS, and of course a whacking great army to actually put boots on the ground, with the necessary armour, artillery, etc.

All this costs money. I dont think anyone in the trenches actually gives a monkey's which squadron the Harrier that just wiped out the enemy is from, FAA or RAF, so long as it did the job, on time, and without "own casualties".

Similarly, I don't think the RAF types care too much whether it's a soldier or an airman guarding the FOB they operate from, so long as it's done effectively.

I do find it interesting though, that the Army has boats and aircraft, the Navy has soldiers and aircraft, while the RAF has soldiers (although no boats any more).

Bottom line - all three services are required, and required to work together. All three services are required to be properly funded with the right kit to be able to work together.

[JFZ90]

R280.

I agree with your sentiments, I was lumping all those below 1* outside certain corridors of influence as lower ranks, so wasn't trying to be "rankist" as such - could have worded it better to implying those outside some of the decision making processes believing some of the inter-service boll*x that is spouted. On reflection most see through such rubbish anyway, so my musings are probably invalid. Leaves you with the conclusion that this influencial characters are however just trying to cause trouble though doesn't it.

As you suggest, most don't care where the e.g. harrier came from - but this kind of makes the rantings of SW and EST harder to really sympathise with, no?

[WE Branch Fanatic]

I did try to stay off of this thread - honest!

1. Whatever your views of Sharkey Ward, he DID successfully command 801 NAS during Corporate and bore much responsibility for defending the task force. He had also been responsible for much of the introduction into service of the Sea Harrier. The alleged attempts by some in the RAF to undermine the Sea Harrier and its capabilities and achievements, together with the hand of the Air Marshals in the decision of axe the Fleet carriers in the sixties probably made him a little bitter, frustrated and maybe paranoid. Likewise the lack of recognition given to the FAA and the RN ever since. But to call him a Crab hater is simplistic. He speaks highly of 1 Sqn RAF, and does mention the Harrier experts at Wittering.

2. Read One Hundred Days by Admiral Sandy Woodward, the task group commander. He comes to many of the same conclusions. Woodward's book was published first, and should convince the reader of the importance of carrier aviation per se and of organic air defence.

3. Anyone who writes a book based on their own experiences is influenced by their own prejudices and limited by what they know. Can anyone be 100% objective when writing about something they were personally involved in?

4. Many of the lessons learnt in 1982 have been forgotten, as shown by the premature axing of the Sea Harrier (http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=98152) and the delays to the Future Carrier (http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=221116). I've listened to people talking about their experiences of being subject to air attack and being in a burning and sinking ship. Not at all nice.

5. One lesson so painfully evident that does appear to have be learnt and remembered is the need for the services to work together.

6. Why do threads like these end up as light blue versus dark blue, when we needed both to win in 1982 and do now?

[soddim]

I have to point out that it is not simply light blue versus dark blue - there is a shade of brown in this argument - at least in the telegarph.

[airborne_artist]

Why do threads like these end up as light blue versus dark blue, when we needed both to win in 1982 and do now?

Divide and rule - Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, 18th C

[Tourist]

The reason these threads always get to slagging, is that whilst the RN/RM and Army have hundreds of years of relatively unbroken trust in each other doing their job when required, we do not, however, trust the Royal Air Farce to find its own @rse with both hands.

This alone we could live with, but the temerity of the RAF to even contemplate turning up at events commemorating the Falkland conflict is astonishingly brazen.
As if a couple of exchange pilots, one chinook, and one bomb on a runway makes up for the fact that hundreds of people in the RN RM and Army died due to the RAF successfully lying about the RAF's ability to project air power anywhere in the world.
A lie that led to the demise of our big carriers. The demise of airborne early warning over the fleet. The demise of adequate airborne protection and attack. The demise of many warships with many crew.

Go on then RAF.
Where were you?

[Mike Oxmels]

It is a sad fact that any poking from outside the British Armed Forces, whether it be MoD cut or a tabloid sting, results in destructive bitch fighting between the forces themselves. You, Tourist, have just demonstrated that with a deliberately provocative and uncharacteristically offensive post. If you're fishing, I'm biting:

I, and virtually all my light blue colleagues, hold the other branches of the forces in high regard. It is disappointing that such loyalty is often publicly not reciprocated by fusty old seniors of those services, notably Southby-Tailyour and Tim Collins whose understanding of the importance of air power is about as advanced as that of an 14 year old in the Army Cadet Force.

I am sure that all the ground forces who bravely fought in the Falklands also took a moment to contemplate the benefits of air power (for example Chinook airlift) as they yomped or tabbed with full equipment across the Falklands moorland. The fact that the RAF successfully prosecuted the longest range bombing raids in history, rendering Stanley unuseable to enemy FJs, and demonstrating that Buenos Aires could get nuked, was a tremendously significant achievment and it is distinctly ungracious of you, Tourist, and certain senior members of the other services to belittle the RAF's contribution. The war may indeed have been lost if Argentine FJ operations had not been pushed back to the mainland by the successful targeting of the runway and its secondary effects.

Do not forget the importance of SH and how advantaged the British Forces would have been had we not lost Atlantic Conveyor and all but one of its Chinnies.

I for one would be delighted to see the RN with angle deck carriers full of Sea Typhoons and Maritime AEW aircraft. The fact that the Army, RN and RM have to accept some cuts and not just the RAF (which has been decimated in the last 10 years) is no justification for open aggression towards the service which has gained the primary importance in modern war fighting, in its short life.

