Your landing or mine - the captain's ultimate responsibility

[Centaurus]

Interesting Channel Seven TV documentary on the Air France A340 overrun at Toronto last year. All aboard (311) escaped with minor injuries. It was compelling viewing especially when compared with the official accident report.

The A340 landed in heavy rain and thunderstorm activity. The captain gave the F/O the landing despite reports of really severe conditions. After coming over the fence at 100ft with a 33 knot crosswind and a quarter inch of water on the runway, the F/O floated 4300ft in to the 9000 ft runway before touch down. To compound the problem reverse thrust was not selected until 13 seconds after touch down. It seems the F/O might have frozen on the reverse levers. The aircraft left the runway at 70 knots and caught fire after nosing into a ravine. The documentary revealed the captain urging the F/O to "get it down, get it down" during the float.


Passengers still tried to carry hand baggage with them down the escape slides and one frame showed a man with a large bag blocking the escape slide flow. I found it compelling watching when a few of the survivors were interviewed for the programme some months after the accident and it made one realise the real responsibility of the captain for the safe conduct of the flight. The people down the back were absolutely terrified as flames erupted after the A340 went into the ravine and the survivors that were interviewed still carried horrible memories of the crash sequence.


Which brings me to the point of this post. Often once the cockpit door is closed, there is a tendency for the two pilots to forget that the cabin crew and passengers are a captive audience to whatever dangers the captain takes them into. In the A340 accident at any stage of the approach the captain could have taken over control from the F/O and either handled the approach and landing himself - or gone around - or diverted well before the aircraft was on final in the thunderstorm. Perhaps if the pilots with hindsight could have seen and heard the screams of the passengers as the aircraft went off the end, they would have never continued the approach

-
It is all too easy to sit in splended isolation up front - after all it is up to the cabin crew to deal with problems with passengers. As the TV documentary pointed out, the captain was aware of the commercial cost of a diversion and there is little doubt this weighed heavily on his mind. The trick is to know when a decision to approach in bad weather is not being subconsciously influenced by commercial pressures. The example of the British Airways Boeing 747 captain to continue 10 hours to London on three engines after losing an engine in the early climb from New York (?) is a case in point. The FAA certainly thought it was a bad decision but BA didn't.


In the documentary on the Air France A340 accident, the captain offered the F/O either the take off or the landing. There was no indication then of possible bad weather at the other end. The F/O then told the captain that he (the captain) could do the take off while he (the F/O) would do the landing at Toronto. The problem arises when the captain starts to have nagging doubts about the wisdom or otherwise of his subordinate doing the handling when weather conditions turn really nasty. It matters not whether the F/O is highly experienced. There is a point where certain conditions dictate that the captain assume handling responsibility and he must not allow his perceived respect for his F/O's experience and demonstrated skills to abrogate that command responsibility.


The decision becomes clouded when a mateship culture pervades on the flight deck as it does in some airlines. The captain feels slightly embarrassed that he is harbouring doubts about who should be doing the flying. Often the captain will find himself rationalising that the F/O can do the job just as well as the captain and disregards his conscience. Maybe the F/O can do the job as well as his captain - but that's not the point here. When weather conditions are such that the captain begins to feel that perhaps he should be running the show rather than "monitoring" the F/O's decision making and handling - then that it is the time to take decisive action and DO something.


It is too late when the aircraft is high and fast over the fence and the captain does not know if the F/O is going to flare high in heavy rain or float down the runway. How can the captain possibly know if the F/O is going to be far too slow to pull reverse thrust - or to kick off the drift in a strong crosswind on a wet runway.


Of course the F/O may harbour the same feelings when the captain is handling in bad conditions. But the command responsibility is with the captain and the passengers are expecting this God among men to fly them safely. The captain should remember that he is doing his F/O no favours by putting him in the position of vital decision making that could go either way in bad weather. Leave those risks to the simulator during ccommand training. The flight deck is not a democracy and the captain should not feel a wimp if he decides to take over control. Equally the F/O should put himself in the captain's position and realise that it is not necessarily a reflection on his decision making or handling skills if the captain changes his mind and decides to do the handling himself.


The TV documentary on the A340 crash at Toronto provides a powerful flight safety message and every crew member should try and view it.

[neville_nobody]

I would hardly call that show a "documentary" more like a dramatization of reported events. The only people interviewed were passengers who had no idea about what the hell was going on. The rest of it was speculation. If it was a documentary then maybe they should have had a chat to the controllers and played some of the black box and looked at it from more of a technical point of view not the usual hyped up crap that they go on with.

Loved it how the FO was using two hands to fight the controls in an airbus! About says it all really! :rolleyes:

On a serious note though, the newer generation of CRM talk is for the Captain to watch and the FO to fly. Not sure how much of a good idea it is but that's the talk at the moment.

With cadets and MPL's being all the rage these days how will these guys ever get ANY experience doing anything if people don't let them. You can't have Captains taking over the duties every time you encounter crap weather.

In regard to this incident I never understood whether or not the approach was high or it was that they just got a unexpected downwind component and as a result floated. The "documentary" wasn't real clear on that part of it.

One has to ask why when touching down halfway on (the "short" as the "documentary" described it) 3000m runway that they didn't just go around. If you land halfway down a runway in ANY aircraft you would have to seriously consider a go around.

[Centaurus]

the newer generation of CRM talk is for the Captain to watch and the FO to fly

Fine as long as the F/O gets paid more than the captain. Clearly pilot experience levels do not count for much in the new world of CRM or Threat and Error management. Makes you wonder if you will soon need regulatory currency at monitoring as well as actual handling!

[Dream Land]

mateship, I think not, the wx conditions you described are severe in my book, is this not covered in Air France SOP's? I feel no responsibility to let the F/O fly in these conditions, I'm not sure what the captain was thinking by letting him fly in severe conditions with a possible bingo fuel problem, the airplane should have been planted at the end of the runway IMO.

[Wiley]

My (much-maligned on this site) employer has clearly stated minimum visibility and maximum crosswind values for FO's takeoff and landings and in the case of landings, for both precision and non precision approaches. It's clear cut: if the visibility is less or the crosswind component is greater than these clearly stated values, the captain is required to fly the approach.

I've always believed that many if not most so-called 'first order' airlines have similar clauses in the SOPs, including Air France - (if not before this accident, then certainly after it).

[ScottyDoo]

Some interesting comments in amongst that post but I'm not sure what the point of this thread is overall other than describing this accident.

BTW, Are these all your own words, Centaurus?


Which brings me to the point of this post. Often once the cockpit door is closed, there is a tendency for the two pilots to forget that the cabin crew and passengers are a captive audience to whatever dangers the captain takes them into. In the A340 accident at any stage of the approach the captain could have taken over control from the F/O and either handled the approach and landing himself - or gone around - or diverted well before the aircraft was on final in the thunderstorm.


Really not sure what the point of this post is but you're right, there is a tendency to forget the passengers during the flight but this is not an absolute.

No captain is doing his passengers any favours if, in a non-normal, all he's thinking about is all the burden of responsibility he feels on his shoulders for all the boguns in his airplane who suddenly wish they'd paid attention to the safety demo. He should be concentrating on getting his arse onto the ground safely; if he succeeds in this, the passengers will safely follow just as certainly.


Perhaps if the pilots with hindsight could have seen and heard the screams of the passengers as the aircraft went off the end, they would have never continued the approach


How is this possible, using "hindsight"?? And do you really think the visualisation of screaming, hysterical passengers should be a part of the decision process??



It is all too easy to sit in splended isolation up front - after all it is up to the cabin crew to deal with problems with passengers.
As the TV documentary pointed out, the captain was aware of the commercial cost of a diversion and there is little doubt this weighed heavily on his mind.


Not sure what you were smoking when you wrote all this... What does it mean? Why does that second comment follow the first? Ever heard of the term non-sequitur?


The trick is to know when a decision to approach in bad weather is not being subconsciously influenced by commercial pressures.


That's one of the many, many tricks, yes. But for every incident or accident like the above, there are thousands or tens of thousands of safe and timely decisions being made during the approach and landing phases of flight. Despite this, it is inevitable that an accident scenario will take place from time to time.


It matters not whether the F/O is highly experienced. There is a point where certain conditions dictate that the captain assume handling responsibility and he must not allow his perceived respect for his F/O's experience and demonstrated skills to abrogate that command responsibility.


Thank you for that. So the intent of this thread is to be a lecture? I think I get it now!! :ok:


Often the captain will find himself rationalising that the F/O can do the job just as well as the captain and disregards his conscience. Maybe the F/O can do the job as well as his captain - but that's not the point here.


I like that. I'm going to take that concept on board as a worthwhile notion to keep in mind, at times. I've noticed it happening occasionally but never put it into words.


When weather conditions are such that the captain begins to feel that perhaps he should be running the show rather than "monitoring" the F/O's decision making and handling - then that it is the time to take decisive action and DO something.


PPRuNe Command School...:hmm:


It is too late when the aircraft is high and fast over the fence and the captain does not know if the F/O is going to flare high in heavy rain or float down the runway.


No, it's not. It's too late when reverse thrust has been selected on the ground. Before that a go-around is still an option.


How can the captain possibly know if the F/O is going to be far too slow to pull reverse thrust - or to kick off the drift in a strong crosswind on a wet runway.


It's called faith. As a member of a crew, each of us has to have faith that the other member or members will carry out the required functions as per training. This applies whether the other crew-member is known personally or a complete stranger.

Another option to the faith the company expects you to have in a stranger whom they have certified to do the job, is to lob into the sim with every new crew-member you are rostered to fly with and evaluate him, before you operate the sector. Do you think this will work?

A third option is to curl up into the foetal position and, rocking gently to and fro, cry yourself to sleep in fear.

Let's get real. If your FO's been checked to line, why should you harbour doubts (without previous cause) about his abilities?

You are right in that in many airlines, the captain is expected to act as PF when conditions exceed certain parameters. But this is because he is assumed to be the best suited, not because FOs are generally held in suspicion.

[terronnd]

This is why I never want to work for an Oz airline.

Get a life.

[atiuta]

With cadets and MPL's being all the rage these days how will these guys ever get ANY experience doing anything if people don't let them. You can't have Captains taking over the duties every time you encounter crap weather.


"How will they ever get any experience?"

They won't.

"You can't have Captains taking over in crap weather....."

Oh yes you can!

The worldwide shortage of pilots has caused a paradigm shift in the way pilots gain experience. The trouble is, it will most likely be a very long and expensive period before the worlds transport safety boards work out what went wrong.

The most difficult weather I have observed, was on smaller aircraft (twin turbo props) with different operators and although less experienced, it was IMO an ideal training ground. Why? More sectors, Less inertia, lower ground speeds, fewer runway considerations, more fuel, more alternates, less commercial pressure, smaller route structure, smaller operation, no cultural/ language issues, shorter duty times, no/few time zones. In other words you just flew a lot more, in a very familiar environment and with few variables. When the weather deteriorated a bit, a Captain could take an incremental approach to exposing a lesser experienced First Officer to the conditions. If a pilot showed an aptitude for x/winds, you might let him take on stonger conditions than perhaps someone else. If the individual was weaker, you were going to fly with him next week and he could be left to develop progressively as his and your confidence grew.

Take the large airline scenario, but the same 200hr cadet/mpl pilot. Fewer sectors (don't care what anyone says, it will be fewer), more inertia (when it goes wrong, it happens in a big way), higher ground speeds, every runway is short, less fuel, costly diversions, unfamiliar airfields because you just fly to so many, never flown with the crew before and you both speak different languages (quite possibly English is 2nd for both of you), fatigued and then the weather hits you. To right I'll be doing the landing!

This situation is happening, more so for some airlines than others but an MPL scheme will bring the issue of experience to all. Perhaps not the case with AF but there is common ground between the YYZ accident and what I have discussed.

[VH-Cheer Up]

WIthout wishing to detract from Centaurus astute posting, one cannot help feeling the makers of Air Crash Investigation must have been desperate when they finalised that program to go to the network broadcasters.

I've watched a few programs in the series and found them to be a little over-dramatised, but this program on AF358 was pure soap.

The official Canada TSB accident investigation report is still not completed. The interim update is available right here (http://www.tsb.gc.ca/en/reports/air/2005/a05h0002/a05h0002_update_20051116.pdf).

What the interim report states is that:

The runway anenometer device had been hit by lightning and final crosswind and gust information were being estimated by crews from previous landings
Approach was high - 100ft over the threshold
Touchdown was 4000 ft into the 9000ft runway
The flight copped a last-minute tailwind of 5 knots due to wind shift. (Not 33kt as the program implied)
With a -5kt wind, operative reversers and standing water they needed 6614ft to stop
The reversers were engaged starting from 12.8 seconds after touchdown and max rev thrust achieved 17 seconds after touchdown
When the runway excursion commenced the aircraft was still travelling at 79kt
The aircraft was found to be in full working order and according to the FDMR had 7500kg of fuel remaining on board at the the time of the accident. 4500kg would have been needed to reach the alternate at Ottawa.

Frankly, the program was overhyped for the masses, and was hawked mercilessly by Channel Seven on the coat-tails of the Garuda GA200 overrun at Jogyakarta recently. I've found past ACI programs to be worth watching, but this one was way below standard.

It won't do much for SLF confidence in approaches during thunderstorms, that's for sure.

I could not help thinking the captain will probably be wishing for the rest of his non-flying life that he'd made some different decisions earlier in the final stages of the flight. The French term for Captain is "Commandeur", indicating the role is one of leadership, not that of a monitor or spectator.

And that goes in any language.

VHCU

[019360]

I haven't got "Handling the big jets" in front of me right now but one of Davies immortal paragraphs is roughly this:
"If you go off the far end and crash you'll sit there, if you survive, saying "what wouldn't I give to have the last 5 minutes of my life over again?".
"Well as you cross the threshold you have that time and if you're not totally happy go around"
Those few lines etched their way onto my heart long ago on slippery short R/Ws. If your sim program doesn't include routine rejected landings at or after touchdown, then ask for it.

[Capn Bloggs]

Excellent, thought-provoking post, Centaurus, regardless of the quality of the show (which I haven't seen). It (not some of the replies) should be required reading for all prospective captains.

[Swingwing]

Great post Centaurus - didn't see the programme myself, but this is what I log in to PPruNe to read - thought provoking discussion betwen professionals about flying, rather than slag-fests and bitch fights.

So my question is this - having grown up in the military system, the go-around was burned into our brains as a non-negotiable requirement under a whole range of circumstances.

At 2FTS I think there were 9 defined criteria - ranging from "approach too steep or too shallow" through "S-turn required to line up on finals" etc. I failed one of the best ACM rides I did on intro fighter course - because I didn't go around when I should have back in the circuit. As a senior F-111 QFI I would still go around routinely from approaches.

But I do a lot of commercial flying (down the back) these days, and a go-around is so rare as to be very noteworthy. Indeed from what I've seen, the "go -around culture" isn't nearly so strongly emphasised in civil aviation - and I'm wondering why.

The money aspect is one obvious possibility, but if you follow that thought through it leads logically to the unpalatable statement that "I will compromise safety for $$"

So what else is it? Are you all such sky gods that they aren't necessary? Is it pride / cultural factors? Seemed to be the case in the Air China Airbus prang in Japan a few years back. Traffic density - ie hard to slot back into the circuit because everyone focuses so heaviliy on straight in approaches? Lack of defined criteria that should trigger a go-around? Doubt that that's it - I know QANTAS is very strict on stable approaches etc - but still, what about Bangkok?

