Real Men don't go around - a fatal cultural flaw.

[Tee Emm]

On TV Channel Nine this morning (Sunday 1st April) the reporter interviewed the Indonesian chief aircraft accident investigator about the recent Garuda Boeing 737 accident where the aircraft landed long and fast and over-ran the runway with resulting loss of lives. The questions were about the CVR readings and the statement made that the first officer had suggested to the captain that a go-around should be made.

While the chief investigator chose his words very carefully the reporter in summing up the interview was startlingly blunt. She said that in Indonesia, it was considered "shameful" if the pilot elected to go-around. Clearly she had done her homework - perhaps having sought opinions from aviation professionals who are aware of the loss of face syndrome in Asian culture.

Despite extensive accent by many major airlines on the principles of CRM or Threat and Error Management (whichever), it is an expensive waste of time if local ethnic culture is so powerful in the crew member's mind that lives are put at risk because of cultural mores.

Asian cadet pilots are now a normal feature of several Australian flying schools where flying training to CPL standard is conducted before the cadets return to their country as qualified pilots ready to go into jet training and ultimately first officers on passenger jets.

While the training in Australia will of course include the usual theory subjects of navigation, meteorology and other allied subjects to ATPL standard, I wonder if there should be included in the syllabus accent on cultural issues. By these I mean blowing out of the water the insidious "real men don't go around" syndrome. It is all too easy for flying instructors to advise their Asian students that when in doubt go-around - after all this is taught as good airmanship in all flying schools.

But there needs to be more than just a few words of casual advice to overseas students who, on their return home to their native country, will quickly be pressured by their culture to disregard the norms of sound airmanship practices. Australian flying school instructors from the most junior grade 3 to the CFI, can have a powerful influence on their Asian students but in turn the flying school management must not fall in the trap of political correctness just to keep the dollars flowing in.

There is a need to approach the cultural problem associated with go-around philosophy in strong terms. The perceived shame of a go-around in Asian pilot's minds is nothing to laugh about over coffee in the crew room. It is a lethal problem that needs to be addressed all through the flying training of cadets who are trained in Australia.

[pakeha-boy]

well said!!!!:ok:

[lowerlobe]

I wonder how long it would take to re-educate the in-grained cultural loss of face in student pilots or if it is even possible.

If the student has been taught this philosophy or mind set since birth and only spends a few years in the west and then is re-acquainted with this culture as soon as he is back home will anything have changed?

[The Messiah]

Real men don't go-around and minimas are for private pilots. :ok:

[019360]

The focus of CRM is "What is right?" not "Who is right". That makes it ideally at least, culture free. As long as "we who know better" (i.e. western pilots) think this can only happen to "them" (Asian pilots) then we ourselves are part of the problem.
Were there asians in the cockpit of this Southwest 737 at Burbank?...
"Arriving in Burbank on a flight from Las Vegas, NV, the crew contacted SOCAL Approach and were told to expect the visual approach to runway 8 at BUR. Approximately 10 miles from the field, while descending to 3000 feet, the crew was instructed to maintain 230 knots until further advised. One minute later, the crew was cleared for the visual approach to runway 8, with an instruction to maintain 3,000 feet until passing the Van Nuys VOR (approx 6nm from the runway).
For unknown reasons, the flight crew passed the VOR and failed to start their descent from 3000 feet. 3.9nm from the runway threshold, at an airspeed of 230 knots and an altitude of 3000 feet, the crew began their descent to land. Due to the steep nature of the descent (nearly 7°), the crew received two "sink rate" warnings at approximately 400' AGL, and a "pull up" warning at 190' AGL. The aircraft touched down 2800' down the 6032' runway with a groundspeed of 181 knots.
Despite using max reverse thrust, spoilers, and brakes, the crew was unable to stop the aircraft before the end of the runway. The plane broke through a blast fence at approximately 40 knots, skidded across Hollywood Way, and came to rest 38' from a Chevron gasoline station. The aircraft was evacuated via the escape slides."
This was an amazing approach effort. As with American MD-80 at Little Rock, Air France 340 at Toronto, Qantas 747 at Bangkok etc etc. It can happen anytime that one pilot thinks the other knows what he is doing or thinks the price of speaking up is too high. That can come from items other than DNA such as friendship, admiration, bewilderment, pride, fatigue etc etc.
FWA (Flying While Asian) is not yet an indictable offence.

[neville_nobody]

019360
In all the instances you listed the FO wasn't sitting there telling the captain to go around. From current reports; in the Garuda accident the FO was telling the captain that the approach was no good and to go around. The captain ignored this for whatever reason.

In the QF accident the captain said that the approach was at the upper end of his tolerance. I'm sure if the FO had said too high go around this was all he needed to confirm his gut feeling.

Two totally different problems between stuffing the approach and landing long, and the FO sitting there saying go around yet you are to proud to do so.
Unfortunately Asian culture; for all it's positives and the amazing advancements they have brought to technology and production, just does not work well in a multi crew aeroplane.

[019360]

Hmmmm....so its OK to crash if you both agree that all is OK? Situation AWareness is one of the basic planks of CRM. If you can't see that things are wrong then you have nothing to call out about. I cannot believe that in the examples cited, as in almost all similar Asian and non-Asian cases, neither crew member had any doubt that everthing was fine. What sort of clowns would that make them?
When one pilots watches and doesn't speak up, because a) he doesn't think there's a problem, b) he does but doesn't want to call it out c) thinks the other guy PF-knows what he's doing or d) calls it out but it is ignored....then passengers die. Wrong is wrong and I bet that passengers don't die happier if the crew up the front is smiling just before "sound of impact".
My airline had a horrible accident years ago at Guam. At night, below the FAF crossing height with no RW in sight, one crew member queried whether the glide slope was working. Up to a few seconds before impact that nagging "something is wrong" feeling, translated into action, would have saved hundreds of lives. In the years since then we have spent a fortune on training, and a generous fuel policy and a total "no-fault" go-around policy to ensure it doesn't happen again. We're not pefect...no-one is. Our FOQA system monitors go-rounds to ensure there are enough of them, not to reduce them.
But to pretend that we (Asian airlines) alone have to fix this problem is to stick our collective heads right in the sand.

[A37575]

The Garuda 737 captain had 15,000 hours and his first officer 2000 hours. Yet despite the experience of the captain he pressed on regardless with what appears to have been a horrendous visual approach. How bad must things get before the first officer finally decides bugger this for a joke I am not ready to die yet - and takes over control? It is not exactly the sort of training exercise taught in the simulator. Maybe it should be.

[Captain Sand Dune]

In the QF accident the captain said that the approach was at the upper end of his tolerance. I'm sure if the FO had said too high go around this was all he needed to confirm his gut feeling.
Didn't the F/O initiate the go around, after which the captain immediately took over and ....... well we know the rest?

[domo]

From topgun


What you should have done is land the plane

[J430]

And not break it!:sad:

[Turboman]

Do Garuda have stable approach criteria? If so, and I'd be surprised if they didn't, the FO should have felt confident in forcing the go around.

If the first officer recognised the need for a go around, and 2000hrs should have given him enough experience to reach the conclusion that this was not a stable approach, where is the "simple oversight" by the crew that the investigator refers to?

[aircraft]

Psst... It is not only asians that don't like to lose face. How many Australian, American or English pilots are happy to "lose face"?

"Losing face" is a perception in the mind of the "loser" and is a function of his/her ego. If he/she has no ego, they cannot lose face.

How many pilots don't have an ego? How many humans don't have one?

[Keg]

An F/O 'forcing' a go around. Now we have two pilots wrestling on the controls at 300'. One is driving toward the runway and the other has applied max thrust for a go around.

Have we really thought this all the way through?

I'm not disagreeing with the sentiment and I acknowledge that it's a difficult situation with an unknown outcome. Over the last nine years or so I've thought through a number of times the possible responses to a disagreement at such a critical phase of flight and it's possible outcomes. None of them are very pretty.

[Gnadenburg]

An F/O 'forcing' a go around. Now we have two pilots wrestling on the controls at 300'.

Concerned PNF "ABC Going Around".

Rougue & unstable PF can not land without landing clearance.

Except maybe in Asia. :}

[DutchRoll]

Yeah there's only so much "forcing" you can do if the other bloke is hell bent on continuing whatever he's doing. Any of the possible outcomes while doing that could end in disaster depending on how the cookie crumbles at the time.