Dry your eyes princess and show a little respect for the light blues just as you demand respect for yourself! Muppet.

[Autorev]

Tourist,
In answer to your question - at the bottom of the atlantic ocean still on board Atlantic Conveyor.

Your comment on the remembrance service denigrates the achievments' of the thousands of servicemen from all three services who served during the conflict, let alone those that gave their lives, regardless of cap badge.

Grow up son, and have some respect - you are a disgrace. As long as servicemen continue to perpetrate this childish attitude, we will never rid ourseleves of such small mindedness

[JFZ90]

Tourist

A quick question I'd like an honest answer to.

Do you really :

a) believe in what you wrote in the post above, or
b) see it as a bit of banter you don't really believe but its a bit of fun

[LOTA]

Tourist,

In a professional capacity, I was at an anniversary event at Falklands Islands House in London 10 years ago.

It was for, in the main, those who had fought at Goose Green. To a man, those splendid soldiers were delighted to meet the RAF Harrier pilots, who they believed saved many lives on the ground by their actions during that particular bit of fighting.

Just one small example why the RAF should be welcomed at any Falklands 25 event.

[Geehovah]

If you look at the picture, the stick cut the runway and one bomb hit the concrete. Seems like it did the job as planned. 4.5 k for Mirages was always tight.
It also spoiled an otherwise quiet night in Stanley Town for the occupiers who thought they were relatively safe
Lets not take it awy from the crews. The raid may not have been pefect but as piece of strategy I'd say it did its job.
BTW, you could feel the bump at about lift of even after the AM2 fix. On landing it was beyond the RHAG.

As for Tourist's comments..................

[Archimedes]

Where were they?
At the risk of being a victim of a wah:

1. The RAF provided 25% of the SHAR pilots during Corporate and they scored approx 25% of the air-air victories. Rather more than a couple.

2. The replacement SHARs would never have got to the Task Force had they not been provided with AAR by the Victor Fleet. That would have left the Task Force eight SHARs light. That would have left the fleet with 20 SHARs to use in combat. Without the replacements, the SHAR force would have been down to 14 airframes by the end of hostilities.

3. 1 Squadron provided Harrier GR3s (again, AAR got them into a position where they could join the Task Force). These were used in several CAS missions, notably at Goose Green where they came in quite handy. They suffered five airframe losses. Without the GR3s and the AAR that got the SHARs to the carrier...

4. ASW and MR cover was not only provided by SK from the fleet, but from Nimrods and MRR from Victors.

5. Resupply of the fleet included airdrops from the Hercules fleet, including what was then (and may still be) the longest air transport sortie ever flown, weighing in at over 24 hours duration. The C-130s flew over 13,000 hours in support of the Task Force, while the rest of the AT fleet (or VC10s, as they were known) flew 4,000 hours.

6. And finally, but by no means least, in the case of Flt Lt Garth Hawkins, on a Sea King that took a bird in the engine and which went to the bottom of the ocean along with the SF team to whom he was the FAC and with whom he died.

[Art Field]

Tourist, have you ever wondered how a fair number of SHARs managed to catch up with the fleet at or even beyond Ascension, certainly not on their own, could it have been another RAF contribution by the Victors perhaps?. Archimedes you just beat me to it.

[Geehovah]

Not to mention the difference a Squadron of F4s would have made with PD radars and SPIII missiles, had the AM2 matting actually arrived on East Falkland. I guess the Chinooks were not the only thing that was lost that day.

[Tourist]

JFZ90

No, not really.


I think I judged my last post to be just about the right distance the other side of the truth to balance the rest of the pro RAF spin being put on the Falkland conflict at the moment.

Irritating, isn't it when somebody twists the truth..........
Do you remember when some idiot tried to say that the RN won the Battle of Britain not that long ago? Got on the RAF's t1ts didn't it. Well think about how the RN and might feel about the people on here's attempt to hijack the Falklands.


p.s. Geehovah, were you seriously going to argue my b@llocks with a what might have happened?:rolleyes:

[Mike Oxmels]

Aaah, playing Devil's advocate - very philosophical. At least you've provided plenty of quotable material for the tabloids. They do seem to largely consist of PPRUNE and ARSSE 'cuts and pastes' these days.

[Archimedes]

I think I judged my last post to be just about the right distance the other side of the truth to balance the rest of the pro RAF spin being put on the Falkland conflict at the moment.

Sorry, Tourist, but I think you judged wrongly.

The only 'pro-RAF spin' came in the Torygraph article which endeavoured to claim that the Vulcan won the war - even the RAF website doesn't say that...

Also, bear in mind that the reason that the RAF case may be being pushed a little more strongly than you like may not be unconnected with very clear and concerted attempts made by some members (or ex-members) of the RN and Army to write the RAF's contribution to the Falklands out of history.

[WPH]

Tourist, as shown many times before on this forum, you are an arse! Unfortunately, some others took your bait too quickly!:):):):)

[Tourist]

:) ......................................

[JFZ90]

So its just banter then?

Does this mean ES-T is just writing to the papers for a bit of a laugh?

(imagines ES-T is some smokey gents club having a laugh with his old muckers about how he got some journos to print a letter in the daily rags implying that the vulcan never hit the runway at Stanley. He won a bet of £50 as his muckers reckoned no journo would be daft enough to fall for it, let alone print it......).