So what is it? Is there a problem with go arounds that I'm missing?

Interested in feedback from airline professionals.

[maggotdriver]

F/O is going to be far too slow to pull reverse thrust - or to kick off the drift in a strong crosswind on a wet runway.
Or, the corollary for the F/O; if the Captain's landing, that he has to have faith that the Captain doesn't kick off the drift with 33 knots of crosswind on a contaminated runway (assuming of course that some other emergency is forcing them to land with plenty of fuel on the short runway in bad weather). Otherwise good (somewhat) patronising post.:=

[maui]

Centaurus and Nev No

The concept of having the F/O fly the ****ty approaches is not new. It was SOP at TAA/Australian 20 odd years ago. It was the blue tail version of the monitored approach. The procedure allowed the PIC to monitor, more accurately, what was going on around him, rather than focussing on the actual manipulation. At the minima if the F/O had heard nothing to the contrary he had a mandatory missed approach. Upon breaking visual the PIC had a couple of seconds to get his perspective and inputs sorted before he took over the landing. The F/O stayed head down into the roll out, to monitor speed /sink reducing the risk of "duck under" or speed excursions, or as we say now, unstabilised approach.

The system worked well.

Having used both ways of conducting the "monitored approach" I personally prefer the F/O flying. Unfortunately my current operator has it the other way around.

The PIC always had the option of taking over, as was his recognised right. Indeed it was mandated that he take over, it was only a matter of judgement as to when he would do so. This got over the hurt feelings problem that some seem to think is a factor. And also eliminated any misgivings that the PIC might feel, about having given away the leg.

Win win.

Maui

[KRUSTY 34]

Bring back "Black Box".

Now there was outstanding television.

I had to turn this one off about half way through, the repetition and hysteria was driving me nuts.

[VH-Cheer Up]

I know QANTAS is very strict on stable approaches etc - but still, what about Bangkok?

Were there not a few changes in procedure and culture at QF as a result?

In some other respects the situation on VH-OJH at BKK on 23 Sept 1999 may have been similar. Certainly the changing wind and worsening weather was similar at both Bangkok and Toronto.

Transcripts (http://www.tacare.org.tw/msg_files/TACARE_6_E.pdf) from the CVR of OJH shows the Captain said ‘get it down, get it down, come on you’re starting your flare’.

Aboard AF358 the captain may have said something similar, if you can believe the dramatisation. I don't think TSB Canada has released CVR transcripts yet.

Any QF drivers care to comment on whether the go-around decision or any other safety culture was significantly re-engineered, following Bangkok?

VHCU

[DutchRoll]

It's called faith. As a member of a crew, each of us has to have faith that the other member or members will carry out the required functions as per training. This applies whether the other crew-member is known personally or a complete stranger.
Relying on faith, ScottyDoo, is playing a potentially dangerous game. While "meeting the minimum company standard", FOs, like Captains, have varying abilities to handle demanding conditions. This is not a sledge on either - just stating a fact.

Noone should have "faith" that everything will be just sweet when yours and a couple of hundred other lives depend on split second decisions, especially under conditions like those. Otherwise I may as well catch up on a few winks of sleep and tell the guy to wake me after the landing. This of course doesn't mean you have to swing the pendulum fully the other way and be completely paranoid. A nice, calm balance somewhere in the middle would be good.

On go-arounds, from the QF perspective the company has done a lot of work trying to encourage that practice if there are any doubts about the safety of the approach. Several people I know recently (myself included, as the non-flying pilot:} ) have done them for various reasons, made the required phone call to Ops (just to fill them in and pre-empt any "I thought we were all going to die!" reports from pax), and not another word has been said.

[Swingwing]

Dutch Roll - precisely the way it should be I think. The more a go-around is seen as routine, the less chance you've got of pushing a bad situation into a position from which you cannot recover.

After all, you're pointing several hundred tonnes of metal at the ground at nearly 300 km/h - if people imagine that it is possible to get that right every single time, then they are deluding themselves.
SW

[Dream Land]

Enjoyed reading the posts, Dutch Roll I do agree with you on your go around philosophy, but you have to admit, that your FUEL state must come into play before starting the approach, it's all about options, as far as how will the cadets get experience, I was taught in teaching fundamentals that watching a demonstration is most effective, Scottydoo, I understand your faith statement, but I feel that most posters and all captains agree that this shouldn't have been an F/O landing.

[podbreak]

There are (well should be at least!) stringent tolerances that require the PM to call for the MA. The SOPs do go quite far in shifting the "mateship" factor out of the cockpit. Stable calls and out of tolerance calls allow for the captain to 'objectively' can an approach or the FO to speak up if the cockpit gradient is dangerous, eliminating the "but I had it" scenario. As for this particular incident, be careful when making your analysis from a TV DocuDrama, hardly objective information... What did we learn from Current Affairs this week...:ugh:

[Cloud Cutter]

"If you go off the far end and crash you'll sit there, if you survive, saying "what wouldn't I give to have the last 5 minutes of my life over again?".
"Well as you cross the threshold you have that time and if you're not totally happy go around"

019360 that's the best thing I've read on PPRuNe for some time. It applies to all situations in aviation (and life).

Good thread Centaurus, even if not everyone agrees with you, it certainly gets you thinking.

[Dream Land]

But as mentioned by Scottydoo, go around is an option up until the point of T/R deployment, may be a good practice to check braking PRIOR to deployment in severe conditions.

[podbreak]

More sectors, Less inertia, lower ground speeds, fewer runway considerations, more fuel, more alternates, less commercial pressure, smaller route structure, smaller operation, no cultural/ language issues, shorter duty times, no/few time zones. In other words you just flew a lot more, in a very familiar environment and with few variables. When the weather deteriorated a bit, a Captain could take an incremental approach to exposing a lesser experienced First Officer to the conditions. If a pilot showed an aptitude for x/winds, you might let him take on stonger conditions than perhaps someone else. If the individual was weaker, you were going to fly with him next week and he could be left to develop progressively as his and your confidence grew.

Spot on atiuta. I think it is brilliant what QF are doing with their cadets (Oz regional placements).

This is why I never want to work for an Oz airline.

Get a life.

Somehow I don't think you'd stand a chance of ever working for an Oz airline.

[Gnadenburg]

Swingwing says So my question is this - having grown up in the military system, the go-around was burned into our brains as a non-negotiable requirement under a whole range of circumstances.


and then But I do a lot of commercial flying (down the back) these days, and a go-around is so rare as to be very noteworthy. Indeed from what I've seen, the "go -around culture" isn't nearly so strongly emphasised in civil aviation - and I'm wondering why.


If airliners were to pitch and break into the circuit area, you would see a lot more go arounds.

However, especially with the advent of a STAR tying a green line onto an ILS and a lesiurly transition from 250kts to Vapp, airline profiles have become very simple.

In the old glory days of 340kts to 15 miles in a 727,or even an A320, an unstable approach was more of a liklihood. Offsetting things being more adventurous stabilisation rules ( I recall 300' when I first joined Ansett ).

The go around is non-negotiable in most airline SOP's too. And remember that the military culture ( not so much RAAF ) was not often an easy one to adapt to airline environments and is still the cause of great problems today and abroad. CRM was partially brought in to play, to rid airliners of a Korean War single-seat culture that pervaded it's way through the airline game in the 60's & 70's. These days, it's more the problematic fast jet culture of second tier, non-Westernised air forces.

Although sadly, my chief pilot is ex-RAF, and his attitude to go arounds nothing short of abominable.

[Gnadenburg]

Centaurus's post has some good fundamentals.

However, bluntly, I feel it is too simple and leans toward outdated command practices that don't have an appreciation for the successful management of a modern glass airliner.

[ScottyDoo]

Scottydoo, I understand your faith statement, but I feel that most posters and all captains agree that this shouldn't have been an F/O landing.

"Faith" was a bad choice of word, I admit.

And I fully agree it should've been a captain's landing, absolutely. But how is a pilot supposed to pre-judge the competence of his fellow in the cockpit? This seems to be the guard against complacency that Centaurus is advocating.

As for a mateship culture, in 12 years flying airliners, I personally have never seen mateship and the ensuing relaxed cockpit atmosphere lead to an alarming situation. If something unusual begins to develop, mateship goes out the window.

[blow.n.gasket]

Lets look at that Qantas lack of fuel policy again shall we.:}

[Centaurus]

So what is it? Is there a problem with go arounds that I'm missing?

One of the more unfortunate aspects in many airlines is the captain is required to fill out a form for management explaining in detail why he made a missed approach or aborted a landing. Despite tongue-in-cheek assurances to the contrary, it is not uncommon for the captain to be nailed to the wall.
I stress this is only with certain airlines; but it happens.
Under those circumstances it is not surprising that the captain is hell-bent on landing even though a go-around would be mandated if the aircraft was not stable by a certain point on the approach.

During a court case after the Silk Air B737 tragedy (the only way to describe those circumstances) evidence was presented that on one occasion specifically, the captain was hopelessly high during an approach and attempted to lose height by applying full alternating aileron on short final in order to use the spoilers to increase the rate of descent. The first officer urged the captain to go around but the captain refused. In desperation the F/O pushed open the throttles and forced the go-around. The captain then completed a split-arse circuit and landed. He told the F/O to keep quiet about the incident and not to put in a report as he (the captain) would put in a report. But the captain did not report the incident. Management were alerted later by passenger and cabin crew stories.

Why didn't the captain put in a report on the incident? Loss of face, maybe? Fear of management repercussions? (definately). Much depends on the culture in the airline and indeed of the particular individual in the cockpit.
Here we are talking not about a bad weather missed approach but more a cocked up approach gone wrong.

[Centaurus]

Good thread Centaurus, even if not everyone agrees with you, it certainly gets you thinking.
Precisely why I placed it on Pprune. Of course I knew the limitations of drama on the TV show - in fact I nearly switched the TV off when I saw the depiction of the F/O "wrestling" with the controls. But I thought I may as well watch the end of the show while waiting for the dog to have a bog outside before settling down for the night. It was the interviews with three of the survivors (real people, not actors) that provoked deep thought.


I would hazard a guess and state there is not a pilot among us that has not occasionally quietly worried about having committed ourselves to giving the F/O a landing and as the ETA gets closer and the weather radar looks nasty over the airport, you think maybe I should be doing the landing - just in case, you know..
But being the good old bloke and crossing fingers the F/O doesn't stuff things, we let him fly the thing anyway. 99% of the time he does a good job and you congratulate yourself for being an astute judge of the man in the RH seat. It is the other one percent that used to worry me - just a little bit of course.

[Chimbu chuckles]

Great thread Centaurus..

In the airline I work for that landing would have been so far outside FO limits as to be rediculous.

I don't get to decide whether I'll let the FO extend himself in such conditions...it is written VERY plainly in our SOPS...>15kts crosswind, <1200 m vis (<3000m vis with precip), runway anything more than 'wet', <300' cloudbase or < perfectly serviceable aircraft and it is MY LANDING.

No ifs, buts or maybes and I am not about to risk my command by breaking those rules irrespective of how experienced or talented the FO may be...the fact remains that an expensive aeroplane and 250 lives (not to mention mine) are my responsibility and that responsibility has been vested in me by the company for one reason and one reason only....because they are convinced that I can be trusted to operate their aircraft safely and conservatively.

If FOs have not got handling skills gained in more 'extreme' conditions single pilot/in command in smaller aircraft they can, and are, exposed to them, where I work at any rate, in the sim. Yes it isn't as good as the real thing and lacks that sphincter twitching quality, but a widebody jet is certainly not the place.

In the conditions that existed that day I find myself wondering why they were making an approach at all let alone one flown by the FO. 33 kts is right on the demonstrated limit (actually significantly in excess for a contaminated runway as Toronto was that day) for the 767 I fly and coupled with all the other factors in play that day I would have been holding for improved conditions and then once on approach going around for the slightest excuse and diverting to the alternate...and I am without any doubt that that would be the absolute expectation of my superiors in the corner office. In fact I suspect I would lose my command for landing in such circumstances even if it ended with me parked at the aerobridge and not a scratch on the airframe...I know of captains busted back for less.

I have no idea what the limits are under such circumstances in an A340...but I would be VERY surprised indeed if they were not reasonably similar to those of the 767.

If they were trying to land in 33 kts of crosswind on a contaminated runway they were entering a world of hurt one way or another. They don't seem to have been all that short of fuel so why push it?

[Chronic Snoozer]

So Chimbu, that begs the question...

If you are close to the demonstrated limit/s - can you do the approach? Will you do the approach? If the limits are 'close' to the FOs limits, do you let him do the approach?

Swingwing

At 2FTS I think there were 9 defined criteria - ranging from "approach too steep or too shallow" through "S-turn required to line up on finals" etc. I failed one of the best ACM rides I did on intro fighter course - because I didn't go around when I should have back in the circuit. As a senior F-111 QFI I would still go around routinely from approaches.

One of the criteria was 'if not satisfied with the approach'. I can't recall a single time that I saw that one being used and yet it is perhaps the most powerful and subjective reason to go-round. You would have to admit though, as a senior military QFI, who would ever question you on why you did a go-around? The FLTCDR? And a go-round in a Pig ain't cheap is it? Ergo, there is never any overt pressure in the training environment NOT to go-round. However I can think of times during my time where the pressure to 'get it in' was higher than normal e.g. one way strips in PNG, anywhere in Asia during thunderstorm season. The military also seldom have to contend with curfews (Canberra excepted) so the pressure is perhaps not the same as the airlines.

Personally I think there are perhaps two reasons why a Captain may end up in this situation - lack of supervisory 'training', that doesn't just mean four bars on the epaulette;

and you hit the nail on the head Swingwing when you asked Is it pride / cultural factors?

[ScottyDoo]

So we've seen that in Australia, due to the introduction of CRM, STARs, updated SOPs, etc, etc, the unstabilised approach is now a relative rarity.

And that in Australian airlines an unstabilised approach calls for a mandated go-around.

But that in some "lesser" parts of the world, culture and loss-of-face issues might over-ride the imperative to go-around.

So why the lecture on D&G??? Instead of preaching to the converted, maybe this thread should've been posted in the South Asia or Middle East forum...



BTW, wasn't it ELEVEN go-around reasons???

[Bling-Blot]

Excellent Thread Centauras!! Having been a long time Prune reader, it is good to finally see a professional discussion between flight crew rather than the usual b**ch sessions that go on. Being a new CPL and wanting to end up in the pointy end of a jet it's interesting to read about the authority gradient on the flight deck.

A question for the jet captains out there; If it has been decided the FO will fly the approach and mid-way through the procedure the conditions nosedive, (Not the Aircraft I hope!!) do you assume control of the approach? Is there a discussion about it first? And for the FO's out there have you ever had a situation with the captain taking over?

Obviously both pilot are qualified to fly the aircraft but ultimately the Captain's a*se is on the line.

Keep the posts coming, an excellent read!!:ok:

[Gnadenburg]

If it has been decided the FO will fly the approach and mid-way through the procedure the conditions nosedive,

Good question. If the conditions fall out of parameters on approach, it is not going to offend sensibilities with a call of "I have control"in a regime of clear cut SOP's.