Whatever the case, it sounds like a stupendous cockup by the skipper, very much unhelped by the good ol' face-saving tradition you find in some parts of the world.:(

[ratpoison]

There's only one way to stop some d***head continueing the approach after consistant verbal requests to go around and that is, to pull the gear up. From personal experience,it certainly works. But it needs to be done well before the flare point.:)

[Blip]

If I were an F/O in a situation where the aircraft was descending through 500 ft at 180 kts with only 15 degrees of flap (or whatever the scenario might be) and I thought a crash at the other end of the runway was looking inevitable, I would simply reach for the gear selector and select "GEAR UP"!

If we're talking about "Emergency Language" from the F/O being completely ignored or dismissed by the Captain and lives are at stake, this would be the alternative to taking control of the aircraft.

I don't see how the approach could possibly be continued from that point unless the Captain was completely insane.

[Ha! You beat me by one minute!]

[Ultergra]

Quote Tee Em "There is a need to approach the cultural problem associated with go-around philosophy in strong terms. The perceived shame of a go-around in Asian pilot's minds is nothing to laugh about over coffee in the crew room. It is a lethal problem that needs to be addressed all through the flying training of cadets who are trained in Australia."

Agreed. However, having worked, teaching Asians how to fly, a big part of our time with the cadets was to encourage them to 'come out of their shell' and speak up to the pilot next to them. A good practical example is, when practice IFR flying in the T/A we instructed the cadets to decend to 500ft. Most did, without question. When we asked them, "why didn't you click, that perhaps thats a little low..." they answered that they knew it didn't sound right, but didn't want to question it. This was the case that we brought up with many other cadets, saying to them that you must open your mind and think about every order, every instruction. Not only relating to ATC but to the other pilot (us included) in the cockpit too.

According to ninemsn.com, the FO spoke up to the captain and instructed him to go around. He didn't listen. As we learn in human factors, say it once more. No response, or no action... take over. It's in the interest of lives and safety.

My point is, getting our guys out of their shell, it worked and they left the college a lot more confident than when they arrived here. However, the culture is that instilled in their lives and within the airline, that the day they get into their 777's or whatever, the captain will shoot them down if they speak up, and all that work, wasted.

It's cultural, its instilled, it's virtually impossible to change.

Simple.. choose with whom you fly with... :8

[ScottyDoo]

I thought a crash at the other end of the runway was looking inevitable, I would simply reach for the gear selector and select "GEAR UP"!

Because landing on the gear pods would be a much shorter landing "roll"?

:p

[ratpoison]

Yes indeed, and apparently one requires toga thrust promptly set on all engines to taxi in to the gate. :p

[pakeha-boy]

This whole Sagarso(fred daggs terminolgy) has been a problem since some of you blokes were sucking on lollipops

Did a stint for JAL as an instructor in their 747 programme,the mindset was there in the mid eighties,and obviously,from what I gather,still here...(bloody howl!!!! ).....biggest complaint from the pakeha-instructors.....peer pressure,and retaliation amongst their own,and it was rampant.....

Watched a 747 skipper of 20 yrs ,land gear up in a piper one day,(in front of 80 students)...he was told to go around more than 20x.....had not closed the door properly on take-off,paniced and landed gear up.....(on the 1000ft marker though)

Company sent all instructors home for the day as we were having too much fun with this one,but the fall-out was something to behold....disgrace,demotion to F/O,etc etc......not too sure what those boys do to one another,.....but I,m sure the ol knife in the belly button was contemplated...

They do have a mindset that has to be changed.....has nothing to do with taking potshots,discrimination,malice or predudice.....just take a look at some of the "other" accidents....

Reckon it might be the "pot calling the kettle black"...but for those of us who have been "within" these institutions will tell you ...theres the side of things you see,and a side you never see...only hear about...PB

[Will964]

The major cultural factor which has a direct impact on multi-crew operations is the individualism/Collectivism v Power Distance dimension. This means the groups interdependence v independence and the relationship between superiors and subordinates.

Australia and Indonesia are on either end of the scale for both these dimensions. Our current TEM strategies combined with CRM countermeasure training is aimed at our own cultural deficiencies (a highly individualistic cultural with a low power distance that makes group operation difficult). You cannot apply the same logic to other counties training and you cannot view their problems using ‘Western Anglo Goggles’.

The problems these nations have with multi crew operations can be solved, but only through designing CRM training which is compatible with cultural differences and that doesn't try to replicate a Western Anglo cultural stereo type.

[priapism]

If proven, I hope they charge the captain with murder - arrogant prique!

[pakeha-boy]

Will964.....you are right...no argument here.....

The problem with your approach is that all their training,CRM,flying,and training is/was designed through your"Weatern Goggles" theory.....and Idont make the rules....just follow them....

As an example,because of insurance problems in the early days...JAL was required to have "western pilots' in the cockpit,who had heavy time.....JAL tired on many occassions to Nationalize their airline......for obvious reasons,(and Ihave seen them)they werent able to....the situation now has improved,due to your "Western goggles theory".

Maybe I,m reading your post wrong......but culture in the cockpit,seems to be alive and well......but to my thinking,CRM,GA,S....etc.....whether it be in Asia,Europe,downunder,State side.....is basically the same....do your job and do it well....

Have done a couple of contracts in Asia.....its an eyeopener,for us Western types for sure.......my Goggels got steamed up on several occasions...

Culture has its place,no argument.....but flying Aircraft,is flying aircraft
PB

[Will964]

Culture has its place,no argument.....but flying Aircraft,is flying aircraft

Agreed, it is. But the values we bring to the flight deck are based on a myriad of influences including national, organisational and professional cultural. You can’t get around them and you can’t change them. You can, however, work with them to increase awareness and, in doing so, improve safety.

Many consider it is the responsibility of the organisation (carrier) to recognise and minimise their negative cultural aspects whist emphasizing the positive. But in the real world, if there isn’t the pressure (either financial or regulatory) then it doesn’t happen.

[Centaurus]

I heard a worrying story from a simulator instructor conducting IFR training on overseas cadets. On final the instructor failed the altimeter near the OM. The PF immediately feathered the left engine, then selected gear up, flap up and continued the approach to a wheels up landing. When the PNF asked by the instructor why he did not warn the PF, the reply was "But he is the captain, and you never question the captain's decisions."
Within the next five years both of those cadets will most likely be captains on jet transports.

[galdian]

Ultegra
Where the f**k have you been hiding??
Great post, insightful and true, best of the lot on this post with one addition (and apologies if it has been mentioned and I've missed it ) but in Asia AGE will trump any other concept/idea thrown up.
As you alluded what you train them to do, and what they allowed to do within their culture upon return to their homeland, is two different things.

Will964 - also a great, and sadly true, post.

A small story - worked for an asian airline, went to their "CRM" days, largely held in their own language as a "tick in the box" exercise for the reegulator.
At one session thought I'd stir the pot, mentioned most western airlines had a "CRM" pyramid or similar in their Ops Manual so any F/o had a company obligation to query the decisions of the Captain up to the point of "takng over",this simply confirmed the companies support of the F/o's legal requirement to ensure a safe operation etc blah blah blah! Where was ours???
With a steely eye I was told by the Chief Pilot (old, retired, non-operational) that it was not required and he would "talk" to the F/o's.
And that reflects the dominance of age over anything else in Asia.

As an almost in a brutal but honest analysis it wasn't the regulators or the company management who minimised killing people when dealing with airlines in Korea but insurance agencies - maybe one of the few times in history they can take a bow!

As a final-final; at least in the west the Captain is accountable, in Asia if there is ANY F/o within 100km of the aircraft at the time of the incident (prefereably a Western F/o) then he will, of course, be responsible.
Such is the Asian way!

OK - the quiz question for the night: which Asian airline had 3 Check Captains aboard a new 767 on training, one western F/o on board in a jump seat, during circuits they trashed the aircraft and who was to blame??
Obviously the western F/o! Why...? Didn't you read the make up of the crew???
Moral of Story - western pilot who comes to Asia as F/o be very, very, very careful - and then be expected to be screwed over (somehow) if something ever happens.
Regards to all.

[compressor stall]

At risk of an us and them attitude, the anti western sentiment is not just that. It is also directed at other asian countries.
The SQ media release after Taipei summed this up perfectly: "...The captain had 9000 hours flying experience and was Malaysian."
CS

[coaldemon]

A long time ago a friend of mine ( being an airline pilot) was on a Garuda flight (prior to 9-11) and got himself invited up to the flightdeck. Once up there he chatted to the pilots and found out that the fleet manager was the Captain. He asked the usual question " How did you get into Garuda?", the answer was " I was one of the original cadets". My friend remaked that he had obviously done very well and were were the rest of his cadet course? They were all dead from accidents over the previous 25 years but they were good cadets...... :ugh: QED

[fox niner]

I am such a Sissy.....