If it is just hoot then fair enough

[Mike Oxmels]

By the way Tourist, how was my rant. Marks out of 10 please. It certainly made me feel better.

[soddim]

Tourist seems to believe that the demise of the fixed wing carrier was due to false claims by the RAF of ability to project air power worldwide . In fact, it was HM Govt that abandoned the strategy to project military power worldwide and withdrew all forces east of Suez.

The fixed wing carrier with all its essential supporting vessels simply did not fit into this new concept of ops and it is questionable that it does today. Had it not been possible to park the carriers so far East of the Falklands that the Harriers could barely reach their targets, it would not have been possible to protect them in the Falklands war.

Perhaps Tourist is unwise to put forward this argument today when all defence expenditure is up for grabs. If Gordon examines this topic he might get ideas.

As for the suggestion that the RAF tried to hijack the Falklands war - it is a fact that both the Navy and the RAF were supporting a predominantly Army land battle to retake the islands - both classic roles of naval and air power.

I doubt very much if anybody not in the Navy viewed the war as anything other than a fine example of what our three services could achieve together despite repeated defence cuts.

[brickhistory]

Oh, c'mon, for Gawd's sake, y'all have to admit it was us Americans letting you have AIM-9s to hang on your SHARs is what won the war for you.













(Couldn't resist! Say, where's that door.....)

[Maple 01]

You mean kindly storing them in a NATO forward area and not squealing too much when we eeeeerrmmmmm "borrowed" them?

Well that was the story I was told shortly afterwards by a very drunk armourer, probably not true, but more romantic in an Ealing comedy style - "Some of our sidewinders are missing" sense.

[The Helpful Stacker]

Didn't the US also aid the Argentinians as well?

[henry crun]

Aw Brick, what a pity you included that last sentence in brackets, think of the bites you would have had without it. :)

[Gainesy]

Brick, you forgot to mention the HARMs and Harpoons.

Another RAF contribution was the bomb disposal team from Wittering.

[Wader2]

Gainsey, that EOD Team was also responsible for the reintroduction of berets with DPM.

There was a wonderful photo of an EOD (I guess) officer over a bomb wearing his DPMs and wearing a brand new (the gold was gleaming) SD Hat. I know questions were asked in the corridors of power.

[Tourist]

Mike

Not many I'm afraid

"It is a sad fact that any poking from outside the British Armed Forces, whether it be MoD cut or a tabloid sting, results in destructive bitch fighting between the forces themselves. You, Tourist, have just demonstrated that with a deliberately provocative and uncharacteristically offensive post. If you're fishing, I'm biting"

+2

"I, and virtually all my light blue colleagues, hold the other branches of the forces in high regard."

-1 Hmm:hmm:

It is disappointing that such loyalty is often publicly not reciprocated by fusty old seniors of those services, notably Southby-Tailyour and Tim Collins whose understanding of the importance of air power is about as advanced as that of an 14 year old in the Army Cadet Force.

-1 S-T's understanding of what air power was going to do to the ships in the harbour was excellent. Tim Collins may be a tw@t, but he is the closest thing we have had to a man with true leadership ability in a while.

"I am sure that all the ground forces who bravely fought in the Falklands also took a moment to contemplate the benefits of air power (for example Chinook airlift) as they yomped or tabbed with full equipment across the Falklands moorland."

-2 They yomped because you weren't there! The fact that you triad to be doesn't cut it. "Losers do their best, winners go home and f**k the prom queen" etc:ugh:

"The fact that the RAF successfully prosecuted the longest range bombing raids in history, rendering Stanley unuseable to enemy FJs, and demonstrating that Buenos Aires could get nuked, was a tremendously significant achievment and it is distinctly ungracious of you, Tourist, and certain senior members of the other services to belittle the RAF's contribution."

-4 Erm, you are surely aware, as the Argentinians were, that the RN could have Nuked BA from plymouth, with a lot more accuracy, less cost and no risk to aircrew? You know, those dasterdly underhanded underwater boats? National deterant?:rolleyes:

The war may indeed have been lost if Argentine FJ operations had not been pushed back to the mainland by the successful targeting of the runway and its secondary effects.

-1 More a morale effect than any real military damage. Holes can be filled without any trouble, and the Argentinians were more than willing to lose aircraft in the pursuit of sinking our ships. To suggest that the fear of losing a/c in airfield strikes was the reason they did not operate from Stanley is illogical.

"Do not forget the importance of SH and how advantaged the British Forces would have been had we not lost Atlantic Conveyor and all but one of its Chinnies."

-1 Erm.. but we did.....:rolleyes:

I for one would be delighted to see the RN with angle deck carriers full of Sea Typhoons and Maritime AEW aircraft. The fact that the Army, RN and RM have to accept some cuts and not just the RAF (which has been decimated in the last 10 years) is no justification for open aggression towards the service which has gained the primary importance in modern war fighting, in its short life.

Nearly docked you 10 for mention of a sea Typhoon (which I assume was a joke for so many reasons) We have all suffered vast cuts, and I think you would find it very hard to justify saying the RAF has taken the most pain. Primary importance would probably go to the Army at the moment, feet on the ground, apache etc, and we all have SH

"Dry your eyes princess and show a little respect for the light blues just as you demand respect for yourself! Muppet."