The grey area is if conditions haven't strictly fallen out parameters which are usually defined by x-wind, visibility & runway conditions. This could happen with a scenario involving windshear or turbulence.

It's a grey area. Like many. Compounded by a myriad of operational pressures.

[Capt Claret]

Bling,

No conversation, particularly late in the approach, there's no time for discussion.

We executed a missed approach the other day, new F/O flying, hot central Australia, thermal activity, float past the touchdown zone.

As Capt I called, "Go Around". F/O executed the manoeuvre well, the mains touching the runway briefly in the process, but we all lived to tell the tale, and no one claimed, we climbed vertically and I thort we wus gonna die" :E

[Chimbu chuckles]

CS If I am close to the limits, but not exceeding them, I can of course commence an approach however my company also has approach bans (JAR-OPS) and a limit of two approaches and then bog off to alternate...so there is a judgement call to make.

We are also certified down to Cat 3b ND so if the problem is vis/cloud base rather than howling crosswind we can autoland at most of the destinations on our network. That would be a captains only landing too.

If things are close to FO cutoffs but I am reasonably comfortable that they won't be exceeded of course I would let the FO continue as PF but with the stabilised approach criteria very much in mind. Crossing the threshold at 100', as in the subject of this thread, is not stabilised.

There is of course the final arbiter of FO approach/landing cutoffs...'if for any other reason....'

Interesting that you mention 'one way' airstrips in PNG...almost always it was the case in PNG that if you attempted a go around at one way mountain airstrips once established on final approach, or sometimes beyond a certain point on finals, you would crash in the attempt...not maybe but would. That tends to concentrate the mind wonderfully and sloppy flying, if it was a feature of your flying before, dissappears.

When I progressed to the F28 after joining PX if you touched down beyond (or before) the aiming point, 800-1200' in, it was a big deal...if you touched down beyond the 1500' markers it was a VERY BIG DEAL and a go around was strongly encouraged.

To this day if it looks like we will touch down beyond that point, even on a 11000' runway, the hair on the back of my neck stands up...it is a most uncomfortable feeling...but my company touchdown zone is 'first 1/3rd' of runway which gives a little more leeway.

Of course weather conditions that exceed FO cut offs are quite rare so 99.9 times out of 100 there is no question that he/she will remain PF...I think the only times I had a landing taken off me in the past was for landings in fog etc that necesitated an autoland to Cat 2 or below minimas.

Someone mentioned CRM and 'letting the FO fly'. In my view the definition of CRM should be widened to Circumstantial Resource Management.

Often in complex non normals it is very beneficial to have the FO as PF so you can free up your mind and manage the resources at your disposal...but the captain would always be PF for the approach and landing.

[Gnadenburg]

Often in complex non normals it is very beneficial to have the FO as PF so you can free up your mind and manage the resources at your disposal...but the captain would always be PF for the approach and landing.

And in a complex non-normal in an aircraft such as the A340 there are a number of scenarios ( inertial systems, air data computers, display management computers ) where a captain will not have any computer screens for the approach but the F/O will.

The F/O, if capable, is in a better position to fly the approach and landing than the Captain who would be relaint on standby instrumentation.

Who should fly the approach? If the approach is messed up you are now faced with the relatively difficult missed approach procedure with degraded systems.

Decision?

[Chimbu chuckles]

Fair point....in the 767 it would take the failure of so many systems concurrently that the prospect of ending up in that circumstance is almost, but not completely, impossible...perhaps the A340 is different:E

It is rather like the current J* (ex AN) management pilots desire to test FOs by having them fly a manual thrust, handflown, raw data, single engine, non precision approach at limit crosswind in the A320 just in case all those things fail and there is not an ILS handy AND the captain is incapacitated as well.:rolleyes: :ugh:

It is one thing to have them do something like that in the sim for interest sake or in a no jeopardy training scenario...quite another to fail people based on something that is so far outside the certification basis of the aeroplane. Or maybe the A320 is different:E

No-one seems to be addressing the AF captain's decision to continue an approach in conditions of contaminated runway and crosswinds (up until the wind recorder was taken out by lightning, windshear anyone:ugh: ) in excess of limits for those conditions...in the 767 the crosswind limits for contaminated are 10 kts...does the silence on this thread indicate that the limits for the A340 in this circumstance are in excess of 3 times those of the 767?

I just point blank refuse to believe that.:ok:

[J430]

CC

Non airline pilot comment.....Based on your comments, I think the silence says the AF guy F:mad: ed Up big time, or he thought all them computers would sort it out for him.:E

J:ok:

[Gnadenburg]

FOs by having them fly a manual thrust, handflown, raw data, single engine, non precision approach at limit crosswind in the A320 just in case all those things fail and there is not an ILS handy AND the captain is incapacitated as well.

The profile you have stated is not a particularly high expectation. In fact, for those familar with a managed Airbus NPA, in some circumstances, the workload can be less when you fly it like a Navajo. Yes Chimbu's case is SE but the point remains.

But your aversion for high standards of raw data ability under pressure is an inherent problem in Airbus aircraft. An inability or under confidence to fly a missed approach on raw data has led to a number of CFIT accidents on A320 aircraft including a former Ansett aircraft.It may have also been a factor in the Air France overrun.

Why?

When things turn profile ugly from 30, 40 , 60 miles out so begins a process of removing the aircraft's automation. It may start with the autopilot to maximise spoiler deflection, then the autothrust to prevent unwanted power up. Closer in, the flight director info' won't correspond to the performance you are trying to extract to get the aircraft in. So off they come. You are getting toward a scenario where your aircraft is hot n' high with Navajo like presentation.

This is no problem for those with very good raw data skills. Generally, pilots with such disciplines are quite adept in re-instating automatics once profile regained or if things botched, comfortable with a GA manoevre from any position, profile or configuration.

Airbus addressed the above problem of average piloting and raw data skills by having a GA Mode that reinstates the Flight Directors. However, this won't always be available and the recent A320 CFIT's due spatial disorientation ably demonstrates that Airbus, as of yet, cannot protect pilots from a lack of core skills including raw data piloting under pressure.

J* pilots should Harden The F*** Up frankly. Try circling off the completion of that profile at 500' like the mugs used to make us do a decade ago.:*

[Chimbu chuckles]

When things turn profile ugly from 30, 40 , 60 miles out so begins a process of removing the aircraft's automation. It may start with the autopilot to maximise spoiler deflection, then the autothrust to prevent unwanted power up. Closer in, the flight directors info' won't correspond to the performance you are trying to extract to get the aircraft in. So off they come.

Rubbish....all this shows is a lack of basic automation competencies...or the aeroplane should never have been certified for pax carrying operations as several of my, very experienced, mates attest. If you have to turn stuff off that isn't broken then you don't know what you're doing...it is just that simple.

Core competencies are required in both areas, automation and handflying. But the AN* philosophy is now big C little t so they fail people for not being able to do what they have never been taught to do.:rolleyes:

But back to the thread...so is the A340 so clever that it can be landed in the conditions that prevailed on the day by ANYONE let alone an FO.
This accident was not about your landing or my landing it was about landing period in conditions that warranted further consideration.
Hosing rain, contaminated runway, lightning destroyed wind reporting equipment, strong x wind that sounds like it gave a small tailwind component too, unstable approach...and, theoretically at least, the lesser qualified pilot flying. I would have been amazed had it not ended badly.

Sounded to me, when we looked at this accident at work, like the captain felt the conditions were beyond his abilities and handed his future career to an FO he felt might be able to land safely in conditions bordering on impossible. The last chance to really save the situation was on VERY short finals...look at the rain, look at the wind display on the EFIS...and then hit the GA switches...and they were hot and high as well.:ugh:

Everyone is fond of quoting Prof Reason's swiss cheese model...well all the holes were lining up and the ONE person who is supposed to be the final filter, the captain, did not one fecking thing about it...in fact quite the opposite.

[faheel]

CC gotta agree with you mate , I prefer to be a very big sook in situations like that and go somewhere nicer.:*
And the last thing I would worry about is commercials reaction to it.
Hey, its my licence on the line not the right seater(well maybe not) but mine is far more valuable to me!!
btw congrats on your move to the left seat :)

[Guptar]

I believe that te Sil Air FO that Centauras was talking about was a Massey University cadet, on his 2nd week of line flying on the 737.

Back then Massey were running an aviation degree programme where in the 4th year, the students were placed with an airline for 6 months work experiance as a 737 FO.

That FO must have had gonads the sise of cocconuts to initiate a go around.

[Centaurus]

That FO must have had gonads the sise of cocconuts to initiate a go around

He is a captain with Virgin Blue now after a command in UK on the 737. Top bloke.

[pakeha-boy]

QUOTE..CC.......This accident was not about your landing or my landing it was about landing period in conditions that warranted further consideration.

.........SOMETIMES THE WRITING IS ON THE WALL......IT STARES YOU IN THE FACE AND YOU STILL CANT SEE IT!!!!

CC.....congrats mate....the whole thread summed up in one sentence!!!.....

the misses and my tui piss are yours....

[donpizmeov]

Another pressure in conditions like this, is the sheep conditioning we humans have (no, not in a Kiwi trying to make a family way!!!). When you hear the WX is bad, but hear all the guys in the line in front of you still taking off or landing, it makes the decision to delay a lot harder. I have seen this quite a few time HKG when the typhoons are a commin or a leavin.

On arrival there on downwind the procession in front of us were taking the vectors and commencing the approach. The weather was shocking. On late downwind, I asked the controller if the aircraft in front were landing off the approaches. He replied that some were, but most were conducting missed approaches. I asked to hold, then the guy behind asked to hold, then another etc etc.

We get so use to being able to fly in all sorts of weather, that when it really does get bad it is hard to step back and say enough is enough. Add to this that all the other airlines are continuing, and the decision to join the hold or divert is made so much harder. Luckily we have SOPs, OPS MANs, and another flight deck crew member (its even better if you both understand the same language!) etc to help with this decision making.

Another good reason to call sick if the weather at departure or destination is anything but CAVOK.:}

Don

[pakeha-boy]

Don....mate!!! ditto....

Please dont use the word "sheep" as it gits me really horny......

....the word you are looking for is ....PRUDENT!!!!.....old,bold,young stupid ugly thing...PB

[donpizmeov]

Sorry PB, didn't want to get you all excited. Mate, you should see some of the goats we have running around over here!!! If only the little baaaaastards could cook.

Don

[Gnadenburg]

Rubbish....all this shows is a lack of basic automation competencies...or the aeroplane should never have been certified for pax carrying operations as several of my, very experienced, mates attest. If you have to turn stuff off that isn't broken then you don't know what you're doing...it is just that simple.


Chimbu.

Congratulations on your new command but I would suggest a red flag there. By your own admission, you know nothing of Airbus, yet your convictions bulletproof. And I would prefer a discussion based on science and not " my very experienced mates".

In my experience with Airbus, unstable approaches and a number of fatal accidents ( Air India, Gulf Air, Armavia etc ) have one thing in common at the latter stages- degraded automation. In the case of the Air France A340 overrun, the Autothrust was simultaneoulsy disengaged with the Autopilot at 300 feet. Why? Well again Chimbu, you have all the answers.

Hosing rain, contaminated runway, lightning destroyed wind reporting equipment, strong x wind that sounds like it gave a small tailwind component too, unstable approach...and, theoretically at least, the lesser qualified pilot flying. I would have been amazed had it not ended badly.


You must be dreading the upcoming monsoon and typhoon season. So, they were lured into the approach.

Confidence and currency in a late GA from an unstable approach, regardless of position and configuration, probably the only way to counter the problem. Rembering that in most crashes in approach and in foul weather, aircraft have landed ahead- overshoot shear, turbulence increasing TWC due a gust front etc isn't linear nor predictable.

Two of the four Airbus outfits I have worked for practiced late GA from an unstable position. Not difficult and when versed and with curreny, takes away a bit of the committment psycology to a difficult approach.

[pakeha-boy]

Quote,Gnads......Two of the four Airbus outfits I have worked for practiced late GA from an unstable position. Not difficult and when versed and with curreny, takes away a bit of the committment psycology to a difficult approach.

Gnads...CC has always taken potshots at the bus...he has a history of it,and most of it as a friendly jibe,,dont really have a beef with it as he means no harm.....some boeing blokes just dont want a better life:}

I agree with the intent of your comments,and your last paragraph is one by which most of us practice and more by rote than anything else....The problem with real life GA,s(as you well know) is that they are rarely practiced and are never initiated soon enough...the mindset that it has to be initiated at the GA point,when the ****e hits the fan or as the ultimate last resort......when one has realised they have no other choice as opposed to making a professional decision earlier on......

GA,s are a critical part of any flight....if we put as much emphasis on this procedure as we do when doing our normal flying duties,we would hear less of these events.....and I,m as guilty as the next...PB

[Chimbu chuckles]

Why would I be more worried about the next monsoon season than I have about the last 20. I have spent my entire career based in the tropics...heavy monsoonal rain and big TSs are as much a part of my day as putting my trousers on one leg at a time.

My only quibble about your last post was the, apparent, enthusiasm to turn automation off at the first sign that it was not doing what you expected rather than chosing a mode with more direct control...like going from Managed Descent to Open Descent or from Nav to Track or Heading Select.

Virtually all my long time mates are flying Airbus...some are checkers and trainers...I speak to them at length about the bus...very few if any are overly enthusiastic about the bus culture but it is pretty obvious that for the most part the various modes are more about what it is called than what it does...like Nav as opposed to LNAV or Open descent v FLCH and VNAV v Managed descent. Most don't like the A320 but recognise that the 330 and 340 are better aeroplanes to fly.

As to how/what extent automation is used/when or under what circumstances it is switched off is more a company culture thing in many respects. Overwhelming annecdotal evidence, confirmed in your post, is that the Ansett culture was 'turn it off' rather than use another mode...in the 767 if VNAV is not doing it for you then you change to something else...FLCH or VS. As soon as you are not conforming to a magenta line HDG SEL.

If I was to follow the practice outlined in your post I would be carpetted and, most assuredly, have remain an SFO until I changed my habits. .

In our normal daily operations we use the AFDS/MCP from first pitch change after takeoff to short finals, including circling approaches. It works very well and means both pilots are freed up to monitor flight path, traffic and ATC clearances using good CRM rather than PF hand flying and PNF doing everything else with a constrained ability for either pilot to satisfactorily monitor.

That doesn't mean we don't hand fly approaches when it is appropriate...I did so today at home port in nice weather and no traffic...but would not do so, unless forced to, at LHR or DXB in rush hour. It just loads up the PNF too much and degrades the team effort...its bad CRM.

I certainly don't have all the answers...but still none of you Bus officiandos have pointed out what the contaminated xwind limit is for the 340. This accident wasn't one where you could really say, hand on heart, "poor fellas, there but for the grace of God go I"....none of the parameters were just a little bit off and caught anyone unawares...it was just a giant clusterfeck in the same vien as GA200 at Jogya. many are quick to point out the Indonesian pilot's mistakes/cultural issues but you all seem less keen to comment on why someone would land in a situation that was AT LEAST as cut and dry as that of GA 200.