We made a go-around three hours ago. Was great fun though.

[metro752]

I heard a worrying story from a simulator instructor conducting IFR training on overseas cadets. On final the instructor failed the altimeter near the OM. The PF immediately feathered the left engine, then selected gear up, flap up and continued the approach to a wheels up landing. When the PNF asked by the instructor why he did not warn the PF, the reply was "But he is the captain, and you never question the captain's decisions."
Within the next five years both of those cadets will most likely be captains on jet transports

what the .@(??????????

ok, altimeter stops working, lets kill an engine, Vmc here we come!

[pakeha-boy]

Will964....a professional approach on your part for sure,and the only one if we are to maintain a standard/s ,that dont care where you come from or the culture you subscribe ....

you talk of the myriad of obstacles that we all face,and when you start to mix "flying cultures" that has now forced our hands to make the standards even tougher,complex(however you want to look at it)....because to allow these cultural differences to influence saftey of flight or ops,you have now ****e in your own nest....

Do or are western influences the dominant feature here...I say they are(for obvious reasons).....and if cultural backgrounds and influences are affecting saftey...then they have no place in the cockpit as you/they have no right to be using this as an excuse to operate aircraft.....

Ispeak from experience....I was a training capt for Jal...747,s out of Moses Lake washington....theses blokes were trained in the American culture and after it was all said and done thrown back into the JAL culture and the private conversations Ihad were not pretty....and will964, these were in no way linked to the yank flying culture...it was shoved up their taiipipes by their own system.....

I get the feeling that you think the western flying culture has to change...AGREED TOTALLY......the problem lies in that no matter how much we change to (for lack of a better word)accommodate these cultures to make a more harmonius cockpit......and Ido believe most are very accommodating...the problem inherently lies within there flying culture.....and from previous accounts...it s nothing more than an uphill battle!!!

Like you,I,m as pro-active as you .......:ugh: but this is what it used to feel like...PB

[criticalmass]

I have a suspicion that in an Asian airline - any Asian airline - an F/O who managed to get a Captain to go-around (against that Captain's judgement or desire), by whatever means, would in all likelihood be looking at the end of his career - or his life. Life is cheap in many parts of Asia.

I'm not optimistic that any amount of training by western training organisations will ever overcome the imperative, ingrained since birth and reinforced by nurture, for the Asian male in a position of command/responsibility/authority to "save face " at all costs.

The reality is, if Asian aircrew continue to operate heavy jets, then these sorts of accidents will have to be accepted as simply "part of the cost of doing business". Bear in mind the owners of these companies often have very close connections with governments and regulators, in relationships which in some (e.g. Western) societies would be viewed as corrupt, but which in Asian society are regarded as mere "patronage", and just "another cost of doing business".

A major accident may cause an Asian airline to shut down...but within a short time another will rise to take its place, probably established by the same principle players and with the same government officials/ministers etc granting permits/licences etc in return for the appropriate "consideration".

We'd better get used to this, because I simply don't see it changing. There is no way there will ever be such a significant cultural change, no matter how hard you drill it into pilot trainees. Bucking the system will avail them nothing but a one-way trip out the door.

I wish I could be optimistic - but the plain fact is I can't.

[OK 3 wire]

Did anyone hear of the B747 pilot that held for 30 minutes due to thunderstorms at the airport then landed after they cleared or the A330 pilot that stuffed up his approach and was not stabilized by 500'agl and went around for another appraoch and then landed, NO, MY F###ING PIONT EXACTLY!

AIRMANSHIP.

[Absolutely Fabulous]

hmmm, did'nt know the crew on the QF BKK incident was Asian :}

[mingalababya]

Ultergra wrote:

Most did, without question. When we asked them, "why didn't you click, that perhaps thats a little low..." they answered that they knew it didn't sound right, but didn't want to question it.

{snip}

It's cultural, its instilled, it's virtually impossible to change.

Yes, totally agree. Those from Asian countries are taught from a very young age to never question authority. You do as big brother tells you and this is instilled in them right from when they're born.

[Centaurus]

We'd better get used to this, because I simply don't see it changing. There is no way there will ever be such a significant cultural change, no matter how hard you drill it into pilot trainees. Bucking the system will avail them nothing but a one-way trip out the door

Unfortunately this is so true.

[Ozgrade3]

A year ago when I started teaching Asian cadets, I was full of ideas of how I would teach them to be assertive. I thought if I got them early enough and drilled into them the idea of challening their captain , or instructor they would develop the character needed to challenge a captain.

Sadly I have been proven wrong. Their culture of absolute deference to a superior is too instilled, its the very fundiamental of their psyche.Its evident in everything they do, even within a class, where they sit on the bus is an indicator of where they lay in the pecking order. Front seat goes to the class leader and the lower the rank the further back in the bus. The other day I picked up a back row kid first, as he was the only one i asked him to sit up front with me, the look of terror on his face said everything.

In flight, they will challenge you only in jest, the moment you cme accross as serious they will back down. Taxi out with the oil door open, cabin door open, or anything else, climb into CTA without a clearence etc, some will speak up but inveriably submit. Pointing the airvraft dirsctly at high terrain, most will say something......weakly but if you tell them to shut up, submission is quickly followed. I even manage to persuade one to take off using the apron as a runway. We had set takeoff power and had rolled a few metres before i cut the power.

When asked later why he ultimately gave in to me, he said candedly he wanted to stop me, but just couldnt bring himself to do so. Even though he knew it was patently wrong what we were going to do. Even more telling is that he said that their culture taught them from birth that their life as an individual was not important and if a superiors actions caused them to die, that is the their way.

I'm affraid, nothing is going to change in the next 10, 30 or 50 years. The only thing that will force a change is when the hull loss rate become intolerable for the insurance companies to stomach.

[amos2]

Sad, but true. Was upgrading a couple of senior F/Os for command on the 737 a few years back and they weren't doing too badly until we started on emergencies. Following an uncontrollable engine fire with direct tracking to the nearest suitable I put them into a holding pattern...and we went round and round and round etc without a word from either of them. Unfortunately we can't simulate wings burning off yet!

[Absolutely Fabulous]

Speaking of asia as though it is a homogenous entity is like referring to all whites as europeans :ugh:

There are cultural differences and there are culture differences - one refers to upbringing the other to environment, so lets not mix the two.

The authority gradient in a cockpit is as much culture as it is cultural. The hard bit is to know which causes the other if at all.

This trade is one where ego plays a large part, just look at how we talk of ourselves - CFIT is a great example, "ahhh he may have not fcuking idea where he was but hey, he was in control all the way" :}

A mistake is a mistake, sometimes that's all there is to it :ok:

[amos2]

Having trained Chinese, Malaysians, Koreans, Singaporeans and Vietnamese...I gotta tell you Fab...they are all the same!

[Skystar320]

are you refering to there looks? values? culture? or what ? :cool: :cool: :cool:

[amos2]

I think you know exactly what I'm referring to! Unless you are completely thick!

[W.R.A.I.T.H]

<Quote>are you refering to there looks? values? culture? or what ?
</Quote>

1st off, its their, not there, and second, how about reading through the thread so that you get at least a misty idea of what's going on here for the last 3 days.

[GORN ROUND]

I always encourage my pilots to GO ROUND.

Its much cheaper than losing my aircraft, my crew and my fare paying passengers.

Its just my ego.

Oops, too many my's and I's.

[EY777]

Speaking of asia as though it is a homogenous entity is like referring to all whites as europeans

Yes to the uneducated caucasian they all look the same, but if you look closely or even take the time to study the differences they are like chalk & cheese, culturally, psyche & even physical traits! :}

Having trained Chinese, Malaysians, Koreans, Singaporeans and Vietnamese...I gotta tell you Fab...they are all the same!

amos2, have more faith in your students mate!Most major asian carriers have CRM's, TEM's, ALAR/CFIT & other mandated ICAO recommended programmes ongoing within their organisations.The pilots are all bombarded by power distance, high cockpit gradient & other terms to make them aware of complacency & the need to voice out any deviations from SOP's especially if they are caught pants down in an unstabilised approach.

This phenomenon isn't exclusive to asian pilots as they are other well documented western carriers with the same accidents.The question is why are the pilots so focussed to land that they totally forgot about the unstabilised approach?Granted the asians tend to be conformist, but most of them are taught to leave those feelings at the cockpit door.