Nice finish though:p

[amontgomery]

Pse see below - reply to Daily Telegraph

BLACK BUCK

Colonel Southby-Tailyour is a remarkable man: few know the environs of the Falkland Islands better than he does; his contribution to the success of our invasion force in 1982 was more than vital – it was fundamental. Thus, his views deserve attention. However, I do have comment on his recent letter (“Effects of bombing Stanley Runway”– 4 May 2004).

The Vulcan raid was the opening salvo of the War; thus, it made a decisive statement of our intent. Moreover, 21 x 1000lb bombs arriving out of the darkness, in total surprise, had more than a deleterious effect on the morale of the conscript defenders at Stanley airfield who were already living in poor conditions; this dramatic arrival of the British also had a real affect on the morale of the residents of Stanley. Later, Vulcan anti radar sorties significantly impinged on the Argentine use of their radars. Also, the Argentine Government could never be sure that a subsequent attack might be made on a mainland base. As to their use of the runway at Stanley, while it was certainly too short for normal fast jet operations, Squadron Leader Withers attack ensured that they did not have use of it for emergency refuelling – which would have given them another option. While the Vulcan sorties should certainly be viewed alongside the outstanding contribution of Harrier and Sea Harrier operations, the Vulcan missions had a part to play in the context of the war. Whatever one’s view of the results, these were remarkable missions achieved by the efforts of planning staffs, Vulcan crews and the much too unsung Victor tanker crews whose contribution to the wider support of the conflict was remarkable.

Often, in these pages, we see inter-Service sniping; I am sure this was not the Colonel’s intent and nor is it mine: everyone gave of their best. Although much of all our efforts did not go as planned (and often they did not) the overall achievement of our forces was remarkable – and, at this juncture we should remember our success with humility and recognise the sacrifice of those who gave their lives and those who were injured to ensure the freedom of these remarkable Islands.

I should make clear that I am not entirely detached from these events!

Monty
Vulcan Detachment Commander, Ascension Island 1982

[knowitall]

"They yomped because you weren't there!"

and they weren't there because the RN couldn't adequately defend its self from a missile, it had owned its self for several years prior to 1982

can't blame the crabs for that one

[Wader2]

you are surely aware, as the Argentinians were, that the RN could have Nuked BA from plymouth

That will be news to the Plymouth bretheren.

[NURSE]

Maybe the Navy is a little bitter because the RAF claimed it could provide airdefence to the fleet anywhere in the world?
I would sugest if money had been spent on a proper carrier force instead of being wasted on nimrod AEW and Tornado then the Falklands might never have happened.
I have seen numerous claims of what the RAF did in the Falklands including Regiment being at San Carlos for the Arggie airstrikes yes there was Raiper there but it was RA Raiper who had severe problems as they had no spare parts because the Cdo Log regt had offloaded them at ascension .
I have also noted the rewriting of history having worked with RA NCO's who were there its amazing how many Blowpipe and Raiper Kills have been re designated.
The GR3 contrabution was excellent and Black Buck was an outstanding piece of airmanship but it didn't close the runway and Glamorgan was severley damaged by exocets flown in on hercules. If the Air Bridge to argentina had been closed earlier maybe somany of our casualties wouldn't have happened.

[Mike Oxmels]

money ... wasted on ... Tornado
I would suggest that Tornado has proved its worth over the years.

[Wader2]

Nurse,

I have also noted the rewriting of history having worked with RA NCO's who were there its amazing how many Blowpipe and Raiper Kills have been re designated.

I am not sure of the relevance of this but do tell. They were redsignated as what?

[Seldomfitforpurpose]

"Do not forget the importance of SH and how advantaged the British Forces would have been had we not lost Atlantic Conveyor and all but one of its Chinnies."

-1 Erm.. but we did.....:rolleyes:


Just remind us who was supposed to be protecting the A C :rolleyes:

[Wader2]

Mike, thank you for that, but Nurse is implying changed from that.

So do they now claim Rapier more or less than 1?
How many of the 5 are attributed to Blowpipe?

I heard a story at the time about the difference between RAF and Army Rapier procedures but we won't go in to that now.

[brickhistory]

Didn't the US also aid the Argentinians as well?

To the best of my knowledge (I was in school at the time, first time I've felt young in ages!), no. With the exception of Al Haig's grandstanding attempt to win the Nobel Peace Prize with his shuttle diplomacy, I think we helped out a fair amount behind the scenes with logistical support - tankers full of fuel at Wideawake, field living facilities at same brought in from stateside stocks, some hardware, and some satellite recce.

But, I stand to be corrected if facts can be presented.

There was a mention in a post about the world's longest C-130 flight. Any unclassified info out there? Sounds as if it would make a good read.

This was an all British show and one you should be proud of. What will you do the next time the Argies try it? Can it be repeated with current capabilities?

[dakkg651]

Brick.

The answer is no.

In 1982 we had a female prime minister with balls.

Now we have a man without the pre-requisite appendages.

The Royal Navy consists of a couple of rowing boats and the RAFs only heavy bomber is needed on the display circuit.

I believe the British Army are also a tadge on the busy side right now.

[Tourist]

Seldom.

Exactly.
We no longer had the requisite air defense, because the RAF had promised they could do it, thus no big carriers any more.

[Strictly Jungly]

Laughable................thats all I can say..........some of you are simply not worthy to make any kind of "comment" on this thread. Some individuals in here are a disgrace not only to their own uniform but to the memory of all of those who died or were injured in 1982.

Inter service banter is one thing, but some of the comments in here go far beyond that. You should be ashamed!