I have never shrunk from saying i don't like Airbus...I don't and have no desire to fly one. 99% of the stick I give them and the pilots that fly them is just good natured ribbing along the lines of OZ v Kiwi or Bne v Mexicans...but there is an underlaying Bus culture and lack of intuitiveness about Buses that I really think is bad. Airbuses pilots virtually invented, or certainly cornered the market on, 'the work around'.

I really, REALLY like the fact that, in my Boeing, Ground speed mini is never going to (try to) overspeed the flaps in managed descent because of a temp/wind change causing a signal to be blasted off to BS castle by the computer dobbing me in in less time than it takes to pull the thrust levers back.:rolleyes:

[Centaurus]

Reminds me of the time in another life I was dobbed in by the F/O of a German airline I was contracted to, for hand flying SIDS in the 737 Classic. This was basic VOR radial/DME flying same as any GA IFR pilot in Australia. When I asked the F/O to fly a raw data ILS in perfect weather, he refused point blank. I insisted and his flying was so bad I was forced to take over.

Within days it was tea and bikkies in front of the chief pilot, a kindly gentleman in every sense, who explained gently that F/O's were not trained to monitor raw data - only the FMCS - and please would I stick to the automatics from lift off to landing. His train set etc...

[Dream Land]

Truly amazing how pilots with absolutely no training on the bus are self-proclaimed experts by good advice from their mates! :mad: Chimbu, my bet is that no one gives a rat's ar$e whether or not you have a desire to fly the Airbus, your ramblings are meaningless without any real operational knowledge.
In the reported wx conditions, I would much rather be in the small bus than the big bus.

[Chimbu chuckles]

That's ok...doesn't mean I can't have a preference...I am not knocking yours:ok:

I have never driven a Skoda either...I know I don't want to....I wouldn't deny you your choice to do so however.

Still waiting for the A340 contaminated xwind limits:)

Centaurus know what you mean....you'd think there was a logical middle ground but apparently not:ok:

[donpizmeov]

Chuck,

For the A343 the figures are:

27 knots on a dry runway.
27 knots wet.
15 knots on a runway covered with standing water or wet snow.

Don

[Gnadenburg]

Why would I be more worried about the next monsoon season than I have about the last 20. I have spent my entire career based in the tropics...heavy monsoonal rain and big TSs are as much a part of my day as putting my trousers on one leg at a time.

Because the reported conditions in the A340 accident pretty atypical of monsoonal activity in Asia or the sub-continent. Most would have been 'lured' into the approach IMHO with the reported actuals- this based on the NTSB report on WX conditions at the time and not the TV programme which I feel you draw your opinions second hand from.

My only quibble about your last post was the, apparent, enthusiasm to turn automation off at the first sign that it was not doing what you expected rather than chosing a mode with more direct control...like going from Managed Descent to Open Descent or from Nav to Track or Heading Select.


I made not a single reference to my own practices. I was linking the coincidence that most Airbus accidents or unstable approaches have varying degrees of pilot induced automation degradation at the end. With a little research, it was discovered the Air France pilot chose to take out the auto thrust system at 350'.

Airbus managed profiles are designed for STAR's. Bring in WX diversions or track shortening or high speed requirements and the managed modes may be corrected with more direct modes granted. However, extracting maximum performance, correcting mode confusion, can require autopilot, autothrust or flight director removal- this compounded in a situation where a transition can be made from a sporty approach on instruments to visual segment or GA. Accidents and Flight Data Analysis to support this. My common link so to speak.

Virtually all my long time mates are flying Airbus...some are checkers and trainers..

Big deal. A referrence to mates doesn't qualify an opinion.

Overwhelming annecdotal evidence, confirmed in your post, is that the Ansett culture was 'turn it off' rather than use another mode..

This was Australian domestic airline culture coupled with Australian pre-STAR ATC culture. Airbus aircraft weren't conceived to fly 340kts inside 20 track miles to run nor fly decelerating NPA's for example- but this is how it was in Australia- and Airbus crews quite adept in working the aircraft to fit the system. Domestic airline pilots of old, no matter what their aircraft, have expanded 'green bands' operationally in my experience.

If I was to follow the practice outlined in your post I would be carpetted

If I flew a standard ILS approach the same for every airline I worked for, I would be carpetted too. Every airline is different.

[Chimbu chuckles]

Agreed Gnads...the good old days were a ton of fun and we learned a lot of aircraft handling skills that stand us in good stead...arriving at 10 nm at 330kts in an F28 was a hoot and certainly 'enabled' an expanded green band in those of us so experienced.

Fact is the 'good old days' are over and finished...pilots who have entered the system in the last 10-15 yrs will never gain those skills because the system and aircraft design don't allow them. That being the case you're just gonna scare people witless doing it in aircraft that lack the flexibility to do it easily, even though an 'expanded green band' still makes it possible.

Worse still those not scared witless will try and emulate but without the skills to do so or the flexible aircraft type to do so easily and, invariably, cock it up.

So given that the current reality is STARs, SIDs, crowded airspace, larger aircraft with attendant handling and inertia issues, system redundancy up the waazoo and generally 'different' experience, perhaps it is long past time to recognise that the system requires the current levels of automation be used to best effect 100% of the time...and therefore train and check accordingly?

Whether you're flying a Fokker, Boeing or one of those silly French aeroplanes;)

Don thanks for that...I was beginning to think I wouldn't find out until I get to DXB on Wednesday and quiz an EK mate who just finished his command training on 330s after 4 years of MCC 330/340. As an aside he LOVES the 330...reckons it's a GREAT aeroplane when everything is working (and a crunt when it isn't)...I jus' tell im he's suffering Stockholm syndrome.;)

As I suspected...all within a few kts of my current mount...that being the case does anyone think the AF captain was displaying qualities in keeping with his job description by carrying out an approach under the prevailing conditions of a last reported crosswind > 30kts (double the AFM limitation)?

If you argue, and you could, that, yes, his decision to at least fly the approach was not completely stupid what about being high crossing the threshold and not going around at that point?

Even under perfect conditions a threshold wheel crossing height of 100' would mean touching down at least 3000' into the 9000' runway assuming they were on speed. They were clearly not on speed so touchdown only 1500' beyond the normal spot was a forlorn hope at best...and it was raining HARD. I can't remember off the top of my head whether the runway was grooved...lets assume it is. That doesn't mean you can land in heavy rain and expect acceptable braking action.

They touched down approaching 4500' (half way) down the runway...absolutely to be expected.

Why didn't the captain take control, apply max thrust and go around at this point...or even command the FO to do same?

Once they were down it was really a forgone conclusion. You might argue that they had some capability to get airborne again until thrust reverser activation but by the time 13 seconds ticked by (the apparent delay and an ENORMOUSLY long period of time) I think that hope was gone too. 13 seconds after touchdown, even with degraded braking action, they were probably sufficiently slow that the effects of reverse thrust was marginal....but still not slow enough to have any hope of stopping the aircraft in the remaining approximately 2000' (4500' + 13 seconds of, effective, innaction) of runway.

The pilot in the LHS of this aircraft on the day was not a captain he was a passenger.

It could be argued that the pilot in the RHS displayed zero command potential by not 'taking command' of the situation and doing his job to avert a near gauranteed outcome given the complete lack of effective input being received from the LHS.

The cabin crew are to be commended for getting everyone out...but recognise that pure unadulterated luck was the overriding factor in that miracle.

As airline pilots we are generally paid very well. AF pilots are paid very well indeed. We acknowledge that we earn our pay not merely because of the day to day humdrum of airline ops but on the rare occassions when circumstances are such that high levels of skill and decision making abilities are required to keep everyone in our charge safe.

Did this tech crew meet those expectations?

[J430]

CC
Seems you are not getting many replies, so for a low hour bugsmasher here goes.......
Did this tech crew meet those expectations?
No.
Quite simply they were not on the job at all. Who knows why, nobody will know but them I guess if in fact they can recall.
As for the Captain being a passenger, not sure he was really there at all!:eek: Must have been off with the pixies:\ .
And I am not meaning to be smart arsed about it, even if it sounds that way. But really there is no reason at all but to get to the threshold and not bugg off somewhere else. I would have chickened out long before.
J:ok:

[Chimbu chuckles]

It is also worth noting that even had there been no crosswind, or if the crosswind was negligable, the unfactored landing distance required was 6614' with a 5kt tailwind component. I am assuming non factored because I get a similar number from my 767 QRH (1000' more if I assume MLW and braking action 'poor')...and that is the only thing that comes out of QRHs be they Boeing or Airbus. I will further assume that the quoted distance includes 1000' of air distance.

Given that the aircraft was fully serviceable the crew had no relief from requiring fully factored landing distances.

If the crew applied 1.67 that is 11000' LDR.

And all they had was 9000'.

They simply had no legal means to begin the approach in the conditions that existed.

[pakeha-boy]

QUOTE CC....The pilot in the LHS of this aircraft on the day was not a captain he was a passenger.

It could be argued that the pilot in the RHS displayed zero command potential by not 'taking command' of the situation and doing his job to avert a near gauranteed outcome given the complete lack of effective input being received from the LHS.


,.........and there gentleman....in a nut shell.....is the answer and probably the final outcome and findings of this case!!!!

[donpizmeov]

Chuck,

From the A343 holy book. For an aircraft at MLW, flaps full, medium autobrakes, 1/2inch standing water. (From the book: Autoland landing distance with autobrake)

Factored LDR, 1/2 inch water, 10kts tail wind = 2722m
With 4 reversers operating= 2477m

Thats from landing threshold to point of stop.

Unfactored for same conditions as above: (from book:the actual landing distance to come to a complete stop from a point 50' above the landing surface. No margin is included in this distance).

2063m (this is with operating reversers). 1664m nil wind.

(Used 10kts tail as I am too lazy to work out the 5kt factor, used max landing weight as most limiting case)

9000' x 0.305= 2745m. Don't know what the distance beyond the glidepath was.

Don

[J430]

Don

I think the answer is right there. And I am a novice. From the book, reversers working (some many second later).......they were skating on ice way to thin, with heated blades!

Who likes using the whole strip, nose up to the brbe wire so to speak. Not me. What about you Chuck?

Maybe I am wrong.

J:ok:

[Chimbu chuckles]

Thanks Don...much better to use airbus figures than to try and massage, and draw conclusions from, my 767 figures.

Lets assume for simplicity sake that the increased LDR is linear between nill wind and -10kts (tailwind)

From your figures that gives 6150' [(2063m+1664m)/2 (3.3)] unfactored (all reversers working). Close enough to the figure quoted earlier in the thread (6600') for govt workers.

6150 x 1.67 = 10270'

Lets assume nil wind...fighting hard to give the crew the benefit of all doubt.

1664m x 3.3 = 5490' x 1.67 = 9170'

Of course in my last post the 11000' figure (6614x 1.67) was correct and I should not have increased that figure anymore because the basic figure is already for 'poor' braking action thus requires no further factoring after 1.67. Post edited accordingly.:ok:

They still had no legal basis for starting an approach.

[Gnadenburg]

Can someone from the elite Airbus brotherhood explain to me why Chimbu is using the dry conditions, pre-dispatch 1.67 factor to an airborne, contaminated runway scenario?

1.15 contaminated rwy factor incidentally.

[Gnadenburg]

Fact is the 'good old days' are over and finished...pilots who have entered the system in the last 10-15 yrs will never gain those skills because the system and aircraft design don't allow them. That being the case you're just gonna scare people witless doing it in aircraft that lack the flexibility to do it easily, even though an 'expanded green band' still makes it possible.

Sorry Chimbu. We will never agree. I see you & your ilk as apologists for a deterioration of elemental aviation skills. Glass technology can hide this for a whole career. But sadly, it can also fatally expose it- about once in 5 years on Airbus aircraft.

[Chimbu chuckles]

Whose using dry figures?

Don's figures were for contaminated.

'Poor' reported braking action refers to braking action on 'wet ice' in the Boeing QRH. I assume something similar would be the certification process in an Airbus.

I would be just fascinated to see a reference for not factoring LDR in normal ops...either before dispatch or after.

You might view me as an appologist, although the check and training dept here would find that amusing to say the least. I think you're stuck in the past...technology has moved on and, like it or not, the system relies on that technology.

[donpizmeov]

I think the main point here is, that if the guys had been able to hit the tarmac in the correct spot, we would not be reading about it. As they would have stopped with some 300m remaining, using medium autobraking. If they they had used max manual braking after touchdown in the correct spot, they would have 700m remaining. All this at Max landing weight (not sure what weight they were at), and 10kts tailwind (twice what has been mentioned). I think this shows the importance of stabilised approaches, and maintaining the correct touchdown point, rather than the implications of pre and post dispatch performance figures. This accident was preventable right up to the point of touchdown.

A good lesson for all of us I should think.

Don

[fistfokker]

Can someone from the elite Airbus brotherhood explain to me why Chimbu is using the dry conditions, pre-dispatch 1.67 factor to an airborne, contaminated runway scenario?
1.15 contaminated rwy factor incidentally.
While not claiming to be an elite of Airbus brotherhood (I hate the heap of s**t but am forced to fly it to date) in my experience many Airbus pilots believe the 1.67 factor (dry) + the .15 (wet) only applies pre-dispatch and that once dispatched only the FCOM/QRH actual landing distance figure need be applied. In Aus the factor must always be applied unless in an emergency. NOT abnormal or Company convenience but EMERGENCY. Contaminated runway landings are not allowed. While conceding that other contracting states may permit contaminated runway landings the factor for this would always be additional to Dry runway factored distance unless in an emergency.
Hence this would explain CC's use of DRY runway conditions as the starting point.
I don't fancy explaining to ATSB why I ran of the end of the runway at Hamilton Island, for example, because the flaps had seized at Flap1, the QRH said I only had to add 10% (not actual but for example) to the actual dry landing distance but I had the fuel on board to divert to Townsville.
J* pilots should Harden The F*** Up frankly. Try circling off the completion of that profile at 500' like the mugs used to make us do a decade ago.
I think you may find that world wide attitudes have changed to ten years ago. The type of approach you have described in RPT Jet transport is a sure fire recipe for CFIT and should be actively discouraged. Sadly it does seem to exist still in some circles. "I can do it" is a common phrase used in CRM courses as an alarm bell. I know if I am sitting in the back I would like to think the operating crew would utilise a runway aligned approach, with automatics, in preference to a hand flown, raw data, minimum use of any available resources, circling apprach the way Airbus and ex AN pilots advocate when there is so much more available to assist with a safe and efficient outcome.
The fact that so many relatively minor systems failures on Airbus aicraft may require Raw data, Hand Flown Approaches using manual thrust, in this day and age, compared to equivalent Boeing aircraft, is supportive of my view that the the Airbus family is an accident looking for somewhere to take place, and should never have been certified to carry fare paying members of the unsuspecting public.
You may think you are cleverer than the average Jet* pilot but I can assure you, none of us would contemplate circling in the dark at 500ft if there were any other alternative. And yes I have operated in an environment like that in the past in steam driven jets. I can do it, I just choose not to. The place to practice that kind of thing is in the simulator, in a training environment, NOT in the aircraft in normal operations, just in case some idiot check pilot wants to see it done in real life or the sim on check day.

[Chimbu chuckles]

Further to the above I quote the Boeing QRH, Performance in Flight-Text.