So let's take an objective look at the cases per se than just to tar all asian pilots as kamikazes.....:ugh:

[Wizofoz]

So let's take an objective look at the cases per se than just to tar all asian pilots as kamikazes.....

Ok, let's...

Indonesia- 32 Airframes in 10 years.

Korea- 9 Fatal jet crashes in 12 years.

Singapore- Pilot takes off on closed runway

Taiwan- Air China- speaks for itself.

The pilots are all bombarded by power distance, high cockpit gradient & other terms to make them aware of complacency & the need to voice out any deviations from SOP's especially if they are caught pants down in an unstabilised approach.


...and yet they won't, or if the F/O does, the Captain ignores him.

This phenomenon isn't exclusive to asian pilots as they are other well documented western carriers with the same accidents.

Certainly, but to a FAR lesser degree. Name one major western carrier with as bad a record as ANY of those mentioned above.

The question is why are the pilots so focussed to land that they totally forgot about the unstabilised approach?

Because in some cultures, addmitting that you are in an unstabilised approach is a shameful loss of face.

but most of them are taught to leave those feelings at the cockpit door.


Sure, lets teach people to ignore their most ingrained characteristics. That will work...

Granted the asians tend to be conformist,

So there ARE cultural norms...

[EY777]

Obviously then Wizofoz, with that attitude, Australia should just close all their flying schools especially the ones that caters to asian students as then I would label them as a bunch of hypocrites :hmm: Just churning out mindless drones, rather than imparting knowledge! :mad:


I shall not comment on Korean, China or Indonesia as their problems are more complex than just an asian psyche.As for SQ, they have learnt their lessons from that incident (& it was nothing about asian psyche as other asian operators cancelled their flights in a raging Typhoon!)


Going around in my former company & I believe the other major asian operators are nowadays non punitive & are considered a non event :ok: Generally, the new western educated asian pilots are more open minded & are open to criticism unlike the older ones, this attitude is infectious & is permeating throughout the organisation.Of course there will be resistance, but Rome wasn't built in a day!


Loss of face is a non issue nowadays, especially to the newer generation that I mentioned as they are well aware of the repercussions of an unstabilized approach.It's all a matter of perception.


Like I said earlier just because your culture is subservient by nature or even non conducive to a safe conduct of the flight (remember, asian cultures differ from each other), it doesn't mean that you should carry it over to the cockpit.After all, we're professional pilots!

[norihaga]

As far as the SIA incident Wizofoz mentioned, I seem to recall reading rather recently about a certain aircraft operated by non Asians that took off on a closed runway: Comair in Lexington, KY, who were of course operating for Delta. The thread's probably still running somewhere on rumours and news. So I think that counts as naming a western carrier with a record as bad as SQ. Do I win a stuffed animal or something?

In all seriousness though and without any intention of questioning those with experience of training pilots for Asian carriers, it would seem SQ (to take one example) are rather better at not flying their many expensive aircraft into solid objects at speed than their neighbours in the Indonesian archipelago. And while I haven't looked at their statistics, my general impression is that the folks at MAS are also pretty good at not killing their passengers, despite the relatively short cultural and physical distance between the two countries. So how does one account for the regional differences, even if we just look at the statistics for Indonesia, Korea and Singapore in Wizofoz's post?

[Casper]

"Loss of face" remains (STILL) the biggest threat to safety in Asian aviation.

[VH-Cheer Up]

"Loss of face" remains (STILL) the biggest threat to safety in Asian aviation.

Perhaps in their CRM sessions they should show them pictures of people with their faces burned off after a crash like GA200.

That's the kind of "loss of face" you never get over.

[EY777]

"Loss of face" remains (STILL) the biggest threat to safety in Asian aviation.


Casper, to the uninitiated, Loss Of Face is a very subjective subject, even for asians!Numerous books are written by westerners on this subject but I believe that most authors have yet to grasp the gist of it.


Let me give you a classic example.Loss Of Face can also occur to the surviving families of the dead crew.Where, let's say, hypothethically in an accident where the pilots were asians,the findings of the AI Board puts the blame on the 'incompetent' pilots.The grieving crew's family now will suffer a "loss of face" syndrome, as due to the fault of the crew, they have to carry the burden of shame for the misdeeds of their dearly departed.So. like I said earlier, it's a matter of perspective.


I believe in most cases of accidents due to unstabilized approaches, they are more than likely caused by a high "macho & ego" factor or "goal oriented & tunnel vision".These factors are prevalent in most cases & aren't ethnic or gender biased.


Perhaps in their CRM sessions they should show them pictures of people with their faces burned off after a crash like GA200.



VH-Cheer Up, I don't see it going to work.Case in point?Look at the gory advertisement on the effects of smoking in your media.I don't see people quitting smoking in droves after that shock treatment! :}

[PK-KAR]

Real men don't go around... So I guess Indonesia is full of gutless pilots now since everyone's paranoid about their approaches that we've seen more go-arounds over the past month that we did over the last 20 years !

*yawn*

I guess I should call my friends spineless useless pilots now because they have done more than 1 go around in their careers (prior to GA200)...

Geez...

You only hear about those who screwed up and caused a mess, but you never hear about those who resigned or were fired or resigned out of personal shame for NOT going around and getting away with it... which is a lot by the way...

PK-KAR

[pakeha-boy]

PK.........I doubt it has anything to do with chicken-****e pilots.....if the go-around rate has gone up...then hopefully its because these pilots are paying closer attention to the SOP parameters and staying within the boundries of a "stabilized app"......

and....from the fact they are being pounded by the controlling agencies......to tidy up their operating performance,procedures and daily routines.....seems normal after what they have been through.....time will tell

Give you an example,....after SWA ploughed that 73 off the end of Midway.....things have changed big time......and they have had a few...the SWA get paid by the mile...so its go go go.....job and finish....it was tough staying up with these boys on an approach......they were for the most part hot and fast.....

Not anymore...they are like following a herd of turtles.....culture change,the feds,pilot attitudes etc etc....it all adds up....

the crash killed a young boy......if that doesnt wake you up.....and make you come to the party......then find another occupation.....PB

[PK-KAR]

Most Pilots here make more money by going around... they get productivity pay by the actual hour, not by the route mile or the scheduled flight/blocktime on routes they do. Now that's an incentive to go-around even if your F/O sneezes at 500'AGL!

Even before GA200, go-arounds are not viewed as shameful. If it was, we'd have more crashes in Indonesia... Now the good news is that, people are beginning to wake up to the fact that "if this can happen to the carrier everyone looks up to, did we miss something?"

The trend has been there since CRM being made mandatory by most if not all of the companies... the GA200 case is a needed wake up call to remind everyone to continue the trend for change... the death of a young boy killed in the crash should not be the reason for people to change, but an additional and tragic reminder.

[Chimbu chuckles]

the GA200 case is a needed wake up call to remind everyone to continue the trend for change..

Why was it needed?

Why will this crash have greater impact than the dozens that have preceeded it in Indonesia?

While I share none of the more extreme views expressed in this thread, and I live in Asia happily flying for an asian carrier, Indonesia is a rather special case within the region. The country has a terrible aviation safety record.

[aerostatic]

While I share none of the more extreme views expressed in this thread, and I live in Asia happily flying for an asian carrier, Indonesia is a rather special case within the region. The country has a terrible aviation safety record.

This is true however consider that Indonesia is actually a huge country geographically, divided into dozens of heavily populated islands, and has been highly dependent on air transportation for many years. Every year it gets hammered by thunderstorms when the ITCZ comes south. It is also a relatively poor country (considering the population) and therefore lacks the quality of infrastructure (ATC is a case-in-point), maintenance and training available in the west and elsewhere in Asia. Poor governance/corruption doubtless plays a role too. As mentioned elsewhere Garuda is at the top of the heap in Indonesia and has first bite at the cherry when it comes to maintenance and training facilities.

Having said all that I don't really think this accident was caused by those factors necessarily. I suspect the pilot-in-command may have been suffering from some sort of task fixation or even subtle incapacitation associated with task fixation and excessive workload. Unstable approaches often fill the pilot with a sense of disbelief and it is at this point that it is critical to snap out of the fixation with the task of continuing the approach and immediately go around. The earlier the go-around decision is made the easier it is to manage the situation.

The FO not taking control and/or forcing a go-around when it must have been obvious that the aircraft would overrun the runway is a mystery - perhaps he tried?? If he did not try you would have to say that a very steep authority gradient was the likely reason.

Anyway sorry for digressing into speculation, it's probably not all that helpful, but it may still be of some benefit to discuss these issues.