Unhelpful blanket stacker - since when is being a governmental detainee best described as a "holiday". I am a true believer in Free Speech but if you haven't anything sensible to say...........then don't!

How sad that a thread should sink so low...........irrespective of cap badge/service etc etc ................... everyone played their part when it was required.

[Tourist]

Working under the assumption that you are refering to me Jungly, and not sure as to why you think you are qualified to make such an assertion,

Stick it up your hoop.:)

[Archimedes]

Didn't the US also aid the Argentinians as well?

Jeanne Kirkpatrick thought that the US should at least be even handed. She nearly voted against a couple of resolutions at the UN that she'd been told to support; on one occasion she told the media that she'd 'followed orders' and that the administration was quite wrong to support the British case.

Utlimately, her point of view played no small part in Dr Kirkpatrick finding herself re-entering academia rather earlier than she had intended, instead of becoming the first female Secretary of State as some commentators suggested she would if Reagan won the 1983 Presidential election.

[scroggs]

5. Resupply of the fleet included airdrops from the Hercules fleet, including what was then (and may still be) the longest air transport sortie ever flown, weighing in at over 24 hours duration. The C-130s flew over 13,000 hours in support of the Task Force, while the rest of the AT fleet (or VC10s, as they were known) flew 4,000 hours.
(Also for Brickhistory's benefit) Um, I can speak with some authority about that sortie - if you're talking about the one I'm thinking of and took part in! It doesn't really qualify as part of the argument at hand as it happened after the war was over. There were a couple of C130 fliights during the conflict which approached 24 hours, though they weren't necessarily in support of RN operations. There were several during June and July of 1982 which exceeded 24 hours, the longest being 28 hours and 4 minutes, which were resupply flights for the various units remaining on the islands while the Stanley runway was closed for repairs. That particular flight remains, I believe, the longest-ever C130 flight (the previous record having been 27:45, held by a Lockheed test crew) and holds a number if operational resupply records both in distance and time.

Despite the banter - some of it quite vindictive - being bandied about here, my overwhelming memory of the conflict was the way in which all three Services pulled together to achieve the objective of regaining the Islands. Many personnel worked out of role and service to play their part in the whole, and there was rarely any bitching about any other service not pulling their weight or being surplus to requirements. I am very proud to have been part of that team, albeit in a support role, and I remain convinced that the achievement was magnificent.

Unfortunately, the politics currently decimating the UK services (and, in part, causing the inter-service back-biting demonstrated in this thread) has convinced me to return my invitation to the Falklands 25 parade, and to make my remembrance of those dead and living elsewhere.

[London Mil]

You know, all this inter-service willy waving bores me. Corporate, like many ops since, proves that the British military can pull together a joint effort in the most diverse of environment.

Take a look at the thread "One Year On". If ever there was an example of how joined-up we now are, consider those five unfortunate souls and their individual Services. i bet they weren't thinking about the inadequacies of another Service.

Personally I am proud to be British military. Nothing more, nothing less.

[Biggus]

Tourist......'you are surely aware, as the Argentinians were, that the RN could have Nuked BA from plymouth, with a lot more accuracy, less cost and no risk to aircrew? You know, those dasterdly underhanded underwater boats? National deterant? ........'

A very brief search of the internet (and I don't mean 'wikawhatsit'!) reveals the range of the Polaris A3 missile, as fitted to the 4 R class 'boats' that provided the deterrent (correct spelling!) in 1982 was 2,500 nm. Missiles fired from Plymouth due south wouldn't even have reached the equator - let alone BA! Hopefully some of your other points are more considered/researched/accurate than the one posted above!

Credibility?

[Tourist]

Oh gosh, you got me.

Yup, I retract everything I said.








................Or maybe you understood my point that Vulcans were not required to Nuke BA, and are taking refuge in pedantry because you cannot challenge my points with any real argument.

Credibility?

[airborne_artist]

Of course, there's an argument that if the Argentinians had been really frightened by the RAF's ability to deliver conventional weapons, they would not have invaded, as they'd have known in advance that they'd be bombed out of existence the minute they started to dig in on the FI.

In the Argentinians' planning stages, the RAF should have been their worry, given the speed of aircraft versus the speed of a frigate. The Argies clearly were not worrried, nor as it turned out, they didn't have too much to fear from the RAF as a whole for quite some time into the conflict.

[Pontius Navigator]

if the Argentinians had been really frightened by the RAF's ability to deliver conventional weapons, they would not have invaded

This is a specious arguement. The Argentinians would hardly have considered any of HM Forces abilities. Their consideration was entirely focussed on HMGs likely reactions. In that they were perhaps not far wrong.

HMG was, apparently, quite defeatist in its ability to recover the islands by force of arms. It was 1SL who was quite positive.

Clearly the RAF would have been wholly unable to recover the Falklands as indeed would the Army have been without the sea lift capacity of the RN. The RN would have been hard pressed to recover the FI without the Army.

The RAF provided some support, not least topping up the task force with stores as the TF reach Ascension. The other RAF efforts have been mentioned already.

True much of what the TF needed could have been done without the RAF but the RAF effort, for instance MRR, enabled quicker exploitation of places like South Georgia. It was a combined effort and one that the RAF did not claim for itself as the major component.

[Tourist]

Pontious

I 100% agree with your post. That I would agree is an accurate portrayal.