These values are actual distances and do not include the 1.67 regulatory factor. Therefore, they cannot be used to determine the dispatch required landing field length.

That would indicate that it applies everywhere not just Australia.

As Toronto was the dispatched destination those factors must apply. I would hate to try and argue to the ATSB or in a court of Law that they do not apply in all cases other than an emergency. It is my belief that they do apply.

Quite frankly I find it a little strange that we factor thus when the aeroplane is perfectly serviceable but need no factoring, legally, when the aircraft is in a degraded state...that doesn't mean of course that good airmanship or company SOP don't require factoring in an emergency.

Don I agree that if they did it all perfectly, or even reasonably, they would have stopped in the LDA...but I remain sceptical that the approach was legal.

These are the sorts of accidents that, if anything was required at all, keep me in the QRH to ensure I am aware what is 1/. possible and 2/. legal.

[Gnadenburg]

Chimbu

I have no idea what you are talking about. You further compound my misunderstanding by meshing Boeing with Airbus, metres with feet, pre-dispatch with dispatch, dry with wet with contaminated. On top of this little basket case is the fact that the WX Toronto pre-dispatch didn't forecast a contaminated runway as this was caused by a severe thunderstorms.

[donpizmeov]

REQUIRED LANDING DISTANCE


MANUAL LANDING
Regulation defines the required landing distance as the actual landing distance divided by 0.6, assuming the surface is dry.
If the surface is wet, the required landing distance must be at least 115 % of that for a dry surface.
For JAR-OPS operators, if the surface is contaminated, the required landing distance must be at least the greater of the required landing distance on wet runway (see previous paragraph) and 115 % of the landing distance determined in accordance with approved contaminated landing distance data.


Not much different from what you are saying re what is required. Taken from a Bus holy book. My employer states we need required landing distance (for ALW, actual conditions and actual runway)to land. Unless we have a non-normal, then its factored Actual distance (plus another factor for mum and the kids, the dog etc etc).

My brain hurts..must need beer.

Don

[Chimbu chuckles]

Really? I thought it was pretty clear.

I never mentioned or used dry figures...they are all either contaminated figures from Don's A343 QRH or the figures from the accident investigation (I assume Transport Canada calculated the LDR with respect to the contaminated state of the runway). The only other references were to 'poor' braking actions (wet ice remember) from my QRH.

So you're saying that if you have dispatched to your destination nothing would give you pause to consider whether your subsequent landing might or might not be legal...not even a TS/blizzard contaminating the runway...and if so you would be comfortable using raw data unfactored?

That's kinda scary.

Airbus and Boeing are certified to the same regulatory standards are they not?

However why don't you go back and read what I actually wrote rather than what you think I wrote.

[Gnadenburg]

fistfokker

Contaminated runway landings are not allowed.

How strange. Is that a limitation placed on J*?

The type of approach you have described in RPT Jet transport is a sure fire recipe for CFIT and should be actively discouraged.

Nobody would circle for real at 500' on one engine after an NPA to minima. It was a CASA licence renewal requirement. My point was licence renewal for you would seem to have softned.

The fact that so many relatively minor systems failures on Airbus aicraft may require Raw data, Hand Flown Approaches using manual thrust,

Not true at all. List a minor failure which will degrade to that extent.

Say a double failure of an inertial reference system? Luckily for Airbus they have three. Doesn't a 737 have only two?

You may think you are cleverer than the average Jet* pilot

Only in the fact that I never paid for my training

but

none of us would contemplate circling in the dark at 500ft

Just to remind you that as pointed out earlier this was a CASA Licence renewal requirment.

But complex profiles in the simulator help develop a solid elemental skill set. As alluded to ad nauseum, most Airbus accidents have been due a neglect fundamentals- including two aircraft flown into the water on GA.

[Gnadenburg]

Don
But you have used the contaminated table. Are you applying the 1.67 to those?

So, with your outfit, you have a single HYD failure with an increment that will inevitably come in under the 1.67; all of a sudden your required landing distance is less than prior to when the HYD system failed?

Lesson?

What was Air France's policy before non-endorsed Monday morning quarterbacks make profound statements as " the approach was never legal".
Even prior to dispatch the approach wasn't legal if I read some of you correctly!

[Chimbu chuckles]

Gnadenberg I don't understand your confusion...transport category is transport category. It matters not whether the label on the control column says Boeing or Airbus.

The A340 at Toronto was perfectly serviceable...up until it speared off the runway end and burst into flames.

This stuff is not Monday morning quarterbacking...it is airline pilot 101. How can I land on a runway in the conditions that exist at the time (who cares what the conditions were 10 hrs earlier) if I am unsure of the LDR + regulatory factors.

Whether you apply straight 1.67 to good, medium or poor braking distances or divide by .6 and multiply by 1.15 the answers won't be too far adrift from each other. In fact the Airbus method will be a little more restrictive.

[donpizmeov]

Gnads,

I used the 4.03, "Landing distance without autobrakes" runway condition covered with 12.7mm(1/2inch) water, corrected for tailwind and 4 operative reversers from that same page for the unfactored. And the landing with "autoland landing distance with autobrake", runway condition 12.7mm(1/2inch) water, corrected for tailwind and reversers from that same page for the factored. No extra multiples by me.

For a non-normal I would use the 4.03 distance multiplied by the "LDG CONF/APP SPD/LDG DIST FOLLOWING FAILURES" corrections as required. Depends what type of HYD failure you get mate. Could be upto a multiple of 2.4.

Anything else I can help with?

Don

[Gnadenburg]

RWY Length Toronto

2743

Actual LDG Distance:

dry=1264

wet= 1564

contaminated = 2016

Chimbu applies the 1.67 to the contaminated figure???????

( I will pour another glass of Amarone before bed ).

[Chimbu chuckles]

From Don's post.

Regulation defines the required landing distance as the actual landing distance divided by 0.6, assuming the surface is dry.

If the surface is wet, the required landing distance must be at least 115 % of that for a dry surface.

From Gnads post.

Dry runway unfactored

1264m

(1264/.6) x 1.15 = 2422m (Airbus method)

Toronto LDA 2743m

1264 x 1.82 = 2300m ( Australian method 1.67 +.15)

And the above figures are just for wet...not contaminated...at best the landing was so marginal as to be less than sensible but given it was contaminated rather than just wet I still believe the landing was probably illegal.

Edited because I remembered the wet figure rather than Gnads dry figure when I went to post with calc in hand.

[donpizmeov]

Gnads,

Above I have pasted a bit from the Airbus VOL 2 re how to change a actual landing distance to the required landing distance. JAR states you need a required landing distance, except in the case of non-normal.

Don

Chuck,

You would need to correct the dry distance as you have not the wet. For the wet distance you divide by .6 only. Remember these numbers are max landing weight. At a lesser weight (and I have no idea at what weight he was at) he would have been legal.

[Gnadenburg]

I see your logic and application.

However, pragmatically, every time it snows in Toronto enroute, you are now compelled to divert?

[Chimbu chuckles]

I recognise the fact he had 3000kg of fuel over and above diversion fuel so holding and then making a approach based on having min divert fuel at the minima was a possible alternative course of action...particularly if an improvement was likely/forecaste.

I find it very difficult to believe the 6600 figure from the accident report is factored for contaminated given that the runway is marginal just for wet. If you work back from that figure removing factors the raw data figures would be small indeed. It seems unlikely to be the case if Gnads figures are for a representative landing weight.

I have edited my previous post for transposition error.

[haughtney1]

This accident falls firmly into the category of "poor decision making" compounded by a complete lack of situational awareness from both seats when it came to commencing the approach in the face of deteriorating wx and runway conditions.
Have been there done that and nearly worn the T-Shirt...(into St Johns of all places).

[Gnadenburg]

Gnads,

Above I have pasted a bit from the Airbus VOL 2 re how to change a actual landing distance to the required landing distance. JAR states you need a required landing distance, except in the case of non-normal.



My point was that with most abnormals except the multiple failures, you now have a paradox where your RLD is less with the abnormal than without.

Which would help explain the common interpretation that airborne your RLD is your ALD with abnormal factors. Or pragmatically, that some French Test Pilot without system failures, slammed the a/c onto the piano keys to determine your ALD figure- which you conservatively address.

[Chimbu chuckles]

Gnads as I too operate to JAR-OPS that is a paradox that has bemused me also...so I just took the pragmatic view that I will never land with < than normal factored LDR + a buffer for broken bits of the aeroplane and sundry family members.:ok:

It gets real interesting in say, a double hydraulic failure. On the one hand that is definately an emergency and the good book says "Plan to land at the nearest suitable". Defining suitable with an aeroplane that is handling like a bucket of jello exercises my mind somewhat...especially if all you're left with is one thrust reverser and brake accumulator presure:sad:

[J430]

All of this stuff above, and the x-wind was.....30+ knots:ugh:

Memories of Microburst and a QFB737 in BrisVegas come to mind also. GA executed!:ok:

Might be my simplistic view of the world but even if the text book says you will scrape it it, you have to hit the Piano keys, and in that kind of storm you must be pretty lucky to pull it off every time.

Divert is what I would want as a pax. Better to have my luggage in a hotel somewhere else than have it crisped, along with me:sad:

J

[Chimbu chuckles]

J430 much of this stuff is, or should be, ingrained habit in any airline pilot that has been airline flying for a while...it should be bordering in subconcious in a captain such that when the information is needed it is just there...by that I don't mean he pulls numbers from his ar$e but he knows where to look to get the basic numbers and knows what to do with them to make them meaningfull. Having said that I do store away a few numbers in the grey matter that (hopefully) will gell with information received in an ATIS, Notams or when looking at the 10-9 chart (aerodrome diagram) or just looking out the window, and if it seems a little tight cause me to seek further refinement of those numbers.

In large aircraft we can't just thump it down 'on the piano keys' and stand on the brakes to give us 'a bit for mum' when the runway is wet or contaminated. Because of the geometry (height of eye vs wheels and how far they are behind you ) if you did the likely outcome would be stuffing the wheels into the dirt before the threshold and then ripping them off the aeroplane when they met the beginning of the runway.

As a result our aiming point is fairly well set in concrete at 1000' in from the threshold which, all things being normal, gives a main wheel crossing height of 50' at the threshold...hence the markings you see on runways at the 500', 1000' and 1500'.

The 1000' markers are where the glidesope beam portion of the ILS 'intersects' the runway. On a nice day when you are desirous of a flattering landing you actually land a little beyond that point because you, of course, round out and flare...you might touchdown around the 1500' markers. In bad conditions you don't flare you just drive the aircraft on and get the wheels spun up so the autobrakes and, a few seconds later, the thrust reversers can do their job. In strong crosswinds on wet runways you might not, and need not, even kick the aeroplane straight but rather let the aircraft geometry sort it out for you. The CofG is a fair way ahead of the main wheel boggies in big aircraft so if you touchdown with drift allowance on the aircraft's inertia means it won't dart off but actually just shudder and straighten up. The main boggies are designed for this...good airmanship, if not a little mechanical sympathy, dictates you don't do it on dry runways but you can...and the odd person does:ugh:

We have all sorts of aids to help us with all of this...from diagrams and narrative in manuals to talking radio altimeters that (should) say "50 feet" a fraction of a second after the threshold dissappears from view right up to autoland and auto rollout if conditions dictate. We have SOPs that dictate, with absolutely no room for interpretation, how a crew will react under certain stimuli...as an example if you are out of tolerance the ILS display flashes and changes colour...under certain well defined circumstances that requires a go around...under others it dictates a go around might be a bloody good idea.

'Stabilised approach' criteria, in well founded airline SOPs, dictate a whole raft of requirements that absolutely must be met by a minimum altitude or a Go Around is required. These criteria include IAS, ROD, configuration and spacial positioning all to be within narrow margins and checklists completed by 1000' in IMC or 500' in VMC. Of course these are limits not targets...you usually have all that in place earlier. Things can go pear shaped later in the approach and may well require a go around if, in the captain's judgement, the situation demands...most airlines would not question that decision unless it became a regular feature of that captains operation...go arounds are rare because of stabilised approach criteria...if an individual is doing them 'regularly' clearly there is an issue that needs addressing with some retraining in the sim.

Mention has been made in this thread to handflying core skills...sometimes heated mention. They are essential and the VAST majority of pilots do maintain appropriate skills whether by practice in the real aircraft when circumstances dictate it is appropriate or in the sim every 6 mths. As an aside my company has it's own sim and we are encouraged to go in our own time and practice and that practice is free. I would never contemplate fronting up to my 6 mthly recurrent without doing a couple of practice sessions in the weeks prior and before my recent command sim training my course mates and I all spent many hours in the sim getting our eye and muscle memory in in the LHS by practicing lots of engine failures and fires on takeoff and flying assymetric circuits in foul weather and with strong crosswinds. Sim training/practice is a helluva lot of fun actually.

That doesn't mean that core handflying skills remain a fixed skill set down through the ages. In my early airline career I was flying F28s in the tropics and the combination of a level of automation akin to that in my Bonanza and near universal non precision approaches only on our route network, with circling a regular feature in darkness/bad weather, meant our handflying skills were high indeed...it was a crapload of fun, but is also well recognised within the industry as relatively high risk.

In the 767 I fly these days that eventuality is so rare as to be vanishingly small and combined with incredible automation and system redundancy the requirement to actually handfly such an approach borders on non existant. We do practice them in the sim and we do fly them if required (virtually never) but we fly them via the A/P. It works just incredibly well and both pilots are freed up to monitor flightpath and a myriad of other things such that the risk is reduced enormously.

Some check pilots still demand levels of handflying skill along the lines of what Gnadenberg is suggesting. Certainly such exercises in the sim are beneficial but they should not be fail items on brand new FOs. Teach them how, release them to line, let them build skills over time, refresher training each 6 mths in the sim and when they are approaching command seniority levels/experience make it a scoreable event...but not before...and even then not at totally unrealistic levels of aircraft system degradation.

Automation is my best friend...turning it off for macho reasons is just stupid. When the weather is crap or ATC is bringing us in behind someone with minimal spacing is the time to leave it in. A handflown Go around in a widebody jet is a VERY busy event. One pilot is just flying and the other is doing EVERYTHING else..selecting modes, adjusting heading bugs, winding in altitude clearances, talking to ATC and trying to monitor the flying pilots performance to ensure tracking and climb performance is all optimal...and the likelyhood is high that your Go around will throw the ATC system into slight dissarray as you charge into areas where other aircraft are transitioning the terminal airspace to arrive or departing off adjacent runways...or at places like Dubai and London departing and arriving at adjacent airports.

Flown on the automagics it is a calm and straightforward exercise with both pilots freed up to monitor flight path and aircraft system performance and the division of duties far more evenly spread across the two pilots.

The days of the F27, F28, 727 etc are over for the most part...mainline training and skill sets should, and in most airlines do, reflect that. If a young pilot ends up flying old technology in a 'time warp' operation he should rejoice because he will learn some excellent skills...but if a young pilot never flies anything other than current generation aircraft thise skills are essentially not required so relax and challenge yourself to be good at the technology you're flying.:ok:

[J430]

CC
Your educational material is great reading yet again. Thank you.