[Knackers]

An interesting discussion, which I can only comment on from an air traffic control point of view. The phenomenon of which you're argueing is now known as "cultural ergonomics" (Kaplan, 1991 for those interested). It has become an emerging issue in ATC as airspace borders break down, controllers move about and Western-designed ATC systems are taken up by other nations.

In his book Human Factors in Air Traffic Control, Hopkin writes that cultural ergonomics "...refers to deeply imbued cultural differences between nations and groupings of nations, and affects attitudes and loyalties and responsibilites rather than abilities or performance. Some people may be able to learn all the knowledge and skills necessary for air traffic control but be unwilling or unable to subscribe wholeheartedly to the professional ethos, norms and standards of air traffic control...".

It seems that it may be a very difficult issue to tackle head-on. It only becomes apparent after an incident.

[019360]

Reference a recent post here...."The FO not taking control and/or forcing a go-around when it must have been obvious that the aircraft would overrun the runway is a mystery - perhaps he tried?? If he did not try you would have to say that a very steep authority gradient was the likely reason"
Google the many many references to the Southwest B737 fiasco at Burbank. Or a more recent Ryanair (I think) fiasco in Norway somewhere....or many others. Then honestly say to your self "If I didn't know what the genetic/racial composition of the crew was, what would I guess?"...then you'll find some of your prejuidices.
Where I work....not far from Seoul....last 2 PICs fired were fired because when there was doubt late in the approach...they ignored any squeaks from the RHS and continued. We haven't had, in a very long time, any resembling the terrible QF B737 approach into the teeth of a force 12 CB at Brisbane....."Cleared to land with hail on the RW".
Airlines can and do make progress. Those wannabee ethnic commentators who instruct a few asians for a short time then move on should keep appropriately quite. As PIC in an asian airline, or anywhere else....... you/we can affect you first officer, in your cockpit and in that time motivate him to understand a tiny bit more about airmanship and assertiveness and the horrors of pride as a tool in a pilots armoury.
And it works. The horrors of "Saving Face" might get you a few more free drinks in an Australian aero club bar....but when you get the chance to live and work with it in Asia, and change it, year in , year out, you can actually do something, vs making caustic remarks.
There was a time when the rigors of the Royal navy would have made the asians look positively flexible...yet they changed. Its not impossible if you get past the rhetoric.

[lowerlobe]

A GARUDA Boeing 737 was travelling at 410kmh, nearly double normal landing speed, when it slammed into Yogyakarta Airport's runway last month, bouncing, bursting into flames and killing 21 people, the crash investigators' report says.

The confidential report, which Indonesian authorities are trying to suppress, points towards pilot error as the cause of the crash. Aviation experts confirmed speed and flap warnings would have been sounding in the cockpit and the pilot should have aborted the landing and "gone around".

Whether there is a cultural problem with Asian airlines or not if this report is accurate there seems to be a problem with Garuda which is endemic.

[Blip]

Actually I don't think you can say that 410 km/h is almost twice as fast as usual however...

410 km/h = 220 kt

At Max Landing Weight (56 tons) FLAP 40 Vref = 138 kt
Approach speed would be 143 kt. Assuming the temperature was 30C the TAS would be 148 kt.

220/148 = 1.486. (You could hardly say that was almost twice as fast as usual.)

However 1.486^2 = 2.21 (You CAN say it had OVER TWICE the kinetic energy that it should have had.

Put another way, it had the combined energy of two B737's. One approaching at the correct speed of 148 kt TAS (143 kt IAS), and the other approaching at 162 kt TAS (157 kt IAS).

Or put even another way, it had the same enery as three B737's. Two at the correct speed of 148 kt TAS and the third at 66 kt TAS.

(148 kt = 272 km/h)
(66 kt = 122 km/h)

Don't underestimate the power of velocity squared!

[The Messiah]

I don't think loss of face is the main reason, it is certainly a factor post event but poor training is more the reason I think. They are simply not trained that a go-around is always a possibility and always a reasonable result from any approach should the circumstance call for it. Poor training is the biggest factor in most accidents.

[lowerlobe]

Whether the problem is cultural or poor training or even basic ability I can think of 2 questions immediately.

1:What was the captain thinking?

2:Why didn't the F/O question the captain during the approach?

[galdian]

Been an interesting thread however the real reason (and starting point for any fix) for the problems has been missed.

There will be no effective CRM in Asia until airline management make it a clear cut company requirement and outline the requirements and obligations of both the F/O and the Captain.

Someone can confirm exact layout but I believe (for example) Qantas, in their Ops Man, have the CRM pyramid explained, how the F/O gradually increases his forcefulness until a point where he makes a final demand (I believe it is something like "Captain you must listen to me") before taking control of the aircraft IF the Captain has not responded to any of the F/O's increasing concerns.
The requirements for both pilots and steps taken are laid out in black and white and the support of the company is mandatory as it is in their legal operating documents.

I would be surprised if any asian-management airline has more than something like "CRM is good and should be used by pilots to assist safety" in their Ops Man's (but more than happy to be corrected.) :)

Without the requirements from the company being clearly and unequivocably laid out for both crew members and the company demonstrating their support as above all the training in the world will be (almost) useless, bottom line will be the cultural norms/expectations of "face" and "age" and "position."

[EY777]

(I believe it is something like "Captain you must listen to me")

In my former airline (a major operator based in South East Asia), it's stated as such in their ops manual.Challenge the skipper, if there's no satisfactory response then the F/O has to take over if no satisfactory response after the second challenge.The words "Captain You Must Listen To Me" is emphasised & is the mantra of the CRM course.This is a usefull phrase as it weeds out subtle incapacitation cases (which are the hardest to detect).

So, galdian .... look surprise! :}

[OK 3 wire]

220kts now thats faster over the fence than the french lady ( Mirage III ), what about the tyre speed on a B737?, max for a bus is 195kts.

All you B737 pilots out crunch the numbers from your QRH, what landing distance is required verses landing dist available.

For an A320 220 kts is still 27kts faster than required over the threshold at MTOW (Vref +50) for a flaps & slats at zero app, the LDR is about 2640m if done correctly, how long was the r/w?

[Keg]

2:Why didn't the F/O question the captain during the approach?

I thought he did.....a couple of times.

Also, a flap warning I can understand- although realistically I thought 'too low, flap' would be a GPWS warning rather than a flap warning- but I must be having a slow night tonight because I can't think of a single speed warning that they'd get?!?! :confused: Perhaps it's my lack of 737 experience! :ok:

[welcome_stranger]

OK 3 wire writes
For an A320 220 kts is still 27kts faster than required over the threshold at MTOW (Vref +50) for a flaps & slats at zero app, the LDR is about 2640m if done correctly, how long was the r/w?
Jepps dated 12JAN07 page 11-1 for WARJ/JOG YOGYAKARTA, INDONESIA ADI SUTJIPTO, states the rwy length at 7218 feet or 2200 metres with a 82ft/25m stopway at the western end and a 197ft/60m stopway at the eastern end.

[PK-KAR]

1:What was the captain thinking?
That's what the investigators are looking into.

2:Why didn't the F/O question the captain during the approach?
He did. The contents of the CVR is however still not open to public discussion (Not included in the preliminary report) other than that the F/O did question the captain, and in the end he called a go-around but didn't do it/didn't take control.

I would be surprised if any asian-management airline has more than something like "CRM is good and should be used by pilots to assist safety" in their Ops Man's (but more than happy to be corrected.)
There are F/Os who has walked out of aircraft in a/as a result of poor CRM by the captain in Indonesian airlines, and who got the can? The Captain.

Now after seeing the preliminary report, and other data from this accident presented in front of me, the case of GA200 was preventable, the F/O called the go around, but him not having a stunning record himself, was afraid that the captain would pull the rabbit out of the hat on the last moment so didn't take over even when it was obvious that the aircraft had violated GA's SOPs. To partly understand the partial incapacitation, one must look at the data from the initial descent phases. Out of ordinary wind above 10,000ft on the descent started the stress increases early on. The aircraft hit the right VNAV profile albeit a little fast at 9000, and then at 4000ft@8DME to JOG VOR, the "wild" speeds started after that, in that they were not configured quickly enough but decided to chase the visual slope instead. From 3500 - 1500ft, the altitude/speed trade off resulted in the aircraft peaking at 280 knots IAS during this stage, but from then the speed bled off gradually and the aircraft was on slope on the last 200ft... but with the speed, it was at 3000fpm ROD.

Talking to some sources within GA and the investigators reveal that it is their opinion that the Captain suffered from partial incapacitation and the F/O did not take the required measures until it was too late. The GA accident has little to do with the problem of "real men don't go around."