[Evalu8ter]

"It was a combined effort and one that the RAF did not claim for itself as the major component." Quite so. Unlike the RN propaganda machine justifying sending an Amphib Task Group to Iraq in 2003 to carry out a Littoral Op on a country with about 20 miles of coastline...Oh, and then conveniently forgetting to tell everyone that the bulk of the assault was conducted from a land base and by RAF SH.......See, we can all play this childish game!
Strictly Jungly, I'm with you on this one. There has been some nasty vitriol spouted on this thread which is exactly what Brown, Browne & minions want to hear. Who cares about making a fist of Strategic planning when a "bit of red meat" (read CVF for the RN, TypHoon for the RAF, FRES/"don't tinker with the cavalry" for the Army) gets the Brass Hats scurrying to brief the press defending their own sacred cows.
Tourist, grow up. Healey killed your precious carriers. The RAF put up a point of view, the Admiralty's case must not have been as good (probably more concerned with "real" ships, DDs and FFs and all those Command seats...good god, we don't wan't aviators running the RN!). So live with it. Don't forget the Naval machinations that contributed to the demise of TSR2, we all carry our scars. No one seriously disputes that a CV would have made the campaign easier, but could you have defended it any better than the Atlantic Conveyor? Maybe, maybe not. This generation of Sea Lords seem to embrace air power more; they've seen that Amphib & Expeditionary are the new ASW & Convoy Escort -good on them, and they're making every effort to get your ships. I hope you get them, I do, if only to stop paranoid crab-haters like you banging on. As a SH mate I've had the honour to serve with the brown and light blue, and have embarked on the LPH/CVS, always finding it challenging and enjoyable flying. I consider some of the Jungly boys good mates, and whereas over a few wets this sort of banter is funny, sober it is not.
If you're still sore, then it must be the flypast thing. Sorry, I just don't see you getting a T42 down The Mall (though it's probably not too far away from water for some of your skippers to have a go...) When the Flypast occurs look carefully at the units involved; many of those units are in AFG and Iraq now, fighting todays war, together.

[NURSE]

The last articles i read in various recent magazines had Blowpipe credited with 0 kills for UK and 1 for Argentina. those atributed in the book mentioned had been redesignated as Multiple ground fire or raiper. But then within the RA there has been a school of thought that they don't need light air defence.
Tornado at that time was useless for that type of conflict and still is needing secure airstrips whereas a proper carrier with escort group can cover a much larger proportion of the Globe.
Yes I did miss the contribution of BN which was outstanding and its a shame that we lost Atlantic conveyor and the 3 other chinooks and wessex's it was carrying as well as the Harrier base stores and engineer kit, tentage etc. Why was Atlantic Conveyor lost would that be because of the limited air superiority and lack of AEW capablity?
I would contest that 14 Phantom FG1's and a handful of Gannet AEW3's could have made a huge difference. And with 13-14 Buccaneers would we have had to do Black Buck at all?

[AR1]

Apologies for using the phrase 'crab hater'..

I wasn't there - well four years late, but thats not my fault. All the people I met there in semi-peace ( on Mount Kent) Javelin Crew, Kings Regiment, Argyle & Sutherlands, Navy comms, Nurse's,(!), F4 Crew; were top drawer. My next door Neighbour still has his smoked vest from Antelope, and I read Sharkeys book once a year, and yes he comes across as a bit cocky, but maybe thats what it takes, and if i'm being honest, who am I to argue with someone who had to pull the trigger? (as for the AIM9L argument - most kills were from the rear right? and thats just superior airmanship, be it dark or light blue)
All in it for the right reasons, and lest not forget that.

Cheers.

[Wader2]

In a new series, we talk to former Defence secretaries about the crises that marked their time in office. 25 years on from the Falklands, Sir John Nott shares powerful memories. Report by Lorraine McBride.
[/URL]When he first heard that the difficult situation with Argentina was escalating towards conflict, Sir John . . . he returned to the Commons and requested an update on the Falklands. He was stunned . . .intercepted Argentine signals suggesting . . . invade the Falklands within 48 hours. Sir John Nott. . . went across to see a "horrified" Margaret Thatcher

. . . the flamboyant First Sea Lord, Henry Leach, interrupted them and bolstered their resolve: . . . He showed great selfconfidence and really did persuade us that we could get the fleet to sea the following week."
Today, he admits having felt "great scepticism" that the fleet really would be able to recover the Falklands:
"There hadn't been any proper contingency plans . . . it wasn't in the front of our minds at all."
[URL="http://defenceintranet.diiweb.r.mil.uk/NR/rdonlyres/2AEF37DC-34C6-4137-9BC8-87C01209B466/0/ArgentineSoldierFalklands.jpg"] (http://defenceintranet.diiweb.r.mil.uk/NR/rdonlyres/79FA83CD-56E1-4397-BEB9-7145AABDB673/0/SirJohnNott.jpg)"Then Willie Whitelaw came in a frightful panic . . . everyone was threatening to resign.
he noted a growing confidence spreading through the MOD's Main Building:
"As soon as there is a challenge, the military is transformed. There was an initial sense of shock on the day of the invasion but by the following Tuesday, the Chiefs of Staff had come to the conclusion that this was a do-able operation, and that increased my confidence.

the alternative would have spelt humiliation:
a feeling of inevitability about military action:
"Margaret was a fairly aggressive and pugnacious lady.