I do think you might have missed my simplistic view though. With all the talk above about the landing distance available etc, and a wet/ contamintaed runway etc etc, my point was that when the book says you will sneek it in by say 1000' to 2000', that does not afford you the luxury of touch down at 1000-1500' feet, and in very trying conditions you may not get every thing you hoped for from the theoretical figures. So why risk it like they did in Toronto. Seems ok if the runway was wet and a slight tail wind component but when it was considerably worse, you dont have any margin up your sleeve. Hence my comment you can not rely on spot landing it in such conditions.

better to bug off somewhere nice for a cup of tea and try later perhaps.:ok:

J

[Gnadenburg]

< than normal factored LDR + a buffer for broken bits of the aeroplane and sundry family members.

So ALD x 1.67 x abnormal factor x your comfort%

So, in a dual HYD failure in an Airbus, with an abnormal multiple pushing or exceeding 2.5 to 3 depending on the model you have the following
4-5 X ALD X comfort%. The A340 ALD at the weight in the accident was 1155 nil TWC.

Airborne, you are now looking for a 4000-5000m strip? Without even adding your comfort factor! Edwards Air Force Base anybody??????

The actual landing distance is measured from 50ft above the runway surface until the aircraft comes tp the completestop.

This distance is measured during flight testing and represents the maximum aircraft performance. It is called LANDING DISTANCE WITHOUTAUTOBRAKE in the QRH. Should a failure occur inflight which requires the actual landing distancetobe multiplied by a factor, then the factor should be applied to the"LANDING DISTANCE WITHOUT AUTO BRAKE" configurationfull. Conversely, the AUTOLAND LANDING DISTANCE WITH AUTOBRAKE table available in the QRH gives a realistic indication of the aircraft performance during normal operations. Therefore, if a new-route diversion is required, and no landing distance factor is to be applied, the crew should refer tothistable.

[Chimbu chuckles]

The book figures include 1000' of air distance from overhead the threshold at 50' to touchdown at the 1000' point....so the ground braking portion doesn't start until then. Those figures for normal ops are then factored heavily as discussed above so if you do everything nearly right you actually do it quite easily even in foul conditions. Clearly as the starting point is fixed then any extreme variation in braking effect caused by a contaminated runway is taken care of to some extent by varying autobrake settings or if that doesn't do it you just need to be lighter when you touch down...hence you might hold and burn off fuel.

The autobrake has multiple settings with 1 being hardly noticeable and max auto being VERY noticeable and in reality just a little less than max manual. Max manual braking is quite literally BOTH pilots standing on the anchors as hard as they can. The antiskid system protects the wheels from aquaplanning or lockup...so braking is always optimal and this is dne by comparing wheel spin up/speed with IRS derived ground speed. The RTO (rejected takeoff) autobrake setting is akin to park brake with antiskid:E

Landing/RTO performance figures are certified without reverse thrust being used...so reverse thrust is a bonus. At lower/mid autobrake settings the autobrakes seek to achieve a rate of deceleration so applying reverse actually causes the brakes to release somewhat to achieve the same rate of deceleration thus saving the brakes...this is important on a quick turn around where brake energy doesn't have time to dissipate and can effect the next departure in terms of being able to meet rejected takeoff criteria.

When you do it nearly right the margins are quite large in transport category operations...where it gets scary is if you don't react to variations that effect the validity of the landing calculations.

In the case of the subject of this thread the crew can not have been aware of how marginal was there performance had become because of the contaminated runway...when they didn't react appropriately to the circumstances they found themselves in (unstable approach) on short finals those slim margins and a whole lot more besides went out the window and the overrrun was a forgone conclusion.

It is sorta understandable, but not excusable, because we all spend 99% of our arrivals in reasonable weather and really long runways..like 11000' plus.

In this case a contaminated 9000' runway didn't raise a red flag in the captains mind...it should have.

Had the approach been flown coupled (on A/P) with both pilots fully briefed and raised awareness of company SOPs stabilised approach requirements with the captain as the PF they almost assuredly would have arrived at 100' stabilised. If not hit the GA switches and fly a fully automatic GA and hold for better weather or divert. If everything is nicely within tolerances disconnect and land (or autoland if within autoland xwind limits) and the regulatory buffer easily takes care of any less than optimum handling on the part of the pilots...non of us are test pilots.

If you give the system half a chance it is actually pretty easy.

[Chimbu chuckles]

No Gnads i am not....all I am saying is that depending on the level of aircraft degradation 'suitable' gets a little interesting.

But lets look at it. A double hydraulic failure will leave you with only one thrust reverser and may leave you with degraded wheel brakes/antiskid...perhaps only accumulator pressure with paired wheels rather than all wheel antiskid protection.

If you have just taken off at MTOW in really foul weather (departure alternate required) how much runway do you think will GAURANTEE a safe landing? What if your departure alternate is 8- 9000' long (no problems most of the time) and wet?

It is absolutely abundantly clear that 'the good book' says "Plan to land at the nearest suitable airport" and that this must occurr as soon as possible.
I am not diverting to Edwards AF base or anything like it but in such a circumstance would you prefer your family was behind someone factoring effectively or just racing in and putting the aircraft down in circumstances that require test pilot performance levels?

In this situation I go into the QRH non normal landing graphs (for the specific non normal I have) and it gives me a reference distance plus additions and subtractions for all manner of things like wind, slope, weight above/below the reference weight, IAS above Vref etc.

That is great...but it doesn't have factors for a rough runway, rubber deposits that haven't been removed in living memory, pooling water and the fact that I might be having a bad day...or be at the end of a 14 hr duty period.

67% factoring may be appropriate on the day and I would argue a great starting point. 10% or 20% most often would not be.

Airline certification is all about gauranteed performance...I cannot just hope it will be ok I must be able to gaurantee, within reason, that it will be.

[haughtney1]

As an aside my company has it's own sim and we are encouraged to go in our own time and practice and that practice is free. I would never contemplate fronting up to my 6 mthly recurrent without doing a couple of practice sessions in the weeks prior and before my recent command sim training my course mates and I all spent many hours in the sim getting our eye and muscle memory in in the LHS by practicing lots of engine failures and fires on takeoff and flying assymetric circuits in foul weather and with strong crosswinds. Sim training/practice is a helluva lot of fun actually.


Ahh Chuck, if only my employer allowed that:8
We sold our 757/767 and A320 sim's back to Alteon:bored: Every 6 months its full on from the word go:{

[Centaurus]

Certainly such exercises in the sim are beneficial but they should not be fail items on brand new FOs
CC. Your posts are always worth reading and I for one greatly appreciate your dedication to the Pprune pages.
I am sure you will agree that those pilots legally qualified to be second in command of a passenger jet must be certified competent not only at monitoring the automatic pilot but also to demonstrate excellent handling skills. There must be no place on the flight deck for a second in command that is unable to hand fly the aircraft.

Granted, most flying in todays sophisticated jets is on automatic pilot from a few seconds after lift off, to a few seconds before touch down. Company policy in many airlines is that hand flying or even raw data flying is to be avoided unless absolutely necessary for the safety of the operation. The theory being the "dangerous" stuff such as hand flying is best left to recurrent simulator sessions.


The trouble is most simulator flying is taken up on just about everything else but raw data navigation and/or hand flying with no automatics. Even the autothrottle is left engaged. Accent in the simulator is on labour intensive LOFT or whatever is the latest fancy name, and instrument rating renewals are nothing more than full automation. Not much skill needed there.

It is rare to see circuits and landings, unusual attitude recovery practice, dark hole approach practice, strong crosswinds, short wet runways. Even a high altitude stall recovery is only for the endorsement and not practiced after that. The very skills needed to keep a second in command up to scratch with basic handling is simply disregarded. Most of the time recurrent simulator training is little more than a rehash of normal daily flying - perhaps with an engine failure thrown in to tick a box.


It is incumbent on the testing officer, whether he be a check captain or simulator instructor, not to lower the standards just because the newby is just a bum in the RH seat. Either the chap is qualified and certified competent to act as second in command of his big passenger jet or not. You cannot be just a little bit pregnant. You cannot have a second in command that is good at automatics but lacking at manual handling skills - and we all know that is an umcomfortable truth in many well known airlines.


The handling and automatics competency required of the crew should not be restricted to the bloke with the flashy hat and four gold bars. It follows in my book that failure to attain command standard competency in hand flying is enough to take the fellow from the RH seat (or the left seat) and either give him more training - or take a tough decision on his career.


Passengers and cabin crew are entitled to have a fully qualified and competent pair of pilots up front - one is the captain; the other ready to take over if the captain becomes impaired. If the second in command cannot demonstrate that he has the full gambit of skills required to hold a command endorsement - or a copilot endorsement, then flight safety is compromised.

[haughtney1]

The trouble is most simulator flying is taken up on just about everything else but raw data navigation and/or hand flying with no automatics. Even the autothrottle is left engaged. Accent in the simulator is on labour intensive LOFT or whatever is the latest fancy name, and instrument rating renewals are nothing more than full automation. Not much skill needed there.

Centaurus, that might be representative in OZ, but its not the case in JAR Ops land.
Everything other than a non-precision approach must be hand flown, raw data, FD's off.
There is a component of showing competency with the automatics ala SOP adherence, but the vast majority of jeopardy items are hand flown in manual thrust.
(the same in the 2 airlines I've worked for)

[Centaurus]

Last year I observed assessment tests of 12 pilots of different nationalities who were gathered together to see if they could get direct entry commands into a Japanese 737 operator. The sim checks were dead easy. CAVOK, wind calm - Take off, circuit and land. Then another take off, engine failure at V2, radar vector for ILS and land. Weather 500 ft cloud base, 3000 metres vis.

The catch? The assessing officers required raw data, and 75% of the flight hand flown. With two notable exceptions, the standard of flying accuracy of these experienced pilots was dismal. Without the availibility of the flight director and autothrottle, and autopilot these chaps were quite unable to fly within instrument rating tolerances most of the time in what was the easiest tests I have seen. All except one were given jobs, though.

No small wonder that airlines demand full use of automatics to keep the pilots from making fools of themselves.

So what is to be done about it? A big fat nothing, that's what. It's the way of the aviation world judging by many of the posts on Pprune.

[Gnadenburg]

A lot of good stuff has been missed in this thread reference the A340 overrun. If Chimbu's creation of the Airbus Industrie 767 confused you, don't despair, you aren't alone.

Lets go back- the approach WAS legal. Lets look at some of the information presented to the crew of the A340 and decide if you too would be lured into the approach. Then let's look at reactive procedures to the scenario- notably a late GA option or sound contaminated runway landing technique ( reversors are king etc ).

I believe, and will outline below, that the crew may not have been aware of a contaminated runway. But even so here are the actual landing distance ( ALD )figures- runway length is 2743, dry actual landing distance 1155, wet 1502, contaminated 1987.

Airbus ( company procedures may differ ) post-dispatch have NO requirement to apply the 1.67 dry, 1.92 wet, and 1.15 factors to dry ,wet and contaminated runways.The FAA recomendation stands that you x by 1.15 any airborne derived ALD's- this incidently a post-accident Airbus requirement and may address the confusion crews have with these concepts. But still, the approach is well within the bounds of legality.

The actual conditions and how they are presented to the crew important. An hour before touchdown, TS activity in the area and nothing untoward in terms of windspeed nor viz. Heavy rain but enough to deem the RWY contaminated???

The wind direction indicator is now knocked out- would you divert? Or rely on pilot reports or ATC estimates of W/V?

Running down the timeline, prior to approach commencement. Two preceding aircraft have landed and report the wind to be 15 knots gusting twenty. Braking action poor. A definitive indication of a contaminated runway? But as yet, no reports of TWC.

When the 340 landed, a possible gust front significantly changed the W/V, and in the flare a rain squall. The wind has increased significantly to 20 plus knots with gusts over 30- very late in the approach ( flare or short final by the looks of the report ) with heavy rain.

Think of time compression and the information presented. At this late stage, a GA could have saved the day. I feel that if the the wind rapidly backing to an increasing quartering TWC made things very tough- compounded by overshoot ( perhaps inevitable ) of the touchdown zone and late selction of reversors ( a decelaration not dependant on runway friction ).

There is a lot that can be taken from this incident.

[Dream Land]

accuracy of these experienced pilots was dismal Is this surprising to anyone? In the days when I flew the SA226 Metro, we had no autopilot, our skills were dead on, you have to use it or lose it.

[Chimbu chuckles]

Centaurus I would not attempt to argue that tradition skills are not degrading but is that a significant cause for concern?

I am not aware of any hull losses or loss of life where a captains innability to fly raw data, manual, non precision approaches was a contributory factor...let alone an FO's innability to do so.

There have been many cases where mode confusion/lack of core skills with automation did contribute to hull/life losses. The A320 at BAH, A320 in Germany, 757 in Cali etc.

As to your example of recent sim assessments...well I think the world has long since reached the point where (cheap) bums on seats is the major consideration...keeping aircraft in the air earning beans for the beancounters...sadly.

Don't get me wrong...I am a firm believer in core handling skills and feel blessed that the first 11000+ hrs of my career were in low technology aircraft, including jets, and that has left me with good core handling skills...not always been seen as a 'positive' by everyone with an influence on my career progression:rolleyes:

My company places lots of emphasis on automatics on the line and in the sim...but we also do a fair bit of handflying in the sim...including NPAs in crap weather with degraded aircraft handling/systems.

Given the system redundancy and route network I don't think I can fault their training emphasis. There has just NEVER been a real life example of a B767 being reduced to the technological equivalent of a 1975 C402.

The training budget at any airline is constrained by available resources...why emphasize the 100 million to 1 chance at the expense of not infrequent reality?

We get back to the beancounter 'real world' where if you fail every candidate for innability to cope with scenarios that are statistically insignificant then you soon run out of bums for your seats.

Personally I would LOVE to see that happen...the pilot shortage would all of a sudden become accute to the point of industry collapse but by god those pilots with solid, all round skills would be making a **** of a lot of money.:D :ok:

[Chimbu chuckles]

REQUIRED LANDING DISTANCE

MANUAL LANDING

Regulation defines the required landing distance as the actual landing distance divided by 0.6, assuming the surface is dry.
If the surface is wet, the required landing distance must be at least 115 % of that for a dry surface.

For JAR-OPS operators, if the surface is contaminated, the required landing distance must be at least the greater of the required landing distance on wet runway (see previous paragraph) and 115 % of the landing distance determined in accordance with approved contaminated landing distance data.

Gnadenberg the above is from one of donpizmeoff's earlier (Airbus) posts.

That would give, based on your 1155m dry or 1987m contaminated figures a RLD of 2285m...the greater of (1155/.6 x 1.15) or (1987 x 1.15)..at first glance seemingly acceptable.

The information available to the crew before commencing approach was;

9000 LDA- no overly long.
TS in area- possible Windshear?
Heavy rain- possible contaminated runway?
'Poor' reported braking action- Definately contaminated runway.
X wind component in excess of contaminated xwind limits (15 gusting 20 - aircraft limit 15kts)

We are all aware of the difference between legal and safe and that what is legal is not always safe and visa versa.

So with a mere 450m in reserve this crew commenced an approach to a runway they could reasonably expect was contaminated with a xwind component they knew was in excess of the aircraft limitations.

Legal? Safe?

I don't think so.

They then experienced significant deterioration on short finals...xwind now more like twice limit, windshear (reasonably predictable) and much heavier rain (not likely to make 'poor' reported braking action any better:hmm: ).