PK-KAR

[lowerlobe]

PK-KAR,

What do you or GA mean when you say that the captain had a partial incapacitation?

The Indonesian authorities are now saying that there was no argument on the flight deck.Where did you get the information that the F/O questioned the captain?

There seems to be some conflicting info from the authorities .

[lokione]

Are not these guys bound by any stabilised approach criteria? Clearly a 3000 fpm rate of descent at 200 feet screams "here comes the crash". Can anyone enlighten us on whether Garuda must be established within stabilised approach criteria by 500 feet?
Also how about the air traffic controllers? Surely they would have observed the erratic descent profile? Was anything said? Or perhaps erratic descent profiles are the norm??? Just wondering..................................:=

[aerostatic]

What do you or GA mean when you say that the captain had a partial incapacitation?

Partial or subtle incapacitation is where a person's ability to perform a task is seriously degraded but they may not be obviously or totally incapacited (unconsious for example). This could be caused by stress, fatigue, illness, drugs, alcohol etc or a combination of the above.

Can anyone enlighten us on whether Garuda must be established within stabilised approach criteria by 500 feet?
Garuda, like every airline, has stabilised approach criteria. Why some pilots (in any airline, in any country) press on when the parameters are exceeded I don't really know for sure but it would be fair to say that all pilots have been faced with this situation at least once in their careers and usually more often than once. Perhaps there is a perception that if we continue then no one will know anything was wrong. They'll fudge it a bit and all will be well in the end. This is where QAR and a rigourous Flight Operations Quality Assurance Programme can help. The QAR will always detect an unstable approach that is not followed by a go around. In this case the crew can expect to be contacted for an explanation followed by counselling and/or remedial training. The message will soon get through.

In the case of GA200, assuming the report of high rate of descent close to the runway is accurate, as well as a 'too low flap' GPWS alert this would have been followed by a 'sink-rate sink-rate' and possibly even a 'whoop whoop pull-up' GPWS. You would think that self preservation on the part of the FO would have kicked in at this point?

[galdian]

EY777 could I just ask - your previous airline, a "major operator based in South East Asia", was that an airline run by Asian management or with a significant Western input (thinking of Cathay and Singapore type airlines) ??

So far you are the only response regarding a detailed breakdown of CRM in the Ops Man (early days yet, true) and that could be negated if your major airline does have significany Western input.
I still reckon if I were to bet the VAST majority of ASIAN managed airlines will have nothing more than a bland statement regarding CRM I'd be on a winning bet :ok:

No amount of training will offset the lack of management leadership and direction on this issue.

PK-KAR: have always enjoyed your information and input but in all fairness there is a huge difference between being "out of the slot" and being "unrecoverable."
On slope and V/S but 10 kt fast @ 200' is out of the slot, on slope but V/s 3000fpm and speed?? @ 200' is unrecoverable as indeed it was @ 1500' if the speed was anywhere near 280kt.

Shoot the messenger if you want but it is sounding like the "fix" is in: conflicting stories and data are being released, now the investigators are leaking conjecture suggesting the Captain had partial incapacitation (based on what hard, if any, evidence?? at least if he had full incapacitation you might think about it but how are you going to "prove" partial??) and the F/O (whom now is less than average and himself " did not have a stunning record ") failed to do his duties.

Captain not to blame (sympathy for his sad sad plight) and the F/O is fully to blame, CRM not in question as the Captain was out of it! :ugh:

aerostatic - regarding your final sentence IF the company manual does not clearly lay out the required CRM procedures for both crew members thereby obligating company support this accident would indeed indicate that potential death is preferable to going against the bottom line of cultural norms and expectations.

[PK-KAR]

Lowerlobe,
Based on information I've received to date, there were no arguments in the flight deck. The F/O questioning the Captain does not mean an argument took place.

Lokione,
They were. It's stable 500ft for visual with Garuda. From seeing the data on the flight path, it appeared that they managed to get on the slope at 500' but were way out on the speed.

Galdian,
Out of the slot or unrecoverable in this case doesn't mean much, it just means they should have done something (and with all our benefit of having hindsight of course).

Excuse my bad previous post, I've just had a look at the notes I took immediately after seeing the report yesterday... it was 250kts at 4000 & 3500, 284kts @ 3000, 272@2500, 254@2000, 232@1500, 220@1000 all the way down. (not that it doesn't change the required action much).

After hitting JOG 8DME @ 4000 at 250kts, they tried to chase DME3.5@2500 with flaps 1. I'm still waiting for info on A/P and A/T status on this segment. They overshot the equivalent of the ILS Final Approach Fix (3.5@2500) by a few hundred feet only, but ended up chasing the (visual) slope and it was flaps 5@2000. The rate of descent until they hit that glideslope was 3000fpm... they somehow followed the last few hundred feet on the slope and then the "flare" prolonged the time airborne... Even by then, the ability to stop was "academic"...

The initial report doesn't give any info on the overall descent from FL270. Sources inside the investigation and Garuda has leaked out comments from the CVR such as wind, and it has been said that the F/O did question and/or call for go-around at 3 occassions... the last being around 500' or 200' AGL.

As to partial incap, the evidence, if any, has yet to be made public. I have been told that the CVR will be checked again, to see of signs of stress and other possibilities in the Captain's voice and also of the F/O's. The "shrinks" have been called in aswell.

Whether this is fixed or not, only time will tell, but the information on partial incap and the calls for the G/A as well as the speeds and descent path were leaked weeks back. I am told the minister has tried to suppress it but the NTSC wants it opened. There's a battle going in the NTSC between those capitulating to the minister's threats, and the NTSC's senior members. It was after a reported "pressure from outside the DoT" that the minister yielded.... but that's not the end of the story yet.

PK-KAR

[EY777]

galdian, it was Malaysia Airlines.

There are no major or significant Western Input, but like SQ (which are majority wise, asian management) they are safety conscious & have a very pro active flight safety department.Their pilots are represented by associations (not a union) & are actively involved with IFALPA on safety matters.

As much as the airline wasn't making money (a different issue :} ), safety has always been their number one policy.I believe SQ shares the same ethos as both airlines are commited to their masters....the government of each nation.An accident will be the biggest 'face losing' an asian nation can experience! :E

PK-KAR, it looks more & more like mental fixation (in a way, also considered a subtle incapacitation).Interestingly, the F/O looks like he might have been going along with the approach until he realised the gravity of the situation & tried to salvage the situation but either he was too late or not forceful enough (to snap the skipper out of his mental state).

[galdian]

EY777: thanks for that, I hadn't thought of Malaysian in the context of Cathay or Singapore but it makes sense when you consider they evolved from MSA of the 70's (???), I assume the culture was set then and has simply evolved in both companies as factors such as CRM have grown in significance.

Could I ask - do EY have the "CRM pyramid" (or similar) or something else?? Just interested.

Still think I'd win the bet though - maybe the qualification should have been "western management or significant western operatives therefore subtle input", thinking about China they have only seen western crews in the last 5 years and western crews have never been a part of mainline airlines in Japan (subsiduries/offshoots yes.)
No political discussions about Taiwan please anyone. := :)

PK-KAR: with the various uncertain, contradictory "facts" floating around I am sure more than ever the "fix" is in place.

Question: do not know your position but do you know if Garuda Ops Mans have a "CRM pyramid" or similar (as discussed earlier) outlined in detail??
What DO they have??

Intesesting discussion, thanks all!

[Centaurus]

The GA accident has little to do with the problem of "real men don't go around

It's nice to see someone who is brimming with blind optimism..

[PK-KAR]

Galdian,
I wonder what the various uncertain and contradictory facts are? The preliminary report does not suggest a cover up. The police is ready to continue its criminal investigation, to which the NTSC report cannot be used as evidence... knowing the police here, they'd probably want to slam the pilots into jail regardless.

All the talk about fixation or partial incap came as a result of the data presented, and is subject to examination by the human factors section of the GA200 investigation in the NTSC.

What makes me wonder is what are the conflicting stories? The case on argument or no argument is to me more or less solved... go around calls were made by the F/O. There have been cases in Garuda where the F/O had to take control and report the captain for "violations of SOPs due to/or with fixation".

As to the content on the CRM section of the company's manual, I do not know. I don't work for Garuda. All I know are cases of CRM failures and CRM successes...

Centaurus,
Call it whatever you want... call it a freak day, call it "the Captain capitulated to the real men don't go around culture after 20 years flying", or whatever else. Not going around in such a situation does not conform with what's been heard of captain Marwoto's normal behaviour.