[John Purdey]

Had I known when I started this thread that there would be quite so much irrelevancy and vituperation in many of the contributers, then I would not have stated it in the first place. Give it a rest. John Purdey

[Mike Oxmels]

You got a real purdey mouth.:ok:



(Sorry, I bet you've never heard that one before!)

[Wader2]

JP, true, however looking afresh at Forget's post #2, a new thought occurs.

Look at all the 500lb bomb plots and then compare them with all the targets. I wonder what they were aiming at and if they hit anything?

So, aside from the Vulcan raid, what about all the other attacks?

A couple of AAA sites pretty close to Vulcan 1000lbs craters and one close to a 500lb. Also two 500lb near misses on the runway. Looking at the dense 500lb cluster south of the runway, did they hit a target or miss the runway?

[forget]

I should have mentioned, the diagram of the bombed airfield is from the book 'Falklands, the Air War' by the British Aviation Research Group. ISBN 0 906339 05 7.

Staggering detail of anything and everything involved! You have to see the book to appreciate the work that went into it.

A few copies for sale on Amazon -

http://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/offer-listing/0853688427/ref=sr_1_olp_8/202-5101255-2184614?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1178718334&sr=1-8

[TMJ]

@forget: Is that the one which goes through the war day by day, listing and describing every sortie and which has appendicies giving details of every type used by both sides, listing every ac lost by both sides and how they were damaged or destroyed, the eventual fate of every ac that survived the war and suchlike? If so, I found it bloody useful at Shriv for researching a syndicate presentation.

[forget]

Is that the one which goes through the war day by day.............

It has to be the same one. I don't believe there'd be two books of this quality out there.

[cheese bobcat]

I entirely agree with Post No. 80 from Monty.

This unbecoming inter-service sniping is unwelcome. We all gave of our best in 1982 and we all felt sympathy when casualties were announced. The Army, Navy and the Air Force all showed that we were a force to be reckoned with.

The fact that it was the honour of the Vulcan to start proceedings is neither here nor there; the crew did us proud.

As with Monty, I was not entirely unconnected with the operation.

Papa Fox.

[Zoom]

In discussing whether or not the RAF could provide AD wherever, one should remember that the politicos will plump for any plan that a) saves money, which can then be spent on some eye-catching, vote-winning plan and/or b) brings jobs to their own constituencies. A suitable defence policy will then be woven around the remaining resources, and whatever the Services want, feel or claim is utterly irrelevant.

[Pontius Navigator]

I see Ray Fletton's letter in today's Telegraph tells the same story - shock and awe in the modern vernacular.

Then MW King, who built the original short runway says that a temporary repair of one or two craters would have been a very simple exercise.

Simple with the off Sea Slug firecracker, further raids as necessary, and BL755s. Also Ray Fletton says how the hardcore filling of the crater had to be tamped down daily.

What MW King has overlooked, or been unaware of was the camouflet caused by the explosion. Rapid runway repair was never going to be easy. The pulverised sub-base would take a considerable amount of ballast to effect a decent repair. Unless the Argentinians had a proper runway repair organisation in situ, with all the necessary heavy plant, their job would have been nigh impossible.

[forget]

Today's Telegraph letters -

Role of Stanley airport in Falklands conflict

Sir - I was senior operations officer at Stanley from March 1983, and one of the major concerns was to keep the runway open for the Phantom jets (Letters, May 9). This involved daily removal of the runway matting and consolidation of the hardcore filling in the (non-existent) crater caused by the first Vulcan raid.

We operated fast jets out of Stanley, and the Argentines could have, too. The air picture would have been different and made things much more difficult for the Army, Navy and Fleet Air Arm.

Tony Chater, the Falklands artist, told me that, after the first Vulcan raid, the Argentines were wandering about in a daze: they had no effective defence against this type of bombing, and the blow to their morale was immense. It was at this point that Tony knew the end of the occupation was inevitable.

There was also the implicit threat that a Vulcan could bomb the mainland, and it was, after all, primarily a nuclear bomber. In my opinion, the negative effect on enemy morale, and the positive effect on that of the islanders, was sufficient justification in itself for the huge effort needed to mount the raids.

Raymond Fletton Flt Lt (RAF) Rtd, Cordes, France

Sir - I was the overseas director of Johnston Construction when we were building the runway, and visited every two months or so from 1974 to 1977.

At the time of the war, we had Royal Engineers staff with us for three weeks so that we could brief and advise them on the runway, the islands and the task of lengthening that they would face once they succeeded in recapturing Stanley.

The runway was some 4,000ft long, built of asphalt on a locally quarried stone base. It was designed to take small aircraft such as the F27 turbo prop and the F28 jet, which were expected to be the regular aircraft from Argentina. Using it for conventional military jets was always out of the question. Strong enough, certainly, but not long enough.

When, towards the end of the construction project, the Falkland islanders realised that the runway length meant that planes would not be able to fly in from countries further afield than Argentina, there was huge disappointment and anger. We were asked by island representatives to offer a price to extend the runway before we left. We quoted circa £1,000,000. This proposal was turned down at the time, no doubt for political reasons.

As far as the bombing was concerned, I suspect this was largely a sabre-rattling exercise, as the temporary repair of one or two craters would have been a very simple exercise for the Argentine equivalent of the Royal Engineers.