Things just got very illegal and terribly unsafe.

But they landed anyway and ran off the runway end at 79kts.

I think you're wrong to believe runway performance doesn't need full regulatory factors after dispatch in normal operations..and those regulatory factors are the absolute minimum...it is the captains right and absolute LEGAL responsibility to increase them as he deems fit given additional circumstances such as existed at Toronto.

Think of time compression and the information presented.

Sorry...most of the circumstances they found themselves in could be reasonably predicted to be factors possibly affecting their landing before they even commenced the approach. We get paid to think about these possibilites before they happen and react appropriately.

Heavy rain but enough to deem the RWY contaminated???

Absolutely...the defination of contaminated is 'significant areas of standing water, depth 3mm or greater' (paraphrase).

One of the numbers I keep stored in my head is 23000kg. That is the 'contaminated' RTOW reduction (3mm...its closer to 40000kg at 12mm) if I walk out of the crew room at my home port and a thunderstorm is dumping water all over our 11000' runway. If it starts pi$$ing down after I 'dispatch' (aircraft first moves under its own power) does my accelerate/stop performance magically no longer suffer on that rain contaminated runway?

If, as I did last night, I taxied out about 7000kg under MTOW (about 10000kg under performance limited RTOW) and it started pi$$ing down as I reached the holding point (happens from time to time) and I ignore it...and suffer a catastrophic failure 1 second before V1, reject, and charge off the end of the runway at 79kts would my performance be deemed legal? Would it be deemed safe? Would I remain in the employ of my company?

I, theoretically, took off at least 13000kg in excess of book figures for the conditions. If I killed people I would end up in jail.

To think the same does not apply landing at your destination is pure fantasy.

We get paid to take into account all factors that may effect our operation...not to be so lacking in foresight that one set of numbers override, or are immune from, mutitudinous other factors.

[amos2]

So, the egofest is over?...Thank goodness!!

[Centaurus]

I am not aware of any hull losses or loss of life where a captains innability to fly raw data, manual, non precision approaches was a contributory factor...let alone an FO's innability to do so.


Over the many years I have read hundreds of accident reports involving GA and jet transports. My memory is average in most matters involving aircraft accidents - especially those events where I have been personally involved in their investigation. But that said, there is no way I can pick out any one or more of these accidents from memory and say the cause was poor hand flying ability.

So the statement you make that: "not aware of any hull losses..where a captain's inability....was a contributory factor" is quite understandable. Your memory is like everyone else's on Pprune forums - fallible.

Few of us can waste time poring through the internet, trawling accident reports from magazines and libraries just to argue the point between poor hand flying and poor automatics management. But there is no doubt in my mind that pilot incompetence on hand flying ranks well up the scale in accident causes. Take it or leave it..

[Gnadenburg]

I am not aware of any hull losses or loss of life where a captains innability to fly raw data, manual, non precision approaches was a contributory factor...let alone an FO's innability to do so.

If you were familar with Airbus technology Chimbu you would retract that statement.

Whether it be a lack of raw data ability that lead to disorientation and hull loss- Gulf Air and Armavia ( ex- Ansett HYB )- or the inability to look through the 'glass' and crosscheck what can be confusing presentation of data- Air Inter.

[Chimbu chuckles]

I cannot present you with hard numbers Centaurus but that is what we are told by our training department.

I put a close mates son (50 hrs TT) in the LHS of my Bonanza the other day and took him for a fly...we spent most of the time doing steep turns, a much underated skill/scan builder, and with some instruction on scanning technique he went from +/- 500' to +/- 50' in a matter of minutes. Once I had him scanning outside-AH-outside-VSI-outside-AH-outside-VSI fast enough and making small corrections it all started to gell.

Much underated instrument is the old IVSI...even in a Boeing....but how do you put an old head on young shoulders?

Gnads...even in the Boeing I find myself, occasionally, looking 'through' the FD and flying it by basics.

[Gnadenburg]

Chimbu

You have some definitive but inaccurate opinions of Airbus Performance and I think that because of that, the 'good stuff' in this accident never gets the warranted discussion. Because you deflected the thread long ago with bold statements such as the approach was "never legal".

The Manual Landing requirements Don quotes are pre-dispatch requirements only. If he had published the next page and a half it would go on to explain that once airborne, in an abnormal scenario, a coefficient dependant upon the failure, must be applied to the Actual Landing Distance to determine the Required Landing Distance. There a few comments that follow, that consitute a hint in Franglais, that once airborne these pre-dispatch factors to ALD don't apply. Fair enough and subject to interpretation and as Don mentions, some operators apply these fully throughout the different flight stages- planning, airborne, diversion.

It was clear in the Airbus Instructors manual or Performance Engineering courses that the 1.67 dry, 1.92 wet and the contaminated 1.15 factor were pre-dispatch only as well. The trouble being, that many operators probably were not aware of the very dangerous limitations relying on absolute ALD's represented.

So, it evolved. The Airbus Flight Crew Training Manual went on to elaborate that once airborne these pre-flight factors need not apply. However, it took them a decade to realise the 'threat' of crews relying on ALD's airborne in a normal situation. So they now ask you to consider the Landing With Autobrake situation which factor ALD's in a normal scenario- about 40% from memory for dry, 10% wet. But well below those pre-flight requirements.

The further recent evolution has the following boldly labelled in the QRH- Airborne Refer To These Figures ( Autobrake ).PRE-FLT refer to FCOM ie: the regulatory figures you have confused the situation with.

I hope this clarifies Airbus procedures.

[pakeha-boy]

well boys.....between Gnads,chuckles J430 and centaurus.........I think you blokes have covered a lot of good ground ...depending on your view....in and out of the cockpit....

Sort of hard for any of "us" to make comment as "you" have fairly well covered most of anything worth saying about this situation.....

...it has made great reading and not gone to the sewer.....PB

[Gnadenburg]

Gnads...even in the Boeing I find myself, occasionally, looking 'through' the FD and flying it by basics.

Not doubting that Chimbu.

However, something has gone awry with Airbus and CFIT.

The Flight Path Vector caused a hull loss - and some anxious moments in transition from an NPA in the old days to the GA. The FPV would be rotated toward 15 degrees of pitch before a rapidly decaying airspeed would have crews realising they were pitching to 15 degrees body angle!

Crews come on to the Airbus and learn how to performance fly the FPV on a raw data ILS- a year after transition take it away from them and many struggle with elemental IF technique. This elemental IF technique will be required of them in 3 QRH procedures however many Airbus crews are lured in to the false sense of security that the bird never flies away!

Airbus evolved and protected crews from disorientating GA's in raw data because of confusing PFD presentations. As soon as TOGA activated, simple & conventional Flight Directors reinstate. I suspect this due the Gulf Air accident where an inability to transition to a raw data GA had a crew submit to somato gravic gyral & pitch ilusions and fly into the sea.

Last year an Armavia A320 did similar- gear down flap full, failure to transition to GA and flies in to the ocean.

Anecdotal of close calls of a number of airlines- what happend to the AirNZ A320 thread?

It's of my opinion, that Airbus has had some big problems. Instead of elemental raw data proficiency, or a confidence to transition from automation to raw data and vice versa, it relies on technological upgrades that sadly are generally preceded by hull loss.

As a postscript, I suspect Armavia didn't have a software upgrade enabling the automatic reinstaion of FD's on GA. I suspect the crew were endorsed on a simulator that did. Dark night, TOGA thrust, 180 degree turn, no lateral or vertical guidance from the expected FD presentation and .......... no raw data proficiency.

[Chimbu chuckles]

Interesting stuff Gnads.

The way I have always read this stuff is that normal ops are normal ops...and 'emergency' ops something else again when it comes to factored performance criteria.

I cannot fathom how any regulatory agency could possibly, knowingly, approve a system that says you will carry xyz factor at the planning stage and then once airborne pretty much anything goes.

The problem is that this stuff has a direct effect so rarely that we hardly ever give it a second thought...the average runway I operate off is 12000' long and some are more like 13000'. You just know you're covered and crank up the autobrake setting on the odd occassion when it is snowing/pissing down.

That doesn't remove the requirement for us to be extra carefull when things are more marginal.

We are not paid to fly around in a constant state of surprise.

'good stuff' in this accident never gets the warranted discussion.

Please go ahead!

As far as airbus v boeing...they are both certified to identical regulations...words may vary but the certification nuts and bolts are identical. I think the statement re regulatory factor (1.67) and normal ops I quoted earlier in the thread from the 767 QRH is fairly clear. It is inconceivable to me that the FAA would allow Airbus to meet less stringent requirements than Boeing.

Having said that it is pretty clear people read these statements and come up with different interpretations...sometimes I suspect because it can get 'inconveniant'.

[Chimbu chuckles]

I think I made a statement earlier in the thread that airbus' lack of intuitiveness was a worry to me...I have just heard too many horror stories that seem to be airbus specific. There is another that will come out soon that will make your skin crawl...but my lips are sealed.

That is one of the things I love about the 767...It is just a normal aeroplane that conforms to all my expectation/experience...plus a few neat gadgets...rather than a computer nerd's view of the world.

Just today I heard two stories of VERY experienced airbus pilots 'discovering' aspects of the computer programing they were never told about...one was simply embarrassing but resolved in cruise with no deviations...one resulted in serious retraining back in the sim when a manual go around went very badly askew.

[ScottyDoo]

Gnads, you and Chuck need to get a room... seriously.

[pakeha-boy]

CC...mate...Ill read your posts as they are obviously entertaining,and informative.....Ive flown the F-27/F28(1000 and 4000 models/B-727 Q100 model.....but mate!!!! it gets old listening to you kick Airbus pukes in the balls ......Ive heard many a boeing "scary story"(been there done that).....and the 11 yrs Ive flown the bus....it,s been a breeze....and thats the 319/320/321...your mates who tell you these storys are ether...

(1) bull****ting
(2)dont fly the bus
(3)love to "tell" a story
(4)dont know "how" to fly the bus
(5)..if its not boeing.,I,m not going
(6)cannot adapt to a different theory

I,m more that happy to listen to a "different" view.....in fact I,m as pro active as any body.....love to hear the other side.....

What annoys me the most is the inability of "others" to accept that many of us have no problems with bus techology....we understand and comprehend the bus mentality/........please dont let it obscure your obvious talent....

PB

[Gnadenburg]

Gnads, you and Chuck need to get a room... seriously.

You must be QF to suggest two grown men get a room together.

[4PW's]

Though this thread has not followed its title, it's been partly useful in that some of us may find inspiration to review our methods of calculating landing distances in-flight.

As a contribution, may I suggest anyone who initially, like me, felt overwhelmed by all the science being thrown around, mostly by a certain writer who categorically does not understand a particular airplane type, then simply go to your operations manual and re-study landing distances required.

Though you might be tempted to invoke your own interpretation and apply 1.67 to QRH derived figures in-flight, perhaps due to the insistent badgering being done here, my suggestion would be to pause and take a breath.

Follow your own SOPs, not someone else's.

Thankfully, the pot of Gnadenburg and Chuckles has gone off the boil.

It was not helpful reading detracting and unqualified statements about Airbus for the sake of making an argument as it reduced the usefulness of the crucial subject at hand, which is perhaps more important than the title of the thread.

[Gnadenburg]

It was not helpful reading detracting and unqualified statements about Airbus for the sake of making an argument as it reduced the usefulness of the crucial subject at hand, which is perhaps more important than the title of the thread.

Good point 4PW. Let's get back on topic because I suspect this accident has Airbus review it's landing distance calculations airborne.


QRH Landing Distance Without Autobrake

Note- The Above Distances Are Given For Use In Flight

Before Departure Refer FCOM

Confusion could arise by the fact that this bold QRH statement is only tabelled under the LDG Without Autobrake figures and not the LDG With Autobrake figures which have inbuilt factoring.

I would suggest people confused here read FCOM 2, FCTM Abnormals and have a look at the QRH.

I would go as far to say that these small details have been amended post-340 overrun.

[Chimbu chuckles]

Thanks for taking the heat off me Ey777:}

4PW, how is it going mate? :ok:

I find it fascinating that people consider conducting an approach and landing in conditions which exceed limitations (seemingly) legal let alone acceptable.

I also find it fascinating that my opinion on a particular aircraft type, based on opinion expressed by close friends who have been flying them for up to 10 years, illicites such defensive and vitriolic responces.

Have we lost the ability to debate a topic rationally? It seems so when the opposing view is deemed to be unstateable as opposed to simply a different, but equally valuable opinion.

I have stated often enough in this thread that I don't view it as Airbus v Boeing...they are identical when it comes to performance certification. In other aspects of operation I have expressed a negative opinion on airbus, that is my democratic right...but lets leave it for another time.

Someone answer me these questions;

Why/how was the approach legal...was it safe?

Why/how was the landing legal, was it safe?

How do you justify not using regulatory factoring in normal ops post dispatch...is that safe?

Can we have a robust, open minded, professional, intellectually stimulating discussion where we accept the validity of opinions we may not agree with?

[Gnadenburg]

The NTSB prelim' report is essential reading for those who wish to continue this discussion. Google A340 overrun wikpedia and there is a link to it.

It gives a good outline of WX and landing distances.

To me, it paints a pretty different picture of events to what many believe here.

Not condoning any mismanagement or poor decision making, but as per usual it's hardly an accident that can be dismissed as a black & white set of events- nor one where a strong command gradient would have saved the day.

For posterity, there is a lot of good sh&t in this accident. A brush up of Airbus performance and limitations may be warranted though. ;)

[Chimbu chuckles]

A METAR (weather observation) for the Pearson Airport was released almost exactly at the time of the accident. It stated that the weather at 20:04 UTC (16:04 EDT) consisted of winds from 340° true (north-northwest) at 24 knots (44 km/h) gusting to 33 knots (61 km/h), with 1 1/4 statute miles (2 km) visibility in heavy thunderstorms and rain. The ceiling was overcast at 4,500 feet (1,400 m) above ground level with towering cumulus cloud. The temperature was 23 °C (74 °F). According to the Canada Air Pilot, runway 24L has a heading of 227° true (237° magnetic),

Additionally from the report the unfactored LDR was 6614' (LDA 9000') for contaminated conditions and they actually touched down 4000' into the runway at Vref+ 8 kts. That would indicate they were going a crap load faster over the threshold.

There is mention of the wind instruments being knocked out by lightning prior to the approach and the pilots of two aircraft who landed immediately prior reported 'poor' ('poor' is defined in my QRH as equivalent of braking on wet ice) braking action and estimated crosswinds at 15 gusting 20kts.

The METAR, released at the time of the accident) indicates a 21kt average xwind component (Maximum closer to 30kts) and 5kt average tailwind component, maximum closer to 10kts. I accept that crew may not be in receipt of this METAR on approach but they were in receipt of previous pilot reports and they would have system derived wind vector (direction and magnitude) information available from on board systems as they flew the approach. Not to mention their weather radar showing multiple TS cells around the airport environs...reported lightning strikes etc.

I have seen no information (I might have missed it) that indicates they discussed holding or actually held prior to commencing the approach when they clearly had the fuel to do so.