PK-KAR

[mingalababya]

Just a thought .... if calling for a go around by an F/O (thereby over ruling the Captain's decision) is an issue for cultural reasons or other, then could this be alleviated by technology? ie, have the aircraft's systems call for a go around when an unstablized approach and landing is detected, ie, smiliar to the ground proximity warnings/TCAS alerts? I'd imagine a Captain in such circumstances would be more inclined to comply with a computer than his F/O, and the non-assertive F/O would not have to worry about the consequences either. Just my two rupiah's worth.

[kiwi grey]

mingalababya asked
"could this be alleviated by technology? ie, have the aircraft's systems call for a go around when an unstablized approach and landing is detected"?

As it happened, last week's Flight International carried an article about Honeywell's ongoing development work on providing additional functionality to EGPWS. (see here http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2007/03/27/212926/global-warning-honeywell-enhances-the-egpws.html)

To paraphrase the magazine, one mode suggested will have the system annunciate in a male voice "Too fast - too high" and, if the wayward approach continued below 400ft, the system would issue its final plea: "Unstable, unstable!" This warning would also appear in text on the multifunction display.


So yes, technology could help with this, and by the look of it, in the rather near future.

[pakeha-boy]

Kiwi grey...yeah mate,have seen that also .......they could title it

"Go- Around for Dummies"

Ultimately it is up to the crew to make this decision,based upon their current and actual config....you are within the "Gates" or you are not.

For those of us that do CAT 3 GA,S at 50 ft,the aircraft will in most cases touch down,but the procedure is to continue the go-around,we practice these in the sim(Ive had one actual) and they work very well.To me it proves a GA is possible from just about anywhere.... I dont say they are guranteed,but possible....

You talk of computers that crank out voice commands,....we have plenty of them now thankyou,and I personally dont believe they are the answer.. who,s flying the bloody thing.....it lies in the training,the abilty to make a decision.

I use my company ops as an example.....at the 1000ft(RA) gate the PM calls "one thousand"...the PF...calls "STABLE"... or ...UNSTABLE and correcting(whether it be be or altitude,speed etc)....@t the 500ft(RA) gate the PM calls" five hundred".....stable or unstable(meaning you are within the parameters,ie speed,altitude,VSI,GS,LOCALIZER).....anything outside of that is a GA,(whether VMC or IMC)......IT IS MANDATORY!!!!.....it works......

I,m sure this is similar to other ops,but my point here is that most do not "condition" themselves for the GA......everything is predicated on approach and landing....in that sequence.....you throw in a GA....and it seems most(not all) are not prepared for the event .....I think we have all at some time been guilty of that....

The bottom line here is training and a GA event must be briefed in all apps,whether VMC or IMC...

[Tee Emm]

I use my company ops as an example.....at the 1000ft(RA) gate the PM calls "one thousand"...the PF...calls "STABLE"... or ...UNSTABLE and correcting(whether it be be or altitude,speed etc)....@t the 500ft(RA) gate

I thought the radio altimeter gave the instantaneous height above the terrain immediately below the aircraft and therefore simply using 1000 ft (RA) would not necessarily be the height above the runway. Same with the 500 (RA) call. Obviously if the terrain below the aircraft on final approach is not dead flat and same altitude as the runway, the calls based on purely a radio altimeter read-out are superfluous and worse still potentially misleading. It is a wonder that the CAA have not commented on this during their audit of the company Ops Manual.:ooh:

[pakeha-boy]

it does....when was the last time @ 1000ft on final or 500 ft you flew over a hilltop etc on landing....this may come as a surprise to you ...but most airports are on flat land ,away from hills and mountains in the immediate area......

also the callouts are specific to "our" operation and the airports "we" fly into...

[galdian]

PK-KAR
Greatly appreciate and respect your input, hope you realise there will be times we "agree to disagree" and it is not personal (although I know deep down you realise I'm actually right! :) :) )

Have to disagree about "out of the slot" Vs "unrecoverable", one calls for a re-assessment of how to safely complete the approach whilst the other dictates that the current approach can never be safely completed.
This incident is certainly a case of the latter and, based on the figures you quote even the most generous interpretation is that it was "questionable" above 1000' AGL, below 1000' AGL with a contant high speed, unconfigured and a huge sink rate it became "unquestionable."

I've had a good look at the thread in "reporting points" we have had the following suggestions/conjecture/thoughts/observations/musings from various people such as Ppruners/various investigators/reporters/government officials/ministers etc that the cause or mitigation was:
downdraft/flap failure/normal flight was OK above 1000'AGL/flap assymetry/operational and non-operational equipment on dispatch/losing of "plot"/flaps in or not in position/ high plane speed/no report to ATC of any configuration problems/airport vehicle on runway/Captain "good" Co-pilot "average or less"/absentmindedness/crew argueing or not/go-around calls or not/Captain "experienced", Co-pilot "young"/go-around call too late/"no argument" and "co-ordination between them about flight safety"/go-around asked, recommended, called for by Co-pilot/go-around call made too late.

And THEN, in the last few days, out of the blue the words "subtle incapacitation" came to the fore - a situation that will be unable to be definitively confirmed nor denied by its very nature but sit back, relax and have a laugh as various psychologists try to justify various positions using exquisite psycho-babble.
And when things start getting leaked/suggested/theorised by heavyweights or people "in the know" I always wonder whether they are trying to lead you to a path that is true or a path that deviates.

That is one of the things that confuses me about some of your posts - are you simply passing on information as relayed to yourself or are you also doing some editing to move things in certain directions?
As an example you included in one of your posts what added up to "Captain good, Co-pilot average" however the (now apparent?) CVR fact that he 3 times voiced his concerns with growing intensity greatly impresses me for an asian F/O and is worthy of note. Maybe that's just me.

The stage has been set, the company and authorities will get a slap on the wrist, the Captain will cop some but also receive sorrow for his "subtle incapacitation" and the F/O will be literally strung up by his nether regions in the town square.
And everyone (well I suppose the F/O might be inclined to disagree!), will happily celebrate an "unfortunate" situation, "well resolved!"

That's about all, reckon the topics been well covered except to say that after this incident, if the world airline industry has ANY desire to pick up their game then, in principle or similar:
- IATA, ICAO or whomever dictates that ALL airlines around the world set up a "black and white", step by step CRM pyramid within their legal Operating Manuals which lays out the required actions by ALL crew INCLUDING the stated requirement for the F/O to take over, this also enforces legal company responsibility and support for their crew members, no more crap "CRM is good for safety" single statement bull**** acceptable;
- company training must vigorously reflect the same;
- country authorities confirm in class and simulators that thje policy is being vigorously trained/enforced;
- maybe set up a central authority outside of the countries to regulate the above in a totally unbiased way (boy, watch the fur fly on THAT suggestion!! :E :E )
- give them a reasonable time frame (I'd say 3 months but others may disagree) to comply;
- those that can't/won't - remove their licences, better they (the airline) die than the passengers they purport to care for.

OK - end of imminently sensible suggestions (or rant, whichever you see fit!) :ok:

[UNCTUOUS]

PK-KAR

Thanks to your insights into the Investigator's preliminary report, I've picked up that it's not yet known whether an "over-flare" kicked in an auto-throttle response (>27ft RA, to maintain whatever speed was dialled up on the MFP as bug-speed) - aka Captain Marwoto's "the push" - but also haven't heard any comments upon:

"Whether or not the observation by a very experienced traveler that the airbrakes (aka speedbrakes) were extended throughout finals is a fact (i.e. the investigator hasn't yet said yea or nay on that?).

If they were, it could be interpreted that their use by the captain perhaps demonstrated that he was doggedly determined to "show" the copilot that he could still land, despite the copilot's refusal to extend the flaps any further because of their limiting speeds."

Is the above comment near the truth? / nearer to the truth or just (as yet) uncalled for? But I must add that the Austral/Italian journalist has been adamant throughout that the speedbrakes were extended. Sometimes it's little clues like that that can give truer insights into what was going on in the pilot's inner cranium.

[PK-KAR]

Galdian,
although I know deep down you realise I'm actually right!
If everyone agrees then this place will be damn boring! But, when I feel I'm right, I say I'm right, when not, I say I'm not right, when I am unsure, I'd say so... same on my opinions on other people's opinions... Differences is what makes us learn something everyday!

As to out of the slot and unrecoverable... unrecoverable is a subset of out of the slot... but that's just my personal opinion.