M. W. King Tytherleigh, Devon

[bigwordsmith]

Can I second the motion supporting Monty - There's a lot of inter-service sniping going on here, and surely the place for that is over a beer or two, not in a public forum?
As a journalist ( and ex-Sapper) I'd just like to gently remind all contributors that everything that gets published here has a very, very wide audience, not all of whom are as ethical as we'd like them to be.
While open discussion, debate and criticism is healthy, it's all too easy for the wrong message to come across - I've seen parliamentary motions carried on less hard evidence than the tide of opinion on PPRuNe
On another note - what has happened to XM607?

[ZH875]

XM607 has had a bit of a spruce up job carried out. The civvy contractors (can't remember if FRA or Serco) have actually done it all. So she does not look as sorry as she did.

This is one time that praise can be awarded to the contractors.

[AR1]

" As far as the bombing was concerned, I suspect this was largely a sabre-rattling exercise"

When we rattle sabres, we dont do it by halves....

[rab-k]

Back to topic -

Some craters can still be seen today - c/o 'Google Earth'

http://i46.photobucket.com/albums/f105/rab-knight/Stanleycraters-1.jpg

[Tourist]

Well, if Tony Chater, the artist says it was worth it then who am I to argue?
I didn't realise you had such a prominent military tactician supporting your argument:rolleyes:

[soddim]

At the end of the war many of us involved were anxious that all possible lessons from the conflict should be gleaned. The direction from MOD was quite simple - 'there will be no airing of lessons learned - this was a victory, let's just remember that'.
At the time that seemed wrong - but, reading this thread, perhaps MOD were right after all.

[BEagle]

Oh lord, she's back..........:rolleyes:

[Rheinstorff]

Tourist, Chater was an eyewitness, and one who had obviously observed the Argentinean forces before and after the bombing. Is it so unreasonable to believe that he could judge a change in mood/attitude/behaviour? It seems to me like you're willing to dismiss any argument that doesn't support your own position rather than evaluate each on its merits.

As for 'tacticians', wars have tended to prove that about half of them are wrong. They're usually on the losing side. In the case of an operation of this nature, you should surely also be considering Chater's qualifications as a strategist as strategic effect was surely intended by the raid.

[Tourist]

I feel I should point out, that I do happen to know Tony Chater.
My parents house boasts beautiful pictures of a leapard Seal, penguins and the like courtesy of him.
For about 6 months I lived just down the hill from his Pink Shop, and then for 5 1/2 years I lived just behind him. He is a nice guy. Lovely pictures. He never said as much to me about the bombing.


The point is however that it was completely unimportant what a local artist thought of the effect of the bombing. The islanders moral was high throughout, and the argentinians moral was conversely catastrophically low throughout.

I would hazard the opinion that the testimony of the man who built the airfield that it was easily repairable is rather more pertinent.

And Rheinstorff, I too believe that the raid was strategic. It's just that I believe it was part of the RAFs strategy to justify its existence in the face of mounting evidence to the contrary.

[Archimedes]

I'm starting to smell vinegar, but whether that's from a chip on Tourist's shoulder or from the freshly battered fish he's just fried for supper from the array he's hooked so far on this thread, I'm not sure...

The point, serious or not, is interesting. In all the defence reviews from 1957 onwards, the one service that has had the most difficulty in justifying its existence to the beancounters has (remarkably) been the RN. Only the RN has found itself confronted with a defence review paper stating that despite much scrutiny, the role of the service was 'unclear'.

Granted, I would argue that this was obviously (to borrow from Ian Botham) because the lemon at the bottom of the G&T was obscuring the view of the various persons conducting the study, but...

The reason Nott set about the RN in 1981 with such fiscal violence was because both the roles of the Army and RAF were utterly clear cut, and reductions in any size for both services simply could not be justified. It was put to Nott at a seminar that cuts to the RN couldn't be justified either; he seemed to concur (albeit in that policitican's manner that means you can't quite tell) inferring that savaging the fleet was the least unpalatable option if money had to be shorn from the defence budget.

The notion that the RAF in 1982 had to justify its exsitence to a government which had made re-equipping the RAF with more modern aircraft a plank of its manifesto commitment (another reason why Nott passed the RAF by in 81) doesn't quite seem to fit either.

[The Helpful Stacker]

Tourist - You really are the most bitter and twisted little blue job I've ever encountered. Do you ever tire of it or do you just keep your efforts in the workplace to a minimum in order to have enough energy left at the end of the day to bleat so much on here?

:rolleyes:

[Tourist]

Archy.
Not justify prior to 1982, rather in the light of the lack of visible big moustache "few" type derring do in the Falklands.

Stacker.

Not bitter, nor twisted, quite happy actually, as well I should be. I fact I seem to be about the only regular poster on here who loves his job and never whinges about it and encourages everybody to join.
I do tend to limit my effort at work though, I must admit.........

[Archimedes]

Bob Iveson had a very natty 'tache. Does that count? ;)

[DON T]

Sqn Ldr Iveson did a great job escaping from the Argies!

Mind you, I seem to remember that when he later served at MOD, he was late for an appointment at the RAF Dental Centre in Harley Street. His excuse was, 'I got lost'!

[Rheinstorff]

Tourist, surely it's about effect not visibility? It's not the numbers that count, but the effect that they have.

Eg, Chinook BN had a disproportionate effect on the campaign, despite being a single airframe. The Harrier attack at Goose Green to allow 2 Para to continue its attack and win that battle probably also had a disproportionate effect. Perhaps its something about the 'few'...