Fuel on board indicates 3000kg available over and above the 4500kg required to divert to Ottawa. What holding time does that equate to in a A343? Met reports indicate weather improved markedly in less than 1 hour after the accident with wind backing around to the south and general improvement in vis, reduced rain etc. Ts are generally not long lived systems.

The decision making process, or lack thereof, post minima we have discussed to death. Once they touched down there was simply no possibility of stopping the aircraft on the runway.

I am interested in hearing how the rest of you think you would react given the known information available to the crew.

Would you be happy with the available runway length given the conditions?

Do you feel xwind limitations are limits or a helpfull guide?

The CBC reported that the crash occurred two hours after operations at the airport were grounded because of severe thunderstorms in the area ("red alert" status). Visibility at the time of the accident was reported to be very poor. There was lightning, strong gusty winds, and hail at the time and the rain just began as the plane was landing.....A severe thunderstorm warning was in effect since 11:30 a.m. and all outbound flights and ground servicing operations had been canceled but landings were still permitted.

[Centaurus]

The old English phrase of "Press on regardless" fits so many aircraft accident scenarios.

[Chimbu chuckles]

I forgot to add in my last post that in the airline I work for, and those I have worked for in the past, operations are expressly forbidden in conditions of 'poor' reported braking action. That doesn't mean you might not be the first poor sap to report those conditions exist...but that doesn't apply in this case does it?

I have no idea what it states in relation to this in AF's Operations Manual....but I could take a guess.:ouch:

Honest question.

If your company ops manual expressly forbids such are you 'breaking the law' by doing so or are you simply being a little silly?

How would it be interpreted in court?

In my opinion, as the ops manual forms part of the legally required documentation that defines how an airline exercises the priveledges of it's AOC, the act of ignoring such directives makes the operation illegal.

I am open to counterviews.:ok:

[EY777]

No worries Chimbu Chuckles, glad this interesting topic was put back on track by the moderators :D :ok:

[pakeha-boy]

CC.....I think you would be hard pressed to find anyone who would disagree with the logic.

CYYZ has 5 Rwys 2 @11000ft/3368m/3@ 9000ft/2770m....I fly into CYYR at least once a month and it is a very well run Airport, they are a little crazy about noise abatement procedures but other than that this is a top operation

The ground information (10-7) for arrival considerations,highlights the fact that..."Anticpate ldg 05/23 and 6R/24L in crosswinds up to 25kts @90 degrees"...also
"The climate of Toronto is influenced by its location with respect to Major Storm Tracks and the great lakes."...

I bring this up as these conditions are fairly routine operating conditions for those who fly into this airport

Based on what Ive read,and the condtions that existed at their time of arrival,your point CC , about company Ops Specs would have made it illegal for our company to even think of contemplating the approach .

Would be handy to know this companys SOP,s governing these conditions,and whether they were able to maintain the companys profile.
Certainly dont want to play the monday halfback.......but the decision to execute this app with the conditons that existed would raise eyebrows from most who are familiar with these conditions.....

[4PW's]

Very well thank you, Chuckles.

I'm pleased to report the hotel in Mumbai as perfectly adequate. It also has a connection, so here is my paltry reply. Must be brief though. Hark, the call to breakfast, and all that...

I, like many others, enjoy these threads because I always seem to learn something. You've brought more to this subject than any other contributor; don't doubt that.

No one is advocating a cessation of any sort of discussion, on any subject, but for attacks on worthless issues like Airbus vs Boeing, or one poster attacking the opinions of another.

My contribution is simply that LDR aloft is not 1.67 times the figure derived from the QRH in normal or non-normal conditions. More on that later perhaps, though if the Airplane Flight Manual figures are assessed (the figures where manual braking is used, not autobrakes...vague, perhaps, but I don't have the AFM with me, though I was reviewing it for this post when the need to divert arose) it can be seen the figure for LDR is very close to that of the QRH derived figure multiplied by a factor of 1.15.

Which is why the company manual advises factoring the QRH by 1.15 for LDR aloft.

[Dream Land]

How would it be interpreted in court?
A great point, mentioned by Wino on many occasions. :ok:

[4PW's]

Chuckles, I'm no legal specialist so I've little to offer.

Notwithstanding my lack of legal training, it seems to me you're making a very big call saying these guys acted illegally.

In effect, to say this is to infer they wilfully committed a violation, that is to say they did not err, but wilfully violated a law, in this case their SOPs for landing on a contaminated runway.

Do you know this for sure?

On the subject of AFM vs QRH landing distances required, the airline I'm fortunate enough to work for is a world leader in many respects. The safety department is significant, as is the company's performance department.

I'll ask for further guidance in due course, but our Ops Manual is very clear on what to do with QRH figures when assessing a landing, any landing, be it normal or non-normal. Nowhere is it suggested we factor the QRH by 1.67 and to suggest one does so is to go outside the company recommendations, which is in itself questionable.

A review of the e-manuals on my laptop shows:

1) AFM LDR using max manual braking at sea level, 0' PA, nil wind, dry runway @ 300000kg LW = 7300'. This is factored by 1.67, so Boeing's unfactored landing was 4380'.

2) QRH LDR using autobrakes 4 at sea level, 0' PA, nil wind, dry runway @ 300000kg LW = 6350'. Conversely, this is unfactored. If factored by 1.15 the figure is 7303'.

Not the differences, specifically the max manual braking versus autobraking, and when the numbers are factored or unfactored.

Hope this helps others to find a reason to read their own Company Operations Manuals, compare their own AFM derived figures to their own QRH Performance Inflight figures, marry the lot against SOPs and determine which runways and under what conditions you may or may not attempt a landing.

[Gnadenburg]

4PW

If your company has the Airbus FCTM this may be valid for you-


Conversely, the AUTOLAND LANDING DISTANCE WITH AUTOBRAKE table available in the QRH gives a realistic indication of the aircraft performance during normal operations. Therefore, if an en-route diversion is required, and no landing distance factor is to be applied, the crew should refer to this table.

The reason I mention this is the tables above a have higher than a 15% factor that you may be applying to LDG Dist Without Auotbrake ( despite SOP's ).

[Gnadenburg]

People are quoting the METAR at the time of the crash!

I have been trying to make the following point- what information was presented to the crew at the time of the accident?

WX: W/V 50 degrees off the RWY at 15KTS gusting 20KTS. This is well within limits. Now, two preceding aircraft landed ahead and reported POOR braking action. PLEASE lets stick to Airbus here- as per FCOM 2 POOR braking is used to restrict X-W operational limits. This needs to now be considered. For Boeing drivers, POOR Braking is not an ice runway equivalent- it is dry snow or standing water on an Airbus and is predominantly ( possibly entirely but don't have manuals ) used to reduce XW limits

So, you have the legally required ALD 1987m contaminated unfactored versus 2743m available. Now Airbus tells you to use the Autoland With Autobrake to derive realistic factored ALD figures and from memory these figures are padded by around 15% for a contaminated runway.

XW Limitation at approach commencement would appear to be in limits even when you reduce it by the mandatory factor because of reported POOR Braking.

You have no W/W indication from the Tower so are reliant on the pilot reports and your IRS derived readout on approach.

But......................... the NTSB Prelim report says

At about the time the aircraft landed a sharp boundary of rain with a moving TS associated wind changes and gusts

So it wasn't until the last stages of the approach and possibly the flare that the conditions become 1) possibly illegal 2) extremely perilous.

The fact the aircraft overshot the touchdown zone could even suggest overshoot sheer on short finals and the flare.

Which returns me to my original point that a low level GA may have been the only way to save the day.

And a footnote. In clutter, heavy rain and in a terminal area close to the ground I personally find Airbus radars to be overly sensitive. Point being the radar picture may not have been clear.

[Chimbu chuckles]

4PWs...Mumbai? Mate you have all the luck:E

My Boeing QRH is specific in the Performance in Flight preamble where it states that the landing distance figures are not factored and cannot be used for dispatch purposes. It is also specific when it refers to "poor" braking performance...and I quote 'The performance level used to calculate "poor" data reflects runways covered with wet ice'...further on..'Use of the autobrake system commands the airplane to a constant deceleration rate. In some conditions, such as a runway with "poor" braking action, the airplane may not be able to achieve these deceleration rates.'

My bolding.

We are all well aware that in the normal course of events our takeoff and landing distances are factored. We are simply not allowed to use runways that don't meet certain factored performance criteria. In normal operations what changes once we are airborne?...I have never seen any guidance EVER that suggests that regulatory requirement changes airborne unless in an emergency situation...where it becomes very much more nebulus.

Typically, in non normal ops, you get a different version of 'reasonable' from every trainer...anything from 20% to "just double the numbers..after all we need 67% in normal ops".

The AF crew were not experiencing any non normals that would give them relief from regulatory factors which are defined, as posted by Donpizzmeoff, as /.6 for dry, /.6 and x 1.15 wet and contaminated x 1.15.

Interestingly the dry and wet factoring is actually slightly more restrictive than the Boeing equivalent 1.67. Also very interesting that Gnads suggests
Airbus might have already revisited these factors, as a result of this accident, and their use...I think the factoring of contaminated by only 15% is something less than conservative....bordering on wishfull thinking in fact.

As far as landing in "poor" braking conditions I am yet to read an Ops manual which allows it...ever...I accept that ops manuals do exist that don't give specific direction on this matter but I would be very surprised if a company like AF has such an ops manual. "Poor" reported braking is rolling a dice...might be ok most of the time but often it won't be and that is just not the way Transport Cat works. The aircraft system redundancy and our training reflect circumstances in the 'millions to 1' category...why do that then just toss a coin when it comes to landing?

Boeing are being quite up front with the use of may not from the QRH quote above...they just don't know. How do you factor that?

Hence Ops manuals that expressly forbid ops in "poor".

Of course a pilot report of "poor" is a very subjective thing...but the word has still been used...my feeling is ignore it at your peril.

I see nothing in the circumstances surrounding this accident that would allow me to leave the holding pattern.

[Gnadenburg]

Chimbu

Nobody gives a stuff about the Boeing performance figures. They are very different and your continued regurgitation of them here has done a great disservice to this discussion.

I have repeatedly told you how it is; quoting from the FCOM, QRH & FCTM. I have also politely pointed out too, that Don's Airbus quotes that you use as credence for your arguments, are in fact, only half of the info provided. Then it was explained that their is a different classification of POOR braking by Airbus and Boeing due certification differences.

You have stated on occassions that what I am saying is rubbish which is gross arrogance.

I can not help that you can't get it around your head that Airbus & Boeing are different. In certification and performance.

Why is it so? Post FAR 42? Airbus defined hard and fluid contaminants? The allowance for Airbus because as a FBW aircraft it's lowest selectable speed is less than Boeing? Airbus uses temperature for ALD's on contaminated runway and has inherent conservatism?

I don't know.

You have stated you would never have left the Holding Pattern in your Boeing. So what are you learning here?

[ScottyDoo]

Wasn't this thread originally a tale about what happens if you leave an FO to do the landing in ratsh!t conditions???

Not that we would, in the civilised world, but it was a nice tale anyway.

So what's with all the willy-waving here about regs and performance? Is it worth me reading the last dozen pages or so? Am I missing anything?

Is centaurus still in the game here? I see he started a new thread on the same topic... maybe he got tired of all the above macho muchachos... :rolleyes:

[Chimbu chuckles]

Name of thread: Your landing or mine - the captain's ultimate responsibility.

Airbus mentioned nowhere in name of thread.

Airbus crash used as thread starting point...average intellect would suggest a starting point is just that.

Lots of the huggy fluffy CRM brigade suggest accidents have many contributing factors and would suggest this one is no different...suggestion even that the report has/will find no one person at fault...not even the captain who's vocabulary seems to lack the phrases "I think we will hold a while" or "Go around":rolleyes:

Some accidents are the PIC's fault and there are pilots flying that shouldn't be in command of a kite.

I Was discussing this accident, and thread, with a Airbus 330/340 captain mate here in DXB today, yes amos2 I am on a long haul.

His reaction to the LDA at Toronto was "**** that is short" given the conditions that existed.

His view of the airbus statutory factoring situation is pretty much as reported in this thread...but "You'd be crazy if that was all you ever used" ...an airbus captain who wouldn't have left the holding pattern under the circumstances that prevailed, let alone landed half way down the runway:ugh:

Ego amos2...or basic airmanship?

Scotty what part of performance and command responsibilities can be described as macho willy waving?

[J430]

You have stated you would never have left the Holding Pattern in your Boeing. So what are you learning here?

I know what I learnt here, if its that bad, never leave the holding pattern, divert or in the least go around and divert. They bent a perfectly servicable A340 instead.:uhoh:

J:ok:

[Gnadenburg]

I know what I learnt here, if its that bad, never leave the holding pattern, divert or in the least go around and divert. They bent a perfectly servicable A340 instead.

Two aircraft preceding the A340 landed ahead. There were two aircraft stacked up and one on approach behind- KLM.

Doesn't this tell you something? A point I have been trying to make the whole thread. The actual weather conditions didn't deteriorate until very late in the approach. They had HWC and acceptable XWC right to the late final position- and then it looks like all hell broke loose with a huge backing of the wind, overshoot sheer and a sharp boundary of rain.

Iif some here have the foresight to never leave the pattern than further discussion unneccessary.

[Gnadenburg]

Despite Chimbu's endless sources of Airbus "mates" telling contributors here they are talking rubbish, he has found one in Dubai that points out that oils ain't oils in Boeing versus Airbus performance.

But of course, the new Airbus mate gives total credence to Chimbu's line of argument, discussion or willy waving.

My mate Neil Armstrong said he probably would have left the holding pattern with the conditions as presented. He said that he wouldn't want to explain to the Mission Controller, that despite all performance criteria being met and factored as per realistic operational Airbus requirements- Autoland with Medium Autobrake on a contaminated surface, he didn't want to commence the approach because if you factor as per a Boeing and with your personal comfort factor it looks awfully uncomfortable.

Neil said he would have taken over the approach- " I have control". Poor autothrust lag would have been his first clue that conditions deteriorating. Backing wind, overshooting the glideslope and an increaesing Vapp Neil reckoned he was out of there- " GA Flaps......"

If actual winshear conditions, Neil would have maintained his configuration and politely slapped the co-pilot's hand as he reached for the flap lever. Like Chimbu, he feels CRM fluffy and duffy.

The bloody great cell on the missed approach path was another story....

I won't contribute further here. With mates like Neil Armstrong, you people know nothing. :ugh:

[J430]

They had HWC and acceptable XWC right to the late final position- and then it looks like all hell broke loose

Well that would indicate a good time to

in the least go around and divert.

I am not qualified to comment about A340's and B767's and not getting involved in willy waving as you call it, but really this is a clear case of get the heck outa here if all hell broke loose wouldn't you say!

J:ok:

[amos2]

With a moderator participating in this thread, and censoring posts, why are we wasting our time? :hmm:

[Chimbu chuckles]

There is no moderator participating in this thread as far as I can see...what posts have been moderated?

Gnads ok if it makes you feel better I will endevour to live my life in a vacuum and not ask mates flying other equipment anything at all...in fact I will insist that when we get together over beers we do not discuss our work in any way shape or form...as to learning from others different experience I will stop hence forth.

That meet with your approval?

Clearly in your view airbus are different, better and, apparently, immune from the laws of physics.

amos 2 do you have anything to add to this subject besides 'pithy' one liners?