I've had a good look at the thread in "reporting points" we have had the following suggestions/conjecture/thoughts/observations/musings from various people such as Ppruners/various investigators/reporters/government officials/ministers etc that the cause or mitigation was:
downdraft/flap failure/normal flight was OK above 1000'AGL/flap assymetry/operational and non-operational equipment on dispatch/losing of "plot"/flaps in or not in position/ high plane speed/no report to ATC of any configuration problems/airport vehicle on runway/Captain "good" Co-pilot "average or less"/absentmindedness/crew argueing or not/go-around calls or not/Captain "experienced", Co-pilot "young"/go-around call too late/"no argument" and "co-ordination between them about flight safety"/go-around asked, recommended, called for by Co-pilot/go-around call made too late.
"Subtle incapacitation" that has surfaced in the last few days did not come from anywhere in the investigation nor Garuda. If the investigators or Garuda subscribe to that view than it won't be me receiving "fixed info" but me giving them a fix. All the NTSC will say to subtle incap for the moment will likely be "we're looking into it"...

As an example you included in one of your posts what added up to "Captain good, Co-pilot average" however the (now apparent?) CVR fact that he 3 times voiced his concerns with growing intensity greatly impresses me for an asian F/O and is worthy of note.

The stage's not set at all! He voiced his concerns, so what? Does that make him an impressive (asian) F/O? No, he didn't take over like someone else (another asian F/O) did and saved the day. He just sat there and let it happen.

That is one of the things that confuses me about some of your posts - are you simply passing on information as relayed to yourself or are you also doing some editing to move things in certain directions?
This place is a discussion forum and not a place for indoctrination nor it is a news agency... None that I've written are guaranteed to be accurate. As to whether I'm simply passing the info or me editing it at the same time, well, it's up to you to decide.

I always wonder whether they are trying to lead you to a path that is true or a path that deviates.
So, am I being led to or am I leading people to a certain path? Then, do I receive fixed info or am I fixing info or perhaps there's truth? Disect the threads, but don't forget the timestamps on the posts and also those of newspaper articles and see which one... *coz I dunno myself!*
---

Unctuous,
1. The damn wrong FDR was fitted so some parameters are missing! I have yet to see the info on A/T and A/P conditions in the flight and when were they deployed. But I myself find it eyebrow raising that GA seems to use "A/T at all stages of the approach" down to that 27' feet... but I have yet to see it on the manual with my own eyes.

2. Speedbrake deployment? Well, the detailed data of the FDR hasn't been released, but, from what I've seen, unless I've forgotten the details, no, they were not deployed once the flaps were set.

One thing that peeved me off so far in this accident is people's definition of "landing" and "approach". I'm beginning to think that the public/media's view of landing was when the plane taxies off the runway, and everything else before that was approach. This of course does not help us understand the chain of events prior to the landing... until the FDR data was sighted...

PK-KAR

[galdian]

PK-KAR
- when I said "you know I'm right" (with smilies :) ) I was only joking - sorry if it came across as being serious;
- in wondering whether people are fed information that gives a true or deviating path I said "you", I did not mean you personally but anyone receiving information from someone else, not meant personally and probably could have been phrased better, apologies;
- I still reckon voicing his concerns with (apparent) increasing intensity is impressive for an asian F/O, the question of not taking over is simply a question of whether the Ops Man states, in black and white, that it is a company requirement that he do so.
If it is NOT laid out as such he does not have the absolute support of the company for such actions and, like most, is more prepared to accept a possible incident or accident rather than the fallout of challenging the cultural norms and expectations.
And is that HIS fault?? Called a Catch-22 as far as I can see.

If it IS laid out in black and white then he has screwed himself bigtime.

If anyone cannot believe that F/O's are more willing to accept an incident or accident rather than challenge the culture - well I personally reckon that's the case and am happy to "agree to disagree" and leave it at that.

PK thanks for the exchanges - been interesting. :ok:

[Centaurus]

when was the last time @ 1000ft on final or 500 ft you flew over a hilltop etc on landing

Try Pago Pago ILS in American Samoa. Approach over water over rising ground on the coast the radio altimeter drops rapidly to 300 ft then back to 800 ft. Try the 1000ft call RA approaching over water to the the island of Nuie in the South Pacific that stands around 400 ft amsl. Get around a bit and there is no shortage of undulating terrain under close in flight paths on final. Port Vila runway 28 where the 1000ft AFE call is 600 RA.

Read the 737 FCTM where the recommended call by the PNF is "500 Feet" and the condition is 500 ft above field elevation - no reference to radio altimeter reading.

It is clear that the call of 1000 ft and 500 ft in these respects are above airport elevation in terms of barometric altimeter reading - not radio altimeter.

[PK-KAR]

Galdian,
Nurries mate... Sometimes cultural differences and humour need to be reminded of each other. The "rant" was good to remind us all too.

As to the F/O taking over in such a situation, it is laid out in the manual under the, if I remember correctly, Basic Operating Manual (GA's company manual (equivalent QF's Flight Administration Manual) under, I am told, non-normal and CRM sections).

Has he screwed himself bigtime? Well, we have to wait and see... but with the limited info we have, looks like it...

PK-KAR

[YesTAM]

With the greatest of respect, and as a low time PPL with no aspirations of ever flying a jet and nothing useful to contribute to this debate, I respectfully suggest that the candour, honesty and tenor of PK-KAR's posts on this disaster should be recognised by Ppruners.

I dips me lid to you Sir for your efforts to shed light on this awful accident, in what appears at least to me, to be highly professional and unbiased manner.

[A37575]

With the greatest of respect, and as a low time PPL with no aspirations of ever flying a jet and nothing useful to contribute to this debate

That is true.

[EY777]

galdian, any self respecting airline (or is it any airline?) will have CRM built into their ops manual.The million dollar question will be like you asked earlier is it just lip service? :}

As for my present employer, we can consider it western management (debateable), with western pilots in the system.Need I say more? :p


I still reckon voicing his concerns with (apparent) increasing intensity is impressive for an asian F/O,

galdian, it's more the norm in any asian airline.The only problem is if they have the will to take over (irrespective of any ethnic or gender biasness).

[pakeha-boy]

Centaurus.....your point is noted and valid...no argument here and the 500/1000 ft calls for most operators are BA......we used to use these also .......but as I also noted....

we use RA as this is specific to "our" operations and the airports "we" fly into ......mostly for "our" CAT 3 operations......unless the app says
"RA NOT AUTHORIZED" for "our" ops.....then we use BA for "our" ops


(wished I,d never said RA now.....sort of screwed the point Iwas trying to make...fu:mad: )

[aerostatic]

Two SMH articles today:

Crash poses questions Jakarta cannot ignore
Mark Forbes in Jakarta
April 12, 2007
http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/crash-poses-questions-jakarta-cannot-ignore/2007/04/11/1175971179811.html

Pilot may have been trying to save fuel
Mark Forbes Herald Correspondent in Jakarta
April 12, 2007
http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/pilot-may-have-been-trying-to-save-fuel/2007/04/11/1175971179808.html

[ithinkso]

it's runway 29

cheers

[squire]

According to the Oxford English Dictionary, racism is a belief or ideology that all members of each race possess characteristics or abilities specific to that race, especially to distinguish it as being either superior or inferior to another race or races.

[Will964]

What’s your point Squire?

Trying to stir the pot? :hmm:

[Zhaadum]

I think Squires point is Asians SUCK as pilots. Generally with a very few exceptions.

Well that is my view anyway. From experience.

Rote learning ROBOTS with little ability or interest in understanding.

There, did that stir the pot sufficiently?

Z:eek:

[Brian Abraham]

little ability or interest in understanding

Zhaadum, a trait unfortunately present in many of our Caucasian brothers/sisters (from my experience).

[A37575]

I think Squires point is Asians SUCK as pilots. Generally with a very few exceptions

I dunno about that as a general statement. The pilots of one country in that area did a bloody good job on Pearl Harbour and their Kamikazes were pretty accurate pilots as well. :ok:

[squire]

their Kamikazes were pretty accurate pilots as well

They didn't have to go around

[Angle of Attack]

Whats the problem using Radio Altimeter for 1000ft and 500ft calls? If there is terrain on final then so be it, its going to be more conservative than flat ground anyway right?? Because youll be actually calling it earlier than on approach over flat ground. Many operations use radio altimeter and I believe it is superior than pressure altimeter, because if there is terrain on approach the call will be early. What's wrong with that? Unless you have a 500ft hole prior to the threshold but I think thats unlikely lol!

[maui]

AOA

In the big wide world outside of Oz, 500' holes on approach are not uncommon.

Maui